ŠĻą”±į>ž’ ³&ž’’’!"¶€µ“’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’ģ„Įq` ųæf>bjbjqPqP >0::C,æ &=’’’’’’¤ęęęF,4\ \ \ p ųuųuųu80väyÜp īhüyŽŠ€"¬€Ā€Ā€Ē–.õ– — 1ķ3ķ3ķ3ķ3ķ3ķ3ķ$rļhŚń†Wķ\ )„„–"Ē–)„)„Wķ``Ā€Ā€ćlķJÆŖÆŖÆŖ)„`&Ā€\ Ā€1ķÆŖ)„1ķÆŖÆŖŠ¹Š† Ö\ ńŅĀ€šy ­¬U.3Ęųu=§xÕŃ"õģ<¶ķT ī÷Ńś`ņµØ–`ņDńŅńŅ`ņ\ Óš—ž³›LÆŖ’ž¤£”†———WķWķKŖd——— ī)„)„)„)„p p p D8“BD3p p p “Bp p p ``````’’’’  Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock-in? Zhonglan Dai University of Texas at Dallas Edward Maydew University of North Carolina Douglas A. Shackelford University of North Carolina and NBER Harold H. Zhang University of Texas at Dallas First version: September 2005 Last revised: February 16, 2006 We thank Ashiq Ali, Robert Kieschnick, Suresh Radhakrishnan, and seminar participants at the University of Texas at Dallas for helpful comments. Zhonglan Dai is at the School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083,  HYPERLINK "mailto:zdai@utdallas.edu" zdai@utdallas.edu, Edward Maydew is at the Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514,  HYPERLINK "mailto:Edward_Maydew@unc.edu" Edward_Maydew@unc.edu, Douglas A. Shackelford is at the Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514,  HYPERLINK "mailto:Douglas_Shackelford@kenan-flagler.unc.edu" Douglas_Shackelford@kenan-flagler.unc.edu, Harold H. Zhang is at the School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083,  HYPERLINK "mailto:harold.zhang@utdallas.edu" harold.zhang@utdallas.edu. All errors are our own. Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock-in? Abstract This paper examines the impact on asset prices from a reduction in the long-term capital gains tax rate using an equilibrium approach that considers both buyers’ and sellers’ responses. We demonstrate that the equilibrium impact of capital gains taxes reflects both the capitalization effect (i.e., capital gains taxes decrease demand) and the lock-in effect (i.e., capital gains taxes decrease supply). Depending on time periods and stock characteristics, either effect may dominate. Using the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 as our event, we find evidence supporting a dominant capitalization effect in the week following news that sharply increased the probability of a reduction in the capital gains tax rate and a dominant lock-in effect in the week after the rate reduction became effective. Non-dividend paying stocks (whose shareholders only face capital gains taxes) experience higher average returns during the week the capitalization effect dominates and stocks with large embedded capital gains and high individual ownership exhibit lower average returns during the week the lock-in effect dominates. We also find that the tax cut increases the trading volume in non-dividend paying stocks during the dominant capitalization week and in stocks with large embedded capital gains and high individual ownership during the dominant lock-in week. Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock-in? I. Introduction This paper jointly models and tests two effects of capital gains taxation on equity trading: a demand-side capitalization effect and a supply-side lock-in effect. Previous studies have separately identified and tested these effects, but, to our knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate them jointly and empirically document the relative dominance of each effect surrounding an event of a tax rate change. Employing an equilibrium approach, we show that in general their net tax effect on asset prices is ambiguous. Evaluating returns and trading volume around the 1997 reduction in the capital gains tax rate, we find evidence of the capitalization and the lock-in effects jointly affecting trading. In particular, the capitalization effect dominates the lock-in effect in the week following news that sharply increased the probability of a reduction in the capital gains tax rate, as buyers respond to information that future capital gains tax rates will be lower. The lock-in effect, on the other hand, dominates the capitalization effect after the rate reduction became effective. Taxation is one of the most prevalent market frictions in financial markets. It affects investors’ decisions and distorts the valuation of assets. Capital gains taxes, in particular, play an important role in determining an investor’s trading strategies and ultimately influencing asset prices. Because investors endogenously respond to the imposition of capital gains taxes, the tax effect on asset prices can be complicated and difficult to measure. In his review of taxes in the finance literature, Graham (2003) concludes that “Though intriguing in theory, the profession has made only modest progress in documenting whether investor taxes affect asset prices…we need more evidence about the importance of personal taxes affecting asset prices…” To date, research on the effects of investor level capital gains taxes on asset prices has produced conflicting results. Several studies report that the presence of capital gains tax reduces stock price and current stock return (see Guenther and Willenborg (1999), Lang and Shackelford (2000), Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson, (2003), among others), while other studies document that imposing capital gains tax increases stock price and current stock return (see Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, (1980), Landsman and Shackelford (1995), Reese (1998), Poterba and Weisbenner (2001), Klein (2001), Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford (2003), Jin (2005), among others). The former is referred to as the capitalization effect of taxes and is often justified by the argument that investors would demand a lower price to buy the assets if they have to pay capital gains taxes in the future. The latter is referred to as the lock-in effect and is attributed to investors requiring higher prices to sell assets if they have to pay taxes on selling them. Recognizing that the two effects work in opposite directions, the purpose of this paper is to understand the interaction of the two effects and the circumstances under which one effect dominates the other surrounding a tax rate change. Theoretical studies on taxes and asset pricing have been scarce and often focus on trading strategies for investors to avoid paying capital gains taxes and their impact on asset prices when investors face embedded capital gains on their asset holdings. For example, Constantinides (1983) shows that investors can rebalance their portfolios without triggering capital gains taxes if they are allowed to sell short assets in which they have embedded gains. This allows investors to separate their optimal liquidation of assets from their optimal consumption and investment policies. Klein (1999) introduces a general equilibrium model of asset pricing with capital gains taxes when investors face short sale constraints so that they cannot rebalance their portfolio without triggering capital gains taxes liability. He makes predictions on the effects on asset prices of capital gains taxes without explicitly solving for the equilibrium price. Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) develop a trading model where the long-term and short-term capital gains tax rates differential creates a trade-off between optimal risk-sharing and optimal tax-related trading strategy. They show that sellers are reluctant to sell appreciated assets sooner because they are subject to higher capital gains taxes. To entice sellers, buyers must provide compensation in the form of higher sales prices. In this paper, we develop a simple equilibrium model of stock markets to analyze the effects of capital gains tax on prices that jointly considers the capitalization effect and the lock-in effect. Intuitively, the capitalization argument approaches the tax effect from buyers’ perspective (demand side), while the lock-in effect views the tax impact from sellers’ perspective (supply side). A more complete analysis of the capital gains tax effects must simultaneously allow for demand and supply to interact. In equilibrium, the net effect on stock markets of the capital gains tax will be the combination of both effects. Our study provides such a unified framework and offers predictions for the capital gains tax effect on security markets. Our model suggests that a change in capital gains tax influences asset prices by shifting both the demand for assets and the supply of assets. Specifically, when the capital gains tax is increased, the demand curve for assets is shifted down, reflecting the decline in prices required to attract buyers. An increase in the capital gains tax also shifts the supply curve up, reflecting the boost in prices required to entice current owners to sell. The equilibrium net tax effect on asset prices is ambiguous, depending on which effect dominates. An increase in capital gains taxes unambiguously reduces the float of assets (number of shares actively traded). In the event of a capital gains tax cut, the demand curve for the assets shifts up and the supply curve shifts down. The equilibrium net tax effect on asset price is still ambiguous, but the float of assets is unambiguously increased. To detail the predictions of our model, suppose the capital gains tax rate is reduced. If the capitalization effect dominates the lock-in effect, stock prices will increase leading to higher current stock returns. Furthermore, the future returns to growth stocks (i.e., stock whose valuation depends largely on future dividend growth) are more likely to face capital gains taxes than the future returns to income stocks (i.e., those stocks currently distributing dividends). Consequently, when the capital gains tax rate is cut, growth stocks should experience even higher returns than income stocks. Conversely, if the lock-in effect dominates the capitalization effect, we predict that stock prices will decrease and lower current stock returns. These reactions will be particularly pronounced for stocks with large price appreciation in the past. With these firms, the lock-in effect will dominate, leading to lower current returns. Although the capitalization effect and the lock-in effect co-exist at all times, the relative importance of the two effects should vary around the timing of a capital gains tax rate change. Specifically, if there is a capital gains tax cut, the capitalization effect (price increase caused by demand shift upward) will be stronger than the lock-in effect before the tax cut becomes effective and the lock-in effect (price decrease caused by supply shift downward) will dominate the capitalization effect after the tax rate cut effective date. The reason for the timing difference is that investors react to changes in the probability of a capital gains tax rate cut before the rates actually fall. In other words, buyers could purchase stocks in response to the news of future tax cut before the stock prices fully incorporate the new lower rate. Conversely, because capital gains are taxed upon realization, current stockholders likely will not sell shares with embedded gains until the capital gains tax rate cut becomes effective. Consequently, we select different event windows for a dominant capitalization effect and a dominant lock-in effect in our empirical investigation. Different event windows are critical for identifying the relative dominance of capitalization and lock-in. We perform the empirical tests of the model predictions by examining return and volume responses to the 1997 capital gains tax cut on stocks included in the CRSP dataset for the periods between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 1997. Our empirical analysis confirms that while both the capitalization and the lock-in effects jointly influence asset prices, the magnitude of each effect differs across the timing of the tax cut and stocks with different characteristics. The 1997 capital gains tax rate reduction provides a rare opportunity to jointly investigate the effects of capitalization and lock-in on asset prices. In late April, 1997, information leaked that the Democratic White House and the Republican Congressional leadership had reached an accord to reduce the capital gains tax rate. This news preceded the actual effective tax rate by about one week. During that interim week, we find that the capitalization effect dominated the lock-in effect. This is consistent with individuals (the only shareholders benefiting from reduced rates) buying shares on the increased probability of lower capital gains tax rates when they sell the shares in the future. Conversely, we find that the lock-in effect dominated the capitalization effect during the week following the effective date of the tax cut. This is consistent with individual investors (i.e., again, the only shareholders benefiting from the lower rates) selling stocks with large embedded gains after the tax cut became effective. Although consistent with the model, broad market movements surrounding the effective date may reflect other factors moving the markets during those two weeks. Our cross-sectional analyses, however, do provide compelling evidence about the effects of capitalization and lock-in. Specifically, we find that: Non-dividend paying stocks experienced a stronger capitalization effect than dividend-paying stocks during the week the capitalization effect dominated. Stocks with large price appreciation in the past and high individual percentage ownership experienced stronger lock-in effect and earned lower immediate returns during the week the lock-in effect dominated. Trading volume was higher for non-dividend paying stocks during the week the capitalization effect dominated and for stocks with large embedded capital gains and high percentage of individual ownership during the week the lock-in effect dominates. Since constructing alternative explanations for these cross-sectional findings is difficult, we infer from these results that capitalization and lock-in effects jointly affect market returns in the predicted manner. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and discusses its empirical implications. Section 3 lays out the empirical methodology and section 4 provides empirical analysis and discussions. Finally, section 5 concludes. II. The model and its empirical implications Investors in the economy trade multiple stocks indexed by i. To facilitate our exposition, we introduce the following notations. Let  EMBED Equation.3  be the time t market price of stock i,  EMBED Equation.3  be the dividend distributed in period t on stock i,  EMBED Equation.3  be the time t tax basis of the marginal investor who currently owns stock i,  EMBED Equation.3  be the capital gains tax rate, and  EMBED Equation.3  be the dividend tax rate. To facilitate our discussion, we denote  EMBED Equation.3  as the price willing to pay for a share of stock i by buyers at time t and  EMBED Equation.3  as the price willing to accept for a share of stock i by sellers at time t. The price a typical tax sensitive marginal investor is willing to pay is determined by the expected payoff as follows:  EMBED Equation.3  (1) where  EMBED Equation.3  is the discount rate applied to the cash flow of stock i and EMBED Equation.3  represents the investors’ anticipated capital gain realization. We assume that the anticipated capital gain realization takes the following form:  EMBED Equation.3  (2) where  EMBED Equation.3 . This specification takes into account that investors who purchase the shares have to pay the market price, which serves as the basis for computing buyers’ capital gains taxes when they sell in the following period. Moreover, parameter  EMBED Equation.3  is used to allow investors to use tax efficient trading strategies to reduce their realized capital gains. On the other hand, a typical tax sensitive marginal shareholder with embedded capital gains, who contemplates selling, will require a price high enough to compensate him for his tax liability. This implies:  EMBED Equation.3  (3) where  EMBED Equation.3  represents the seller’s net-of-tax reservation value for a share of stock i and  EMBED Equation.3  is the seller’s capital gains tax. We assume that the seller’s net-of-tax reservation value is less than the market price  EMBED Equation.3  because the tax burden is borne by both sellers and buyers in equilibrium. In equilibrium, the demand for the company shares equals the supply of the shares, and the price paid by the buyer equals the price received by the seller (including taxes), i.e.,  EMBED Equation.3  (4) Substituting (2) into (1) and using the market clearing condition (4), we arrive at the following equilibrium price for stock i in the presence of taxes  EMBED Equation.3  (5) Rewriting equation (5) recursively, we obtain the price of stock i at time t as follows:  EMBED Equation.3 . (6) Assuming that the dividend  EMBED Equation.3  grows at a constant rate  EMBED Equation.3 and the tax basis  EMBED Equation.3  grows at rate EMBED Equation.3 , we have the following simplified expression for the price of stock i at time t:  EMBED Equation.3 . (7) Denote the first term in equation (7) as “Xi” and the second term as “Yi”. Taking the first derivative of “Xi” and “Yi” with respect to EMBED Equation.3 , respectively, yields:  EMBED Equation.3 , (8)  EMBED Equation.3 . (9) Equation (8) is unambiguously negative and we call this capitalization effect of the capital gains tax because the term X includes dividend and dividend growth which concern a potential buyer. Furthermore, the cross derivative of  EMBED Equation.3  with respect to dividend growth  EMBED Equation.3 , EMBED Equation.3 , is also negative. Hence, the magnitude of the capitalization effect becomes larger as the dividend growth rate of a company ( EMBED Equation.3 ) increases and the dividend tax rate ( EMBED Equation.3 ) decreases. This implies that in the event of a tax cut growth stocks will experience larger price increase than income stocks. The sign of Equation (9) depends upon the size of the investors’ embedded capital gains over time. We have a positive lock-in effect if the following condition holds:  EMBED Equation.3 . (10) The above inequality suggests that the lock-in effect depends positively on stock i’s discount (or capitalization) rate and the marginal investor’s net-of-tax reservation price but is inversely related to the rate at which investors’ tax basis grows. If we interpret the capitalization rate as the average appreciation rate of the stock price, then the left-hand-side measures the size of embedded capital gains. If the appreciation rate is high and the marginal investor demands a high reservation price relative to the tax basis growth rate, the embedded capital gains are large and inequality (10) will be satisfied. In this case, there is a positive lock-in effect. On the other hand, if the appreciation rate is low and the marginal investors demand a very low reservation price relative to the tax basis growth rate, the investors will have little embedded capital gain or even a capital loss and there will be no lock-in effect. To empirically identify a dominant lock-in effect, we need to focus on stocks with large embedded capital gains for tax-sensitive investors. The combined effect of capital gains tax on stock price is given by  EMBED Equation.3 . (11) Overall, because the capitalization effect ( EMBED Equation.3 ) and the lock-in effect ( EMBED Equation.3 ) work in opposite direction, the net effect of capital gains tax on stock price is ambiguous. If the capitalization effect dominates, the net effect of capital gains tax on stock price will be negative; if the lock-in effect dominates, the net effect of capital gains tax is positive. Figure 1 illustrates the interaction between the two opposing forces. At first, suppose that there are no capital gains taxes. The demand and the supply for any particular stock are depicted as D and S in the graph and the intersection determines the equilibrium price EMBED Equation.3  and float of shares EMBED Equation.3 . Now, we introduce capital gains taxes. The demand curve shifts to the left from D to D’ due to the capitalization effect. At the same time the supply curve also shifts to the left from S to S’ due to the lock-in effect. In equilibrium, the new demand and supply curves interact with each other at new equilibrium price  EMBED Equation.3  and new float of shares EMBED Equation.3 . It is obvious that new price could be higher or lower depending upon which effect dominates. However, float of shares is clearly decreased. In the event of a capital gains tax cut, the shift in demand and supply is reversed. Consequently, the float of shares is unambiguously increased. However, the change in equilibrium price remains ambiguous depending on which effect dominates: the capitalization or the lock-in. Our analysis above has the following empirical implications. First, when the capitalization effect dominates the lock-in effect, a reduction in the capital gains tax will cause an increase in the stock price leading to higher stock returns. This will arise when potential buyers are more responsive to an imminent capital gains tax cut than are current shareholders. Conversely, when the lock-in effect dominates the capitalization effect, a reduction in the capital gain tax rate will cause a decrease in the stock price leading to lower stock returns. This will happen if current shareholders are more responsive to the capital gains tax cut than are potential buyers. Second, the float of shares is inversely related to the capital gains taxes. When the capital gains tax is reduced, both the capitalization and the lock-in effects reinforce each other to increase the number of shares actively traded. The above implications apply to all stocks with embedded capital gains and thus represent market wide reactions to capital gains tax rate change. Our theoretical analysis also suggests that growth stocks will experience a greater price increase and higher returns than other stocks in the event of a capital gains tax cut. In general, dividend-paying stocks are more likely to be income stocks while non-dividend paying stocks are more likely to be growth stocks. This means that for the capitalization effect the stock returns are predicted to be higher for non-dividend paying firms than dividend paying firms. Further, for stocks with high percentage of tax sensitive individual ownership, the lock-in effect is stronger for larger embedded capital gains because condition (10) is more easily satisfied when the tax basis growth rate is lower relative to stock price appreciation rate. This implies that in the event of a capital gains tax cut, these stocks will experience a larger price decline than will other stocks. These implications pertain to individual stock characteristics. We thus call them cross-sectional effects of a capital gains tax rate change. In the next section, we empirically test both the market wide and cross-sectional effects of a capital gains tax change by jointly considering the capitalization and the lock-in effects. III. Empirical Methodology To empirically test the above implications, we use the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97) capital gains tax reduction as our event. The TRA97 lowered the top tax rate on capital gains due to appreciation from 28 percent to 20 percent for assets held more than 18 months. TRA97 is particularly attractive as an event because the tax cut was both large and unexpected. Often tax legislation follows a protracted process with gradual changes in the probability of a particular bill becoming a law. In TRA97, however, Congress provided researchers with an attractive research setting by coming to rapid agreement on a large, unexpected reduction in capital gains tax rates. Having a well-defined event is particularly important in this study because we need to define separate event windows for two opposing effects. The key to jointly identify the capitalization effect and the lock-in effect is to understand that the potential buyers and current shareholders perceive the expected capital gains tax cut differently as we discussed above. They differ not only from required rate of return or valuation, but also from when they react to the news/event. A potential buyer, in order to capture the expected tax cut benefit, will react to the capital gains tax cut information before the tax cut becomes effective. On the other hand, a current shareholder who is subject to capital gains taxes will more likely sell shares with embedded capital gains to rebalance his portfolio when the uncertainty on tax cut is largely resolved. As a result, the capitalization effect is more likely to dominate before the tax cut announcement and the lock-in effect is more likely to dominate after the tax cut becomes effective. For the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), little information was released until Wednesday April 30, 1997 when the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) surprisingly announced that the estimate of 1997 deficit had been reduced by $45 billion. Two days later on May 2, the President and Congressional leaders announced an agreement to balance the budget by 2002 and, among other things, reduce the capital gains tax rate. These announcements provide positive signals about the possible tax cut. Investors could start to react to the possibility of capital gains tax cut. On Wednesday May 7, 1997, Senate Finance Chairman William Roth and House Ways and Means Chairman William Archer jointly announced that the effective date on any reduction in the capital gains tax rate would be May 7, 1997. Given the above background, we choose Wednesday, April 30 to Tuesday, May 6, 1997 as the week that we expect the capitalization effect ( EMBED Equation.3 ) to dominate as potential buyers react to the possibility of capital gains taxes cut. The same event window is used in Blouin, Hail, and Yetman (2005). Lang and Shackelford (2000) use a similar event window (April 29 to May 5, 1997). We then choose Wednesday May 7 to Tuesday May 13, 1997 as the week that we expect the lock-in effect ( EMBED Equation.3 ) to dominate as current shareholders sell their appreciated stocks to rebalance their portfolios. Another important factor is that capital gains taxes only affect income that is reported on personal tax returns, i.e., capital gains from the selling of shares held directly by individuals or flow-through entities, such as mutual funds, partnerships, trusts, S corporations, or limited liability corporations that pass dividend income to investors’ personal tax returns. Capital gains taxes are not levied on tax-deferred accounts (e.g., qualified retirement plans, including pensions, IRAs and 401(k)), tax-exempt organizations, and foreigners. Corporations pay capital gains taxes; however, the rate reduction in TRA97 did not apply to corporations. Thus, the ensuing tests predict variation in returns based on the amount of holdings by individual investors. To capture the group of investors who are the most sensitive to the capital gains taxes, we construct a proxy for the percentage of individual ownership of a stock using the shares outstanding and shares owned by institutional investors. The data on the institutional investors’ ownership are obtained from their quarterly filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (known as Form 13F). Let EMBED Equation.3 be firm i’s stock return at time t. To test the effect of a capital gains tax rate cut on stock returns, we formulate the basic empirical regression equation on firms with positive embedded capital gains as follows:  EMBED Equation.3  (12) where  EMBED Equation.3  represents the dummy variable for the week when we expect the capitalization effect to dominate (hereafter, we call  EMBED Equation.3  the capitalization week for brevity),  EMBED Equation.3  represents the dummy variable for the week when we expect the lock-in effect to dominate (hereafter we call  EMBED Equation.3  the lock-in week for brevity), EMBED Equation.3 is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there was no dividend distribution in year 1996 and 0 otherwise,  EMBED Equation.3 is the measure of embedded capital gains,  EMBED Equation.3 is the percentage of shares of stock i owned by individual investors as of 3/31/1997, and Controls refer to all other variables which may affect stock returns. Our specification above considers both the broad stock market reactions to the capital gains tax cut and the cross-sectional differences in the tax effect for different stocks with diverse characteristics. Intuitively, for a tax-sensitive investor who is indifferent between buying and not buying a stock, a capital gain tax cut will induce the investor to buy the stock. This applies to all stocks and thus constitutes the market-wide effect. Thus, in the event of a capital gains tax cut, the coefficient of the capitalization week dummy ( EMBED Equation.3 ) will be positive ( EMBED Equation.3 ). Similarly, for existing tax sensitive shareholders contemplating selling shares with embedded capital gains, a tax cut will induce them to sell the stock to rebalance. This applies to all stocks with embedded capital gains. When the lock-in effect dominates the capitalization effect, a tax rate cut will lead to lower returns on stocks with embedded capital gains resulting in a negative sign for the lock-in week dummy variable ( EMBED Equation.3 ). Because firms differ in their dividend policy and growth potential and consequently future capital gains tax liability, the magnitude of reaction to the capital gains tax cut will likely vary with firms’ characteristics. Our analysis in the previous section suggests that in the event of a capital gains tax cut, the impact from demand side on stock return will be larger for growth stocks than for income stocks. This implies a cross-sectional effect of a capital gains tax cut and is captured by a positive interaction term (WKC*Divi), indicating a larger price increase for growth stocks than income stocks during the capitalization week ( EMBED Equation.3 ). On the other hand, for a current shareholder who faces a capital gains tax liability, a capital gains tax reduction offers a strong incentive for him to sell shares with large embedded capital gains to rebalance, consequently leading to a large lock-in effect on the stock returns. Therefore during the week the lock-in effect dominates the capitalization effect, stocks with larger embedded capital gains and higher percentage of tax sensitive individual ownership will experience lower stock returns. In our specification above, this is captured by a negative ( EMBED Equation.3 ) interaction of three variables (WKL*Gainsi*INDi): the lock-in week dummy variable, the embedded capital gains on the stock, and the percentage of shares of the stock owned by individual investors, the sole shareholders directly affected by TRA97. To test the prediction on the effect of the capital gains tax cut on the float of shares, we need to first provide a measure for the float of stock. Unlike the shares outstanding, the float of shares measures the number of shares actively traded and is usually less than shares outstanding. For example, shares owned by insiders sometimes are subject to certain restrictions and cannot be quickly sold in the market thus not included in the float; some long-term buy-and-hold investors are also less inclined to churn their portfolio for short-term price fluctuation. Their holdings are not included in the float during normal time. However, for a major event, such as a capital gains tax cut, an investor may find it optimal to buy additional stocks and/or to sell some stocks with a large price appreciation to rebalance his portfolio. Trading from these investors is likely to temporarily increase trading volume. In particular, the increase in trading volume caused by the capital gains tax cut is likely to be concentrated in the few weeks when the tax cut is announced. We use trading volume as a proxy for the float of shares of stocks. Let  EMBED Equation.3 be stock i’s logarithmic weekly trading volume. We formulate our regression equation on the tax effect on the float of shares as follows:  EMBED Equation.3 , (13) where the week dummies are defined the same as above and the controls are discussed in next section. Our prediction for stock float suggests that the coefficients for both interaction terms ( EMBED Equation.3 ) and ( EMBED Equation.3 ) will be positive because there should be more individual investors buying shares of stocks with growth potentials during the week the capitalization effect dominates and more individual investors selling their holdings with large embedded capital gains to rebalance their portfolios during the week the lock-in effect dominates. IV. Empirical analysis Sample and Summary Statistics We use stocks included in the CRSP dataset with observations for the entire period between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 1997. Following Lang and Shackelford (2000) we focus on weekly returns. Explanatory variables include dividend dummy, embedded capital gains, the percentage of individual ownership of a stock, week dummies defined to identify the event period, and various interaction terms to identify the tax effect. Dividend dummy is defined based on a firm’s dividend distribution in 1996. It takes a value 1 if a firm did not pay any dividends for the year 1996 and 0 otherwise. We calculate the weekly return as follows  EMBED Equation.3  (14) where  EMBED Equation.3  is the daily return and t runs from Wednesday to the following Tuesday to be consistent with the event windows. The logarithmic weekly volume is similarly calculated as  EMBED Equation.3  (15) where  EMBED Equation.3 is the daily trading volume of stock i on day t and the summation runs from Wednesday to the following Tuesday. We use both volumes in shares traded and in dollar amount for our empirical tests. We obtain daily stock returns and trading volume from the daily CRSP data set. Dividend, stock price, and shares outstanding are extracted from the monthly CRSP data set. To obtain the percentage of shares of each stock owned by individual investors, we extract institutional investors’ ownership as of March 31, 1997 from Form 13F submitted to the SEC by investment management companies. We then compute the percentage of individual ownership on stock i as follows INDi = 1 – Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. We exclude non-common shares such as preferred stocks from our analysis. Firms with missing observations are also removed. Following Klein (1999, 2001), we define the embedded capital gain as the price appreciation in the last five years. Specifically, the five year embedded capital gain is calculated as the price appreciation from 3/31/92-3/31/97 (5-year holding gains) for each stock. We require that a firm has at least 5 years of uninterrupted data (from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1997) to be included in our sample. For the empirical tests, we use weekly returns in the last three years (1995, 1996 and 1997). Our control variables for the weekly return regression include the dividend distribution dummy, the percentage of individual ownership, the embedded capital gains for the past five years, the interaction terms WKL*Gainsi, WKL*INDi, WKC*Gainsi, WKC*INDi, Gainsi*INDi, INDi*Divi, the size of the firm measured by the logarithm of firms’ market capitalization, and the calendar effect represented by month and annual dummies. For the volume regression, we only use the firm size and the calendar effect as control variables. We also check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of loss firms and the market returns later in the section. Table 1 presents the basic summary statistics for variables used in our regression analysis for both the subsample of firms with positive embedded capital gains and the entire sample including firms with embedded capital losses. Each variable is defined at the bottom of the table. The subsample consists of information on 1,747 firms with positive embedded gains for the past five years and a total of 275,564 observations. The average weekly return for firms with positive embedded capital gains is 0.43 percent with a standard deviation of 6.49 percent. In the meantime, the full sample including firms with embedded capital losses consists of 496,809 observations and has a lower average weekly return of 0.26 percent and a slightly higher standard deviation of 7.25 percent. On average, half of the firms in the gains subsample and 54 percent of all firms in the entire sample paid dividends in 1996. The average five-year price appreciation for the gains subsample is 168 percent with a standard deviation of 655 percent. The five year price appreciation is much lower at 75.7 percent with a standard deviation just above 500 percent for the full sample. The five-year embedded capital gain is highly skewed with half of the firms gaining less than 69 percent for the gains subsample and less than 9.2 percent for the full sample as indicated by the median. The average percentage of shares owned by individual investors is 63 percent with a standard deviation of 26 percent for the gains subsample and almost identical mean and standard deviation for the full sample. The trading volume for the gains subsample has a mean of 11.6 and a standard deviation of 2.2 when measured in logarithmic shares. The statistics are slightly higher at 14.3 for the mean and 2.7 for the standard deviation when measured in logarithmic dollar volume. The summary statistics for the trading volume for the entire sample including both the gains and loss firms are almost identical to that of the gains subsample. The number of observations for the volume is slightly smaller than for the returns. The smaller sample size for volume data is caused by the merge of weekly volume with the institutional ownership data. Return Tests for Joint Tax Capitalization and Lock-in Effects We use generalized least squares to estimate our regression model in order to account for possible heteroscedasticity. Our first set of regression results is based on equation (12) and reported in Table 2. Consistent with our model predictions, the coefficient estimates associated with WKC and the interaction term (WKC*Div) are both positive and highly statistically significant with p-values less than 1 percent. The results indicate that the market reacted positively to the possibility of a capital gains tax cut. The weekly return for the capitalization week is 5.78 percent higher than the average weekly returns. Moreover, non-dividend paying stocks yield 1.58 percent higher returns on average during the capitalization week than do dividend-paying stocks for the same period. The coefficient estimate associated with the interaction term (WKL*Gainsi*INDi) is negative at  EMBED Equation.3  percent and statistically significant at the conventional five percent level. This suggests that stocks with large embedded capital gains and high individual investor ownership have lower returns during the lock-in week. The coefficient implies that for firms with the average percentage of individual ownership, a one standard deviation increase in the five year embedded capital gains will yield 93 basis points  EMBED Equation.3  lower weekly returns during the lock-in week. For firms with an average five year embedded capital gains, a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of individual ownership leads to 10 basis points  EMBED Equation.3  lower weekly returns during the lock-in week. The above findings are consistent with both potential buyers anticipating the possible tax rate cut and trading before the effective date and potential sellers withholding their shares until after the effective date. Investors respond by increasing their demand for stocks and driving up prices during the capitalization week. This is particularly evident for non-dividend paying growth stocks, whose returns are more likely to face capital gains taxation. After the lower tax rate became effective, individual investors sensitive to capital gains tax liabilities were more inclined to sell positions with large embedded capital gains to rebalance their portfolios. This leads to a lower price for stocks with large embedded capital gains and a higher percentage of individual stock ownership during the lock-in week. While we have documented a strong general market reaction during capitalization week ( EMBED Equation.3 =5.52 with P-value of 0.0001), the evidence for a dominant lock-in effect is weaker for the broad market. The estimate for WKL is  EMBED Equation.3  percent and is insignificant statistically. There are two potential explanations for this result. First, once the capital gains tax rate is reduced, current shareholders do not have to react immediately to lock in the lower tax liability unless they believe that the government is going to raise the tax rate again soon. In other words, the lock-in reaction from current shareholders will likely be spread out over time. Secondly, since this estimate is for the overall market reaction to the tax cut, unless the sellers are moving their proceeds out of the stock market, we may not observe an overall negative return response. For example, shareholders may sell appreciated stocks to take advantage of the lower tax rate. However, they might use the proceeds to buy back stocks so that their new shares will have higher basis. This will generate higher restart options value as suggested in Constantinides (1984) and Dammon and Spatt (1996). Our findings suggest that a dominant lock-in effect appears to be concentrated in a subset of stocks that have both large embedded capital gains and high individual ownership in the week after the announcement of the effective date of the tax cut. Given that TRA97 directly affects individual investors with large embedded capital gains, this finding is consistent with our prediction on the relation between stock price and capital gains taxes. Our regression analysis also provides the following findings. Non-dividend paying stocks earn slightly lower weekly return on average than dividend paying stocks. This suggests the possible existence of value premium for this time period. Stocks with higher individual ownership experience higher weekly returns on average. The interaction between WKL and the embedded capital gains is significantly positive. There are two possible explanations. First, institutional investors not subject to capital gains tax could be buying these stocks. Second, it could reflect momentum trading by some investors. Both phenomena tend to drive the prices further up. Size is positive and statistically significant but small in magnitude. This indicates the superior performance of large cap stocks relative to small cap stocks for this time period. The annual returns to large stocks and small stocks are 37.71 percent versus 33.21 percent for 1995, 23.07 percent versus 16.5 percent for 1996, and 33.17 percent versus 22.4 percent for 1997. Stocks with higher individual ownership experience a lower average weekly return during the capitalization week. Non-dividend paying stocks with higher individual ownership also yield a lower weekly return on average. Although not reported in the table, we find that the annual dummy is highly statistically significant for year 1995 but not for year 1996. The monthly dummies on the other hand are all statistically significant indicating the existence of monthly return variation. Given our panel data, firm characteristic variables (gain, dividend, size and individual ownership) also act as controls for the fixed effect in the test. Return Tests with all Firms and Market Returns Our basic specification for the return test focuses on firms with positive five year embedded capital gains. The reason for this is that our model makes explicit predictions regarding the lock-in effect for firms with embedded capital gains. For firms without embedded capital gains, the lock-in will not likely have a significant effect on stock returns in the week after the tax cut announcement. However, tax-sensitive investors may sell their holdings with embedded capital losses before the tax cut becomes effective so that they can benefit from the higher tax rebate under higher tax rate. If so, firms with embedded capital losses and individual ownership will experience some downward price pressure during the week before the tax cut announcement. Since these stocks are also subject to the capitalization effect, which increases the demand from investors who have no existing positions in them and investors who are not subject to taxation, the net effect on these stocks is ambiguous. On the other hand, because there is no lock-in effect on individual holdings of stocks with embedded capital losses after the tax cut announcement, the selling pressure on these stocks will likely be small while the capitalization effect remains for these stocks. While these hypotheses are not directly implied by our model, they are consistent with our general intuition of the tax effect on asset prices. To check the robustness of our findings on the return tests on joint capitalization and lock-in effects and to test the hypotheses on firms with embedded capital losses, we extend our specification in (12) to incorporate two additional terms: (WKC*Gainsi*INDi*Li) and (WKL*Gainsi*INDi*Li), where  EMBED Equation.3 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if firm i has an embedded capital loss and 0 otherwise. The extended specification is given by  EMBED Equation.3  (14) Our discussions above suggest that the coefficient for the interaction term  EMBED Equation.3 will likely be statistically insignificant ( EMBED Equation.3 ) because the selling pressure may offset the capitalization effect, and the coefficient for the interaction term  EMBED Equation.3 will be negative ( EMBED Equation.3 ) because  EMBED Equation.3  for firms with embedded capital losses. A negative coefficient will yield a higher return for firms with larger embedded losses in the week immediately after the tax cut announcement. Table 3 reports the regression results with the two additional interaction terms. Both the signs and magnitude of the effects of key variables are similar to those using the observations on firms with positive embedded capital gains only. Specifically, the coefficient for the capitalization week is 5.5 percent with a p-value less than 1 percent. The coefficient for the lock-in week is  EMBED Equation.3  percent but is insignificant. Regarding the cross-sectional effect of the tax cut, we find that firms distributing dividends earn 1.54 percent higher average weekly returns during the week the capitalization effect dominates, almost identical to the estimate using firms with positive embedded capital gains only. The estimate indicating a dominant lock-in effect is negative at  EMBED Equation.3  percent, which is almost identical in magnitude to in the case with gains firms only and remains significant at the conventional 5 percent test level. For the firms with embedded capital losses, the coefficients are consistent with our predictions. Specifically, firms with embedded capital losses and high individual ownership earn lower weekly average returns than other firms during the week before the tax cut became effective. However, the effect is statistically insignificant at the conventional test level (p-value is 17 percent). Firms with embedded capital losses also earn higher average weekly returns during the week after the tax cut takes effect. For every 10 percent additional embedded capital losses, the average weekly return is about 14 basis points higher during the week after the tax cut became effective, statistically significant at a p-value less than 5 percent. Besides including firms with embedded capital losses, another important control variable is the overall market return. The capital asset pricing model suggests that individual stock returns are determined by their exposure to the systematic risk represented by the return to the market portfolio. Given that a tax cut is a market-wide event, the return to the market portfolio will also likely respond to the tax rate change. Because stocks with different characteristics may have different exposure to the market return risk, the asset pricing effect of a tax cut may also be affected by including the market return in our analysis. To address the potential effect of the market return, we further extend equation (14) by adding the value-weighted returns on all stocks included in the CRSP dataset as an additional control variable. Table 4 reports the results after we control for the value-weighted market return. The market return is positive and highly statistically significant indicating positive exposure of individual stock returns to the systematic risk represented by the market return. The cross-sectional effects of the tax cut remain when we control for the market return. Both the interaction terms (WKC*Div) and (WKL*Gains*IND) remain significant in the predicted directions. Once we control for the market return, the magnitude of market-wide effect from the tax cut in the capitalization week is decreased from 5.5 percent to 2.6 percent. This is consistent with a temporarily increase of market risk caused by the uncertainty surrounding the tax cut before the effective date. A fraction of the increase in individual stock return in that week is a reward for bearing a higher systematic risk. After the tax cut becomes effective, the uncertainty is resolved and we observe the normal relation between individual stock returns and the market returns. While not reported in the table, we also find that the annual dummies are no longer statistically significant with the market returns included. Trading Volume Tests for Joint Tax Capitalization and Lock-in Effects Next, we test the impact of the tax cut on trading volume. Table 5 shows the results of the regression analysis for firms with positive embedded capital gains only. Consistent with predictions from our model, both the interaction term WKC*Div and the interaction term WKL*Gains*IND are positive and highly statistically significant with p-values less than 1 percent. When measured in logarithmic shares, the trading volume for non-dividend paying stocks is on average 0.94 higher than the trading volume for dividend paying stocks, during the week after the market receives news of the rate reduction before it becomes effective. This is consistent with investors buying shares of stocks with high future growth potential, anticipating an imminent capital gains tax cut, leading to increased float of shares. Stocks with large embedded capital gains and high individual ownership also experience higher trading volume during the lock-in week. A one standard deviation increase in five year embedded capital gains leads to 0.13  EMBED Equation.3  higher trading volume on the logarithmic scale during the lock-in week for firms with average percentage of individual ownership. For firms with the average five-year embedded capital gains, a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of individual ownership increases the trading volume by 0.014  EMBED Equation.3 on the logarithmic scale during the lock-in week. This is consistent with investors selling shares of stocks with large accumulated capital gains to rebalance their portfolio after the lower capital gains tax takes effect. In Column B of Table 3, we perform a robustness check using the trading volume in dollars. The results are qualitatively similar. Both interaction terms are positive and highly statistically significant. The dollar volume goes up by 0.48 on average on the logarithmic scale for non-dividend paying stocks relative to the dividend paying stocks. During the lock-in week, a one standard deviation increase in the five year embedded capital gains or the percentage of individual ownership increases dollar volume by 0.12 and 0.012 on the logarithmic scale, respectively. Both are consistent with the results based on the trading volume measured in number of shares. In Table 6, we report the results for the trading volume tests including firms with five year embedded capital losses. As in the return tests, we extend the basic trading volume regression to incorporate two additional interaction terms: (WKC*Gains*INDi*Li) and (WKL*Gains*INDi*Li). As we discussed in the return tests with loss firms, investors may sell shares with embedded capital losses before the tax cut to benefit from higher tax rebate under higher tax rate. Therefore, the coefficient for (WKC*Gains*INDi*Li) will likely be negative because the Gains is less than zero for loss firms. After the tax cut becomes effective, because there is no lock-in effect on firms with embedded capital losses, the capitalization effect is likely to increase the demand and the coefficient for (WKL*Gains*INDi*Li) will also likely be negative. As in Table 5, the main findings on the joint effects of capitalization and lock-in on trading volume remain strong. For non-dividend paying firms, the trading volume is statistically significantly higher on average than that for dividend paying firms during the week the capitalization effect dominates. The trading volume is also higher for firms with larger embedded capital gains and higher individual percentage ownership. For both measures of the trading volume, the magnitude of the effects is slightly lower than that when only positive embedded capital gains firms are used. Our results suggest that trading volume for firms with embedded capital losses are higher when measured in logarithmic shares. However, when measured in dollars on a logarithmic scale, trading volume is lower for loss firms in the week before the tax cut becomes effective and is not significantly affected in the week after the tax cut becomes effective. Our findings on the effect on the trading volume of a capital gains tax cut is consistent with the results reported in Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford (2003). Using announcements of quarterly earnings and additions to the Standard and Poors 500 index as their events, they document that trading volume falls with the incremental taxes saved by deferring the sale of appreciated asset values. In our case, as the capital gains tax is reduced, the incremental taxes saved will decrease. This will lead to an increase in trading volume. In other words, in their case holding period incentive causes current shareholders to restrain from selling shares, which shifts supply to the left. In our setting, current shareholders sell some stocks with embedded gains to rebalance their portfolios, leading to the supply curve shifted to the right. V. Conclusions We analyze the effect of capital gains taxes on returns and trading volume using an equilibrium approach that incorporates both the capitalization effect and the lock-in effect. Extant studies separately model and test the capitalization effect and the lock-in effect. To our knowledge, this is the first to jointly model and test both effects. Our model predicts that in the presence of capital gains taxes, the net effect on asset prices is ambiguous. If the capitalization effect dominates (is dominated by) the lock-in effect, the stock price decrease (increase). The relative strength of the capitalization effect and the lock-in effect depends on the time period surrounding a tax rate change and firm characteristics, such as dividend policy, growth potential, and the percentage of tax-sensitive individual ownership. The number of shares actively traded increases (decreases) as the capital gains tax rate decreases (increases). We empirically test our model predictions using weekly returns and trading volume from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1997, focusing on the 1997 capital gains tax rate cut. Consistent with our predictions, we find evidence of both the capitalization and the lock-in effect. In particular, the capitalization effect dominates the lock-in effect the week between news of the rate reduction and the effective date of the rate cut, (4/30/1997-5/6/1997), reflecting anticipation of the proposed tax cut making it into law. Weekly stock returns are on average higher during the capitalization week. Moreover, non-dividend paying stocks have higher stock returns during the capitalization week (about 1.6 percent) than dividend paying stocks. In contrast, the lock-in effect dominates the capitalization effect during the first week after the rate reduction becomes effective (5/7/1997-5/13/1997). The weekly stock returns are on average 0.4 percent lower during the lock-in week. Stocks with large embedded capital gains and high individual percentage ownership experience lower returns on average during the lock-in week. A one standard deviation increase in the five year embedded capital gains leads to 93 basis points lower weekly returns during the lock-in week for firms with average percentage individual ownership. Non-dividend paying stocks experience higher trading volume during the capitalization week, which is consistent with increased demand for these stocks. Stocks with large embedded capital gains for the past five years and high individual ownership also show higher trading volume, consistent with increased supply for these stocks. The results are robust for both measures of volume in shares and in dollar amount. All these findings are consistent with our model predictions. This paper joins an emerging literature in financial economics (see Reese [1998], Guenther and Willenborg [1999], Poterba and Weisbenner [2001], and Klein [2001], among others) in providing evidence that personal capital gains taxes affect equity trading. Together, these papers challenge a common assumption in financial economics that shareholder taxes are irrelevant in pricing stocks. Although the inferences that can be drawn from these papers are limited to the settings that they examine, their findings call for additional research to examine whether equity prices vary as shareholder taxes change and with the mix of taxable and non-taxable shareholders. References Ayers, B., Lefanowicz C., Robinson, J., 2003, Shareholder taxes in acquisition premiums: The effect of capital gains taxation, Journal of Finance 58, 2785-2803. Blouin, J., L. Hail, and M. Yetman, 2005, Capital gains taxes, pricing spreads and arbitrage: Evidence from cross-listed firms in the U.S., working paper, The Wharton School and University of California at Davis. Blouin, J., J. Raedy, and D. Shackelford, 2003, Capital gains taxes and equity trading: Empirical Evidence, Journal of Accounting Research 41, 611-651. Constantinides, G., 1983, Capital market equilibrium with personal tax, Econometrica 51, 611-636. Constantinides, G., 1984, Optimal stock trading with personal taxes: Implications for prices and abnormal January returns, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 65-89. Dammon, R. and C. Spatt, 1996, The optimal trading and pricing of securities with asymmetric capital gains taxes and transaction costs, Review of Financial Studies 9, 921-952. Dhaliwal, D., L. Krull, O. Li, and W. Moser, 2005, Dividend taxes and implied cost of equity capital, Journal of Accounting Research 43:675-708. Dhaliwal, D. and O. Li, 2006, Investor tax heterogeneity and ex-dividend day trading volume, Journal of Finance 61, 463-490. Feldstein, M., J. Slemrod, and S. Yitzhaki, 1980, The effects of taxation on the selling of corporate stock and the realization of capital gains, Quarterly Journal of Economics 94, 777-791. Graham, J., 2003, Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review, Review of Financial Studies 16, 1075-1129. Guenther, D., and M. Willenborg, 1999, Capital gains tax rates and the cost of capital for small business: Evidence from the IPO market, Journal of Financial Economics 53, 385-408. Klein, P., 1999, The capital gain lock-in effect and equilibrium returns, Journal of Public Economics 71, 355-378. Klein, P., 2001, The capital gain lock-in effect and long horizon return reversal, Journal of Financial Economics 59, 33-62. Landsman, W., and D. Shackelford, 1995, The lock-in effect of capital gains taxes: Evidence from the RJR Nabisco leverage buyout, National Tax Journal 48, 245-259 Lang, M., and D. Shackelford, 2000, Capitalization of capital gains taxes: Evidence from stock price reactions to the 1997 rate reduction, Journal of Public Economics 76, 69-85. Jin, Li 2005, Capital gain tax overhang and price pressure, Journal of Finance, forthcoming. Poterba, J., and S. Weisbenner, 2001, Capital gains tax rules, tax-loss trading, and turn-of-the-year returns, Journal of Finance 56, 353 - 368. Reese, W., 1998, Capital gains taxation and stock market activity: Evidence from IPOs, Journal of Finance 53, 1799-1820. Shackelford, D., 2000, Stock market reaction to the capital gains tax changes: Empirical evidence from the 1997 and 1998 Tax Acts, in Tax policy and the Economy 14, edited by James M. Poterba, National Bureau of Economics Research and MIT Press (Cambridge, MA.), 67-92. Shackelford, D. and R. Verrecchia, 2002, Intertemporal tax discontinuities, Journal of Accounting Research 40:1, 205-222. Table 1: Summary Statistics ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Variable N Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Panel A: Firms with Positive Embedded Gains Wret (%) 275564 0.430 6.8E-8 6.490 -181.45 129.93 Vol 272486 11.610 11.678 2.211 4.605 19.154 $Vol 272486 14.304 14.245 2.743 2.526 23.708 Size 275564 12.248 12.049 2.061 6.920 18.908 Div 275564 0.497 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 Gains 275564 1.681 0.685 6.551 0.000 227.00 IND 275564 0.629 0.651 0.262 0.004 1.000 Panel B: All Firms Wret (%) 496233 0.256 1.3E-8 7.247 -188.87 179.17 Vol 491749 11.749 11.834 2.142 4.605 19.154 $Vol 491749 14.204 14.115 2.701 2.238 23.708 Size 496809 12.030 11.794 2.110 6.920 18.908 RM 496809 0.483 0.703 1.605 -5.684 4.606 Div 496809 0.543 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 Gains 496809 0.757 0.092 5.007 -0.984 227.00 IND 496809 0.643 0.671 0.255 0.002 0.999 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wret is the weekly stock return calculated as  EMBED Equation.3  and  EMBED Equation.3  is the daily return and t runs from Wednesday to the following Tuesday; Vol is the sum of daily logarithmic volume running from Wednesday to the following Tuesday; RM is weekly market return calculated using value-weighted daily returns; Size is the logarithm of the market value as of the end of year 1996; $Vol is the sum of daily logarithmic dollar volume running from Wednesday to the following Tuesday; Div is a dummy variable which takes value of one if the company did not pay any dividend for year 1996, zero otherwise; Gains is calculated as holding gains from 3/31/92 to 3/31/97; and IND is the percentage of individual ownership calculated as one minus the percentage of shares held by institution investors filed on 3/31/97. Table 2: Return Tests for Tax Capitalization and Lock-In -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Variables Predicted sign Estimates p-value -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- WKC + 5.779*** (0.00) WKL - -0.401 (0.34) WKC*Div + 1.578*** (0.00) WKL*Gains*IND - -0.226** (0.04) Div ? 0.142** (0.03) IND ? 0.292*** (0.00) Gains ? 0.003 (0.58) Size ? 0.041*** (0.00) WKL*Gains ? 0.147*** (0.01) WKL*IND ? 0.445 (0.48) WKC*Gains ? -0.010 (0.66) WKC*IND ? -5.277*** (0.00) Gains*IND ? 0.006 (0.47) IND*Div ? -0.454*** (0.00) N 275,564 Adj. EMBED Equation.3  0.0053 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Div is set at one if the firm did not pay any dividend in year 1996, zero otherwise; Gains is the 5-year holding gains from 3/31/92-3/31/97; WKC is the week from 4/30/97-5/6/97; WKL is the week from 5/7/97-5/13/97; IND is the percentage of individual ownership calculated as one minus the percentage of shares held by institutional investors filed on 3/31/97; and Size is the logarithm of firms’ 1996 year-end market capitalization. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The year dummies and month dummies are included in the above regression and the inclusion of those dummies does not change the results. The parameter estimates are expressed in percentage. ***--at or below 1% significance; **--at or below 5% significance; *--at or below 10% significance. Table 3: Return Tests for Tax Capitalization and Lock-In Effects for All Firms -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Variables Predicted sign Estimates p-value -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- WKC + 5.515*** (0.00) WKL - -0.301 (0.40) WKC*Div + 1.542*** (0.00) WKL*Gains*IND - -0.231** (0.05) Div ? 0.141** (0.01) IND ? 0.292*** (0.00) Gains ? -0.007 (0.17) Size ? 0.060*** (0.00) WKL*Gains ? 0.140** (0.03) WKL*IND ? 0.242 (0.66) WKC*Gains ? -0.016 (0.56) WKC*IND ? -4.693*** (0.00) Gains*IND ? 0.042*** (0.00) IND*Div. ? -0.567*** (0.00) WKC*Gains*IND*L ? 0.914 (0.17) WKL*Gains*IND*L - -1.445** (0.03) N 496,233 Adj. EMBED Equation.3  0.0058 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Div is set at one if the firm did not pay any dividend in year 1996, zero otherwise; Gains is the 5-year holding gains from 3/31/92-3/31/97; Dummy variable L equals one if Gains<0, zero otherwise; WKC is the week from 4/30/97-5/6/97; WKL is the week from 5/7/97-5/13/97; IND is the percentage of individual ownership calculated as one minus the percentage of shares held by institutional investors filed on 3/31/97; and Size is the logarithm of firms’ 1996 year-end market capitalization. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The year dummies and month dummies are included in the above regression and the inclusion of those dummies does not change the results. The parameter estimates are expressed in percentage. ***--at or below 1% significance; **--at or below 5% significance; *--at or below 10% significance. Table 4: Return Tests for Tax Capitalization and Lock-In Effects for All Firms Controlling for Market Return ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Variables Predicted sign Estimates p-value RM + 71.18*** (0.00) WKC + 2.589*** (0.00) WKL - -0.296 (0.41) WKC*Div + 1.542*** (0.00) WKL*Gains*IND - -0.231** (0.05) Div ? 0.141*** (0.01) IND ? 0.292*** (0.00) Gains ? -0.007 (0.16) Size ? 0.060*** (0.00) WKL*Gains ? 0.140** (0.03) WKL*IND ? 0.240 (0.66) WKC*Gains ? -0.016 (0.55) WKC*IND ? -4.693*** (0.00) Gains*IND ? 0.042*** (0.00) IND*Div ? -0.567*** (0.00) WKc*Gains*IND*L ? 0.914 (0.17) WKL*Gains*IND*L - -1.445** (0.03) N 496,233 Adj. EMBED Equation.3  0.0285 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RM is weekly market return calculated using value-weighted daily market return; Div is set at one if the firm did not pay any dividend in year 1996, zero otherwise; Gains is the 5-year holding gains from 3/31/92-3/31/97; Dummy variable L equals one if Gains<0, zero otherwise; WKC is the week from 4/30/97-5/6/97; WKL is the week from 5/7/97-5/13/97; IND is the percentage of individual ownership calculated as one minus the percentage of shares held by institutional investors filed on 3/31/97; and Size is the logarithm of firms’ 1996 year-end market capitalization. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The year dummies and month dummies are included in the above regression and the inclusion of those dummies does not change the results. The parameter estimates are expressed in percentage. ***--at or below 1% significance; **--at or below 5% significance; *--at or below 10% significance. Table 5: Trading Volume Tests for Tax Capitalization and Lock-In for firms which had positive embedded gains ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Column A Column B --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Variables Estimates p-value Estimates p-value (volume) ($ volume) WKC -0.3366*** (0.00) -0.1390*** (0.00) WKL -0.0896* (0.03) -0.1503*** (0.00) WKC*Div 0.9367*** (0.00) 0.4774*** (0.00) WKL*Gains*IND 0.0321*** (0.00) 0.0282*** (0.00) Size 0.7385*** (0.00) 1.1323*** (0.00) m1 -0.2876*** (0.00) -0.4446*** (0.00) m2 -0.1487*** (0.00) -0.2775*** (0.00) m3 -0.1720*** (0.00) -0.3036*** (0.00) m4 -0.1693*** (0.00) -0.2981*** (0.00) m5 -0.1277*** (0.00) -0.2031*** (0.00) m6 -0.0831*** (0.00) -0.1472*** (0.00) m7 -0.0715*** (0.00) -0.1343*** (0.00) m8 -0.2036*** (0.00) -0.2391*** (0.00) m10 -0.0049 (0.75) -0.0062 (0.64) m11 -0.1058*** (0.00) -0.1149*** (0.00) m12 -0.1468*** (0.00) -0.1651*** (0.00) Year95 -0.4163*** (0.00) -0.7390*** (0.00) Year96 -0.1685*** (0.00) -0.3056*** (0.00) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------N 272,485 272,485 Adj. EMBED Equation.3  0.4775 0.7325 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Div is one if the firm did not pay any dividend in year 1996, zero otherwise; Gains is the 5-year holding gains from 3/31/92-3/31/97; WKC is the week from 4/30/97-5/6/97; WKL is the week from 5/7/97-5/13/97; IND is the percentage of individual ownership calculated as one minus the percentage of shares held by institutional investors filed on 3/31/97; and Size is the logarithm of firms’ 1996 year-end market capitalization. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Monthly dummies are included in both Column A and Column B regressions. ***--at or below 1% significance; **--at or below 5% significance; *--at or below 10% significance. Table 6: Trading Volume Tests for Tax Capitalization and Lock-In for all firms ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Column A Column B --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Variables Estimates p-value Estimates p-value (volume) ($ volume) WKC -0.4421*** (0.00) -0.0993*** (0.01) WKL -0.3331*** (0.00) -0.1872*** (0.00) WKC*Div 0.8001*** (0.00) 0.4435*** (0.00) WKL*Gains*IND 0.0267*** (0.00) 0.0268*** (0.00) WKC*Gains*IND*L -1.0314*** (0.00) 0.5811*** (0.00) WKL*Gains*IND*L -1.8220*** (0.00) 0.0122 (0.92) Size 0.6574*** (0.00) 1.0848*** (0.00) m1 -0.2739*** (0.00) -0.3894*** (0.00) m2 -0.1469*** (0.00) -0.2411*** (0.00) m3 -0.1581*** (0.00) -0.2626*** (0.00) m4 -0.1766*** (0.00) -0.2867*** (0.00) m5 -0.1160*** (0.00) -0.1725*** (0.00) m6 -0.0674*** (0.00) -0.1161*** (0.00) m7 -0.0809*** (0.00) -0.1363*** (0.00) m8 -0.2001*** (0.00) -0.2311*** (0.00) m10 -0.0161 (0.16) -0.0263*** (0.01) m11 -0.0954*** (0.00) -0.1248*** (0.00) m12 -0.0887*** (0.00) -0.1359*** (0.00) Year95 -0.3235*** (0.00) -0.4565*** (0.00) Year96 -0.1069*** (0.00) -0.1583*** (0.00) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------N 496,809 491,749 Adj. EMBED Equation.3  0.4216 0.7209 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Div is one if the firm did not pay any dividend in year 1996, zero otherwise; Gains is the 5-year holding gains from 3/31/92-3/31/97; WKC is the week from 4/30/97-5/6/97; WKL is the week from 5/7/97-5/13/97; IND is the percentage of individual ownership calculated as one minus the percentage of shares held by institutional investors filed on 3/31/97; L is a dummy variable which takes value of one if Gains is less than or equal to zero and takes a value of zero otherwise; Size is the logarithm of firms’ 1996 year-end market capitalization. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Monthly dummies are included in both Column A and Column B regressions. ***--at or below 1% significance; **--at or below 5% significance; *--at or below 10% significance.  SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT  Figure 1: Effects of capital gains taxes on asset price and share float. (P0, Q0) is the equilibrium price and quantity before the capital gains taxes and (P1, Q1) is the equilibrium price and quantity after the capital gains taxes.  This will be the case if the investor uses the last-in and first-out (LIFO) rule in calculating his tax liability.  This also allows sellers to have tax basis different from the current price.   EMBED Equation.3 only when the capital gains tax rate is zero.  If an investor has to rebalance his portfolio by adding positions in some stocks and reducing positions in other stocks around the capital gains tax cut period, he is more likely to add the positions when the tax rate cut announcement is imminent, and delay his selling until the tax rate cut is effective if he has embedded capital gains on the positions.  See Lang and Shackelford (2000) for more detail about the legislative history of TRA97.  We extend the regression analysis to include firms with no positive embedded capital gains in subsection IV. C.  Note that during the lock-in week, the interaction includes a measure of current individual ownership because current individual shareholders are the only sellers affected by the legislative change. Conversely, during the capitalization week, the interaction does not include a measure of current individual ownership because the composition of the buyers affected by the rate reduction need not bear any relation to the current percentage of shares owned by individuals..  Since we try to capture the stock appreciation potential using dividend variable, the dividend dummy takes value of 1 when there is high appreciation potential (or when dividend distribution was zero in year 1996) and zero when there is low potential (or when the firm distributed dividend in year 1996).  We thank Ozer Asdemir for providing the institutional stock ownership data. Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003), Dhaliwal and Li (2006), and Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and Moser (2005), among many others, also use this measure to capture the extent to which individuals hold shares in the firm.  Complex netting provisions, which are beyond the scope of this paper, govern the taxation of capital gains and losses (see Shackelford, 2000). Having said that, our predictions about the incentives to sell stocks with embedded capital losses before the rate fell assume that the investors can utilize the capital losses. More specifically, we assume a net capital gain position, i.e., total capital gains exceed total capital losses.  We also performed the analysis with a fix effect, the results are very similar as reported in table 3 and not presented in the paper for brevity.     PAGE  PAGE 10 C B A Q1 P1 P0 Q0 D’ S’ S D Price Float $%@ABDFSrstvzŸ ”©¬ŌŻŽßąēź   . < @ E F G H M P Q R öźŽŅźĘźĮ¼ø±­¦±¢±­¦±ž±ž±­¦±š±–’ŽŠ†‚†~zv­rnhĢQÄh'ßh2|hy8hŌ|ch4#Uh“ ƒhĄ Ph)2éhĮ^hŹFhf1cho2hÉy hø*HhĮ^hø*H hø*Hhø*HhŃŅ hf1c5 hø*H5h$V°hø*H5CJ(aJ(h$V°h9Ś5CJ(aJ(h$V°h$V°5CJ(aJ(h$V°hŹF5CJ(aJ(hf1c5CJ,aJ,)BCDEFTrst‚Ÿ ”øŽßąš   . N O śņņņņķņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņā× $dha$gdf1c $dha$gdf1cgd'ß$a$gdf1cgd@%¦C4>(>e>żżżżO P Q R S į  # $ % . / z{|}æĄōōōōģä×ĻĻļ±¼¼¼©ž $dąa$gd›r¼$a$gdčQ¶ $dha$gddągd×6V $dha$gd4"dhgd×6V $ Ęø ąa$gd4"$a$gd4"$a$gdRī $dha$gdf1cR S ä F G m n o €  ļ š    1 2 © Ŗ č é ź   { | Ŗ « ¬ Å Ę Č É ą į ā ó    # üųōģōįģŲģōģōĶģŲģōÅüŗűÅü©„š©‘©„ōü„xoxfxhĶ{¾5CJ aJ hÉy5CJ aJ hCa©hCa©5CJ aJ hŚyŒ5CJ aJ hø*HhR=hK460JjŃhK46UhK46jhK46UhR=hRī0Jj¦hRīUjhRīUjĖhx/UhR=hx/0Jjhx/Ujhx/Uhx/h)2éhRī(# $ % - . C G M ] c e € ‘ – “ ¹ ŗ Ć č ź ķ ų )+,34:>IU[ln~„†˜žĮÄÅŅųś  7?@Rfpuz‡’“ßśõśńķéķéķåįķįŻįŻįŻįŁÕŻŁŻåŻŁŃŁŻŁŻįåįåŁŻĶįåŁįŁÉŁįŁįŁÉÅįĮÉÅɽ¹µÉ½±å­©h+Rh^ŹhŗIPhę(…hę‚hėˆhO‹hÅŖhłBh[ƒh\ ÕhäY„h]!DhtÅho2hÉyh«ChCa©hø*H h=::5 hCa©5Bßõöś ?@IKLMfšŗ»ĒĢšLdh…†‡ˆ‰ŠŸ¬“¼ėō÷ 8<Vbkwy}~æĄŠŃüųōšģčäąģÜųüģŲšŌüŌŠĢŌĢŌĢŌĢŌōŌČÄČÄĄą¼ąČąŌąø“ąČąĄ°¬ ›–ŽŠh5S-h§‚h§‚5 h§‚5 hčQ¶5hčQ¶hčQ¶5CJaJhŚyŒhø*Hhxc¾h»ģhėˆhYghü6Ęh³i“hѶh-FµhėJ›hDuh£ŻhŗIPhÉyhäY„hłBhę‚hņtēh^ŹhšAĀ6ĄŃ q$_'ą*?-‘.p5y9¬:±¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢“$„Šdą`„Ša$gdÜ/Š$„Šdą`„Ša$gd›r¼M$dąC$Eʀfš”†a$gd›r¼ ‹–ķõ)2knotwØŪŻē:=MOPTk{ƒŒ•—§ØÉÜéKLOmŸ ”„³“ĘĒņö PQeg‹“¾ĄĮĻŠ*/2BSüųüųüųōšōųüųüųüōüųüģüģüģüģüčüģüäüąüąÜŲŌüŲąŠĢąŲąŲąŲÜŲČÄĄÄģļÄøĄÄĄÄ“¼“Äh• ©hÉyhDuhĒPŻhč Mh !“h [ŗh(ZhšAĀh^Źh£Żhœe3hwe*hž(hO2ƒhųoh“ ƒh5S-hirsES`±·øŌŽÆĒÕŽėń.5?EOPWce•­½ÄŃŅÓ×é"0MOV]üųōüųüšģčģč乣ӹĻļµĻ¼±ąģčģčąģ­ą©ž“ˆÓ‚wlhŽh¬ B*phhŽh\*yB*ph hCßCJhŽhti B*phhŽhĒ)B*phhŽh UB*phh UhayÉh_LÆ h!K,hC ³hC ³B*phhhC ³B*phhC ³ h¾OtCJ h‚r‘h¾OthĒ)h_/hghŅmžh©!hDuhč MhŸ&ƒ(]e{|}‚„‡œžŸ ¬®ĮÖäē%w…‡›©®±Ņ+Yvy§ŌÜŻēōģōģōģōįÖĖĄµ­Ą¢žš’šŽžŠšŠš’šŽ†‚Š~z~zvrnvrjhwe*hå&Xh-FµhüjGhxMhłq#hayÉhŒCEhīBŻh [ŗhayÉh_/6h_/hŅmžhŽhŅmžB*phhD{wB*phhŽhĒ)B*phhŽhayÉB*phhŽh_LÆB*phhŽhJxÉB*phhŽh\*yB*phhŽB*phhŽhŽB*ph)  9=]”ČŃ  D f é M!\!Ų!ä!8"x"–"·"ø"ō"ś"ž"D#F#•#¦#Į#Ā#Ä#Ų#ß#ū#$$p$q$r$‚$ƒ$„$Œ$$”$•$”$§$ø$Ā$ē$ķ$ī$ó$%%6%üųōšģšōčäąäąōäÜäŲäŌŠŌĢČĢÄĄ¼ø¼ø¼Ą“°“°¼°¼°ĄŌä¬Ø¤š¤Ä¤¬Ä ¤ØšØšØšØhĄ}h›=hŹFh:ahź hö$“höX“hy8hŽh‰kCh¹C<hOdęh !“h\*yhčNUh_%}hø1Ūh!D½hß^hRqFhC-‚hs‚hč MhxM=6%7%8% &&4&9&q&r&”&™&„&ŗ&»&ä&ē&''\']'_'`'“'±'ŗ'æ'Q(R(^(m(}(Ž((Ę(Ģ(Ó(Õ(Ö(ā(ī(õ()))\)])ƒ)½)ņ)ó)ō)V*\*©*Ŗ*ą* +8+9+q+s+…+Ž+Ÿ+ +Ø+“+üųōüōšōšōģčōčäąčäčÜąčŲŌšŌŲšŲŠŲŠŲšŲĢŲšŲŠŲŠŲĢŲšŲČŲČšÄĄÄ¼Äø“°¼“¬ĄØ¬Ø¬h¢dżhA*™hb7åhóLahE_ŒhłR:h²,$hLeńh+Rh[QrhńĖh¦SIh  WhLhŒCEh”+ühd#PhĄ}hC-‚hN*„hŹFh>{B“+µ+ø+¹+Ę+Ź+Ń+Ł+ā+2,E,X,b,g,n,y,¢,¼,ō,õ,- -?-›-Š-...7.:.B.P._.y.†.‘.š.Ó.ß.ą.ę.ś. /// /./0/>/N/^/ƒ/·/Š/Ż/õ/ū/00M0f0o0‰0Š00Æ0üųńųķéķåųķįåįéįŻŁįŁŻįųÕŃÕĶÉĶÕųÕÉÕŃÉÕÅĮåÅÕÅéÕÅÕŽÅÕ¹ÕµÕµ­Õ©ÕµÕµÕ­„héxāh+>ūh‘.±hE_Œ6h–e^hy8hŖn^h !“häEhÓEƒh ^ah¢dżhE_Œhq ahY hT@mh”5h›o+hs$ hb7åhb7åhb7åh²,$AÆ0Ä0Õ0Ž0ę0ē0č0ń01!1,12171J1L1a1b1ą1į1ķ142;2@2C2I2d2i2j2n2‰2š2Ź2Ė2Š2Ū2ź2ń2õ2’23-3.303:3@3L3i3|3š3›3¾3ē3ņ3S4T4k4l4„4›4üųüōšģōčäąäÜŲčŌšŌčŠÜčÜčÜščÜčÜĢÜČÜÄÜÄÜÄÜČÜŠĄ¼ŠĄøĄ±­©„©”©©™hjHhšh!ehŌRHhn:Šh"ß hK hK hwe*h(‹hK h.Mh‘.±h+>ūhP"hy8hHC•h‹7Z7[7~7¼7½7Ä7ņ7ų7 8 8 888+878D8E8_8z8{8‚8Š8‹8”8™8§8¶8üųōšųüųōųōųōųüųšģčäąäÜäŲäŲųŌčŠĢŌčČŌčŌčĢčųÄĄČčŌčŌč¼čŌčĢŌčōŌōøŌøŌÄø“ø°¼hHC•h²,$h)Q^hĆaIh&i§hŌRHhļy'hļmĒhü`čhhm~hK~„hzLhĪ;}hÜ/ŠhņShwe*h(U hP"hjHhĒfåE¶8Ā8Ü8ę8ķ8ō8+9/929:9T9Z9]9f9w9x9y9Ó9Ž9ß9ķ9ō9:3:4:]::::Ŗ:«:¬:­:Ń:Ņ:;;;B;C;D;E;F;H;w; ;«;¬;Ķ;Ļ;Š;ß;<<<<<<%<&<(<[<d<s<‚<ƒ<„<ģ<õ<ż< ==üųōųüųōųōšųģōųōčäąÜäÜäÜäÜąŲŌÜäŠĢčüčģčČüčÄģĢčĄčĢčĢč¼ČĢčĢÄĢøĄüĄ“Ą“Ģ“Ą“Ą“Ąh9hgMh¢dżhŌRHhčQ¶häY„h$m hļmĒhŲOhü`čhÜ/ŠhØk!h­f hąaĪhįōhgh)Q^hņShhm~G¬:E;G;<<ƤPA$„rdh^„ra$gdčQ¶S$ & F „ŚdhEʀ”B¢f·š^„Śa$gdļmĒ $dha$gdļmĒO$ & FdhEʀ”B¢f·ša$gdļmĒ<==č=Ū>ą> ?ßAVB‡B‹C« •†wlwwYl$„Š„Šdą^„Š`„Ša$gdüĮ $dąa$gd›r¼$„Šdą`„Ša$gd›r¼$„Šdą`„Ša$gdčQ¶ $dąa$gdÜ/Š $dha$gd›o+S$ & F „ŚdhEʀ”B¢f·š^„Śa$gdÜ/Š ===F=V==ˆ=č= > >>˜>Ł>Ś>Ū>Ü>Ż>ß>ą> ?G?H?’?“?¦?§?Ø?©?¶?·?ø?¾?Ä?Ī?Ļ?Ń?Ņ?å?ę?ē?č?@@@@@@1@üųüōüōüšģščšäąÜŲŌŠĖąĘą¾ąÆ¢¾ąĘąĘšąĘą¾ą‹~¾ąĘąĘą¾ąjĆh¾9¬hļvEHō’UjT"æE hļvCJUVaJh²TNhļv6j¼h¾9¬hļvEHō’Uj "æE hļvCJUVaJjhļvU hļv6 hļv5hBKéh  WhA*™hÓEƒhļvhn:ŠhéxāhįōhąaĪhØk!h›o+hÜ/Š/1@2@3@4@A@B@T@e@@‚@ƒ@–@—@˜@™@½@¾@Ń@Ņ@Ó@Ō@AA+A,A-A.A6AJA`AbAtAvAzA{AŽAšćŪ×Ņ׏×ŅĄŅ±¢Ą×Ūד†Ū×Ū×wjŪ×b×Ņ×Ņ×Ū×h²TNhļv6jh¾9¬hļvEHō’Uj;ĘćF hļvCJUVaJjķ h¾9¬hļvEHō’Uj±#æE hļvCJUVaJjŅ h< hļv6EHņ’Uj¤*ńF hļvCJUVaJjhļv6UhAhļv6 hļv6hļvjhļvUjŹh¾9¬hļvEHō’UjĪÅŅF hļvCJUVaJ#ŽAAA‘A™A°AĘAĒAŪAÜAßAėAóAB BBVBWBjBkBlBmBBŽB”B¢B£B¤BÜBŻBįBāBõBöB÷BšćŪ×Ļ×Ē×Ē×Ć滳Ć×Ūפ—Ū×Ū׈{Ū×s×Ū×dWjkhi¶hļvEHō’Uj'æE hļvCJUVaJh›=hļv6jfh›=hļvEHō’Uj©AĄE hļvCJUVaJj'h›=hļvEHą’Uj³*ńF hļvCJUVaJh{UQhx E6hx EhĻnėhx6įhĀhļv6h²TNhļv6hļvjhļvUjhĀhļvEHō’UjHĘćF hļvCJUVaJ"÷BųB‹CŒCŸC C”C¢CĢCĶCąCįCāCćC»D¼DŃDŅDåDęDēDčDSETElE‚EŠE–E²E·EøEĶE&F'F:F;F÷ó÷óä×÷ó÷óČ»÷ó±ó÷ó¢•÷ó‹ó‡ó{wswó÷ódjéā6G hėN"CJUVaJhŠ+Óhx6įhh{UQh¬}Ų6hĻnėjhļv0JUjŽh—ŅhļvEHō’UjŖ%G hļvCJUVaJjhšt€0JUj=hEahhļvEHō’Ujb|ÅE hļvCJUVaJjŸhi¶hļvEHō’Ujo?$G hļvCJUVaJhļvjhļvU#‹CĘCVE&FWF»GpH«HDImIĘIīIńJKŌKśK2L×N~OĄOłS=TˆT‰TVōééōéŚōŚōŚĻŚĻéĻĻŚŚĻŚŚĻéé $dąa$gd½~¦$„Šdą`„Ša$gd›r¼ $dąa$gd›r¼ $dąa$gdüĮ;F‹häjEHŽ’Uj•ć6G häjCJUVaJ hļv6jƒ:h"žhļvEHō’UjÖPČF hļvCJUVaJj{8h8k*hļvEHņ’UjH$G hļvCJUVaJjt6h"žhļvEHō’Uj¹PČF hļvCJUVaJhļvjhļvUjl4h8k*hļvEHņ’Uj6$G hļvCJUVaJ#fKŠK‹K“K”K„K¦K¹KŗK»K¼KŌKÕKčKéKźKėKōKõKżKžKLLLL˜LŖL«LńLņLóLMMMM-M.M/M0MQMRMeMüõüõüķüŽŃķüķüĀµķü±üķü¢•ķü‘Œ‘ü‘ü‘üķü}pķüķüjēIh²HhļvEHą’Ujb,ńF hļvCJUVaJ h×X­6h×X­j^Fh}>‹h:zEHŽ’UjIä6G h:zCJUVaJh}>‹j³Bh}>‹häjEHŽ’Uj­ć6G häjCJUVaJj—@h_whļvEHņ’Uj½ĶōF hļvCJUVaJjhļvU hļv6H*hļv)eMfMgMhMiMjM}M~MM€M‚M”MNNNNNN>N?NRNSNTNUNaNbNÖN~OO’O“O”O•OĄOPšćŪ×Ļץ³Ļ×Æ×Ļ× “Ļ×ĻׄwĻ×Æ×ÆŪÆh[ŪÆWh: ÖjļTh®—häjEHā’UjĪć6G häjCJUVaJjÕRhą`ńh×X­EHō’Uj mÄE h×X­CJUVaJjĪPh wžh×X­EHō’Uj?RČF h×X­CJUVaJhļvjLNh²Hh×X­EHą’Uj÷dG h×X­CJUVaJjh×X­Uh×X­jhļvUjELhöA9hļvEHō’UjŹŅF hļvCJUVaJ"PPTP_PņQ RR¬R­RkSłS=T>TQTRTSTTTbTgT‡TˆT‰TµT¶TÉTŹTĖTĢTęTēTśTūTüTżTˆUŒUÉU VVśöņöīźöęöāöŚöĖ¾Śöŗö³öƧƘ‹§Æ§Æ|o§ÆkÆgÆhĀ6hFj¬\hEa«hļvEHņ’Uj9-ńF hļvCJUVaJj3ZhEa«hļvEHņ’Uj:-ńF hļvCJUVaJjhļvUhļv h—h¶h: Öh½~¦j~Wh²Hh: ÖEHą’Uję$G h: ÖCJUVaJjh: ÖUh,£hŠbh0›hé$—hQh: Ö h: Ö6&VV*W+W>W?W@WAWUWVWiWjWkWlWW™WøW¹WĘWX.X­X®XĮXĀXĆXÄXÜXŻXšXńXņXóX5Y7YXYxY‚Y‰ZŠZ—Z˜ZŻZüųšųįŌšųšųÅøš“ų“ų“ų“ųšų„˜šųšų‰|šųxų“ųtptųlhæmIh !“hYGh.~ņjGehĆh„h¶EHö’UjtHČF h„h¶CJUVaJjjWmĀoĄrōåÖōōĒuĒĒĒf$„Šdą`„Ša$gdāzQ$„ŠdąC$Eʀ°”`„Ša$gd¦č$„Šdą`„Ša$gd¦č$„Šdą`„Ša$gdHK€$„Šdą`„Ša$gd(?õ $dąa$gd›r¼ ŻZįZåZ[ [b[z[\\›\³\6]7]"^8^=^>^L^h^³^“^¶^ā^é^ź^ļ^š^_$_6_g_q_r_{_|_8`H`‰`Ų`ģ`a©aĻaÖa×a#b±blcmcncscˆc‰cŒc¦c¼cæcĄc×cŪcćcddüųüųüųüōüųüšģčščščšģüčäčüčüčąüąÜąÜąäąŲčŲŌčŌŠčĢČĽø³Æ«§«§£Ÿ«Ÿ«Ÿh,!†h‰Z¼hų’häQDha• ha•5 hŚ:o5 h€½hä§h½~¦hŽP­h•÷h7<hŽPÅhŒ&źhņ]hHK€hāzh¹EJh(?õhF%hæmIh.~ņh„h¶>d d˜d™d×dŚdYe@fJf‰f‘fŗfÅfÕfčfšf÷f ggg’g™gšgägīghh h h hhh3hAhVhdhzh†hŒhŌhśhūhühiiOiSiTiXiZiai‚i‘i«i½iĘiĢiżij=j>jŽlüųōšģščäčąäōÜōŲÜŲōŌŠŌĘŌōŌōŌōĀ¾ŌŲŗĀŌ¶Ō®ŌÜŖŌ¦Ōŗ¦Ō¢¦ō¢ŌܚܞܚܚähØk!h #ihę [h{ash`QKh?56h!'h+&h6Øhi\jh n0JUh_%}h?5hqOhY~h™‹h¦čh—,“h™|Ńhāzh„|Čh,!†häQD=Žllmmm(mTmUmVmWm†m‡m›mœmµmÄmßmąmómōmõmömnnMnZn[nįn$o3oGoHo[o\o]o^o”oæoĮoĀoäo:p\pip‚påqjrŖrærĄrsüųüųüųīųźųüųüųęųŽųĻĀŽųęų¾ę¾ųęųŽųÆ¢Žųžųš“Œ“ŒˆŒ“ü“„ˆhē8hy8 h6Øhü6Ę h6Øh hY~hķ! j\ih8­h¦čEHö’Uj9G h¦čCJUVaJh½4žjRgh¶h¦čEHō’Uj&G h¦čCJUVaJjh¦čUh—,“hāzjhØk!0JUh¦čhņ]2s'sYsZs\scs®sįsäst't)tBtFtKtOtPtQtRtUtVtitjtktltttutvtwttŽttt¦tØtÖt×tćt u u8uCuDuEuFuYuüųüųüųōšōģōģōģōģōčäÜäĶĄÜä»ä“䬻äؤ؝ä™ä•äˆ™€|h jh UjhŁ9ąh÷~~0JUh²=ōhĘE hpałhŗ.ƒhuh~thŗ.ƒhŗ.ƒ6 hŗ.ƒhŗ.ƒ hŗ.ƒ6jdkhŗ.ƒhŗ.ƒEHō’UjMæÓF hŗ.ƒCJUVaJjhŗ.ƒUhŗ.ƒh$Žh¬B7hNhē8h¤‡h_0€-ĄrRtEuhuxxŪz¤|@„‚ž„‡„‡Ļ‡4ˆŠŠ*ŠššåŚĖ¼ĖĖĖĖĖ±ŚĖŚŚ $dąa$gd½~¦$„Šdą`„Ša$gdH$„Šdą`„Ša$gd›r¼ $dąa$gd›r¼ $dąa$gdV>”$„Šdą`„Ša$gd—,“YuZu[u\ueuguoupuƒu„u…u†uęuńuņuūuüuvvvv*v6v7v9v:vMvNvOvPv©v½v¾vŃvšćŪ×Ó×Ū×Ä·Ū׳Ƴ§³˜‹§³‡³×Ū×xkŪׇc‡jhHÓUj©th8­h EHö’Uj9G h CJUVaJhHÓj rh7ŚhłkEHō’Uj+G hłkCJUVaJjhłkUhNhłkj—ph7Śh EHō’Uj+G h CJUVaJh®`h jh Ujlmh˜~3h­LnEHō’Uj™łžG h­LnCJUVaJ!ŃvŅvÓvŌvņvóvōvww w w6w8ww€w“w”w•w–wwØwøw¾wĄwĮwŌwÕwÖw×wüwšćŪ×ÓĖÓ¼ÆĖÓ«§Ÿ›ŒŸ{w{s{kgXKkgjÕ|hAh°{`EHō’UjOG h°{`CJUVaJh°{`jh°{`UhŸ'*h×€hAjĒzh7ŚhųOcEHō’UjRõžG hųOcCJUVaJhŸEōjhŸEōUh#8h{asj¹xhŸEōh­LnEHō’UjÆłžG h­LnCJUVaJjh Uh hHÓjhHÓUj±vh8­hHÓEHö’Uj9G hHÓCJUVaJüwżw-x0x1x9xxx£x©xÆxŻxįxåxy&y'y,y-y4yFyGyLyoyĄyĮyźyz z2z3z4z•z–z©zŖz«z¬z¾zĄzĮzŌzÕzÖz×zŲzŪzŠ|śöņīéåįŻŁŻįŻįŻįŻįÕŻŃĶÉĶŃÉŁÉŃĶÉŁĮŁ²„ĮŁ”™”Š}™”ŁyhHjķ€hÆ£h“R0EHö’UjVeG h“R0CJUVaJjh“R0Uh“R0jä~h,N?h,N?EHō’Uj3eG h,N?CJUVaJjh,N?Uhćodhåj hÉIyha; h,N?h`=Xh’dīhō{­ hō{­6hAh˜~3h°{` h°{`6.Š|‹|ž|Ÿ| |”|¤|«|¬|}}N}m}n}o}€}Ē}Ū}~~3~:~@~P~g~†~–~ ~­~²~³~µ~¶~ø~ŗ~»~¼~½~¾~ $&':÷óä×÷óÓĻĖÓĒĆĒĆĒæĖ»Ė·»Ė»Ē»³»³Æ³§ §›‘³³»³‰…}…jh“R0Uh“R0h z“hbLhāzčhāzč6H* h\al6 hāzč6H*hāzčhāzč6hXudhāzčhÉIyhže®h,N?h>ŹhXnDh`=Xhé?Ųhćodj-ƒhÆ£hHEHö’UjöeG hHCJUVaJhHjhHU,:;<=>?lmvx”–ĆŽć䀀"€5€Z€7SZbcgqst‡ˆ‰Š‹¬®Æ±µ¶ŗšćŪ×ÓĻĖĒĆĒĻæ»·³»³·æĻÆĒÆĒÆĒÆ×Ū× “Ū×Ē‹ytj‹h z“h–:w6H* hųOc6h z“h–:w6h z“h z“6H*h z“h z“6j¬‡h_)h“R0EHö’UjŽeG h“R0CJUVaJhÜ_»hÉnĶhd=Mh>ŹhY=huh z“hāzčh`=XhXudh“R0jh“R0Ujm…hFBdh“R0EHō’Uj–eG h“R0CJUVaJ)ŗ»ĀĻÕŻ‚O‚g‚p‚‚‚‚ƒ‚„‚ƒ ƒ„„#„B„C„E„¼„ü„ż„ž„……'…]…^…~…Ä…Ż… ††††ø†ŗ†»†¼†Ó†Ō†Ö†ķ†÷†’†‡‡‡‡öņīņźņęāŽāņŚÖŅĪŅŹŅĘĀ¾ŅĘĀęŅŗŅŹ¶²ŹęŹ®ŹŖ²Ŗ¦®¦Ā¢Ā¦Āžš’šjh6LĄUh6LĄhońhy8hu>ŹhźaYhuhFBdh£)hbLhźQ‰hóDYh†2ųhŁ_@h¼™hJņhHh“R0hˆrģh h/XĒhchÜ_»h z“h z“h z“6H*3‡‡‡‡$‡%‡(‡4‡I‡„‡©‡Ŗ‡½‡¾‡æ‡Ą‡Į‡Ķ‡Ī‡Ļ‡ņ‡ž‡4ˆBˆSˆpˆqˆvˆ{ˆŒˆˆŽˆˆ¢ˆ£ˆ¤ˆ„ˆšćŪ×Ņ×ĪŹ×Ę¾ŗ«ž¾š–’ךŽš’Ž’Š’†‚’Šz’k^zjh­Ząhā1nEHō’Uj÷łžG hā1nCJUVaJjhķNiUhqoģh¶h$l§hóDYhķNih^ņhńLBjō‹hXF(h•küEHō’Uj泞G h•küCJUVaJh¤ ±jh¤ ±Uh>GhnhqPX h6LĄ6h6LĄjh6LĄUjģ‰h6LĄh6LĄEHō’Uj»TäF h6LĄCJUVaJ$„ˆ§ˆ«ˆ¬ˆ­ˆĄˆĮˆĀˆĆˆÅˆįˆäˆīˆņˆżˆ‰6‰j‰n‰o‰t‰‰‰‰‰‰„‰«‰Į‰Ž‰ß‰ Š ŠŠŠŠŠŠ Š)Š*ŠGŠHŠ–Œ—Œ˜ŒšŒØŒüųōģōŻŠģōüōĢōČōÄĄōüōČōüōļÄü¼Ąü²®ü§¢˜“‹‡}y‡uh 0h”UŪjh Ņ0JUh Ņh+„h+„6 h iW6 h c35 hŚ:o5 hR5 häQDh~thMājhčJ³0JUh­Ząh$l§hœvØhčJ³hF<ūj_‘hœvØhųX«EHō’Uj›õžG hųX«CJUVaJjh¶Uh¶h•7ÄhķNi.*ŠHŠ˜ŒĘŒüŒĆŽōŽĒ ‘“ž•&œœžžÆ  “ˆ}ˆ        $dąa$gd{6 $dąa$gd›r¼ $dą¤ša$gd{6$„Šdą`„Ša$gd›r¼O$ & F dąEʀä™”†.a$gd›r¼،»ŒĆŒĘŒĒŒŚŒŪŒÜŒŻŒėŒīŒłŒśŒūŒ23DO\`ˆŠµĀĆÄ×ŲŁŚńŽŽŽ-ŽüųüšüįŌšŠĢŠČŠüĄ¼±¤Ą¼Ÿ›ü›ü—ü“‹ƒtgƒČƒj˜hpEŲhe#GEHņ’Uj$åF he#GCJUVaJjhés Uh£Pįhés hu>Źh/ģh’tu hIR6j8–hp,±hė)EHō’UjąŠF hė)UVhė)jhė)Uh^ņh5šhū>±j·“hpEŲhés EHņ’UjaYäF hés CJUVaJjhIRUh 0hIR(-Ž.Ž/Ž0ŽUŽWŽ]Ž^Ž_Ž`ŽšŽžŽŸŽ¬Ž³ŽńŽņŽóŽōŽ÷ŽžŽ$*4ACDY]cd„ˆŸ®¶ĮĻńpxšćŪ×Ņ×ĪĘ×Ā¾Ņŗ¾ŗ¶²®Ŗ¦¢Ī¢¦¢žš–š–’–¦–ŽŠŽ†Ž‚Ž‚Ž†~ht%ŽhESihO}hž¶h ‰h /:hĀkhźQ‰hĒĀhk^huh„$¶h8*ęh$²hueehe#Ghˆ};hxUh/XĒh/XĒ6h/XĒ hés 6hés jhés Uj’šhés h„GÓEHō’Uj&ZäF h„GÓCJUVaJ-xy•˜±ŗ»¼ĒŹĖĪŅį‘ ‘‘‘%‘&‘?‘P‘v‘{‘‚‘„‘’’’š’Ÿ’„’¦’©’Ŗ’²’Š’Ń’å’ü’““““)“7“K“c“d“z“{““±“ŗ“õńķńéįéńŁĻéńĖĒĄ¼ø“°¬°¼é¼Ø¤ ¤ØœØ˜éœ˜ØøØøéø”¤”ؔؐ”øŒˆŒh$$?h.Ęh/*Źhē&$hĀkh·—h®B›h×€hwh¼m—huGh”wĖh_P¤hk^ hvŠhO}h+Žh]āhvŠh/XĒ6H*hvŠh/XĒ6h/XĒh/XĒ6h/XĒhvŠhO}jht%Ž0JU5ŗ“ź“ķ“K”L”M”O”P”R”V”W”Y”[”\”`”a”c”e”f”h”l”m”o”q”r”v”w”x”y”z”~””€”ƒ”„”†”‰”Š”Œ”Ž””‘”²”!•"•#•…•ż•ž•–üųüōüģāģŻāüģÓģāüĖĮĖŻ·ōĖĮĖ·ōüÆŻ„”ģāüœĮœ—Įœü“‹‡ƒh^hØJvhOT#hŖkPh$$?hMė hĢ0b6 h†6#6hŒ@’h$NLhŒ@’6H*h$NLhŒ@’6h$NLh†6#6H*h†6#h†6#6H*h$NLh†6#6h†6#h$NL6H* hųX«6h$NLh$NL6H*h$NLh$NL6h†6#h|jh$NL1–/–B–E–P–Y–į–ć–ē–ō–ü–——&—'—9—V—‚—‘—„—¦—«—Ą—Ė—š—ö—÷—’—˜˜˜˜˜!˜)˜+˜ ™™™™+™8™>™o™u™˜™™™°™Č™Ļ™×™Ų™ų™šš†š‡šššĪšŚšęšēššš6›üųüųōšōģōģōčäčąÜąäąčŲŌŠäąŌĢŌģŌŲČąĢŲÄąĄŌ¼ø¼ø¼“°“øąĢ¬ąĢ¬øčØ°Ø¤ØĄØøh N*h†y hŪ.éh|jhŻŸh õh¶ )hueehĪhž[hl_h†ZQhŪhĻ2nh‹\–h8/hMC”h$=ķh·—h‰R8h^hĀUßhhÖ@6›•›–›Ę›#œ%œ&œ9œQœ`œcœ‚œƒœ§œØœŃœ×œŲœäœšœ0ŃģūžAžGžLžUžtž›žœžž­ž³ž·žŅžŚžŪžāžūž%ŸRŸmŸvŸxŸŽŸ§Ÿ©ŸŃŸčŸéŸśŸüŸżŸ üųüōüšģōģčģäąäģčųģčģōģÜąÜčÜģąģŲŌĻŹÅĻŹ½¹µ¹µ±­©„±­±””˜‘ h;xa6H* h;xa6h;xahI-kh^ņh*iœh_P¤h#ŒhāgthœAæh+„h+„6 h¹Tā6 hź ›6 h+„6h+„h^h™jhŹ;h—|ÅhŒR“hK:ˆh/#Ņh õhueeh†y 7žŪžļ”2„gØ­Ż®m±¾³cµdµÆ       ‘† $dąa$gdÄ4"$„Šdą`„Ša$gdq d$„Šdą`„Ša$gd›r¼O$ & F dąEʀä™”†.a$gd›r¼            ! ) . 2 3 4 7 8 W ^ h y { ‘ © “ ½ Ź Ģ Ż į ų ”-”1”S”T”s”t”x””Ž””š”›”æ”Ā”Ź”Ė”š”¢-¢.¢0¢1¢3¢7¢üųōšėäߌÓßĻųĖĒĻĖųĻĆüĆųæĻæĻōæōĻü»ĻæĻų·ų»³ųæųÆųæųĒųĖ«§¢›“Ž h•f6hź ›hź ›6 h’O6H* h’O6hź ›hæ‚h^Zéh$Īh¤"Õh®}hF<ūh`Yh¾D&hI-kh;xa hh0,hh0, h~NŻ6 h’Ai6 hāgt6H* hāgt6hh0,hE9hāgth’Ai87¢8¢<¢=¢?¢F¢J¢K¢N¢O¢b¢c¢d¢e¢m¢¢“¢²¢(£)£*£1£C£b£e£”£¹£Ó£é£¤¤¤¤¤¤½¤Ą¤Õ¤Ü¤Ž¤ė¤ģ¤ķ¤„öīöźęāŽŚŅĪæ²ŅŽę®ęŖ¦Ŗ¦¢žš–š–š–Ž–rŽ–š–n–Ž–Ž–hŹ;jŠžh}\ēhDkEHö’UjéäCG hDkCJUVaJjh^OŗUh^Oŗh‰ hF<ūh®.Ühh&;…h’gRjŖœhķ Ehķ EEHś’Uj 8G hķ ECJUVaJhķ Ejhķ EUh jņh}\ēhI-kh’Ohź ›hź ›hź ›6hź ›hź ›6H*+„„„„„ „„„1„2„;„H„X„Y„n„{„ˆ„‰„„‘„•„»„ ¦ ¦ ¦Z¦a¦y¦z¦¼¦ū¦ü¦§%§g§i§Č§Ź§Ė§ć§ų§ØØ Ø"Ø,Ø.Ø1ØKØLØSØdØg؈ػؽؚćŪ×ÓĻĖĻĒĆæ»·Ć³·³æ³Æ«ĆÆ»æĖ槣«£§Ÿ§Ÿ§›—›§›«§«§›«›§Ė§»Ć“Ćh;xahķ Eh¤"ÕhtM=hmV)h’VĆhƒTąh h Ozhū'h‰Knh®.Ühlah’Ohh‰ hueeh^Oŗjh^OŗUj@”h}\ēhRJLEHö’UjåCG hRJLCJUVaJ7½Ø¾ØŃØŅØÓØŌØńØóØ©©'©<©?©@©P©R©S©T©W©X©k©l©m©n©Œ©™©š©©©Ņ©ņ©Ŗ ŖŖ Ŗ.Ŗ9ŖHŖiŖqŖšŖžŖÄŖĢŖŚŖļŖšŖ«÷óä×÷óÓĻĖĻĖĒĻĆ»±Ć­„Ļ–‰„ĻĒ…­Ļ­}­Ē­Ļy­Ē­y­u­}uĻhhoIZh¢[ÆhˆuhxfŠjÉ„h¶+žh¶+žEHś’Ujņō6G h¶+žCJUVaJjh¶+žUhēzLh¬h'b6H*h¬h'b6h'bh[/‡h“h¶+žh;xaj¬£hÆ£hX\IEHö’UjTĒG hX\ICJUVaJhX\IjhX\IU.«««5«9«Š«©«««­«±«¶«¾«Į«Č«ć«¬+¬.¬V¬ˆ¬Ø¬Å¬ē¬ė¬­­8­B­’­˜­³­ø­Ģ­®®®Ū®Ü®Ż®ß®ü®ÆÆĶÆŻÆßÆąÆ"°:°<°=°‚°…°¢°Ż°üųōüōšģōčäąüųōÜŲŌŲÜŠÜŲÜŠüĢČÄĢÄĢÄĄÄĢ¼ĢÄø“ø“°¬Ø¬Ø¤œ’¤Ž¤ŠhöT[h™!h¬h¬6H*h¬h¬6h¬h jøh_†hÜ,åhc‰hŌhōwóh±5Ńh[/‡h2SÕh—hß]shŹ;h|jh¾"Wh;xahxfŠhb ¼hB.Bh¶+žhēzLh¢[Æh6Ż°ę°± ±8±9±>±H±l±m±…± ±Į±Š±ć²ä²š²½³¾³Ē³š³“#“'“(“G“I““Ę“Č“Ń“Ż“Ž“µ4µUµbµcµdµzµ€µ’µ“µ«µÆµæµŌµēµ¶¶¶¶A¶K¶b¶ƒ¶Æ¶üųüųōųüųķōéōåōįŻįÖŅĪŹĘŹĀĘŹĘ¾Ęŗ¶ŗ²®Ŗ²¦¢˜“¦ü¦¦ü¦ü¦ü¦ü¦h4 Õ h"uH6 h™!6 hÄ4"6h@7čhÄ4"hQl~hŌhB.Bh§»hw|hÄ_Wh§J2hŽŽh—[¼h jøhƒTą h™(hm%hm%hõc3h’gRhoIZ h¬h_P¤h¬höT[h™!8dµ“µy¹Ż¼½8æĆęÅcČųŹĖĶÆ •Š{•pppa$„Šdą`„Ša$gdĮ $dąa$gdjYź$„Šdą`„Ša$gd4 Õ $dąa$gd|6Č $dąa$gdÄ4"$„Šdą`„Ša$gd™!O$ & F dąEʀä™”†.a$gdÄ4" ƶŠ¶Ņ¶ä¶ ·C·F·i·q·u·w·‹·®·»·æ·ē·č·é·ī·|ø“øŹøĖøŃøŚøŪøÜøąøēøéøžø ¹k¹m¹y¹ ¹£¹³¹Ź¹Š¹ķ¹*ŗHŗMŗ€ŗšŗńŗ~»†»«»³»Ū»Ż»Ž»¼¼¼ ¼ ¼¼¼¼¼üųüųüōšųšģščščšŽģōŚÖųŅųÖųÖųÖųÖųÖŅÖĪųĪŹĪŅĪĘĀĘĪ¾ĪųĪųĪŗųŗ¶®¤®Ÿ¤®¤ h•f6h#-Bh#-B6H*h#-Bh#-B6h#-Bh2JhØh5>ŽhqpRhźiEh+Šh™!h‰'h8gjh7<0JUh7<hŠhæ {hƒTąh4 Õh¤H>¼¼¼¼¼¼!¼"¼$¼(¼)¼-¼.¼0¼1¼2¼:¼;¼N¼O¼P¼Q¼†¼‡¼µ¼Ü¼Ż¼Ž¼ß¼ņ¼ó¼ō¼õ¼½½Q½R½e½÷ķéåéŻÓŻĪÓŻÓŻÓéåĘå·ŖĘå„唝啝†y•uqiqjhŸÕUhŸÕh4 Õjõ©h|6ČhĒ=EHā’UjcśžG hĒ=CJUVaJjh|6ČUh|6ČhwiÖ h2J6jī§h2JhCøEHō’UjĒ qG hCøCJUVaJjh2JU h•f6hCeh#-B6H*hCeh#-B6h2Jh#-Bh#-Bh#-B6H*h#-Bh#-B6%e½f½g½h½m½t½“½”½•½Ø½©½Ŗ½«½­½š½¾¾1¾2¾3¾4¾E¾F¾G¾Z¾[¾\¾]¾_¾g¾h¾{¾|¾}¾~¾šćŪ×ÓĻ×Ē×ø«Ē×ÓĻŪĻœŪĻ×Ē׀sĒ×ĻŪĻdWŪj·hŸÕh‡nEHō’UjxśžG h‡nCJUVaJjÓ“h|6Čhc>EHō’Uj›>rG hc>CJUVaJjv²h2Jh_§EHō’Uj¾öžG h_§CJUVaJj5°h|6Čh×GjEHō’Uj]FrG h×GjCJUVaJjh|6ČUhŸÕh4 Õh|6ČjhŸÕUjÕ­h2Jh_§EHō’Uj±öžG h_§CJUVaJ"~¾ž¾5æŠæ‹æ«æŗæ×æÜæĄ ĄvĄxĄ€Ą“Ą½Ą¾ĄŃĄŅĄÓĄŌĄÕĄÜĄńĄóĄõĄžĄTĮƒĮøĮėĮōĮżĮĀRĀSĀfĀgĀhĀiĀjĀqĀ{Ā|ĀĀšĀœĀŸĀĆĆBĆcĆsĆüųüōšģšųšųščšäšÜšĶĄÜäš¼šø¼š“ų“ų“ų“¬“¬ä“¼“Œ“Œ“ˆüˆ„ˆh5>Žh( śhįgÜjv»høZthįgÜEHś’Uj¼"‡G hįgÜCJUVaJjhøZtUhøZth GWhjQ¹hqˆhįgÜEHś’Ujœ"‡G hįgÜCJUVaJjhqˆUhpÓh),µh4 Õhqˆh:~hhßiÓhŸÕ4sĆ‡ĆĆ¹Ć¾Ć ÄÄ(Ä)ÄmÄoĄąćěģÄōÄÅ*Å2Å_Å`ŗŧÅØÅ©ÅČÅŠÅŚÅŪÅćÅäÅåÅęÅēÅīÅ^ĘcĘÜʯʜʞĘĒ0Ē1ĒUĒVĒ‘Ē’ĒbČcČsČ-ɲÉĪÉžÉ5ŹOŹPŹ`ŹfŹŖŹ¬ŹüųüōüšüųüģüģüčųčäčųčąčšģčģčÜšÜģčŲŌŠŌĢŌĢŌČŌČĢČŌČŌČÄČĄ¼ø¼ø“°“°“Øhž~³hž~³6h+>Rhž~³h@hŚ%ČhĢm—hjYźh+–hhķ-ThĀ ³hõ`]h¤, hO.Ēh¼c|h„9ĘhźiEhö-*hÓ ühßiÓhqg½>¬Ź­Ź±ŹøŹŗŹ»ŹÅŹĘŹĒŹĪŹõŹ÷ŹųŹĖ#Ė0Ė6Ė7ĖDĖGĖTĖoĖrĖ”Ė¢Ė¾ĖĄĖĖĖĪĖŪĖåĖĢ&Ģ‰Ģ‹ĢÆĢĄĢŻĢ9Ķ:Ķ;ĶŹĶĖĶĢĶĶĶĪĶēĶķĶńĶ ĪĪĪ"Ī-ĪöīźīöīźęźāźŽŚźÖźŅźÖźŚźŚĪŹĘŹŚŹÖŹĀŹ¾ŹĀŹŗŹź¶Æ«§£ž™”ž™ŒˆĀh„GÓh+„h+„6 h¹Tā6 hš6 h+„6hq dh( śhqg½ hž~³h+–hÖO•hÉ6h\Āh¼c|hĒ:hęGĢhĖ[˜h+>Rh˜:.hĮhŹ/¬hhŚ%Čhž~³hž~³hž~³6hž~³hž~³6H*5ĖĶĪĶĪ>ŃYŌņÖ9ŚēŻō¤••••CQ$„ŠdąC$EʀŪj¢&`„Ša$gd›r¼$„Šdą`„Ša$gd›r¼O$ & F dąEʀä™”†.a$gd›r¼ $dąa$gd|6Č-Ī<Ī?ĪMĪUĪVĪaĪhĪlĪoĪƒĪ·ĪøĪÉĪćĪ’ĪĻĻĻĻĻĻ Ļ"Ļ#Ļ%Ļ)Ļ-Ļ.Ļ^ĻyĻĻƒĻˆĻØĻÜĻāĻėĻģĻōĻųĻŠ&ŠˆŠŒŠ«Š¬ŠŻŠŃ+Ń=Ń>ŃfфŃŖŃĀŃÄŃõŃŅüųōųšģüčäčäüąÜŲÓÉÓĽąŲÓÉøÄÓŲą“Ųą°ą°ą“¬°ą°ąØą“¤ą ¤ąœąœąœą¬˜hsah*Sh¶W>hž3h¼c|h!n…h‰ h\³ h\³6 høQ6H* høQ6h€2Jh€2J6H* h€2J6h€2Jh+>Rh­@]hń56h’5Ķh’xŖhwQ°hhģ=®h„GÓ:ŅŅ,Ņ-Ņ.Ņ/Ņ]Ņ}Ņ±Ņ²Ņ¶ŅĶŅŃŅŅŅÖŅļŅ&Ó;ÓDÓEÓHÓPÓXÓZÓ^Ó`ÓaÓbÓuÓvÓwÓxÓŖÓ»ÓŌÓŚÓäÓüÓŌ Ō&Ō'Ō-Ō1Ō7ŌIŌUŌVŌXŌYŌrŌ±Ō²Ō³Ō÷óä×÷óÓóĻĖóĒĆĒæóĆóĆæóæóæóæ÷ó°£÷æŸĒŸĒŸ›ŸĒ›—›—›—›Ÿ“‹‡‹h3Ahvœh­oNh„GÓh¼c|h¶W>h­@]jĄhsah—EHö’Uj@ÅBG h—CJUVaJhN@įh*Sh‰ hEZ‚h!n…hDkjœ½hsah—EHö’UjÅBG h—CJUVaJhsajhsaU5³Ō“ŌµŌ¶ŌĘŌŌŌŻŌ Õ&Õ'Õ(ÕHÕ“ÕĖÕĢÕĪÕņÕöÕÖ@ÖaÖjÖkփ֑֓֯ÖńÖņÖą×į×ć×ä×ęן×ī×ļ×ń×ņ׳×ū×üמ×ŲŲŲ Ų Ų Ų ŲjŲrŲÅŲćŲäŲåŲõńķńéńåńåįŻįŁÕŁŃĶŃĶŃĶŁŃŁŃįÉńÅĮ¹Æ¹Ŗ¹Æ¹ÆĮ¢˜¢Ŗ¢˜¢˜Į”ŒŒ”ŒhŃshc#Jh¶žhCeh=bļ6H*hCeh=bļ6 h‚G–6h#-Bh=bļ6H*h#-Bh=bļ6h=bļhĒhN@įhRJLh śh²VKh—bh—h/2h-R h3AhEZ‚hvœjh¬gB0JU7åŲēŲčŲźŲīŲņŲóŲõŲöŲŁ ŁŁŁ!ŁBŁ±Ł²Ł³Ł“ŁõŁŚ Ś Ś ŚŚŚŚŚŚŚ#Ś*Ś-Ś8Ś9ŚIŚGÜQÜwÜ܂ÜÕÜŪÜ;ŻMŻPŻ’ŻäŻęŻēŻ ŽŽ@ŽAŽ5ßą2ą÷ķ÷č÷ķ÷ķäąäąŲąäŌąŌąŠČ¾ČčČ¾Č¾ŠąŠąŠŗ¶²®²®²ŗŖŗ¦Ŗ¦Ŗ¦¢žšž–ž’ŽhķOčhbŖh­oNhPijhe 6h+PŒhTØhCDžhv_Qh¶žh²VKhŅBHhCehs6H*hCehs6hshxżhxżhŌ96hŌ9hŃs hą ©6h#-BhŃs6H*h#-BhŃs682ą5ą:ąnąoąąą‘ą’ą˜ąŸąčąīą÷ąųą,į.į/į>į?įJįNįUįiįvį‰įØįŗįĆįļįńįšā²āĮāŲāŁāWćdćwćxćzćżćääää.ä/ä@äFä[ä\äzä|äėäģä*å+å>åBåCåråxå€å˜åšåüųüōüšüšüģüčüäüąÜ×ŅĪŹĘĪĀ¾ĪĀĪĀĘŹĪŗ¶ō¶ŗĀŗ¶ŗ²Āŗ®ŗ®ŗ®²®²ŗŖĀʦŖĀ¦Ā¦Ę¦Ęh«Käh+jhM×h” “h'Éhą yhO2ƒhxI”hę(…h_'h1ż h¶gČ5 hŚ:o5hĢi‚he 6hé%Ąh¹Tāh3Ah²VKh2XNhķOčhbŖAēŻ.į/į?įģäŠēźóėŽīšī›ī­¢–‡‡‡‡tl_ „Š„0ż^„Š`„0żgdC ³$a$gd›r¼$ ĘąĄ!„Šdą`„Ša$gddķ$„Šdą`„Ša$gd›r¼ $$dąa$gdD{w $dąa$gd(Q$„ŠdąC$EʀZė”`„Ša$gd›r¼ šåęę"ę3ęFęNęOę›ęÆę¼ęĖęŠęŅęÓęóęüę’ę>ē@ēAē§ē©ēĻēŠē×ēŲēŪēłēśēč*č0č4č9čUčič‡čˆč–čžč¢č„čÆč·č¼č¾čæčŃčēč4éNéźźqź{źļź ė-ė.ėµėņėóė)ķ6ķüųōšųšģčšģäģäąäģÜŲäģŌŠŌĢäąäģōųčČčģčŲģōÄĢŲģäŲäģäŲōŲōŠĄ¼ø¼“¼Č¼Ų°©¢ hdķhCß hdķhM×h+jhlŒh¹Tāhü0)hŖZOhE8@hM×h„#€hź[hueeh”szh 6Čh2hxI”h2XNh«Käh°7×hQņh” “h_'@6ķxķ›ķžķ#ī2īVīWī[ī\īī†īŒīŽīī™īšī›ī¤ī„ī¦ī°ī“īĆīėīōīļļļļ,ļ5ļ;ļ<ļ=ļ»ļĒļššš«šōšõšńń‹ńłņīņłņłņłņłņłéäßŪŌŪŌÉĮŌĮÉĮÉĮ³„ÉŌŪ œ˜œ”Œ”ˆ„|ˆxhß]shėihėi6hpa/hėihņZņeņfņgņĶņėņłņVóhówó ō(ō5ōoōŠō™ōšō›ō$õBõQõ`õaõ™õšõ›õ¶õĀõĆõÄõö7ö:öAöBöQöjö–ö—öĆöÄöÅöŁöńöśöśöļėēßēŪÓŪĻŹĻĘĮĘŗ¶²Ŗ²¶¦¶¢¶š¶¦’¦†~¶z¶v¶¢¶š¶hCßh4@h»hÜh»hÜ6 hX~9h»hÜ h»hÜ6h»hÜhQņ6h%8ÖhQņ6h%8Öh»hÜhX~9hX~96hX~9hQņ h1Eh1E h1E6h1E htbį6htbįh€6:h‚r‘6h‚r‘h]h]6h]hC ³ hß]shß]shß]s hß]s6.ÅõBöCöęöēö™÷š÷÷÷ų÷Šų‹ųłłśśś÷÷÷÷÷÷÷ęŻ÷÷÷ՇÕN$ Ęz(°`®p Š € 0ą@š P°` Ą!p# %Š&€(0*ą+-@/š0 2P46°7`9;Ą

@ŠA„°„Pž^„°`„Pža$gdV Ś$a$gdV Ś  ĘąĄ!gdCß ĘąĄ!„Š„0ż^„Š`„0żgdCß$a$gdf1cńö ÷2÷3÷p÷r÷÷˜÷™÷ž÷”÷Ö÷ö÷÷÷ų÷gųyųŠų‹ųāųõųłł‹łŖł śśśaśśśś‘ś’ś™ś¤ś­ś®śūüųōųüģčųäąäŪÓĖļķ³®³Ŗ¦”¦š’¦”¦‹„€{vngchX hĢi‚hXh2EhX5 høA_5 hX5hĢi‚ h‰¶h_' hV ŚhV ŚhJxÉhV Ś6 h‰¶hV Ś hV Ś6hV Śhć$ć htbį6htbį hˆLŸ5hdķhCß6 hdķhCßhCßCJaJhJxÉhJxÉ6 hJxÉ6h\*yhJxÉh’h%8Öh4@6hCßhQņh4@&ś‘ś®śÆśūuūvū¤ū ü}üüüżü“¬¬”…”zoofo 7$8$H$gdżmš $dha$gdżmš $dha$gdŸĶ$dh&d(dPĘ’RĘ’a$gdX $dha$gdX$a$gdXK Ęz(°`®p Š € 0ą@š P°` Ą!p# %Š&€(0*ą+-@/š0 2P46°7`9;Ą

@ŠA„°„Pž^„°`„Pžgdć$ć ū)ū2ū:ū@ūEūOūSū`ūdūjūkūuūvū€ūū¤ū²ū ü üü"ü(ü|ü}üüŒü”üšüūüüüżüż-ż.ż@żCżEżGżhżiżųščŻščŻšŻÕšŻĢĆŗƱ©’©’©’’©’©q©©’©’©’©’@h•zšhżmš5B* CJOJQJ\^JaJfHph€€qŹ ’’’’h•zšhżmšCJaJh•zšhżmš6CJaJhżmšCJaJhżmš6CJaJhp'>*CJaJhŸĶ>*CJaJh >*CJaJhKxīCJaJh•zšhXCJaJhR&ÆCJaJhXCJaJh†;šCJaJ(żüiżjżŁżMžĒžČžŻžB’µ’45”  {ļjģķī1jōōōōōééŽÓŹŽŽŽŽŽŽŽĀĀĀŽŽ$a$gdX 7$8$H$gdȤ $dha$gdȤ $dha$gdX $dha$gdŸĶ $dha$gdżmšiżjżmżnżŠż‹żż§żµżøżŲżŁżŽżēżžż’żžž)ž*žMžRžĘžĒžŅžÓžŻžėžńžōž÷ž’’’’ ’ ’’’ ’*’/’<’öķįŁĪŁĪŁĪŁĪįĪŁĪŁĪŁĪŁķŁĆŗ±ŗ؝•…•…••}u}m}mh“.yCJaJhOQ-CJaJh8ZrCJaJhé; CJaJhŪ}¼CJaJhR&ÆCJaJhŪ}¼hŪ}¼CJaJhR&Æ6CJaJhp'>*CJaJhŸĶ>*CJaJhK+hżmšCJaJh•zšhżmšCJaJhżmšCJaJh•zšhżmš6CJaJhżmš6CJaJhżmš>*CJaJ*<’=’>’?’A’B’E’R’Z’`’‘’“’µ’¹’Ä’Ģ’Ņ’ 345@FRUcefghklxz|š ”¢ųščųąŌÉųÉųĮÉŌÉųÉųĮ —‹ųšųƒšxųšųƒšxųxšąšąohŪ}¼6CJaJh•zšhXCJaJhOQ-CJaJh•zšhX6CJaJh+PŒ>*CJaJ@h•zšhȤ5B* CJOJQJ\^JaJfHph€€qŹ ’’’’hȤCJaJh•zšhȤCJaJh•zšhȤ6CJaJhXCJaJh“.yCJaJhR&ÆCJaJh8ZrCJaJ(¢£¤­    ),-:;?IMTWZguz{€‰œ ”°³½ĮĘĒČĖĢÕÖŲŪęčėīļõźįŁĪż°ŁØ Ł• Ł •Ø Ł• Ø •°•Ł Ł• Ł•Ø Ł Ł•  …}Ø}Øh_kjCJaJhż{CJaJhfhCJaJh•zšhXCJaJhR&ÆCJaJhXCJaJh•zšhX6CJaJh:z6CJaJh >*CJaJh8ZrhŪ}¼CJaJh8ZrCJaJh8ZrCJH*aJh8Zr6CJH*aJhŪ}¼6CJH*aJ1ļņō’ %&4<>KLNOTUYcefijÖėģķīņöś01öķåŻåÕåŻÕŻåÕĶŻÅŻåŻ½åŻå²§Ÿ§›—‹€Å€q€_#jĢŠF hŽDhXCJUVaJjhŽDhXCJUaJhŽDhXCJaJhŽDhX6CJaJh hXh9čCJaJh•zšhXCJaJhK+hXCJaJh¼B%CJaJhĢi‚CJaJhż{CJaJhXCJaJhR&ÆCJaJhfhCJaJhX6CJaJh:z6CJaJ#12389LMNOhi‘’—˜›ž¢°¼Óōõö=>B]x}‚ƒ„‰°īßŌßŌĀ±ßŌ„ŌŌ•Œ•„••|sh|•\Ō•Ō•Ō•Œ•hŽ'ęhX6CJaJhfh6CJH*aJhfh6CJaJhfhCJaJh¹TāCJaJhX6CJaJhXCJaJhĢi‚CJaJhŽDhX6CJaJ!jļÄhŽDhXCJEHō’UaJ#jąŠF hŽDhXCJUVaJhŽDhXCJaJjhŽDhXCJUaJ!jeĀhŽDhXCJEHņ’UaJ$°čėģų`e}ž¢£„©Š019:ij–ĄĶĪÜŻŽęčīEFHIJVWZ]^_ųļęųŪĻŪųŪĒęļųæųŗ²ŗ­¢›—›“—ˆ›„}›—›yq›y—mh¼-”h†6#hXH*h†6# h FåhMÉh:> h Fåh6h FåhĶ\æhq h FåhXhę[:hXCJaJ h¹Tā5hQņhX5 hX5hõ+ÕCJaJh¹TāCJaJhŽDhX6CJaJhŽDhXCJaJhX6CJaJhõ+Õ6CJaJhXCJaJ*jĮļFm Ąū7SoŠæā% f ž Ö ļ - Æ ° ± ÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷ļēē×ĢĢĢĢĢ $dha$gdX$&dPĘ’a$gdčn$a$gd‰vĪ$a$gd¼-”$a$gdX_belmopyz|‡‘”•—™žŸ ¢£§Ø­°µø¾æĄĀĆÅÉĖĶŅŻŽßėīóųłśūüž’ (+/045678:>@CEFHKRüõīõźāŽźŚŽŚŽõÓŽüīõźāĻüŽŚüõŽīõźāźĻĖĒõŽŚźŚŽõüĆīõźĻźõÓ¼ŽŚõüŽīüīõĖĒõŽŚõµüµī h Fåh&Iå h FåhĖrhv`€ha#æhg}„hŽx® h FåhŃZhqh Fåh†6#hXH*h†6# h Fåh6 h FåhXh¼-”GRS^aeflmnopuvwz‚‰ŠŒ“›œ©¬Æ³“·¼½¾æĮĀÄĘĒĪĻŠŃŌÖŁŪąįāäåėņö  łõńõķéåŽłŚłÓõńÓłŽĢČĄÓł¹łõńłķł²®²łČĄŖ¦łÓ¹ł¢ńłÓ²¢²žé–éé®é h Fåh¼-”hŽx®h¼-”H*hXh |Eha#æhg}„hxSR h FåhĖr h FåhA phŽx®h&IåH*h†6# h Fåh‰vĪ h Fåh&IåhŽx® h Fåh6hv`€h¼-”h)³hqh Få h FåhX8 # % ' ( * , 3 7 R k m o €  ‚  ” • š œ ž ¦ ¬ Å É Ė Ō Õ Ö Ž ß é ķ ī ó ō       & + , - Æ ° ± üõńéåįŚńüŚåįŚÖįÖńüŚüŚńŚńŚüńŚńĻČÄĻüĻ¹Ļ«ž¹ĻČÄĻÄĻ–Žƒht9‰hQ<CJaJh.J®CJaJhXCJaJjĻĘh FåhXEHü’Uj2HęF h FåhXUVjh FåhXUh |E h FåhE ‡ h FåhXhyA h Fåh‰vĪha#æhg}„hŽx®h‰vĪH*h‰vĪ h Fåh¼-”hxSR1± “ ¾     < = > @ A c e f ‡ ˆ ‹ Œ ¢ ¦ µ Ż ą ļ ū     " ‚ ƒ Š Œ ł ū  I ­ ® óėćŪćóćŪćŅÄć»­ć„»œ„ć„ćŪ”Œ”ŒćŪóć„„ć|t|tlg hc>5h¢“CJaJhAk0CJaJh,4CJaJhXpCJaJh—SŚCJaJhŁ?+CJaJhX6CJaJhĶ\æCJaJh J&hX6CJH*aJh J&6CJaJh((ęhX6CJH*aJh((ę6CJaJh¹TāCJaJhXCJaJh((ęCJaJh vLhX6CJaJ(± ­ ż T‚Ł3SŽŹę (\Ā=vÆę’=æōéįįįįįįįįįįįįįįįįŃŃŃééé$&dPĘ’a$gd¬#‹$a$gd¬#‹ $dha$gd¬#‹ $dha$gd¢“® µ ¶ ü ż )S`py{®ŲŁŪÜŻōõ'*/1356HKQSUV^`eƒ„†‹ŒŽ’Ø»¾ĆĒČŹĖĶŃÖŁŪę   (*+GPQRYZ\śņśēąÜąÜąÜąÜąÜŌąÜŠąÜŌÜŠÜŠąÜŌܹܹÜŌĢȹ܊ąÜŠąÜąÜąÜąÜąĢȹܹܹ܊ąÜąÜąÜĄąÜ¼Üą¼ąhIÕhŽx®h¬#‹H*hę8hg}„h‘gģh†6#h¬#‹H*h¬#‹ h Fåh¬#‹hę[:h¬#‹CJaJhQņh¬#‹5 h¬#‹5J\^_acmqstuvx{}~‚ˆ­®æĄĀÄÅĒÉŠļ  59;=DEFLtuxyz…±²³øŗ¾ĄĮŠŅ×ŲŻŽćäåüōšģåüåįüįåüįåüōüåüŻüŁåüōšģåüåŁåšģåÕåüåüåüšüåüåüĶüģüģüČüģÄģüĄüįü¼üŁüøühŽhh5>Žh@shM‰ h¬#‹H*h. Ńh. ŃH*hö-*h‘gģh34hIÕ h Fåh¬#‹hę8hg}„hŽx®h¬#‹H*h¬#‹Fåęļżž06;<=ĄĮÄ]^_mtuv†ˆ‰«­®ŠŌfjõłņīźņßņŃÄßņīņĄņø­”ø”ø•ŒøŒƒŒø•uøŒgøŒø”øh J&h¬#‹6CJH*aJhš Ķh¬#‹6CJH*aJhay6CJaJh¬#‹6CJaJhš Ķh¬#‹6CJaJh vLh¬#‹6CJaJht9‰h¬#‹CJaJh¬#‹CJaJhž$zjŚČh Fåh¬#‹EHü’Uj2HęF h Fåh¬#‹UVjh Fåh¬#‹UhŗIh¬#‹ h Fåh¬#‹ hš Ķh¬#‹&æĄĮõödŃ’?r’Ķ &MhœæC}µīōōōģįŁÉŁŁŁŁŁŁŁŁŁŁŁŁŁŁÉÉ$&dPĘ’a$gdO$a$gdO $dha$gdOdhgd¬#‹ $dha$gd¬#‹õö÷ž’cdŗŠŻķöų’4?ABfinprtu‡Š’”•šŸ¤ĀĆÅŹĖĶŃēśż  &KMNśõščšŻÖŅĪÖŅÖŅÖŹĀŅ¾ŅÖŅ¶ÖŅÖŅ¶Ņ²Ņ²ÖŅ¶ŅÖŅÖŅ¶Ņ®ŖÖŅ²ÖŅ²ÖŅÖŅÖŅÖŅÖŅÖŅÖŅÖŅÖŅhayhg}„h+rmh†6#hOH*hqsh‡88h‡88H*h‡88h¾hO h FåhOhę[:hOCJaJhQņhO5 hO5 h÷y5 h¬#‹5CNT]hjk‡‘’™šœžŸ”£­±³“¶ø»½¾ĮĀČĻķī /HJLUV_uy{}…‹©Ŗ³“¹æĄÄėģšńņ÷łż’$%.=łõłõķłõéõłõłõķåįłõłéõłõéłõķõłõéõłõķåįłõłåįłŻłõłõłõłõéõłõįõįõéõŲõįåįõŌõéŠõĢõÅłõ hš ĶhOh=h:h˜:.ht}g hOH*h"[hayhg}„häOłhŽx®hOH*hO h FåhONī%>|ž’„…ó_ A ˜ Ś  !E!!·!ź!'"ļääääääÜŌŌĢĢĢ¼ĢĢĢĢĢĢĢ$&dPĘ’a$gd1 $a$gd1 dhgdv_QdhgdO $dha$gdO$&dPĘ’a$gdO=BCVWXYo{|’PS„Ŗģķīü:<=_cõł„łīłąÓīłĻłĒæ¶ØŸĒ“Ē“Ē‡ŸĒŸ~ŸĒ‡pĒŸbĒŸĒ“Ēh J&hO6CJH*aJhš ĶhO6CJH*aJhay6CJaJhš ĶhO6CJaJh vLhO6CJaJhO6CJaJh‚cĒh‚cĒ6CJH*aJh‚cĒ6CJaJh‚cĒCJaJhOCJaJhOjåŹh FåhOEHü’Uj2HęF h FåhOUVjh FåhOU h FåhO$„…†ŒŽĒņó&E^_lwxyŠå    " ) , / 0 8 @ Z g   ˜ š › œ § ŗ ¾ æ Ä Å Ē Č Ļ Ń śõķčķćŽÖĻĖĻĄø­„ø­„­ø„ø­­ø­­„­„­ø”‰„yy‰„y‰hŌ6pCJaJh[qfCJaJhœQżh1 CJaJh¼B%CJH*aJh3SčCJaJh1 CJaJhVh1 CJaJh¼B%CJaJhv_Qh1 CJaJh1  hŠG]h1 hv_QCJaJ hv_Q5 h1 5 h†Vō5hQņh1 5 hX5 hO5/Ń Ų Ś Ü Ż ß ī š ö ł ! ! !!!!!#!(!)!.!/!2!4!:!=!C!E!G!H!L!P!R!T!V!k!l!n!p!v!y!!!‚!…!‡!–! !”!¤!¦!¬!Æ!µ!¶!ø!Ź!Ō!×!ß!č!ė!ż!" " """%"+":"ųķåŁķŃÉŃĮŃųķåŁåķŃĮŃĮķÉĮŃķųķåŁÉ¹±åĮŃķÉĮŃķųķåÉķŃĮķÉĮŃķųķÉŃĮÉŃĮÉŃĮÉĮŃÉŃÉŃhayCJaJhg}„CJaJhŌ6pCJaJh1 CJaJh[qfCJaJh¼B%h1 CJH*aJh¼B%CJaJhœQżh1 CJaJh_lĪCJaJF:"D"G"H"X"["m"w"z"{"‹"Ž" "Ŗ"­"®"¾"Į"Ó"Ż"ą"į"ń"ó"#######$#'#9#C#F#G#W#Y#i#t#w#x#y#}#†#‰#œ#¦#©#Ŗ#ŗ#Ą#Š#Ü#ß#ą#š#ń#ņ#ö#$ $$$$$$$!$'$)$H$M$^$`$f$t$v$z$~$…$ųšųčščųšųčščąšųčščąšųčščšąšųčščščąšųčščąšųŲšŲščąšųŲščąšųŲšĶšųčąšųšĶčĶčĶščųčąšĶčšĶhœQżh1 CJaJhkzCJaJh_lĪCJaJh[qfCJaJh1 CJaJhŌ6pCJaJQ'"Z""Ą"ó"&#Y#ˆ#¼#ņ#)$…$#%h%i%ė%ģ%l(¼(()J)Ģ) *÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷ģģ÷ģäŁŃÉÉÉÉ$a$gdv_Qdhgdv_Q $dha$gd¢“dągd1  $dha$gd1 $a$gd1 …$ö$%"%'%(%;%<%=%>%C%Z%g%h%i%ź%ė%ģ%ļ%:&?&r&t&u&—&™&š&¼&æ&Ą&Ć&é&''#'&'.'9'ųščŻĪŻæ®ĪŻščų£ų£›ųų†xų†xų†oų›ųg_ų_gh ~=CJaJhŁ?+CJaJh1 6CJaJh.Rsh1 6CJH*aJh.Rs6CJaJh vLh1 6CJaJh.RsCJaJhVh1 CJaJ!jšĢht9‰h1 CJEHü’UaJj2HęF h1 CJUVaJjht9‰h1 CJUaJht9‰h1 CJaJhkzCJaJh[qfCJaJh1 CJaJ%9':'Q'U'¤'Ą'Å'ņ'k(l(m(s(t(u(»(¼(ļ()()5)@)B)™)®)Ģ)į)ė)ņ)õ)ł)* *#*0*J*V*a*c*d*e**Ž*‘*˜*š*”*£*„*ųšäšÜšÜšŃĢÄæÄæ“­©­”–”–”–”–”–”–”–”–”–”‚”‚”z‚z‚”hg}„CJaJhœQżhv_QCJaJhv_QCJH*aJhVhv_QCJaJhv_QCJaJhv_Q hŠG]hv_Qh)0>hv_QCJaJ hv_Q5hQņhv_Q5 h1 5hö”h1 CJaJhbEJCJaJh vLh1 6CJaJh1 CJaJh ~=CJaJ/ *a*£*×*+M+–+Ī+,7,t,§,Ś, -@-s-¦-×- .A.x.Ō.r/¶/·/90ļēēēēēēēēēēēēēēēēēēēēÜÜēÜ $dha$gdv_Q$a$gdv_Q$&dPĘ’a$gdv_Q„*¦*Ø*Ä*Ģ*Õ*×*Ł*Ś*Ž*ß*ł*ś*’*+++++++++&+'+7+8+<+B+E+K+L+M+O+P+W+[+˜+™+ +¤+Ķ+Ī+Ņ+Ō+ć+ķ+ī+ó+ł+ü+,,,,$,,,8,J,X,_,x,‡,•,œ,Ø,ŗ,Č,Ļ,Ū,ķ,ū,óčąŲąčąóąčąčąŲčąčąóąŲŠąŲąčąŲčąčąŲĒŲŠŲĒŲŠŲ¼ąčŲąčąŲčąčą“ą“ą“ą“ą“ą“ą“ą“ą“ąh ŽCJaJhg}„hg}„CJaJhg}„CJH*aJhayCJaJhg}„CJaJhv_QCJaJhœQżhv_QCJaJh¼B%hv_QCJH*aJGū,-- -.-5-@-S-a-h-t-†-”-š-¶-Į-Ę-Ļ-Ó-Õ-Ų-ė-ł-.../.6.@.A.O.X.g.i.m.p.v.x.—.œ.Ć.Å.É.Ķ.Ō.E/e/g/q/v/w/Š/‹/Œ//’/©/¬/µ/¶/·/8090:0ųšųšųšųšųšųšųšųšųšųšųšųšųšųšåšųšåųåšåšųšåųšåšųšųŚĖŚ¼«ĖŚųšųš š šhVhv_QCJaJ!jūĪht9‰hv_QCJEHü’UaJj2HęF hv_QCJUVaJjht9‰hv_QCJUaJht9‰hv_QCJaJhœQżhv_QCJaJhv_QCJaJh ŽCJaJ?90:013334353R3S3T3U3V3W3X3Y3C4ø45N5¶6÷ģēßŌĢĒĒĒĒĒĒ»³««««$a$gd3j­$a$gd  $„Š`„Ša$gd§Shgd§Sh$a$gdJ0” $dąa$gdJ0”$a$gdf1cgdv_Q $dha$gdv_Qdągdv_Q:0=0ˆ00Ą0Ā0Ć0å0ē0č0 11›1œ11Ķ1Ņ1š122203132333435363M3N3O3P3Q3R3X3óėóėāŌėāŌėāėĖĀŗ®ŗ¦ŗóė›–’†~z~ld~_X h§Shh§Sh h§Sh5jŃhJ0”UjhJ0”UmHnHuhJ0”jhJ0”U hŠG]hJ0” hˆLŸ5hX hv_Q5hö”hv_QCJaJh¾3CJaJhé-hé-6CJaJhé-CJaJhé-6CJaJh Ž6CJaJh.Rshv_Q6CJH*aJhv_Q6CJaJhv_QCJaJh vLhv_Q6CJaJ"X3Y3b3¢3„3¦3©3Ŗ3÷3ų3ū3ü3B4C4D4ø4¹455 5 5555 5N5O56>6F6o6Œ6¶6·6č6ü÷üóīóīóīóīóēŻŁĻĖĮ½µ½Ŗµ½“‹„}v}eZhØk!hØk!CJaJ!jhØk!hØk!0JCJUaJ hØk!hŲ1_ hØk!hmL hØk!h”0åh”0åhmLjhmL0JUj–Ńhh‰NĻEHō’UjPuƒG h‰NĻUVjh‰NĻUh‰NĻjh‰NĻ0JUhļvjhļv0JUhšt€jhšt€0JU h h„.M h#H*h# h§Sh5h§Sh"č6ī677"7K7ƒ7„7…77’8Ä8_9`9a9“:”:•:É:Ź:Š:ß:ą:;;; ;~;¶;·;ųķćßŪ×ßĶÉÅÉÅÉø±¤’‡|‡’qfqfq[PhD{wh^ņCJaJhD{whACJaJhD{whD{wCJaJhD{wh3j­CJaJhD{whCECJaJhD{whx§CJaJhD{wht%ŽCJaJ hØk!ht%ŽjhØk!ht%Ž0JU hØk!h ŅjhØk!h Ņ0JUhīwhčJ³jhčJ³0JUh:|Æhšh÷~~jh÷~~0JUhØk!hØk!CJaJhØk!CJaJ¶67„7`9“:·;l=m=>>>>>> > > >>>>>%>&>'>(>óėėėćėėėįįįįįįįįįÕÓįÕÓįį „ü’„&`#$gdDDC$a$gdD{w$a$gd3j­ $dąC$a$gd3j­·;ø;&=+=m=n=“=Ō=ū=>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> >!>#>$>%>'>(>*>+>->.>0>1>2>3>4>5>6>7>8>9>:>;><>=>>>?>@>A>õńķńąŁŅŁĪŹĀŹĀŹĀŹĀŹø²ø²Īø²ø§ø²ĪŹ£ĪœĪ£Ī£—Ī£—‡Ī£—Ī£—Īh©hJ0”H*h­ ZhJ0”H* hJ0”H* h¬0 hJ0”hJ0”h¼Uƒ0JmHnHu hmL0JjhmL0JUjh/x¬Uh/x¬hmL hØk!h-R hØk!hmLjhØk!hmL0JUhƒTąh7<jh7<0JU5(>*>+>->.>0>1>4>5>8>9><>=>@>A>D>E>H>I>K>L>N>O>U>V>W>X>Y>Z>śųśųśųśųśųśųśųśųśųśųśųśųųųųųgdJ0”A>D>E>H>I>K>L>M>N>O>U>]>c>d>e>f>üųüųüųüńųüųüķéā h h„.Mh!lčh¬0 hJøhJ0”hmLhJ0”Z>[>\>]>c>d>e>f>żżżųżżš$a$gd gdJ0”< 00&P1h:pÓba°Š/ °ą=!°"°# $ %°°Š°Š ŠĖDŠÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© zdai@utdallas.eduąÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© 2mailto:zdai@utdallas.eduŪDŠÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© Edward_Maydew@unc.eduąÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© :mailto:Edward_Maydew@unc.edu+DŠÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© *Douglas_Shackelford@kenan-flagler.unc.eduąÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© bmailto:Douglas_Shackelford@kenan-flagler.unc.eduėDŠÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© harold.zhang@utdallas.eduąÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© Bmailto:harold.zhang@utdallas.eduDd hččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šQÕ† †¼ļ±j"Ż·’-<`!š%Õ† †¼ļ±j"Ż·’Ą@Hµų|óžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpud›±K€ĢŪF&&„ąŹā’Ō\†^¹ @Š ] UŸ…`n‡ŲÅČĄ –KPMDd |ččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šeM F{Ă½~HĢō6Ög %’A <`!š9M F{Ă½~HĢō6Ög %’Ą`Hµ0®žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu į0‘D€›ŪĄ(6·¤’ źz.°Į¦Cģ``óö€Ć„‘‰I)ø²ø$5—Įd.P‡"CDHÕg!˜Ū!v120ƒeŠL4Dd hččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šc%C<œæO’c±Muz”e’?1 <`!š7%C<œæO’c±Muz”e’Ą@Hµų|žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~€‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—˜™š›œžŸ ”¢£¤„¦§Ø©Ŗ«¬­®Æ°±²³“µ¶·ø¹ŗ»¼½¾æĄĮĀĆÄÅĘĒČÉŹĖĢĶĪĻŠŃŅÓŌÕÖ×ŲŁŚŪÜŻŽßąįāćäåęēčéźėģķīļšńņóōõö÷ųłśūüżž’     ž’’’ “ż’’’ż’’’ż’’’%(N*)+-,.0/132456879;:<=>@?ABCEDFHGIJKLMOQyPSRTVUWYXZ[\]^_`abcdefhgikjlnmopqsrtvuwzx{ą}|~‚Root Entry’’’’’’’’š ĄF š V.3Ę'@…Data ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŃÓWordDocument™’’’’’’’’>0ObjectPoolœ’’’’' ņ§U.3Ę š V.3Ę_1170153993’’’’’’’’ĪĄF ņ§U.3Ę ņ§U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj’’’’fObjInfo’’’’’’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’%ž’’’ž’’’()*+ž’’’ž’’’.ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’3ž’’’ž’’’6ž’’’ž’’’9ž’’’ž’’’<=ž’’’ž’’’@ž’’’ž’’’Cž’’’ž’’’Fž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Kž’’’ž’’’NOž’’’ž’’’Rž’’’ž’’’Už’’’ž’’’Xž’’’ž’’’[ž’’’ž’’’^ž’’’ž’’’až’’’ž’’’dž’’’ž’’’gž’’’ž’’’jž’’’ž’’’mnopqrsž’’’ž’’’vž’’’ž’’’yz{|}~€ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qęĮø霞 ƒP ƒiƒtž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’:_1170154068 ĪĄF ņ§U.3Ę ņ§U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj ’’’’fObjInfo’’’’ ’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ :_1188218318w&ĪĄF ņ§U.3Ę ņ§U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ ęĮø˜4Ä ƒD ƒiƒtž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q§ĄšŁ¼ģ ƒB ƒiƒtCompObj’’’’ fObjInfo’’’’’’’’ Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’:_1190210212’’’’ĪĄF ņ§U.3Ę ņ§U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj’’’’fObjInfo’’’’’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’6ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀRDģ „Ä ƒgž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q_1170154417’’’’’’’’ĪĄF ņ§U.3Ę ņ§U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj’’’’fObjInfo’’’’’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’6_1189332539’’’’’’’’ĪĄF ņ§U.3Ę ņ§U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj ’’’’fęĮ™,Į „Ä ƒdž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ#ˆ>," ƒP ƒiƒtƒDž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqObjInfo’’’’!’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’?_1189332552Ū$ĪĄF ņ§U.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj#%’’’’fObjInfo’’’’&’’’’!Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’"?_1190210227ĀE)ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3Ęuation Equation.3ō9²qĀ#1œĢ ƒP ƒiƒtƒSž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ @tÓ ƒP ƒiƒtƒD †Ole ’’’’’’’’’’’’#CompObj(*’’’’$fObjInfo’’’’+’’’’&Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’'=ƒE ƒt ƒP ƒiƒt†+ˆ1 †+ƒD ƒiƒt†+ˆ1 ‚(ˆ1†"„Ä ƒd ‚)†"ƒG ƒiƒt†+ˆ1 „Ä ƒg ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi –[–]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q_1170227625’’’’¤.ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’,CompObj-/’’’’-fObjInfo’’’’0’’’’/Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’06_1170155291 ;3ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’1CompObj24’’’’2fęĮ cd  ƒr ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qęĮ&@µ4ü ƒG ƒiƒt†+ˆ1ObjInfo’’’’5’’’’4Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’5B_1193557871’’’’’’’’8ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’7CompObj79’’’’8fObjInfo’’’’:’’’’:Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’;ž_1170570338,½=ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3Ęž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qŪĮ‚DŒ½ ƒG ƒiƒt†+ˆ1 †=„± ƒi ‚(ƒP ƒiƒt†+ˆ1 †"ƒP ƒiƒt ‚)‚,ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’>CompObj<>’’’’?fObjInfo’’’’?’’’’AEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’BOuation Equation.3ō9²qęĮ3ȧ „± ƒi †"‚(ˆ0‚,ˆ1‚]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q_1193643946rOBĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’DCompObjAC’’’’EfObjInfo’’’’D’’’’GEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’H6_1194779369hłGĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ICompObjFH’’’’JfĀجD¾ „± ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qßĮ£š­Œ½ ƒP ƒiƒtƒS †=„Į ƒi ˜ėƒP ƒiƒt †+‚(ƒP ƒiƒt †"ƒB ƒiƒt ‚)„Ä ƒgObjInfo’’’’I’’’’LEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Mæ_1194779445’’’’’’’’LĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’Pž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qßĮ4˜94! „Į ƒi ˜ėƒP ƒiƒtž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqCompObjKM’’’’QfObjInfo’’’’N’’’’SEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’TP_1194767465Y’’’’QĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’VCompObjPR’’’’WfObjInfo’’’’S’’’’YEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Zouation Equation.3ō9²qßĮS ¬4! ‚(ƒP ƒiƒt †"ƒB ƒiƒt ‚)„Ä ƒgž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q_1199797322ąVĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’\CompObjUW’’’’]fObjInfo’’’’X’’’’_Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’`[_1194262038’’’’’’’’[ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’bCompObjZ\’’’’cfźĮ?š­Œ½ ‚(ˆ0†<„Į ƒi ˜ė˜ė˜ė†d"ˆ1‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q“ĄB D¾ ƒP ƒiƒtƒD †=ƒP ƒiƒtƒSObjInfo’’’’]’’’’eEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’f^_1194779492Jc`ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’hž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qßĮÆųŌL± ƒP ƒiƒt †=ƒE ƒt ƒP ƒiƒt†+ˆ1 ‚(ˆ1†"„± ƒi „Ä ƒg ‚)†+ƒD ƒiƒt†+ˆ1 ‚(ˆ1†"„Ä ƒd ‚)†+‚(ˆ1†+CompObj_a’’’’ifObjInfo’’’’b’’’’kEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’lĖ_1194779503’’’’’’’’eĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3Ęƒr ƒi ‚)„Ä ƒg ƒB ƒiƒt ‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)‚(„Į ƒi †+„Ä ƒg ‚)†"„± ƒi „Ä ƒg –[–]‚.ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’tCompObjdf’’’’ufObjInfo’’’’g’’’’wEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’xnž’’’ž’’’„ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’‰ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Žž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’“ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’˜ž’’’ž’’’›œžŸ ”¢£ž’’’ž’’’¦ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’«ž’’’ž’’’®Æ°±²³“ž’’’ž’’’·ž’’’ž’’’ŗ»¼½¾æž’’’ž’’’Āž’’’ž’’’Åž’’’ž’’’Čž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Ķž’’’ž’’’Šž’’’ž’’’Óž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Ųž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Żž’’’ž’’’ąž’’’ž’’’ćž’’’ž’’’ęēčž’’’ž’’’ėž’’’ž’’’īž’’’ž’’’ńž’’’ž’’’ōž’’’ž’’’÷ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’üž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ßĮR` ĢÕ ƒP ƒiƒt †=ƒE ƒt ˆ1†"„± ƒi „Ä ƒg ‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)‚(„Į ƒi †+„Ä ƒg ‚)†"„± ƒi „Ä ƒg –(–) ƒj†"ˆ1 ƒD ƒiƒj ‚(ˆ1†"„Ä ƒd ‚)†+‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)„Ä ƒg ƒB ƒiƒj†"ˆ1 ‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)‚(„Į ƒi †+„Ä ƒg ‚)†"„± ƒi „Ä ƒgƒj†=ƒt†+ˆ1†" †" –[–]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ–44 ƒD ƒiƒj_1193577782@jĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’‚CompObjik’’’’ƒfObjInfo’’’’l’’’’…Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’†:_1187532985’’’’’’’’oĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’‡CompObjnp’’’’ˆfž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q{Į€xüł ƒd ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qObjInfo’’’’q’’’’ŠEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’‹6_1193577800’’’’®tĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŒCompObjsu’’’’fObjInfo’’’’v’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’:_1187533014ĢŠyĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘĀx­lŠ ƒB ƒiƒjž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q{ĮŠ¹,Ŗ ƒb ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’‘CompObjxz’’’’’fObjInfo’’’’{’’’’”Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’•6_1194779541^:~ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’–CompObj}’’’’—fObjInfo’’’’€’’’’™uation Equation.3ō9²qßĮTH'Ģ! ƒP ƒiƒt †=ƒD ƒiƒt†+ˆ1 ‚(ˆ1†"„Ä ƒd ‚)‚[‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)„Į ƒi †"ƒd ƒi ‚]†+‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi †"„± ƒi †+„± ƒi ƒd ƒi ‚)„Ä ƒg †+‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)„ÄEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’šp_1190448573øуĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’¤CompObj‚„’’’’„f ƒg ƒB ƒiƒt ‚[‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)„Į ƒi †"ƒb ƒi ‚]†+‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi †"„± ƒi †+„± ƒi ƒb ƒi ‚)„Ä ƒgž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qObjInfo’’’’…’’’’§Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ø6_1194779565’’’’©ˆĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’©ĀRDģ „Ä ƒgž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qßĮĘ`‚”± †"ƒX ƒi †"„Ä ƒg †=†"‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi †"„± ƒi †+„± ƒi ƒd ƒiCompObj‡‰’’’’ŖfObjInfo’’’’Š’’’’¬Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’­ā_1194779721†NĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3Ę ‚)‚[‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)„Į ƒi †"ƒd ƒi †+‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi †"„± ƒi †+„± ƒi ƒd ƒi ‚)„Ä ƒg ‚] ˆ2 ƒD ƒiƒt†+ˆ1 ‚(ˆ1†"„Ä ƒd ‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’µCompObjŒŽ’’’’¶fObjInfo’’’’’’’’øEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’¹æßĮ£š­Œ½ †"ƒY ƒi †"„Ä ƒg †=‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)„Į ƒi †"ƒb ƒi ‚[‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)„Į ƒi †"ƒb ƒi †+‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi †"„± ƒi †+„± ƒi ƒb ƒi ‚)„Ä ƒg ‚] ˆ2 ‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒi ‚)ƒB ƒiƒt_1190210658’’’’’’’’’ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ĄCompObj‘“’’’’ĮfObjInfo’’’’”’’’’Ćž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ=88 9 †"ƒX ƒi †"„Ä ƒgž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ÄY_1188219395’’’’’’’’—ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ĘCompObj–˜’’’’Ēfuation Equation.3ō9²q§Ą°āäć ƒd ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀaš­Œ½ †" ˆ2 ƒXObjInfo’’’’™’’’’ÉEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ź6_1197799187D’’’’œĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ĖCompObj›’’’’ĢfObjInfo’’’’ž’’’’ĪEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ļ}_1187533375’’’’’’’’”ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3Ę ƒi †"„Ä ƒg †"ƒd ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q{Į8–Ty ƒd ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŃCompObj ¢’’’’ŅfObjInfo’’’’£’’’’ŌEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Õ6_1170500875’’’’’’’’¦ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ÖCompObj„§’’’’×fObjInfo’’’’Ø’’’’Łuation Equation.3ō9²qęĮÉœž „Ä ƒdž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qßĮ`˜9üā ‚(ˆ1†+ƒr ƒEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ś6_1194779598’’’’’’’’«ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŪCompObjŖ¬’’’’ÜfObjInfo’’’’­’’’’ŽEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ß|_1193577958’’’’’’’’°ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’įi ‚)„Į ƒi ƒb ƒi †>ˆ1ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ³°ŖL® †"ƒP ƒiƒt †"„Ä ƒg †=†"ƒX ƒi †"„Ä ƒg †+†"ƒY ƒi †"„ÄCompObjƱ’’’’āfObjInfo’’’’²’’’’äEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’åĻ_1190210874’’’’’’’’µĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3Ę ƒgž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀFXźDģ )†"ƒX ƒi †"„Ä ƒg †<ˆ0Ole ’’’’’’’’’’’’éCompObj“¶’’’’źfObjInfo’’’’·’’’’ģEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ķb_1190210873³ŗĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ļCompObj¹»’’’’šfObjInfo’’’’¼’’’’ņž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀFQ¼/ )†"ƒY ƒi †"„Ä ƒg †>ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ób_1187530735’’’’’’’’æĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’õCompObj¾Ą’’’’öfObjInfo’’’’Į’’’’ųEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ł6_11875307601ÄĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ś{Įųś“^ ƒP ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q{ĮpTP ƒQ ˆ0CompObjĆÅ’’’’ūfObjInfo’’’’Ę’’’’żEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ž6_1187530816’’’’’’’’ÉĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjČŹ’’’’fObjInfo’’’’Ė’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’6ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ !"ž’’’ž’’’%ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’*ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’/ž’’’ž’’’2ž’’’ž’’’5ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’:ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’?ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Dž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Iž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Nž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Sž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Xž’’’ž’’’[\]^_`ž’’’ž’’’cž’’’ž’’’fž’’’ž’’’iž’’’ž’’’lž’’’ž’’’ož’’’ž’’’rsž’’’ž’’’vž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’{ž’’’ž’’’~ž’’’ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q{ĮųTüĶ ƒP ˆ1ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q_1187530868ĒmĪĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjĶĻ’’’’fObjInfo’’’’Š’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’6_1191585285Ö6ÓĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ CompObjŅŌ’’’’ f{ĮĪœW ƒQ ˆ1ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ(6¼ ƒWƒK ƒCž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqObjInfo’’’’Õ’’’’ Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ :_1191575865åōŲĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjף’’’’fObjInfo’’’’Ś’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’:_1188282189•ŻĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3Ęż’’’„ƒ…†‡ˆ‰‹ŠŒŽ‘’ĪĶ”•–—˜™š›œžŸ ”¢£¤„¦§Ø©Ŗ«¬­®Æ°±²³“µ¶·ø¹ŗ»¼½¾æĄĮĀĆÄÅĘĒČÉŹĖĢ ĻŃŠŅŌÓÖÕŲףŪŚÜŻŽįßā3äćåęēéčźģėķļīšńóņõōö÷ųśłūżüž’uation Equation.3ō9²qĀą¼TŖ ƒWƒK ƒLž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q§Ąč”ķ ƒR ƒiƒtOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjÜŽ’’’’fObjInfo’’’’ß’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’:_1201600921ļāĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjįć’’’’fObjInfo’’’’ä’’’’ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q\Ā~š­Œ½ ƒR ƒiƒt †=„±†+„² ˆ1 ƒWƒK ƒC †+„² ˆ2 ƒWƒK ƒL †+„² ˆ3 ƒWƒK ƒC †"ƒDƒiƒv ƒi †+„² ˆ4 ƒWƒKEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’š_1191575851’’’’’’’’ēĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’#CompObjęč’’’’$f ƒL †"ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒi ‚*ƒIƒNƒD ƒi †+„³˜ėƒCƒoƒnƒtƒrƒoƒlƒs†+„µ ƒiƒtž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ€©¼ ƒWƒK ƒCObjInfo’’’’é’’’’&Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’':_1201600943’’’’’’’’ģĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’(ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q\Ā"ˆ€ ƒDƒiƒv ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qCompObjėķ’’’’)fObjInfo’’’’ī’’’’+Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’,>_1201599826{]ńĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’-CompObjšņ’’’’.fObjInfo’’’’ó’’’’0Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’1F\Ā*ą‰ ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ"š­Œ½ ƒIƒNƒD ƒi_1191583567’’’’’’’’öĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’3CompObjõ÷’’’’4fObjInfo’’’’ų’’’’6Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’7>_1197805107|TūĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’8CompObjśü’’’’9fž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀš­Œ½ ƒWƒK ƒCž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qObjInfo’’’’ż’’’’;Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’<:_1197805910’’’’’’’’ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’=CompObj’’’’’>fObjInfo’’’’’’’’@Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’A?_1197806326 lĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘĀ#š­Œ½ „² ˆ1 †>ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ#š­Œ½ „² ˆ2 †<ˆ0Ole ’’’’’’’’’’’’BCompObj’’’’CfObjInfo’’’’’’’’EEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’F?DÄ|b€łb#3XėŻLčDd T|ččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2š[ŚZpz"Oƒ­Øx ³%Ē’7Z<`!š/ŚZpz"Oƒ­Øx ³%Ē¢ `XJ0®żžxŚcdąd``¾ČĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu ²Ä>ßÅü÷7U qB#²‰jžŖåū_ ż‘`ÄžŪÅ|Åģ¹›Ķ³żÕ<’(I±NhęĻł§ó|żŪr³ū#bŪuɖŗ‘,qk‰ņ@궔$Ø+ī9†87¶æė”øĒ!x"HŠ®ŁžÜµDd Čhččšb² š  c š$€€A ?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šOšā…“§=°īmĮŻ“ 8’+Ŗ<`!š#šā…“§=°īmĮŻ“ 8’@@ļų|ńžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu—bƒÆå\i X€źtŠ9€“×F=°ĪĢJˆy ’Ģc™\™›”ŸŌĆÉõqĮG!ę12€čpse@ę&VrA]Ļö!#Ųtˆ] ģ`Žp˜021)W—¤ę2,™ĖŌ”ČŠŃRõYˆęvˆ]Œ Ģ`¹©MS‘Dd Ų ččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š €2šŪ„N#W6Aźųóę5{ń6’·ģ <`!šÆ„N#W6Aźųóę5{ń6jĄ€Čjhß}žxŚ„’æKĆ@Ēæwmm›“¶tā*āŅÉÅĮAPÄvr«µ`l±Į’­³“«[AqqöŅ”ž žŽŽ•*‚ńŽ%9ŒÖA \ī}’÷īū}ĒcH‘KpŒ€ž˜XIDœ1?bÜu]Ķ±!’›®ņR¼É;™œˆ&2†KÉČ īˆčZ¬f(ˆ|ŻĻIaµlļ–œš Ō¤ö7\iĒR5Ź‘-U,³n¬™ c£j•÷qsÖk܉eĢæ4®ōķzTäåErBģ ųė Uī8?¦ČbÅų$ęn,ĢēQö‰Ÿ±)Õ^¾ē·łž7æ “w•ļsu:aÉų!A¼®ø ó2<ī惓¢cmU÷€Ó“6ŚzŹżxož¦|čņžl„s!>ų¦ƒö{‘¦#¦•ĪŠģwŖŸGøŸ±ßōsÆŃy„3'žU|ȉmĶŸJMN®lĻŸÉ,ā’ŚrÖēE§n›ź¤ Q1Ž#Y@Æv/‡Æ=Gdż >¦|-Dd hččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šwJo§Ā”Ūöy‚€³_\Ģ’S}#<`!šKJo§Ā”Ūöy‚€³_\Ģś@@ˆ ų|žxŚcdąd``žĖĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuŗ=  BąŹÜ¤ü†jN®m > įō'ÄFø=L #lKø ”ŹyF°é»ŲĮ¼=ąøbdbR ®,.IĶeX 2—ØC‘” ¬Dģł,Āī'f°~?…kX¶Dd  ččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2š¼ķc]ŁWżåācŠÖ&’Ü¢,<`!šŌ¼ķc]ŁWżåācŠÖ& Ķ18Ą¢žxŚ„•MLQĒē½ni»]Ū„ŪņmY9h )QćĶ=ˆ ƒbAb+F֔Žz®=pc41ńø=€Ń‹Æ^‰ŒF¹HŠƒ]ßĒīĖBāĒ6ŪĢÆóŸ7ūfęu $"·"ģ ŗ€_Qv'h`QB|‹PĻó„ÕOŚüߒJgPˆŚv†Yū›ŅŠƒÉų%³–Ł½Ś °¬±_cĄŠ„se“v½Ät$Ī~Ż¤2‚_LE"×ĪŅ:½å–Ŭyžœ[“žS*ļ”§`ŽĪTJsöp©jŸ›­L\ƒē6ŖÆŲmüVŒMĶĖ5 š\‡õUz·›‡ö×$Ś‰,ē^Å+)¾½ŽBĄo“ÜH±#øą³KŽt’Ž%}ma½KŽ“bż»֏g°žG3ÖķĮś«q¬OĘ„^ÖĒöž­>TŌž‹Ŗ“E§›Ćy,z3&y‡>Pö1Gj•ÉŁ2Ąė”Žx°žŁµ2õóŒk^ž/±éēÉE0/śž-ŸÉß AüšĘł³ŠĒ¼čū×T¼äOŖŸiя¢ā‡bß}Š_avI®óÓĢ§­šz.iOa’łDŲæJ{(ēś‡ź:ečvÆėļżūj†óZ”Ę$oĻCžņįž•µa1ļӅ€ˆyŸQÜ°°ÅÄžK©0[“%ĻĻߌp½KÄ+~ÖAæ[ōļ²ā‹&Ž_0p|%‰ćĖMaż±Č1Žb¤ūܓ’:_†ö^œėN0Žœ+>ŚżgŅœO*v£œĻ:ĮME8*>ŅæĆsS Ÿ×Ū~^ m²5\Ckó?”ų~ū×Óx aæK²˜Ÿ$1ér}Żƒčā-#žŽ@īĶ„˜ %ń^"”öŒŌęœRęł>€Eģƒ†ą‚„ lļIDÄ’="—XDd Ąččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2š¢ö¤ō’XY»ŠM\ ®WW’~X0<`!švö¤ō’XY»ŠM\ ®WW"  )8‡@ČL DžxŚ„–KLA€gf§…>€R°¼ }šŚĘ`ŠzńąÅØ  ‰/ŌX  µFIo$ĘhLbōˆ€‰įjTH8Ō³/†DŠ P|‚PwfvĒż Śģf¾żßó’;YŒl)÷ØvC^Ä~ķ²cE0ÖW˜är9¾:‚+õg©ē$Č:rk«&k ŖF9¦Œ\gµÕ¤vu‡šŌTŗŽ‹¤śŗŅ×¢µćBķéģ§%„Z°š]N2VČVeŚź¢Ēx¶Vi<{¢²Ü7ÉŠ¶°fIķļźL'.'ūš)²÷~q£©‰õĮ—Śåoż>8oė™q0bńŁŅ¬ŹL7Ņ‚UrĘ"xSē),ųwŚ°_”Œ?K{Č‹ąi/xŁÓGõŒ[$÷3>,¹½ĘĢa‚ƒų ‡½f!zŪĆų§Ī5 dŸEš/‰ąŅ~¾€ń'iŁg¼$ķ/Źü/øa}Ša}Čó_,2ėw+AĀųdZō;»µ[æß8ģ[»÷›šłZ“}ŸVę,ĢÅGŻÆ?·ĒÅöš#į—č~ßį6+sńXĻŽ¾·šė›£VQąræŁ\o?«¼C^ˆjyuÅŃ’łč æ#™ˆ\Żg½s“ƒ÷å،KU3pC„ąŽ«’ˆ›æś–ĻkHö;YĖŽjpO5+ŁŹYUyš7`“~˜TĢśaņĀõ_ÕAż¶Øæ ügč­R ņń9a~Ģļy!Œ÷Ē)äłżĀģ×>')Õą§|^ć:ÆŅ…&Ę½’§Ē${ƒPžōAłWƙGifuĒā÷s½’Ēł9õOīąū|ErØŚlĄ>ĒńøoųŁß*•›ż­Ņ×.(÷Cł˜Ęo,…łm—˜åYå?gS’sˆē—ŹŸo|Ął¾Į÷ńzŹ˜‡*Ž—S’›ė”ÜSÅųtŹ°or˜åŻJĀųŒä³ˆqūNy Ļ?“’ó/Cæńž¦dćü=‹Hn @łĶ:XĒPƒY&”ZØ?Q¹³ ś_(ņpōĀż/ {»ž5aē_üxBbo\Ø€Ó ’FĮ„;Ó©hĶ²}@šEŻåģ6³īFł=Uøż_Ļ„‰@Dd T|ččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šRCŖoŚźŌ dƒō|£éī’.°4<`!š&CŖoŚźŌ dƒō|£éī’ `XJ0®ōžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu‰ĖnNĶIŠA1’-Ē:<`!š%iž>‰ĖnNĶIŠA1’€@ŲRų|óžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu‚öĆ °¢•ĄŅHi3ÉMq–ķɧ ”"¢·„ØW{ˆ~€śBÅīk‘X=“ĶĢŻ;Ķ1…~,Üå|ęœ3gę{ęĪ%ąp40žõ ~%üqQŪ¢„-B …‚“ŗIuqĢ­āL %ĖQ?·Ś^؅‚ēeneł3Čņ:ībŒ ƒc©KC™™8#e|ōµ2ďB±ę®¤sō¼CXn©µĒruöŲÕØXūw,XŁ rՌ‚oh2OĒÓĮSӉ±+š8»™~ĮŸ`Ļ—ōJłÅE«Q?j$ŁRDdNdlž°_š¤āõnĢ_;1ׄ1æiÅ|¤ó@“Īś9,$LŁ|.$×£ųv;ŃüSģVīŸbk»±’zę{Ģ«>Ģ×ܘ_•a^qźÜO#‚/(ž1õõ÷9 `±ÕŸ¹’Ö*ĻĆ'Õ§‹Ź¾ŒŪŗ°»R§Yō­ŲæÖØū—ˆ[öé āšvŻo²Uś¾L6čĆž‡ösźž<•:.rŽ€ą“Ūé@…±Lb|z ąŽĒźŪšļxN-ØŅįu˜7„öłR¼40¦8·ópė0Ū”ē›ģ~5ęä.=ßd ~Ģė„xß'|VžÖ}Āö{Bī3¬öqCö+¢øKrHq¬Mšč/]špž“zœ’¶NœÓ³![æŌ%¬Ų%ē‹(~ ĻW(dėp“Z7Yo¹o²wļ0åś*ÅłĪqčėĖ“ =>O¦Q½<ń–[õ¶Ž‹š—÷">oż4江lÓ_ Ś9ž7ŒŲĪēų÷ž>Ż'¦č Łü^¾Ÿ]ŠÓŲļŁƒŁhĮńŁŻæD6ŪtĪŃGµ:›ģr%ꛜ|&ėšb’só¼ Ē·•čž<öźžm”‚{·ėŅ‘ߧ’ü>č§NU×(~e ł%–m«–J%=“ßnBiK,“LÅ°(ęžŃ ó2AŒlśakĻ2’'$N?±Dd |ččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šf½Ö8,N”ō%–Ü_īS’BŪ@<`!š:½Ö8,N”ō%–Ü_īS’Ą`Hµ0®žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu į0‘D€›ŪĄ(6·¤’ źz.°Į¦Cģ``óö€Ć„‘‰I)ø²ø$5—Į d.P‡"CDÄ|b€¹b#3X§Jó«Dd äččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šõBZśč…é5xˆ‘p„Lué’Ń÷B<`!šÉBZśč…é5xˆ‘p„Luéśą$ p)9(+—žxŚ„•ĶkAĄßĢ&M²łt“Ś[»­A"6ŅV‚  ź1=˜€ć!šØEc[›ö nŠS/z°½¶ ŽŠāĮƒÅ»śh‹žEM½T0ĪĒī8ÓFØŗ0įżę}Ī›É ‚€v[#?Šōó’Ą®„r$„Ūķ6“Ž£^g.(ģBxÕ³‘2ˆt¤+ IhScˆ~E¤'d¬¦Īzˆc‚\©v­`ĶVˆņ“ŁmĢ=čG !ƒxģ6ń“āDZĒīœåuē²ż“öŲžÉ½ C¬0]­Ģ›“•ŗyn¦Zŗ /·źėd˜#ßė„š•"Ļƒ€ęÓmܓ¢®G-——LŹ£‚³ŒÓ7µÖAŹ> ū7µOQŁæ©Ż‹ŖžÅ€jŸļRķ¼“ÅŅœ(·ŸŁ >bö‚?Yü4ļ‡Łž·~`Ö’/¢/xe@ĪćÓģ>Źc»ņ æģ;ĻƒEžó‡i„rŚååCtżÓ5ĪqĻ)Öļ«‚ēXæėGzUĪu«™Pł[@­ÓŠĖśZŽÉ¼¦Eßį>Į ­cQ×s^Ēīżø3HCdD]ūœ«ś71U_ŽØü(ØŚūd}Ķ*?ŒŹö ” Ėz_÷ČzŸŠ(‹¾€ņsį?åp‡{FéŁļg{ßļ <<ĄėŅWBg/ »¾€ēŠŃKöö Œ‡ņÖ|­R…" Äc™5(¶ Ų¹'ó’ø'ź‰Dd äččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šÓNĢ¹ ļšÕ¶·S©`Ū’Æ¢F<`!š§NĢ¹ ļšÕ¶·S©`ŪRĄ! ˆR4(+užxŚ„”ĶkAĄßĢl»Év›l6©Ę“źF°lŠJ[<(A<ųš\JõB¬ckŗrK<ō =õāEüø<ÄCķąÅCOփ‡ž,„ ŻĪĢī3±‚»Ģņ~ó>ö½7oA€}Ą°«®8Ž$ŒP(!ģū>—N”lø7 ģLüL[ĶŪTķOB|f åU*½¢«•øØQŸŠĘ„«eļN©¹P”v(FwwqąĮ.jc(ˆĮžāRšJk8Ś»ÆE{ļ†Yīß±ćŽOxÖ«T­Uk•†sc¾V¾o_n7ÖčrĘw—ĢŪNšģż“Ę'¼å°’Ŗ^Ä;GÄiķż!Ęs‚ćYU’ķ€ŹC•Ļ¦Tž3U^«üA—y=O«œJ©l'e6µ]$ē»tčƒ~µ~ž[æ0?ŸÆ¢o-sX„ ^ÄMŽ·zČ]rż ćYĮ+–Ŗ= źgtYßF›¶¬o£å„Ŗ?Ē+˜ž„.ųĖ9źĀ¢®śQ¢ źŖŽ0žēģŠ¼åß¼”•ż»¤“ż»äJBõ/ÅTūĖ}Ŗ}Mcó9ćFu?ęē]¼ÄēiBš(g×ķż>ąæĪ['ŁabŅŻ§ß˜ŽV±Y›æ 0n¹©-ūū]<ĢBœp£z?fTžĮē}LšrR՟Tł©”ŚŸé—õm“®Äk£Åæ…OĘēCī0~#ģ„¼Ļ÷„5©/éß÷”·æ]ņ…Ļ'ņž<Äø,Ų·UŽäsSy·dī āįß׹h>änĪi…’ÓĘĒŠĶEÆR‡å Ō#¹{Üܶ”÷ ÷ߊŠ^Dd ąŠččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šØČĄ}T‡§>ēzlž€ŪŹ¬’„+J`!š|ČĄ}T‡§>ēzlž€ŪŹ¬Ž€°„šłJžxŚ’1KĆPĒļ]R51jˆEž‚n ś ܜt°ŗVˆZ0Vh ¼­®N®NŗøuvźįŚ („Kć½{ÆEŖ]|p’…ū’ī€s$č‚ Š§BįįX”V ,Ė’ÕžØŚo‹“ŗ;.8©¹X‡RCHyAź™¢ Śm—<¶&€ćFv«›DĆč”qčC…°+ { %²Z%U žóei*ļyB!Œ›iŅ–'I.O[ić^yŸBŹa> Ī=Ć {ų;bē…2y_ģ£Ī›Źš;_’ć#Ļž>és+"&Ō’ā¢ęÖTzÖŗ¢’ķé#š9·į¢åveęfæøzmšƒ[]ņfs§ēķ:1hċĻ_·¹o7ēóvw3½C˜ē¬Ē’ƒ@ÜŖ©v–¤ąé>@ŽMøcƒ¾zƒ¦ßä°’P4{ Dd hččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šQ·O{× ē|Bż< %„j’-‰L`!š%·O{× ē|Bż< %„j’ @„ų|óžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu—bƒÆåøÓ¢ f2‚ķ2āj`ņbi5¬„š÷2ƒųšpžTł0_£‹żL@(\™›”ŸĆĄš€—«Łį£ū™Ą~ū€ä6vp{ęĆ\jĀ˜=Œ$śbŌe°’2”öAĮRŁ"/p›UŸ?Üś5Ģ6i>Ć-UæīśMļØ”oŠ¹ļ7ßexŽw³b_ Œ&iÆm§E^J•n‰ z,?·(‚óź5š˜u>öæņSōX÷ŚŃżL(‰=ć]Kįē!ŽĮĘ× c_šqćĖ‘o—Žl„p)b<Ē WžĶ7›Ļ„łt’Ē“tŁ¹·NĀyš~oćż·Ø§ļ©!œč…8śéß ćå"„ы~wļVõ†` t!+Vq§ į“ŸĒų –®’ėo{Dd ģ|ččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šÅ?HnÉyƒ.0²Ė(żéģ’”š\`!š™?HnÉyƒ.0²Ė(żéģöą`°4 0®gžxŚcdąd``®f 2 Ą ĜL0##”ÅČō’’0KQ*Ę WĒƔĄō€]ČRcćgbųRĢ ä²–ńv6 znØßĒŒŹ‚T† č/&ˆ`b]FˆŁ"LQ '˜@,a&A&&;35üƒØœĄVĻÄ ’™›Z¬ą—Z®”Ÿ›˜Ēpcžēņ‡@¬ šµ|[ŚEˆ™Œ`»Œø/³“Tb1 ‚+s“ņsVps=tų(„Ć<&°[? ™»d„]%Œ’ˆ Äßē›0@ų{žĆģe$Ń{™ ö>`ģ`™^ ćļ›˜‰į?ŅģĮōß;°ū#±™ĖĂnŻ\AøĆ Żż Œs˜Aę–TrAS8£—b—;˜·œī™˜”‚+‹KRs.‚ĢeźPdčk)ˆł,Āīf°~`˜ū Dd hččšb² š- c š$€€A$?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šT‘£€F‚ó4{•Æm–’0k_`!š(‘£€F‚ó4{•Æm–’Ą@Hµų|öžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu;źvv0o8L™˜”‚+‹KRsA<.E†.ˆb ųņYˆaēĮćå0·Cģbd`ĖŅL Dd ,Tččšb² š0 c š$€€A'?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šU¦y½šQ/6ä„ÉŠ»¢0°’1‹e`!š)¦y½šQ/6ä„ÉŠ»¢0°’ą čēXJ÷žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpud›±K€ĢŪF&&„ąŹā’Ō\S¹ @Š ] UŸ…`n‡ŲÅČĄ –źnL+Dd ¼ hččšb² š1 c š$€€A(?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š €2šu½ˆŸŃśB¦{GĶŠ’Q°m`!šI½ˆŸŃśB¦{GĶŠ`4@Č1Qų|žxŚcdąd``ī`b``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZÄ & Ļ€†qCÕš0ų&–d„T¤20$€ķžĶ¤šģ† `[Y˜B2sS‹üRĖ‚ņsóv,ł\~ˆ ¾–Æ×JŪĀT§ TĢ¤ø0N19)³ʏŌdDį‹«¢ņgȃų>pžmITł~QßĪßȏŖ~*'Ŗ¼>#Ä~ˆž‘ēFżZF\ ŒB: œóóJŠņsŠ9”¢ĒŌ˜,O?—.ØH¹"(6Ü3óŠó9 bz² 7…{Ćt­érÉ,Ėƒ©0†Ø€ńŻyQłģØ|7‚¼±ų’ äĖąŹÜ¤ü†#Z\Ó> įŒ5ˆ/`ę0™› ·ĒHÄO‡óĻHƒųIpž=ATžSnT>*?‡ÄOÄp7(”3 ¹;]‡Ė·»±3w!Čmø=rZØüv_ Ī_ …*æP U~“ŖüN.TžT~ˆo‹Ķ_$å"ōų8¢ qzīd 35ĆrÉa&Ž0ž9!ßĪæĆāĮł÷ĄńhčĶ-;øĄå ŲŠ’C€ĢŪ.‘™˜”‚+‹KRs¶€ÜĮŌ”ČŠŃ1Ÿ…ŠżĢ –•ėīZ Dd hččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š €2šS'r%qŌž}‚µ—’/Ūp`!š''r%qŌž}‚µ—’`@Ą:ų|õžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÅĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuĘ UĆĆą›X’RYŹĄ¶ū7“Ā°&€meabÉĢM-VšK-WŹĻMĢcŲ±äsłA V0ųZ."™ö…ØNؘHq=`¬`éĢ¬„˜×š<ó@ō &N°¹ Œn Ģ@–KfY*Ōż\`?2‚Ķ‡Ų&ĄĄęķ‡ #“RpeqIj.ĆÉ @Š ] @óYˆęzˆmŒ`;-MŪDd ¼hččšb² š  c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šXŹ]&»e†Ā£T¾o5.v±Ÿ’4 {`!š,Ź]&»e†Ā£T¾o5.v±Ÿ–`@PĒų|śžxŚcdąd``>ĶĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuąū’lÄ>v0o8\™˜”‚+‹KRsŲAfƒLSdč‚h©ś,Äs?Ä>Ff° ąėL>Dd hččšb² š  c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šY ?Q¾7¬i{2!²ģ„’5}`!š- ?Q¾7¬i{2!²ģ„”`@Ą:ų|ūžxŚcdąd``>ÅĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuÄ6v0o8T™˜”‚+‹KRs¼@&3u(2tA4€T}b€¹b#ŲšKƒ Dd hččšb² š  c š$€€A ?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šSšm„1µŠ˜t.ĆĀ Š ©’/(`!š'šm„1µŠ˜t.ĆĀ Š ©’`@Ą:ų|õžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu€ĢeźPdč‚h©ś,Äs;Ä.Ff° +ŲMP@Dd ØTččšb² š c š$€€A ?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šŠ“«łžĪŠ9…Ė†< ‡l'Ō’f1`!š^“«łžĪŠ9…Ė†< ‡l'ŌB@ –XJ,žxŚcdąd``Vdd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&&! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZā±00Ę UĆĆą›X’RYŹĄ¶ū7SĆ?°&€,e`abÉĢM-VšK-WŹĻMĢcŲ±äsłA V0ųZŽĮ“6 h(ƒ.P56āj`tci5؄˜§šŸ<óAŽeų7÷£8 +±ø“ ‚+s“ņsŠŁ¹Ų|ĀéNˆ¹Œp÷Š0Œ°Ć0!,HęžęꌈŪ\t÷60:0€ĢMŖ䂆68FĄĮ kv0o8™˜”‚+‹KRsfĢeźPdč‚h©ś,Āīf° VŃsØ@Dd ¼Tččšb² š c š$€€A ?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šŠ¤/EŃåh„)ׯ)’fq_1197805974ž ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’GCompObj  ’’’’HfObjInfo’’’’ ’’’’Jž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ#Ą7? „² ˆ3 †>ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’K?_1197806046’’’’’’’’ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’LCompObj’’’’MfObjInfo’’’’’’’’OEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’P?_1189369019’’’’’’’’ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’QĀ#ąIĢ „² ˆ4 †<ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀHŚ”ķ ƒv ƒiƒtž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqCompObj’’’’RfObjInfo’’’’’’’’TEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’U:_1201600995źXĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’VCompObj’’’’WfObjInfo’’’’’’’’YEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Zšuation Equation.3ō9²q\Ā~H«äC ƒv ƒiƒt †=„±†+„² ˆ1 ƒWƒK ƒC †+„² ˆ2 ƒWƒK ƒL †+„² ˆ3 ƒWƒK ƒC †"ƒDƒiƒv ƒi †+„² ˆ4 ƒWƒK ƒL †"ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒi ‚*ƒIƒNƒD ƒi †+„³˜ėƒCƒoƒnƒtƒrƒoƒlƒs†+„µ ƒiƒtž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q\Ā<Xä$‹ ƒWƒK ƒC †"ƒDƒiƒv ƒi_1201601015’’’’’’’’ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’aCompObj’’’’bfObjInfo’’’’ ’’’’dEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’eX_1201599899’’’’’’’’#ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’gCompObj"$’’’’hfž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q\ĀbĄ‡ ƒWƒK ƒL †"ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒi †"ƒIƒNƒD ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qObjInfo’’’’%’’’’jEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’k~_1189370209"0(ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’mCompObj')’’’’nfObjInfo’’’’*’’’’pEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’q…_1188037088’’’’’’’’-ĪĄF­¬U.3ʐ­¬U.3ĘĀiHŚ”ķ ƒR ƒiƒt †=‚l‚o‚g‚(ƒr ƒiƒtƒd †" †+ˆ1‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’tCompObj,.’’’’ufObjInfo’’’’/’’’’wEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’x?¼Į#ؐ C ƒr ƒiƒtƒdž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀiHŚ”ķ ƒv ƒiƒt †=‚l‚o‚g‚(ƒVƒoƒl ƒiƒtƒd †" ‚)_118941315652ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’yCompObj13’’’’zfObjInfo’’’’4’’’’|Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’}…_1189370406’’’’’’’’7ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’€CompObj68’’’’fž’’’‚ž’’’ž’’’…ž’’’ž’’’ˆž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’“ž’’’ž’’’–ž’’’ž’’’™ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’žž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’£ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Øž’’’ž’’’«¬­®Æ°±²³“µž’’’ž’’’øž’’’ž’’’»¼ž’’’ž’’’æž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Äž’’’ž’’’ĒČž’’’ž’’’Ėž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Šž’’’ž’’’Óž’’’ž’’’Öž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Ūž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ąž’’’ž’’’ćž’’’ž’’’ęž’’’ž’’’éž’’’ž’’’ģž’’’ž’’’ļšž’’’ž’’’óž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ųž’’’ž’’’ūž’’’żž’ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ+`~üŻ ƒVƒoƒl ƒiƒtƒdž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqObjInfo’’’’9’’’’ƒEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’„G_1194855295‹?<ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’†CompObj;=’’’’‡fObjInfo’’’’>’’’’‰Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Š9_1195631849€šAĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3Ęuation Equation.3ō9²q’Įš­Œ½ †"ˆ0‚.ˆ2ˆ3ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀYš­Œ½ ‚(†"ˆ0‚.ˆ2ˆ2ˆ6Ole ’’’’’’’’’’’’‹CompObj@B’’’’ŒfObjInfo’’’’C’’’’ŽEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’u‚%†×ˆ6ˆ5ˆ5‚%†×ˆ6ˆ2‚.ˆ9‚%‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀY(‰  ‚(†"ˆ0‚.ˆ2ˆ2ˆ6‚%†×ˆ1ˆ6ˆ8‚%†×ˆ2ˆ6‚.ˆ2‚%‚)_1195631875’’’’’’’’FĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’‘CompObjEG’’’’’fObjInfo’’’’H’’’’”Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’•u_1201522516’’’’’’’’KĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’—CompObjJL’’’’˜fž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qäĮČĽ „² ˆ1ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qObjInfo’’’’M’’’’šEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’›6_1194783986’’’’’’’’PĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’œCompObjOQ’’’’fObjInfo’’’’R’’’’ŸEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ 5_1198591175’’’’’’’’UĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘßĮš­Œ½ †"ˆ0‚.ˆ4ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ8ė× ƒL ƒiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’”CompObjTV’’’’¢fObjInfo’’’’W’’’’¤Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’„6_1201601123qZĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’¦CompObjY[’’’’§fObjInfo’’’’\’’’’©uation Equation.3ō9²q\ĀĘp Œ½ ƒR ƒiƒt †=„±†+„² ˆ1 ƒWƒK ƒC †+„² ˆ2 ƒWƒK ƒL †+„² ˆ3 ƒWƒK ƒC †"ƒDƒiƒv ƒi †+„² ˆ4 ƒWƒK ƒL †"ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒi ‚*ƒIƒNƒD ƒi ‚*‚(ˆ1†"ƒL ƒi ‚)˜Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ŗā_1201600177!g_ĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’¶CompObj^`’’’’·fė˜ė˜ė˜ė†+„² ˆ5 ƒWƒK ƒC †"ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒi ‚*ƒIƒNƒD ƒi ‚*ƒL ƒi †+„² ˆ6 ƒWƒK ƒL †"ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒi ‚*ƒIƒNƒD ƒi ‚*ƒL ƒi †+„³˜ėƒCƒoƒnƒtƒrƒoƒlƒs†+„µ ƒiƒtž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q\Āxģ ‚(ƒWƒK ƒC ‚*ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒi ‚*ƒIƒNƒD ƒi ‚*ƒL ƒi ‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qObjInfo’’’’a’’’’¹Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŗ_1198671453’’’’’’’’dĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’½CompObjce’’’’¾fObjInfo’’’’f’’’’ĄEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Į?_1201600190’’’’’’’’iĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘĀ#š­Œ½ „² ˆ5 †=ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q\ĀØØL‚ ‚(ƒWƒK ƒL ‚*ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒi ‚*ƒIƒNƒD ƒiOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ĀCompObjhj’’’’ĆfObjInfo’’’’k’’’’ÅEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ʝ ‚*ƒL ƒi ‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ#š­Œ½ „² ˆ6 †<ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Eq_1198669467SbnĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ÉCompObjmo’’’’ŹfObjInfo’’’’p’’’’ĢEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ķ?_1201601144’’’’’’’’sĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ<ŖU.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ĪCompObjrt’’’’Ļfuation Equation.3ō9²q\Ā3P‰Ģ ƒGƒaƒiƒnƒs ƒi †<ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qObjInfo’’’’u’’’’ŃEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŅO_1200038556”’’’’xĪĄF<ŖU.3ʐ­¬U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŌCompObjwy’’’’ÕfObjInfo’’’’z’’’’×Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ų5_1200038588vI}ĪĄF­¬U.3ʐ­¬U.3Ę Ā˜ Ü& †"ˆ0‚.ˆ3ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q ĀČ­T  †"ˆ0‚.ˆ2ˆ3ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŁCompObj|~’’’’ŚfObjInfo’’’’’’’’ÜEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ż9_1195558173’’’’…‚ĪĄF­¬U.3ʐ­¬U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŽCompObjƒ’’’’ßfObjInfo’’’’„’’’’įż’’’  4²   !"#$%&'()*+,-./012ž’’’ž’’’56ž’’’89:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|~ż’’’€uation Equation.3ō9²qÓĮQš­Œ½ ‚(ˆ0‚.ˆ0ˆ3ˆ2†×ˆ6ˆ5ˆ5‚%†×ˆ6ˆ2‚.ˆ9‚%‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ām_1195558208’’’’’’’’‡ĪĄF­¬U.3ʐ­¬U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’äCompObj†ˆ’’’’åfObjInfo’’’’‰’’’’ēEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’čm_1188037068Ÿ+ŒĪĄF­¬U.3ʐ­¬U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’źÓĮQ ĄüV ‚(ˆ0‚.ˆ0ˆ3ˆ2†×ˆ1ˆ6ˆ8‚%†×ˆ2ˆ6‚.ˆ2‚%‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q¼Įm(AÜ] ƒR ƒiƒtƒw †=‚l‚o‚g‚(ƒr ƒiƒtƒd †" †+CompObj‹’’’’ėfObjInfo’’’’Ž’’’’ķEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ī‰_1189496882’’’’’’’’‘ĪĄF­¬U.3ʐ­¬U.3Ęˆ1‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qJĀ8Ļ”ģ ƒR ˆ2ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ńCompObj’’’’’ņfObjInfo’’’’“’’’’ōEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’õ6_1199797584’’’’’’’’–ĪĄF­¬U.3ʐ­¬U.3ĘOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’öCompObj•—’’’’÷fObjInfo’’’’˜’’’’łuation Equation.3ō9²qźĮ/š­Œ½ „Į ƒi ˜ė˜ė˜ė†=ˆ1ž’ą…ŸņłOh«‘+'³Ł0œ˜ ČŌäšü  , L X d p|„Œ”ä Effects of Capital Gains Tax: Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’śK1Table’’’’7¤ņSummaryInformation(›’’’’üĢDocumentSummaryInformation8’’’’’’’’’’’’؃`!š^¤/EŃåh„)ׯ)B` PĒXJ,žxŚcdąd``Vdd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZÄ , Ē€†qCÕš0ų&–d„T¤20€ķžĶŌšģ† KX˜B2sS‹üRĖ‚ņsóv,ł\~ˆ ¾–+p§½Ź  TĶ¤ø³˜AZ *!ę)ü'Ļ įt'Ä\Fø{ ˜@FŲa˜ Š$sEx¹q›‹īŽF¹I•\ŠŠęĒ8 a-ĄĄęķĒ!#“RpeqIj.ƒ%Č\ E†.ˆŖĻB č~`Ė‰Qq?@Dd ¼Tččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šŠ"¤’³ōĆé08¾©·3m’fš‡`!š^"¤’³ōĆé08¾©·3mB` PĒXJ,žxŚcdąd``Vdd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZÄ , Ē€†qCÕš0ų&–d„T¤20€ķžĶŌšģ† KX˜B2sS‹üRĖ‚ņsóv,ł\~ˆ ¾–ļęM[4”AؚHq50f1ƒ“TBĢSųOžyŒ śÜÜŒęąp0©ÄāN& ®ĢMŹĻa`Øęįŗŗą£NwBĢe„»×‚ d„ †¹ aA2ח›«·¹čīm`t`™›TÉ m.pŒ€ƒÖ ģ`Žp221)W—¤ę2,™ĖŌ”ČŠŃRõYˆŻĢ`suƒDd hččšb² š c š$€€A ?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šRp_Xp"į¹żnĮrM—’.0Š`!š&p_Xp"į¹żnĮrM—’Ą@Hµų|ōžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu 1ĄÜ±‹‘,lN*Dd ” hččšb² š3 c š$€€A*?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2štRæŅß':KꘌAI’P8Œ`!šHRæŅß':KꘌAI 4@šĶPų|žxŚcdąd``ī`b``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&&! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZÄŒž ć†ŖįašM,É©,He`HŪż›Iį?Ų Ą¶²01„dę¦+ų„–+åē&ę1ģXņ¹ü +|-ŌH[ĄT§ TĢ¤ø0zƒœ”Yć h2¢šĻ© ņżåA|8’$Ŗ¼›(ˆļ ēgš£Ŗ÷įD•ʱāŸ†䳇‘D€†–WćIm Īły%Eł9ŜPŃZ5f ĖÓĻ„„ *¢§Š ÷ÄĢ¼ā|ØŲS›Ā½aŗÄAŗ\2Ėņ`*^ ATĄų’xPłļŁPł& ’”ycń%ȗĮ•¹Ił9 ėµø\> įŒ5ˆ/`ꖁĢM…ŪóR ÄO‡ó›„Aü$8Ŗ *7*;+*_™ÄOÄp7(”3 ¹»Q“ėnw#bfn²!Čmø=W5Qłv ¾œ.…*!†*Ÿ)€*_Ą…ŹļfAås2ų¶ŲüER.BjUˆ»Šs'™©–KŖd@F˜xĆų­B ¾1œ?™Ä7‚󧲁ų†Ž\Š²ƒ \¾€-9ŲĮ¼=ą‰‘‰I)ø²ø$5—aČ @Š ] @óYˆŻĻĢ`{PėADd ˆhččšb² š4 c š$€€A+?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2š‹Āq[Ķ<£ŪÆ5ā¶Ć÷z’gb`!š_Āq[Ķ<£ŪÆ5ā¶Ć÷z @@0= ų|-žxŚcdąd``fcd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&&v! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZā±30<Ę UĆĆą›X’RYŹĄ¶ū7“Ā°&€meabÉĢM-VšK-WŹĻMĢcŲ±äsłA V0ųZ~I#M™ØNؘHq=`Üņ Cf%Œ_Ģā;WBĢoųGžłŒ śP'ŲÜĘ^f Ė%³,•*"Ę Œpot›@„Į•¹Ił9 +“ø> įō Ä&F˜¹­Ģ #“¼¹ įĘ[F°é»@A {Ą±ĮČĤ\Y\’šĖ  2—ØC‘” ¬DÄ|b@÷3X?į°dBXDd hččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2š¢«³žĢq÷jćóå{ ĘÉąh’~£‘`!šv«³žĢq÷jćóå{ ĘÉąh@ą @čōų|DžxŚcdąd``V`d``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦I&ķ# P.P16āzĄčĆŅ™Y ć’cGå70ų>•ūž‘g#ˆžŌÄ 6·q''3åéē’Ź‰c…‹{bf^1Ōu Œb   ÷F·Š@(\™›”ŸĆĄĄ§ĆõĢį£NßBlg„›»‘d„–7ŒŸĒ įsAƚ Œ`Ū v 0°ƒy{Ą1ČČĤ\Y\’šĖšdP‡"CXˆˆł,Āīsf°~hėoåDd Xččšb² š c š$€€A ?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š€2šĖzÆDƍ`ĄPĻ€±éO’§ū“`!šŸzÆDƍ`ĄPĻ€±éOüĄ € 7hßmžxŚ•R±JĆP=÷µµMR0‡č JUŠA'”“›‚mG;TŒ¶Ņ˜¢šE:;ł‚ż ‡~†«ƒcA©"ß}}-vhĀĶ»'œ{Ī}ļ]‚$. ˜?)†ˆ3A¤3Q©l•¦õ?ė‡—mѵr2[˜˜Ä "&Ɩø+³;m Ų”|Ks²Ų©µrŲt¦ņžķ/Õ®ŁI»\÷Üsg×m9Eß«žāį¶ßz”į8o­ ćؗ”¼ÉĪČuŻģPßäŅ„0Ę{ ƅ†ĘĖ)®hųĒ‹’8 łŚ„Š;š@`›µĀKn„#×ē_Īƒ%ņ~Œ ‚ń–?šé~Žņ©XęÅhhŅ>ļt’`‰'­ėD±.ubĆżæ¢ša…CŻ?ÄT†/·Ä8O<|n4ęMżŻO‡nŅ¬pÄxŒ‹©ēÄT³¤BO‰“B÷jśHˆłRxøzģY1‡+UĄŸż~Ć{NØśo7]—|ąDd |ččš0² š # š A’š€2š\ž#S – óėX¾m×ņ©žĶ’8|–`!š0ž#S – óėX¾m×ņ©žĶ¢Ą`Hµ0®žžxŚcdąd``¾ČĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu֚`!š6•OĘĒĄœŹ½\o®%¤ `čÖ0®žxŚcdąd``¾ÄĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu u2É"ž’“CŻüpµ_ÄDd Tččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š"€2šgkšÕ‡p‡įļ— Æm T’Cš£`!š;kšÕ‡p‡įļ— Æm T’Ą HµXJ žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu—bƒÆåÓŁŅœX€źtŖ9€“×F9°{ +!ę5üƒ™e™\™›”ŸĆĄ°€‡«ĮG!ę12€čps@ę&UrA]Ļö!Ų™P· 0°ƒy{ĄaĀČĤ\Y\’šĖą2—ØC‘” ¢¤ź³Ģķ»˜Į2³ńKœ%Dd 0ččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š#€2šoŽż¶ā:©[īē)bīšą]’K ¦`!šCŽż¶ā:©[īē)bīšą]²€ĄųkHµžxŚcdąd``¾ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu 1Ąü±‹‘,I£PLDd hččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š$€2šQĄ}hµķUigōøŻ5Ł ž’-2Ø`!š%Ą}hµķUigōøŻ5Ł ž’ @„ų|óžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu—bƒÆårœi~,@uŗ@Å@Śˆė£8Xgf%ļ†ä™ĒČ¢?ĄĶm`tc™ąSÉu=Ų‡Œ`Ó!v 0°ƒy{ĄaĀČĤ\Y\’šĖą2—ØC‘” ¢b> 1ĄÜ±‹‘,>PJEąDd ÜŠččšb² š5 c š$€€A,?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š%€2š*mPéUOŖĘėgMj¼Wf•Č’9Ŗ`!šžmPéUOŖĘėgMj¼Wf•ČL`1€°ŠLšłĢžxŚ•MhAĒßģ&i³mMšŚFÓJ·ÕĘ&Mæā"T m-’˜CZæĄƒ)Äȇ˜`ča”7ĮƒüĄƒ ‚zTDT<(JéA< “āµRō"gfwĘ}i{° ĆĪoß{’yofv†€@Whö8is+¢§bõˆR©TxƏģ°¾ÕIæzeÖqnŠG{A—PaĪą„üšöhÓBcłŌĆńTéĀäĢÅ4Ą*ū·¢Wx 0ĒGu(ąĢäŅE=‘.ėÉB.•‡ē׏ohÓ~–ćmēĒØ ōRēZśŽjAĒŻ–R¦$8$ˆæīĘ|Ƴ`—<½Ūæ7b~Ō€Y­e ,dlƒPŲ LĢä¦ Y€„ˆöių‡oÓn®QļR?ÓMĖY;ÜĶxZņéĘS’;ä}+ę•FĢßź0ƒ sVeœZW;4ĄV׍nķÄęużŪY"Ļ§üé‘y÷böš¼Ć’#ĶŲŽģĘöNÕn7Čp„qÆä+ŗŻß ÷Ų’A ¶?ńbū óGę¤Āxh£yśÆ®zżÆķĮuĘuĢ7}˜“Ūp/ł<‡$Ÿģa<(łW˜q·dWĒæė2¹śä†-ž,āł™ÄĮ˜ą#NĘbāD{ŪĘxæä¼Ī}’æŌ3ŽJ^q™uiÖ½£ń»‰§iŻ:^ØįōŠßfDQ:'fŠ„tĘXž@#:ąŖ@Ÿ³k>Ø^•[ž 2X`Dd P hččšb² š$ c š$€€A ?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š&€2šŖ¼Ÿø…E…¢Ķīf¬’†®`!š~¼Ÿø…E…¢Ķīf¬€@€“ų|LžxŚcdąd``ö`d``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZÄ@Ī3 aÜP5< ¾‰%!•© `»35ü;aČR&ĢÜŌbæŌr… üÜÄ<†K>—bƒÆå’i²,@uŗ@Õ@Śˆ«ń ?H«f%Œ_Ć ākĮłVœØ|fT¾ ˆÆQ qĀ˜{Ir#ˆžw×F°»2+aüó<Øü^Tžw&ß¹=\I ˆ;įįSĒ2Į§’Ź·įb²<ż\R¹ "oY@ń鞘™W ×5‹ŃįŽ\ŠøćĒ/8’ 1'ĄĄęķ§F&&„ąŹā’Ō\Yk€:ŗĄ@DĢg!ōbėhJt¦ADd ¼hččšb² š c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š'€2š‹}Ŗ{/äĒœ…õY’gy°`!š_}Ŗ{/äĒœ…õYB`@PĒų|-žxŚcdąd``Vdd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZÄ , Ļ€†qCÕš0ų&–d„T¤20$€ķžĶŌšģ† KX˜B2sS‹üRĖ‚ņsóv,ł\~ˆ ¾–3ó„± eŠŖęŅF\ ŒiĢ ­•óž“g#ˆž7÷£8L+±ø“ ‚+s“ņsŽór­pų(„ӝsįī5aa‹a.(BXĢżĆĖ5·¹čīm`t`™›TÉ m.pŒ€ƒÖ ģ`Žp221)W—¤ę2°ĢeźPdč‚h‚˜ĻB č~`ĖDļnN]Dd P hččšb² š% c š$€€A!?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š(€2š§?¬‹ę½ŚĆÕöyę߂G#’ƒŗ²`!š{?¬‹ę½ŚĆÕöyę߂G#€@€“ų|IžxŚcdąd``ö`d``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZÄ@Ī3 aÜP5< ¾‰%!•© `»35ü;aČR&ĢÜŌbæŌr… üÜÄ<†K>—bƒÆåQ:i=,@uŗ@Õ@Śˆ«q?H«f%ŒŸĘ ākĮł*œØü·ĢØ|_£ā…’0÷0’äFżī®Œ–`weVĀų;yPłåØ|°»|*Ńƅ‘Äpøƒ>|s9”|5.f ĖÓĻ%• *rŸī‰™yÅp]³@īĶ;.pü‚# s ģ`ŽpŠ`dbR ®,.IĶeč¹†ØC‘” ¬DÄ|b@)f°~6~w_ADd ¼hččšb² š  c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š)€2š‹Lž€nŖx6Óā,?ø’gµ`!š_Lž€nŖx6Óā,?øB`@PĒų|-žxŚcdąd``Vdd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČZÄ , Ļ€†qCÕš0ų&–d„T¤20$€ķžĶŌšģ† KX˜B2sS‹üRĖ‚ņsóv,ł\~ˆ ¾–ēH›4”AؚHq50¦1ƒ“TBĢSųOžyŒ śÜÜŒĘąp0«ÄāN& ®ĢMŹĻa`ˆåętų(„ӝsįī5aaƒa.(BXĢ­įāŗ‚Ū\t÷60:0€ĢMŖ䂆68FĄĮ kv0o8™˜”‚+‹KRsęĢeźPdč‚h‚˜ĻB č~`ĖūčtJ=Dd Lhččšb² š6 c š$€€A-?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š*€2š‡-G‡fš‰sØ}Õŗz’cX·`!š[-G‡fš‰sØ}ÕŗzFą@ Ø ų|)žxŚcdąd``Vfd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦lB@–?ƒĆb ’µ ˆ°10<Ę UĆĆą›X’RYŹĄ¶ū7SĆ?°&€,e`abÉĢM-VšK-WŹĻMĢcŲ±äsłA V0ųZ>Y#-ŽØNؚHq50^gi5ØÄb Wę&åē00(is¹9|Āa#ˆž€dīR6PsžĆĢe$ѝs”ę>`<Ē 2!Ć½¤™‹p/Ō½ząXqOĢĢ+‹Bœ +ą …†·;˜·ŒLLJĮ•Å%©¹ q ³A¦)2tA4AĢg!t0ƒe-‰v’%Dd ččšb² š! c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š+€2šoŠćÆVDŽ_,ć¶)ŻUrZ’’K•¹`!šCŠćÆVDŽ_,ć¶)ŻUrZ’²`ĄĄ:HµžxŚcdąd``¾ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuFżÉ^+ŗĘ\PßqCģ ØßŲĮ¼=ą0cdbR ®,.IĶe™ĖŌ”ČŠŃRõYˆę7ˆ]Œ Ģ` uL dDd 8 @ččšb² š" c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š,€2š®œNˆ°ŅĪ1SŠ;n×[˜’Šą½`!š‚œNˆ°ŅĪ1SŠ;n×[˜6ĄŠÜ PžxŚcdąd``–fd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦|B@–?ƒĆb ’u ˆųŽ ć†ŖįašM,É©,He`Ūż›©įŲ @–2°01„dę¦+ų„–+åē&ę1ģXņ¹ü +|-ĻēL»ĄT§ TĶ¤øwš€œ¤Ŗ ć’ąe ēĻóõą| .z3#;H^ՈŹceɛš¦ĀDn0‚D ŒRaz*Ąa¤g w#XŒoękcń#0Ō‚+s“ņs”y¹²> įš##ˆž€äW.N[ąöx°@ų\ŠęĒ8(”į+ĄĄęķĒ#“RpeqIj.Ɛ= @Š ] @óYˆ¾»˜Į2{\žeDd $ @ččšb² š# c š$€€A?æ ’?3"ńæ`æ€?š-€2šÆJ“ģĶ»”l¼PY’ģ:P’‹DĄ`!šƒJ“ģĶ»”l¼PY’ģ:P6 ˜« QžxŚcdąd``–fd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦|B@–?ƒĆb ’u ˆųŽ ć†ŖįašM,É©,He`Ūż›©įŲ @–2°01„dę¦+ų„–+åē&ę1ģXņ¹ü +|-ŸĮ™ĘĆT§ TĶ¤øgņ€œ¤Ŗ ćßäeēW‚łzpžO°WĢ`ü"v¼Ŗ'”oÄŹ dšY¤ĀDn0‚D ŒRaz*Ąa¤g ćļ``«€ńMĄ| c,~†ƒ@penR~ƒ×9‡B8üČČ¢? łõ)Ȉ-p{Ÿ“!šąv Ī'UÓ’1Ē`!š)¾Z>Ÿ“!šąv Ī'UӒą čē÷žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuŸ“!šąv Ī'UÓ’1É`!š)¾Z>Ÿ“!šąv Ī'UӒą čē÷žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuŸ“!šąv Ī'UÓ’1)Ė`!š)¾Z>Ÿ“!šąv Ī'UӒą čē÷žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuŸ“!šąv Ī'UÓ’14Ķ`!š)¾Z>Ÿ“!šąv Ī'UӒą čē÷žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuŸ“!šąv Ī'UÓ’1?Ļ`!š)¾Z>Ÿ“!šąv Ī'UӒą čē÷žxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu į0‘D@2—‹ d„-Ō\…’0sIt'Ä\Fع­Į&dbø!,Øīå$Žn s‹*¹ ”ĶŽp°BĆZ€ĢŪŽCF&&„ąŹā’Ō\†é s€:ŗ € ę³ŗ˜Į2u(q—ž’’’     ž’’’ž’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’zhanghaNormal hza05400035Microsoft Office Word@ž @p¬÷$Ę@D¢„2Ę@|EB.3ĘŠ,s’ž’ÕĶ՜.“—+,ł®DÕĶ՜.“—+,ł®t0 hp¤¬“¼ ÄĢŌÜ ä ä,University of North Carolina- Chapel Hill ™Ŗ+ę Effects of Capital Gains Tax: Title4 8@ _PID_HLINKSäAģ f !mailto:harold.zhang@utdallas.eduf 1mailto:Douglas_Shackelford@kenan-flagler.unc.eduf>)mailto:Edward_Maydew@unc.eduf#mailto:zdai@utdallas.edufž’ ’’’’ ĄFMicrosoft Office Word Document MSWordDocWord.Document.8ō9²q†œ@@ń’@ NormalCJ_HaJmH sH tH DA@ņ’”D Default Paragraph FontRió’³R  Table Normalö4Ö l4Öaö (kō’Į(No List@"@@ — ŠCaption ¤x¤x5CJ\aJ>@> Eah Footnote TextCJaJ@&@¢@ EahFootnote ReferenceH*6U@¢!6 ø*H Hyperlink >*B*ph’4 @24 )G«Footer  ĘąĄ!.)@¢A. )G« Page NumberH™RH Éy Balloon TextCJOJQJ^JaJB'¢aB įōComment ReferenceCJaJ<r< įō Comment TextCJaJ@jqr@ įōComment Subject5\ŠR@’Š _'Body Text Indent 2‰ Ęt&`®p Š € 0ą@š P°` Ą!p# %Š&€(0*ą+-@/š0 2P46°7`9;Ą

@ŠA„Ā„>ž^„Ā`„>žCJaJ»<S=¹?™_TeCm ‚–„xˆēƳĢf6 uÄ sĻAPt* ¾ Į  !$'./012345<f6’’’’_’’’’^’’’’]’’’’\’’’’[’’’’Z’’’’W’’’’T’’’’R’’’’P’’’’O’’’’L’’’’’’’’ ’’’’ ’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’K !$'./012345<?    ’’f60’’’’BCDEFTrst‚Ÿ ”øŽßąš.NOPQRSį#$%./z { | } æ Ą Ń  q_ą"?%‘&p-y1¬2E3G34455č5Ū6ą6 7ß9V:‡:‹;Ę;V=&>W>»?p@«@DAmAĘAīAńBCŌCśC2D×F~GĄGłK=LˆL‰LN˜R¶Vm[n[‰[+^ `>bWeĀgĄjRlEmhmxpŪr¤t@w„zž|„Ļ4€‚‚*‚H‚˜„Ę„ü„Ć…†ō†Ēˆ ‰‹ž&”œ––Ū–ļ™2g „Ż¦m©¾«c­d­“­y±Ż“µ8·»ę½cĄųĀĖÅĪÅĘ>ÉYĢņĪ9ŅēÕ.Ł/Ł?ŁģÜŠßāóćŽęšę›ę<ē=ēčč«č¬čééµé¶éfźgźųźłźvėwė5ģ6ģšģ›ģPķQķÄķÅķBīCīęīēī™ļšļ÷ļųļŠš‹šńńņņņ‘ņ®ņÆņóuóvó¤ó ō}ōüōżōiõjõŁõMöĒöČöŻöB÷µ÷4ų5ų”ų ł ł{łļłjśģśķśīś1žjžĮžļžF’m’ ’Ą’ū’7SoŠæā%fžÖļ-Æ°±­żT‚Ł3SŽŹę (\Ā = v Æ ę ’ = æ Ą Į õ ö dŃ’?r’Ķ &MhœæC}µī%>|ž’„…ó_A˜Ś E·ź'ZĄó&Yˆ¼ņ)…#hiėģl ¼ (!J!Ģ! "a"£"×"#M#–#Ī#$7$t$§$Ś$ %@%s%¦%×% &A&x&Ō&r'¶'·'9(:(1+3+4+5+R+S+T+U+V+W+X+Y+C,ø,-N-¶./„/`1“2·3l5m56666 6 6666%6&6'6(6*6+6-6.6061646568696<6=6@6A6D6E6H6I6K6L6N6O6U6V6W6X6Y6Z6[6\6]6c6d6g6˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€š@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€ 00¾ š@0€€š@0€€š@0€€š@0€€š@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€€˜@0€€˜@0€€š@0€€€ 00˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€Iˆ0!ŸBCDEFTrst‚Ÿ ”øŽßąš.NOPQRSį#$%./z { | } æ Ą Ń  q_ą"?%‘&p-y1¬2E3G34455č5Ū6ą6 7ß9V:‡:‹;Ę;V=&>W>»?p@«@DAmAĘAīAńBCŌCśC2D×F~GĄGłK=LˆL‰LN˜R¶Vm[n[‰[+^ `>bWeĀgĄjRlEmhmxpŪr¤t@w„zž|„Ļ4€‚‚*‚H‚˜„Ę„ü„Ć…†ō†Ēˆ ‰‹ž&”œ––Ū–ļ™2g „Ż¦m©¾«c­d­“­y±Ż“µ8·»ę½cĄųĀĖÅĪÅĘ>ÉYĢņĪ9ŅēÕ.Ł/Ł?ŁģÜŠßāóćŽęšę›ę<ē=ēčč«č¬čééµé¶éfźgźųźłźvėwė5ģ6ģšģ›ģPķQķÄķÅķBīCīęīēī™ļšļ÷ļųļŠš‹šńńņņņ‘ņ®ņÆņóuóvó¤ó ō}ōüōżōiõjõŁõMöĒöČöŻöB÷µ÷4ų5ų”ų ł ł{łļłjśģśķśīś1žjžĮžļžF’m’ ’Ą’ū’7SoŠæā%fžÖļ-Æ°±­żT‚Ł3SŽŹę (\Ā = v Æ ę ’ = æ Ą Į õ ö dŃ’?r’Ķ &MhœæC}µī%>|ž’„…ó_A˜Ś E·ź'ZĄó&Yˆ¼ņ)…#hiėģl ¼ (!J!Ģ! "a"£"×"#M#–#Ī#$7$t$§$Ś$ %@%s%¦%×% &A&x&Ō&r'¶'·'9(:(1+3+4+5+R+S+T+U+V+W+X+Y+C,ø,-N-¶./„/`1“2·3l5m56666 66g6˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜ 0€€€˜0€€€˜ 0€€€˜0€€€˜ 0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€X€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€`˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜ 0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€Ø˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜@0ߘ0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜@0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€IČ0“0®IČ0“0®˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0ŹŁŠ0Ą0Ź˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€€ŁŠ0É0æ˜0æ˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€˜˜0€€˜˜0€€˜˜0€€˜˜0€€˜˜0€€˜˜0€€˜˜0€€˜Kˆ00X „ŁŹ00€ŁŹ00€ŁŹ00€ŁŹ00€ŁŹ00€ŁŹ00€˜@0€˜@0€@0˜@0€@0@000¾ Iˆ00ŸIˆ00ŸIˆ00ŸIˆ00ŸIˆ00Ÿ %%%(R # ßS]6%“+Æ0›4¶8=1@ŽA÷B;F¹GJfKeMPVŻZdŽlsYuŃvüwŠ|:ŗ‡„ˆØŒ-Žxŗ“–6› 7¢„½Ø«Ż°Æ¶¼e½~¾sƬŹ-ĪŅ³ŌåŲ2ąšå6ķ‹ńńöūiż<’¢ļ1°_R ± ® \åõN=„Ń :"…$9'„*ū,:0X3č6·;A>f> ¤„¦Ø©Ŗ«¬­®Æ°³“µ¶ø¹ŗ»¼½¾ĄĮĀĆÅĘĒČÉŹĖĢĪĻŠŃŅÓÕÖ×ŲŁŚÜŻŽßąįćäåęēéźģīšņóōõö÷łśūüž’   O Ą¬:<‹CVĄr*ŠždµĖĶēŻ›īÅõśżüj± æī'" *90¶6(>Z>f>”£§±²·æÄĶŌŪāčėķļńųż  e>¢Fn€ļ1©é{«Å’7¦7Ø7Ń7å7ē781838‚8–8˜8½8Ń8Ó89+9-9z9Ž99V:j:l::”:£:į:õ:÷:‹;Ÿ;”;Ģ;ą;ā;Ń<å<ē<&>:><>]>q>s>Å>Ł>Ū>W?k?m?p@„@†@DAXAZAĘAŚAÜA BBB:BNBPBcBwByBˆBœBžBńBCC„C¹C»CŌCčCźCżCDDE-E/EQEeEgEiE}EEFFF>FRFTF~G’G”G=LQLSLµLÉLĖLęLśLüL*O>O@OUOiOkO­PĮPĆPÜPšPņPßeóeõeGg[g]gUlilklEmYm[momƒm…mūmnn9nMnOn½nŃnÓnóno oo“o•oĄoŌoÖo•r©r«rĄrŌrÖrŠtžt t&w:w?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRS^gqqŒžžĀŌŌś  ŗĆĶĶÅĀÅĀ-Ē-ĒĒēłēčččšPöPöņłņłĶ’Ķ’::ĘĘ,,oo””``ĶĶccÉÉ  @ @ ƒ ƒ ¼ ¼ ŸŸ  ££  LL€€ĀĀūūRR##Z#Z#£#£#g6  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRS9Q*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags€place€B>*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags€country-region€=S*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags €PlaceName€=T*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags €PlaceType€8R*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags€City€9B*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags€State€ €sŻTSRQTQSTQSTSRQTSRQBQQB>TSRQQBQQBQBQBBQBQBQBQQBQBQBBQBQBQBQQBQBBQQBBQBQBQBQQBQBQBQBQBG7H7Ī7Ļ7888€8`9a9Ę9Ē9Ü:Ż:æ>Ą>)A*A®AÆAäBåBHHtlwlüożo$'U†V†ŗˆ»ˆ†“‡“gźoźxź}źłźėÜšąš>ņKņ¤óØó ō ō~ōōŻöįöB÷E÷¶÷¹÷īśņś˜ū›ūC,ž2¢2£2Ŗ2č2ņ233.33366666666 6 6 66'6(6g6‡:Œ:Ę;Ģ;€EEÓY×YĻŌü„…††˜ŽœŽ*é1éÕéŲékīnī`ódóžŗļóŽ®’  >B#';!W>ŌC2D„Ļ‚H‚Ę„ü„Š…†‘ņóŽ‘’»’ Į –#Ī#C,66666666 6 6 66'6(6)6+6,6.6/61636567696;6=6?6A6C6E6G6I6J6L6M6O6T6]6b6g6C,66666666 6 6 66'6(6g6vÕ·@§’’’’’’’’’z ū|6J+’’’’’’’’’å)r|VÖŽ’’’’’’’’’śfó.ÖŖ¢’’’’’’’’’Q†|VÖŽ’’’’’’’’’ØVż#*i’’’’’’’’’©1Ė(ŗ°:”’’’’’’’’’™w“*QŒ§’’’’’’’’’0¬+ĀŻØ’’’’’’’’’(Iž-|—’³’’’’’’’’’Ėf(9·@§’’’’’’’’’d #TŽ„ŽŽ’’’’’’’’’/sķ^ŚŽŽi’’’’’’’’’Ś8*x$ ˜k’’’’’’’’’h „Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜ž‡hˆH.h „p„L’Ęp^„p`„L’‡hˆH.h „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜ž‡hˆH.h „„˜žĘ^„`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „ą„L’Ęą^„ą`„L’‡hˆH.h „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „P„L’ĘP^„P`„L’‡hˆH.„±„Oüʱ^„±`„Oüo((.r„Q „OüĘQ ^„Q `„Oüo((.)„ń„OüĘń^„ń`„Oüo((.).„„ČūĘ^„`„Čūo( (.).. „ø„ČūĘø^„ø`„Čūo( (.)... „Ą!„`śĘĄ!^„Ą!`„`śo( (.).... „`'„`śĘ`'^„`'`„`śo((.)..... „h.„ųųĘh.^„h.`„ųųo((.)...... „4„ųųĘ4^„4`„ųųo((.).......„°„PģĘ°^„°`„Pģo((.r„P„PģĘP^„P`„Pģo((.)„š„PģĘš^„š`„Pģo((.).„$„Pģʐ$^„$`„Pģo( (.).. „0*„PģĘ0*^„0*`„Pģo( (.)... „Š/„PģĘŠ/^„Š/`„Pģo( (.).... „p5„PģĘp5^„p5`„Pģo((.)..... „;„PģĘ;^„;`„Pģo((.)...... „°@„PģĘ°@^„°@`„Pģo((.).......h „h„˜žĘh^„h`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „8„˜žĘ8^„8`„˜ž‡hˆH.’h „„L’Ę^„`„L’‡hˆH.h „Ų „˜žĘŲ ^„Ų `„˜ž‡hˆH.h „Ø „˜žĘØ ^„Ø `„˜ž‡hˆH.’h „x„L’Ęx^„x`„L’‡hˆH.h „H„˜žĘH^„H`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „„˜žĘ^„`„˜ž‡hˆH.’h „č„L’Ęč^„č`„L’‡hˆH.„°„PģĘ°^„°`„Pģo((.r„P„PģĘP^„P`„Pģo((.)„š„PģĘš^„š`„Pģo((.).„$„Pģʐ$^„$`„Pģo( (.).. „0*„PģĘ0*^„0*`„Pģo( (.)... „Š/„PģĘŠ/^„Š/`„Pģo( (.).... „p5„PģĘp5^„p5`„Pģo((.)..... „;„PģĘ;^„;`„Pģo((.)...... „°@„PģĘ°@^„°@`„Pģo((.).......„Ā„>ļĘĀ^„Ā`„>ļo((.r„2„>ļĘ2^„2`„>ļo((.)„¢!„>ļĘ¢!^„¢!`„>ļo((.).„*„>ļĘ*^„*`„>ļo( (.).. „‚2„>ļĘ‚2^„‚2`„>ļo( (.)... „ņ:„>ļĘņ:^„ņ:`„>ļo( (.).... „bC„>ļĘbC^„bC`„>ļo((.)..... „ŅK„>ļĘŅK^„ŅK`„>ļo((.)...... „BT„>ļĘBT^„BT`„>ļo((.).......h „h„˜žĘh^„h`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „8„˜žĘ8^„8`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „„L’Ę^„`„L’‡hˆH.h „Ų „˜žĘŲ ^„Ų `„˜ž‡hˆH.h „Ø „˜žĘØ ^„Ø `„˜ž‡hˆH.h „x„L’Ęx^„x`„L’‡hˆH.h „H„˜žĘH^„H`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „„˜žĘ^„`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „č„L’Ęč^„č`„L’‡hˆH.h „Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜žo(‡hˆH.€ „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜ž‡hˆH.‚ „p„L’Ęp^„p`„L’‡hˆH.€ „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜ž‡hˆH.€ „„˜žĘ^„`„˜ž‡hˆH.‚ „ą„L’Ęą^„ą`„L’‡hˆH.€ „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜ž‡hˆH.€ „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜ž‡hˆH.‚ „P„L’ĘP^„P`„L’‡hˆH.„±„Oüʱ^„±`„Oüo((.r„Q „OüĘQ ^„Q `„Oüo((.)„ń„OüĘń^„ń`„Oüo((.).„„ČūĘ^„`„Čūo( (.).. „ø„ČūĘø^„ø`„Čūo( (.)... „Ą!„`śĘĄ!^„Ą!`„`śo( (.).... „`'„`śĘ`'^„`'`„`śo((.)..... „h.„ųųĘh.^„h.`„ųųo((.)...... „4„ųųĘ4^„4`„ųųo((.).......„°„PģĘ°^„°`„Pģo((.r„P„PģĘP^„P`„Pģo((.)„š„PģĘš^„š`„Pģo((.).„$„Pģʐ$^„$`„Pģo( (.).. „0*„PģĘ0*^„0*`„Pģo( (.)... „Š/„PģĘŠ/^„Š/`„Pģo( (.).... „p5„PģĘp5^„p5`„Pģo((.)..... „;„PģĘ;^„;`„Pģo((.)...... „°@„PģĘ°@^„°@`„Pģo((.).......h „Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜ž‡hˆH.’h „p„L’Ęp^„p`„L’‡hˆH.h „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜ž‡hˆH.h „„˜žĘ^„`„˜ž‡hˆH.’h „ą„L’Ęą^„ą`„L’‡hˆH.h „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜ž‡hˆH.h „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜ž‡hˆH.’h „P„L’ĘP^„P`„L’‡hˆH.h„ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH·šh„p„˜žĘp^„p`„˜žOJQJ^Jo(‡hˆHoh„@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH§šh„„˜žĘ^„`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH·šh„ą„˜žĘą^„ą`„˜žOJQJ^Jo(‡hˆHoh„°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH§šh„€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH·šh„P„˜žĘP^„P`„˜žOJQJ^Jo(‡hˆHoh„ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH§šh„Ü„˜žĘÜ^„Ü`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH·šh„¬„˜žĘ¬^„¬`„˜žOJQJ^Jo(‡hˆHoh„| „˜žĘ| ^„| `„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH§šh„L„˜žĘL^„L`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH·šh„„˜žĘ^„`„˜žOJQJ^Jo(‡hˆHoh„ģ„˜žĘģ^„ģ`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH§šh„¼„˜žĘ¼^„¼`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH·šh„Œ„˜žĘŒ^„Œ`„˜žOJQJ^Jo(‡hˆHoh„\„˜žĘ\^„\`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH§š„Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜žo(.€ „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜ž‡hˆH.‚ „p„L’Ęp^„p`„L’‡hˆH.€ „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜ž‡hˆH.€ „„˜žĘ^„`„˜ž‡hˆH.‚ „ą„L’Ęą^„ą`„L’‡hˆH.€ „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜ž‡hˆH.€ „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜ž‡hˆH.‚ „P„L’ĘP^„P`„L’‡hˆH.™w“*Ś8*xĖf(9vÕå)r(Iž-Q†z ū0¬+ØVż#śfó©1Ė(/sķ^d #T’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’                                                      Ģ+q$våu²-A1EéE—ĘĘ%Ņ.}?/NģQX^~eLĘQ'@02|jAt~tF«ū'y8øQ™kļv@łBwŽXšA*`8TAśCzL”NŲO½[la_w”)Į^r ™(Ę-36É6F[e’qD ŗ+&YG±h<  o ( Y †y ’ ² ^ s$ é; y{ ¬ | ¬0 -R ķ! ^3 a; ­f ti $m Įs és ‰* «G ßj åj €p r ŃŪ‰ I9ÉB«C[äjŹÓ2ŹFc4"P"/Ź0Ź;7Eé^čnXpāsĖyæ?#¬'-ę8¼FiqA#(qOŠb(ØQX[J_DuĖŚAYšė)2JŸg{~ć% T:a‹lę.84?5Ć;ˆuģ6Ö9KTŃZpėtĖ0ŻHŲp@ Ø©!äEjHdhīw]° 4(Rź[Os¦g™!o2÷y­&ĻBc4@¤H­`hĆRm%£)w>}IYgįpŃw2|N"[Ėr< ÉB ČC SI (U !µ !Øk!"n#"Ä4"ėN"žT"{j"!###¤ #£#†6#Ŗ7#fJ#eO#OT#µY#˜g#łq#$‘ $ē&$²,$9Y$Y$Ng$%¼B%F%Õn%Hz%Š&¾D& J&Ėn&!'‰'ö'p'=')A' H'_'Kn'ļy'ž(x(&,(„A(XF(ƒ~(¶ )©)Ē)l0)ü0)ŌK)mV)_)6 *.*¤!*Ÿ'*ö-* N*we*8k*‹+Ł?+›o+,“,,y, /,#0,h0,?,},é-š-;-OQ-5S-.z-±~-5.….Ė7.˜:.x/8/’:/²;/_/pa/6¬B7õU7²z7#8‡88‰R8Š\8Ń>)0>:>¶W> \>$$?2?,N?s @ž*@E8@Ł_@9ARA3AyA—A#-BB.BĢHBńLBEXB;^B¬gBŅsB§}BC CN6CDDC‰kCžuC D! DŽD]!DĒ9DäQDXnDķ Ex EĘEECEŒCEĖEEźiE |E¢FŸQFäXFRqF"vF·vFõ}Fe#G|*G>G QGüjG²Hø*HŅBHEHŌRH"uHŗI‚ I¦SIX\IĆaIæmIzIKJ¼Jc#J€2JbEJ¹EJäRJ«TJqHK`QKżRK²VKexK{zKLŖLbLRJL$NLQLmLēzLč MgM»-M.M„.Mą1Md=MxM NąNūKN²TN”VN2XN­oN3 OŖZO=hOĄ P)Pd#PŗIPŖkPQF*Q{UQ†ZQv_QIR+R+>RżQRxSR’gRqpRSS*S" SS+dSņS6*Th+Tķ-ToKTf]TępTäqT#U UjU4#US@U)IUčNU²mU5vUģU×6VCiV¬V  W¾"W4WŻDW GW©XWÄ_WeeW iWmmWqWowWå&X`=XqPXQX mX…Yc)Y*DYóDYźaYłcY(ZR Z­ ZoIZsRZž[ę [VO[öT[}k[i\Ī=\…a\Ø~\ņ]˜]«%]µ+]­@]ŠG]õ`]r]ß^”^Ņ^)Q^Ė]^™b^–e^k^Ŗn^©y^_Ų1_øA_l_k<`+W`,s`°{`q a9(aóLa ^aÓba;xa—bSb'bĢ0bOAbŽGbaZbŽebnbŌ{bœcf1cwKcųOc‘UcŌ|cq dFBdćodXud€xdCeHeŠ#e!:eYIeQeĀUeueeŚhe•fPf¢efVhf[qfµ g¹'g»(gŌ0g :g‹{\{)s{ 2|@H|¼c|w|õz|®}Ą}Ÿ!}_%}V0}Ī;}O}Ek}’ ~Y~?1~óH~Ql~hm~÷~~© ā· ½nŃsź~×€#"€„#€V+€_0€µ4€HK€äM€v`€üj€št€1 ^b#3’OxU]X`Ysa!e¤k§‚s‚ę‚æ‚,‚C-‚]4‚EZ‚g‚Ģi‚P}‚“ ƒØƒŸ&ƒŗ.ƒO2ƒÓEƒ¼UƒZƒ[ƒ+„äY„}i„K~„ę(…¶)…&;…4]…!n…›z…_†Ą†,!†¾$†¤‡E ‡[/‡Śr‡ėˆˆK:ˆ8bˆqˆc‰ ‰øB‰mE‰M‰źQ‰ÕT‰h Š— ŠFDŠuWŠŠXŠ™‹ż‹O‹¬#‹(‹}>‹ÄR‹:Œ#Œ±CŒ+PŒRŒĆ[ŒE_ŒæfŒŚyŒlŒ'œź !użB"Hfh™jČ~“!Žt%Ž-Ž5>Ž"wŽ Ź {6ŸSœTŽh'Ā6^®`Ut +‘§1‘„k‘‚r‘ų’ŗh’£k’” ““¢““S“ z“ś~“ö%”n7”jE”€G”a•HC•–E•ÖO•s]•k•Ū –+–[1–ąB–‚G–‹\–Ak–8t–„——·—¶—é$—D&—1i—¼m—Ģm—¼˜.>˜/A˜Ė[˜y}˜¼™A*™©M™5ššź ›0›™›e+›®B›ėJ›9S›łt›Ł œvœ"%œ\&œyCœĶSœ*iœģiœH¶1;.ē8c>uG„ž¶žKžCDžPžŅmžŻŸ%ŸˆLŸųUŸš  ¤, >2 K ö”·”¼-”J0”V>”MC”xI”p[”óp¢Ū|¢G¢Æ£Ū£D$£,£Č¤Y1¤_P¤jZ¤\l¤f„N*„Õ7„&@„4I„qP„Nk„ćn„g}„@%¦4¦Ōf¦Ŗl¦Ģm¦$q¦õs¦½~¦x§_§ä§d(§P§&i§$l§¢p§6Ø8ØTØBr؜vØą ©• ©9©Ca©ÅŖAŖŠLŖbŖ’xŖ׫’;«)G«äG«}U«ųX«5`«Ea«h}«¬e#¬Ź/¬J4¬¾9¬/x¬‰­8­ P­ŽP­×X­3j­½o­ō{­Ō%®±:®ģ=®‰?®ŒD®bF®.J®)T®že®Ük®Žx®ėÆAƗÆR&Æw7Æ_LÆ¢[ÆųiÆ:|Æ£ °F4°wQ°$V°WZ°_°Óc°ē°¤ ±‘.±ū>±æJ±AT±jt±T ²$²;²B²+N²]N²śn²C ³Ā ³)³čJ³(W³\³ž~³ !“ö$“—,“Ż/“§N“ŒR“öX“³i“),µŅDµ-FµTµśdµŃ¶ž¶…"¶„$¶čQ¶_a¶—h¶„h¶i¶`m¶d·ī·>·+W·sp·Cøˆ>øJø jøŸ¹ó¹4)¹×E¹’P¹z|¹»FŗšMŗ^Oŗ±Oŗ [ŗÜ\ŗPwŗ‡»»§»Ø&»Ü_»b ¼‰Z¼—[¼›r¼Ū}¼Ā½€½é ½C%½»5½!D½ĢI½¬Z½qg½¾ō(¾)E¾-I¾@^¾xc¾Ķ{¾³æa#æG&æ6æœAæĶ\æhæé%Ą%-Ąb3Ą£@ĄČAĄūHĄ6LĄžPĄDWĄBgĄčĮĮüĮģ\ĮĒĀ\Ā ĀĀšAĀGbĀŠlĀ’VĆQpƟuĆyÄO$ĕ7Ä0;ÄĢQĽkÄqŦŒ2ÅŽPÅtŗ|ÅkĘæ!Ę,(Ę;*Ę>-Ę.Ęü6Ę„9ĘTHĘĒ1ĒO.Ē/XĒ‚cĒļmĒŚ%Č 6Č|6Čł<ȶgČĒnȄ|Č&É'É+2ÉŃJÉMÉĘhÉŹ^Ź/*Źu>ŹūZŹöĖš Ė*ĖńĖšEĖņIĖŚdĖ”wĖŻĢęGĢŸĶ’5Ķ[ĶŒ`ĶźjĶÉnĶHĪĪ$Ī0.Īö7Ī DĪąaĪ_lĪnĪ‰vĪDĻ‰NĻsĻvŠŠ+ŠÜ/Šn:Š~SŠ(WŠXYŠxfŠfŠ. ѱ*ѱ5љ|ѐ ŅŃŅ—ŅßŅ/#ŅźŠHźƒSźjYź†$ėJ)ė¼4ė"@ėMėĻnė/ģ»ģc$ģ>6ģ;ģ‘gģqoģˆrģdķ|ķĄķĖķ$=ķ•iķRīŹ&īį0ī’dīeī6qīKxī‚ ļµ&ļ5ļ AļBļ"Jļ=bļ†;šżmš•zšźUńą`ńLeńońyńJņōJņQņ^ņ jņyņ.~ņōwóœ|óWōįō™ ō„(ōā6ō²=ōŸEō†Vōövō2yō°õe õ/õ(?õÕYõÜfõ õNö¹cö•÷—4÷†2ų-5ų6ų—Fų]ųl3łäOł’^łpałįbłłś( śėś ś`+śšZś„eśęyś3 ū ū5+ūx-ūF<ū+>ūĄGūĀ\ū¦]ūņüüÓ ü§üšüĻü”+ü•kü¬}ü°ü1ż¢dżśużxżxž"ž¶+ž½4žšGžjVž‰fž wž’Œ@’ŗt’.„y±C,/·3g6’@€ƒEƒE(*ƒEƒEf6`@’’Unknownshackeld owner hza054000’’’’’’’’’’’’G‡z €’Times New Roman5€Symbol3& ‡z €’Arial?5 ‡z €’Courier New5& ‡za€’Tahoma;€Wingdings"1ˆˆšŠhD}¢fVƒ¢†Ģź”#eŠ,s’™ Š,s’™ !š ““4dŖ+Ŗ+ 2ƒqšHX š’?ä’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’yņ2’’Effects of Capital Gains Tax: zhangha hza054000D         CompObj’’’’’’’’’’’’q’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’Root Entry’’’’’’’’š ĄF «2õ@3Ę'@…Data ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŃÓWordDocument™’’’’’’’’>0ObjectPoolœ’’’’' ņ§U.3Ę š V.3ʁ‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—˜™š›œžŸ ”¢£¤„¦§Ø©Ŗ«¬­®Æ°±ž’’’ž’’’%ż’’’ż’’’ż’’’ø¹ž’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’  ·²   !"#$%&'()*+,-./012ž’’’ž’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’89:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|~’’’’€     ž’’’ “ż’’’ż’’’’’’’’’’’(N*)+-,.0/132456879;:<=>@?ABCEDFHGIJKLMOQyPSRTVUWYXZ[\]^_`abcdefhgikjlnmopqsrtvuwzx{ą}|~‚zhanghaNormal hza05400035Microsoft Office Word@ž @p¬÷$Ę@D¢„2Ę@|EB.3ĘŠ,s’ž’ÕĶ՜.“—+,ł®DÕĶ՜.“—+,ł®t0 hp¤¬“¼ ÄĢŌÜ ä ä,University of North Carolina- Chapel Hill ™Ŗ+ę Effects of Capital Gains Tax: Title4 8@ _PID_HLINKSäAģ f !mailto:harold.zhang@utdallas.eduf 1mailto:Douglas_Shackelford@kenan-flagler.unc.eduf>)mailto:Edward_Maydew@unc.eduf#mailto:zdai@utdallas.edufž’ ’’’’ ĄFMicrosoft Office Word Document MSWordDocWord.Document.8ō9²q