Russian special forces weapons

    • [PDF File]RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS IN THE ‘‘GRAY ...

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      thoughts on the need to strengthen the capabilities in our special operations forces which may have understandably atrophied after over a decade focused on direct action counterterrorism missions. The Russian influence campaign and unconventional warfare ef-forts in Ukraine contain all the hallmarks of the gray zone oper-


    • Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities - Congress

      The Russian military’s tier-one Special Forces unit is the Special Operations Forces Command, built around the 346th Independent Spetsnaz Brigade. This unit was modeled on Western Special Forces and represents Russia’s most capable intervention force. Airborne and Air Assault Troops Russia’s airborne and air assault troops represent some of


    • Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry - Congress

      Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry Congressional Research Service 2 flexible financing options, such as loans with favorable terms.10 Finally, in contrast to U.S. arms exports, Russia generally exports weapons regardless of a country’s human rights record or


    • [PDF File]Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group

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      to administer the same geographical region. Although Russian intelligence, special-forces and small artillery units had supported separatist militias since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, regular forces organized as BTGs were not committed until Ukrainian tactical success in July and August threatened to completely defeat the separatists,


    • [PDF File]Russia’s “Ambiguous Warfare” and Implications for the U.S. Marine Corps

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      participants discussed the structure of the Russian military generally, as well as its special forces (the Spetsnaz) specifically. Russia’s armed forces At our event, one expert who has studied the Russian military extensively commented that nuclear weapons still play a central role in Russia’s strategic thinking.


    • [PDF File]Russian Combat Capabilities for 2020: Three Developments to Track

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      United States in regard to air and special operations. Several points merit special attention for the West to follow, to include Russian preemption capabilities and new methods to deter (scare) adversaries with advanced weapon capabilities. Gerasimov’s AMS address noted that Russia’s overall “strategy of active defense” is a set of


    • [PDF File]Russian intelligence services and special forces

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      Spetsnaz are Russian special forces. They are trained in fighting but also in intelligence work and are attached to various military forces. The GRU has its own spetsnaz forces. Spetsnaz have been involved in conflicts including Afghanistan, Ukraine and Syria. While the Kremlin seems to be pushing political intervention in rival states as a ...


    • [PDF File]Version of Spetsnaz GRU - Self-defense with knife - Rage University

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      Special Forces of the MAIN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT of the General Staff of the Russian (former Soviet) Army (or, in an abbreviated form, "Spetsnaz GRU") are intended for conducting secret combat operations at the rear of the enemy. Missions carried out by SPETSNAZ troops determine special character and basic lines of SPETSNAZ COMBAT training.


    • [PDF File]Trends in Russia’s Armed Forces - RAND Corporation

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      tiatives that span all of the Russian armed forces’ services and indepen - dent branches. The report touches on most of Russia’s armed forces’ major capabilities, by service or domain, but it is not comprehensive. ... a focus on readiness, organization, fielding modernized weapons, and updating tactics and doctrine. After the 1998 ...


    • [PDF File]The Russian Way of Warfare - DTIC

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      defensive systems and strike weapons with extended ranges. These extended ranges would also provide operational advantages to Russian forces conducting offensive operations near its borders. 3. Given Russia’s conventional weaknesses in a protracted war with a peer or near-peer adversary, it will attempt to use


    • Information Weapons: Russia’s Nonnuclear Strategic Weapons of Choice

      As a result, Iwes have become non-nuclear strategic weapons of choice. This article will exam-ine several Russian views of IWes that cover these aspects, beginning with the bigger picture of IWes as strategic weapons. That discussion is followed by an overview of the Russian military literature that has addressed IWes over the past two decades.


    • [PDF File]Russia - The Heritage Foundation

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      l Among the key weapons in Russia’s in-ventory are 336 intercontinental ballistic ... mand of Russian Special Forces. It has used such volunteers in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine


    • [PDF File]INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK - Public Intelligence

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      weapons in the non-Russian republics or return them to Russia.2 The issue of conventional mili - tary forces was much more problematic. Forces returning from Eastern Europe had to be rein-tegrated into the new Russian military, while F Kremlin Guards in 2017. Military power has always been regarded as of critical importance by Russian and


    • [PDF File]Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” - RAND Corporation

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      launched the debate over Russian “hybrid strategies.” The annexation of Crimea relied heavily on the now-infamous “little green men”—primarily Russian special forces operating through a newly created Russian special operations command. The use of these elite troops, in conjunction with an information warfare campaign and the deployment of


    • [PDF File]234205 RUSSIAN NEW GENERATION WARFARE HANDBOOK - Public Intelligence

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      RUSSIAN NEW GENERATION WARFARE HANDBOOK Version 1: December 2016 A handbook for U.S. Army formations to increase awareness of Russian tactics, near-peer capabilities, and current U.S. non-material solutions to mitigate the threat posed by Russian proxies. UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


    • [PDF File]Russia’s Forms and Methods of Military Operations

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      30 May-June 2018 MILITR REVIEW Russia’s Forms and Methods of Military Operations The Implementers of Concepts Lt. Col. Timothy Thomas, U.S. Army, Retired General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (front), chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and Russia’s first deputy defense minister, and Nikolai Pankov (left), Russia’s deputy defense minister, attend a reception 9 May 2015 ...


    • [PDF File]Russian Special Forces and Intelligence Information Effects

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      weapons).10 These efforts also involved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA) and Directorate K of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).11 Professor Igor Panarin of the MFA’s Diplomatic Academy is the author of one of the standard works on Russian theory of information war.12 In his text, Panarin advocates “using the


    • [PDF File]Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements

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      Forecasting must assess the impact on the nature of war from weapons based on new physical principles. The speed of cyber operations indicates that forces must be prepared now for the initial period of war (IPW). Planning tomorrow for a surprise attack is more than a day late, as the cyber IPW may result in the conflict’s end before it starts.


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