ࡱ> _ Wbjbj r=\r=\M<o  !!!!t!!!V"#!&w#L:$:t$t$t$%%%vvvvvvv$ z|v!%%%%%v!!t$t$4v)))%!t$!t$v)%v))yf lt$Wl&h<vv0&whV}x'<V}xllxV}!Um< %%)%%%%%vv(<%%%&w%%%%V}%%%%%%%%%> :  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA GUILLERMO VILLALOBOS VALENCIA, Petitioner, v. RIVERSIDE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT Respondent.) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )DOCKET NO. S226559 (Ct. App. No. E063481; Sup. Ct. No. INF1302664) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BY THEIR ATTORNEY, MICHAEL HESTRIN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Real Party in Interest. REPLY TO ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW ____________ STEVEN L. HARMON Public Defender, County of Riverside LAURA ARNOLD St. Bar No. 177978 Deputy Public Defender 30755 D Auld Rd., Ste. 2233 Murrieta, CA 92563 Telephone: (951) 304-5600 Facsimile: (951) 304-5605 Attorneys for Petitioner GUILLERMO VILLALOBOS VALENCIA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA GUILLERMO VILLALOBOS VALENCIA, Petitioner, v. RIVERSIDE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT Respondent.) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )DOCKET NO. S226559 (Ct. App. No. E063481; Sup. Ct. No. INF1302664) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BY THEIR ATTORNEY, MICHAEL HESTRIN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Real Party in Interest. TO: THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: Petitioner, Guillermo Villalobos Valencia, by and through his attorney, respectfully submits the following reply to the District Attorneys Answer to his petition for review. In its Answer to the petition for review, the District Attorney contends that, given the procedural posture of this case, this court should not exercise its supervisor power, grant review, and remand the matter to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue an Order to Show Cause. The District Attorney also contends that a hypothetical alternate theory of prosecution, not raised in the trial court, supports the Peoples attempt to prosecute Petitioner for felony burglaries. The People advance here, for the first time, the theory that Petitioner did not enter the Cash Mart with the intent of committing larceny or misdemeanor forgery; rather, he entered with the intent of violating Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) TA \l "Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a)" \s "530.5, subd. (a)" \c 3 , a felony. Finally, based on a tortured interpretation of the words commercial establishment supported by a single dictionary entry, the People argue that the bindover was proper. These arguments are addressed in turn. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW EXIST While trial and appeal from a conviction may, in some cases, provide an adequate remedy to a defendant whose Penal Code section 995 TA \l "Penal Code section 995" \s "995" \c 3  motion is denied and whose petition for writ of prohibition, per what appears to be a pervasive local custom, is summarily denied by the reviewing court, this case is quite different. Section 459.5 TA \l "Penal Code section 459.5" \s "459.5" \c 3  sets forth a brand new criminal offense, the elements of which have not yet been determined. There is no case law. There are no official California Jury Instructions. There is no judicial guidance whatsoever. Petitioner is certainly not the only person in Riverside County, or in the State of California, for that matter, who is currently charged with a felony burglary when the law permits him to be charged only with a misdemeanor violation of Section 459.5 TA \s "459.5" . And because of the ambiguity addressed herein and the matter in which the case is charged, Petitioner, like countless others, is subject to enhanced bail, longer statutory timeframes in which to be brought to trial, and, if convicted, a much harsher sentence. Sure, he could proceed to trial and, if convicted, appeal, while serving an unauthorized felony sentence for a crime of which he should never have been charged much less convicted. And, years from now, assuming the trial court incorrectly instructs the jury as to the elements of Section 459.5 (which, absent any appellate guidance, is highly likely), and assuming Petitioner is convicted of a felony burglary rather than a misdemeanor violation of section 459.5, he very well might be able to secure a reversal after conviction. But the procedural safeguards in place to prevent this from occurring strongly evidence the Legislatures recognition that the plan proposed by the People would be constitutionally inadequate. (Sections 859b TA \l "Section 859b" \s "859b" \c 3 , 861.5 TA \l "Section 861.5" \s "861.5" \c 3 , 871.6 (right to a speedy preliminary hearing), 871 TA \l "Section 871" \s "871" \c 3  and 872 TA \l "Section 872" \s "872" \c 3  (discharging defendant or issuing a holding order), 17, subd. (a) TA \l "Section 17, subdivision (a)" \s "17, subd. (a)" \c 3  (courts power to reduce degree of offense to a misdemeanor at preliminary hearing), 995 TA \s "995"  (review of bindover), 996 TA \l "Section 996" \s "996" \c 3  (forfeiture of grounds to appeal upon failure to challenge defect in the holding order via section 995) and, of course, 999a TA \l "Section 999a" \s "999a" \c 3  (writ review of denial of section 995 motion).) Also, notably, a defendant cannot rely on any error in the holding order to reverse a subsequent conviction unless it is shown that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination. The right to relief without any showing of prejudice will be limited to pretrial challenges of irregularities. (People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 TA \l "People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519" \s "People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519" \c 2 , 529; accord People v. Cabrera (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695 TA \l "People v. Cabrera (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695" \s "People v. Cabrera (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695" \c 2 , 701.) Grounds for review exist. The merits of this case need to be judicially resolved. The petition for writ of prohibition filed by Petitioner in the Court of Appeal was not discretionary, as characterized by the District Attorney in its Answer. It was statutorily authorized and constitutionally necessary, and it should not have been summarily denied. II. A HOLDING ORDER FOR FELONY BURGLARY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED UNDER THE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS NEWLY ADVANCED ALTERNATE THEORY Petitioner was not charged with having violated nor having attempted to violate Section 530.5 TA \l "Section 530.5" \s "Section 530.5" \c 3 . (Exhibit B, pp. 11-13.) At no point in the trial court did the People advance the theory that his burglary charges rested on the fact that he entered Cash Mart with the intent of committing any felony other than larceny by deceit. (Exhibits C and D, Exhibit E, p. 45, Exhibit F, Exhibit G.) A careful review of the trial court record reveals no mention whatsoever of section 530.5. Yet, the District Attorney now contends that the theory of the prosecution is not what was charged, briefed, and argued in the trial court entry into a commercial establishment with the intent of committing larceny by deceit or misdemeanor forgery. This case is really about entering a commercial establishment with the intent of violating section 530.5, subdivision (a) TA \s "530.5, subd. (a)" . (Answer, at pp. 6-8.) This argument is legally untenable. The Legislature enacted section 530.5 in 1997, to codify and penalize the crime of identity theft. (People v. Valenzuela (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 800 TA \l "People v. Valenzuela (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 800" \s "People v. Valenzuela (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 800" \c 2 , 806-07.) From 1997 to 2006, section 530.5, subdivision (a) prohibited the willful obtaining and use of another person's identifying information in the name of the other person in other words, the crime of identity theft, as it is commonly understood. Then, in 2006, with the adoption of Assembly Bill 2886 TA \l "Assembly Bill 2886 (2006 Reg. Sess.)" \s "Assembly Bill 2886" \c 13 , the words in the name of the other person were removed from the statute. The author of A.B. 2886 explained that under the then-current law, identity thieves usually receive just a slap on the wrist for all the damage they cause in the lives of these victims, and that the purpose of the bill was to give local law enforcement and the courts the legal authority and tools necessary to aid victims. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2886 (20052006 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 28, 2006.) (Valenzuela, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 807.) In its current form, section 530.5 TA \l "Section 530.5" \s "530.5" \c 3 , entitled Unauthorized use of personal identifying information of another person; attempt to obtain credit, goods, services, real property or medical information; etc, proscribes a wide variety of conduct involving the unauthorized use of the personal information of another person, including, but not limited to identity theft. The People contend that, based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, Petitioner could theoretically have been held to answer for felony burglary on the grounds that, when he entered Cash Mart with the forged Vons checks made payable to himself, he specifically intended to commit a felony other than larceny a violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a) TA \s "530.5, subd. (a)" . This is incorrect. Section 530.5, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: (a) Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55, of another person, and uses that information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or medical information without the consent of that person, is guilty of a public offense . (530.5, subd. (a).) While this might be a viable theory if Petitioner had used the personal identifying information of an individual person, as opposed to a corporate entity, such is not the case here. Section 530.5, subdivision (a) specifically references subdivision (b) of section 530.55 TA \l "Section 530.55, subdivision (b)" \s "530.55, subd. (b)" \c 3 , which defines Personal identifying information as follows: any name, address, telephone number, health insurance number, taxpayer identification number, school identification number, state or federal drivers license, or identification number, social security number, place of employment, employee identification number, professional or occupational number, mothers maiden name, demand deposit account number, savings account number, checking account number, PIN (personal identification number) or password, alien registration number, government passport number, date of birth, unique biometric data including fingerprint, facial scan identifiers, voiceprint, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation, unique electronic data including information identification number assigned to the person, address or routing code, telecommunication identifying information or access device, information contained in a birth or death certificate, or credit card number of an individual person, or an equivalent form of identification. (530.55, subd. (b) TA \s "530.55, subd. (b)" , emphasis added.) Personal identifying information, as defined in this subdivision, cannot reasonably be construed as including the corporate entity, Vons, which is not an individual person. Accordingly, the Peoples new alternate theory of guilt would not support the holding order or warrant the Court of Appeals summary denial of Petitioners petition for writ of prohibition. III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING DOES NOT PROVE THAT CASH MART IS NOT A COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENT The District Attorneys final argument is that the bindover was proper because the evidence presented by the People at the preliminary hearing established that Cash Mart is not a commercial establishment within the meaning of section 459.5 TA \s "459.5" . They contend that the plain commonsense meaning of the broad phrase, commercial establishment is limited to establishments that offer goods for sale. (Answer, p. 10.) If dictionary definitions are the appropriate means of defining statutory terms like commercial establishment, then the inquiry cannot be confined to only one dictionary definition that advanced by the District Attorney. Merriam-Websters online dictionary defines commercial as related to or used in the buying and selling of goods and services; concerned with earning money; relating to or based on the amount of profit that something earns. (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ commercial TA \l "http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commercial" \s "http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commercial" \c 12 .) Its thesaurus lists the following synonyms: economic, financial, monetary, profit-making, profitable, wholesale, commissary, exchange, market, merchandising, retail, retailing, sales, supplying, trade, trading, across the counter, bartering, fiscal, for sale, in demand, in the market, marketable, mercantile, pecuniary, popular, saleable, and wholesaling. (http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/commercial?s=t ) Establishment is defined as a place of business or residence with its furnishings and staff. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ establishment TA \l "http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/establishment" \s "http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/establishment" \c 12 .) Even the name of the establishment in question, Cash Mart, is consistent with the plain commonsense meaning of a commercial establishment. Mart is a place where things are bought and sold. (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mart TA \l "http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mart" \s "http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mart" \c 12 .) Contrary to the Peoples position, the preliminary hearing evidence did not establish that Cash Mart is not what is classically understood as a commercial establishment. To the contrary, it established that Cash Mart is a business which provides check cashing services in exchange for money in other words, a commercial establishment. (Exhibit E, p. 39, p. 43.) In adopting Proposition 47 TA \l "Proposition 47" \s "Proposition 47" \c 12 , the voters not only intended to create the crime of shoplifting, they did create it. And they defined it broadly (commercial establishment versus retail store), consistent with their expressed intent that the initiative be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes. (Ca Prop 47 (2014), 18, 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop 47.) To the extent that there is an ambiguity in the statutory language, the instant case provides a perfect opportunity for that ambiguity to be resolved. CONCLUSION Because the evidence adduced at Petitioners preliminary hearing proved that he violated section 459.5 TA \s "459.5" , which precludes prosecution for certain burglaries as felony offenses, he should not have been held to answer on felony burglary charges. Forcing him to resort to postconviction remedies under these unusual circumstances would be inappropriate. Petitioner respectfully urges this court to grant his petition for review and remand this matter to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two, with instructions to issue an Order to Show cause and decide the merits of the petition for writ of prohibition so that Petitioner and others in his situation do not continue to be irreparably harmed. Dated: __________________ Respectfully submitted, STEVEN L. HARMON Public Defender By: ___________________________ LAURA ARNOLD Deputy Public Defender Attorney for Petitioner GUILLERMJO VILLALOBOS VALENCIA CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT According to the Word count of my computer program, this Reply contains 2,039 words I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on June 9, 2015, at Murrieta, California. _____________________________ LAURA ARNOLD Deputy Public Defender TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PAGE  TOA \h \c "2" \p STATE CASES People v. Cabrera (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695 4 People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 4 People v. Valenzuela (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 800 5  TOA \h \c "3" \p PENAL CODE Penal Code section 459.5 2, 3, 8, 10 Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) 2, 5, 6 Penal Code section 995 2, 3 Section 17, subdivision (a) 3 Section 530.5 4, 5 Section 530.55, subdivision (b) 6, 7 Section 859b 3 Section 861.5 3 Section 871 3 Section 872 3 Section 996 3 Section 999a 3  TOA \h \c "12" \p SECONDARY AUTHORITY http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commercial 8 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/establishment 9 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mart 9  TOA \h \c "13" \p LEGISLATION & INITIATIVES Assembly Bill 2886 (2006 Reg. Sess.) 5 Proposition 47 9  TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 I. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW EXIST 2 II. A HOLDING ORDER FOR FELONY BURGLARY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BASED ON THE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS NEWLY ADVANCED ALTERNATE THEORY 4 III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING DOES NOT PROVE THAT CASH MART IS NOT A COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENT 8 CONCLUSION 10 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Rule 1.21(c) CASE NAME: GUILLERMO VILLALOBOS VALENCIA V. SUPERIOR COURT DOCKET NO. S226559 Ct. Appeal 4th DCA, Div. 2 No.: E063481 Trial Court No.: INF1302664I, Debra Lewis, declare as follows: I am employed in the County of Riverside, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a party to this action; my business address is 30755-D Auld Rd., Ste. 2233, Murrieta, CA, 92563, in said County and State. On June 10, 2015, I served the foregoing document REPLY TO PETITION FOR REVIEW on the parties stated below, by the following means of service: (BY MAIL: Pursuant to Rule 1.21(b), on the above-mentioned date I personally deposited in the United States Mail true and correct copies thereof, each in a separate envelope, postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed to the following [See Service List]. .(BY PERSONAL SERVICE: On the date of execution of this document, I personally served true and correct copies of the above-mentioned document(s) on each of the following Riverside County District Attorney, Attn: Writs & Appeals, 3960 Orange Street, Riverside, CA 92501 (BY FAX: From fax number (619) 338-4847, I caused each such document to be transmitted by fax machine, to the parties and numbers indicated above, under California Rules of Court, Rule 2.306. The fax machine that I used complied with Rule 2.301 and no error was reported by the machine.(BY E-MAIL: On the above-mentioned date, I caused a true copy of said document to be emailed to said parties email addresses as indicated on the attached Service List. (Rules of Court, Rule 2.251(c)(1))( STATE)I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on ______________________ ____________________________ Debra Lewis Declarant SERVICE LIST Clerk of the Superior Court c/o JUDICIAL SERVICES 4100 Main Street Riverside, Ca. 92501 Phone: (951).777-3147 Court of Appeals 4th DCA. Div. 2 Attn: Clerk of the Court 3389 12th St. Riverside, CA 92501 Kamala D. Harris California Attorney General Attn: Appellate Division 110 West 'A' Street, Suite 1100 San Diego, CA 92101 Phone: (619) 645-2001 Riverside CountyDistrict Attorney Attn: APPELLATE DIVISION 3960 Orange Street Riverside, CA 92501 Mr. Guillermo Villalobos Valencia (through counsel)  Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.  In addition to offering services in exchange for money, Cash Mart may also offer goods in exchange for money, but neither of the Peoples witnesses had knowledge as to whether this was true. (Exhibit E, p. 39.) No evidence to the contrary was introduced.      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