ࡱ>  []NOPQRSTUVWXYZ` @bjbjss :FC'NNNNNNNb8|~bx266"XXX333eeeeeee$,zh|eNZ33ZZeNNXXx444ZNXNXe4Ze44 HNN_X* p;$Pe$x0xIQl} ' }_}N_3V 4}A333ee2333xZZZZbbb1f5dbbbf5bbbNNNNNN CIVIL PROCEDURE OUTLINE Tyler, Fall 2007 Introduction The Importance of Procedure (Capron, Des Moines) 1 Personal Jurisdiction The Traditional Rule and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction (Pennoyer, Harris) 3 Presence, Consent, and Minimum Contacts (Hess, Shoe, McGee, Hanson) 4 Long-arm Statutes (Rule 4) 7 Stream of Commerce (Volkswagen) 8 Stream of Commerce+ and the Internet (Calder, Keeton, Asahi, Millennium) 8 General Jurisdiction (Perkins, Helicopteros, Gator) 10 Minimum Contacts and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction (Shaffer) 12 Transient Jurisdiction (Burnham) 13 Notice and Service of Process (Rule 4, Mullane) 15 Venue (1391, Bates) 16 Transfer of Venue and Forum Non Conveniens (1404, Gilbert, Piper) 17 Subject Matter Jurisdiction Diversity Jurisdiction (1332, Mas, A.F.A. Tours) 21 Federal Question Jurisdiction (1331, Mottley, Planters Bank) 24 Supplemental Jurisdiction: Origins (Gibbs, Aldinger, Finley, Kroger) 26 Supplemental Jurisdiction: Governed By Statute (1367, Zahn, Exxon Mobil) 31 Removal and Remand (1441, Caterpillar) 33 Describing and Defining the Dispute Stating a Claim (Rule 8, Twombly) 37 Special Pleading Requirements (Rule 9, Stratford, Dura Pharm.) 38 Pre-Answer Motions and Answers (Rule 12, Rule 8, Zelinski, Ingraham) 39 Dismissal and Amendment (Rules 41, 15, Beeck, Washington) 43 Responsibilities of the Pleader (Rule 11, Mattel) 45 Obtaining Information for Trial Scope and Mechanics of Discovery (Rules 26, 30-35, 45) 49 Attorney Work Product and Privilege (Rule 26, Hickman, Upjohn) 53 Discovery Sanctions (Rule 37, Cine) 58 Ascertaining the Applicable Law Erie and the RDA (1652, Swift, Erie, York, Byrd) 60 Erie and the REA (2072, Hanna, Walker) 64 Applying Erie and Ascertaining State Law (Klaxon, Mason) 67 Adjudication Before Trial Summary Judgment (Rule 56, Adickes, Celotex) 69 Trial and Post-Trial Pretrial Conference and Trial Procedure (Rule 16) 73 Judgment as a Matter of Law & New Trial Motions (Rules 50, 59-61, Lavender) 75 Preclusive Effects of Judgments Claim Preclusion (Moitie, Rinehardt) 79 Issue Preclusion (Little, Sunnen) 81 Nonmutual Issue Preclusion (Blonder-Tongue, Parklane) 84 Complex Litigation: An Introduction Permissive and Compulsory Joinder (Rules 13, 18-20, 23, Mosley) 87 Impleader and Intervention (Rules 14, 24, NRDC, Martin) 90 Class Actions: The Framework (Rule 23, Hansberry, Eisen, Shutts) 92 Class Actions: CAFA and Removals (1332(d), 1453) 99 Agent Orange 100 INTRODUCTION 1. Background: The Importance of Process Capron v. Van Noorden, US SC, 1804 (p. 22)  files claim in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, loses  appeals contrary verdict on grounds that complaint didn t show  and " from different states Holding: Verdict invalid because federal court lacked diversity jurisdiction (no SMJ) Federal courts are courts of limited SMJ; can only hear cases over the Constitution grants and Constitution bestows jurisdiction Des Moines Navigation & R Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., US SC, 1887 (p. 60) In previous case between  and ", federal court took jurisdiction over case even though  and " both from Iowa " won; US SC sustained Claiming prior case invalid for want of diversity jurisdiction (SMJ),  filed new case in Iowa court Iowa ruled in  s favor; US SC reversed Holding: Earlier ruling (sustained by US SC) not overturned and so still stands good If no SMJ in case, case may be reversed on appeal. Case may not, however, be reversed on a collateral attack. Prior ruling by US SC (sustaining lower court) stands until overturned. SMJ not subject to collateral attack (diff. from Capron ( here attack on SMJ was collateral, not on direct appeal) The Iowa SC cannot overturn a US SC ruling (federal supremacy) Why court ruled the way it did: There must be some finality, an end to proceedings Fusion of these cases Procedure matters Rules of procedure must balance need for proper jurisdiction (Capron) against need for finality (Des Moines) Questions to evaluate at the outset of every case 1. SMJ ( Is there SMJ? 2. Territorial (personal) jurisdiction ( Is there personal jurisdiction? 3. Venue ( Is there proper venue? 4. Notice ( Has proper notice been made? 5. Service of Process ( Was service proper/has service been waived? 6. Possibility of removal/transfer of venue 7. Possibility of waiver of rights Two types of jurisdiction Subject-matter jurisdiction (SMJ) Is this the kind of case the court has power to hear? Collateral attack on SMJ not allowed (Des Moines) Territorial (personal) jurisdiction Are the parties subject to the jurisdiction of the court? I.e., Power of the court to enter judgment against a specific person Federalism concerns involved in deciding whether theres personal jurisdiction Collateral attack on personal jurisdiction allowed (Pennoyer) CHOOSING THE FORUM: TERRITORIAL JUSTIDICTION & RELATED TOPICS 2. In the Beginning Three traditional forms of territorial jurisdiction In personam: Court taking jurisdiction over an individual person and holding him personally liable In rem: Court taking jurisdiction over a piece of property and adjudicating its status E.g., quiet title action: Court takes jurisdiction over property and decides who it belongs to Quasi in rem: Court lacking in personam jurisdiction over a person instead taking jurisdiction over that persons property in the state  s use quasi in rem jurisdiction when in personam jurisdiction isn t available Judgment limited to value of the property state s taken control of (second-best form of jurisdiction, after in personam) " can make  special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction  (appears without submitting to personal jurisdiction) Territorial jurisdiction must be satisfied at the outset of the suit If property is to be attached, it must be attached at the outset of the suit (gives notice to " and prevents " from selling land during middle of trial) Classical view of personal jurisdiction (Pennoyer rule) States are all-powerful over individuals and property within their borders, but may not exercise personal jurisdiction over persons outside their borders For court to have jurisidiction, " must be in the state or brought within state at the outset of the suit Bright-line rule ( states can t reach outside their borders (federalism) Pros of rule: Prevents fraud against nonresident " s (like happened in Pennoyer) Cons of rule: Allows individuals to avoid judgment merely by leaving state Exceptions: (1) If courts adjudicating status (divorce, etc.); (2) corporation can be required to appoint agent to receive process on its behalf This is no longer the rule Pennoyer v. Neff, US SC, 1877 (p. 63) Mitchell sues Neff in OR court; Neff not a resident of OR; notice served through newspaper (constructive notice) Neff doesnt see newspaper, doesnt show; Mitchell wins default judgment After verdict, and not knowing verdict, Neff buys property in OR Court seizes property to enforce judgment, Mitchell buys and sells to Pennoyer Neff finally learns of original suit and sale of land, sues Pennoyer to get his land back Collateral attack on original case for lack of personal jurisdiction (land not attached at beginning of original suit) Holding: OR lacked personal jurisdiction over Neff in the prior case because he wasnt in OR; could not later assert jurisdiction over the property Neff purchased b/c the property wasnt attached at the beginning of the prior case (couldnt circumvent jurisdictional requirements) Collateral attack allowed on personal jurisdiction grounds (remember not allowed on SMJ grounds ( Des Moines) Quasi in rem jurisdiction (Harris v. Balk) Jurisdiction over property permissible so long as property is within the state (even if its intangible) ( way to get around rigid Pennoyer rule through quasi in rem jurisdiction Harris v. Balk, US SC, 1905 (Handout 2) Harris (NC) owes Balk (NC) $180; Balk (NC) owes Epstein (MD) $344 Harris goes to MD; Epstein (MD) sues Balk (NC) in MD while Harris (NC) is in MD and wins $180 by garnishing the $180 Harris owes Balk Harris returns to NC and is immediately sued by Balk for the $180 Holding: MDs jurisdiction over Balk was proper because Harris was in MD (Balk could have sued Harris in MD, too); NC must respect MDs ruling Shows potency and limits of quasi in rem jurisdiction (Epstein got some of his money back, but only some of it) 3. The Transition to Minimum Contacts Development of the Pennoyer rule Pennoyer became increasingly problematic as transportation and interstate commerce increased Two ways court tried to work within the Pennoyer framework: Presence concept: Pennoyer placed great emphasis on " s presence in the state ( " had to be present in the state for the court to have jurisdiction (Milliken rule): One is always deemed present within ones own state (state of domicile), whether or not one is actually present Later expansion of rule: Corporations always present in state of incorporation and principle place of business Consent concept: Pennoyer said (1) person who voluntarily entered state could be served with process and (2) person doing business in state could be authorized to appoint an agent to receive process on his behalf So states began to pass laws saying drivers who wanted to drive in their state either (1) had to formally appoint an agent to receive process or (2) automatically consented to service of process upon entering the state Hess v. Pawloski, US SC, 1927 (p.63) Pawloski (MA) wants to sue Hess (PA) for car accident in MA MA law says by driving on MA roads, out-of-state drivers gave implied consent for MA DMV to be their agent (i.e., to be sued in MA) ( Hess receives notice after hes returned to PA State may exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents through implied consent laws (laws that say that by entering state " gives consent to be sued in the state) Court stretching limits of Pennoyer rule Pennoyer all about state sovereignty, but here Court more concerned with state s ability to protect their citizens than with state sovereignty Over time, simply doing business in state came to be seen as giving implied consent to be sued in that state The minimum contacts rule (the Shoe test) In order to subject a nonresident " to a judgment in personam, if the " be not present within the territory of the forum, the " must have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend  traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice ( applies to both individuals and corporations Due process now the lodestar Jurisdiction no longer limited to territoriality and physical presence ( looks to fairness and justice of jurisdiction given " s contacts with the forum Balancing of interests (does suit offend fairness and justice?), includes: " s contacts with the forum (and effects of those contacts) Forum s interest in regulating " s actions What benefits " s received from forum s laws Fairness/inconvenience of forcing " to defend in forum state Shoe test: Two-part inquiry for determining whether personal jurisdiction over nonresident " exists 1. Are there sufficient minimum contacts between " and forum state? If no, end of inquiry (no matter what fairness dictates) Lodestar is due process ( that s why " can waive personal jurisdiction (possible to waive due process rights) 2. If yes, then look at fairness factors (due process) Even if minimum contacts, if bringing suit would be unfair, no personal jurisdiction International Shoe Co. v. Washington, US SC, 1945 (p.76) WA wants to sue Shoe (incorporated in DE, ppob in MO) in WA for contributions to state unemployment program Shoe structured employment scheme so as to technically avoid doing business in WA Holding: Shoe subject to WA jurisdiction because had sufficient  minimum contacts to make WA jurisdiction  fair and  just. Shoe employed salesman in WA who made sales, could sue in WA if customer failed to pay Justification: When " does business in a state, it enjoys certain benefits (protection of state s laws) that in turn give rise to obligations to state arising out of those benefits Shoes four categories of contacts: Continuous/systematic contacts: Cause of action arises out of those contacts (continuous related contacts) ( always jurisdiction (Shoe) Cause of action doesnt arise out of those contacts (continuous unrelated contacts) ( sometimes jurisdiction (general jurisdiction) Isolated/sporadic contacts: Cause of action arises out of those contacts (sporadic related contacts) ( sometimes jurisdiction (specific jurisdiction) (McGee) Cause of action doesnt arise out of those contacts (sporadic unrelated contacts) ( never jurisdiction (Hanson) See graph on CB p. 147 High-water mark of minimum contacts jurisprudence (McGee) McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.., US SC, 1957 (p.89) " (TX) takes over policy from AZ company with  (CA) as beneficiary " refuses to pay out when insured (also of CA) dies  (CA) sues " (TX) in CA court and wins; goes to TX to enforce Holding: Minimum contacts test met; claim arises out of " s contacts with insured (CA) and " getting benefits from CA b/c could have sued in CA court to compel insured s payment ("  purposefully availed itself of CA law)  High water mark of minimum contacts jurisprudence Where nonresident " has purposely availed itself of benefits of forum state law and the cause of action arises out of " s contacts with the forum state, minimum contacts have been met sufficient for forum state jurisdiction over nonresident " Putting the brakes on McGee (Hanson & Kulko) Hanson v. Denckla, US SC, 1958 (p.90) Donner (PA) establishes trust with DE bank, moves to FL While in FL, Donner changes beneficiaries of trust to granddaughters and dies Donners daughters sue in FL to have trust change invalidated, try to include DE bank in suit (DE bank an indispensable party to the suit) (other suit in DE, too) Why DE bank indispensable ( prevent contrary judgments in DE & FL Holding: FL lacked jurisdiction over DE bank because less than minimal contacts; only contacts between Donner and " mailed correspondence, change of trust FL s contacts with " result of  unilateral action on part of Donner Dissent: FL a good forum because all parties lived there and FL had strong interest in validity of Donner s trust change The unilateral action of one party in the forum state is insufficient to subject the other (if nonresident) to jurisdiction in the forum state if the other party did not purposefully avail himself of the laws of the forum state Put brakes on McGee Kulko v. Superior Court, US SC, 1978 (p.106)  divorced " (NY) and moved to CA " (NY) buys plane ticket for children to go live with  CA  (CA) sued " (NY) in CA to modify child-support agreement (now that children living with  in CA) Holding: " did not purposefully avail himself of benefits of CA law, so no CA jurisdiction (would violate notions of fairness and justice) Merely causing a noncommercial, noninjurious effect within a state, absent purposeful availment of that states laws, is insufficient grounds for personal jurisdiction Effects test applies only to (1) wrongful activity outside the forum state that causes injury within it and (2) commercial activity affecting state residents, provided such application would not be unreasonable General vs. specific jurisdiction General jurisdiction: Sufficient contacts for jurisdiction over " in all matters Specific jurisdiction: Insufficient contacts for jurisdiction over " in all matters, but enough contacts for jurisdiction over matters relating to " s actions in the forum 4A & 4B. The Role of Statutes & Territorial Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts Long-arm statutes State laws that reach outside the bounds of the state to bring nonresident " s within the jurisdiction of the state (e.g., Hess) Predicate jurisdiction over nonresidents upon the " s general activity within the state, or the commission of certain enumerated acts within the state, or even the commission of a certain act outside the state causing consequences within it Determining personal jurisdiction Two-part inquiry for state courts: 1. Does the applicable long-arm statute reach the "? 2. If yes, is exercise of jurisdiction consistent with due process? Three-part inquiry for federal courts: 1. Look to FRCP Rule 4(k): 4(k)(1)(A):  subject to jurisdiction if he would be subject to general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court sits. So if you could get state jurisdiction, then you can get federal Service of summons or filing a waiver of service Exceptions: On certain issues (e.g., antitrust) Congress allows nationwide service, bulge rule (joinder of parties less than 100 miles from courthouse), if " cannot be reached by any state court but has sufficient contacts with nation as a whole 2. Does the applicable long-arm statute reach the "? 3. If yes, is exercise of jurisdiction consistent with due process? 5. Refining the Minimum Contacts Analysis: Volkswagen Minimum contacts and stream of commerce Stream of commerce test (Volkswagen): When a corporation delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state, then the corporation can reasonably expected to be sued (haled into court) in that forum state World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, US SC, 1980 (p.94)  purchased Audi in NY from Seaway VW (WWVolks was distributor) On way to AZ,  injured in OK; sue Seaway and WWVolks in OK  sues in OK in order to maintain diversity of parties for federal SMJ Example of forum shopping (result of Shoe test) Seaway VW (NY) and WWVolks (NY, NJ, CT) contest OK jurisdiction OK long-arm statute said OK could assert personal jurisdiction as long as consistent with fairness and due process (skip step 1, go directly to step 2 ( pushed personal jurisdiction as far as due process would allow) Holding: " s lack minimum contacts with OK ( no jurisdiction " s do/solicit no business in OK ( only connection is  s drove car there (unilateral act) Dissent: Majority focuses too much on " s interests what about OK s and  s? Preferred test: Whenever there are minimum contacts among (1) the parties, (2) the subject/transaction of litigation, and (3) the forum state 6. Refining the Minimum Contacts Analysis: New Criteria, Foreign Defendants & New Technology Intentional infliction of harm on nonresident  Calder v. Jones, US SC, 1984 (Handout 3) Jones (CA) sues National Enquirer (FL) in CA for libel; Enquirer challenges jurisdiction Holding: Enquirer wrote story that knowingly inflicted harm on a CA resident ( sufficient for personal jurisdiction in CA Where nonresident " intentionally inflicts harm on a  in forum state, such harm ( negative effects ) sufficient to give forum state personal jurisdiction Not important that nonresident  have minimum contacts (only care about nonresident " s contacts) Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, US SC, 1984 (Handout 3)  (NY) sues Hustler (OH) for libel in OH, suit dismissed b/c SoL had expired  (NY) refiles in NH, where Hustler sells 10,000-15,000 magazines/yr Holding: Sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction ( Hustler sells enough in NH expect to be  haled into court there & NH has interest in preventing libel Not important that nonresident  doesn t have contacts with foreign state; only important that nonresident " does By this logic Jones could have sued Enquirer all over the country (Jones) Minimum contacts, stream of commerce +, and fairness factors Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, US SC, 1987 (p.117) Zurcher injured in motorcycle accident in CA caused by faulty tire Tire tube made by Taiwan co. (Cheng Shin), tire valve assembly made by Japanese co. (Asahi) ( Asahi knew some of its assemblies sold by Cheng in CA Cheng files indemnification claim against Asahi in CA court ( can CA exercise personal jurisdiction? Holding: Court says no, but no majority ruling Even if nonresident " had minimum contacts, if suit would be unfair then forum state has no personal jurisdiction Holding rests on fairness grounds ( burden on foreign (Japanese) " (probably deciding factor in this case), CA lacks strong interest, case involves international companies Stream of commerce  plus vs. stream of commerce: SOC+ (O Connor plurality): The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the " purposefully directed toward the forum state. Not enough that nonresident " merely knows products will/may end up in forum state ( Asahi did nothing to purposefully avail itself of CA market Examples of something more: marketing, sales reps, service centers SOC (Brennan plurality): Placement of a product into the stream of commerce is by itself sufficient for jurisdiction. Enough that nonresident " knows product will/may end up in forum state. As long as a " knows a product is being marketed in a forum state, he should be subject to jurisdiction (because he knows a lawsuit s a possibility and is availing himself, though indirectly, of the state s law that facilitate commercial activity) ( Asahi knew its products would end up in CA Problems w/SOC (w/o +): Opens  to suit almost anywhere Stevens: Suggests if feet held to fire he d agree Asahi had minimum contacts with CA So, is mere putting of product into stream of commerce enough, or does nonresident " have to do something more? ( Issue remains unresolved (Volkswagen still the law?) Minimum contacts and the internet Mere publication of an interactive website accessible in the forum state by a nonresident " is not sufficient to establish minimum contacts with the forum state.  Deliberate and repeated contacts required such that "  purposefully availed itself of forum states benefits (Millennium). Millennium Enterprises v. Millennium Music, US Dist. Ct. for OR, 1999 (Handout 4) OR and SC music-selling cos. have similar names; OR co. sues SC co. for trademark infringement SC co. sells mainly in store, but also has website that makes a small number of sales ( website clearly directed towards SC residents Holding: SC co. made no sales and no deliberate actions towards OR with its website, so no OR jurisdiction over SC co. Zippo sliding-scale test: Active websites: Actively conduct business with residents of forum state (nonresident " doing lots of business with forum state through website) Almost always personal jurisdiction Interactive websites: Sites that permit user to exchange information with host computer (user can buy things, register, etc.) Sometimes personal jurisdiction, depending on circumstances Passive websites: Do little more than make information known to those who are interested Rarely personal jurisdiction Tyler: But what if Enquirer had posted Shirley Jones story on its website? Relevant concerns: Fairness to ", level of activity conducted with forum state through site Tyler thinks this test is silly Review of minimum contacts doctrine up to this point Shoe: Benchmark test is minimum contacts, so long as personal jurisdiction would not be unfair/unreasonable Asahi: Look at contacts first ( if there are minimum contacts, reasonable/fairness factors can still veto exercise of personal jurisdiction Hanson (also VW): To determine if there are minimum contacts, look at nonresident " s ties with forum state Hanson, VW, and Kulko: Nonresident " s ties to forum state cannot be established by unilateral act of third party ( must be some gesture (purposeful availment) by " directed towards forum state SOC vs. SOC+: SOC (VW, Asahi): Personal jurisdiction if nonresident " injected product into stream of commerce, knowing product will end up in forum state SOC+ (Asahi): Something more than mere  injection needed ( action by " directed towards the state required Technically, controlling language on the issue is still VW 7. General Jurisdiction General Jurisdiction General jurisdiction: Cases where cause of action does not arise out of nonresident " s actions within the forum state, but state still has personal jurisdiction ( i.e., nonresident " can be sued on any claim Higher threshold for general than for specific jurisdiction ( easier to establish specific jurisdiction (if possible) because threshold is lower Where nonresident " has  continuous and systematic contacts with forum state, " subject to personal jurisdiction there even for claims not arising from " s actions in the forum state (general jurisdiction) (Perkins & Helicopteros) Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining C., US SC, 1952 (p.125) Category 2 case under Shoe framework " was a Filipino co. During WWII, " s president returned to OH to run the company  (not from OH) sued " (not from OH) for claims unrelated to " s actions in OH Holding: " carried out  continuous and systematic corporate activities in OH, so subject to suit in OH for claim not arising out of its actions in OH Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A v. Hall, US SC, 1984 (p.128)  s relatives while working in Peru (for Consorcio, not ") died in helicopter crash in helicopter operated by ", a Colombian co. that provides helicopter transportation in South American  s file wrongful death suit in TX ( conceded there wasn t specific jurisdiction (conceded that claim didn t arise out/weren t related to " s actions in TX ( Tyler: this was a mistake) " s contacts with TX: Bought helicopters there, pilots were trained there, negotiated deal w/Consorcio there Holding: " lacked  continuous and systematic contacts with TX, so exercise of personal jurisdiction (remember,  conceded there wasn t specific jurisdiction) inappropriate Difference from Perkins: In Perkins, " s business conducted from OH ( here, " s business conducted from Colombia Dissent (Brennan): Direct relationship between crash and " s actions in TX (pilot trained in TX, " s deal with Consorcio negotiated in TX) ( ignores  s concession of no specific jurisdiction Causes of action can  arise from or  relate to " s contacts with forum state There should be personal jurisdiction whenever cause of action  relates to nonresident " s contacts with forum state (when cause of action arises from actions by " that are similar to, but not necessarily same as, " s contacts with forum state) Lessons (Tyler): (1) A court won t deal with an issue the parties don t raise (here, whether or not TX had personal jurisdiction), (2) good to play nice and make some concessions, but not the central aspect of your case Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 9th Cir., 2003 (Handout 5) Gator (DE) makes pop-up LL Bean (ME) doesnt like LL Bean does a lot of mail-order and internet business in CA Gator seeks declaratory judgment in CA that its popups were legal Holding: LL Bean (ME) does so much business in CA that is has something akin to a physical presence there If nonresident " does so much business in forum state that it approximates a physical presence there (like in Perkins), forum state has general jurisdiction Tyler: Throwback to Pennoyer and  presence requirement? Summarizing the Cases so Far  8. Harris v. Balk Revisited Types of appearances General appearance: " submits fully to court jurisdiction (open oneself up to personal liability) Special appearance: " appears only to challenge jurisdiction (can t get into merits of case) Limited appearance: Where allowed, " appears and litigates on merits of the case only up to the value of his property in the state (relevant in quasi in rem jurisdiction cases) This category is now largely irrelevant (following Shaffer) In rem jurisdiction A state always has in rem jurisdiction over property (tangible and intangible) within its borders, whether or not the owner is present within the borders also (Pennington) Requirements in order for state to exercise in rem jurisdiction: Presence of property within the state Seizure of the property at the beginning of proceedings Opportunity of the property owner to be heard Minimum contacts and quasi in rem jurisdiction All assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be determined by (tested again) the Shoe minimum-contacts test (Shaffer) (but see Burnham exception in Scalia plurality) When the cause of action arises out of the property itself or ownership of the property (i.e., quiet title actions), jurisdiction always lies, but when the property is unrelated to the cause of action, must apply the Shoe minimum-contacts test. Shaffer v. Heitner, US SC, 1977 (p.147)  sharehold in Greyhound; " s directors/officers of Greyhound Greyhound incorporated in DE; Neither  nor " residents of DE  sues " s in DE and attaches " s stock in Greyhound Tough DE law says " s whose property has been attached ( sequestered ) must make general appearance (submit to personal jurisdiction) in DE before they can litigate case on the merits ( " can t make a limited appearance I.e., " can either make general appearance of forfeit his attached property Holding: " s stock not the subject of the suit, and mere ownership of stock not sufficient contacts, so no DE jurisdiction Tyler HATES this holding: (1) everything " s do as directors of Greyhound has an effect in DE, (2) " s enjoyed benefits of DE law as directors of Greyhoud, (3) " s probably had lots of contacts with DE, and the reason the court didnt see any was because this particular issue wasnt litigated Reasoning: Jurisdiction over property essentially is jurisdiction over the propertys owner (in rem proceedings are really proceedings about the property owners rights vis--vis the property) BUT, Shoe test rests on traditional notions of fair play ( isnt quasi in rem jurisdiction a tradition? ( Marshall: Tradition isnt decisive Concurrence/Dissent (Brennan): DE has strong interest in adjudicating the suit and " s enjoyed benefits DE affords to corporate officers (voluntarily) Implications of Shaffer: Breaks down traditional distinction between in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem jurisdiction Tests for determining whether in personam and quasi in rem jurisdiction lie is now exactly the same In rem jurisdiction will always lie under the minimum-contacts test (in rem cases involve determining who owns a particular piece of property) Situation in which quasi in rem jurisdiction might apply: If state s long arm statute won t reach the nonresident " 9. Pennoyer Revisited: Personal Service Within the Jurisdiction Transient jurisdiction Transient jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over a party because he is in the forum, even if for only a short time Burnham v. Superior Court, US SC, 1990 (p.160)  and " agree to separate and that " will move to CA and file divorce there When " travels to CA to do some business and see their children,  serves him with divorce papers in CA Difference from Kulko: In Kulko, wife seeks to assert jurisdiction over ex-husband to modify child-support agreement after their children move to CA to live with the wife. Kulko involved unilateral act of a third party (ex-husband stayed in NY) ( in this case husband himself goes to CA, so no unilateral act of third party) Holding: Court says CA has jurisdiction over ", but for different reasons (no majority holding) Scalia plurality: Physical presence of nonresident " in forum state is alone sufficient for personal jursidiction Reasoning: Why Shaffer doesn t apply ( court treats physically absent and physically present " s differently Scalia uncomfortable with Brennan s test because (1) seems too subjective and (2) gives too much power to judges to determine  fairness and  reasonableness Jurisdiction based on physical presence alone is sufficient because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice Tyler sees contradiction here: Didnt Court in Shaffer say tradition is not decisive in disallowing traditional notion of quasi in rem jurisdiction? Brennan plurality: Shoe and Shaffer mean that every assertion of state-court jurisdiction, even one as traditional as transient jurisdiction, must comport with contemporary notions of due process ( transient jurisdiction is fair in this case In determining fairness of jurisdiction, court should look at all the relevant factors, not just " s contacts with the forum state Reasoning: Assertion of transient jurisdiction fair in this case because: (1) everyone knows about transient jurisdiction, so " should have been on notice, (2) " had availed himself of benefits of CA during 3 days he was there, and (3) burden on " light because of advances in transportation Doesn t like Scalia s single-minded reliance on historical pedigree Take away: Ruling applies only to individuals and not corporations Scalia finds transient jurisdiction sufficient because thats the way weve always done it (and Shaffer didnt change that) ( sees minimum contacts as a sort of surrogate for physical presence Brennan thinks Shaffer did change the way we think about transient jurisdiction, but that there are sufficient contacts here for jurisdiction to be fair Tyler: Both are wrong because tradition isnt always determinative (e.g., Shaffer) yet Brennan s approach would allow jurisdiction over just about any out-of-state " Jurisdiction by consent Consent to personal jurisdiction can be implied (Hess) Consent to jurisdiction can be an express part of a contractual agreement (Carnival Cruise Lines) ( contract had clause about where adjudication would take place) Such clauses are almost always upheld Jurisdiction to Decide Jurisdiction In submitting to courts jurisdiction for the limited purpose of challenging jurisdiction, " agrees to abide by (1) court s decision re: jurisdiction and (2) the manner in which the court  determines the issue (including the ordering of discovery re: minimum contacts) (Insurance Co. of Ireland) 10A & 10B. The Mechanics of Notice & The Requirement of Notice as an Aspect of Due Process Rules for serving process (FRCP 4) 4(c)(1): Summons served together w/complaint 4(e): Service can be made to an individual either (1) according to the relevant states rules (in federal court, option of following applicable states rules) or (2) by hand Relevant state = state in which district court sits or in which service is effected By hand = to ", to person of  suitable age and discretion at " s house, or to " s authorized agent 4(h): Service can made upon a corporation either (1) according to the relevant state s law or (2) by hand delivery to an officer/director of the corporation 4(d): Waiver of formal service of summons (  sends " complaint and asks " to return waiver form (idea is to avoid costs involved in serving process) Incentives for " to waive formal service: 1. If " waives he gets more time for answer (60 days, rather than 20) 2. If " refuses to waive and doesn t have good reason for refusing, " may later be liable  s expenses in serving process If summons waived, proof of service not required " who waives service doesn t waive any objections re: jurisdiction or venue "s in federal court usu. waive right to formal service US govt cant be served in this manner 4(m): Timing ( service must be made within 120 after complain is filed, or action is dismissed Only way to get extension is to show good-faith efforts to serve process (cause) Notice and due process The means employed to serve process must be such as one desirous of actually serving process might reasonably adopt to accomplish it (mere gesture not enough) (Mullane) If a method is reasonably certain to notify an absent party, its sufficient (Mullane) Thus, personal service always adequate, but not always required ( usu. the best form of service, but not constitutionally required ( service by mailing usu. okay b/c usu. reasonably certain to effect notice Exception: where conditions do not permit such reasonably certain notice, if the form chosen is not substantially less likely to give notice than another feasible, customary substitute (e.g., publication), then that substitutes okay (Mullane) Due diligence test: if it would require an extraordinary amount of effort above and beyond due diligence to identify someone (e.g., unknown beneficiaries in Mullane), publication notice is okay Exception: publication notice usu. acceptable in in rem proceedings Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., US SC, 1950 (p.183) " bank had pooled trust fund; settled trust and made notice by publication in NY newspaper for 4 weeks Trust settlement (accounting) prevented beneficiaries from protesting " s decisions re: the trust over the past year Holding: Court divided beneficiaries into two group: those who could be easily identified (" had their addresses) and those who could not be (interests too contingent). Publication notice was sufficient for unknown beneficiaries but insufficient for known ones. 11. Venue Venue Not a constitutional matter ( defined by statute (28 USC 1391) Method for allocating work among the system to promote efficiency and convenience If court has (1) jurisdiction and (2) theres been notice, then ask if venues proper Venue objections are waivable ( must be made in the first document " files Key question re: venue: which court would be most convenient and fair location for parties to adjudicate the dispute? Rules for venue (28 USC 1391) Venue selected doesn t have to be best venue ( only relevant factor is whether venue meets requirements of 1391(a) and (b) (Bates) 1391(a): Diversity cases may be brought in judicial district: (a)(1) Where any " resides, if all " s reside in the same state, or (a)(2) Where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is located, or (a)(3) Where " was subject to personal jurisdiction at time of beginning of suit, if no other district where case can be brought (minimum contacts analysis) ( fallback provision 1391(b): Federal question cases may be brought in judicial district:: (b)(1) Where any " resides, if all " s reside in the same state, or (b)(2) Where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is located, or Application of (b)(2): Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., 2nd Cir., 1992 (p.337)  incurred a debt while living in PA; moves to NY " sends collection notice to  s old PA address, forwarded to  s new NY address  sues in NY district court ( proper venue? Holding: Receipt of collection notice was  substantial part of events giving rise to  s claim under FDCPA (federal question) b/c harm didn t actually occur until  received the notice. Under 1391(b)(2), NY is okay venue. Under 28 USC 1391(a) and (b), a civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (b)(3) Where " may be found, if no other district where case can be brought (treat same as (a)(3) ( minimum contacts analysis) ( fallback provision 1391(c): For purposes of venue, corporations said to reside in any state where " subject to personal jurisdiction at outset of suit (minimum contacts test) If state has more than one district, corporation resides in any district where " has enough contacts for personal jurisdiction if that district were a state (c) informs (a) and (b) ( look to (c) to determine where corporation resides and then apply to (a) or (b) 1391(d): An alien may be sued in any district (but there still must be service of process) 1391 (f): Venue rules for suit against foreign state 12. Transfer of venue and forum non conveniens Transfer of venue 1404(a): For (1) convenience of parties and witnesses and (2) interests of justice, civil action may be transferred to another district where it might have been brought Two questions to ask here: 1. Could suit have originally been brought in the transferee district? (Hoffman: this means could suit have been brought by  in transferee district at the outset of the action) 2. Would transferring comport with convenience of parties and interests of justice? A suit cannot be transferred to a venue in which the  could not have brought the suit at the outset of the action, even if such transfer would serve the convenience of the parties (Hoffman) Hoffman v. Blaski, US Sup. Ct., 1960 (p.341)  (IL) sues " (TX) in TX for patent infringement (  couldn t sue " in IL because " lacked sufficient contacts with IL " wants to transfer venue to IL Holding: Court can t transfer venue to IL b/c  couldn t originally have brought suit in IL, even if transferring would be more convenient for parties and witnesses Reasoning: Were " allowed to transfer venue upon a finding of  convenience by the court, result would be situation where " could transfer case to any district where they were willing to waive rights to venue and jurisdiction (on notion that suit could have been brought there since " now willing to waive right to not have to defend there absent appropriate venue and jurisdiction), while  would not be able to transfer a case to any district without consent and waiver of venue and jurisdiction by " ( this would be discriminator Dissent: Allowing " to transfer to IL would temper discrimination in system against " s b/c  s always have sole choice of forum General rule re: choice of law in transfer cases: choice of law determined by the laws of the transferor court, so long as transferor court had proper jurisdiction (Van Dusen) 1406: Authorizes transfer even if transferor (original) court lacks jurisdiction (Goldlawr) 1407(a): (multiparty litigation) In cases where " sued in different districts by different  s all over the country, cases can be transferred to one district for purposes of pretrial proceedings (e.g., discovery) and then remanded back to original districts for trial Forum non conveniens Forum non conveniens: The discretion of a court to refuse to hear a suit, even when the court has jurisdiction, when there is another more appropriate forum for both parties Judge-made (common-law) doctrine Idea is to prevent  from harassing " by filing at place most inconvenient to " If applied, case dismissed and can be refilled by  in the more convenient forum Rarely invoked, because it s extreme ( only used when public and private factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal (when choice of forum is extremely unfair)  s forum choice usu. given substantial weight ( less weight when  is foreign (see Piper) Flipside of Asahi: court less favorable to foreign  s than foreign " s (contrast w/Asahi) b/c worried about foreign  s forum-shopping in US b/c of US s more favorable laws (see Piper) Gilbert test for forum non conveniens determinations (see Piper): Private factors: (1) evidence/proof location, (2) availability of witnesses, (3) cost of getting witnesses, (4) jurys ability to view premises Public factors: (1) court congestion, (2) local interest in deciding local controversies at home, (3) forum familiarity with substantive law, (4) unfairness of burdening citizens with jury duty for cases unrelated to forum Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, US SC, 1981 (p.349) Plane manufactured by " Piper (PA) crashes in Scotland, killing everyone onboard (all Scottish citizens)  (victims relatives) bring wrongful death suit in CA b/c of more favorable strict liability tort law than in Scotland " s want to litigate in Scotland b/c (1) co. that operated plane based in UK (wants to implead plane operator ( crash resulted from pilot error) and (2) Scotland doesnt have strict liability Holding: Using Gilbert test, would be more convenient for parties and witness to litigate case in Scotland, so case dismissed under forum non conveniens Reasoning: All the evidence is really in UK,  s live in UK, UK interest stronger than American interest, so case should be litigated there Possibility that a venue change will result in a less favorable application of law for  not given substantial weight ( if possibility of less favorable application of law were given substantial weight, forum non conveniens would become a non-issue because  almost always files suit in forum with most favorable laws Court worried about  forum-shopping in US b/c of US s more favorable laws CHOOSING THE FORUM: SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION Types of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (SMJ) Central question re: SMJ: How do you determine which court has the power to hear the type of case you have? Federal courts are courts of limited SMJ US Const. Art. III 2: 9 heads of federal jurisdiction: All cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the US, and treaties made under US authority All cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls All cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction Controversies to which the US shall be a party Controversies between two or more states Controversies between a state and citizens of another state Controversies between citizens of different states Controversies between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states Between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects US Const Am. 11 denies federal jurisdiction to cases commenced or prosecuted against one of the states by citizens of a different state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state Original jurisdiction: Authority to hear a case at its inception Federal courts have much broader SMJ than the US SC (US Supreme Court) under 28 USC 1331 and 1332 Appellate jurisdiction: Authority to review the decision of lower courts US SC has very broad appellate jurisdiction US Const. Art. III 2 gives US SC appellate jurisdiction over the 9 heads of federal jurisdiction, subject to rules and regulations imposed by Congress Concurrent jurisdiction: When two or more courts have authority to hear a particular type of case When a federal court has SMJ over a case, usu. state courts have SMJ, too E.g., generally, federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction in a federal question case (unless Congress has said otherwise) The presumption is concurrent jurisdiction, unless specified otherwise by Congress Exclusive jurisdiction: When only one court has authority to hear a particular type of case Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in (1) federal bankruptcy cases, (2) admiralty cases, (3) patent and copyright cases Ascertaining if theres federal court SMJ Federal courts must always ensure that at the outset of the case they have SMJ (Mottley) SMJ is so important that Mottley court raised SMJ concern sua sponte SMJ cannot be waived (parties cannot by consent create SMJ (as opposed to personal jurisdiction, which can be waived) Even the  who chooses the forum can challenge SMJ on direct appeal (Capron) Yet, while you can t waive SMJ, you can waive your right to appeal if you wait too long Yet, SMJ not subject to collateral attack; SMJ of first proceeding cannot be argued in second proceeding (Des Moines) The interests of finality must at some point take precedence Two questions to ask: Does the Constitution provide federal courts with this type of SMJ (see US Const. Art. III 2)? Has Congress taken the additional step in 28 USC of granting the federal courts SMJ over this type of case? The Constitution gives Congress rather than state courts power to determine federal court SMJ Just because the US Const. says federal courts can exercise SMJ in a certain type of case does not mean Congress cannot limit that SMJ (e.g., $75,000 a/c requirement in diversity cases) Two most important SMJ grants Congress has made to federal courts: (1) diversity jurisdiction and (2) federal question jurisdiction) The bulk of federal court cases come from federal question cases (70-80%); 20-30% come from diversity jurisdiction cases 13. Diversity Jurisdiction Rules for Diversity Jurisdicition (28 USC 1332) Federal courts have original jurisdiction in cases (1) that meet the Art. III requirements of diversity of citizenship and (2) in which the amount in controversy (a/c) exceeds $75,000 Diversity jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear cases in which claims arise solely under state law, so long as constitutional and statutory requirements are satisfied State includes DC, PR, and US territories (US SC in Tidewater said this is constitutional) Gap in the statute: A person who moves to France cannot bring a diversity suit Diversity of citizenship: General rule (Strawbridge v. Curtis): Complete diversity of parties usu. required for a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction (i.e., no party on one side may be from the same state as any party on the other side) Congress does, however, in some cases permit diversity suits when theres only minimal diversity (where at least one  is a citizen of a different state than at least one ") E.g., Class action cases in which there are over 75 deaths or claims in excess of $5 million Corollary: Diversity of citizenship must be present at the time the complaint is filed, and changes in citizenship subsequent to the filing of the complaint do not affect the diversity jurisdiction (Connolly) Amount in controversy: If judgment is for less than $75,000, judge has power to assess penalties on the  Idea is to discourage  s with meager cases of filing for $75,000+ just to get into federal court Determining citizenship For individuals (domicile): Mas v. Perry, 5th Circuit, 1974 (p.255)  s were married grad students living in LA; husband was from France, wife from MS  s accused " landlord (from LA) of peeping on them ( no federal anti-peeing law, so for case to brought in federal court it had to be brought on diversity grounds " at end of trial moved to dismiss on SMJ grounds (lack of diversity), said no complete diversity because wife was from MS Objections based on SMJ may be raised at any time (not waivable, unlike personal jurisdiction) Holding: Though wife had moved to LA, she was still a citizen of MS because she lacked the requisite intent to stay in LA to change her domicile from MS to LA. So, case can go forward. For diversity jurisdiction purposes, citizenship means domicile; mere residence does not equal citizenship A change of domicile requires (1) taking up residence in a new state (2) with the intention to remain there indefinitely Courts determine domiciliary intent by looking to a host of factors For corporations: 28 USC 1332(c)(1): A corporation (for purposes of diversity jurisdiction) is deemed to be a citizen of any state where (1) its incorporated or (2) has its principal place of business Exception: An insurer is also deemed to be a citizen of any state in which an insured is a citizen Tests for determining corporations principal place of business: Nerve center test Operating assets test Total activity test (this is the test the casebook prefers) For unincorporated associations (e.g., partnerships, labor unions, charitable organizations, etc.): Courts generally consider citizenship (domicile) of each of the organizations members rather than treating the unincorporated association itself as an entity with citizenship in a particular state(s) Thus, its very hard to get diversity jurisdiction over large unincorporated associations because they have members in so many states For representative actions: Citizenship of representative governs (Ben Hur), unless representative is executor or guardian, in which case citizenship of represented party governs ( 1332(c)(2)) Thus, appointment of an administrator for a decedent, infant, or incompetent can neither in and of itself create nor destroy diversity of citizenship (because depends on citizenship of person for whom administrator is appointed) For aliens: For purposes of diversity, an alien admitted to the US for permanent residence is deemed a citizen of the state in which that alien is domiciled (28 USC 1332) In determining diversity jurisdiction, a federal court looks only to the citizenship of the  real parties to the action ( disregards citizenship of  nominal or  formal parties Real party (as to "): a party who, by the substantive law, has the duty  seeks to enjoin or enforce Nominal party: a party who, in a legal sense, has no interest in the result of the suit or no actual interest or control over the subject matter of the litigation Determining the amount in controversy (a/c) The sum claimed by the  in good faith in the complaint is taken to be the a/c in controversy unless it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the stated a/c (St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., AFA Tours) Very -friendly doctrine A.F.A Tours, Inc. v. Whitchurch, 2nd Circuit., 1991 (p.262) " worked for  tour company for many years, then quit and used  s client list as a basis for finding business  brought diversity suit for misappropriation of trade secrets, asking for damages  in an amount not presently ascertainable, but which is believed to exceed the sum of $50,000 and punitive damages of  not less than $250,000 Federal trial court dismissed case on ground it would not be possible for  to prove damages amounting to more than $50,000 (a/c requirement at the time) Holding: " s profits from  s client list could exceed $50,000, and the record does not foreclose the possibility that  could recover punitive damages. Thus, it s not a legal certainty that  s claim is less than a/c requirement, so trial court was wrong to dismiss Aggregation to meet the a/c requirement: A single  can aggregate claims against a single " to meet the a/c requirement If there is a single, indivisible harm, multiple  s may aggregate against a single " Except for special statutory exceptions, multiple  s may not aggregate against a single " if they have separate and distinct claims in order to meet the a/c Generally, two  s may not aggregate their claims to get over the a/c hurdle Generally, if the a/c requirement is met either from the  s viewpoint (how much the  stands to gain) or the " s (how much the " stands to lose), then he a/c requirement has been satisfied Exceptions to diversity jurisdiction Even if the requirements of diversity jurisdiction are met, a federal court generally decline to hear, and instead dismiss for lack of SMJ, cases related to: Probate (sale of an estate) Domestic relations (in cases involving the issuance of divorce, alimony, or a child custody decree) US SC has held that Congress in the diversity statute did not intend to give federal courts jurisdiction over these two types of cases (but could have if it had wanted to) Should we have diversity jurisdiction? Original justifications for diversity jurisdiction: To avoid discrimination against out-of-state residents in state courts To afford some measure of security to investors developing the frontier sections of the country (back when that was relevant) Yes: Gives " s the choice to remove cases if case filed in forum " doesn t like Diversity jurisdiction leads to cross-pollination (dialogue) between federal and state court, and that s a good thing No: Diversity jurisdiction makes federal courts too congested Diversity cases have high transaction costs (because federal courts apply state law in diversity suits): Require judges to gain close knowledge of state law Distract federal judges from doing their primary job, that is, applying federal law What about states rights? Do we have justification for taking power from state courts? 14. Federal Question Jurisdiction Federal Question Jurisdiction (28 USC 1331) 28 USC 1331: Federal courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the (1) Constitution, (2) laws, or (3) treaties of the US No a/c requirement Important: Generally, if a  has a federal question, case, he can go either to federal or to state court (federal question jurisdiction usu. not exclusive) Is federal question jurisdiction a good thing? Maybe federal judges are better than state judges Maybe leads to greater uniformity b/c US SC doesnt have time to try all cases, and is more likely to hear circuit splits than state court splits It depends on how much we trust the state courts Determining whether a case arises under a federal question: The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule) Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule: A case brought in federal court under 1331 (i.e., on federal question grounds) must in its complaint state a cause of action based on a federal law, a treaty, or the US Constitution. Otherwise, the federal court must dismiss for lack of SMJ. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, US SC, 1908 (p.273)  injured due to " RR negligence, given free passes for rest of their lives In 1907 Congress passes law to prevent RR s from distributing free passes, and " RR refuses to renew  s passes  s sue in federal court on federal question grounds (no basis for diversity suit), basing federal claim on argument that " will rely on 1907 law in its defense Holding: Court dismisses for lack of SMJ, even though a federal question is implicated, because the federal question implicated relates to an anticipated defense, not to the cause of action itself Reasoning: This is really a breach-of-contract claim, and breach-of-contract claims are governed by state law (theres no federal breach-of-contract statute) The federal question must be implicated in the cause of action itself (well-pleaded complaint rule). It is not sufficient that a federal question likely will be implicated in the defense. Contrast Osborn v. Bank of US Bank of US sues to prevent OH from colleting a tax on the Bank of the US Holding: Even though the tax collection itself is not a federal question (rather, its a state matter), there is federal question jurisdiction b/c: Reasoning: Bank of the USs claim is that OHs tax collection is unconstitutional (i.e., the federal question implicated is one of unconstitutionality) Congress has passed a statute allowing the Bank of the US to sue and be sued in federal court (the statute being the Bank of the USs charter) Contrast also Bank of US v. Planters Bank of Georgia (p.272) Bank of US sues Planters bank for refusing to honors its notes ( essentially, sues for breach of contract Holding: Federal SMJ exists (under federal question jurisdiction) Reasoning: The Bank of the US exists solely as a creation of federal law ( thus, every suit involving the Bank of the US implicates the federal law under which the bank was established A federal question arises under the Constitution (i.e., federal courts have federal question jurisdiction) whenever the underlying cause relates to a federal law Distinction between Mottley and Planters: The Planters court is interpreting US Const. Art. III 2, whereas the Mottley court is interpreting 28 USC 1331 The Planters court reads US Const. Art. III 2 quite broadly (says as long as the underlying cause relates to a federal law, theres federal question jurisdiction) The Mottley, in contrast court reads 28 USC 1331 more narrowly (says federal question jurisdiction lies only if a federal question is implicated in the original complaint Arguments for/against the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule For: Pragmatic reasons: Cut down on the litigation being brought to federal court So that federal judges dont have to be experts of state law Administratively, its much easier to decide at the outset that theres a federal question than to figure out of down the line there might be a federal question implicated I.e., it may look like a federal question will be implicated, but maybe in actuality it wont be ( should court really speculate about what will happen? Federalism reasons: To keep litigation in state courts (let state courts decide their issues) Against: Questions of federal law determined in state court rarely get review by the Supreme Court (i.e., state courts determine many questions of federal law) Under 28 USC 1257 the US SC may review state court rulings that turn on questions of federal law (well-pleaded complaint rule doesnt apply), but this rarely happens I.e., even when a cause of action arises under state law, US SC can review as long as the case actually turns on a question of federal law) Undermines uniformity to have many courts deciding questions of federal law 15A. Supplemental Jurisdiction at its Origins Supplemental jurisdiction: The foundation Often an injury inflicted on a party will give rise to both a federal and a state claim E.g., federal antitrust laws prohibit unfair competition in business, and so do most states Pendent and ancillary jurisdiction Pendent jurisdiction: When the , in his complaint, appends a claim lacking an independent basis for federal SMJ to a claim possessing such a basis Involves claims/parties a  may attach to his original complaint Basis is FRCP 18 (joinder of claims): If a claim is cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action Rule 18 allows a  to add as many claims as he has against " in one suit Rationale: Promotes judicial efficiency by avoiding piecemeal litigation Diminishes the possibility of inconsistency between state and federal rulings Ensures that litigants are not dissuaded from exercising their rights in federal court because they can dispose of all claims by one litigation in the state court but cant in federal court I.e., to make a grant of federal jurisdiction meaningful in certain cases (e.g., civil rights claims) we need to make  able to bring state claims along with federal claims Ancillary jurisdiction: When either a  or " injects a claim lacking independent jurisdiction by way of a (1) counterclaim, (2) cross-claim, or (3) third-party claim Involves reactionary claims (counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims) Basis is FRCP 13, 14, and 20: Rule 13: (counterclaim and cross-claims) A party may, with the permission of the court, present a counterclaim it did not present at the outset of action through inadvertence or because the claim had not yet matured A party may cross-claim against a co-party to indemnify the cross-claiming party against the claims claimed in the suit against the cross-claiming party Rule 14 (third-party practice): At any time after commencement of action " may, as a third-party , bring in a third-party " who may be liable for all or part of  s claim against third-party  Third-party " in turn can turn bring in another third-party " to cover the claim against it Any party can move to strike the third-party claim, or sever it for a separate trial Rule 20 (permissive joinder of parties): Any group of  s or " s wishing to be joined in one action may do so if the cause of action arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences or if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action A judge may prevent permissive joinder in order to prevent delay or prejudice on the part of a party on the other side of the parties wishing to be joined Determining when supplemental jurisdiction lies (the Gibbs Constitutional Case test) United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, US SC, 1966 (p.291) G was hired to open a mine using non-UMW labor Members of the local UMW chapter forcibly prevent G from opening the new mine G brings claim against UMW under both federal (LMRA) and state law (TN conspiracy and boycott law) Since UMW is an unincorporated association with members in TN and G is a citizen of TN, G cant bring the state claim on diversity grounds ( can only bring the state claim in federal court by seeking pendent SMJ Holding: The federal court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claim because the state claim meets the below test Reasoning: Under US Const. Art. III 2, federal judicial power extends to all cases arising under federal law ( thus, the question becomes: what is a case under Art. III? A state-law claim is part of the same constitutional case as a federal claim under Art. III (i.e., is a ride-along or pendent claim) when: Theres a substantial federal claim at the root of the state claim The state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact Common nucleus of operative fact: When the facts supporting the federal claim overlap substantially with the facts supporting the federal claim The  would normally be expected to try the claims together in one judicial proceeding I.e., a federal court can hear a ride-along (pendent) state claim that meets these three requirements Pendent jurisdiction is matter of discretion (i.e., just because federal court can exercise pendent jurisdiction doesnt mean that it has to). In determining whether or not to exercise pendent jurisdiction, the federal court should consider: The potential for jury confusion Whether or not the federal claim really dominates over the state claim Whether, if the federal claim is dismissed, the federal court has the possibility of dismissing the state claim without prejudice Whether the federal law may preempt the state law (i.e., if theres a issue whether the federal law may preempt the state law claim, the court should keep the case b/c preemption is an important federal question) Preemption becomes an issue when state and federal laws conflict Analyzing the Gibbs test: There are two parts to Brennans opinion: (1) power and (2) discretion Power: Brennan take pendent jurisdiction to the full extent the Constitution allows Discretion: Courts should be pragmatic in deciding whether to hear pendent claims Brennan doesnt mention the statutory grant hes interpreting Brennan mentions only Art. III, but presumably hes interpreting 1331 (i.e., he seems to imply 1331 allows this exercise of pendant jurisdiction, but he doesnt specify) Pros/cons of the Gibbs test: Pros: Allows  to bring all of his claims together in federal court Makes grant of federal question jurisdiction meaningful in civil rights claims (prevents civil rights claimant from having either to split his claims or bring all his claims in state court) Gives federal court discretion (not mandate) to hear pendent claims Cons: Brennan never cites or discusses the law that grants federal question jurisdiction (28 USC 1331), which provokes a backlash from textualists Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction following Gibbs (pre-1367) IMPORTANT: US Const. Art. III is not self-executing ( Art. III requires Congress to act to confer original jurisdiction on district courts in order for district courts to have that jurisdiction Pendent jurisdiction following Gibbs: Aldinger  sues county officers in federal court under 42 USC 1983; wants also to sue the county itself, but can t do so under 1983 so brings pendent state claim against county Important:  can only sue county in federal court on federal question grounds, b/c county is from same state as the  Diff. from Gibbs: Gibbs involved pendent-claim jurisdiction (i.e., state claim against the same party); this case involves pendent-party jurisdiction Pendent-party jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over parties not named in any claim cognizable by the federal court ( bringing in non-diverse parties on a state claim arising from the same nucleus of fact as a federal claim Holding:  can t bring state claim against county b/c Congress had specifically said that counties weren t amenable to suit under 1391 Pendent-party jurisdiction does not lie when a claim against the pendent party may be brought in state court Court suggests that if federal court had been the only place where  could have brought the federal claim (i.e., if federal courts had held exclusive jurisdiction), the case would have come out differently ( turns out not to be true in Finley Finley v. US, US SC, 1989 (p.299)  sues US on FTAA claim for death of her husband and children in plane crash  wants to join San Diego and utility company under state claims, but b/c federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over FTAA claims against the US, in order to sue everyone in one proceeding  has to sue them all in federal court  can t sue San Diego and utility company in federal court on diversity grounds b/c she s not diverse from them, so can only sue by attaching pendent state claim against them Holding: B/c Congress in the statute  sued the FAA under referred to  claims against the US and no one else,  cannot attach San Diego and the utility company as pendent parties on state claims Reasoning: For federal courts to have SMJ, the Constitution must have given the court the capacity to take it and Congress must have supplied that power. Regarding jurisdiction over additional parties (as opposed to over additional claims), SC will not assume that the full constitutional power has been broadly authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly Unless a statute passed by Congress expressly grants supplemental jurisdiction over a type of claim, courts may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those types of claims A grant of jurisdiction over claims involving particular parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over claims by or against different parties Tyler: This is a reining-in of supplemental jurisdiction, a reaction to Gibbs Scalia says that if the text of the statute doesnt grant it, courts should not exercise pendent jurisdiction (textualist approach) Tyler likes Gibbs, not Scalia Ancillary jurisdiction following Gibbs: Owen Equipment & Erection v. Kroger, US SC, 1978 (p.297)  (IA) brings diversity suit against utility company (NE) on state claim Utility company (NE) then impleads ", and  brings state claim against ", too Case against utility company (NE) dismissed b/c Owen impleaded It turns out Owen s from IA, so no diversity anymore Holding: Court dismisses  s case against IA for lack of SMJ Reasoning: Allowing  to maintain claim against " now that there s no diversity would allow end-run around the diversity statute (1332)  could simply sue diverse " and want for the " to implead a nondiverse " ( this would flout the congressional command of 1332 Simply suing diverse " s and waiting for those " s to implead nondiverse " s ( such a result would flout the congressional command Following Gibbs, to determine whether ancillary jurisdiction lay, courts would generally ask (1) if joinder rules allowed it, (2) if it was constitutional under the Gibbs test, and (3) if it was a good idea 15B. Supplemental Jurisdiction Governed by Statute 28 USC 1367 (Supplemental Jurisdiction) 1367(a): Except as provided otherwise, in any civil action where district courts have original jurisdiction, district courts also have supplemental jurisdiction over claims that form part of the same case or controversy under Art. III (the Gibbs test) Codifies the Gibbs test ( Allows supplemental jurisdiction to its full constitutional limit Holds true for joinder and intervention claims 1367(b): In any civil action founded solely on 1332 (diversity grounds), federal court do not have supplemental jurisdiction over claims by  against person s made parties under Rules 14 (third-party claims), 19 and 20 (joinder), or 24 (intervention), or over claims by persons asking to be to joined as  s under Rule 19 or intervene as  s under FRCP 24, when such joinder or intervention would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of 1332 (i.e., diversity of citizenship and a/c) IMPORTANT: Does not limit ability of " to join parties 1367(c): District courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if: The supplemental claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law The supplemental claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction (i.e., if the state claim is the real issue) The district court has dismissed the anchor claims (i.e., the claims over which it had original jurisdiction) There are exceptional circumstances that warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction If the district court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for these reasons, the supplemental claims are dismissed without prejudice and can be brought in state court Interpreting 28 USC 1367 (Exxon Mobil) Zahn (pre-1367) A class of 100  s who live on the banks of a river sue a polluter on diversity grounds The named  s have meet the a/c requirement; the others do not Holding: No diversity jurisdiction over the unnamed  s Rule the court adopted (overturned by Exxon Mobil): A district court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the parties that don t meet the a/c requirement Court here interpreted 1332 (1367 not adopted yet) Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. & Maria del Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., US SC, 2005 (p.642) Exxon Mobil facts: Similar to Zahn: In diversity suit, some  s meet a/c requirement and some don t Maria del Rosario Ortega: In diversity suit, girl (for hand injury) meets a/c requirements, but family (for emotional distress injuries) doesn t Issue: Can a federal diversity court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional  s whose claims do not satisfy the a/c requirement but are part of the same case or controversy as the claims of  s who do allege a sufficient a/c? Holding: 1367 overruled Zahn, so, yes, federal diversity court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional  s who don t meet a/c requirement when one or more original  s do (and all  s are diverse from all " s) 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by diverse parties arising out of the same Art. III case or controversy, provided at least one of the claims meets the minimum a/c requirement Reasoning: Kennedy (majority): Defines  civil action in 1367(a) as being the original claim that meets the a/c requirement In this case, the additional  s not meeting a/c requirement seek to join ride-along claims under Rules 20 and 23 1367(b) bars claims against " s joined under Rule 20, but says nothing about claims by  s joined under Rule 20, and 1367(b) says nothing about Rule 23, so nothing in 1367(b) precludes claims by  s joined under Rules 20 or 23 Even if legislative history indicates Congress didnt intend 1367 to overturn Zahn, the statutes clear, so theres no need to look at legislative history Summary: Draws distinction between diversity and a/c requirements Contamination theory works for diversity requirement (when parties no longer completely diverse, no need to be in federal court in the first place), but not a/c requirement (if only some parties meet a/c requirement, doesnt eliminate need to be in federal court in the first place) Benefit of Kennedy s argument: Coheres better with a plan reading of the statute Problem with Kennedy s argument: Doesn t wrestle enough with the meaning of  civil action in 1331 and 1332. Also, Kennedy s reading should allow non-diverse  s to come in as ride-along  s under Rules 20 or 23 under 1367(a). Thus, if you take Kennedy s opinion to its furthest reaches, you ve just overruled Strawbridge (complete diversity requirement) Ginsberg (dissent): Defines  civil action in 1367(a) as being the whole case together (the original and the additional claims) ( so, 1367(a) does nothing to upset the prior definitions given in Zahn (merely overrules Finley) 1367(b) codifies the result in Kroger (prevents an end-run around the diversity statute), so 1367(b) allows jurisdiction over ancillary, but not pendent claims Summary: 1367(a) allows pendent jurisdiction in federal question 1367(b) allows ancillary jurisdiction in diversity casesafter initiation of an otherwise proper diversity actionbut does not allow pendent jurisdiction; rather 1367(b) merely addresses instances of ancillary jurisdiction in diversity cases Ginsbergs a purposivist: Thinks congressional purpose here was to overrule Finley and codify Kroger Problem with Ginsbergs argument: Cant account for the distinction between 1367(a) and 1367(b) Tyler: 1367 is a disaster 1367 displays a lack of foresight and shows the problems involved when Congress tries to interpose itself exclusively in an area where there was a great deal of judge-made law 16. Removal and Remand Removal Purposes of removal: Gives one advantage to ", who after all didn t ask to be sued  s always make strategic plays in deciding whether to bring suit in state or federal court; removal just gives " opportunity to make a strategic play by vetoing  s chosen forum " s love being able to remove cases Removal rules (28 USC) 1441 (actions removable generally) 1441(a): Who can remove, and to where Only the original " can remove (Shamrock Oil) E.g.,  cannot remove if " interposes a federal counterclaim Generally, removal is available only where the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction (for exception, see 1442) E.g., Mottley case not removable b/c district court lacked original jurisdiction Cases can be removed only to the district court that embraces the forum where the suit is currently pending (i.e., only vertical removal allowed) 1441(b): Effect of citizenship on removal A federal question case is removable without regard to the citizenship of the parties A diversity case is not removable if the " (or any of the " s) is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought (i.e., only a non-resident " may remove diversity cases) 1441(c): If a separate and independent federal-question claim or cause of action is joined to otherwise non-removable claims, then the entire case may be removed (though district court has discretion to remand again) 1442 (federal officers sued or prosecuted) 1446 (procedure for removal) 1446(a): If case is removable at its inception, " has 30 days from time case is filed to remove 1446(b): If case not originally removable, " has 30 days from time case becomes removable (e.g., if  amends complaint and adds federal question, raises a/c, or drops non-diverse ") to remove Exception: In diversity cases, " cannot remove if more than 1 year has passed since case originally filed (even if case becomes removable after 1 year has passed) Oldest trick in book by  seeking to avoid removal ( file suit against nondiverse ", then dismiss against nondiverse " after year and a day, keeping claim against diverse " 1447 (procedure after removal generally): 1447(c): If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks SMJ, the case shall be remanded  has 30 days to file for remand once case has been removed 1447(d): Technically, an order for remand is not reviewable, though higher courts often allow appeal for fairness reasons 1447(e): If after removal  seeks to join additional " s whose joinder would destroy SMJ, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the state court Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, US SC, 1996 (Handout 7) L (KY) sues C (DE) and W (KY) in state court on a state-law claim; LM (MA) intervenes with a state-law claim against C and W L (KY) settles with W (KY) C moves to remove b/c says case is now diverse; L (KY) points out case is not diverse b/c W (KY) is still in the case b/c of LMs (MA) claim against it, court mistakenly allows removal Following removal, LM (MA) settles with W (KY), so case now is diverse C wins; L appeals, saying case never should have been removed L s Argument: If you allow the verdict to stand, " s will be encouraged to try to improperly remove cases, and the removal rules will become meaningless Holding: The verdict stands, even though improperly removed Reasoning: Setting aside the verdict and remanding the case would be wasteful/inefficient The jurisdictional defect was cured by the end of the case Where a case has been improperly removed and adjudicated, if the jurisdictional defect that made removal improper is cured prior to judgment, such defect is not fatal to the courts judgment. IMPORTANT: The problem here was statutory, not constitutional (removal is governed by statute, not the Constitutionunlike SMJ, which is governed by the Constitution), so we re not as concerned about the mistake Diff. between Capron and Caterpillar: In Capron, the jurisdictional defect couldn t be cured (Capron involved 2 non-diverse " s), in this case it could be (and was) DESCRIBING AND DEFINING THE DISPUTE Pleadings Pleadings: The initial papers exchanged at the outset of the lawsuit (the nuts and bolts of starting a suit) FRCP 3: Everything starts with the filing of the complaint Filings not enough, though; you still have to serve process on " At a minimum you ll see a complaint and a response from " (answer, motion to dismiss, reply, etc.) What functions should pleadings serve? Map out the legal issues raised in the case (issue revelation) Fact revelation/Narrowing Specify relief sought (amount of damages, injunctive order) Claim revelation (what is the essence of what  seeks to accomplish)/Narrowing Screen out frivolous claims Resolve extent of dispute Allege appropriate bases for jurisdiction Pleadings under the FRCP: FRCP came into effect September 16, 1938 Primary function of pleadings today is notice (i.e., to give " notice of the general basis of  s claim) The problem of pleadings: Incompatible goals: (1) Learn as much as we can at the start of the case so we can screen out weak case cheaply, and (2) Eliminate technical barriers to cases that will be meritorious if they can get to discovery Todays pleadings do well at goal 1, less well at goal 2 The only cases todays pleadings screen out are those where the pleader lacks a legal basis for his claim; facts get screened later Rule 7 (types of pleadings): A pleading shall contain a complaint and an answer A reply can be filed (and should be if the answer includes a counterclaim), but is not required If theres a counterclaim, then a reply to the counterclaim If theres a cross-claim, then an answer to the cross-claim If a third party is summoned under Rule 14, a third-party complaint and answer No other pleadings allowed, though court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer 17A. Stating a Claim Rules for Stating a Claim FRCP 8 (general rules of pleading): Rule 8(a): A pleading setting forth a claim for relief shall contain: (1) A short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the courts jurisdiction depends, (2) A short and plain statement of the claim showing that  is entitled to relief, and (3) A demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks (relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded) Note that these requirements are pretty minimal (see Digiardio ( standard is only that  has to state a  claim upon which relief can be granted, not  facts sufficient to support a cause of action ) You can get to discovery pretty quickly (which makes discovery much more costly) This is good for  because it makes discovery very expensive ( increases  s bargaining position re: settling Before Twombly last term, the standard was that pleading merely had to give " sufficient notice of  s claim ( notice standard) Twombly and the ratcheting up of pleadings requirements Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, US SC, 2007 (Supplement p.595)  s bring claim again ILC (major telephone companies) for violations of the Sherman Act  s assert (1) " s had engaged in parallel conduct and (2) refrained from competing with each other, but did not allege the specifics of a conspiratorial agreement (who, where, how, when) Under the Sherman Act, conspiracy cannot be proved by mere inference from parallel conduct; an agreement must be shown Holding: Court dismissed for failure to state a complaint for which relief can be granted. The complaint needed to go beyond merely alleging there was an agreement, needed to give some additional details so as to give " s notice of the foundation of  s claim. For a complaint to give a " fair notice of what the claim is and what grounds the complaint rests upon, it must contain sufficient factual allegation to make the claim not only conceivable, but plausible (i.e., must contain sufficient facts to raise the right to relief above the level of mere speculation) A bare averment or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice to pass the pleadings requirement; the claim for relief must be backed up with specific factual allegations A complaint must contain enough factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of improper conduct by " Reasoning: Court concerned about letting the complaint stand on policy grounds, worried about allowing discovery that would be massive and hugely expensive Even if " not guilty/liable, " might be driven to settle case at outset rather than fund the expenses of discovery Dissent (Stevens): Court is rewriting Rule 8, asking the complaint to prove everything at the outset (to state what  wouldn t normally find until discovery) The solution to the majoritys concerns about the expense of discovery is to deal with the problems of our discovery system (e.g., by limiting discovery or having discovery in phases), not by ratcheting up the pleading requirements Tyler: The Twombly court has ratcheted up Rule 8 to some extent, with the consequence that conspiracy cases (by their nature) have now become much more difficult to prove Twombly portends a raising of the bar of the requirements at the outset of a case If you ratchet up Rule 8(a), you sift out more bad claims, but also likely sift out some legitimate claims, too If you make the Rule 8(a) requirement lower, you make it easier to get to discovery, and thus make " s much more likely to settle (in order to avoid cost of discovery) IMPORTANT unstated current in this case: Who stands to benefit most from a settlement? (  s attorneys (who will collect on a contingency fee) The pleading rules we have are very much the product of policy choices 17B. Special Pleading Requirements & Burdens Special Pleading Requirements FRCP 9 (pleading special matters): 9(b) (Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind): In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally Stratford v. Zurich Insurance Co., SDNY, 2002 (Handout 8)  dentist filed claim with insurance company; when insurance company refused to pay,  sued " insurance company counterclaimed, saying   knowingly and willfully devised a scheme and artifice to defraud " s and obtain money by false pretenses and representations Holding: " s counterclaim dismissed for failure to state the circumstances constituting  s fraud with particularity (FRCP 9(b) b/c " failed to identify the statement by  that they claim is false (i.e., " claims lied, but fails to identify the lie). Reasoning: " s counterclaim fails to give  notice of precisely which of  s statements " claims are false. A fraud claim requires specificity b/c more is at stake (punitive damages,  s reputation) Tyler: Why did insurance company bring fraud claim rather than breach of contract claim? To get punitive damages Tactical reasons: Fraud claim makes the insurance company look like the victim at trial Denny v. Barber, 2nd Cir., 1978 (p.514)  s alleged in complaint that " s had fraudulently concealed " Chase Manhattans true financial situation by not revealing that the corporation had made risky and speculations without providing adequate reserves for lose and had delayed in writing off uncollectible loans Holding: The complaint failed to satisfy FRCP 9(b), because there must be more than vague allegations that, as shown by subsequent business developments, the corporation s true financial picture was not as bright as its annual report claimed and that " s knew, or were reckless in failing to know, this Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, US SC, 2005 (p.516)  s brought securities fraud suit based on claim that the price of the stock on the day of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation Holding:  s claim was insufficient because it failed to state what precisely the  s loss was and the causal connection between " s action and that loss Reasoning: Simply claiming " s misrepresentation artificially inflated the price doesn t indicate what  s actual loss was (inflated price not a relevant economic loss) Has the Twombly court possibly imported Rule 9(b) into Rule 8(a), at least in antitrust cases? 9(f): (time and place): For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material matter Courts often impose heightened pleadings requirements in (1) civil rights claims and (2) complex litigation involving matters such as antitrust violations and securities cases 18. Defendants Turn: Motions and the Answer Three Possible Responses to a Complaint Nothing Consequence: Default judgment Pre-answer motion: Consequences: Delays answer, decision on issue raised by motion ( if nothing else, stops the clock while " can work on an answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion: Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted This is called a demurrer (tests the legal sufficiency of  s claim) Only question asked is whether the complaint itself states a legally sufficient claim Does not resolve factual issues ( pleadings veil ) In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must resole an ambiguities in the pleadings in favor of the nonmoving party Normally  will be given an opportunity to amend a complaint dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) Answer Pre-Answer Motions FRCP 12 Rule 12(b): Waivable defenses must be made in the first pleading possible Rule 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings): " may file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted) later on as Rule 12(c) motion (motion for judgment on the pleadings) A Rule 12(c) motion is a method of attacking the substantive sufficiency of an opposing partys pleading after all the pleadings have been completed Rule 12(d) (motion for a more definite statement): If a pleading to which a responsive pleading responds is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and details desired Rule 12(f) (motion to strike): Because a motion striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and is so often sought by the movant merely as a dilatory tactic, motions under Rule 12(f) (motions to strike) are viewed with disfavor and infrequently granted Rule 12(g): If you want to file a motion under Rule 12(b), you have to do it before your answer, and you can only make one such motion, so youd better put in everything in that initial motion Rule 12(h)(1): You must put your objection to (1) personal jurisdiction, (2) venue, or (3) service of process in the first piece of paper you hand the court, whether its a Rule 12 motion or your answer; otherwise the objection it waived To reiterate: You have to put the objection to personal jurisdiction in the first thing you file with the court; otherwise its waived ( You have to make an objection to personal jurisdiction before the answer if filed (Rule 12(b) defenses must be raised before making the answer) If " asserts lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense in his answer, the defense is preserved and " may request a preliminary hearing under Rule 12(d) Rule 12(h)(2): Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Rule 12(b)(6) motion) is a more durable objection, and you dont have to raise it up front. Notwithstanding any earlier motions (see 12(h)(2)), after youve filed your answer, you can make a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), which can be based on failure to state a claim. Plus, you can always move for summary judgment later. Rule 12(h)(2) tells us which defenses are not easily waivable (can be made pretty much any time): (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (2) failure to join a party indispensable under Rule 19, and (3) failure to state a legal defense to a claim Rule 12(h)(3): Whenever it appears that the court lacks SMJ, the court shall dismiss Lack of SMJ is the Teflon objection. You can raise it at any time, and it cant be waived on direct review (remember Capron) No pleading is allowed in response to an answer ( if the defense raised in an answer seems insufficient,  can file a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings Why make a Rule 12 motion even if you re not likely to succeed? Stops the clock on your time to answer The risk is low, and the reward is huge Answers " has 20 days to file answer unless he waives service of summons, in which case he has 60 days (idea is to incentivize " to waive service of summons) FRCP 8(b) (defenses; form of denials): What the answer needs to include: Answer-by-answer response to the claim Certain affirmative defenses Certain compulsory counterclaims Three options " has to respond to allegations in  s complaint: Admit Deny State there is insufficient information to respond at this time (has the effect of a denial) In a responsive pleading that is required, averments not denied are admitted (except for averments as to amount of damages) To avoid an unintended admission, " s often add all-inclusive paragraph in their answers denying each averment of complaint unless otherwise admitted If a party has insufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, it shall state as much (and this has the effect of a denial) A party may offer a general denial of everything the opposing party avers General denials disfavored today Zelinski v. Philadelpha Piers, Inc., E.D.PA, 1956 (p.541)  alleged a forklift (1) owned, (2) operated, and (3) controlled by " (PPI) negligently struck and injured him " made general denial, which was accurate but misleading b/c " in fact owned the forklift, but wasn t operating or controlling it  didn t learn forklift wasn t operated or controlled by " until two years into the litigation, by which point the S/L had run on  s potential claim against CCI (the operator and controller of the forklift) Holding: " PPI estopped from raising defense at trial that they neither operated nor controlled the forklift Reasoning: Court worried that the insurance company running the defense (which insured both " PPI and true owner and operator CCI) had made a general denial in bad faith in order to mislead  so  wouldn t realize his mistake until the S/L had run Tyler: BUT, does all the pleading fault in this case really lie with "? Shouldn t some of it lie with ? You could say  erred in drafting the pleading by including multiple assertions in a single paragraph (  should have made allegations of (1) ownership, (2) operation, and (3) control separately IMPORTANT LESSON: In pleading you need to be very careful about breaking out your specific allegations and denials Affirmative defense: A defense that doesnt meet the merits of the complaint, but instead say regardless of whether the allegation in the complaint are true, this is a separate reason why " should prevail Rule 8(c): Affirmative defenses shall be included in the answer, or they risk being waived If, however, a party has mistakenly designated an affirmative defense as a counterclaim (or a counterclaim as a defense), the court may, if justice so requires, treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation Ingraham v. US, 5th Cir., 1987 (p.546) After  won judgment, " (US government) wanted to reduce the damages awarded under a TX damages cap law that it had not raised at trial Holding: " not allowed to raise TX law to reduce damages because to do so would constitute an  unfair surprise to , b/c had  known the statute would be applied,  would have made greater efforts to prove damages that were not subject to the statutory limit Reasoning: The main issue here is notice  needs sufficient notice to respond to an affirmative defense, and after judgment is way too late to raise an affirmative defense IMPORTANT: Had " raised the TX cap law at trial, court would likely have allowed it under FRCP (see Lucas) IMPORTANT: You need to preserve an affirmative defenses in your answer or you risk waiving it I.e., if you fail to file an affirmative defense, and fail to raise it at trial, it may be lost Nonetheless, you can amend your answer to include the affirmative defense later if you can show the court that the  will be able to meaningfully respond (i.e., that s it not prejudicial to the  ( that it s not an  unfair surprise ) This is called a  constructive amendment Compulsory counterclaim: A counterclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence of the opposing party s claim Rule 13(?): " must include compulsory counterclaims in his response, or he waives them " may also file a permissive counterclaim Replies are rare, but if " files a counterclaim with his answer  has to file a reply to " s answer A party may state as many claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency 19. Dismissal and Amendment Dismissal FRCP 41 (dismissal of actions) Rule 41(a):  can dismiss without prejudice anytime before an answer or a motion for summary judgment is filed by the " Exception: Notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits when filed by a  who has once been dismissed in an action based on or including the same claim If  dismisses after filing of answer, then dismissal is with prejudice Rule 41(d): If  brings again an action previously dismissed, the court may order the  to pay the costs of the action previously dismissed (and stay the proceedings until the  has complied with this order) Why  might dismiss his case: Might not like the judge he drew Might want to get his ducks in better order Might worry hes filed a sanctionable complaint Amendments Amendment policy under FRCP is quite lax (since FRCP deemphasizes pleadings, it allows amendments during discovery) FRCP 15 (amended and supplemental pleadings) Rule 15(a) (amendments): A party may amend the partys pleadings (1) once as a matter of course (matter of right) at any time before a responsive pleadings is served. After a responsive pleading is served, a party may amend its pleading (2) only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires Amendments are quite frequent b/c many parties will learn additional facts (e.g., that they have additional claims) during discovery Rule 15(b) (amendments to conform to the evidence): If evidence is raised at trial not within the pleadings, the pleadings may be amended to include that evidence when (3) the other party gives express or implied consent or (4) over the objection of the other party when leave to amend would subserve the merits of the action and thus not be prejudicial to the other party Constructive amendment: Where an issue is raised in the litigation and the other party is determined to have expressly or impliedly consented to litigating that issue, theres no formal amendment, but its treated as though there has been a constructive amendment during the pleadings Moore v. Moore, DC Cir., 1978 (p.554) Reasoning: The clearest indications of implied consent are (1) failure to object to evidence or (2) the introduction of evidence clearly related to the new issue but not to other matters specified in the pleadings I.e., if your opponent raises evidence not related to the pleadings, watch out/object, and be very careful when you yourself raise evidence not in the pleadings b/c you may inadvertently consent to an issue not in the pleadings Beeck v. Aquaslide N Dave Corp. 8th Cir., 1977 (p.551)  injured in slide accident, sues " " admits in answer it manufactured slide, then after S/L had run " discovered it hadn t manufactured slide and sought to amend its answer Holding: " allowed to amend answer b/c no evidence of bad faith on part of " and finding that amendment would  prejudice  requires assuming " would (1) prevail on the issue of manufacture at trial and (2)  would be foreclosed from proceeding against other " s Tyler: This seems like a harsh result, but that s the price you pay for a more liberal amendment policy Rule 15(d) (supplemental pleadings): Upon motion of a party the court may permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented Relation back (deals with issue when a party wants to amend their claim to add a new pary after the S/L has run on that claim): Rule 15(c) (relation back of amendments): Rule 15(c)(1): Relation back occurs if permitted by the law that provides the S/L applicable to the action Rule 15(c)(2) (adding a new claim against the same "): If you re not adding a new party but merely adding a new claim against the same " after the S/L has run (must be part of the same  conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original claim), the new claim will be treated as having been filed on the same date as the original pleading Rule 15(c)(3) (adding a new "): An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when the amendment changes the party if: (1) The claim against the party to be added arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, and (2) Within 120 days of filing the original claim the new party (A) Has received notice of the action so as not to be prejudiced and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party Two issues implicated in 15(c)(3): (A) notice and (B) mistake In Zolinski, relation back probably would have been allowed b/c the insurance company was the same for both parties (and therefore had notice) Worthington v. Wilson, IL, 1992 (p. 557)  files complaint on day S/L expires but doesn t include names of police officers who abused him b/c he didnt know who they were; then after S/L passes wants to amend complaint to include names of the officers Holding: Officers had notice of suit, so desired amendment passes first hurdle. Desired amendment fails second hurdle, however, b/c issue was lack of knowledge/ diligence, not mistake I.e.,  didn t name officers in original suit b/c he didn t know who they were, not because of mistake What  s attorney should have done: Rather than waiting until S/L had nearly passed and suing John Does, sue immediately and begin discovery to find out whom  should sue 20. Responsibilities of the Pleader Responsibilities of the Pleader (FRCP 11) Two goals: Ensure truthful pleadings Deter frivolous litigation Rule 11 applies to all papers filed (and only signed papers filed) Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 9th Cir., 2002 (Handout 9)  sued Mattel for copyright infringement; case patently frivolous b/c a cursory examination of the doll would reveal Mattel copyrighted their doll b/f  claims she copyrighted hers  s attorney misbehaved badly during depositions, meetings with Mattel (threw Barbies across the table), at oral arguments, etc. District Court levied Rule 11 sanctions, noting all of  s attorney s misconduct in its sanctions decision Holding: Sanctions vacated and case remanded b/c appellate court thought it was possible district court  impermissibly intertwined its conclusion about the complaint s frivolity with  s attorney s other misconduct Rule 11 sanctions are limited to papers signed in violation of the Rule. Conduct in depositions; discovery meeting or counsel, oral representations at hearings, and behavior in prior proceedings do not fall under the ambit of the rule. Does not apply to discovery actions Does apply to Rule 11 motions themselves(!) Rule 11(b) (the standard): An attorney or unrepresented party certifies when filing a pleading written motion or other paper that: (1) It is not being filed for an improper purpose (e.g., delay, harassment, or needlessly increasing the cost of litigation) (2) The legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for a change in the law (3) The factual contentions therein have evidentiary support or are likely to have evidentiary support after further investigation (4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted by the evidence, or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief What is frivolous? Where the litigant can point to support for its theories in minority opinions, law review articles, or through consultation with other attorneys, that is relevant (i.e., non-frivlous) Arguments for a change in the law need not be so labeled, but one that is should be viewed with great tolerance under Rule 11 I.e., Rule 11 should not be used to sanction or chill arguments for changes in the law Rule 11 imposes duty on  to  stop, think, investigate before filing pleading ( lawyers need to do their homework before filing claims Continuing obligation: Rule 11 doesn t impose duty to correct pleadings you later learn are erroneous, but does impose obligation not to advocate defense after realizing its false Rule 11s safe harbor Rule 11(c)(1)(A): A motion for sanctions must be served first; then can only be filed with the court 21 days later if the alleged offending party fails to withdraw or correct the submission at issue Basically, for 21 days party is allowed to withdraw the pleading essentially w/o penalty Takes a great deal of the force out of Rule 11 Criticism (Scalia): This allows a  to file a totally frivolous claim with no penalty, while " has to invest time, money, energy filing a Rule 11 motion on what  may later admit is a frivolous claim BUT, Rule 11 (c)(1)(B): Where a court initiates the Rule 11 inquiry, it must issue a show cause order first. The rule does not provide for a safe harbor in such circumstances No safe harbor when the court on its own (sua sponte) files a Rule 11 motion Rule 11 sanctions: Discretionary rather than mandatory Exception: In areas where Congress has specifically said sanctions are mandatory, like securities litigation (28 USC 78u-4, which requires mandatory court review all documents filed to ensure Rule 11 compliance and makes sanctions mandatory if any violations found) May be monetary or non-monetary and should be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of the offending conduct or comparable conduct Purpose: To deter bad conduct, not to compensate the other party (so no longer presumption of attorneys fees) Bridges v. Diesel Service, Inc., E.D.Pa, 1994 (Handout 9)  filed claim under ADA Case law requires that before suing under ADA,  has to have filed claim with EEOC  didn t do this b/c his lawyer didn t do the requisite level of research Holding: Rule 11 sanctions not appropriate b/c not necessary to deter future misconduct.  s lawyer has learned his lesson. COMPARE Walker v. Norwest Corp., 8th Cir., 1997 (Handout 9)  brought diversity suit that lacked requisite diversity " notified  diversity was lacking, but  s attorney did nothing Holding: It was  s counsels responsibility to plead the citizenship of the parties. He didnt do this, even after notice that his pleading was defective. Therefore, sanctions were appropriate. Its the lawyer, not the party, who gets sanctioned (unless the party shares some fault) Judges rarely award sanctions under the current iteration of Rule 11 Rule 11 was supposed to complement the lax pleading requirements as a stick for the court to use to deter/prevent frivolous lawsuits Rule 11 in practice: Rule has proved less effective b/c judges today are reluctant to impose Rule 11 sanctions The result is decisions like Twombly, where the court ratchets up the pleadings requirement Nonetheless, the stronger Rule 11 is, the greater the chill on potentially meritorious ligitation Tactical issues: Tyler: Its only appropriate to move for Rule 11 sanctions where other party has committed flagrant violations of the Rule b/c: Judges dont like to hear Rule 11 motions or award sanctions When you file a Rule 11 motion, youre calling the integrity and competency of another member of the bar into question in a public manner ( this should not be done for mere tactical advantage If youre on the receiving end of one of a Rule 11 motion its deeply offensive, even if you end up winning US SC held in Chambers v. Nasco that courts have an inherent power to sanction parties OBTAINING INFORMATION FOR TRIAL 21A. The Scope and Mechanics of Discovery Discovery Once a parties get past the initial pleading stage, they jump headlong into discovery Our pleading regime leaves factual revelation for the discovery phase It follows that discovery in our system is very, very broad Discovery works well in most cases; its only in big, complex cases that it gets out of hand Maybe we should have a loser pays regime to deter parties from bringing frivolous suits in the first place Maybe we should have phased discovery in cases where discovery is a problem (i.e., in the big, complex cases) Judges hate dealing with discovery disputes, so be careful when going to the judge with a discovery dispute The Scope of Discovery FRCP 26(b) (discovery scope and limits): Rule 26(b)(1) (in general): Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party Relevant: Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence Rule 26(b)(2) (limitations): Rule 26(b)(2) allows for some degree of proportionality in the scope of discovery Invokes cost-benefit principles that try both to achieve an optimal level of discovery beyond which discovery would not be cost-effective, and restricts discovery when the dollar amount or values at stake are low Considerations include: (1) a/c, (2) parties resources, (3) likelihood that discovery will uncover useful information Discovery of electronic documents may be limited if searching would prove an undue burden on the party Rule 26(c) (protective orders): Court will issue protective order if theres good cause to do so What constitutes good cause? ( Courts generally require that the moving party demonstrate that disclosure will work a clearly defined and very serious injury (use balancing test to determine whether protective order should be issued) The Mechanics of Discovery Discovery is largely party driven ( parties are encouraged to where possible do discovery without involving the court Rule 26(c): Party cant obtain protective order unless its first conferred with the other party Rule 26(f): Requires pre-trial conference to set discovery plan Also requires parties to confer to consider the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case The parties are always supposed to confer to try to resolve discovery disputes b/f going to the judge Mandatory disclosure: Rule 26(a) (required disclosures): Both parties now required to make initial disclosure to the other sides Mandatory disclosure doesnt necessarily require the documents themselves, only descriptions of categorizations of the documents ( up to the other party to obtain the documents desired through specific requests (Comas v. United Telephone of Kansas) Rule 29(a)(1): Party are required to turn over (or at least describe) four types of information within 14 days of the Rule 26(f) conference: A list of relevant witnesses (including expert witnesses) and how they may be contacted Exception: You dont have to turn over witnesses youre likely to use to impeach the other sides claims Documents supporting your positions, esp. documents (exhibits) youre likely to use to support your claims or defenses IMPORTANT: Parties dont have to turn over documents damaging to their position, only those supporting it Computation of damages Any relevant insurance policies (not admissible at trial) Purpose: Idea is to give both parties a realistic appraisal of the case Rule 26(a) operates as though there are standing requests for this information Requests for admission (FRCP 36) Typcially used for rarely mundane trial matters, to get opposing side to admit to rather mundane things (e.g., place of incorporation, authentication of a photograph) A party that admits something cannot later change its position unless the other party will not be prejudiced thereby Duty to supplement Rule 26(e): You must correct errors or omissions in later disclosures/responses (1) Disclosures and (2) responses to interrogatories, (3) requests for production, and (4) requests for admission must be supplemented if the party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the updated information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties Duty to supplement does not apply to depositions (except expert depositions) If a party fails to make a material supplementation as required by this Rule, he can be sanctioned (see Rule 37) Expert witnesses: Two kinds of expert witnesses: Those you engage and plan to use at trial Rule 26(a)(2)(B): In initial disclosures you must (1) identify the experts you plan to use at trial, (2) disclose their resumes, (3) share the data they used, and (4) provide an extra report The other side has the ability to depose the witness (gives other side chance to see what kind of witness the expert will be at trial) Those you engage but dont plan to use at trial Rule 26(b)(4)(B): Permits discovery of facts and opinions from an expert employed in anticipation of trial but who will not be called to testify only upon a showing of special circumstances Allows you to bury an expert who disagrees with you with you ( other party cant get at the report except under exceptional circumstances Good strategy: Hire expert whom you know disagrees with you so other party cant use him Discovery devices Interrogatories (FRCP 33) Interrogatories: Written questions prepared by one party, delivered to another party, and answered under oath by the other party with the aid of its lawyer Can be used to flesh out the other partys contentions/claims Can ask the other side to preview in greater detail its position Rule 33(a): Presumptive limit of 25 interrogatories per party This is b/c interrogatories are cheap to propound, but expensive to answer Parties cannot evade the presumptive limit by joining as subparts questions that seek information about discrete separate subjects Rule 33(b): Interrogated party has duty to investigate to answer questions propounded You can ask anything in an interrogatory thats fair game under Rule 26(b)(1) (i.e., anything thats relevant as defined in 26(b)(1)) A party has a duty to respond to interrogatories not only on the basis of his own knowledge, but also with regard to the knowledge of other persons that reasonably can be obtained through investigation (attorney, employees, etc.) Rule 33(b)(4) (objections to interrogatories): Objections to interrogatories must be set out with specificity Once party objects to an interrogatory, its up to the propounding party to go to court to compel a response Alternatively, if a party doesnt want to object it can go to court and get a protective order (though it has to confer with the other party first under Rule 26(c)) Rule 33(d) (option to produce business records): If answers to interrogatories can be gleaned from business records, the interrogated party can turn over the records rather than actually going through and finding the answers itself The interrogated party must, however, provide the propounding party with a road map for how to answer the question (document dumping not allowed) Document requests (FRCP 34) Document requests merely identify categories rather than specific documents Rule 34(b) (procedure): A party must respond to a document request within 30 days (unless parties come to some other agreement) If a document request is overly burdensome, the party can go to court to have the request quashed Rule 34(b)(i): Again, party cannot make document dump ( must turn over documents as they are used in the ordinary course of business Document requests are the best method for uncovering smoking gun documents, which are not turned over in initial mandatory disclosures but can be requested through document request Depositions (FRCP 30-32) Rule 30 (oral depositions) Rule 31 (written depositions): Almost never done Deposition: Allows you to take live witness testimony Most interesting and useful form of discovery No opportunity at deposition to reflect and carefully shape the information given Unless full cooperation of nonparty is certain, subpoena is advisable Are public events (anyone can attend) Corporate deposition: Party supplies corporation with subject matter of deposition, and corporation sends a deponent with knowledge of that subject matter Purpose: Discovery (obtaining information) Impeachment at trial of witnesses who testify differently at trial than at deposition (most common use of deposition at trial) At trial, theres greater leeway to enter depositional testimony from the other party Broad rules about who can be deposed (any person, not just a party ( anyone who meets requirements of Rule 26(b)(1)) Limitations: Rule 30(a)(1)(A): The limit for each side 10 depositions, w/o leave of court Rule 30(d)(2): A deposition cannot exceed one day of 7 hours Objections: Rule 30(d)(1): Objections must be made in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner An attorney can object, but the witness still has to answer the question unless it goes to privileged material (i.e., unless theres an applicable privilege) Usu. course is for an attorney to object to a question, for the witness to then answer, and for the party to re-raise the objection at trial if the other party seeks to introduce the objected-to material Counsel interposes objections at deposition to preserve their right to object to another partys use of deposition transcripts at trial ( counsel must object at deposition or they waive the objection if the ground for the objection is one that can be corrected at the time of deposition Deposition strategy Preparing a witness for your side to be deposed by the other side: Give short answers, wait for the other attorney to draw out your answers, dont give the other attorney help When deposing a witness for the other side: Break up/destroy the witnesss ability to tell a clear story, jump around from issues to issue The idea is that if the witness is trying to hide something or be untruthful, jumping around helps you eventually catch them in a lie Physical examinations (FRCP 35) Rare The only form of discovery left under the FRCP pursuant to which you have to get a court order Can only be taken of a party who has put his health at issue Subpoenas (FRCP 45) Used to compel attendance of non-parties Request addressed to non-party must be served through subpoena Rule 45 permits attorney to issue subpoena compelling any person (i.e., nonparties) to give testimony, permit inspection and copying of designated records, etc. 21B. Work Product and Privilege Work Product FRCP 26(b) (discovery scope and its limitations): Rule 26(b)(1) (in general): A party may obtain discovery of any matter not privileged that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party Rule 26(b)(3) (trial preparation; materials): Work-product doctrine: A party may obtain discovery of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial (i.e., of work product) only upon a showing that (1) the party seeking the discovery has substantial need of the preparatory materials and (2) the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means Purpose: To protect attorneys from having to turn over their legal strategy If attorney work product is not protected, attorneys may be loathe to do investigations or put anything down in writing Theres also a concern about turning the attorney into a witness Major concern: Protecting the adversarial nature of our legal system Central tension: How much need must a party show to get at the other partys work product? Rule only speaks to (1) documents and tangible things (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation for trial If lawyer makes no notes of conversation with witness, rule doesnt cover Advisory committee notes say that notes taken in ordinary course of business are not covered unless in certain circumstances Rule mentions articles prepared by clients attorney or someone working for the clients attorney (so, can apply to non-lawyers as well as lawyers) Rule says we need to be especially guarded about turning over material that reflects an attorneys thought processes (mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney) Hickman v. Taylor, US SC, 1947 (p.800) Tugboat sinks; owner employs attorney to prepare for litigation; attorney interviews the survivors and other witnesses in order to ascertain what happened , in interrogatories, asks (1) whether any statements were taken, (2) for the written statements themselves, (3) and if there were oral statements, for the details of the oral reports Attorney turned over names of the witnesses, but not the written statements or oral reports Holding: Attorney doesnt have to turn over documents b/c  has many other options for investigating, including the survivors testimony before a public hearing and by interviewing the survivors and other witnesses themselves. Witnesses written statements could potentially be discoverable on a showing of  good cause  Good cause: If there s no other way of obtaining the information (if, say, the witness is dead) No good cause in this case b/c (1)  wanted statements merely to make sure he wasn t missing anything and (2) the witnesses were easily accessible (court says go do your homework) Witnesses written statements are not as problematic as attorneys notes on the witnesses oral reports b/c dont include the attorneys thought processes Court doesnt rule out possibility of allowing discovery of attorneys notes on the witnesses oral reports, but is very leery of permitting it (bar seems to be pretty high) Reasoning: Concern about protecting the adversarial process: The witnesses whose statements  wanted were freely available. Attorneys need to provide their own side; can t just be lazy. Concern about attorney thought processes: Possibility of turning attorney into a witness if court allows discovery of the attorneys notes on the witnesses oral reports The other sides shouldnt get a preview of the other sides thought processes leading up to the litigation Production of work product may properly be had where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of ones case IMPORTANT: There was no question of a-c privilege b/c the documents at issue were communications between an attorney and third persons, not an attorney and his client Attorney-Client Privilege (a-c privilege) Rule 26(b)(1) says a party may obtain discovery of any matter not privileged that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party ( privilege here refers to absolute privileges Privilege gives a person a right to: Refuse to disclose information theyd otherwise be required to provide BUT, Moloney v. US: You cant refuse to answer in deposition under claim of one particular privilege and then at trial refuse to answer based on a claim of a different privilege ( must be consistent Prevent someone else from disclosing information Refuse to become a witness Attorney-client privilege: Difference from work-product doctrine: Material privileged under a-c privilege enjoys almost absolute protection; work product involves less of an absolute protection Purpose: We dont want discovery to undermine the adversarial role of the lawyer (same as purpose for work-product doctrine) Requirements for a-c privilege to apply: The asserted holder of the privilege is or is sought to be a client The person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar or his subordinate and (b) in connection with the communication was acting as a lawyer The communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (1) by his client (2) without the presence of strangers (3) for the purpose of securing primarily either: An opinion on law or Legal services or Assistance in some legal proceedings, and Not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort The privilege has been (i) claimed and (ii) not waived by the client The privilege is not absolute, though exceptions are rare However, when the privilege applies a court cannot compel disclosure no matter how compelling the need Waiver: Turning over a privileged documents constitutes waiver of all documents related to that subject matter, so you must be very careful not to turn over privileged documents If you mistakenly turn over privileged document and call and tell the other party that its privileged, if they havent looked at it yet they have to destroy it A party must assert the privilege when information is sought and cannot selectively reveal portions of the communication and maintain the privilege for the remainder (if party does this, privilege is waived) Disclosure to nonparties can destroy the privilege Courts tend to construe attorney-client privilege narrowly and resolve doubtful cases against a finding of privilege (b/c it results in suppression of relevant facts) Rule 26(b)(5): (claims of privilege or protection of trial preparation materials): When a party refuses to produce requested discovery material b/c of claims of privilege or protection as trial-preparation material, it shall make the claim (1) expressly and (2) in such a way that the other can assess the applicability of the privilege or protection I.e., you need to create a privilege log setting for the nature of the documents youre withholding w/o actually revealing the contents You need to give the other side enough information to know how valid your refusal to disclose is (failure to comply with this requirement results in loss of protection), but you need to be careful not to describe too much If a (producing) party makes a claim that information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or protection, the receiving party must promptly (1) return, (2) sequester, or (3) destroy the specified information and may not use or disclose it until the claim has been resolved If the receiving party disclosed the information before the claim of privilege or protection was made, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved Upjohn Co. v. US, US SC, 1981 (p.810) " discovered certain of its overseas officials were making bribes, had its general counsel send questionnaires to employees asking about the bribes IRS files subpoena for those questionnaires and any notes or memoranda the general counsel had made in talking to employees and former employees Appellate court holds that a-c privilege doesnt apply under the control group test Control group test: Defines client as the companys control group, so restricts availability of a-c privilege to those officers who play a substantial role in deciding and directing a corporations legal response Holding: Overturns appellate ruling. Rejects control group test. Says a-c privilege applies to all employees of ". IRS can t get documents b/c didn t show substantial need for them. Reasoning: Problems with control group test: Hard to define what precisely the control group is (uncertain) Defeats purpose of a-c privilege. Lawyer needs to know all relevant information from his client in order to know how to defend his client, but control-group doctrine applies a-c privilege only to what happens after an attorney has gathered info from his client A-c privilege exists to protect not only giving of professional advice, but also giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice Control-group doctrine frustrates this purpose by discouraging the communication of relevant info by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice The IRS can still go to the employees and ask the questions themselves Maybe, if accountability should be merged, then privilege should be merged also A-c privilege applies between a businesss attorney and all employees of that business. PROBLEM: What happens when an employee reveals damaging information to employers attorney, and attorney then waives the a-c privilege? Can government then use the disclosed information against the employee? The answer seems to be yes b/c the privilege is held by the client, and the client in this case is the corporation Maybe this suggests companys should have an obligation to suggest to their employees that they get their own lawyers A-c privilege applies not only to giving of professional advice, but also to the clients giving of information to the lawyer to enable the lawyer to give sound and informed advice. A-c privilege only protects disclosure of communications, not disclosure of the underlying facts I.e., because you told something to a lawyer doesnt make the underlying facts privileged (only the communication itself is privileged) IMPORTANT: States dont have to follow Upjohn in their own state law (and many dont) Disclosure of memoranda of oral statements made by witnesses Neither the Hickman nor Upjohn courts rule out disclosure of notes of oral statements made by witnesses to an attorney if a showing of necessity could be made, but does indicate court is very reluctant to turn over that sort of work product 22. Discovery Sanctions FRCP 37 (failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions) Makes sanctions mandatory, and presumption is in favor of attorneys fees (though court has very broad discretion as to what types of sanctions to award) Sanctions ratcheted up when you move from pleadings stage to discovery Rule 37(b): If party fails to produce compelled discovery, court may: Order that matter regarding which the order was made be established in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order Refuse to allow disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses of introduce designated matters into evidence Strike out pleadings, stay further proceedings until order complied with, dismiss action or any part of it, etc. In addition, hold party in contempt of court Order party to pay reasonable expenses to other party caused by the failure (including attorney fees), unless court finds the failure was (1) substantially justified or (2) that other circumstances make an awarding of damages unjust Rule 37(c): A party that fails to disclose is not permitted use the information it fails to disclose during trial, at a hearing, etc., unless the failure to disclose was harmless Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 2nd Cir., 1979 (p.821)  files conspiracy suit against distributors and neighboring theaters  drags its feet for years on " s requests for schematics of its theater, sends over drawings with no dimensions specified (implication is that maybe  isn t getting first-run films b/c its too small) Holding: Court sanctions  s discovery abuses by saying  can t introduce any evidence of damages (sounds death knell of  s claim). IMPORTANT: Client therefore penalized for counsel s malfeasance Discovery certifications: Rule 26 requires every disclosure and discovery request, response, or objection to be signed by an attorney certifying that the disclosure, request, etc. is complete and correct as of the time its made Again, sanctions for violation are mandatory Rule 37 basically penalizes the client for lawyers missteps in the discovery process Discovery abuse: The biggest catalyst for discovery abuse is the so-called American rule, which says unsuccessful litigants do not pay their opponents attorneys fees, even those made necessary by their failure to drop or settle a losing cause Costs of compliance generally borne by the opposing party Parties can inflict enormous costs simply by asking for documents or asking interrogatories (and dont have to ever worry about having to pay those costs themselves) The relatively low cost of seeking discovery, as opposed to high cost of complying with discovery requests/orders encourages all parties (not just  s) to engage in excessive discovery ASCERTAINING THE APPLICABLE LAW 23. Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Constitution The Rules of Decision Act (RDA) (28 USC 1652)  The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of US or acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the US, in cases where they apply Central problem: What does laws of the several states mean? Pre-Erie (the Swift Doctrine) Swift v. Tyson (p.362) T buys land seller doesnt actually own (T doesnt know seller doesnt own the land), pays with check Seller gives Ts check to S to satisfy a debt, T refuses to post payment on the check b/c it was induced by fraud; S sues T in NY federal court for payment of the check Issue: Under the RDA, which law should be applied, NY decisional law (under which T would win), or new English decisional law (under which T would lose)? Swift Doctrine: In a diversity suit, when theres no state statute on the issue (and the issue is not of a local nature), federal courts apply general common law The RDA commands diversity courts to follow to follow only state statutory law, not state decisional law. Absent state statutory law, a diversity court applies general law (i.e., general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence) I.e., diversity courts need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the state as declared by the states highest court, but are instead free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the common law of the state is or should be Problems with the Swift doctrine: Determining line between general and local law was problematic/impossible ( scope of general law constantly widened Federal courts started applying  general law in almost all diversity cases (far beyond mere  commercial law ) State courts persisted in their own opinions on common law, preventing uniformity The Erie Doctrine Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, US SC, 1938 (p.364)  walking along path next to RR in PA struck by object protruding from train, sues in federal court in NY (state of RR s incorporation; this is pre-Shoe)  unlikely to win under PA decisional law, but likely to win under  general law (i.e., majority rule) Issue: Should PA decisional law (NY decisional law said to apply PA decisional law in this case) or general law be applied? RR didnt argue Swift should be overruled (corporations liked Swift), but rather that this was really a case of local law, so under Swift should be governed by PA decisional law Holding: Swift is unconstitutional. Federal government has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state. PA decisional law applies. Reasoning: New research indicates original intent of RofD Act was to apply state statutory and decisional law (Tyler finds this argument unpersuasive) Effects of Swift doctrine have been highly problematic: Leads to forum shopping Brown and Yellow: KY taxi company reincorporates in TN so it can bring a suit in federal court to avoid KY law (which was unfavorable to the taxi companys claim) Lack of uniformity between state and federal decisional law b/c state courts free to ignore federal court pronouncements of general law Result: Swift regime discriminates against in-state " s: " s rights vary according to whether a suit is brought in state or in federal court, and privilege of selecting between state and federal court is conferred upon the  Erie also discriminates against in-state  s: If federal  common law is more favorable to the  than state law, a diverse  can go to federal court to get a more favorable ruling. An in-state , however, cannot do this KEY: Swift regime is unconstitutional b/c (1) leaves state courts free to disregard federal (decisional) law and (2) gives federal courts power to create law outside the parameters laid out in US Const. Art. I Deal struck at Const. Conv. said that federal law enacted through Art. I (the legislative process) and only federal law enacted through Art. I would be supreme over the states I.e., problem with Swift regime was that it (1) carved out a sphere were federal law actually wasnt supreme and (2) allowed federal courts to create federal law outside the process outlined in Art. I Brandeis, as a strong believer in statutory stare decisis, would have left Swift as is had he not thought it was unconstitutional Except in cases governed by the Constitution or acts of Congress, the substantive law to be applied in any case in federal court is the law of the state, whether statutory or decisional I.e., a federal court must apply substantive state law in diversity cases, whether that substantive state law is made by state legislatures or state courts Result: No more federal common law of the type laid out in Swift Some forum shopping still, but now only horizontal (no more vertical) PROBLEM: If federal courts have to follow state substantive but not state procedural law, where does the line between the two fall (see York)? Substance vs. Procedure under Erie Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, US SC, 1945 (p. 372)  complained " had breached its fiduciary duty  files diversity suit in federal court b/c under NY decisional law the S/L has lapsed, but under federal  general law fraud tolls the S/L Issue: Does federal or state law govern? Holding: State law applies b/c that the state S/L is outcome-determinative. (b/c if S/L is applied, case is foreclosed, if not applied, case can proceed) Reasoning: The central point of Erie is that the outcome of a case should be the same whether the case is filed in federal or state court (b/c a federal diversity court is really nothing more than another court of the state), so the question we should ask is whether a rule will determine the outcome of the litigation The way to think about Erie is not substance vs. procedure, but outcome-determinative vs. non-outcome-determinative A federal diversity court must apply a state law if the application of that law is outcome-determinative (i.e., if the outcome of the case is determined by the application or non-application of the law) A procedural rule is outcome-determinative if it would bear on a lawyers decision of whether or not to bring suit in the first place (i.e., outcome-determinative determined with reference to the instigation of the suit) Dissent A federal court isnt a ventriloquist channeling state courts; its its own independent entity Result: Some overlap between substance and procedure ( some procedural rules are outcome-determinative Substance vs. procedure following York ( led people to question whether we could even have FRCP Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial, US SC, 1949 (p.377) NJ law required  in shareholder derivative suit to post a security-for-expenses bond; FRCP did not Holding: FRCP was on point, but court said apply the state law Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., US SC, 1949 (p.378) Holding: Federal diversity court has to follow MS rule that says  can t bring action if not registered in MS Ragan v. Merchants Transfer, US SC, 1949 (p.377) FRCP said in order to toll S/L all you have to do is file complaint; KS law said S/L not tolled until service of process Holding: Federal diversity court has to apply KS law since KS courts would have been closed to  Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., US SC, 1958 (p.379)  is a laborer for a contractor and is injured while working on " s power lines, sues for negligence " claims that under SC law,  is (legally speaking) its employee, so  can t sue for negligence b/c he falls under workers comp Under SC law, the issue of whether  is an employee of " would go to a judge, but under federal law it would go to a jury Holding: Diversity court can apply federal law b/c, while question of whether to send determination of  s employment status to judge or jury may be outcome-determinative, the state hasn t shown that it s rule is bound up with substantive rights created by the workers comp statute, and there are countervailing federal considerations at work (viz., the need for federal court independence in determining its own procedures) Bound up with substantive state rights (i.e., arguably substantive) = necessary to make more meaningful the state substantive rights The South Carolina rule, far from being bound up with substantive state rights, is but a mode of form and enforcement of the South Carolina workers comp law Question of whether to send determination  s employment status to judge or to jury may be seen as outcome-determinative b/c jury probably more inclined to give benefit of the doubt to  There s an independent interest in the federal courts having their own independent uniformity and integrity that needs to be considered when a state rule is not bound up with substantive state rights Byrd balancing test: In determining whether to apply state or federal procedural law, a federal diversity court must determine if the state rule is bound up with substantive state rights. If it is, the federal court must apply the state rule. If it is not, then were outside the core of Erie and the federal court must then balance (1) state interests against (2) the need for federal court uniformity and independence against When we get outside those matters bound up with substantive state-law rights, the balance becomes whether or not to maintain the balance/integrity of the federal system against state interests to the contrary Heron: State laws cannot alter essential character or function of a federal court Result: Rejects York notion that federal courts in diversity suits are like mere extensions of state courts Halts Yorks potentially extreme expansion of Erie (the outcome-determinative test) 24. Erie and the Rules Enabling Act The Rules Enabling Act (REA) (28 USC 2072) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the US district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect. The REA here says federal court rules cant alter substantive aspects of state law Erie and the FRCP Following cases like Ragan, there was a lot of concern over whether or not the FRCP would be valid Hanna v. Plumer, US SC, 1965 (p.385) MA law said that in cases against an executor of an estate, leaving service of process with a person at " s home other than " himself is not okay; FRCP, however, said this would be okay MA policy justification was to ensure executors had notice of cases brought against estates they were executing Issue: Which rule should govern, the state rule or the FRCP? Holding: In light of Eries twin aims (discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws), the difference between the state and federal law is not outcome-determinative, so diversity court may apply the FRCP Not outcome-determinative re: forum shopping b/c difference between the two rules wouldnt have any impact on the choice of the forum (i.e., Eries forum-shopping concern applies ex ante Not outcome-determinative re: equitable administration of the laws b/c " still received proper notice (" s here litigating, after all) I.e., difference between the laws isn t outcome-determinative b/c the state law could have been satisfied Reasoning:  Outcome-determinative is not a talisman, but has to be understood within the twin aims of Erie: (1) discouragement of forum-shopping and (2) avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws I.e., we need to apply the outcome-determinative test in light of these twin aims IMPORTANT: Theres a direct clash between a federal and a state rule here, but the difference with Erie is that the federal rule here was made pursuant to a grant by Congress (exercising its powers under Art. I), not by a judge acting on his own The difference between this case and Erie is the source of the federal rule (Congressional grant vs. judge acting on his own) The RDA doesnt even apply when theres an FRCP on point b/c RDA says except where the Constitution or treaties of US or acts of Congress otherwise require or provide When theres a direct conflict between a federal and a state procedural rule and the federal rule is an FRCP (i.e., when theres an FRCP on point), theres a two-part test (Hanna-line test): (1) Did Congress have authority to promulgate the rule (i.e., is it Constitutional/is it a proper use of Congresss power under the Necessary and Proper Clause?)?, and Congresss power under the Necessary and Proper clause is quite broad ( includes power to regulate federal courts so long as the regulation/rule is rationally capable of classification as procedural (i.e., where procedure and substance overlap) (2) Does the rule violate REA(b), which says FRCP shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right? Summary: Erie does not apply here b/c theres an FRCP on point, which FRCP was promulgated by Congress under its Art. I power and thus has the force and effect of a statute Hanna court seems more concerned with the first question (Constitutional provision) than the second (REA) There are thus two distinct lines of cases: (1) the Erie line (when theres no FRCP on point; when the federal rule is judge-made) and the Hanna line (where there is an FRCP on point; where the federal rule has the force of a statute b/c of how it came into being through a Congressional grant) Difference between the Erie and the Hanna lines when a rule is arguably both substantive and procedural: When were in the Erie line (no FRCP on point; Erie, York, Byrd, Walker) and the state rule is arguably substantive (as determined under the Byrd balancing test), then the state rule is to be applied When were in the Hanna line (when there is an FRCP on point), if a federal rule is arguably procedural (if it looks procedural), then the federal rule is to be applied As long as an FRCP is arguably procedural, it doesnt violate the REA Shibback v. Wilson & Co., US SC, 1941: Court held FRCP 35, which allows physical examination of parties, does not modify a substantive right b/c real question is whether or not the Rule in question dictates a procedure Tyler: This position ignores the fact that an FRCP can be procedural and still modify a substantive right At the end of the day, no FRCP has ever been held invalid (REA(b) seems not to have a great deal of teeth ) Hanna court seems to think that the power to prescribe rules under the REA is the same power as that enjoyed by Congress to create rules under the Necessary and Proper clause (suggests Hanna court doesnt take REA(b) very seriously) Tyler This seems to read (b) out of the REA, and this is problematic Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., US SC, 1980 (p.395) Case is identical to Ragan:  brings suit three days before expiration of S/L, but takes more than 60 days after filing suit to serve process Under OK law  s action is barred b/c service of process within 60 days required to toll the S/LUnder Under FRCP, though, case can still go forward Holding: FRCP doesnt cover this situation b/c Rule 3 only governs the commencement of cases and doesnt say anything expressly about tolling the S/L (i.e., were outside the four corners of Rule 3). Thus, we look to Erie, which tells us to apply the state rule IMPORTANT: This narrow interpretation of Rule 3 turns on the SMJ (diversity vs. federal question) ( In a similar case brought under federal question jurisdiction, the court said Rule 3 did toll the S/L Twin aims of Erie loom in diversity cases (b/c of federalism issues), but not federal question cases ( affect SC interpretation of FRCP in diversity cases but not federal question cases If an FRCP doesnt govern or directly speak to a situation, then theres not a direct conflict between the federal and the state rule, and Erie applies I.e., Hanna only applies when the FRCP and state rule at issue directly conflict Why the court reached this conclusion: Perhaps wanted to avoid conflict between the FRCP and state rules, so construes the FRCP narrowly here Perhaps concerned about interpreting REA to be self-defeating (when you invalidate an FRCP under REA(b) you basically contravene REA(a), so maybe court really concerned about making sure REA(b) doesnt undercut REA(a) too much) Erie in Summary (how it all comes together) There are two lines of cases: (1) the Erie line and (2) the Hanna line Figuring out which line youre in depends on the source of the federal rule at issue Erie line: Judge-made rule Hanna line: Congressional grant (FRCP) Hanna line: When a rule promulgated pursuant to a grant of Congress directly conflicts with a state rule, were in the Hanna line, which says the FRCP governs under the Supremacy Clause Erie line: BUT, when (1) theres not a direct conflict between an FRCP and a state rule (2) or when theres a direct conflict between a federal judge-made rule and a state rule, were in the Erie line, which says a federal court must apply the state rule if its substantive How to determine whether the state or federal rule applies in an Erie-line case (Byrd): Where the state rule the litigant seeks to have the federal court apply is bound up with substantive state rights, Erie says that the substantive state rule that is so bound up must apply Bound up with substantive state rights (i.e., arguably substantive) = necessary to make more meaningful the state substantive rights BUT, where the state rule is not bound up with substantive state rights and theres a direct conflict between a judge-made federal rule and a state rule, the diversity court needs to balance state interests against the federal courts interest in integrity and independence Reverse Erie: The opposite holds true for federal question cases litigated in state courts (i.e., when a federal question case is litigated in a state court, the state court must follow the federal rule, even if judge-made, if the federal rule is bound up with substantive federal rights) What do when youre in the gray area between substance and procedure: When were in the Erie line, the federal court must apply a state rule if the state rule is arguably substantive (i.e., bound up with substantive state rights) Glannon: A diversity court in an Erie-line case should choose the state rule if the difference between it and the federal practice could prove outcome-determinative, in the sense that following a separate federal practice could lead to (1) forum shopping (prospectively) or (2) inequitable administration of the laws) (meaning of arguably substantive). Otherwise, it may follow the federal rule. When were in the Hanna line, the federal court must apply an FRCP if the FRCP is arguably procedural Glannon: Two-part test under Hanna line: 1. Is the FRCP arguably procedural? 2. Does the FRCP pass muster under REA sub2: Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right NOTE: If the federal rule is a congressional statute, not an FRCP (which is promulgated by the US SC), it must only be arguably procedural (read, constitutional), and sub2 of the REA does not apply 25. Applying Erie and Ascertaining State Law Determining the relevant state law How does the diversity court determine what the relevant state law is? Subsumed within this question are two major issues: Which states laws should the diversity court apply? And once we get past that hurdle, what is the state law on point? Which states law? Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg.: Federal courts must apply the choice-of-law regime of the courts of the states in which they sit What if the case is transferred? Van Dusen v. Barrack: If a diversity case is transferred, choice-of-law regime of the state in which the suit is filed still applies (to the extent the first court had jurisdiction over the state) What is the states law? This is a problematic question b/c: There may be no state law on point There may be a state decision on point, but it may be old and there may be an indication that if the state court was put to the question, it would reverse the earlier decision Methods a diversity court can use to determine the state law: Predictive model: Try to predict how the state SC would rule on the issue, and apply that law E.g., Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 1st Cir., 1957 (p.418)  brings tort suit in diversity court alleging product defect Old MS case on point says privity of contract required for injured consumer to sue for product defect Holding: (predictive model): If the MS SC ruled on the privity of contract issue today, it would probably reverse the earlier decision and not require privity of contract, so privity of contract not required PROBLEM: 1st Circuit looks to other jurisdictions to see what the most common law today is ( isnt this like the Swift regime? Erie says federal courts are to apply state law, not declare what it is, and arguably thats what the predictive model does Abstention: Diversity court permanently stays or dismisses proceedings, telling parties it doesnt want to overreach PROBLEM: If you have a rule that says the diversity court should abstain every time its not clear what the law is, the exception could swallow the rule (i.e., frustrate the whole original purpose behind diversity jurisdiction) Does a court really have the right to decline jurisdiction given to it? Certification: Diversity court stays proceedings to ask the state SC what rule or law would apply PROBLEMS: (1) Not every state provides for certification, (2) state courts are busy and thus dont always have time or wherewithal to answer certification question, (3) delays decision, and (4) its hard to formulate questions in the right way (hard to decide questions in the abstract) Tyler: This is the best option b/c it avoids the tension between Erie and the diversity courts desire to say what the law is (predictive model), but doesnt for the diversity court to apply outdated law (static model) ADJUDICATION BEFORE TRIAL 26. Summary Judgment Summary Judgment Unlike Rule 12 motions to dismiss (12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions, summary judgment motions allow the parties to pierce the pleadings to have the court decide whether there was a triable issue of fact (Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions look only to the pleadings) Key question: Is there a genuine issue of material fact in dispute? Do we need to have a trial? (i.e., is there a factual dispure?) If no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, we dont need to have a trial Material fact: A fact which will affect the outcome of the case ( a material fact raises a genuine issue if a reasonable jury could reach different conclusions concerning the fact FRCP 56 (Summary judgment): Rule 56(c): Movant argues there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law I.e., movant argues that on the record established at the time of the motion, he will win, and nothing a trial could uncover could change that Anderson v. Liberty Lobby: The determination of whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to that case I.e., the question to ask in a summary judgment motion is whether the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury applying the required evidentiary standard (preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, etc.) could reasonably find for either the  or the ", or has to find for the moving party Matsushita: The presence or absence of a motive is relevant to a summary judgment motion Policy question: Should we send matters to the jury and let the jury be the fact-finder or should have a robust screening-mechanism (summary judgment) for rooting out nonmeritorious claims? Tylers Chart Proponent Opponent | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | W X Y Z (1) Issue (1) is a critical fact movant must show to win his case (i..e., a material fact) A genuine issue of material fact exists when were in X-Y (i.e., we need to be in X-Y in order for the case to go to the jury The proponent must get beyond X in order to get to the jury When we ask if were in X-Y, were asking if we should have a trial More specifically, were asking if theres enough in the record that the party with the burden of proof should be allowed to put the issue to the jury (or should as a matter of law the judge take the question away from the jury) To get to X-Y, proponent has to meet the burden of production (to win the case, proponent then must meet/win burden of persuasion) To meet the burden of production, proponent must come forward with enough evidence such that a reasonable fact-finder could find in his favor Summary judgment and burden of proof (Celotex) Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., US SC, 1970 (p.868)  files civil rights suit, claims police and store engaged in conspiracy to refuse her service b/c she attempted to dine with people of a different race " store moves for summary judgment, supplies affidavits from store manager and arresting officer denying existence of a conspiracy  responds with evidence that would be inadmissible at trial Holding: Summary judgment refused b/c " failed to meet its burden (failed to foreclose possibility that a police officer was in the store). B/c " failed to meet its initial burden, court doesn t even look at  s evidence. Court basically asks " to prove a negative ( very difficult to do (very high standard) Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, US SC, 1986 (p.870)  s husband died exposure to asbestos,  sues asbestos manufacturer " moves for summary judgment, offers nothing to disprove exposure, only points out  lacks evidence to support its claim  responds with evidence that would be inadmissible at trial Holding: B/c  carries burden of production, " can discharge its burden in summary judgment motion merely by pointing out to court that  lacks sufficient evidence to prove her case (doesn t have to actually prove impossibility of other sides claim) IMPORTANT: Focuses on question of which party carries burden(s) of production and persuasion When the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial, the court should look at what the non-moving party actually has (opposite of Adickes) Comparing Adickes and Celotex: Adickes court says movant (") has to show affirmative evidence to get to all the way to W-X ( " has to show evidence proving police officer wasn t in the store) Celotex court says movant (") only needs to show  doesn t have enough evidence to get out of W-X In both cases, the burden of production lies with the , yet the Adickes and Celotex courts require different things of the movant (") Celotex court much more favorable towards allowing summary judgment Why the difference in the cases? Adickes deals with civil rights in MS in 1964, so court wants high standard before " can dismiss Responding to a summary judgment motion: To rebut movant s summary judgment motion, nonmovant has to show there is a triable issue of material fact (i.e., has to get to X-Y) Rule 56(e): Nonmovant cant just point to his pleadings to rebut a summary judgment motion Rule 56(f): Nonmovant must set forth the type of discovery it expects will demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact The Celotex standard (depends on who has the burden of proof at trial): (1) If the moving party has the burden of proof at trial (usu., if movant is ): The moving party must get all the way to Y-Z (show a jury will have to rule in his favor) (2) If the moving party does not have burden of proof of trial (usu., if movant is ") The moving party must show that the nonmovant () has never gotten out of W-X (i.e., doesn t have anything to get to X-Y). He can do this either by: (a) Showing the opposite of the disputed issue (1) (i.e., offering affirmative evidence to get all the way to W-X), or (b) Showing  lacks sufficient evidence to support the disputed issue (1) (showing  hasn t ever gotten out of W-X ( i.e., that  lacks sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find in his favor) Celotex court is unclear on whether " in this case must do more than merely say  has nothing Tyler: The  in Celotex never got out of W-X ( simply waving an inadmissible document and citing a witness without saying what he ll testify on the critical issue doesn t get us out of W-X Tyler: Celotex is the better standard; court should look at who has the burden of proof when asking whether there should be a trial Summary Judgment and Demeanor Evidence Cole Porter case: Songwriter sues Porter, alleging Porter stole his songs and passed them off as his own  has no evidence that Porter ever heard his music " moves for summary judgment,  resists on basis that when Porter gets on the stand and says he s never heard  s music, jury won t believe Porter so  will win Holding: Summary judgment motion dismissed b/c Porter s credibility is vital here Dissent: Cross-examination cannot constitute the entire basis of a case without other affirmative evidence (Porter already offered categorical denial at deposition) TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL 27. Introduction: The Pre-Trial Conference and Trial Procedure The Pretrial Conference Judge as manager rather than detached person sitting on high ruling only on difficult matters of law Pros: Leads to greater efficiency Cons: Judge may show his hand, attorney who bucks a judges suggestions (esp. settlement suggestions) during the pretrial phase may invoke the displeasure of the judge FRCP 16 (Pretrial conferences) Rule 16(b): Judge tasked with issuing a schedule for a pretrial conference Rule 16(c): Gives judge managerial role over deciding what the pretrial conference will be about (judge can stipulate matters for discussion, narrow issues, try to streamline matters generally) Judge given power to encourage parties to reach settlement Rule 16(f): Gives judge power to impose sanctions if party/partys attorney (1) fails to appear at pretrial conference, (2) is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or (3) fails to participate in good faith in the conference Implicitly, this gives a judge power to impose sanctions for partys failure to negotiate in good faith in settlement proceedings PROBLEMS: (1) Judge with busy docket may try to force settlement of nonmeritorious claim, (2) judge may begin trial biased b/c knows zone of settlement/which party has stronger case Kothe v. 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hB6hBhB5>*hBhBhho5>*hBhB5hBhB56hhohho5>*0ΏЏޏrvQRҒӒגޒ3jl &Z`ʕ̕0JXZ`lLftvʘ̧̧̘̠̠ h1Qh1Qh1Qh1Q>*h&h&5>* h&6>* h&>* h&h&h1Qh1Q5>*h& h1Q6h1Qh1QhJ5>*hJ hJ6hJhJ5>*:RӒl ̕DƜȜ:Ngdv & FBgdE & FBgdEgdE & F@gd& & F@gd& & F@gd& & F@gd& & F@gd1Q & F@gd1Q & F@gdJ̘ΘBDNdrț̛ڛĜƜ,8:LN!ՠ԰{mh<05B*CJ0aJ0phhp5B*CJ0aJ0phhvhEhE56>*hE hE6hE56>* hE5>*hEh&5>* jh1Qh1Q h1Q6h1Qh&5>*h& h&6h&h1Q5>*h1Qh1Q>* h&>* jh&h&>*'֠נ/^}ȢţAF$%0&v&&l' & FBgdeQB & FBgdn & FBgdn & FBgdn & FBgdp & FBgdeQB & FBgdpgdpgd<0$a$gd<0ՠ֠נ./]^|}ǢȢ(ģţ@A$ $$$D$F$%˚|rprh^hhnhn5H*hnhn5Uhnhn56hphn5>*hnhp5>*hnhn5>*hnhpheQB5>*heQBheQB5>*heQBheQBhp5>*hp hp5>*hphp5>*h<05>*B*CJ$aJ$phh<05B*CJ0aJ0phhv5B*CJ0aJ0ph$Smith, 2nd Cir., 1985 (Handout 9A) Judge encourages parties to settle for $20,000-30,000, warned that if parties settled for a comparable figure after trial began, he d impose sanctions on the  dilatory party After day one of trial, when  testified, parties settled for $20,000 Judge imposes sanctions on " alone Holding: Judge abused his power in imposing sanctions Pressure tactics by judges to coerce settlements are not permissible Reasoning: It s not unusual at all for a " to change his perception of a case based on  s performance on the witness stand (witness performance plays an important role in litigation) The Trial Process Right to a jury: VII Amend. guarantees right to a jury in civil cases when a/c exceeds $20 VII Amend. doesn't protect right to jury in all cases, only those in which it was available under common law rules in 1791 SC has not read XIV Amend. to incorporate the VII Amendment to the states In federal court the right to a jury can be waived FRCP 38(d) A party must make a formal demand for a jury; otherwise, that party waives his right to a jury Admissibility of evidence: Rules of evidence governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence R402: Relevant evidence is admissible Exceptions: (1) Non-expert opinion, (2) hearsay (out-of-court statements that cant be verified in court Except in rare circumstances, no proffered item of evidence will be excluded unless the opposing party objects to its introduction As a result, an attorney will often offer otherwise inadmissible evidence in the hope that it will not be challenged In many instances, an attorney is well advised not to challenge inadmissible evidence that is not seriously prejudicial (b/c attorney doesnt want to antagonize the judge or jury) Burden(s) of proof: Burden of production (burden of going forward): The minimum amount of evidence needed to satisfy the standard of proof and thus win the case One has met burden of production if one has produced enough evidence for a reasonable jury to decide in ones favor Burden of production must be met to get to trier of fact (jury) Usually placed on  Burden of persuasion: Burdened party must persuade trier of fact that its evidence is weightier than the other party s, i.e., that it s side is  true Again, usually placed on  Standards for meeting the burden of persuasion: Preponderance of the evidence (more than 50-50): usual burden of persuasion required in civil actions Clear and convincing evidence: Required in libel, slander, and child custody proceedings Beyond a reasonable doubt: Used in all criminal proceedings Shifting burdens: Usually the burdens of production and persuasion fall on same party, but not always ( when they dont, burden of persuasion shifts from one party to the other E.g., employment discrimination cases under Title VII of Civil Rights Act:  has burden of production (must produce enough evidence to get to trial), but " has burden of persuasion (must prove by clear and convincing evidence that firing was not race-related) Types of jury verdicts: General verdict: Judge asks jury to determine liability (or guilt) General verdict with interrogatories: Judge can ask for general verdict but also give interrogatories for the jury to answer Special verdict: Judge asks jury to answer specific questions 28. Judgment as a Matter of Law and New Trial Motions Judgment as a Matter of Law Terminology: Directed verdict = judgment as a matter of law Can be made anytime before case has been submitted to the jury Judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v) = renewed judgment as a matter of law Made after the jurys come back with a verdict Standard: Same as the standard for summary judgment (Are we in X-Y?), just at a different point in the proceedings Summary judgment motions typically made before trial (Should this case go to trial? Judgment as a matter of law motions made after parties have presented their cases (Should we let the fact finder (jury) decide this case?) FRCP 50(a): If a party has been fully heard on an issue during jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (1) Resolve the issue against the party, or (2) Grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law if the non-moving partys case depends on that issue being resolved in their favor So, standard is whether theres a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party on the issue Central question: Is it a case such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the party with the burden of proof? Lavender v. Kurn, US SC, 1946 (p.50)  killed in RR switchyard, unclear whether killed by " s RR or hobos in the area Jury finds for , " moves for renewed judgment as a matter of law (j.n.o.v.) Holding: Since there was enough evidence for a jury to infer the " was responsible for  s death, case should go to a jury. Motion denied IMPORTANT: The relevant question is not  Do we know for sure what happened? but rather  Shoud we send this case to a jury? In deciding judgments as a matter of law, the relevant questions are (1)  What s the burden of proof? and (2)  Has  come forward with enough evidence to meet its burden of production such that the case should go to a jury? Tyler: This is the same legal standard as summary judgment, and cases in other contexts (e.g., Matsushita) suggest mere speculation isn t enough to send the case to the jury Tyler: There s a significant gap in  s evidence, but FELA is a very pro- statute (thus, be careful about how broadly the Lavender standard applies) If you re  s lawyer in a case like this, the whole idea is to get to the jury ( if  can get to the jury,  back up the truck ( s going to get a huge verdict) Judgment as a matter of law and the Constitution Galloway v. US, US SC, 1943 (p.961) Issue: Does a judges taking away a case from the jury contravene the VII Amend. right to a jury trial? Holding: Judgments as a matter of law dont violate the jury guarantee of the VII Amend. Dissent (Black): Granting of a new trial is less problematic than granting judgment as a matter of law b/c granting of new trials was permissible at the time the VII Amend. was adopted IMPORTANT?: This case is all dicta (the VII Amend. doesnt apply to state governments) Judgment as a matter of law & Renewed Judgment as a matter of law QUESTION: If at end of trial " moves for judgment as a matter of law and it s a close question, is it better for a judge to grant judgment as a matter or law or let the case go to a jury? ANSWER: It s better to send the case to a jury and grant a renewed judgment as a matter of law only if necessary, b/c: If appellate court reverses judges decision it can merely reinstate the jury verdict, rather than having to grant a whole new trial For this reason some would argue a judge should never grant a judgment as a matter of law b/c if hes reversed on appeal there will have to be a whole new trial An appellate court is far less likely to overturn a jury verdict than a judgment as a matter of law by a judge Moving for renewed judgment as a matter of law FRCP 50(b): A party may make move for renewed judgment as a matter of law only if that party moved for judgment as a matter of law (directed verdict) at the close of all the evidence (must be filed within ten days of entry of judgment on the jurys verdict) (grounds must be the same as in the original motion for judgment as a matter of law ( cant sandbag the other party) I.e., in order to reserve his right to move for j.n.o.v., a party needs to moves for a directed verdict before the case goes to a jury Under Rule 50(b), even if a pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied, there is an automatic reservation of decision by the court Typically, a party will move for judgment as a matter of law before the case goes to the jury, the court will reserve judgment on the motion, and then after the verdict the party will move for a renewed judgment as a matter of law The party who lost before the jury will almost always move for both j.n.o.v. and for a new trial Motion for a New Trial Its easier to win a motion for a new trial than a motion for j.n.o.v. FRCP 59(d): A judge may order a new trial on his own initiative (standard not laid out ( Rule only says decision to order new trial should be made on the traditional grounds) (must be filed within ten days of entry of judgment on the jurys verdict) Traditional ground for granting a new trial: If extremely prejudicial evidence was improperly admitted (i.e., procedural errors) If the jury has handed down an inconsistent verdict Where the judge believes the verdict is against the weight of the evidence Even if a judge could not have taken a case away from the jury as a matter of law (i.e., were in X-Y), if a judge believes the weight of the evidence is strong against the jury verdict, the judge may order a new trial in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice (see, e.g., Yeats, Marsh) In cases of erroneous jury verdicts, generally If a judge believes damages are excessive in light of the evidence, the judge can tell  either to accept remitted (lessened) damages or grant a new trial FRCP 61: Where there was error during a trial but it was harmless (i.e., where it could not have affected the jurys verdict), the judge should not grant a new trial Reversible error: A legal mistake at the trial court level which is so significant (resulted in an improper judgment) that the judgment must be reversed by the appellate court. A reversible error is distinguished from an error which is minor (harmless) or did not contribute to the judgment at the trial. IMPORTANT difference between standards for judgment as a matter of law and decisions to grant a new trial: Where theres substantial evidence for  s case, the judge may not direct a verdict, even though he doesn t believe the evidence or thinks the weight of the evidence is on the other side (b/c of the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury) I.e., in deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a judge must utterly disregard his own views and consider the non-movants evidence in the most favorable light A judge may set aside a verdict even if its supported by substantial evidence where in his opinion it is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence or is based upon false evidence (b/c judge has duty to prevent miscarriage of justice) So, judge has more discretion in granting a new trial than in directing a verdict or granting j.n.o.v. Allowing a judge to set aside a verdict and order a new trial serves as a check on the jury system and ensures result is not merely legally acceptable, but also not manifestly unjust Appellate courts rarely overturn judges decisions about whether or not to grant a new trial Relief from Judgment FRCP 60 (relief from judgment or order): Allows relief from judgment in a narrow range of cases Grounds for relief: No time limit: (1) clerical mistakes, (2) void judgment, (3) satisfied or discharged judgment, (4) any other reason justifying relief for judgment One-year time limit after judgment entered: (5) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (6) newly discovered evidence not discoverable in time to move for trial under FRCP 59(b), (7) fraud or misrepresentation or misconduct of adverse party These bases for relief are construed very narrowly Only very rarely granted PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS OF JUDGMENTS Claim preclusion and issue preclusion: Terminology Claim preclusion (res judicata): A valid final adjudication of a claim precludes a second action on that claim or any part of it Claim preclusion encompasses claims that werent litigated in an earlier suit but could or should have been b/c they arose from the same transaction or occurrence Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel): An issue of fact or law, actually litigated and resolved by a valid final judgment, binds the parties in a subsequent action, whether on the same or a different claim Claim: Today, considered to be coterminous with the transaction at issue (the transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or entity which may not be split) regardless of: (1) The number of theories of recovery that may be available to , (2) The number of primary rights that may have been invaded, or (3) The variations in the evidence needed to support those theories or rights Difference between claim and issue preclusion: Claim preclusion sweeps more broadly than issue preclusion b/c claim preclusion applies to all legal theories that could or should (might) have been raised in the first suit, whereas issue preclusion applies only to issues that were actually litigated and decided and essential to the final judgment of the earlier suit IMPORTANT: A party may waive the benefits of preclusion by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense in the second suit 29. Claim Preclusion Claim preclusion Claim preclusion (res judicata): A valid final adjudication of a claim precludes a second action on that claim or any part of it Requirements to trigger claim preclusion: (1) The prior judgment must have been final, valid, and on the merits NOTE: Dismissal for failure to prosecute a suit or a for default are considered to be on the merits (note that they are not sufficient for issue preclusion b/c issue preclusion requires that the issues be actually litigated) (2) The parties in the subsequent action must be identical to those in the first (3) The claim in the second suit must involve matters properly considered included in the first action The transactional test (defining claim) The key question we ask in whether claim preclusion lies is, What constitutes a claim? Hypo 1: A and B get in a car accident; A sues B for all the damage done to As car in the accident; can A now in a follow-on lawsuit sue B for injuries to her person resulting from the accident? Hypo 2: Accident took place on Boylston St; B gets out of his car and gets pretty worked up and hurls insults at A; A feels defamed; A brings first suit for damages and injuries; can A bring second suit for defamation? Yes: Its a different cause of action No: The defamation was part of the same transaction Transactional test: In a suit, a party must bring all claims deriving from the same transaction(s) or occurrence(s) (i.e., the same common nucleus of operative fact) that form the basis of the suit; any claims deriving from that same common nucleus of operative fact brought in a later suit will be precluded Very broad rule ( idea is to incentivize the party to litigate all their claims at once rather than bringing follow-on suits Strong interest in ensuring finality of decision Remember Iowa Homestead: Though everyone agreed after the fact that there was no SMJ in the first case, the court refused to allow a new case on the same matter in the interests of finality) IMPORTANT: Though FRCP 18 makes joinder of claims permissive (Rule 18(a) says a  may join additional claims), the transactional test makes joinder of claims compulsory when those claims arise out of the same common nucleus of operative fact Mathews v. NY Racing Assoc., Inc., USDC SDNY, 1961 (p.1121)  kicked out of racetrack, sues for assault and libel, loses  then brings follow-on suit for false arrest and malicious prosecution Holding: For ", b/c  s second lawsuit, while asserting different theories for recovery, is based on the same incident as the first suit A party may not bring a follow-on suit based on the same transaction or occurrence as the earlier suit merely by asserting a different reason (legal theory) for recovery Transaction and occurrence: we see this language in Gibbs (supplemental jurisdiction) and FRCP 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims) Concern with claim preclusion and toxic torts: Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, if a victim brings suit to recover the initial medical expenses of a disease caused by a toxic tort, she cannot sue later should another disease materialize b/c the subsequent disease is viewed as part of the initial cause of action Claim preclusion and procedure (collateral attack vs. direct appeal) The preclusive effects of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits are not altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on principles subsequently overruled (Moitie) Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, US SC 1981 (Handout 9B) 7 private parties bring price-fixing claims under federal law against Macys in federal court; trial judge dismisses claims on a Rule 12(b)(6) 5 of the 7 parties appeal the dismissal, and win; claims remanded for trial 2 of the 7 instead file new suits (Moitie II) in state court under state claims; Macys removes case to federal court and argues claim preclusion Holding: The earlier dismissal precludes the 2  s new state-claim action b/c the state claims are based on the same transactions as the initial federal claims. That the first suit was erroneously dismissed is irrelevant I.e., the avenue for challenge an erroneous decision is direct appeal, not trying to refile the suit by framing the issues differently A judgment voidable b/c it was based on an erroneous view of the law is (1) not open to collateral attack and (2) can be corrected only by a direct review, not by bringing another suit upon the same cause of action Implication: If you can bring federal and state claims together (under supplemental jurisdiction) but only bring the federal claim (or vice versa), youre precluded from later bringing the state claims Rinehart v. Locke, 7th Cir., 1971 (Handout 9C)  brings civil rights claim, thrown out on Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to plead lack of probable cause Rather than appealing,  re-files suit, this time alleging lack of probable cause in the complaint Holding:  precluded from bringing follow-on suit b/c dismissal of first suit operated as an adjudication on the merits A dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (12(b)(6) dismissal) constitutes a valid and final adjudication on the merits and has a preclusive effect on follow-on suits Tyler: This decision makes sense since the point of claim preclusion is to encourage the  to  go all out on the first suit (again,  should have appealed dismissal rather than bringing follow-on suit IMPORTANT: Certain valid and final judgments are not preclusive. These include: Dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, or non- or mis-joinder Decision on the part of  to direct a nonsuit 30. Issue Preclusion Issue preclusion Key question: When can the fact that an issue was determined in a first lawsuit be preclusive in a second lawsuit? Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel): An issue of fact or law, actually litigated and resolved by a valid final judgment, binds the parties in a subsequent action, whether on the same or a different claim Requirements to trigger issue preclusion: (1) Judgment in the first case must have been valid, final, and on the merits (2) Issue raised in the second suit must have been actually litigated in the first action, and must have been decided by the first court NOTE: The burden of establishing that the issue was actually litigated in the first suit falls on the party seeking to invoke preclusion (3) Determination of the issue at must have been necessary to the first courts judgment Issue preclusion and questions of fact Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., IL SC, 1931 (Handout 9D) Little and Blue Goose bus involved in bad car crash Suit 1: Blue Goose sues Little for property damage to the bus before a justice of the peace (j/p), j/p finds Little negligent and Blue Goose not so Blue Goose wins Little appeals the judgment, but appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution Suit 2: Little sues Blue Goose for injuries in city court, Little then dies and wife continues suit NOTE: Under FRCP 13 Littles entire second suit would be precluded b/c his claim against Blue Goose was compulsory in the first suit (was related to the same transaction as Blue Gooses claim in the first suit), but FRCP dont apply here Blue Goose argues issue preclusion b/c j/p in prior suit determined Little was negligent and Blue Goose was not Holding: Littles widow precluded b/c j/p in prior suit decided issue of negligence (fault) and widow is in privity with Litte Privity applies here b/c under IL law widow can collect only if Little could have collected (widow stands in Littles shoes) Issue preclusion extends to persons in privity with the party who would otherwise have been precluded Take-away: This suit looks like Moitie ( Little should have appealed the first suit rather than filing the second suit PROBLEM: How strong was Littles incentive, really, to appeal such a small judgment? RESPONSE: This is the very purpose of issue preclusion, to give Little a strong incentive to go all-out on the first suit rather than bringing a follow-on suit PROBLEM: Little would have been better taking a default judgment on the first suit rather than litigating b/c a default judgment is not a judgment on the merits Little hypos: (1): Suit 1: Blue Goose sues Little alleging negligence and claiming damages resulting from the accident Little wins on a general verdict. Suit 2: Little sues Blue Goose alleging negligence and claiming damages resulting from the accident. QUESTION: Can Dr. Little assert issue preclusion lies in suit #2? ANSWER: No. The jury might have found Blue Goose negligent and thus barred recovery, or it might have found Little not negligent. So, we have no way of knowing if Blue Goose was found negligent in the first suit, so theres no issue preclusion in the first case (2) Suit 1: Blue Goose sues Little alleging negligence and claiming damages resulting from the accident. Jury is given a special verdict, decides that Little and Blue Goose were both negligent, so Little wins under contributory negligence regime. Suit 2: Little sues Blue Goose alleging negligence and claiming damages resulting from the accident. QUESTION: Can Blue Goose assert issue preclusion lies in suit #2? ANSWER: No. The finding that Little was negligent was not essential to judgment in the first case b/c one Blue Goose was found negligent the doctrine of contributory negligence barred recovery Also, Little had no reason to appeal the verdict in Suit 1 b/c he won, so do we really want the finding of negligence on his part in that suit to bar his claim? (3) Suit 1: Blue Goose sues Little alleging negligence and claiming damages resulting from the accident. Jury is given a special verdict, decides that Little was not negligent and Blue Goose was, so Little wins. Suit 2: Little sues Blue Goose alleging negligence and claiming damages resulting from the accident. QUESTION: Is the only issue in suit #2 the amount of damages owed to Little? ANSWER: No. The verdict in the first suit rested on alternative holdings, either one of which would have been sufficient to bar Blue Gooses recovery, so we cannot say that either holding was essential to the resolution of the first suit. General rule (Tyler): When a judgment rests on alternative holdings, neither holding has a preclusive effect on later suits. In some jurisdictions, however, when a case rests on alternative holdings both have preclusive effect Issue preclusion and questions of law In order for a party to invoke issue preclusion in a later action, the legal matter raised in the second proceedings must involve the (1) same set of events or documents and the (2) same bundle of legal principles that contributed to the rending of the first judgment (Sunnen) I.e., an intervening (legal) doctrinal change will destroy issue preclusion Commissioner of IRS v. Sunnen, US SC, 1948 (p.1145) Suit 1: IRS sues " for tax evasion for period between 1929-31, loses Suit 2: IRS later sues " for tax evasion for period between 1937-41; " claims government precluded b/c the issue of his liability was determined in the first suit Holding: The tax law relevant to " s case changed between the first and second suits, so no issue preclusion in second case Reasoning: Allowing " to raise issue preclusion would essentially make him not subject to the intervening doctrinal change, when all other taxpayers are bound by that doctrinal change. This is the equivalent of special treatment for " and violates the notion of strict equality among litigants. 31. Effects of Prior Judgment on Non-Parties When may a third party be bound/burdened by prior litigation? General rule: A third-party is not bound or burdened by prior litigation Hypo: A, B, and C have car accident A sues B and A wins; finding that A was non-negligent was essential to jurys decision C then sues A QUESTION: Can A argue that her non-negligence was decided in Suit 1 and that the issue is therefore precluded? ANSWER: No, A cannot raise issue preclusion b/c C hasnt yet had his day in court against A When may a third party be benefited by prior litigation? Mutuality doctrine (old rule that no longer applies): Persons may benefit from a prior judgment only if they were bound by it (i.e., were either a party to it or in privity with a party to it) Governing hypo: A, B, and C have car accident A sues B; A loses b/c court determines that A was the sole cause of the accident (and this determination was essential to the litigation) Nonmutual Defensive Issue Preclusion (NMDIP): When a  is precluded from litigating an issue against a " b/c the issue was previously decided against  in an earlier suit against a different " When a  litigates an issue against "1 and the court resolves the issue against , if  then seeks to litigate that same issue against "2, "2 may preclude  from raising the previously litigated issue Bernhard v. BofA, CA SC, 1942 (p.1163)  sues C some money, loses  then sues bank in which C had deposited the money; Bank raises issue preclusion b/c earlier suit determined money belonged to C Holding: Bank may raise issue preclusion even though bank wasn t in privity w/C Privity with " in earlier suit not required for use of NMDIP (or, by extension, NMOIP, either) Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, US SC, 1971  sues "1 for patent infringement, court decides  s patent is void  in follow-on suit sues "2 for infringing the same  patent Holding:  s patent had already been held invalid following a full and fair trial, so  is precluded from litigating the issue in this suit Arguments in favor of NMDIP: Incentivizes the  to (1) litigate the first suit to the fullest and (2) in the first suit join all parties against whom he potentially has a claim We re less concerned about NMDIP than binding non-parties to adverse earlier decisions b/c  has already had his day in court Argument in opposition to NMDIP: Perhaps a different jury would see this all differently Nonmutual Offensive Issue Preclusion (NMOIP): When a " is precluded from litigating an issue b/c the issue was resolved against it in earlier proceeding against a different  A court should not allow use of NMOIP where:: (1) A  could have easily joined in the earlier action or (2) The application of issue preclusion would be unfair to " b/c (a) The a/c in first suit was so small that " had no incentive to litigate the suit, (b) The judgment in the earlier suit was inconsistent with a previous decision, (c) The new action affords " procedural opportunities (or witnesses) not available in the first suit that might lead to a different result, or Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, US SC, 1979 (p.1169) SEC sues " for making fraudulent statements, wins  then sues " for same thing and moves for summary judgment, claiming " estopped from litigating issued resolves against it in the SEC proceeding Holding:  may estop " from litigating issues resolved against it in the SEC proceeding b/c  could not have joined the earlier action and application of NMOIP would not be unfair b/c " had every reason to litigate the first suit to the fullest NMOIP allowed in federal court Mendoza: Federal government not liable to NMOIP Why? ( If we allow NMOIP against the government, then the resolution of an issue against the government will bind the government on that issue for all time, meaning that if the US SC declines to hear the case, whatever circuit hears the appeal will bind everyone Arguments for NMOIP: Gives " incentive to litigate the first suit to the fullest (judicial economy) Maybe there are some  s we want to be able to use NMOIP; maybe the follow-on  lacks the resources to litigate fully against a large corporation that the first  did have Arguments against NMOIP: Seems unfair to say  wouldn t have been bound/burdened by an adverse resolution in the first suit but can benefit from a favorable resolution (incentivizes  s to  wait and see rather than join earlier suits, thus hindering judicial economy) NMOIP makes " s more likely to settle in order to preserve the right to litigate the issue against follow-on claims, so makes it more difficult for follow-on  s to collect Tyler: NMOIP is extremely controversial, and many states don t follow the federal rule here Issue preclusion and the intersection of criminal and civil law If government sues " criminally, loses, and then sues civilly, can " may invoke defensive issue preclusion? NO, b/c there s a lower standard of proof in civil cases If government sues " criminally for destruction of government property, wins, then sues " civilly, can government invoke offensive issue preclusion? YES, generally If " convicted of a crime, then private party brings civil suit, is private-party  allowed to invoke offensive issue preclusion? YES If " pleads guilty, can government or private party in follow-on civil suit raise offensive issue preclusion? NO, because the issue of " s guilt was not fully litigated in the first case; however, the guilty plea generally may be admitted as evidence in the follow-on suit Inter-system preclusion Hypo 1:  sues " in state A, loses  then goes to state B and re-sues " QUESTION: Can " invoke issue preclusion? ANSWER: YES,  Full faith and credit clause (Art. 4 1) requires state B to recognize the judgment in state A in whatever way state B would recognize that judgment Hypo 2:  sues " in state A, loses  then goes to federal court and re-sues " QUESTION: Can " invoke issue preclusion? ANSWER: YES, 28 USC 1738: acts as a full faith and credit clause for federal courts re: state decisions Hypo 3:  sues " in federal court, loses  then goes to state A and re-sues " QUESTION: Can " invoke issue preclusion? ANSWER: YES, under the Supremacy Clause the state court should follow the federal court rules of preclusion re: cases decided in federal court COMPLEX LITIGATION: AN INTRODUCTION 32. Permissive and Compulsory Joinder Determining whether joinder is permissible IMPORTANT: Joinder rules are distinct from SMJ Step 1: Does the applicable FRCP allow joinder of this claim or party under these circumstances? If NO, stop right there If YES, then: Step 2: Are there jurisdictional issues? Is there federal SMJ (original or supplemental) over the additional claim or party? Is there personal jurisdiction over the additional party? Joinder of Claims FRCP 18 (Joinder of additional claims and remedies): Rule 18(a): A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party There must be SMJ over the additional claims This rule basically says that once youve got another party into court, you can resolve all your differences with him in a single suit FRCP 13 (Counterclaim and Cross-Claim) Rule 13(a) (Compulsory counter-claims): Claims that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim and that do not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction Rule 13(b) (Permissive counterclaims): Claims against an opposing party that do not arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim Rule 13(g) (Cross-claim against co-party): A party may state as a cross-claim any claim against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is (1) the subject matter either of the original action or of a (2) counterclaim therein or (3) relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original action Always permissive Once a part-y asserts a proper cross-claim, under Rule 18(a) he may join any additional claims against his co-" that he has, whether or not arising from the same transaction and occurrence as the original claim Rule 13(h) (Joinder of additional parties) u7: Persons other than those made parties to the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or cross claim in accordance with the provisions of rules 19 and 20 NOTE: Doctrine of claim preclusion works to make joinder of some claims in some cases mandatory even though joinder of those claims under FRCP is theoretically permissive Permissive Joinder of Parties (FRCP 20) FRCP 20 (Permissive joinder of parties): Rule 20(a) (Permissive joinder): Several persons may join together as  s (or " s) in one action if: (1) They assert claims (or have claims asserted against them) that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, and (2) Their claims (or the claims asserted against them) raise a common issue of law or fact Transaction or occurrence: All logically related events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another (Mosley) Mosley v. GMC, 8th Cir., 1974 (Handout 10) 10 GM employees bring civil rights claims against GMC: (1) discrimination based on race and gender and (2) GMC retaliated against those who complained (employment law claim) " argues  s should have to sue separately Holding: To be able to sue together,  s claims must (1) be related and (2) raise a common issue of fact or law:  s claims are related b/c the root of all their claims is GMC s alleged policy of discrimination.  s claims also raise a common issue of fact, i.e., whether GMC discriminated against a class among whom the  s are members (doesn t matter that  s were affected differently so long as  s were all members of the same class) Why joinder is such a big deal in this case: Each  s discrimination claim bolster s the other s (much harder for GMC to justify its action light of the multiple claims). Thus, much more likely for  s to win if they bring all their claims together (and harder to win if they don t) Joinder of Necessary and Indispensable Parties (FRCP 19) FRCP 19 (Joinder of necessary and indispensable parties) Rule 19(a): How to determine whether just adjudication requires joinder of a party: A person (1) subject to service of process and (2) whose joinder will not deprive the court of SMJ over the action shall be joined as a party in the action if: (A) In the persons absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (B) (i) The person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and (ii) Is so situated that the disposition of the action in the persons absence may (a) As a practical matter impair or impede the persons ability to protect that interest or (b) Leave any of the persons already parties subject to substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest A person meeting these criteria can be forcibly joined, even as an involuntary  If joinder of the party would render the venue of the action improper, the party shall be dismissed from the action Rule 19(b): How to determine whether a party is indispensable, i.e., if the action must be dismissed if that party cannot be joined: To the extent that the court cannot protect a party already joined from prejudice by the nonjoinder of a non-party, that non-party is deemed indispensable Why might joinder not be feasible? Might destroy diversity in a diversity suit Lack of personal jurisdiction or failure of service of process (cant be found in the jurisdiction) Often dismissal does not have a harsh result b/c the  can go and bring suit in a jurisdiction where the part can be joined If a person described in Rule 19(a) cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed b/c the absent person is regarded as indispensable to the action The factors to be considered by the court in making this determination are: (1) To what extent a judgment rendered in the persons absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties (2) The extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided (3) Whether a judgment rendered in the person s absence will be adequate (4) Whether the  will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder Rule 19(d): Exception of class actions: Rule 19 is subject to the provisions of Rule 23 Misjoinder and Nonjoinder (FRCP 23) FRCP 23 (Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties) Misjoinder of parties is not grounds for dismissal of the action Parties may be dropped or added by the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of an action on such terms as are just Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately 33. Impleader and Intervention Impleader FRCP 1-4 (Third-party practice) Rule 14(a): When " may implead a third party: At any time after the commencement of the action a ", as a third-party , may implead a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the third-party  for all or part of the  s claim against the third-party  (original ") The third-party  need not obtain leave to implead the third-party " if he files the third-party complaint not later than 10 days after serving the original answer. Otherwise, must obtain leave on motion A third-party " may implead another party itself who is or may be liable to the third-party " for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-party " Rule 14(b): When a  may implead a third party: When a counterclaim is assessed against , the  may cause a third-party to brought in under circumstances which this rule would entitle a " to do so IMPORTANT: Impleading a third-party " does not destroy the court s jurisdiction over the original claim (i.e., impleading a third-party from the same state as the original  does not destroy diversity jurisdiction), nor does it render venue improper. The third-party " is disregarded in determining whether venue is proper (i.e., the third-party ", by being impleaded, does not destroy venue). However, for impleader to be proper personal jurisdiction over the third-party " must lie IMPORTANT: It is always within the discretion of the court to allow or refuse to allow third-party impleader IMPORTANT: If liability is an  either/or proposition, impleader is improper (b/c then the other party isn being added to cover part of the original " s liability) If a " has a claim against another " already a party, the first " can t implead the second " (b/c the second " s already a party), but he can cross-claim him In diversity suits, 28 USC 1367(b) withholds supplemental jurisdiction from  s who bring claims against parties joined pursuant to Rule 14 (i.e, impleaded as third-party " s by the " acting as a third-party ) Intervention by Right FRCP 24(a): Intervention of right: Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) When a statute of the US confers an unconditional right to intervene, or (2) (a) When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and (b) The applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicants ability to protect that interest, (c) Unless the applicants interest is adequately represented by existing parties The possibility of divergence of interest need not be great in order for a party desiring to intervene to satisfy its burden that is interest is not adequately represented by existing parties (NRDC) National Resources Defense Counsel v. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10th Cir., 1978 (Handout 11) NRDC sues US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and NM nuclear agency seeking to prohibit the agencies from issuing licenses without first preparing environmental impact statements United Nuclear (UNC) allowed to intervene b/c it has a license NRDC claims was improperly granted (so has strong interest in the suit) Kerr-McGee (KM), American Mining Congress (AMC), and other also want to intervene; KMs interest is that it has pending license renewal application (so decision will affect it) Holding: UNC and KM situated somewhat differently b/c UNC already has license, and KMs up for renewal, so UNC doesnt adequately represent KM. Thus, KM can intervene. Example of general preference for allowing intervention Reasoning: Though KM wouldnt technically be bound by the suit if not allowed to join, in effect it would be b/c stare decisis would lead to same decision in a future case involving KM A party is allowed to intervene by right when its interests are likely to be impaired or impeded by the litigation and are not adequately represented by the parties already party to the case Permissive Intervention FRCP 24(b): Permissive intervention: Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) When a statute of the US confers a conditional right to intervene, or (2) When an applicants claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. A government agency or officer may be permitted to intervene when a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or order administered or issued by that officer or agency In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties Martin v. Wilks, US SC, 1989 (Handout 11) Black firefighters sue Birmingham, alleging discrimination; settlement involves consent decree creating affirmative action program White firefighters sue, saying the consent decrees discriminate against them, case dismissed A second group of white firefighters later bring suit on the same grounds Issue: Is the claim of the second group of white firefighters precluded by the dismissal of the earlier white firefighters case? Holding: No; second groups claim can proceed Burden of joinder: Basically, court places burden of joinder on parties to the suit, not those outside the suit; i.e., in original suit, burden was on the black firefighters to implead all the white firefighters, not on the white firefighters all to intervene Follow-on: Congress later passed law disallowing collateral attack in a civil rights context to a consent decree if the party had reasonable notice of the decree and had opportunity to present objections to the order, and had their interests adequately represented in the consent decree ( so, Martin announced a general rule but is no longer good law on its own facts A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings (even when the strangers knew of the proceedings and recognized they had an interest in them) I.e., the burden of joinder falls on those inside the suit, not those outside ( this stands for the proposition that you should not be bound by an earlier suit if you didnt have your day in court Exceptions: (1) Class action suits where there was adequate class representation, (2) where a special remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing successive litigation by nonlitigants (e.g., bankruptcy, probate) Dissent: Under the majority opinion, everything related to the original suit is up for grabs (there are any number of parties who might be affected by a given suit) 34. Class Actions I: The Framework Provided by Doctrine and Rule Pros and Cons of Class Actions Advantages of class actions: Economies of scale ( can represent vast numbers of parties with only a small number of litigants; consistency in judgments; small claims proceed (small claimants can band together); greater judicial scrutiny; " s repose (" s don t have to worry about suit after suit arising); legitimacy; good tools for social change b/c broad in scale Disadvantages of class actions: Incentives for the lawyers (to go forward with small claims on behalf of a large number of people); due process concerns re: absentee parties; notice problems (Mulane); the complexity of banding together what in some sense are similar claims and what in some sense are dissimilar claims; concerns about the quality of counsel representing the class The Constitutional framework for Class Actions Three constitutional propositions at play in class actions (come from Hansberry): Class members are entitled to adequate representation if they are to be bound by an adjudication of their interest of a class Adequate representation of interests means not only alignment of interests, but vigorous assertion of those interests Class members, if they are not members of the representative suit, are able to collaterally attack at least the adequacy of the representation of their interest If the class members interests were adequately represented in the first suit, they are bound by the result of the earlier suit Hansberry v. Lee, US SC, 1940 (p.691) ( sets the standard for when a party who has not participated in earlier litigation may be bound by that litigation Neighborhood in IL had a racially restrictive covenant Under earlier litigation, the covenant had been held valid (fraudulently) One of the property owners sold his property to a black man (Hansberry) Neighbors sued to prevent sale, arguing the seller was member of the same class as the  s (property owners) in the earlier suit, and that the validity of the covenant was therefore res judicata as regarding the seller Holding: Hansberry and his seller not bound by the earlier suit b/c their interests diametrically opposed to those of the  s in the first suit (who sued to have the covenant upheld) The notion that the  s/landowners in the earlier suit represented Hansberry s interests borders on laughable Prerequisites to a Class Action (FRCP 23(a)) FRCP 23(a) (Prerequisites to a class action) One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if: (1) Numerosity: The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable This requirement is usually mechanical. If a class has more than 40 members, numerosity usually met. If a class has less than 25 members, numerosity usually lacking. If a class has between 25 and 40 members, variables such as geographic dispersion of class members and the size of individual claims becomes important (2) Commonality: There are questions of law or fact common to the class (3) Typicality: The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and Typicality usually found  when each class member s claim arises from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar legal arguments to provide the " s liability Tyler: This requirement s kind of redundant (4) Adequacy: The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class Two aspects to fair and adequate representation: adequate representative and adequate class counsel Idea is to guard against judgment being open to collateral attack by reason of defect in adequacy of representation (Case book also lists two additional requirements: There must be a class, and the class representative must be a member of the class) 3 Categories of Class Type (FRCP 23(b)) FRCP 23(b) (Class actions maintainable) An action may be maintained as a class actions if the prerequisites in subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) Prejudice class: The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of: (A) Inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class (avoiding uncertainty of contradictory injunctions), or (B) Adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members on parties to the adjudication or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests (low pot of money problem); or (2) Injunctive class: The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or Idea is to change " s behavior or policy prospectively and not to provide individual compensation for class members for injuries they ve suffered in the past " s conduct need only be  generally applicable to the class; no requirement that the conduct be damaging or offensive to every class member (3) Damages class: The court determines that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) The interest of the members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action (this is considered to be the key evaluative factor) The tie among members of this class is that they ve all been injured in the same way by the " Why the type of class certified matters ( Notice requirements differ by class type Rule 23(c)(4)(b): Classes may be further divided into subclasses Certification of Class Actions (FRCP 23(c)(1)) FRCP 23(c)(1) (Class certification decisions) (A): When a person sues or is sued as a representative of a class, the court mustat an early practicable timedetermine by order whether to certify the action as a class action (B) An order certifying a class action must: (i) State whether the threshold prerequisites have been met, (ii) Define the class and the class claims, issues, or defense, and (iii) Appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g) Certification is very important: Determines whether or not a case can go forward Dictates the relative leverage that the parties bring to settlement negotiations (important b/c most class actions settled b/f trial) The threat of certification is a danger in itself b/c the certification of a class may create unfavorable publicity for the " Partial class action: considering on a class basis only a limited number of factual issues relevant to a larger cause of action FRCP 23(f) (Appeals from class certification decisions) Appellate courts may review the granting or denial of a certification order before the lawsuit proceeds (i.e., allows an interlocutory appeal) 1st Cir. suggestions for when such an appeal should be granted When denial of class status effectively ends  s suit When granting of class status makes " feel irresistible pressure to settle When granting an appeal will lead to clarification of a fundamental issue of law Notice of Class Action (FRCP 23(c)(2) Purpose of notice of class action: Ensure the adequacy of class representation Protect the interests of class members by allowing them directly to intervene or to opt out Two questions that come up re: notice and class actions: Who pays for notice? 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& FRgd7 & FRgd4 & FRgd4 & FRgd4 & FRgd4gd4Z c yz   X]VW^=>?]^z{/2J>@-0@ jh)h) h)h)h) h)5>*h)5>*B*CJ$aJ$phhE5>*B*CJ$aJ$phhu5>*B*CJ$aJ$ph h[D5>*hEh#6h?N h#>*h#h#6 jh#h# h#63?^0v1hgd'] & FTgd) & FTgd) & FTgd) & FTgd]N & FTgd]N & FTgd]Ngd) & FSgd)gd>Oq@FGJ0vu01gh D      ڝ쮘ڮ읓|w h']6 h4h'] h']>*h'] h']5>* h']5 h)6 h)5 jh]N h]N5h)h)5h)h)56h]Nh]N>*h)h]N>* h]N>* h]N6h]N h)5>* hp5>*h) h)h)h)h)6. D  !A""#d%%E&&'''''m(()*+4-'. & FUgdEs & FUgd'] & FUgdEs & FUgd'] & FUgd'] & FUgd']gd']  !@"A"E"P"Q"R""""""##$d%%%%%D&E&'''''l(m(q(((((())s*t****+++++,,..&.'.+.:.<......./ h']6>*h7ih']6>* h4hEshqz h4h'] h']5>* h']h']h']h']6>* h']6h']hEshEs6hEs hEsh'] h']>*@'.//x00n12b333"4P45/5l5555/66f8f99 & FVgd7i & FVgd1 & FVgd1 & FVgd1gd1 & FUgd'] & FUgd'] & FUgd']//81m122 33b333!4"4U444555.5/535k5l5q5r555555556/666d88d9f9:::p;r;;;r<׭ץ׊zzhhl`6hhl`H*hl` hmh7ih7ih7i6h_h7i6h1h16h&>ch1>* h1h1 hqz>* h1>*h1h15>* h15>*h1h&>c jh']hEsh']h7i h']h'] h4h']09:r;;t<==d==>]>>>>>w??,Ek & FWgd@ & FWgdN & FWgd@ & FWgd7i & FWgd@gd#U & FVgdl` & FVgdl` & FVgd1r<t<===&=F=V=b=d=]>>>>>?L?O?v?w????????@9hjq{|׬+,)ƨ~wp h@h@ h}h@h@h@6>* hN6>* hN>*hNh@>*UhNhN6>*hNhN>* hNh@hNh@6>* h@>*hNh@h7i h@5>* hN5>* h#U5>*h#Uhl`hl`6hl`hhl`6) (23(b)(3)), the court must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances (Mullane standard), including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood language: The nature of the action The definition of the class certified The class claims, issues, or defenses That a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires That the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded, and The binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 23(c)(3) IMPORTANT: Notice to damages classes is mandatory, and members of these classes may opt out IMPORTANT: This rule does not take into account cost considerations (notice must be made no matter how expensive) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, US SC, 1978 (Handout 12) Representative  brings class action on behalf of 2.25 million odd-lot traders on the NYSE; each class members claim is very small individually, but when you add them all together it becomes very large District court orders notice to be sent to all identifiable class members who had 10 or more odd-lot trade and 5,000 other class members randomly selected, and also that notice be published in the WSJ District court also ordered " to foot the bill for notice because the judge held a preliminary hearing and determined  was likely to win Holding: Notice inadequate. Rule 23(c)(2) requires the  best notice practicable under the circumstances, which in this case means individual notice to all members of the class who can be readily identified (see Mullane; this is a constitutional requirement). Also, , not ", is the one who has to foot the bill In a  damages (Rule 23(b)(3)) class action, individual notice must be sent to all class members who can be identified with reasonable effort Individual notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular case The usual rule is that a  must initially bear the cost of notice to the class. Exception: Where a fiduciary duty pre-existed between the  and ", as in a shareholder derivative suit Commencement of a class action suit tolls the applicable S/L as to all members of the class Reasoning: That individual notice would force  to drop his case is immaterial. There is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that notice requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular  s Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, US SC, 1985 (p.699)  brought class action against Phillips in KS state court, seeking to recover interest on royalty payments owed to  and other Phillips lessors Court certified class of 33,000, whose individual claims averaged only $100 (so class action was really necessary for the suit to go forward) Two issues: Is it okay to say that absent class  s need only opt out, or should requirement be that they have to opt in? Choice of law? Holding: Trial court asserted proper personal jurisdiction b/c individual notice sent to all absent class  s with an  opt out provision (opt out okay). However, trial court wrong to apply KS law to all claims b/c (1) KS lacks  state interests in claims unrelated to KS, (2) KS law conflicts substantively with the laws of other states in which there were  s, and (3) There is no indication that when the leases involving land and royalty owners outside KS were executed, the parties had any idea that KS law would control (Allstate rule about choice of law between states): Recognizing that a particular set of facts giving rise to litigation could justify, constitutionally, the application of more than one jurisdictions laws, for a states substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner that state must have a significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair Tyler: This is a serious problem when we have nationwide class actions; there are very strong arguments that we should break up classes into subclasses based on which laws we will apply There is no unfairness in applying a particulars states law over the laws of other states connected to the suit when that states law is not in conflict with any of the other jurisdictions connected to the suit When considering fairness in this context (test), an important element is the expectation of the parties US SC has disapproved practice of using discovery to obtain a -class mailing list (Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders) Class Action Settlement and Voluntary Dismissal (FRCP 23(e)) FRCP 23(e) (Settlement, voluntary dismissal, and compromise) (1) Court must approve all settlements, etc.; requirement of a fairness hearing: The court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class and direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound it, and may do so only after a hearing and finding that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate (2) Court may require another opt-out period before approving settlement: In a damages (23(b)(3)) class action, the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so (4) Any class member may object to a proposed settlement, and such objection may be withdrawn only with the courts approval Objecting class members may also appeal the courts decision approving the settlement once judgment has been entered Class Action Counsel (FRCP 23(g)) Two special concerns re: class counsel that dont appear in regular suits: Class-action attorneys exercise significant control over decisions made on behalf of the class b/c class representatives generally provide less supervision and guidance than other types of clients Its difficult to define loyalty to the client when its not clear who precisely the client is FRCP 23(g)(1) Appointing class counsel: (A) Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class must appoint class counsel (B) An attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class (C) In appointing class counsel, the court: (i) Must consider: (a) The work counsel has done in identifying or investigating the potential claims in the action (b) Counsels experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in the action (c) Counsels knowledge of the applicable law, and (d) The resources counsel will commit to representing the class; (ii) May consider any other matter pertinent to counsels ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class; (iii) May direct potential class counsel to provide information on any subject pertinent to the appointment and to propose terms for attorney fees and nontaxable costs; and (iv) May make further orders in connection with the appointment FRCP 23(g)(2): Appointment procedure: (A) The court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of the putative class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action (B) When there is one applicant for appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint that applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1)(B) and (C) If more than one adequate applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the court must appoint the applicant best able to represent the interests of the class Attorneys fees (FRCP 23(h)): In an action certified as a class action, the court may award reasonable attorney fees and nontaxable costs authorized by law or by agreement of the parties as follows: Notice of motion for award of attorney fees and other nontaxable costs must be served on all parties and, for motions by class counsels, directed to class members in a reasonable manner Class members or " s may object to the motion for attorneys fees, and a court may hold a hearing on the motion. The court may also refer issues related to the amount of the award to a special master or magistrate judge Methods for determining attorneys fees: Benefit: Looks to the amount of benefit conferred by the lawsuit (e.g., apply a percentage of the fund recovered to attorneys fees) The lodestar: Multiply number of hours attorney spent on case by normal billing rate and adjust for discretionary factors like riskiness of lawsuit (US SC discourages use of this factor) and quality of the attorneys performance (often by using multiplier) Methods for Proceeding in a Class Action Single trial that determines liability and total damages, then court decides how to distribute the damages among the class Bifurcated trial: First trial determinates liability, second (which occurs only if " found liable) addresses the amount of damages (may be individualized proceeding for individual claims or general proceeding to determine damages to the class as a whole Sampling: Judge selects some cases at random to adjudicate, then combines the outcomes of these cases statistically to yield results for the larger class population Fluid class recovery: Class award used to provide a general benefit to class members rather than to compensate them individually Used when the costs of identifying class members would exceed the award due to each class member or when the amount of money that can be economically distributed to class members doesn t exhaust the amount of " s liability as determined at trial (e.g., taxi cab company told to lower rates for a period of time b/c no way to figure who d been riding in their cabs) 35. Class Actions II: New Legislation and Modern Challenges The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) (28 USC 1332(d)) Purpose of CAFA is to help more class-actions get into federal court ( expends original jurisdiction to class actions where: A/c exceeds $5,000,000 (in aggregation), There are over 100 members of the class, There is minimal diversity, and Provided were not in one of the exceptions named 1332(d)(2): US district courts have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the a/c exceeds the value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which (A) Any member of a class of  s is a citizen of a state different from any " ((B) & (C) Any member of one of the class of either party is a foreign state or citizen of a foreign state 1332(d)(3): A district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction under sub 2 over a class action in which greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all proposed  classes in the aggregate and the primary " s are citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed based on consideration of: (See supplement) 1332(d)(4): A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under sub 2: (B) Two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed  classes in the aggregate, and the primary " s, are citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed 1332(d)(5): Paragraphs (2) to (4) shall not apply to any class action in which: (B) the number of members of all proposed  classes in the aggregate is less than 100 1332(d)(6): In any class action the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the a/c exceeds $5,000,000 exclusive of interests and costs) 1332(d)(7): Citizenship of members of the proposed  class shall be determined for the purposes of paragraphs (2) through (6) as of the date of filing of the complaint or amended complaint, or if the case stated in the initial pleading is not subject to Federal Jurisdiction, then as of the date of service by  s of an amended pleading, motion, or other paper, indicating the existence of Federal Jurisdiction 1332(d)(10): For purposes of this sub and 1453, an unincorporated association shall be deemed to be a citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business and the state under whose laws it is organized Removal of Class Actions (28 USC 1453) 1453(b) In general: A class action may be removed to a district court of the US in accordance with 1446 (regular removal rules), except: The 1-year limitation under 1446(b) does not apply It does not matter whether any " is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought (i.e., can be removed even if one of the " s is a citizen of the state in which the suit was brought The action may be removed by any " without the consent of all " s (i.e., piecemeal removal allowed 36-38. Agent Orange Questions We Might Want to Ask as  s Counsel Should we file in state or federal court? If federal, what about SMJ? Can we argue for application of federal common law? Is Erie a roadblock to this? One enclave of federal common law: Anytime the federal governments interests are at stake, federal courts make up the rules (Clearfield Trust) Is it in our interest to band together as a class action? What about problems with notice? Probably damages class; notice too expensive? Probably easier to prove there was a systematic problem with the chemicals when we have thousands of parties showing signs of being affected What if the worst-injured victims choose to opt out? 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To win certification as a  damages (b)(3) class, we have to show a class action would be superior to individual adjudication. Can we do this? Could argue efficiency Maybe better for the " to settle the issue once and for all Efficiency argument: Litigation may go on forever Should we sue the government? Probably not. Government cooperation will be essential to discovery, so we dont want to antagonize them (strategically, the government can help us). Also, We may not even be able to sue the government (Feres doctrine says military-service-related injuries are not permitted to be litigated under the Federal Tort Claims Act) Problems were likely to encounter: Causation problems: Our clients have a range of injuries, almost all of which can be caused by other things. If nothing else, this is a reason to band together in a class actionto show statistical causation (statistical disproportion of cancer/birth defects arise in people exposed to Agent Orange) Also, hard to determine percentage of causation b/c chemicals were mixed Potential government contractor defense (" s likely to argue that government contracts fall under the Feres doctrine) We can rebut this by showing a disconnect between what the companies knew and what the government knew Clarifying who s in the class (for notice and settlement purposes) Whats our goal? To compensate the victims? To win recognition/justification for Vietnam veterans To punish the companies? Judging Judge Weinstein Everything Weinstein does seems geared towards forcing a settlement. Is this an appropriate role for a judge to play? Weinstein brings the government back in under the notion that the claims of wives and children are independent of claims of the servicemen, arguing the Feres doctrine therefore doesnt apply to their claims Weinstein refused to give firm opinions or orders in order to avoid interlocutory appeals. Is this ethical? Notice: Right to opt-out expires very soon after notice is sent out. This seems to be another example of Weinstein working to force settlement; Weinstein didn t want many opt-outs because if there were too many, " s wouldn t want to settle The settlement: Veterans don t get an apology (companies weren t going to settle if they had to admit liability because they still had to deal with the opt outs) Companies liability paid by their insurers (settlement didnt exceed their insurance coverage) Did the settlement actually lead to any real deterrence on the part of drug companies? The distribution fund: Feinberg: The less you tell them about how the fund will be distributed, the better ( probably true; is this a problem? Wives and childrenthe very parties Weinstein used to bring the government back into the caseare excluded from the settlement fund(!) The fairness hearings: Tyler: The hearings were a charade. This wasnt the day in court the veterans had in mind at the start of the case (though Weinstein probably thought he was doing something good) There was no way Weinstein would for one moment have rejected the fairness of the settlement he had worked so hard to broker The fairness hearings should be robust and searching. The fairness hearings in this case needed to be much more searching Attorneys fees: Weinstein awards extremely low fees to the class counsel, about 5% of the award. He explicitly says gives such low fees to discourage these kinds of cases (says this case borders on the frivolous) The Final Chapter Stephenson v. Dow Chemical, 2nd Cir., 2001 (Handout 13) The class certified in the 1984 Agent Orange class action settlement included persons who have not yet manifested injury. Under the settlement, payments were to be made for 10 years (until 1994), and no payments were to be made for death or disability occurring after 1994  s, two Vietnam vets who developed cancer in 1996 and 1998, sue; " raises res judicata, saying that b/c  s fall under the class certified in the 1984 (and are thus  parties to that suit),  s claims are barred by the 1984 class action settlement Holding:  s were not proper parties to the earlier litigation b/c the representative  s in the class action, who all had present claims, did not adequately represent exposure-only  s who might not develop symptoms until much later. Thus,  s collateral attack on the 1984 class action is not barred by res judicata (b/c res judicata cannot bar claims by non-parties) Why  s weren t proper parties to the first suit: The class representatives in the earlier suit were all currently injured, and their focus was gener 1L+g  !Z"" & F] 3 gdft & F] 3 gdft 3 gdft & F\ 3 gdMp & F\ 3 gdC8 & F\ 3 gdC8 & F\ 3 gdC8 & F\ 3 gdMp"B####$%%b&c&u&&'),:-678 & F^ 3 gd & F^ 3 gd & F^ 3 gd & F^ 3 gd7 3 gd7 & F] 3 gdft & F] 3 gdft & F] 3 gdft&&&&'()*--.478:T::<<"<0=2=8=L=>>>?T@V@X@\@^@b@d@h@j@n@p@|@~@ոնխՃ{w{w{w{wmgm h"10Jjh"10JUhWSxjhWSxUhvh\z5mH sH h"9mH sH h.k>hmH sH hhmH sH h>*mH sH UhvmH sH h6mH sH hh5mH sH hmH sH h75mH sH h7h75mH sH h7h75H*mH sH (ous immediate payments. In contrast, exposure-only  s like the  s in this case, are interested in ensuring an ample inflation-protected fund for the future (clearly 1984 settlement didn t represent interests of those whose symptoms didn t arise until after 1994) Notice problematic for exposure-only  s b/c they may not be aware of their exposure or recognize the ramifications of their exposure (how could they opt out if they didn t know what would happen?) (due process problem here) If a  was not a proper party to an earlier judgment (e.g., an earlier class action), then res judicata cannot defeat their claims. Currently injured members of a class are unlikely adequately to represent exposure-only members b/c the interest of the first is in generous immediate payments, while the interest in the latter lies in an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future The ultimate merits of a  s liability claims has no bearing on whether the class certified in a previous class action adequately represented his interests. Reasoning: Exposing " s to liability for  s claims is not duplicative if  s were never proper parties to the prior judgment in the first place If Stephenson is correct, it undermines a class-action " s ability to enjoy a sense of repose, thereby giving it less incentive to join in class actions (repose vs. due process rights, due process rights win) Tyler: Maybe this case tells us that not all solutions are in the courts (this case seems to beyond the capacity of our legal system to solve), that maybe some need to found in the legislature     PAGE  PAGE 103 8:<2=>V@Z@\@`@b@f@h@l@n@@@@@@@@@h]hgdu &`#$gd%T& & F^ 3 gdv & F^ 3 gd & F^ 3 gd & F^ 3 gd~@@@@@@@@@@@@hvh\z5mH sH hWSxhiM0JmHnHujh"10JUh"1 h"10J 8 001h:pu/ =!"#$% Dd,dj  FA?Picture 2bʲX^u;U d<D)nX^u;U d\Q@jI=]K?M,( ( (PT`dс._% (\ӿ~ ~Z( ( ( 8P, "& 45kxD¾Ա/Q@Dd DTw~A`J~O'٢( ( (@4~zN2qT9x버( P 4~pJ=;_{:tC( ( V@{; ѣxN˽Dw' W 4~֝UwS( ( 5.bKPbp _k* Jŭ[ӢʇDQ>;ou~4YJDQ@DQ@^vkc pi"_|vQ@HiZ: I~2r( ( ( $R@"1@)H9Y9YD*`{.({:#( ( YQ@/ύkc ԳQ@i|Įhv[U~Og'/MDQ@DQ@ql 9Y>( +`T/0b+ۮ]EQ@DQ@+%q ($6EQ@X .b{J EQ@DQ@1/s#~98$6#(PK?ϫ\\V$Q@DQ@D <Doy?u 48>fJ0w4F gs:GyŒmZ3k1h&y9)MtNzW]yMǢG3>^?vW͜Zs39>ٜ浴9ߧ5vɜf19:s6mF cZVRKۼv5JhN:VswtpNqIg}߻[ɋ&)mӗV<ՕK׏տ(9^<4]2}GsױY>\ soӚvɼۼ|9y=m.&|YMDQ@ȶ H6+!J}`X(Uf!R*-0@º V1ReS(u.f5 Lb-IJS8Zp{?׃R#A)N 2 WIԖݭߥ\R N{HNX8u J UN@%;Q@DQRpH'z(%BѡOzQ;TRap*3 MK_N}^p8pCk J}V\Ti)+0oJgʨJS:Pj(2,ҌIzn}NS2t[؇:>4*h {5+Ѣ( O:J=*9JcoS/Cy7NLҗ85Y*0ronip*Gy׽5UTӡ|SH8%}S7M5j )2 pMѽ]lT5%}S>`[mk}bj Ԫ(-J&lj@fJ .|LvJI/&H_paJR)pkN\ҷ"9́)٥/1BTfS &)* N͟[[dr|fMUoy^d Υ ,&$5sD*? 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