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THE FOLLOWING CASES WILL BE COVERED ON THE MID-TERM EXAM BRADY v U.S.: plea bargaining is legal as long as an attorney is present to protect the defendant's rights, the plea is voluntarily made, and the defendant has a full knowledge of the consequences CARROLL v U.S.: police may stop and search a potentially mobile motor vehicle without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is carrying individuals or articles that offend the law COLORADO v BERTINE: a vehicle that has been impounded by police officials can be searched in its entirety; all items found in any part of the vehicle, including closed and locked items, may be searched D.C. v HELLER: the 2nd Amendment protects the right of individuals to possess a firearm for personal use; specifically, there is a Constitutional right to keep a handgun in the home for self defense DELAWARE v PROUSE: police may conduct brief, scientifically random, suspicion-less/no-causelimited scope searches of motorists at fixed roadside checkpoints looking primary for drunk drivers DUNCAN v LOUISIANA: defendants have the right to trial by jury if the potential sentence is more than six months of incarceration (see also Baldwin v New York) ELKINS v U.S. (Exclusionary Rule applied to the federal courts): evidence that is unlawfully seized by any official cannot be used in federal court FLORIDA v BOSTICK: randomized consent searches of individuals who are on public transportation is acceptable, even though such searches carrysome degree of implied coercion and are not truly voluntary;the governing test is whether a reasonable person feels freeto decline an officer's request to search HARRIS v U.S. (plain view doctrine): if the officer is legally present, the offending objects are in plain view, and the incriminating nature is readily apparent, the items may be seized without a warrant ILLINOIS v GATES (totality of the circumstances test): taken piecemeal, the evidence may not amount to probable cause, but if the evidence reaches the probable cause level when considered as a whole, the legal standard of proof for a search has been met ILLINOIS v RODRIGUEZ (apparent authority doctrine): if consent to search is given by someone who does not have the authority to do so, but the police reasonably believed they did, the evidence is still admissible in court MAPP v OHIO (Exclusionary Rule applied to the state courts): evidence unlawfully seized is inadmissible in state courts MARYLAND v BUIE: officers may search the suspect and the adjoining space region incident to a lawful arrest; if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that there is hidden danger present, officers may conduct a protective sweep of the area, but it is only to be a cursory search for people and may last no longer than it takes to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger MASSACHUSETTS v SHEPPARD (good faith exemption): evidence seized by reasonably well-trained officers acting in good faith, is admissible, even if the seizure technically violated the law NIX v WILLIAMS (inevitable discovery exemption): evidence that was illegally seized may be used in court if it can be shown that it would have inevitably been discovered REVES v ERNST AND YOUNG: liability under RICO requires some primary participation in the operation and/or management of the criminal enterprise ROCHIN v CALIFORNIA: a search cannot be exploratory, it cannot be unreasonable, and it cannot shock the conscience SINGER v U.S.: defendants have no Constitutional right to waive a jury trial STACK v BOYLE (failure to appear test): bail may be denied if there is probable cause to believe that defendants will fail to appear at future judicial proceedings TAYLOR v TAINTOR: bail bond agents may use physical force to apprehend and subsequently hold and transport their bondees who have skipped bail, as long as the force used is reasonably related to the custody and/or transportation of the bondees U.S. v 92 BUENA VISTA AVENUE: assets forfeited under RICO are limited to those that were gained from and/or used in the criminal enterprise U.S. v JAMES DANIEL GOOD: civil forfeitures under RICO are not automatic; they require a separate civil proceeding U.S. v HAVENS: illegally seized evidence can be used to impeach a witnesses courtroom testimony U.S. v LEON (good faith exemption): evidence seized by reasonably well- trained officers acting in good faith, is admissible, even if the seizure technically violated the law U.S. v ROSS: if there is probable cause to believe that a potentially mobile motor vehicle is carrying individuals or articles that offend the law, an officer may stop that vehicle and search every occupant of the vehicle, every part of the vehicle, and all of the contents found in the vehicle without a warrant, but, a ROSS-type search is justified only if probable cause arises regarding a non-traffic offense violation U.S. v SALERNO (dangerousness test): bail may be denied if there is clear and convincing evidence that defendant are dangerous and pose a threat to the community at large and the court participants in particular WEEKS v U.S.: evidence illegally seized by a federal official cannot be used in federal court WILSON v ARKANSAS: even when armed with a warrant, the police generally must "knock and announce" before entering a home IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE NOTED CASES, THE FINAL EXAM WILL ALSO COVER THE FOLLOWING CASES: ARIZONA v FULMINANTE: the erroneous admission of a coerced confession at trial does not constitute grounds for an automatic mistrial; in some cases, an involuntary confession can be taken and legally admitted as evidence; the totality of the circumstances is to be considered (see also Illinois v Gates) ATKINS v VIRGINIA: capital punishment is not a suitable penalty for mentally retarded defendants; such a penalty is excessive, wheninvolving mentally retarded defendants CALIFORNIA v GREENWOOD: garbage containers outside of the curtilage of the home are considered abandoned and may be searched without a warrant and without cause CALIFORNIA v HODARI D.: evidence discarded by an individual fleeing from the police is admissible in court, even if the police had no advance cause to focus attention upon the person who discarded the material EDWARDS v ARIZONA: once suspects in police custody invoke their right to counsel, law enforcement officials must cease their questioning with regard to the current case and any other case, until counsel is present, even if the suspect later agrees to talk without an attorney present ESCOBEDO v ILLINOIS: the right to counsel begins at the point of focus FLORIDA v ROYER: reasonable suspicion can be used as the basis for investigative searches and seizures in situations involving pre-eminent public interests; specifically, reasonable suspicion is the standard to be used to allow investigatory searches of individuals (passengers or non-passengers) on airport grounds FURMAN v GEORGIA: the death penalty is not being administered equitably GAGNON v SCARPELLI: probationers have the right to an attorney at probation revocation hearings GIDEON v WAINWRIGHT: indigents have the right to a legal counsel during the trial stage; the state will appoint an attorney to the case if the individual cannot afford one GREGG v GEORGIA: allows the death penalty to be administered as long as the capital sentence is not mandatory, aggravating and mitigating circumstances are considered, and a bifurcated proceeding is utilized(i.e., different judges determine guilt and sentence) HERRERA v COLLINS: newly discovered evidence demonstrating the actual innocence of the person sentenced to death does not provide automatic habeas corpus relief IN RE GAULT: juvenile court proceedings must possess the elements of basic fundamental fairness; juveniles have the right to a proper hearing, to have an advance notification of that hearing and its purpose, the right to be present at the hearing, the right to confront/cross examine the accuser, the right to present evidence on your own behalf, the right to be represented by legal counsel at the hearing, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a formal ruling based on information presented in court, and the right to an appeal IN RE WINSHIP: the standard proof in a juvenile court adjudication is beyond a reasonable doubt McCLESKEY v KEMP: specific intent to discriminate against an individual must be demonstrated before that individual's death sentence can be set aside; intent over impact McCLESKEY v ZANT: defendants are entitled to a limited number of habeas appeals in capital cases McKEIVER v PENNSYLVANIA: there is no right to a jury trial for juveniles being adjudicated in juvenile court MICHIGAN v HARVEY: an illegally obtained confession can be used to impeach adefendant's testimony at trial MILLER v ALABAMA: the sentence of mandatory life without parole cannot be imposed on juveniles (those who were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense). MIRANDA v ARIZONA: suspects must be informed of their basic rights at the point of arrest, particularly the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during any interrogations; confessions must meet the tests of voluntariness and awareness MORRISSEY v BREWER: parolees have no right to legal counsel at parole revocation hearings NEW JERSEY v TLO: reasonable suspicion is the standard to be used by public school officials to conduct searches on public school grounds of individuals who may be violating either the law or school rules ROPER v SIMMONS: the death penalty cannot be imposed on juveniles (those who were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense) SHERMAN v U.S.: if the criminal conduct is the product of government agent creativity/if the government induced the individual to commit a crime that they otherwise would not have committed, the government action would be considered entrapment and the individual would be free from any criminal liability for the act in question TERRY v OHIO (stop and frisk search): a stop and frisk search may be conducted when there is reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is now or is about to engage in criminal behavior U.S. v DUNN: no specific cause nor a search warrant is needed to search either open fields or uninhabited buildings (see also Oliver v U.S.) U.S. v HENSLEY: a stop and frisk search may be performed when there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the offender has violated the law, past tense U.S. v SOKOLOW: an investigatory search may be conducted if the totality of the circumstances establishes reasonable suspicion to believe that a person matches the drug courier profile WILSON v SEITER: made it more difficult for inmates to win unconstitutional conditions of confinement cases; inmates must demonstrate specific unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and specific intent on the part of specific prison officials to maintain those unconstitutional conditions\ WOLFF v McDONNELL: inmates have the right to an institutional disciplinary hearing, written advance notice of the hearing, to present evidence/witnesses/testify in their own behalf at the hearing, and a formal ruling is to be placed in their file &*\]_n  B C l m M N | }   ; < = P Q ۻۭۻۻۻۭۻۻۻۻۻ۟ۻۻ۟ۇvhvh;xCJOJQJ^JaJ h dh;xCJOJQJ^JaJh dOJQJ^Jh^-CJOJQJ^JaJh"_CJOJQJ^JaJh`tCJOJQJ^JaJh dCJOJQJ^JaJ#h`th d>*CJOJQJ^JaJ h dh dCJOJQJ^JaJ&h dh d5CJOJQJ\^JaJ(l m l m < =   X 45gd d        n ! % . / = D d p ᴧvhZӖӖLh2OCJOJQJ^JaJh=CJOJQJ^JaJh=SCJOJQJ^JaJ#h dh dCJH*OJQJ^JaJhDQCJOJQJ^JaJ h dh dCJOJQJ^JaJh dh;xOJQJ^J h;xh;xCJOJQJ^JaJh RCJOJQJ^JaJh>CJOJQJ^JaJ h dh;xCJOJQJ^JaJh;xCJOJQJ^JaJ  234BCtuv !HIJоްТޢކކxކjjh@CJOJQJ^JaJhCJOJQJ^JaJh@CJOJQJ^JaJhqCJOJQJ^JaJhK>CJOJQJ^JaJh dCJOJQJ^JaJ#h~-h d>*CJOJQJ^JaJhDQCJOJQJ^JaJ h dh dCJOJQJ^JaJ hDQh dCJOJQJ^JaJ)Z[!"45+,WXgŷӷũӛӛӍn hDQh dCJOJQJ^JaJh~,CJOJQJ^JaJh@CJOJQJ^JaJh[CJOJQJ^JaJhyCJOJQJ^JaJhlCJOJQJ^JaJh.;CJOJQJ^JaJ h dh dCJOJQJ^JaJh@CJOJQJ^JaJhDQCJOJQJ^JaJ'#$naXY VW}~gd=gd dgiXYjmt+:WŷyyhZhxCJOJQJ^JaJ hDQh dCJOJQJ^JaJhuCJOJQJ^JaJh eCJOJQJ^JaJ hDQh=CJOJQJ^JaJ h dh=CJOJQJ^JaJh=CJOJQJ^JaJh dCJOJQJ^JaJhDQCJOJQJ^JaJ h dh dCJOJQJ^JaJh~-CJOJQJ^JaJW~  flmIJ|}<ᩛyh h dh;xCJOJQJ^JaJ hDQh=CJOJQJ^JaJ h dh=CJOJQJ^JaJh=CJOJQJ^JaJh dCJOJQJ^JaJh_CJOJQJ^JaJh8CJOJQJ^JaJhDQCJOJQJ^JaJ h dh dCJOJQJ^JaJh@CJOJQJ^JaJ%TUZ[\5 5!6!"gdE gd;xgd dgd=<STUx!Xbc|ɸ}l^l^l^l^P^B^h]8CJOJQJ^JaJhLCJOJQJ^JaJhVCJOJQJ^JaJ h dhVCJOJQJ^JaJ h dh;xCJOJQJ^JaJh=CJOJQJ^JaJh;xCJOJQJ^JaJhDQCJOJQJ^JaJ h dh dCJOJQJ^JaJh@CJOJQJ^JaJhCJOJQJ^JaJh_h;xOJQJ^Jh> CJOJQJ^JaJ+=CDPchilx{/0efȺ䩊yky]y]yL hDQh dCJOJQJ^JaJhDQCJOJQJ^JaJh@CJOJQJ^JaJ h dh dCJOJQJ^JaJ hDQh=CJOJQJ^JaJh;xCJOJQJ^JaJ h dh;xCJOJQJ^JaJhLCJOJQJ^JaJhbyRCJOJQJ^JaJhIRpCJOJQJ^JaJhVCJOJQJ^JaJh]8CJOJQJ^JaJ-.[\?@vw ®~l[ hDQh dCJOJQJ^JaJ#h~-h d>*CJOJQJ^JaJh~-CJOJQJ^JaJ hDQ5CJOJQJ\^JaJ hW5CJOJQJ\^JaJ&h dh d5CJOJQJ\^JaJ hR5CJOJQJ\^JaJhDQCJOJQJ^JaJ h dh dCJOJQJ^JaJhxCJOJQJ^JaJ "!#!M!N!!!!!!!" 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