ࡱ> jlcdefghiq` AbjbjqPqP ::)H$   P  ~.Dopd~~~~~~~$@h;~OC/@oOCOC;~3P~ Q Q QOCX&~ QOC~ Q Q:U,V"  I)V 1] f~0~3VRM VV\VP ( Q2U;;~;~Pp~OCOCOCOCvDDv race, Region, and vote choice in the 2008 election: implications for the future of the voting rights act Stephen Ansolabehere Nathaniel Persily Charles Stewart III TABLE OF CONTENTS  TOC \f \t "Heading 1, 1, Heading 2, 2" Introduction: The Voting Rights Act and the Election of an African American President I. The Potential Legal Implications of the 2008 Election A. The Role of Racially Polarized Voting in Litigation Under Section 2 of the VRA B. The Coverage Formula for Section 5 of the VRA II. Racial Differences in Voting Prior to 2008 A. Presidential Election Exit Polls (1984-2004) B. The 2004 Election III. Race and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election A. National Results B. The Section 5 Coverage Formula and the Results of the 2008 Election C. Accounting for Party and Ideology Conclusion: Change in Voting Behavior We Can Believe In?  race, Region, and vote choice in the 2008 election: implications for the future of the voting rights act Stephen Ansolabehere( Nathaniel Persily** Charles Stewart III*** The election of an African American as President of the United States has raised questions as to the continued relevance and even constitutionality of various provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Barack Obamas apparent success among whites in 2008 has caused some to question the background conditions of racially polarized voting that are key to litigation under Section 2 of the VRA. His success in certain states, such as Virginia, has also raised doubts about the formula for coverage of jurisdictions under Section 5 of the VRA. This Article examines the data from the 2008 primary and general election to assess, in particular, the geographic patterns of racial differences in voting behavior. The data suggest that significant differences remain between whites and racial minorities and between jurisdictions that are covered and not covered by Section 5 of the VRA. These differences remain even when controlling for partisanship, ideology and a host of other politically relevant variables. The Article discusses the implications of President Obamas election for legal conceptions of racially polarized voting and for decisions concerning which jurisdictions Section 5 ought to cover. Introduction: The Voting Rights Act and the Election of an African American President When Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965, the election of an African American President was inconceivable. Even when Congress reauthorized expiring provisions of the VRA in 2006, such an election appeared a distant possibility. Now, as the Supreme Court has cast constitutional doubt on the reauthorized VRA, what once seemed impossible or unlikely has become concrete and real: a member of the racial minority for whom the VRA was written now occupies the Oval Office. It is unsurprising, then, that the election of Barack Obama has led some to question both the relevance and the constitutionality of the VRA. If a black candidate can win a majority of the national vote and even do better than previous Democratic nominees among white voters in states as varied as Colorado, Indiana and Virginia, do the fundamental assumptions underlying the VRA need to be rethought? In particular, does the 2008 election signal a fundamental shift in race-based patterns of voting behavior, such that the geographic reach of Section 5 of the VRA or the primacy of racially polarized voting to analysis under Section 2 of the VRA, requires updating? In this Article, we assess the patterns of race and political preference in the 2008 election and consider their relevance for the meaning and constitutionality of the VRA. The exit polls and election returns suggest that the 2008 election did not represent a fundamental shift in national patterns of race and vote choice. However, these national patterns mask great variation at the state and county level. In particular, Obamas relative success among whites, as compared to John Kerry four years earlier, varied greatly by region. In the Deep South, he actually did worse than Kerry among whites, and nationally, Obama did much better among African Americans and Latinos, both in turning out voters and in the share of the vote he received. We view these findings as principally a response to the charges that the 2008 election represented a fundamental transformation in voting patterns of relevance to the VRA. However, we recognize that this evidence joins a debate as to the relevance of racially polarized voting patterns particularly to the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA, as well as perhaps to the continued operation of Section 2. In Part I we discuss the importance of racially polarized voting patterns for the meaning of Section 2 and the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA. Part II presents background data from 1984 to 2004 against which we can judge any transformation that took place in the 2008 election. The data show persistent differences between minorities and whites in their candidate preferences, and between the preferences of whites in the covered and noncovered states. Part III presents the data from the 2008 general and primary elections and analyzes Obamas relative success in the states covered and not covered by Section 5 of the VRA. Moreover, we pay particular attention to differences in the behavior of white voters between 2008 and 2004. We analyze exit poll results, aggregated election returns, and other survey data to conclude that the differences between whites in the covered and noncovered states cannot be explained by appealing to partisan, ideological or demographic differences. The Conclusion discusses the implications of our findings for cases going forward. I. The Potential Legal Implications of the 2008 Election It is not obvious why election results at all, let alone the results of one election, should destabilize assumptions underlying voting rights law. Whether one takes the most anemic view of such rights, as limited to the casting and counting of ballots, or even the more capacious view as concerning anything affecting the power of ones vote, candidate success does not bear ineluctably on questions concerning the abridgement of voters rights. Whether specific candidates win or lose does not necessarily speak to the question whether voters rights were respected in the process. As voting law has moved from a preoccupation with access and participation to inquiries concerning dilution, however, the relative success of minority-preferred candidates has become a central focus of courts and litigants attempting to assess voting rights progress or lack thereof. Claims of illegal vote dilution under Section 2 of the VRA depend on a demonstration that racially polarized voting patterns hinder the election of minority preferred candidates. Moreover, in the findings of the newly reauthorized Section 5, Congress expressly mentioned racially polarized voting in the covered jurisdictions as one of the justifications for the law. At the end of this Article we return to the questions whether and when polarization should be relevant for voting rights law, but for present purposes, we simply note its centrality to the statutes of concern and the historical and legal debates. A. The Role of Racially Polarized Voting in Litigation Under Section 2 of the VRA Racially polarized voting or racial bloc voting is a term of art in voting rights law. The concept has its genesis in racial vote dilution cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. It played an important role in the legislative history of the 1982 Amendments to the VRA, and then became the touchstone of the Supreme Courts test from Thornburg v. Gingles for proving illegal vote dilution. If the 2008 election revealed decreasing rates of racial polarization in the electorate certainly a plausible hypothesis given Obamas success the election results might indicate that Section 2 cases would be more difficult to win in the future. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prevents jurisdictions from enacting voting laws that deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race. It specifies that a violation of the law occurs when, based on the totality of the circumstances: It is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class of citizens . . . in that its members have less of an opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the Sate or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered . . . . Section 2 litigation is almost exclusively concerned with vote dilution by way of at-large systems of representation or redistricting plans. When successful, it usually leads courts to create majority-minority districts that give minority voters a greater chance of electing their preferred candidates. The Supreme Courts decision in Thornburg v. Gingles established a test for demonstrating that an at-large system or districting arrangement dilutes minority votes. If a minority is large enough to constitute a majority in a single-member district, votes cohesively and is systematically outvoted by whites, then it will likely have a vote dilution claim under Section 2. The structure of an at-large scheme or districting arrangement coupled with the voting behavior of each racial group, under this view, dilutes the votes of the racial minority. Demonstrating racially polarized voting is, therefore, the key to proving a violation of Section 2. A plaintiff does this by using illustrative elections from the jurisdiction demonstrating that minorities and whites vote for different candidates and the minority-preferred candidates consequently lose. Presidential elections, let alone the Obama victory, would not ordinarily be seen as typical or illustrative for the average voting rights case, the lions share of which concern municipal or state legislative elections. However, whether the 2008 election is offered as a counterexample in litigation or merely as a talking point concerning the racial polarization that Section 2 is supposed to address, in general, the data from it draw attention to some of the ongoing controversies in this area of the law. In particular, the election has brought to the fore the oft-made arguments concerning the role of partisanship in measuring racial polarization and the definition of a minority candidate of choice. Without getting too deep into the weeds of voting rights law, suffice it to say that the correlation between race and partisanship has posed some challenges to the Gingles framework. The central question in this realm concerns how the law should respond to a situation in which a high correlation between race and partisanship makes it difficult for a plaintiff to prove that race, rather party, better explains the voting behavior of different groups. In other words, if minority-preferred (usually Democratic) candidates lose because white Republicans tend to vote against them, does the partisan explanation for their loss immunize the districting plan from liability for the racially disparate impact it nevertheless presents? For the Gingles plurality, the bivariate relationship between race and vote choice was the only relevant statistic. Justice Brennans opinion stated: For purposes of [Section] 2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent. It means simply that the race of the voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or candidate; that is, it refers to the situation where different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates. In other words, because Section 2 is about disparate impact, not intent, the reason why voters of one racial group might differ from another in their voting preferences is unimportant. Plaintiffs should not be forced to show racial animus, only that the voting behavior of different groups makes it more difficult for minority-preferred candidates to be elected. Indeed, as many commentators have argued, racial attitudes have sometimes led voters to affiliate with particular parties. Moreover, in a strict statistical sense, neither race nor party causes someone to vote for a particular candidate. Rather, at most, they represent group characteristics that might shed light on the reasons racial identity or animus, on the one hand, or ideological affinity and partisan loyalty on the other why a voter might prefer one candidate over another. Nevertheless, the view that a mere bivariate relationship between race and vote choice should suffice did not garner a majority of the Court, and the lower courts have been split as to whether a strong party-race correlation can defeat a claim of racial polarization. The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc in LULAC v. Clements, for example, held that the Gingles test was not satisfied [w]hen the record indisputably proves that partisan affiliation, not race, best explains the divergent voting patterns among minority and white citizens. The Fifth Circuit is not alone. One study finds that [c]ourts in nine judicial circuits now expressly or implicitly incorporate causation when they assess racial bloc voting. One way courts attempt to address this intractable race-party dynamic (as well as resolve the related issue as to who is a minority communitys candidate of choice) is to focus on elections in which minority candidates oppose white candidates. If minority Democratic candidates tend to receive less of the white vote than white Democratic candidates, the argument goes, then race, rather than party, might better explain voting patterns. The Gingles plurality (and only the plurality) emphasized that it is the status of a candidate as the chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate that is important. However, the lower courts have often considered races that pit minority candidates against white candidates to be the most probative of legally significant racial bloc voting. We mention these gray areas in the law because the data we provide later in this Article allow us to grapple with and shed light on these controversies at a macro level. In particular, we pay close attention to the counterargument that party or ideology explains the gap in candidate preferences that exists between minorities and whites. Much of the story we tell is a familiar one that demonstrates the breakdown of the Democratic Partys monopoly in the South and the rise of the Republican Party among Southern whites. However, we compare earlier results with those from the 2008 election, in which Barack Obama was, by any definition, the candidate of choice of African American voters. Although he was an extraordinary candidate and courts often discount elections featuring atypical candidates in Section 2 litigation, it is all the more surprising then that he did worse than his predecessor among whites in some states. At the same time, Obamas success in other states may shed light on the potential for extraordinary minority candidates in those jurisdictions. In many states, all outside the South, Obama was able to win the white vote and therefore win the state. In still others (ten states according to the exit polls, including places like North Carolina, Virginia and Florida), he lost among whites, but minority voters put him over the top. Finally, there are the states he lost, where he lost a substantial share of the white and/or the minority population was not sizable enough for him to make up for that loss. To use the parlance of Section 2 to describe the geography of his victory: some states exhibited low rates of white bloc voting and in others, despite high bloc voting, the minority community could still elect its candidate of choice. Throughout our discussion of the data we refer to racial differences in voting or racially differential voting patterns, in order to avoid the loaded jargon of polarization of Section 2 jurisprudence. Accommodating both notions of racial polarization discussed above, we present both bivariate correlations and multivariate regressions that attempt to control for partisan and other factors that influence the vote. By comparing the 2008 election with its predecessors, moreover, we can also discern changes in group-based voting behavior under the unique conditions when an African American candidate appears in the race. B. The Coverage Formula for Section 5 of the VRA Our principal goal when we undertook the first cut at the data analysis here was to assess the differences in race-based voting patterns between the covered and non-covered jurisdictions under Section 5 of the VRA. This analysis serves two purposes. First, we wanted to investigate the claim that the 2008 election represented a sea change in the preferences and behavior of voters of different racial groups in different regions. Second, we wanted to assess the claims made as part of the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA concerning persistent racial polarization in the electorate of the covered jurisdictions. These patterns and inquiries gained greater attention as the Supreme Court began to consider the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA. The election of Barack Obama was held out by many, including the plaintiffs in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), as suggesting Section 5 was unnecessary. In particular, since Obama won Virginia and did well in several other covered jurisdictions, the question arose whether his election signaled new evidence as to the potential for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates in states where historically they could not. At the same time, defenders of the coverage formula tended to discount the Obama election by emphasizing the uniqueness of his candidacy and election: his unprecedented fundraising, the dramatic unpopularity of the incumbent president, and the peculiarites of the nomination system that got him onto the general election ballot. Still others contended that the 2008 election should be completely irrelevant to the constitutionality of Section 5. In part, the relevance of the 2008 election to the VRAs constitutionality depends on whether one believes group-based voting behavior and election results, in general, are relevant to the constitutionality of the coverage formula. If the only relevant pieces of evidence to bolster the constitutionality of the coverage formula are instances of unconstitutional discrimination, then mere individual voting behavior does nothing to help the constitutionality of section 5. As Justice Thomass dissent in NAMUDNO maintained, racially polarized voting is not evidence of unconstitutional discrimination [and] is not state action. Although voting may occur in a state-structured and regulated environment (that is, the polling place), the choices made are personal ones to the voter, not efforts by the state. Even if one might view the state as enabling discrimination against either minority voters who get outvoted or their preferred candidates who lose, an individual or groups vote choice, even based on racial animus, does not itself violate the Constitution. If Congresss authority under the Enforcement Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments extends only to remedying or preventing constitutional violations (an open question to be sure, especially under the Fifteenth Amendment) then persistent polarized voting by itself does not constitute a sufficient record for an exercise of congressional power in this realm. At the same time, a lack of polarized voting does not speak to whether racial minorities face increased obstacles or unconstitutional conditions at the polls. Even if the same percentages of whites and blacks across the country vote for the same candidates, for instance, the relative prevalence of discriminatory voting laws in some areas could still justify a geographically targeted voting rights law. If in the 2008 election candidate preferences were completely uncorrelated with race, it still could be possible that minority voters in certain jurisdictions faced discriminatory barriers to voting. The evidence of racial differences in voting patterns is useful and interesting (if not constitutionally determinative) for the current debate over the coverage formula for several reasons. First, it allows for a systematic comparison between covered and noncovered states along a dimension that should not be affected by the existence of Section 5 itself. One problem confronting those who would gather data as to the relative position of jurisdictions in their protection of minority voting rights is that Section 5 deters and prevents covered jurisdictions from committing the kinds of constitutional violations that would constitute the best evidence for their selective coverage under the VRA. In other words, if the VRA works as intended DOJ will prevent the emergence of discriminatory barriers to registration and voting and no constitutional differences should appear between the election law regimes of the covered and noncovered jurisdictions. Race-based voting patterns are largely exogenous to the legal regime that is, should not be directly affected by Section 5 enforcement but might shed light on differential risks to minority voters were the Section 5 regime removed. By themselves they do not point to unconstitutional or discriminatory conditions, but they signal the relative potential for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates. Also, when candidate preferences coincide with racial group membership, there is greater risk that incumbent-protecting or partisan election-related behavior on the part of the legislature will have race based effects. To put it concretely, when those who write election laws under such circumstances succumb to the tendency to enact regulations that benefit their electoral prospects, they inevitably enact laws with discriminatory effects. If blacks all vote Democrat and whites all vote Republican, for instance, an election law that seeks to perpetuate Republican control will often have discriminatory effects, even if it is not unconstitutional. The likelihood that partisan or even mere incumbent-entrenching behavior will have a disparate impact on voting rights is greater under conditions of race-based voting. This last point poses obvious dangers as a constitutional justification for selective coverage of areas that experience racial differentiation in voting. These are reminiscent of the concerns related to the role of partisan voting in vote dilution litigation under Section 2. If racially differential voting patterns on their own could justify singling out a jurisdiction for special treatment, then party-line voting could doom a jurisdiction to coverage until the very late date when parties and racial groups realign. Perhaps that should not make a constitutional difference: such risks of discriminatory state action fueled by partisan concerns either exist or not, regardless of cause. If Congresss decision to single out jurisdictions represents, at least in part, an assessment of the relative risks to minority voters in different places, then the mixed motivation of those who may draft election laws does not bear on that risk assessment. Nevertheless, because constitutionally impermissible race-based discrimination requires intent that is, discrimination because of, not merely in spite of, its race-based effects partisan voting behavior that leads to partisan election laws does not necessarily constitute unconstitutional state action. For these reasons, we view the election data we analyze for the remainder of this Article as primarily a response to the argument of those who maintain that lessened racial polarization undermines the justification for the coverage formula, rather than support for those who suggest that the data, on their own, justify its constitutionality. For those who would recraft the coverage formula to pay particular attention to the jurisdictions with higher rates of racial differentiation in voting, the data that follow indicate the jurisdictions of concern. There can be no doubt that race-based patterns in voting behavior are greater in the currently covered jurisdictions on average. Yet the categories of currently covered and noncovered are not coterminous with those jurisdictions with the highest rates of race-based voting. If voting patterns were to form the exclusive justification for coverage something no one has suggested then the list of covered states would be somewhat different. II. Racial Differences in Voting Prior to 2008 Racial and regional differentiation in presidential vote choice is a familiar characteristic of American electoral politics. The two parties and their nominees have always been able to rely on some groups and regions more than others, even if allegiances have changed (sometimes radically) over time. Some of these patterns of racial and regional differentiation in vote choice held true for the 2008 election, while others were disrupted. The underlying story concerning these patterns is familiar. The flight of African Americans away from the GOP, with whom they had largely affiliated since the end of slavery, began to occur during Franklin Roosevelts presidency. While Roosevelt won only 23 percent of the black vote in 1932, the popularity of the New Deal among blacks led to a realignment such that by 1948 Truman would win 70 percent of the black vote.  Although Southern blacks may have preferred the largely absent Republican Party, most were prevented from voting altogether. The legacy of Lincoln held sway over Southern whites, which made the South solid for the Democrats into the 1960s. Since Lyndon Johnsons landslide victory in 1964 (followed by the passage of the VRA in 1965), the Democrats have not won a majority of the white vote, due in large part to their losses among Southern whites. Republican nominees have consistently won a majority (or plurality) of the white vote. The Democratic nominee has repeatedly won a majority of the vote from racial minorities overwhelming majorities among African Americans and slimmer, but consistent majorities among Hispanics. The magnitude of these racial differences in vote choice varies according to region. In particular, the share of whites in the covered jurisdictions, especially in the South, that has voted for Democratic nominees has been smaller than the share outside the covered jurisdictions or the South. As a result, given the relative consistency of the minority vote across the nation, the gap between whites and minorities is more substantial in the covered states. A. Presidential Election Exit Polls, 1984-2004 Since the last reauthorization of Section 5 of the VRA in 1982, these patterns of vote choice at the presidential level have been relatively stable. Table 1 presents the average share of the two party vote received by Democratic candidates according to exit polls from 1984 to 2004 as broken down by race, party and covered status. The states with some covered counties or municipalities do not differ in any meaningful way from those that are totally noncovered, so we combine the two. We also adopt the DOJs practice of including Virginia as a fully covered state, even though several of its municipalities (amounting to a very small share of its total population) have bailed out from coverage. As noted above, the cell that stands out as distinct is the whites in the covered jurisdictions. Only 28 percent, on average, say they voted for the Democratic nominee 14 percentage points lower than their counterparts in the noncovered jurisdictions, where 42 percent of whites on average report voting for Democratic nominees. This is 33 percentage points lower than Democratic nominees average vote share among Latinos (61 percent) and 58 percentage points lower than the average among African Americans (86 percent) in the covered jurisdictions. Regardless of whether they live in the covered or noncovered jurisdictions, racial minorities, in contrast, do not seem to differ substantially in the share that report voting for Democratic nominees. The regional differences between whites cannot be explained away completely by partisan affiliation. In the covered states, whites of every partisan affiliation (or nonaffiliation) were less likely than whites in the noncovered states to vote for the Democratic nominee. The difference was most stark among Independents, who exhibit a 15 percentage point gap (42 versus 27 percent support in the covered areas). However, the gap is nine percentage points among white Democrats and four percentage points among white Republicans between the covered and noncovered states. In sum, it is not as if whites voting behavior in the covered states can be wholly attributed to an increase in Republican Party identification there. Whether it might be attributable to their ideological conservatism, which might not be accurately gauged by their self- identification with a party, is a topic we address later in the Article. At least in the 2008 election, it appears some variable not captured by either partisanship or ideology still accounts for the differences in vote choice between the covered and noncovered states. B. The 2004 Election We explore in greater detail the results of the 2004 election because of its close proximity to the 2008 election for which it can serve as a benchmark for comparison. With a few exceptions, the results are largely similar to the averages from 1984 to 2004. We present both the cross tabulations from the exit polls as well as regressions that analyze aggregated election returns. The data, regardless of presentation, support the same result. As Table 2 depicts, the 2004 exit polls reveal that John Kerry did somewhat worse than previous Democratic nominees among Hispanics (by about five percentage points) and about the same among whites and African Americans. Relative to the average, he lost among whites in the covered jurisdictions but made up for it among whites in the noncovered jurisdictions. He lost ground among Hispanics regardless of coverage status, but his loss was more pronounced in the covered states. Compared to the partisan structure of the white vote received by previous Democratic nominees, he did substantially better among white Democrats and Independents and slightly worse among white Republicans. This was true for both the covered and noncovered states. In terms of their reported vote in the 2004 election, only Hispanics and whites exhibited differences based on whether they lived in the covered states. 26 percent of whites in the covered states voted for Kerry, but 44 percent of whites in the noncovered states did so. The 2004 election also demonstrated a remarkable lack of cohesion among Hispanics, especially in the covered states. Only half of Hispanics in the covered states voted for Kerry, while 60 percent in the noncovered states did so. African Americans, in contrast, voted about the same, regardless of coverage status: 86 percent voted for Kerry in the covered states and 85 percent in the noncovered states. The aggregated returns from the 2004 election are consistent with the exit poll data. Table 3 and Figure A present in different formats the election results by county, according to that countys racial makeup. Presenting the data in this way allows us to account for the covered counties in noncovered states, something we cannot do reliably with the state-based exit polls. Noncovered counties that contain some covered municipalities (as in New Hampshire) are considered not covered because a small percentage of the population of the county resides in the covered municipality. Figure A plots the relationship between a countys black plus Hispanic percentage and the share of the vote John Kerry received. The size of the triangles or circles in Figure A correspond to the total voter turnout in the county, with triangles referring to counties covered under the VRA and circles referring to counties not covered by the VRA. The solid line is the best fit regression line for the noncovered counties, and the dashed line is the best fit regression line for the covered counties. Table 3 presents the data that are graphically expressed by those regression lines. Figure A clearly (and unsurprisingly) demonstrates the positive relationship between a countys percentage of racial minorities and the share of the vote received by John Kerry. The two statistics of note are the intercepts with the y axis and the slope of the lines. The y intercept denotes the share of voters in a county without blacks or Hispanics who tended to vote for Kerry. It is helpful in isolating the expected share of the white vote that the candidate received. In the noncovered counties, the data suggest John Kerry received 42 percent of the white vote, whereas he received only 24 percent of the white vote in the covered jurisdictions. The results are quite close to those found in the exit polls. As is also clear from the data, the line for the covered counties is steeper than that for the noncovered counties. The slope of the line for the covered jurisdictions is 0.534 and for the noncovered jurisdictions it is 0.374. Moreover the R-squared value is higher as well for the covered jurisdictions (0.42 compared to 0.26). This suggests that Kerrys vote share in covered counties is better explained by its minority percentage than is the case in the noncovered jurisdictions. For each additional percent of black or Hispanic population in a covered county the Kerry vote share in the covered counties increased by 0.53 percentage points and in the noncovered counties it increased 0.37 percentage points. The data from the 2004 election, as with the aggregated data since 1984, point to the regional differences in the relationship between race and vote choice. Of course, the gap between whites and racial minorities is due both to the high share of the minority population willing to vote for the nominee as well as the relatively lower share of whites willing to vote for him. An increase in racial differences can occur both because of a decrease in the white voteshare as well as an increase in the voteshare of racial minorities. III. Race and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election In one very obvious way, the 2008 election departed from the dominant pattern of presidential elections since 1968: the Democratic nominee won. Of course, both Presidents Carter and Clinton won during that period as well, but Republicans had won seven of the previous ten presidential contests and usually by large margins. Republican victories always included wins of the South and the white vote by a substantial margin nationwide. They always lost the black and Hispanic vote, but their share of the minority vote varied by close to twenty percentage points depending on the election. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 election, the most dramatic developments appeared to be the new states Obama won: for example, Virginia, North Carolina, Indiana and Colorado. One could reasonably infer from victories in that diverse group of states that the Democrats had made inroads into previous Republican strongholds in the South and elsewhere, and in particular, among white voters. A rising, nationally uniform pro-Democratic (or anti-Republican) tide, it would seem, lifted Obama to victory in certain states that may have not appeared winnable in 2004 when the conditions and candidates seemed to favor the Republicans. Once the exit poll and other survey data became available, however, the picture of the 2008 electorate appeared more complicated. Obama did better in some states but worse in others, as compared to John Kerry four years earlier. Moreover, the change in the composition of the electorate seemed as much, if not more, responsible for Obamas victory as was the conversion of Bush voters. Both of these features of the 2008 election are relevant to questions underlying the VRA. The uneven geographic distribution of white supporters of Obama highlights where racial gaps in voting patterns might be narrowing and where they might be growing. Even conceding the uniqueness of presidential elections and the Obama candidacy, the changes between 2004 and 2008 may highlight areas of changing racial polarization affecting potential plaintiffs in Section 2 lawsuits. Similarly, the high turnout of minorities and the changing composition of the electorate may hint at a future where even in racially polarized environments, minorities increasing share of the electorate can counteract any tendency among whites to vote against minorities preferred candidates. A. National Results Barack Obama won the 2008 general election because he won a larger share of both the white vote and the minority vote than John Kerry four years earlier. In addition, the composition of the electorate was slightly different than four years earlier, as racial minorities comprised a larger percentage of the voters who turned out. This combination of increased turnout and vote share which was not constant across regions, states or groups propelled Obama to victory. The 2008 electorate was less white and more Democratic than it was in 2004, as Table 4 demonstrates. Ten million more people voted in 2008 than in 2004 (132.6 million in 2008 and 122.5 million in 2004). However, the white share of the electorate decreased from 78 percent to 74 percent, while the African American share increased two points (from 11 to 13 percent) and the Hispanic share increased from 8 to 9 percent. Among whites, white Republicans dropped off dramatically 11 points down to 22 percent of the 2008 electorate. White Democrats remained constant at 24 percent, while white Independents increased 7 points to become 29 percent of the electorate. In other words, the increase in the Democratic share of the electorate was due almost completely to minorities, and the decrease in the Republican share of the electorate is due to the drop off in whites. Comparing the 2008 election exit polls to those from the 2004 election allows us to get a sense of what made the difference for the Democratic nominee. Obama received ten million more votes than Kerry and about 9.5 million votes more than McCain. He received 4.3 million more votes from African Americans, from whom he won 95 percent of the vote (a 9 point increase from 2004). He received 2.7 million more votes from Hispanics, from whom he won 67 percent of the vote (a nine point increase from 2004). In other words, although he received 3 million more white votes than Kerry (which translates into a two percentage point increase among whites from 41 to 43 percent), most of the difference in the 2008 election can be explained by minority votes. As Obama did better than Kerry in total votes from minorities as well as percentages, so too did McCain actually lose ground among minority voters compared with Bush. Four percent of black voters chose McCain in 2008, compared with 11 percent who chose Bush in 2004. Those figures imply that Bush received approximately 1.5 million votes and McCain just under 700,000 votes from blacks. The total number of blacks who voted for the Republican standard bearer actually fell from 2004 to 2008. A similar drop occurred among Hispanics. Bush won 43 percent of the Hispanic vote, and McCain captured just 33 percent. These figures imply that Bush received 4.2 million votes from Hispanics, while McCains Hispanic vote dropped to 3.7 million. As the minority vote grew from 2004 to 2008, Republicans lost support in these communities not just as a percent of the total vote, but in absolute numbers of votes. B. The Section 5 Coverage Formula and the Results of the 2008 Election Although rates of minority support for Obama were largely constant across the country, white support varied greatly by state and region. As a result, the size of the racial gap in support for Obama varied considerably as well. For the most part, but with some notable exceptions, white crossover voting was lower and the racial gap in Obama support was greater in states covered by the VRA. Indeed, in several states in the Deep South, Obama actually did worse among whites than Kerry. Table 5 presents the exit poll data describing Obamas vote share in the covered and noncovered states and comparing it to 2004. The statistic that jumps out is the zero in the added vote share among whites in the covered jurisdictions between 2008 and 2004. Obama, like Kerry, won only 26 percent of the white vote in the covered states. With the exception of whites in the covered states, Obama made statistically significant gains among all racial groups, regardless of coverage status. The added vote share was most pronounced among minorities, but he also gained four percentage points among whites in the noncovered states, where he won 48 percent of the white vote. The differences between whites in the covered states and either their predecessors in 2004 or the whites in the noncovered states cannot be explained completely by partisanship. Obama received 76 percent of the white Democratic vote in the covered states 5 percentage points less than John Kerry, while remaining about constant among white Democrats in the noncovered states, where he won 86 percent of the White Democratic vote. For each partisan grouping of whites Obama did better in the noncovered states than in the covered states: 10 points better among white Democrats (86 percent versus 76 percent), 6 points better among white Republicans (10 percent versus 4 percent), and most significantly, 19 points better among white Independents (50 percent compared to 31 percent). Not only did the covered jurisdictions differ from the noncovered jurisdictions in their levels of white support for Obama, but they became more different in 2008 as the racial gap in the covered jurisdictions grew. The racial gap in voting preferences that is, the percent of the white vote received by Obama minus the percent of the minority vote increased nationally in 2008. The racial gap between blacks and whites grew seven points (from 45 percentage points to 52), as did the gap between Hispanics and whites (from 17 to 24 percentage points). However, the large racial gaps in preferences in the covered states grew even further in 2008, and grew more than the racial gap in the noncovered states. The 71 percentage point gap that separates blacks and whites in the covered states represents an 11 percentage point increase from 2004. By comparison, the noncovered states experienced a growth in the black-white gap of only 6 percentage points, such that 47 percentage points separate blacks and whites in the noncovered states. As a whole, the covered states become more different, not less, from the noncovered states with respect to the gap in voting preferences between the races. Analysis of the aggregated election returns confirms the findings from the exit polls. Figure B and Tables 6, 8, and 9 present county-based results from the 2008 election to examine the relationship between a countys combined black and Hispanic share of the population and the share of the vote Obama received in the county. As in our discussion above, the key statistics are the slope and intercept of the regression lines. The y intercept for the covered counties remained about the same as it was in 2004, at 24 percent, signifying that about 24 percent of whites in the covered counties voted for Obama. The intercept rose 4 percentage points from 2004 for the regression line for the noncovered counties from 42 to 46 percent. The line became steeper as well, and particularly so for the covered counties. The slope for 2008 for the covered counties was 0.635, compared to 0.415 for the noncovered counties both slopes were higher than they are in Figure A. The greater steepness of the regression for the covered counties comes both from the push of Obamas increased vote share among minorities (raising the right side of the line) as well as the anchor of his share among whites, which kept the intercept about where it was in 2004. As Table 6 depicts, the R-squared also increased substantially, suggesting that race became a better explanation for the presidential results. Almost half of the variance in presidential voting results between covered counties can be explained by their racial makeup. To address the claim that partisanship explains the differences between the covered and noncovered jurisdictions we can control for a countys previous support for the Democratic nominee. Tables 8 and 9 control for the Kerry vote in explaining the Obama vote. Table 8 presents a multivariate regression, which includes only the percent of the county voting for Kerry in 2004 and the percent of the county that is white, in order to explain the county-based election results for 2008. Of course, most counties voted the way they did in 2008, and the results in 2004 are the best predictor of how a county would vote in 2008. Even controlling for the Kerry vote, however, does not erase the significance of the countys racial composition. A countys racial makeup remains significant for both the covered and noncovered regressions, but the coefficient on the racial composition variable for the covered counties is about twice as large as it is for the noncovered counties (-0.152 versus -0.080). Table 9 depicts the same phenomenon somewhat differently. The dependent variable there is the difference between Obamas vote share and Kerrys vote share and the independent variable is the white percentage of the county. Again, the coefficient on the racial composition variable is about twice as large for the covered counties as it is for the noncovered counties (-0.047 versus -0.111). The R-squared for the regression for the covered counties is also higher, suggesting that, with respect to changes since 2004, racial composition explains more of the differences over time among covered counties than among the noncovered counties. Until this point we have treated covered states and noncovered states as undifferentiated groups, without examining the diversity within these two classes of states. The state level exit polls allow us to measure how well the current coverage formula captures states with the largest racial differences in vote preferences, the lowest levels of whites voting for Obama, or the greatest changes in white voteshare for the Democratic nominee between 2004 and 2008. Table 7 provides all of these statistics. All of the covered states are below the national average when it comes to the share of the white vote Obama received. The six states with the lowest share of white voters voting for Obama are all covered states. They range from Alabama where only 10 percent of whites voted for Obama to Texas, where 26 percent voted for Obama. The three covered states not appearing at the lowest end of the white crossover voting spectrum are Alaska, Virginia and Arizona. It should also be noted that the five states with the lowest levels of white crossover voting and the largest gap between whites and African Americans in terms of Obamas vote share are also the states with some of the largest African American population shares. These five states are among the top six states in terms of the share of the population that is African American. According to the 2006 Census population estimates, Mississippi (37.1 percent), Louisiana (31.9 percent), Georgia (29.6 percent), Maryland (28.8 percent), South Carolina (28.6 percent), and Alabama (26.3 percent) have the highest African American population shares of any state. All but Maryland are covered by Section Five of the Voting Rights Act. The changes between 2004 and 2008 are also revealing. Three of those states mentioned above experienced decreases since 2004 in the share of whites voting for the Democratic nominee (although for only Alabama and Louisiana were the decreases statistically significant and quite large; Mississippis 3 percentage point drop was not statistically significant). In two other covered states, Obama did better than Kerry among whites. The share of white voters in South Carolina and Virginia willing to vote for the Democrat increased 4 and 7 percentage points, respectively, between 2004 and 2008. In a large number of the noncovered states Obama made significant gains among white voters. These include some states, such as North Carolina, which is partially covered, where Obama received 8 percentage points more of the white vote than Kerry did. In only one noncovered state, Arkansas, did Obama experience a significant drop (6 percentage points) in the white share of the vote he received. Accounting for Party and Ideology As noted above in our discussion of the Section 2 jurisprudence, partisanship and ideology are often used to explain the differences in voting patterns among racial groups. Similarly, partisanship and ideology serve as frequent explanations for why whites in the states covered by Section 5 differ from whites in the noncovered states in their candidate preferences. To generalize, of the groups analyzed here, blacks have been the most Democratic-leaning group, followed by Hispanics, followed by whites in the noncovered states, and then followed by whites in the covered states who are most likely to be Republican. The exit poll data suggested that partisanship reduces but does not explain away the differences among whites across the covered and noncovered jurisdictions. It is still possible that some ideological variable could account for the differences between whites in the covered and noncovered states. To test for this possibility we turn to publicly available national sample surveys that measure many more ideological and issue variables and demographic characteristics than are gauged by the exit polls. The 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study provides a very large sample (25,000 interviews), allowing very precise estimates of differences across areas and groups, and the 2004 and 2008 American National Election Studies, which have a much smaller sample, allow us to examine changes in voting behavior from an election involving two white candidates (2004) to an election involving a white and a black candidate (2008). Although demographic and ideological variables account for much of the difference between whites in the covered and noncovered states, living in a covered state remains a statistically significant factor for whites voting against Obama. This was not the case in 2004. The differences between whites in the covered and noncovered states could be explained away when John Kerry ran against George Bush. The same cannot be said when Barack Obama ran against John McCain. Table 12 presents a regression of the reported vote of whites featuring all CCES variables that might have an impact on vote choice, in addition to the coverage status of the state in which the respondent lived. Partisanship, ideology (self-placement on a liberal to conservative spectrum), and importance of religion exert strong influence in the expected directions. Democrats, Independents, liberals, and less religious respondents were more likely to vote for Obama, while Republicans, conservatives and more religious respondents were less likely to do so. Education is also positively associated with support for Obama, while age, income and gender are negatively associated. That is, older, richer and less educated respondents, as well as male respondents were less likely to vote for Obama. Even with all of these controls added, however, coverage status remains statistically significant. The coefficient drops substantially in size from -.404 to -.156 once the controls are added, but being from a covered state remains a statistically significant factor in predicting opposition to Obama. There could be any number of other variables that are omitted from this regression, and as such the data do not prove that reaction to Obamas race is what distinguishes whites in the covered states. However, for those who merely try to explain the differences between the covered and noncovered states as stemming from partisanship, ideology, religiosity or demographic differences, the data do not support a conclusion that those variables account for the differences in whites voting behavior in 2008. More importantly, it appears that such variables do, in fact, account for the differences between whites in the covered and noncovered states in 2004. In other words, when Kerry was the Democratic nominee the differences between whites in the covered and noncovered states could be chalked up to whites in the covered states being more Republican, conservative or religious. In 2008, however, those differences still do not explain the independent significance that being from a covered state had on predicting a vote against Obama. Tables 13a and 13b present data from the National Election Studies for 2004 and 2008 respectively. The regressions are similar to the one provided in Table 12, but use the smaller and more limited NES dataset. Being from a covered state is statistically significant in 2008 but not in 2004. The standardized coefficient (-.0777902) is negative and statistically significant (at the .01 level) for 2008, meaning that whites in the covered states (all other things being equal) were about 7.8 percentage points less likely to vote for Obama. For 2004, the coefficient is insignificant and positive. Once again, these differences do not prove that Obamas race caused whites in the covered states to be more likely to vote against him. Rather, they suggest that ideological, partisan, and religious variables that could explain away the differences in 2004, could not do so in 2008. Something else was at work in 2008. It is also interesting to note, as Table 12 depicts, that a different pattern emerges with respect to reported primary or caucus vote. Coverage status is not statistically significant, either alone or in combination with the other variables, in predicting whites vote in the Democratic primary or caucus. Support for Obama was higher among Democratic primary voters who were more highly educated, younger, male, liberal, non-union members and less religious. But whites in the covered states appeared no different than whites in the noncovered states in this regard. When we expand our analysis beyond whites, as in Table 14, we can gauge the disparities in the Obama primary and caucus vote based on race, type of nomination method and coverage status. In states that employed primaries, whites and Hispanics in the noncovered jurisdictions were somewhat more likely to support Obama, but not by much. In the primary states, whites and Hispanics did not differ much from each other in their support for Obama, but, as is well-known, they gave much less support to Obama than did African Americans. The caucus states seem to differ somewhat from the primary states, as African Americans there report voting in even higher percentages for Obama. Greater disparities also seem to exist based on coverage status for whites and Hispanics in the caucus states, as those in the non-covered caucus states report voting at higher levels for Obama. This might be a spurious relationship based on the particular idiosyncrasies of the smaller number of states employing caucuses and the much lower and selective turnout in such states. The gaps between African Americans and all others still remain, however. If one seeks to generalize from the 2008 presidential election to gauge the potential for minority candidate success in individual states, one must account for both the primary and the general election results. Doing so highlights the surprisingly small number of states in which Obama won both the primary or caucus and the general election. As Table 15 shows, in only 15 states and the District of Columbia did Obama win both the nominating event (primary or caucus) and the general election. This is important because for all other elections a candidate must get through both the primary and general election in the same state. If either is a barrier, then the candidate will not win. Indeed, in some states and districts the primary election represents the higher hurdle to get over in order to win an office. The geography of Obamas success also bears on the relevance of the coverage formula of Section 5. The only fully covered state in which he won the primary and general election was Virginia, and the only partially covered state was North Carolina. He won several noncovered states in the primary and the general, but even those represent a relatively small slice of the American population. Conclusion: Change in Voting Behavior We Can Believe in? Nothing in the foregoing should take away from the monumental significance of the 2008 election. The election of an African American President represents a historic event by any measure. Even conceding Barack Obamas extraordinary campaign and candidacy, his success contradicts well-known assumptions about what was possible in American democracy. The question for us is whether the results from that election suggest a transformation of relevance to voting rights law. Our general answer is no. The 2008 election did not indicate a disruption of well-known patterns of race, region and vote choice. If anything, Barack Obamas higher vote share among minorities and his uneven performance among whites suggest those patterns are quite entrenched. If racially differential voting patterns were to be the criteria for coverage under a new Section 5 of the VRA, however, the list of covered states would need to be changed. Virginia would be dropped and Arkansas added, for example. It is one thing to point out, as this Article does, that the covered states, as a group, exhibit larger racial gaps in candidate preferences and fewer whites willing to vote for minority-preferred candidates. It would be quite another thing to say that the coverage formula completely and exclusively captures the most polarized polities. It clearly does not, nor was it ever expected to do so. Obamas success highlights when racially differential voting patterns make a difference and when they do not. In some states, a sufficient number of whites were willing to vote for him that he did not need to rely on minority voters to cast the decisive or pivotal votes. In other states, his mobilization of minorities (and perhaps the demobilization of whites) overcame the effect of any polarization that existed in the electorate. In still others, particularly and ironically those with large African American populations, mobilization of minorities could not make up for the low share of the white vote he garnered. For various reasons, the Voting Rights Act should be transformed. Indeed, we would support a fundamental rethinking of basic components of the Act and how it structures American politics. Results from the 2008 election should not be the cause for that undertaking, however. The election of an African American as President is significant in its own right, not because it casts doubt of the VRAs continued utility or constitutionality. Tables and Figures Figure A. Relationship between 2004 presidential vote and non-white population share, covered and noncovered counties.  Figure B. Relationship Between County Racial Makeup and Presidential Vote, 2008  Table 1. The Racial Gap in Voting for Democratic Nominee, Presidential Exit Polls, 1984-2004 GroupCovered StatesNon-covered + partially coveredNationWhite27.742.139.7Black85.985.285.5Latino60.964.163.4 WhitesDemocrats69.679.077.5Republicans4.78.87.6Independents26.742.339.1 DifferenceBlack-white58.243.145.8Latino-white33.222.023.7 Table 2. Racial Gap in 2004 Presidential Election.  GroupCovered StatesNon-covered +partially coveredNationWhite26.043.840.8Black85.985.385.5Latino49.560.357.9 WhitesDemocrats80.185.384.7Republicans2.96.55.3Independents33.350.147.0 DifferenceBlack-white60.041.544.7Latino-white23.616.617.2 Table 3. Relationship Between County Racial Makeup and Presidential Vote, 2004. (1)(2)Non-coveredCoveredBlack and Hispanic percentage of county population0.374 (0.013)**0.534 (0.021)**Constant0.421 (0.004)**0.236 (0.009)**Observations2254860R-squared0.260.42Standard errors in parentheses* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Table 4. Change in the Composition of the Electorate 2004-2008 Change in Racial Composition of the Electorate RACENationVRA covered statesNon-Covered20082004diff20082004diff20082004diffWhite7478-4*6968-17580-5*Black13112*19212*1192*Hisp981*9101*972*Asian220110220Change in Partisan Composition of the Electorate 20082004diff20082004diff20082004diffDem39372*36342*40382*Rep3237-5*3743-6*3136-5*Indep/ else29263*27234*29272*Whites by party, as a percentage of entire electorate NationVRA Covered StatesNon-Covered 20082004diff20082004diff20082004diffWhite Dem242401315-226260White Rep2933-43338-52732-5White Ind222112017323221 Table 5. Racial Gap in Presidential Voting Preferences, 2008 Exit polls Covered StatesNoncovered StatesNationGroup2008 (%)Change from 20042008 (%)Change from 20042008 (%)Change from 2004White260484**432Black9711**9510**959Latino6213**699**679 WhitesDemocrats765**861850Republicans41**103**83Independents312500470 DifferenceBlack-white7111**476**527Latino-white3613**215**247**p<.01 Table 6. Relationship Between County Racial Makeup and Presidential Vote, 2008. Covered countiesNoncovered countiesCombined Black and Hispanic Percentage of County0.635*** (0.022)0.415*** (0.013)Intercept0.244*** (0.009)0.461*** (0.004)N8602,254R2.496.307***p<.001. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Table 7. Race and Vote Choice by State, 2008 State% of Whites Voting for ObamaChange in White Vote-share from 2004% of White Demo-crats Voting for Obama% of Blacks Voting for ObamaAlabama109**4798Mississippi113NA98Louisiana1410**3894Georgia2307898South Carolina264*8096Texas2617898Oklahoma29159NAArkansas306**6895Utah317**NANAWyoming32480NAAlaska33186NAIdaho33489NATennessee3407994North Carolina358**8395Kentucky3626290Nebraska396**83NAVirginia397**8692Arizona40083NAKansas406*85NASouth Dakota414*82NAWest Virginia41-169NAFlorida4218196Missouri4208493New Mexico42-185NANorth Dakota427**90NAUnited States433**8595Indiana4511**8690Montana457**91NANevada4529094Ohio4638597Maryland4738394Pennsylvania4838595New Jersey4938592Colorado509**95NAConnecticut5118693Illinois5138696Iowa513*9393Michigan518**9197California525**9194New York52485100Delaware539**8699Minnesota533*94NANew Hampshire544**92NAWisconsin547**9591Washington554*95NAOregon578**92NAMaine585**89NARhode Island58189NAMassachusetts59186NAVermont6811**96NAHawaii7012**96NADC8669797*Shaded states were won by Obama; State names in bold refer to fully covered states; state names that are underlined refer to partially covered states. Table 8. Relationship of 2004 Vote and Racial Makeup to 2008 Vote at County Level (1)(2)Non-coveredCoveredPercent vote for Kerry in 20040.909 (0.007)**0.930 (0.014)**Percent of population that is White-0.080 (0.005)**-0.152 (0.012)**Constant0.1550.165(0.006)**(0.012)**Observations2254860R-squared0.920.93Standard errors in parentheses* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Table 9. Predicted Change in Support for Democratic Nominee from 2004 to 2008 by White Percentage of County CoveredNoncoveredPercentage of county population that is white-0.111*** (0.009)-0.047*** (0.004)Intercept0.111*** (0.005)0.086*** (0.003)N8602,254R2.159.06***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Table 12. Difference in Support for Obama Between VRA Covered and Not Covered States Among White Voters, Controlling for other factors, in Primary and General Elections Probability Vote for Obama (Probit Estimates) Independent In Primary In General Variable or Caucus Election Coef (SE) Coef (SE) Coef (SE) Coef (SE) VRA Covered State -.066 (.040) -.070 (.043) -.404 (.025)* -.156 (.038)* Education .053 (.011)* .087 (.010)* Income .002 (.004) -.013 (.004)* Age inYears -.007 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* Gender .160 (.031)* -.092 (.029)* Democrat -.124 (.152) 1.615 (.111)* Republican -.098 (.164) -.324 (.112)* Independent .035 (.153) .752 (.110)* Other Party .072 (.217) .510 (.137)* Ideology -.179 (.020)* -.780 (.021)* Ideology Missing -.535 (.106)* -2.312 (.090)* Union Member -.091 (.032)* -.006 (.031) Church Attend -.021 (.014) .002 (.013) Born Again -.177 (.043)* -.199 (.035)* Importance of Religion -.062 (.019)* -.171 (.019)* Constant -.062 (.015) .055 (.194) -.043 (.010) 1.039 (.159) N 8,139 7,636 17,970 16,747 Loglikelihood -5627.01 -5073.08 -12254.62 -5387.44 Source: Compiled by Authors using the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Table 13a. Support for John Kerry Between VRA Covered and Not Covered States Among White Voters, Controlling for Other Factors (National Election Studies) Independent Variable Coef (SE) VRA Covered State .003 (.049) Education .044 (.089) Income .032 (.075) Age inYears .001 (.001) Gender -.008 (.043) Democrat .243 (.114)* Republican -.303 (.115)** Independent -.004 (.114) Ideology .688 (.112)** Church Attend -.005 (.073) Importance of Religion -.049 (.074) Union .054 (.047) Constant .157 (.174) N 324 Adjusted R-Squared .522 Table 13b. Difference in Support for Barack Obama Between VRA Covered and Not Covered States Among White Voters, Controlling for Other Factors (National Election Studies) Independent Variable Coef (SE) VRA Covered State -.078 (.033)** Education -.049 (.127) Income -.104 (.066) Age inYears .000 (.001) Gender .045 (.032) Democrat .398 (.087)** Republican -.152 (.083) Independent .154 (.085) Ideology .639 (.079)** Church Attend .043 (.058) Importance of Religion -.071 (.053) Union .042 (.045) Constant .162 (.155) N 476 Adjusted R-Squared .560 Table 14. Percent of Whites Reporting Voting for Obama in Democratic Party Primaries and Caucuses in States Covered by VRA and states Not Covered by VRA Primaries Caucuses Covered Not Covered Not White 45.6 47.6 48.1 55.0 Black 84.1 82.1 92.1 88.4 Hispanic 44.1 49.6 38.4 64.4 Source: Compiled By Authors using the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Table 15. States Won by Obama in the Primary and General Election Primary or Caucus WinsGeneral Election WinsPrimary and General Election WinsCoveredAlabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, VirginiaVirginiaVirginia Partially CoveredNorth CarolinaCalifornia, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North CarolinaNorth Carolina NoncoveredColorado, Connecticut Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, WyomingColorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, WisconsinColorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin ( Professor of Government, Harvard University. ** Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law and Political Science, Columbia Law School. We benefited greatly from research assistance provided by Anthony Fowler, Jason Levy and Joshua Fougere and from comments received by Heather Gerken and Bruce Cain. *** Kenan Sahin Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Head of the Political Science Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  19 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. 1973 (1964 ed., Supp. I).  Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 2(b)(3), 120 Stat. 577.  Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (NAMUDNO).  Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom, Op-Ed., Racial Gerrymandering Is Unnecessary, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2008, at A15. .NAMUDNO, Brief of Appellant, at 3.  42 U.S.C. 1973c (2000).  42 U.S.C. 1973(b) (2000).  This Article expands upon an amicus brief we filed on behalf of neither party in NAMUDNO. See Brief for Nathaniel Persily, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Charles Stewart III as Amici Curiae on Behalf of Neither Party, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). The brief was mentioned by Justice Kennedy at the oral argument, see NAMUDNO, 2009 WL 1146055 (oral argument transcript) at 55-56, and cited by numerous commentators at the time of the decisions. See Jeffrey Toobin, Voter, Beware, New Yorker, March 2, 2009; Adam Liptak, Review of Voting Rights Act Presents a Test of History v. Progress, N. Y. Times, April 28, 2009, at A16; Robert Barnes, High Court to Weigh Relevance of Voting Law in Obama Era, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 2009; and Linda Greenhouse, Theres Always Another Day, Slate, June 22, 2009, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2220927/entry/2221036/.  NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  See generally Heather Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote," 114 Harv. L. Rev.1665 (2001).  See VRA section 2 (b): The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office . . . is one circumstance which may be considered in assessing whether the political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class of citizens. 42 U.S.C. 1973(b) (2000).  See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 2(b)(3), 120 Stat. 577 (The continued evidence of racially polarized voting in each of the [covered] jurisdictions . . . demonstrates that racial and language minorities remain politically vulnerable, warranting the continued protection of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.).  See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1833 (1992).  See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).  S. Rep., at 29, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, p. 206.  478 U.S. 30 (1986).  42 U.S.C. 1973 (2000).  478 U.S. 30 (1986).  See also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (making clear that the Gingles test requires minorities to be large enough to constitute a voting age majority in a single member district).  478 U.S. at 46. Of course, the formula for a vote dilution lawsuit is more complicated than that and includes proving the so-called Senate Factors. See generally Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, University of Michigan Law School, 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 643 (2006) (describing Senate Factors as litigated in the lower courts).  See Kristen Clarke, The Obama Factor: The Impact of the 2008 Presidential Election on Future Voting Rights Litigation, 3 Harv. L. & Poly Rev. 59 (2009).  See Elizabeth M. Ryan, Note, Causation or Correlation? The Impact of LULAC v. Clements on Section 2 Lawsuits in the Fifth Circuit, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 675 (2009).  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 62.  See Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, 1990s Issues in Voting Rights, 65 Miss. L.J. 205, 210, 222 (1995); Pamela Karlan and Daryl Levinson, Why Voting is Different?, 84 Cal L. Rev. 1201, 1223 (1996) (discussing troubles in disaggregating race and politics).  999 F.2d 831 (1993) (en banc).  LULAC, 999 F.2d at 850; see also id. at 863 (Electoral losses that are attributable to partisan politics do not implicate the protections of 2.).  Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, University of Michigan Law School, 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 643, 671 (2006).  See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L. J. 174, 222-223 (2007); Ellen Katz et al, supra note 25, at 665-68; Richard Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War with Itself: Theories of Representation in Changing Political Circumstances, 80 N.C. L Rev. 1517, 1526 n.22 (2002).  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 68 (emphasis in original).  See Scott Yut , Comment, Using Candidate Race to Define Minority-Preferred Candidates Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 1995 U. Chi. L. F. 571, 583-86 (describing rules from Fifth and Seventh Circuits that discount races involving only white candidates); Issacharoff, supra note __, at 1855-56 & n.111 (citing cases that discuss candidate race).  See Clarke, supra note __.  See Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009), brief of Appellant at 3.  See Clarke, supra note __, at __.  See Ellen Katz, Leave It Up to Congress, National Law Journal, Apr. 13, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202429774549&slreturn=1.  NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (striking down the Violence Against Womens Act as exceeding Congresss Enforcement Clause authority in part because it regulated private behavior).  This is what Chief Justice Roberts at oral argument in NAMUDNO described as the elephant whistle problem. You know, I have this whistle to keep away the elephants, Roberts said rhetorically. Well, there are no elephants, so it must work. Jim Galloway, With John Lewis in the pews, Chief Justice John Roberts compares Voting Rights Act to an elephant whistle, Atlanta Journal Constitution, Apr. 29, 2009, available at http://blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim-galloway/2009/04/29/with-john-lewis-in-the-pews-chief-justice-john-roberts-compares-voting-rights-act-to-an-elephant-whistle/.  See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).  See, e.g., Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., Quiet Revolution in the South 301-89 (1994) (detailing effect of VRA on white and black voting behavior); Nelson Polsby, How Congress Evolves (2005) (describing the rise of the Republican party in the South due to northern migration and conversion of Dixiecrats).  See Nancy J. Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR (1983); V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (1949).  See David Greenberg, The Party of Lincoln, Slate, Aug. 10, 2000, available at http://slate.msn.com/id/87868.  Because of the Perot candidacy in 1992 and 1996, no party won a majority of the white vote.  See Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/covered.php (listing as covered states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia).  We do so because, in the noncovered states with covered municipalities, only a minority of the population in most such states, a very small minority is actually covered. North Carolina is the partially covered state with the greatest share (36 percent) of its population covered. New York is second with 28 percent of its population covered. In all other partially covered states, the share of the states population that is covered is negligible.  Six of ten if one counts the 2000 presidential election as a Democratic win, given Al Gores win of the popular vote.  All the statistics found in this section can be found or derived from those assembled by Michael McDonald of George Mason University. See Michael McDonald, Voter Turnout, available at http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm.  Because county based results for Alaska are not available, we treat Alaska as one large county. Also, noncovered counties with covered municipalities are considered noncovered, given that such a small share of the population of the county is covered. See notes to Figure B.  See U.S. Census Bureau, State Population Estimates-Characteristics, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/SC-EST2006-03.html .  See Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1383 (2001) (highlighting the importance of the primary as a hurdle for minority preferred candidates).  All calculations were performed using sample weights provided by the exit poll in the relevant file. See footnote 2 (citing exit poll datafiles). In all ICPSR files the weight variables are labeled WGT. The exit poll results are weighted to reflect the complexity of the sampling design and take into account the different probabilities of selecting a precinct and of selecting a voter within each precinct. The weights are defined such that the exit poll results equal the final tabulated vote within geographic regions of the states or nation. Data from national exit polls are archived at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.  Source: 2004: National Election Pool, Edison Media Research, and Mitofsky International, National Election Pool General Election Exit Polls, 2004 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Somerville, NJ: Edison Media Research/New York, NY: Mitofsky International [producers], 2004. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2005. doi:10.3886/ICPSR04181.  *p<.05, **p<.01. The sources for the 2004 and 2008 exit poll data are provided in note 4 supra. Covered states are indicated in bold, partially covered states are underlined. NA indicates that due to small sample sizes cell entries are not available.   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