ࡱ> b jbjb{x{x $r ###82$$V%r zj& )"8)8)8)8)F~,-ÚÚÚÚÚÚ,R6E.8)8)../8)8)4///.8)8)/*.D.//őLM& A#/LMtJ0z]/M/r r Vr r VARS OUTLINE Malamud, Fall 2008  TOC \t "CHAPTER;1;SECTION;2" Themes  PAGEREF _Toc90983066 \h 1 Legislative Process  PAGEREF _Toc90983067 \h 2 Theories  PAGEREF _Toc90983068 \h 3 Statutory Interpretation  PAGEREF _Toc90983069 \h 6 SI theories  PAGEREF _Toc90983070 \h 6 SI approach  PAGEREF _Toc90983071 \h 9 Cases  PAGEREF _Toc90983072 \h 11 ADMIN Intro  PAGEREF _Toc90983073 \h 14 History  PAGEREF _Toc90983074 \h 14 Policy debates  PAGEREF _Toc90983075 \h 15 Law  PAGEREF _Toc90983076 \h 17 Approach  PAGEREF _Toc90983077 \h 17 Policy/Notes  PAGEREF _Toc90983078 \h 19 Where things stand re Chevron  PAGEREF _Toc90983079 \h 20 exceptions to nac requirements  PAGEREF _Toc90983080 \h 20 Fact  PAGEREF _Toc90983081 \h 22 Formal Adjudication 706(2)(e)  PAGEREF _Toc90983082 \h 22 Policy  PAGEREF _Toc90983083 \h 23 Exceptions To Reviewability  PAGEREF _Toc90983084 \h 26 Statutes preclude judicial review  PAGEREF _Toc90983085 \h 27 Committed to agency discretion by law  PAGEREF _Toc90983086 \h 27 C'l framework  PAGEREF _Toc90983087 \h 29 Agencys power to legislate  PAGEREF _Toc90983088 \h 29 Nondelegation  PAGEREF _Toc90983089 \h 29 Limits on exec power  PAGEREF _Toc90983090 \h 30 Limits on Cong power  PAGEREF _Toc90983091 \h 31 Self-Help by Political Branches  PAGEREF _Toc90983092 \h 32 Pres Control  PAGEREF _Toc90983093 \h 32 Legislative veto, power of the purse  PAGEREF _Toc90983094 \h 32  Themes Are courts the only institutions that can say what the law is? Institutional competence (e.g. Congressional vs. agency competence) Legislative Process Themes Figuring out interests groups in legislative process. What was necessary to get law passed? Relevance of parts of the process. Trust legislation as product of coherent deliberation? Or at least defer to it? Or rather assume the worst? Accountability vs. expertise (e.g. Congressional staffers). Impact of turf wars over jurisdiction. Trusting legislatures Ex: Canon against surplusage. Role of procedure Behind each substantive decision, many procedural decisions, e.g. time for debate. Ambiguity Can be strategic Bounded rationality Courts w/r/t legislatures PRO (( strengthen courts) Protect minorities CON (( courts should defer) No objective public interest (realist view) CMD Views on leg process PRO Democratic CON Counter-majoritarian elements Filibuster ( makes Senate process super-majoritarian. Time allocation allowing long debates unless theres unanimous consent. Skewed majority toward small states (17% of population = 26 states). Plus small states have fewer issues ( easier to satisfy constituencies ( opportunity to spend time on issues (e.g. Biden on foreign policy). Primary jurisdiction assigning to committees empowers committee chairs (cf. dividing bills House by area of policy ( more people can block). Non-democratic elements Procedures, e.g. time for speeches. Interest groups (see theories below) 3 moods in Lochner Maj = pessimistic court willing to put powers on the line Harlan = optimist, rely on science Holmes = realist, defer to leg Remember: Really about interest group politics ( process as undemocratic. Procedural characteristics to remember Vetogates 3 types C Formal Informal Reflects efforts by political scientists to describe approaches in Lochner. Remember: <10% of bills get through. Committees often composed of preference outliers, so not necessarily the faithful agents of the rest of the body (rather constituents, interest groups, etc.) House vs. Senate Formally co-equal, but easier to strike down a bill in the Senate (filibuster). Parties more important in House b/c Speaker controls bills to committee. Different role of rules. No germaneness req. in Senate. Theories of the legislative process (1) Libertarian Legislation is unnecessary ( Vetogates are good. Rationale People reach ideal solution w/o legislation: mkt takes care of it. Govt only in cases of fraud. Fleeting majorities not supposed to control everything. Strongest proponents Epstein Herbert Spencer Interest groups are good Interest groups better at blocking than passing legislation. Classical liberal can look to positive aspect: good that can block legislation if most legis is bad Classic Liberalism Herbert Spencer "Social Statics" (1851). Defense of classic liberalism - notion that govt shouldn't be trusted to provide happiness, through legislation. Thinks that political reformers use legislative methods to pursue, through govt, the greatest happiness. Optimism about common law baselines that legislation attempts to alter (natural law). Slow evolution over generations of judicial process is better container for human wisdom than legislation aimed at improving human conditions. Problems Mkt failures, information failures, transaction costs, externalities Might be true in long term, but not short term, and society may not want to wait (e.g. riots before CRA 1964). (2) Interest group theory (a) Optimistic pluralism Premise: Everyone can participate, so process ( public interest + legitimacy. Why pluralism is effective Parties mediate b/w individuals and representatives. Plethora of groups = sign of political health. Interest groups = bulwarks against oppressive govt. Conflicting groups ( moderate, well-considered policies. Reflects republican ideal (i.e. participatory democracy) BUT remember blockages (FN 4); sometimes pluralism fails to create best result. Critique Diffuse majorities cant organize (cf. AAA advocating for highways etc.). Wealth effects. (b) Pessimistic pluralism (public choice) Premise: Actors in political process are rational actors seeking to maximize utility. Laws dont necessarily reflect public interest b/c: Outsize influence of business groups. Free riders rational people wont participate at all. Effective interest groups are narrow w/ concentrated benefits. Public may be too fragmented. Relevant actors Legislators rational ones will only take account of interests of powerful groups Constituents Critique Large groups do sometimes organize, and even if they dont legislators pay attention to their concerns. Focuses on economic interests. Ignores role of wealth, culture, social power. Elites shape preferences ( undercuts rationality. Assumes that legislators will only be influenced by interests among their constituents, but interest groups not so limited. Even when controlling for constituencies, ideology explains much of voting. Doesn't account for mavericks. Descriptively, ideology is better predictor of legislators decisions than economics. Depends how you characterize which is diffuse majority, vs. small interest group. ( Given critiques, fair to say (F&F 33): Reelection is important motive; Constituent/contributor interests influence legislators; Small organized groups have disproportionate influence. Rent seeking Minorities (esp. economic minorities). Per theory, economic minorities will be protected, so need to protect e.g. cultural minorities. Protection ex: founders worried about debtors using legislation against creditors. During founding, and Lochner era, groups defined mainly in economic terms. ( veto-gates help economic minorities to block bills against their interests. (3) Chaos theory Arrows theorem: Majority decisionmaking is inevitably incoherent. Ex: Cycling Affects what we think of as a majority. Sources of stability (F&F 49-55) Structures and institutions, e.g. parties, ideologies Agendas Behavioral norms, e.g. fairness Procedures, e.g. germaneness requirements Implication for SI: No such thing as purpose outcome is result of chaos and institutional processes, not confluence of interest. (4) Positive political theory Focus is on inter-institutional relationships; actors preferences are on a spectrum. Game theory: Each party in system anticipates responses of others and acts strategically to realize preferences. Ex: Cong predicts how courts will act. Structure for the game is provided by C, committees and rules. Agencies shift policy w/o amendment by Cong. Implications for SI Optimistic: Legislation = compromise b/w competing interests, and existence/non-existence of legislation is significant. Cynical: Institutions matter (e.g. bicameralism preserves status quo). Critique Assumes full information about others preferences. Actors may act in line with others preferences regardless of hard constraints, e.g. agency acting consistent with leg history. (5) Republicanism Emphasizes civic virtue. Assumes process = reasoned, orderly, participatory deliberation. Critique: Political values are not special, but rather result of personal preferences. If taken to logical conclusion, risks totalitarianism. Distributed costsConcentrated costsDistributed benefitsDiffuse majorities, free riders. ( Bill unlikely. Possible symbolic gestures, or fuzzy language, or delegation to agencies.Diffuse majorities in favor, but opposition organized. Also free riders. Bill only w/ policy entrepreneur (e.g. Al Gore). ( Bill unlikely. Compromise delegation.Concentrated benefitsConsensual interest groups. Logrolling common. ( Lots of legislation, i.e. pork.Conflicted interest groups (e.g. union mgmt leg). ( Stalemate. Agencies either keep the peace, or activist. Problems w/ categories Depends on narrative/characterization. Can reflect political values. Depends on level of govt e.g. if in state leg rather than Cong, can choose places based on different distribution of costs and benefits. Remember timeframes short term vs. long term. Also, future generations. ( Manipulable, but at the margins, helps show where interest group legislation happens. Think about whether leg is detailed or ambiguous. Ambiguity could = compromise. Detailed could = distributed costs. Statutory Interpretation Underlying issues Ferret out pretext? Consider social science? If yes, what was available ex ante, or all? Should court fix Cong mistakes, or future Congs? Who defines baselines? How to figure out interests groups in legislative process. What was necessary to get law passed? Relevance of parts of the process. Trust legislation as product of coherent deliberation? Or at least defer to it? Or assume the worst? Accountability vs. expertise (e.g. Congressional staffers). Impact of turf wars over jurisdiction. Trusting legislatures Role of procedure Ambiguity Can be strategic Reflects bounded rationality SI theories Goals of SI Rule of law: Statutory meaning should be predictable, accessible, and neutrally applied Democratic legitimacy: Defer to popularly elected enacting leg Pragmatic: Contribute productively to stat scheme + common good (1) Intentionalism: Achieve goals by being faithful agent of Congs intent/purpose (remember: continuum) (1) Specific intent: What did Cong decide on specific issue? PRO: If on point, then useful. CON: Who decided (House, Senate, etc.), Likely didnt consider issue, Manipulable (leg hist, etc.), Changed circumstances (2) Imaginative reconstruction: If Cong had considered issue, what would it have decided? Approach: Use all available evidence to reconstruct how Cong would have resolved the issue given: the problem being addressed, constraints, historical context, main actors, etc. PRO: Like completing a K. CON: Difficult (lots of variables), Manipulable, Whose intent? Based on a legal fiction (this is why Posner discards it in Marshall, b/c really about judicial flexibility) Cases Holy Trinity: Given religious values of nation and free exercise of religion, no one could have intended law to bar minister. (3) Purpose (general intent): What was purpose? How to achieve that purpose on these facts? Bounded or unbounded? Hart: Purposes can exist in hierarchies or constellations. Do X only insofar as you can achieve it w/o doing Y. Unbounded = Purpose, by any means and unlimited by another purpose. Ex: Weber, TVA, other super-statutes. Super-statutes (Eskidge & Ferejohn) = seek new normative/institutional framework, sticks in public culture, and has broad effect on the law. PRO: Hart/Sacks: Enacting Cong was reasonable w/ reasonable purposes. Stevens: Presume Cong had coherent policy objectives ( dont use penalty default. Purpose as indicator of how Cong would have decided. Hand: Purpose, from range of sources, is more reliable than text in achieving what Cong intended. CON: Complexity of purpose, risks overstating purpose, verges on legislative role. Risks favoring unbounded purpose. Stats have lots of purposes. Cases, etc. Holy Trinity: HAND commentary Remember: Super-statutes might require courts to be more flexible in interpretation. (2) Textualism: Achieve goals by relying on text (i.e. being faithful agent of enactment) (1) Old/soft plain meaning: Start w/ text, but contrary evidence in leg history can overcome plain meaning. (2) New textualism: What is the meaning of the text, based on textual sources? Sources Dictionaries Canons (ex: Sweet Home) Avoids leg history, but doesnt reject entirely Rationale Art I 7: Only law is the text that passes both houses and is signed by president. Legislators choose text of a statute for a reason. Legislation = compromise, w/ some issues unresolved, w/ which courts shouldnt interfere (Easterbrook: even if court knows how Cong would have acted, courts shouldn't fill gaps; only Cong should fix the text) Statutes dont necessarily capture a coherent set of policy goals (Manning). Determining purpose (end) doesnt answer the appropriate means (Manning). Avoid judicial political preferences. Leg history unreliable, manipulable, wastes time/money. Accountability, b/c there are objective rules for what is legitimate and whats not (Waldron). Clarity; extra-textual evidence muddies the waters (Waldron). Critique Cl argument is weak Addl sources might constrain, not empower. Undercuts political authority by severing connection b/w democracy and rule of law. Preference for flexibility, justice in indiv cases. Posner: Judges must make law rational. Textualism = refusal of responsibility, b/c text is always indeterminate in some way (Peter Strauss). Doesnt explicitly exclude absurd results (Scalia would, but narrowly). Frickey: Runs counter to entrenched nontextualist instincts. Theory Classical/liberal: Public choice: Republican: (3) Dynamic interpretation: Approach: Not limited to text or purpose; rather, consider subsequent evolution of statute and its present context, especially ways in which societal and legal environment of statute materially changed over time Rationale: Pragmatism. Eskridge: Legal and Cl context changes over time. Judges not burdened by figuring out intent/purpose/text. Critique Judicial activism Ignores that Cong wont be able to fix if disagrees. Sets up conflict when text/history is clear but conflicts w/compelling current values and policies. Cases Weber: Fishgold: WWII changed things, regardless of original intent or text. SI approach Text Considerations Ordinary meaning (e.g. dictionaries) Cf.: Tomatoes = vegetable (Nix v. Heddon). Word association Noscitur a sociis: Interpret per associates. ( If exception hadnt been specified, then it would have been included; OR ( Excess of caution (just clarifying that it was not included in the rule). Ejusdem generis: General words restricted by surrounding specific words. Inclusio unius: If theres a list, excludes others. Cf. Holy Trinity. CON: Bounded cognition, compromise. Grammar Last antecedent: Referential and qualifying words refer only to last antecedent, unless contrary to punctuation or policy. Punctuation (e.g. comma vs. semicolon) And/or May (permissive) vs. shall (mandatory) Examples Holy Trinity: labor and service = manual labor Griffin, Stevens dissent: Use definition of term from bankruptcy context. Whole act Considerations If term ambiguous, consider in light of whole statute. Presume that Cong uses terms consistently w/in statute. Presume part of statute doesnt undercut other parts. Statute structure: Section of statute, each section presumably adds something to statutory scheme Super statutes (e.g. NLRA, Civil Rights Act) Sometimes applies to whole U.S.C.. Ex: Casey (attorneys fees). When stat incorporates section of prior law, presume incorporates interpretations too. Coherence Avoid surplusageat any level (word, phrase, act, Code, etc.). Avoid repeals by implication. BUT if relatively clear, then apply primacy of last enacted statute. Avoid Cl problems. Generally, prefer specific statutes to general ones. Other parts of statute: Title Preamble doesnt control, but evidence of intent Provisos control meaning, but construed narrowly. PRO: Objective, Cong is rational, consistent. CON: Unrealistic. Cases Sweet Home: Purpose Considerations Did Cong anticipate this situation? Analogous situation? What was the general intent of Cong? How have circumstances changed? Does looking at purpose provide more bounded interp? Or broader interp? Cases Griffin: Cong showed that stat wasnt limited to compensation, so amount was unbounded. Holy Trinity (majority) Legislative history Sources **Committee reports useful, but not always reliable **Explanatory statements by sponsors/floor managers b/c evidence of views of enacting coalition. Less reliable sources (EFG hierarchy p. 317): Statements by supporters, Statements by opponents, Drafting and deliberation history Amendments consider what Cong changed, what it left alone Subsequent history (e.g. signing statements) PRO: Its a vetogate, so crucial for passage. CON: Subsequent to passage. Considerations When in the process? Is source reliable? Is source relevant to the question? How accessible is the source? Did opponents expect stat to be struck down as uncl? What interest groups were involved? Ex: Locher: Not health or labor, rather big bakeries pushing small bakeries out of business. Which committee was responsible? Does source point toward COMPROMISE (bounded purpose)? Problems Waldron: In large assemblies, blurs deliberation/enactment. Manipulable May be unreliable given problems in leg process FELTES: Even when talking about leg history, only a fraction of whats out there. Even informed strategists < info than in hindsight. EFG: Only use if: Readily available to average lawyer Relevant to precise interpretive question Reliable evidence of consensus in legislature Can be discerned at reasonable cost Cases Holy Trinity ? Absurd results Considerations Courts also have equitable discretion. If particular context could seem absurd ( clear statement rule. Cases TVA v. Hill (darter fish): Maj says its not absurd; Powell dissent says it is. Griffin v. Oceanic Marshall (carrier weight) Precedent Considerations Stare decisis strong in SI context (reliance + Cong can amend) (BUT maybe shouldnt be, b/c leg process). Cases Johnson v. Transportation Agency Substantive canons REMEMBER Strong ones act like clear statement rules. Weak ones are more like tiebreakers Rationale: Efficiency, predictability, signals to Cong, promote leg deliberation, MAL: Presumption should operate as penalty defaults, i.e. presume opposite to force Cong to be explicit. Cl avoidance: Avoid serious Cl issues PRO Cong wouldnt want to violate C; Leg difficult to pass, so would be difficult to remedy; Rule of law (assume Cong is reasonable); CMD: Avoid big judge-made decisions. CON Accepts less-reasonable interpretation; Doesnt force Cong to clarify on important issues; Creates penumbral C. Cases Weber U.S. v. Marshall: Easterbrook: Dont rewrite stat; Posner: Avoid cl problems. Stats in derogation of CL construed narrowly. Ex: Construe stats waiving sovereign immunity narrowly. Use definitions from CL if ambiguous PRO: May reflect Cong understanding. CON: May be contrary to purpose; no federal CL. What if CL changes? Does meaning of statute change? CL at time of passage? Amendments? Particular state where case arose? Cases: Remedial statutes construed broadly PRO: Recognizes difficulty of leg process. CON: Unreliable, overinclusive. Rule of lenity: Ambiguities in crim stats ( construe for D. Rationale: Due process; separation of powers Cases Holy Trinity (1892) (English minister) EXAM: A thing may be w/in the letter of the law but not in the law. Purpose: Look at the spirit of the law. Fishgold (1946) (Hand) (Veteran returning to work under SSA) EXAM: Imagine what Congress would have decided, to figure out limits of statute. Illustrates: Imaginative reconstruction Dynamic SI Bounded purpose Remember: Textualists who oppose looking at background say that b/c too much power to courts. But Hand shows that historical understanding can give pause, make sure youre keeping w/ original intent. Weber (1979) (Brennan) (Reverse discrimination) Unbounded purpose. TVA v. Hill (1978) (Burger) (Endangered Species Act vs. dam) Plain meaning Absurd result: How absurd must result be before judge will invoke judicial values? Sometimes statutes have unbounded purpose. Rehnquist dissent: Avoid Q of liability. Even if TVA liable, ct has discretion not to use injunction and shouldn't. Use reasonableness - cts sitting at equity can consider many issues of evenhandedness simply bc they're cts. Illustrates conflict that cts support to be agent of legis but also has respect for law built into nature. Griffin v. Oceanic (1982) (Rehnquist) (double wages for seaman unemployment ( absurdity?). WVU Hospital v. Casey (1991) Q: Reasonable attorneys fees = expert fees? Scalia Text: Look at other statutes for how term is used. Purpose: Bounded includes what it resolves to leave alone. Stevens dissent Test: Dont look at other statutes when leg history shows meaning was clear. Purpose: Broad, to encourage civil rights cases. Marshall (7th Cir. 1990) Q: LSD carrier weight. Easterbrook Ordinary meaning is clear, includes carrier weight. If results are unreasonable, change statute; not responsibility of courts. Posner Including carrier ( absurd. Cl avoidance: Court should avoid uncl interpretation, even if would not otherwise be the first choice. Johnson v. Trans. Agency (1987) (Scalia dissent): Look at original Cong, not current Cong, and whole act, not isolated provision, b/c goal is to determine the compromise. Sweet Home (1995) (Take in Endangered Species Act) Stevens Text: Look at specific word in list. Purpose: Conservation. Scalia Text: Look at original word being modified. For meaning, look at CL (hunting). Noscitur a sociis: CBOCS (2008) (Retaliation claims under 1981) Characterization: Standing or retaliation. When statutes overlap, doesnt necessarily mean courts should interpret away the overlap. Hearst (1944) (Newsboys under NLRA) Ordinarily use CL definitions, but here context is different ( look at purpose. Green v. Bock Laundry (1989) (rule of evidence re witness credibility): Even new textualists provide exception for absurd results. LaRue v. DeWolff (2008) (ERISA re plans or just individuals): ROBERTS CONCURRENCE. Look at alternative remedy under different statute. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Intro Def = legal principles defining: Authority and structure of agencies, Procedures, Validity of agency decisions, and External review. Underlying Q: Any deference on questions of law? APA 706: said all relevant questions of law. But courts always deferred to agencies on some. Courts tend to see relationship to agencies similar to relationship to lower courts. But in that context, Qs of law are reviewed de novo (cf. Qs of fact). Basic answer: Defer when Cong has delegated law decision-making authority. But what about when unclear? Remember federalism Qs Should fed govt be doing these things at all? Main debate today: Should regulatory power be devolved to states, individuals, etc.? Main constraints Regulator and regulated have adversarial relationship Regulator = bureaucracy Path dependencies; lack of innovation Agencies must defend decisions before courts. History Antecedents were CL courts, but CL seen as inadequate. Before 1875, tried to divide responsibilities of administrators and courts. But impossible, so courts used doctrine of jurisdiction. 1875-1930 First attempts at state level. ICC in 1887 was first agency. FTC in 1914. ( Traditional model of admin law Leg must authorize rules that limit agency discretion. Procedures must ensure agency compliance. Judicial review must be available. Agency processes must facilitate judicial review. Trad model reflected skepticism of agencies, courts trust in CL. 1932-1945: New Deal CL rights considered overinclusive, i.e. economic. And fed govt saw states as bastions of interest groups. Argued that businesses dont have separation of powers, so agencies should do lawmaking and adjudication. 1945-1962: APA Distinguished b/w rulemaking and adjudication. APA was compromise in response to critiques to ND agencies. NLRB was one of the most criticized agencies. BUT remember: APA didnt stop courts from making admin law. Ex: Most important procedure that agencies use doesnt appear in APA courts created it by interpretation. Admin is not like Civ Pro, where there are Rules + application. APA is a benchmark, but more like a CL subject than Civ Pro. 1962-1980: Rights revolution Decreased trust in govt ( shift to protective regulation, e.g. discrimination, consumer protection, worker safety, welfare, etc. Courts asserted more oversight, including right of participation in agency decisions, procedural formalities, and requiring agencies to more fully defend decisions. 1980-today: CBA Emphasis on cost-effectiveness Trend toward quantitative analysis and smarter tools. Reagan administration Economists thought regulation = market failures, but theyre about other things too. Generalizations under Reagans deregulation. Reduced prices and costs. Rarely did competition replace regulation. Weakening labor unions may have had more impact. Policy debates Advantages of agencies Accountability Pres is accountable, through to agencies Cong is accountable, and has oversight Expertise Procedural advantages (e.g. notice and comment), esp. in particular areas. Promote eco efficiency Market failures Control monopoly power ( allocative efficiency. Free riders Information failures. Suppliers mislead consumers Consumers cant evaluate information Supply side doesnt provide information Bounded rationality, esp re low probability events. Collective action problems Public goods Prisoners dilemmas Externalities. Other eco-related justifications Control windfall profits Eliminate excessive competition. Prevent predatory pricing Alleviate scarcity Redistribution Ex: Social Security, FLSA Justifications: Unequal bargaining power. BUT unclear that regulation ( redistribution. See e.g. minimum wage, rent control. Nonmarket values Promote democracy Education (e.g. public TV). Prevent discrimination Planning Paternalism, e.g. protect indivs from stupidity. CRICITISMS (1) Democracy too much discretion; Legitimacy, b/c unelected, definition of public interest. Can be captured ( factions. Liberty b/c by combining responsibilities of branches, threaten safeguards. Headless fourth branch Can be captured. Sunstein: New Dealers thought public interest was self-evident. But effect may have been to increase impact of special interests. (2) Effectiveness ineffective re goals. Coordination Unpredictable. Too much $ on certain issues. See table 3-1 on p. 151. Sunstein: Unnecessary costs (e.g. FDA drug lag). Emphasis on means, instead of ends ( ex: ethanol. Viscusi: Govt should only act when there is a proven market failure; always use CBA w/in policies (cost-effective) and across policies (priorities). Tengs & Graham: Should recognize that some premature deaths are more costly than others, e.g. young people. Breyer: 3 problems: (1) Tunnel vision: Each agency thinks its mission is most important ( coordination/aggregate priorities are vital. No coordination re methodology, monitoring, evaluation. (2) Random agenda selection (3) Inconsistency REHNQUIST IN BENZENE. Agency choice of procedures: Vermont Yankee (1978): Agencies expertise extends to choice of procedure, i.e. they have discretion to choose the procedure that will lead to the best outcome. That is, Courts cant insist on fancier procs than Cong reqs. ( Deference to agency procedural choices. BUT even under discretionary policymaking, courts prefer to have a paper record to review, so may require more formal procedures. DP in administrative decisionmaking: If admin decisions are going to affect people, must be sufficient procedures. So even if Cong allows agency to use particular procedure (e.g. exempts NAC), court can invalidate if it doesnt have enough procedural protections. JR: Law Deference really about rules vs. standards, b/c in absence of deference, legal weight of every regulation would be open to question. Remember that even when deferring, courts are still saying what the law is. Historical approaches Early approach: Pure Q of law ( no deference. Application of law to facts both rulemaking (hypo case) or adjudication (real case) ( some deference. BUT distinction broke down in most cases, b/c pure Qs of law are rare. Next approach: Legislative vs. interpretive rules (still today, see Am. Mining) Leg rule = exercise of delegated leg power Interp rule = not exercising delegated leg power. Skidmore (1944) (idle EEs): Interpretive rules are not controlling but may have power to persuade. And courts must recognize that theres an agency working on the issue (i.e. cant totally ignore agencies). Then look at various factors: Persuasiveness Procedural adequacy Consistency Etc. ( BUT b/c we will listen (e.g. Scalia re Learned Hand)? Or b/c must listen? STARE DECISIS: Court decides meaning of statute, once and for all unless court changes its mind. One factor re whether to defer under Skidmore is persuasiveness of agencys argument. If in later case, agency comes up with better justification, stare decisis still holds, but might be reason to change interpretation. But even so, if agency wants to change its mind, it must appeal to the courts (and procedures are still just one factor). NLRB v. Hearst (1944) (newsboys=EE): Broad stat + agency application ( reasonableness. MAIN Q TODAY: Does Chevron occupy the field? Or some agency decisions not under Chevron? Approach Mead 0(a): Did Cong intend to give agency power to issue decisions as to question at issue that carry the force of law? Factors (Mead) Formality, either adjudication or rulemaking Procedures how detailed; who made decision (in Mead, from HQ, not field offices ( greater deference) Statutory text (no force of law-type language) Here, no deference. Gonzales. Importance of uniform enforcement. Squish Whats the agency? Whats a decision? Whats the force of law? What is Cong intent? What is agency intent? Mead (day planners): No, Cong didnt intend them to have weight of law. Scalia dissent: No exception to Chevron, b/c ossifies agency decisions. Gonzales v. Oregon (2006, Kennedy): Cong did not intend for AG to issue decisions re legitimate medical purposes, esp. implicitly (elephants in mouseholes). Mead 0(b): Did agency intend to make decision pursuant to that power? Factors (Long Island Home, 2007, Breyer): Process (if e.g. NAC, then likely yes). N/a whether in a section of reg called interpretations. Reg sets forth important indiv rights and duties. Agency fully focuses on issue. Rule is reasonable. BOTH YES ( Chevron. NO TO EITHER ( Skidmore. NOTES Mead may create more deference than Chevron in some circumstances. Chevron deference requires ambiguity, but if at Step One can find sufficiently clear answer, THEN THERES NO DEFERENCE. Chevron Step 1: Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue, or gap that Cong might reasonably intend for agency to fill? If implicit + important, see Tobacco ( Importance canon: Clear statement rule (Cong wont lightly delegate important/controversial questions). **Chevron 1 requires looking at context, not just particular provision. Tobacco case (2000, OConner) (drug, device, combination prod): Cong implicitly precluded FDA regulation of tobacco under FDCA (by addressing issue, but not banning). If trad tools of SI ( Cong intent on precise Q, then intent must be given effect (Chevron FN1). ( Look at Cong specific intent, in purposivist spirit (as faithful agent of Cong). Since Stevens was writing, likely would consider: Leg history (BUT maybe not, b/c if at step 1, then stat is unambiguous) Text Ordinary meaning Whole act rules Textual canons Substantive canons General statements of purpose (maybe? Or at step 2?) Remember: In absence of agencies, courts generally dont admit theres ambiguity. Here they do. Q: What is the precise question? (good example: Tobacco case) Broader ( more likely to answer at step 1 ( increases power of courts. Cong intent has 2 elements Substantive Did Cong decide re bubble? Delegation Did Cong decide to delegate decisionmaking? Doesnt cite APA. Rather, its federal CL. Chevron Step 2: If ambiguous, is agency decision reasonable (w/r/t statute)? FN3: Doesnt have to be how Court would have interpreted. If >1 reasonable interp, then only issue in choosing among them is policy (A&C). Squish Static or dynamic? Any constraints on agency changing interpretation? Agency just a junior court, using judicial tools but picking one result? Or something entirely different purposes, tools (e.g. empirical data), political pressure, etc.? Are agencies supposed to be faithful to enacting Cong, or not, even though Courts are? Cl position of agencies doesnt answer the question. Original view: Step 2 is re policy, defer to expertise ((A&C). BUT instead, treats agency more like lower court choosing among reasonable options. ( SI is still relevant at Chevron 2. KENT v. DULLES: Where delegation would create cl issues, construe the delegation narrowly. PROS/CONS OF MEAD/CHEVRON DISTINCTION Policy/Notes Justification for Chevron Best understood as: Cong has given agencies authority to resolve ambiguities in statutes. Reflects policy where political accountability and technical specialization are relevant. Reduces chances of circuit splits on SI Legal realism all legal judgments include policy determinations, so let political actors w/ expertise make them. Scalia: DELEGATION PRESUMPTION Agency expertise isnt the real rationale, nor separation of powers (b/c judges frequently make policy determinations). Really about Congressional intent. It is a presumption that Cong intent w/r/t ambiguities is agency discretion. Problems w/ Chevron APA was passed in light of distrust of agencies, to strengthen judicial review. Role of stare decisis What is stare decisis value of step 1 or step 2? What about pre-Chevron cases? Brand X: If stat is ambiguous (i.e. there are various possible constructions), agency has chosen one of them. Doesnt bar later court saying that interpretation in different context is unreasonable. Problem (Scalia dissent): Means only way court can require agency to follow its interp is to say it is the only interp. Court sees the order in which agencies and courts act is important. EXAM: Think about the order things happen. What cases have stare decisis effect: If decided definitely at Step 1 ( this is the law. If decided under Mead + Skidmore ( Court is still just using SI; agency action is just one factor. BUT WHAT IF ONE FACTOR CHANGES, e.g. formality of procedures? How can agencies know what would be sufficient to get SC to change minds? This uncertainty drives Court crazy, b/c agency seems to be able to change the law. BUT why not? If changing procedures is sufficient, then ( If agencies want flexibility to change interpretation, case must be decided at Step 2. THIS is why Mead/Skidmore vs. Chevron distinction is so important. 553 cases When agencies have NAC power, theyre expected to use it. But make decisions in lots of other areas. Where agencies dont use NAC, but make substantially legally binding rules ( Courts sometimes invalidate for procedural reasons ( agency can go back and use different procedure. ( OR decide re deference (Chevron Step 0) ( court makes final decision. Where things stand re Chevron Common ground Litigating positions no deference Prosecuting policies no deference Legal interpretations in adjudication deference Agencies cant interpret APA If statute covers various agencies, no deference Chevron Step Zero in flux Open questions When agency decides its JD When agency says theres no judicial review When agency declines to be bound by statutory deadline When statute refers to general law When lower-level EEs interpret statute exceptions to nac requirements Interpretive rules Def: Essentially hortatory, not legislative. Am. Hospitals v. Bowen (DCC 1987). Test (whether interpretive rule has legal effect) Am. Mining (DCC 1993): Whether absent rule there would be legislative basis for enforcement action; Whether agency has published the rule Whether agency has invoked its general legislative authority Whether rule amends a prior leg rule. When agency interprets prior regulation (NAC 1st time; none later): Depends on whether its truly interpretive, or a new rule. General statements of policy Test: (1) No present effects, and (2) genuinely leaves agency free to exercise direction. Am. Hospitals v. Bowen (DCC 1987). Community Nutrition v. Young (DCC 1987): FDA corn aflotoxin action levels is not statement of policy, b/c they have present binding effects. Dissent (STARR): Rule here is just a pronouncement. In future proceedings, EPA will have to prove that the product is adulterated. Rules of agency organization, procedure or practice Air Transport Assn v. DOT (DCC 1990): Where rules encode a substantive value judgment or substantially alter the rights or interest of regulated parties, then NAC. This is functional analysis. But not very helpful. Good cause exception Rule: When agency has good cause that NAC is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. Very narrow. Sometimes even clerical errors dont permit exception. JR: Findings of Fact 2 categories Formal adjudication: Substantial evidence Informal procedures: Arbitrary or capricious Formal Adjudication 706(2)(e) STD: Deference to findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. From Universal Camera (1951) (retaliation for NLRB grievance). Level of deference under substantial evidence depends on courts belief that agency had and/or used expertise. As a whole for NLRB added in Taft Hartley Act. But applied in all formal adjudication by courts. Allentown Mack (1998, Scalia): NLRB found union did not have good-faith reasonable doubt re union support. Court sees 2 types of policy Empirical generalization from expertise Counterfactual policy-driven Zhen Li Iao v. Gonzales (7th Cir. 2005): Skepticism of factfinding by ILJs. Remember: Don't try to rank standards of review. Rather, think about why should defer in particular circumstances. Courts believe politics have no place in factfinding. But expertise-influenced factfinding may have a place (so long as court actually has it and is using it). Universal Camera: Review of fact really about a feeling of non-abdication. Focus on technical expertise. Ex: NLRB doesnt have economists; rather, just lawyers. So courts skeptical that they have expertise. How to know a court is reviewing FACT (cf. law): Arbitrary/capricious standard. No cite to a statute being interpreted. JR: Policymaking (A&C) APA: Courts set aside any agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. History Early cases saw as very deferential. But then there were cases where agencies had no paper record on decisionmaking. 1960s: Concerns re agency capture. NAC was informal, and APA called for arbitrary/capricious std. But when NAC become the formal procedure, courts made the standard stricter. Justification for hard look Democracy ensure interest representation, etc. BUT might also empower interest groups too much. Prevent errors in judgment, specialization, and/or insulate experts from politics. Hard to pin down. Even DCC, which originated doctrine, varies how deferential it is under A&C standard. Bottom line: Cant just look at standards courts use. Rather, what they actually do in a particular case. Courts take harder look in 3 situations: Suspicion that policy is really politics, Suspicion of agency capture, Agency changes its mind Why new regulations are so hard to impose Hard to get accurate info; Lots of policy Qs to answer; Must develop testing system; Must study impact on competition; Must negotiate a final standard; Must survive judicial review. Remands are significant, b/c delay, change in personnel. ATTACK: Is there sufficient evidence for the policy to make it not A&C? LEVENTHAL (Ethyl Corp): Cong has delegated legislative authority to agencies because there is substantive judicial review. Judges should gain sufficient background to do the review. Factors (Agencys persuasiveness + expertise relevant to each). (a) Went beyond relevant factors (see enabling statute). Pension Benefit v. LTV (1990): Shouldnt be too strict courts cant reverse whenever there is any statutory policy not considered. Natl Coalition Against Pesticides v. Thomas (DCC 1987): EPA raised max level of something in pesticides b/c would hurt less developed countries. DCC said that wasnt a relevant factor in statute. (b) Clear error of judgment A&C might mean an agency had no reasonable basis for its decision. Thats a tough burden. Community Nutrition (DCC 1989) (lunch foods): Permitting fortification was clear error. Microcomputer v. Riley (5th Cir. 1998): Retroactive application of reg was A&C. U.S. Air Tour (DCC 2002): Looking only at noise from air tours, and not other aircraft, was clear error. (c) Failed to consider important aspect of the problem. Ex: Existence of alternatives. State Farm, Scenic Hudson. (d) Explanation runs counter to the evidence or so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view, or the product of expertise. ( Must respond to counterarguments. BUT complete factual support unnecessary. (e) Changes in policy, agency must explain why the original reasons for adopting the rule or policy are no longer dispositive, i.e. why new rule effectuates stat as well or better than old rule (State Farm). Underlying Qs: Was it A&C to: Believe existing standard was ineffective? Not to investigate different kinds of seatbelts? Not to investigate airbag-only rule? Core substantive Q: Should govt force people to pay more for safer cars? Or let 9,000 people die each year? ( If this is a political determination, where does court fit in? Regulation in this area reflects cognitive biases, pro-individualist cultural views. Illustrates acceptable/unacceptable factors in A&C review. Change in politics is not acceptable under hard look, esp. when agencies change their minds. (f) Other rational reasons (MAL: buzzwords to justify discretion (or to give lip service and then reverse as A&C)) Room for political judgment ( political accountability is good. Facts/expert opinions change. Judicial role is narrow. Cost, budget priorities, Changing circumstances. Court cant require formal procedures. Remember: Specific policy must not be A&C (cant e.g. accept capture in one area to shift resources to another) FCC v. Fox (2d Cir. 2007): Cl overlay: FCC may have decided to use indecency argument b/c thats where 1A is less strict. In avoiding Cl Q, result is second best. Fox argues that since A&C standard is so varied, Court should be stricter when FCC is making decisions in C-inflected area. Then Court considers whether that would be a good idea. Souter: But this would flip the Cl avoidance doctrine. Did agency use sufficient procedures so policy wasnt A&C? BAZELON (Ethyl Corp): Courts `" substantive experts; instead, use procedures to prevent unreasonable or erroneous agency decisions. Factors Evidentiary record, Listen to affected interests, Respond to counterarguments Detailed explanations of reasoning, Adequate consideration to evidence and analysis submitted to it. Overton Park (1971, Marshall) Q: Feasible and prudent alternative routes; if none, then all possible planning to minimize harm. Held: There was no record before decisionmaker at the time (cf. post hoc affidavits) ( A&C. Remember: About deniability, b/c says one thing (stat doesnt require record) and requires another thing (district court must create record so that SC can review). JR: Exceptions To Reviewability Remember: Reviewability depends on type of claim Erroneous finding of fact Wrong application of regs Wrong application of statute Abuse of discretion Wrong SI Acted unclly. **These are questions of SI, but no deference. Courts wont defer to agencies SI re reviewability of their own decisions. Two rationales: Judicial role. Courts should protect Cong. Why: APA Agency might be expert on enabling statute, but no agency is charged by Cong w/ enforcing APA. Cf. some deference to DOJ: Norton v. SUWA: Attorney General Manual re APA is persuasive. Cl overlay New Deal Courts reviewed Clity, but there was no APA, so no other basis for reviewability. So lots of New Deal programs never received any judicial review. Today, presumption of reviewability. But remember: APA was compromise. Sources (1) Organic statute (NOTE: SEPARATE, b/c of murky status of APA) Explicit review provisions (but remember creative SI). Structure/statutory scheme as a whole (e.g. who can challenge, expression unius). Purpose, e.g. protected parties, including vicarious representation of others interests Nature of question Importance of the Q (cf. trivial claims) Whether claim based on Cl violation Action or inaction Whether provisions of statutes create discretion Penumbral C (MAL: avoidance C squared) if no review, then Cl problems w/ The substance of decision? Preclusion of review? Ex: Webster v. Doe: Could be uncl both (1) to preclude review and (2) for CIA to discriminate. (2) APA (a) Presumption of reviewability ( Only overcome by clear and convincing evidence that Cong intended to restrict JR, see Abbott Laboratories (1967). Remember mood of non-abdication. (b) Specific provisions (3) Federal CL of reviewability Even before APA, courts had approaches to reviewability. Q is whether APA incorporated those approaches. Statutes preclude judicial review APA 701(a)(1): JR doesnt apply when statutes preclude review. Usually leads to SI of organic statute. TEST: Do reviewability provisions (or structure etc.) preclude review? Explicit Implicit (rare): Only w/ clear and convincing evidence. Johnson v. Robinson (1974) (VA benefits): Strong presumption. Statute precluded JR of decisions, but couldnt preclude cl challenges. Block v. Community Nutrition (1984, OConnor): Structure excluding customers from remedies is clear and convincing evidence that Cong precluded review. Bowen v. Mich. Family Physicians (1986, Stevens) (Medicare reimbursements): Insufficient evidence to overcome presumption. Committed to agency discretion by law APA 701(a)(2): No JR when agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. TEST: No law to apply. Refers to substantive provisions providing basis for agency action. Main Qs (1) vs. (2) Isnt all action reviewable for abuse of discretion? Does grant of unreviewable discretion violate C? Usually look at the standard the agency was supposed to be applying. Ex: If agency was required to act under certain circumstances, and agency didnt act, then theres law to apply. Theres tension b/w no law to apply and hard look Court could admit that stat gives no guidance, but review for basic rationality anyway. That is, even when agencies have broad discretion, they can use it in A&C ways. Overton Park (1971, Marshall) Court looks at SOR itself to determine whether there is law to apply (i.e. whether alternative was feasible or prudent). Court goes into substantive discussion of prudence to determine whether decision was reviewable. But also linked to merits, since if court decides on broad discretion re reviewability, increases changes agency will win on the merits. Heckler v. Chaney (1985, Rehnquist) (FDA decision not to enforce FDCA): When agencies decline to enforce, usually not reviewable. Exceptions: Agencys decision is based on belief it lacks JD; or Agency has adopted extreme general policy that = abdication of statutory responsibilities. Here, no law to apply. HOW DOES THIS FIT IN? IS IT ABOUT NO LAW TO APPLY? OR ABOUT DECISIONS NOT TO ENFORCE STATUTE? **Baseline = discretion** When agency isnt acting, baseline is prosecutorial discretion, which is unreviewable (other than Cl claim). Here, prosecutorial discretion is seen as safeguard. Cf. other countries, where theres no discretion, and courts review discretion. In that framework, agency inaction would be reviewable for due process. EEOC inaction ( right to sue. But NLRB inaction ( nothing, so no review. In Heckler, Q was whether statute required FDA to act. ( Q: Should courts defer to agencies in interpretation of whether statute is mandatory? Webster v. Doe (1988, Rehnquist) (): Stat: CIA director may, in his discretion, terminate any EE whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the U.S. RULE: In addition to no law to apply, consider character of the decision. Here, std re deems exudes deference ( no basis for review. And besides, CIA requires trust ( discretion in hiring/firing. Compare to Overton Park. OP: Courts can require trial including testimony by agencies to determine whether decision was A&C. Here, if anything, the classified nature of decision MAL: Wrong b/c std is shall deem in interest of U.S. Thats a factual question: Did director actually deem necessary for natl security? Thats asked all the time in employment cases. North v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (2004, Scalia) (ATVs): Under 706(1), JR only when agency took discrete action that it was required to take. Agency responsible for multiple use mgmt, which is enormously complicated task w/ classic land use dilemmas. Failures sometimes remediable under APA, but not always. Failure to act `" denial. Unreviewability and prudence Remember prudential concerns, e.g. difficulties for court of policing. Considerations Litigation costs Delay Reliability Accountability Expertise Depending on which are most evident, may affect likelihood that courts will want to find basis for review. JR of agency inaction Sometimes tough to distinguish action from inaction. Heckler v. Chaney focuses on agencys need to allocate resources. Fine. But could make presumption rebuttableif decision here was not based on resources, then reviewable. JR might not led to greater democracy or accountability, b/c rich private actors are the ones who would bring lawsuits. Courts maintain exception when agencies abdicate their responsibilities. That exception can be narrowly or broadly construed. Constitutional framework Separation of powers vs. checks and balances Distinction SOP: intermingled authority. C&B: independent authority. Both ( uniformity, impartiality. Role of judiciary especially salient re SOP. **About role of the courts in protecting Cong. and C ( Cl avoidance. Why makes sense: Court responsible for protecting Cl values. When agencies do it, its making policy. And protecting Cl values are more important than e.g. trucking policy. Agencys power to legislate State ex rel Railroad Commn (Minn. 1888): Legislative powers cannot be delegated (formalistic). Nondelegation doctrine Theories (positions) (1) Cong cannot transfer legislative powers. Uncontroversial. (2) Legislative = Delegation that is too vague or extensive. THIS is traditional non-delegation doctrine. (3) Delegation = exercise of legislation, not delegation ( Cl. Critique: Overly formalistic, would permit delegation of all legislative power. ( Main Q: Can a statutory grant of authority ever violate C? (2) says yes, (3) says no. Goals of ND doctrine Accountability. Subject to oversight by president, but C requires something moreinput from representatives ( real goal is deliberative democracy. Social K theory govt cant impose restraints w/o legislative authorization. Rule of law promote planning, cabin discretion, prevent factions. But why goals fail to support strong doctrine Theyre slippery slope arguments. Cong has lots of problems. Before 1935, SC never struck down statutes for uncl delegation. Ex: J.W. Hampton v. U.S. (1928) (tariff duties): Cong can justify any delegation so long as based on intelligible principle. 1933: Natl Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) authorized Pres to develop codes of fair competition to stabilize wages and prices. TEST: No intelligible principle for enforcement decisionmaking. Must be courts to decideno deference if agency tries to impose its own limits. Cf. no law to apply ( maximum agency discretion. FACTORS: Importance (most important). Like tobacco case: Raised Q of whether theres an exception to Chevron for really important issues. Scope of impact. Ex: Whole economy (need stds) vs. narrow scope (discretion okay). Practicality Institutional competence Could Cong reasonably be expected to have set standards? Posture of case NOT really helpful, b/c last time Court found uncl delegation, flowchart didnt exist. But still relevant: Parties think meaning of stat is clear ( at Step 2. But court sees as policymaking and theres too much discretion. Schechter Poultry (1935): Cong cannot abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is vested. Del to private groups likely significant. Also significant that Live Poultry Code was ineffective, and smelled like corporatism. Benzene (1980, Stevens): Non-delegation canon. Rehnquist C: Reinvigorate ND doctrine. Democracy forcing. But remember: How would Cong perform if reqd to be more specific? Just less regulation? Better regulation? Rehnquist really is saying that Court shouldnt be involved, either directly or while reviewing agency action. BUT problems w/ doctrine Cong committees would have to fill the role. Delegation ultimately a matter of degree ( reqs line-drawing. Am. Trucking: DCC found no intelligible principle, but EPA could create one. SC (2001, Scalia): Agency cannot cure ND problem. But here, construe statute to avoid nondelegation problem. Limits on executive power C provisions Art II 1: Executive power vested 2 clause 2 categories re appointments: (1) Officers of United States apptd w/ advice & consent of Senate (2) Inferior officers, established by law, which cong can vest in Pres, courts, or heads of departments. Art 2 4: Officers removed only on impeachment or high crimes & misdemeanors. Cases below are where officers removed w/o impeachment. There based on implied powers of executive power. Myers (1926, Taft) (postmaster): Pres can remove any exec officers b/c theyre exercising his discretion. Court sees postmaster as patronage position. Humphreys Executor (1935, Sutherland) (FTC commissioner): Press power to remove officers depends on character of office. Myers only re purely executive officers. Purposive: FTC = indep. ( Result: Headless fourth branch. Weiner (1958, Frankfurter) (war claims commner): Cong may create indep agencies. And C doesnt confer power of removal. So Pres cant remove. Limits on Cong power Bowsher (1986, Burger) (comptroller): Cong cannot reserve power to remove executive officer other than impeachment. C: Cong cant both make and enforce laws. White dissent: Formalistic. Cong has flexibility to achieve govt objectives through various means. ( APPROACH: REMOVAL POWER Is the office one in which independence from the president is desirable? YES: Cong may limit removal power, and judiciary may limit removal even in the absence of a statutory restriction (Weiner). No clear test. Ultimately, functional and contextual: Are there good reasons why the office should be independent on the president. Are Congress's limits on removal constitutional? Congress cannot completely prohibit presidential removal, but it can limit removal to where there is 'good cause'. Nor can Congress give itself the sole power to remove an executive official." Chadha (1983): Leg veto uncl b/c not bicameral and doesnt allow president to veto. Area other than removal that tests executive-ness of agencies. Seems like opposite of non-delegation: Once Cong delegates, cant retain power. Key Q: Would Cong have delegated if it hadnt had leg veto, i.e. how key was it to compromise? Non-delegation argument: Permitting leg vetoes increases amount of delegation, permitting Cong to pass the buck on more and more important issues. Makes leg sloppy. Makes leg vetoes sloppy. Alt middle position: Cong as whole cant anticipate everything. Leg vetoes permit Cong to fix mistakes, exercise control, etc. Spectrum: Cong make all decisions ( Cong delegates everything. Leg veto seems like somewhere in the middle. Remember: Contd existence of indep agencies is proof that 3-branch notion is wrong. Most formalistic frameworks refer to 3 powers, but can sit in same bodies. But if function is same (i.e. making specific rules), not helpful to see rulemaking and adjudication as exercise of different governmental powers. Tools for independence No pres removal Staggered appointments W/o judicial review doesnt mean there arent ways to check, e.g. protests. Pros delegation [see above] Pros permitting Cong to override Democratic Another avenue for oversight Cons permitting Cong override Rule of law Predictability Access to the process Self-Help by the Political Branches Pres Control Presidents have not tried to use these control tools re indep agencies. Executive orders Call for OMB review of all regulatory action above certain threshold level of importance, e.g. affect economy in material way, raises legal/policy issues affecting presidents priorities. Its about disciplining agencies in line w/ press priorities, centralized review. Office of Info and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), w/in OMB. No such thing in Congress. Req certain factors, not nec same as enabling stat. Often effect is delay, not stoppage. Only limit on delay is deadlines in enabling statute. Adjudication is not subject to OIRA review. So even if adj not best mechanism, agencies may prefer. These orders are why we can talk about a presidents administration. Includes indep agencies, even if truly independent. Cong delegates to particular agencies, and sub-parts. Not to pres, who decide which agencies to delegate to. Thats why something like OIRA is necessary for presidential control. Legislative Veto, power of the purse Cong Review Act. There are ways for Cong to fast-track certain agenda items. Remember: Normative value of CRA depends on perspective: Value of delegation Capture of agencies vs. capture of Cong committees. 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