ࡱ> M Jbjbj== JWW'l$^EEEP:FG<^I\>JP]f]f]f]f]zth<)ʐ$ ř֔-f]f]֔f]f]"f]f][#f]2J JM^'EƇ"#|0I ww#toc \o "1-2" Criminal Law outline pageref _Toc470020401 \h 1 OVERVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM pageref _Toc470020402 \h 1 The Big Questions of Criminal Law pageref _Toc470020403 \h 1 Why do we have criminal law? pageref _Toc470020404 \h 1 What makes a good penal code? Specificity v. breadth and flexibility pageref _Toc470020405 \h 1 Structure of the Criminal Justice System pageref _Toc470020406 \h 1 Flexibility of the system pageref _Toc470020407 \h 2 Criminal Procedure pageref _Toc470020408 \h 2 Habeas Corpus pageref _Toc470020409 \h 2 WHY DO WE PUNISH?PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF PUNISHMENT pageref _Toc470020410 \h 2 Purposes and Goals of Punishment pageref _Toc470020411 \h 2 Incarceration pageref _Toc470020412 \h 3 Deterrence pageref _Toc470020413 \h 3 Retribution pageref _Toc470020414 \h 3 Rehabilitation pageref _Toc470020415 \h 3 DEFINING CULPABILITY pageref _Toc470020416 \h 3 Basic Elements of a Crime pageref _Toc470020417 \h 3 ACTUS REUSCULPABLE CONDUCT pageref _Toc470020418 \h 4 Actus Reus defined pageref _Toc470020419 \h 4 Actus Reus: The Requirement of the Act pageref _Toc470020420 \h 4 Circumstances pageref _Toc470020421 \h 4 Causation pageref _Toc470020422 \h 4 Result pageref _Toc470020423 \h 4 Defenses pageref _Toc470020424 \h 4 Illustration: Burglary pageref _Toc470020425 \h 4 VOLUNTARINESS pageref _Toc470020426 \h 5 Proctor v. State (OK 1918) pageref _Toc470020427 \h 5 Martin v. State (AL 1944) pageref _Toc470020428 \h 5 People v. Grant (IL 1977) pageref _Toc470020429 \h 5 People v. Newton (CA 1970) pageref _Toc470020430 \h 5 OMISSIONS pageref _Toc470020431 \h 5 Act and Failure to Act: Crimes of Omission and Status Crimes pageref _Toc470020432 \h 5 Jones v. United States (DC 1962) pageref _Toc470020433 \h 5 STATUS OFFENSES pageref _Toc470020434 \h 6 General comments pageref _Toc470020435 \h 6 Robinson v. California (U.S. 1962) Stewart, J. pageref _Toc470020436 \h 6 Powell v. Texas (U.S. 1968) pageref _Toc470020437 \h 6 Pottinger v. Miami (FL 1992) pageref _Toc470020438 \h 6 Comparison of Pottinger and Robinson pageref _Toc470020439 \h 7 Comparison of Pottinger and Powell pageref _Toc470020440 \h 7 Johnson v. State (FL 1992) pageref _Toc470020441 \h 7 LIMITATIONS ON PUNISHMENT OF CULPABLE CONDUCT pageref _Toc470020442 \h 7 PROPORTIONALITY pageref _Toc470020443 \h 7 General comments pageref _Toc470020444 \h 7 Solem v. Helm (US 1983) Powell, J. pageref _Toc470020445 \h 8 Harmelin v. Michigan (U.S. 1991) pageref _Toc470020446 \h 8 LEGALITY pageref _Toc470020447 \h 8 Keeler v. Superior Court (CA 1970) Mosk, J. pageref _Toc470020448 \h 8 After Keeler, the California legislature amended the statute to include feticide. pageref _Toc470020449 \h 9 SPECIFICITY pageref _Toc470020450 \h 9 Ricks v. District of Columbia (DC 1968) pageref _Toc470020451 \h 9 Papachristou v. Jacksonville (US 1972) Douglas, J. pageref _Toc470020452 \h 9 MENS REATHE GUILTY MIND pageref _Toc470020453 \h 9 History pageref _Toc470020454 \h 9 Purpose pageref _Toc470020455 \h 9 Bad thoughts pageref _Toc470020456 \h 9 STRICT LIABILITY pageref _Toc470020457 \h 9 General comments pageref _Toc470020458 \h 9 Strict liability and the Model Penal Code pageref _Toc470020459 \h 10 United States v. Balint (U.S. 1922) Taft, C.J. pageref _Toc470020460 \h 10 Speidel v. State (AK1969) pageref _Toc470020461 \h 10 United States v. Park (U.S. 1975) Burger, C.J. pageref _Toc470020462 \h 10 Morissette v. United States (U.S. 1952) Jackson, J. pageref _Toc470020463 \h 11 CATEGORIES OF CULPABILITY pageref _Toc470020464 \h 11 Regina v. Faulkner (U.K. 1877) pageref _Toc470020465 \h 11 Other courts have permitted a looser standard than natural-and-probable. pageref _Toc470020466 \h 11 Model Penal Code 2.02(2). Definitions of Culpability pageref _Toc470020467 \h 11 MISTAKE pageref _Toc470020468 \h 12 Model Penal Code 2.04. Ignorance or Mistake pageref _Toc470020469 \h 12 (1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if: pageref _Toc470020470 \h 12 (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or pageref _Toc470020471 \h 12 (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. pageref _Toc470020472 \h 12 Mistakes of Fact pageref _Toc470020473 \h 12 General comments pageref _Toc470020474 \h 12 State v. Guest (AK 1978) pageref _Toc470020475 \h 12 Mistakes of Law pageref _Toc470020476 \h 12 General comments pageref _Toc470020477 \h 12 United States v. Baker (5th Cir. 1986) pageref _Toc470020478 \h 13 Long v. State (DE 1949) pageref _Toc470020479 \h 13 Commonwealth v. Twitchell (MA 1993) pageref _Toc470020480 \h 13 Cheek v. United States (U.S. 1991) White, J. pageref _Toc470020481 \h 13 Lambert v. California (U.S. 1957) Douglas, J. pageref _Toc470020482 \h 13 CAPACITY FOR MENS REA pageref _Toc470020483 \h 14 Insanity pageref _Toc470020484 \h 14 Voluntary Intoxication pageref _Toc470020485 \h 14 RAPE pageref _Toc470020486 \h 14 Definition pageref _Toc470020487 \h 14 Proof pageref _Toc470020488 \h 14 Marital, Relationship and Date Rape pageref _Toc470020489 \h 15 Actus reusFORCE, NONCONSENT, AND RESISTANCE pageref _Toc470020490 \h 15 General comments pageref _Toc470020491 \h 15 People v. Barnes (CA 1986) Bird, C.J. pageref _Toc470020492 \h 15 State v. Rusk (MD 1981) pageref _Toc470020493 \h 15 MENS REA pageref _Toc470020494 \h 16 People v. Mayberry (CA 1975) pageref _Toc470020495 \h 16 HOMICIDE pageref _Toc470020496 \h 16 Homicide under the common law pageref _Toc470020497 \h 16 Contemporary gradations pageref _Toc470020498 \h 16 Kansas Statute (1995) pageref _Toc470020499 \h 17 Alabama Code (1995) pageref _Toc470020500 \h 18 California Penal Code (1995) pageref _Toc470020501 \h 18 Sample jury instructions pageref _Toc470020502 \h 18 What to look for pageref _Toc470020503 \h 19 INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER pageref _Toc470020504 \h 19 Definition pageref _Toc470020505 \h 19 Negligence pageref _Toc470020506 \h 19 Vehicular Manslaughter pageref _Toc470020507 \h 20 Misdemeanor Manslaughter pageref _Toc470020508 \h 20 VOLUNTARY manslaughter pageref _Toc470020509 \h 20 General comments pageref _Toc470020510 \h 20 Reasons for recognizing mitigation pageref _Toc470020511 \h 20 Guiding questions pageref _Toc470020512 \h 21 Provocation under the Model Penal Code pageref _Toc470020513 \h 21 Adequate provocation pageref _Toc470020514 \h 21 People v. Walker (IL 1965) pageref _Toc470020515 \h 22 Rowland v. State (MS 1904) pageref _Toc470020516 \h 22 People v. Tapia (CA 1988) pageref _Toc470020517 \h 22 Cultural Relativism and the Reasonable Person pageref _Toc470020518 \h 22 MURDER pageref _Toc470020519 \h 23 Intent to kill pageref _Toc470020520 \h 23 Malice pageref _Toc470020521 \h 23 Intentional Murder (Second Degree) pageref _Toc470020522 \h 24 Francis v. Franklin (U.S. 1985) Brennan, J. pageref _Toc470020523 \h 24 Proper jury instructions with respect to intent pageref _Toc470020524 \h 24 Commentary to Model Penal Code 210.2. Purposeful or Knowing Homicide. pageref _Toc470020525 \h 24 EXTREME RECKLESSNESS (Second-degree Murder) pageref _Toc470020526 \h 24 General comments pageref _Toc470020527 \h 24 Russian PokerCommonwealth v. Malone (PA 1946) pageref _Toc470020528 \h 25 Killer DentistPeople v. Protopappas (CA 1988) pageref _Toc470020529 \h 25 Killer DogBerry v. Superior Court (CA 1989) pageref _Toc470020530 \h 25 Intent to do serious bodily injuryCommonwealth v. Dorazio (PA 1950) pageref _Toc470020531 \h 25 Vehicular murderPeople v. Watson (CA 1981) pageref _Toc470020532 \h 26 AGGRAVATED MURDER pageref _Toc470020533 \h 26 FIRST-DEGREE MURDER pageref _Toc470020534 \h 26 General comments pageref _Toc470020535 \h 26 Aggravating elements pageref _Toc470020536 \h 26 Proof pageref _Toc470020537 \h 26 PREMEDITated murder (first degree) pageref _Toc470020538 \h 27 United States v. Watson (DC 1985) pageref _Toc470020539 \h 27 Cold blood testAustin v. United States (DC Cir. 1967) pageref _Toc470020540 \h 27 Fully formed purpose testCommonwealth v. Scott (PA 1925) pageref _Toc470020541 \h 27 Insanity and capacity for premeditationCommonwealth v. Gould (MA 1980) pageref _Toc470020542 \h 28 FELONY MURDER pageref _Toc470020543 \h 28 General comments pageref _Toc470020544 \h 28 Inherently dangerous felonies pageref _Toc470020545 \h 28 Mens rea for first-degree felony murder pageref _Toc470020546 \h 28 States burden pageref _Toc470020547 \h 28 Theoretical foundations pageref _Toc470020548 \h 28 Felony Murder Found pageref _Toc470020549 \h 29 Felony Murder not Found pageref _Toc470020550 \h 29 Rationale pageref _Toc470020551 \h 29 Counterarguments pageref _Toc470020552 \h 29 Virtual Strict LiabilityPeople v. Stamp (CA 1969) pageref _Toc470020553 \h 29 Immediate flightPeople v. Gladman (NY 1976) pageref _Toc470020554 \h 29 One Accomplice Killed by AnotherPeople v. Cabaltero (CA 1939) pageref _Toc470020555 \h 30 Felon Causes Own DeathPeople v. Ferlin (CA) pageref _Toc470020556 \h 30 Cop Shoot CopPeople v. Hickman (IL 1973) pageref _Toc470020557 \h 30 Accomplice Killed by Robbery VictimPeople v. Washington (CA 1965) Traynor, C.J. pageref _Toc470020558 \h 30 CAPITAL MURDER/THE DEATH PENALTY pageref _Toc470020559 \h 30 General comments pageref _Toc470020560 \h 30 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION pageref _Toc470020561 \h 31 Before Furman pageref _Toc470020562 \h 31 Furman v. Georgia (U.S. 1972) 54 per curium pageref _Toc470020563 \h 31 Woodson v. North Carolina (U.S. 1976) 54 Stewart pageref _Toc470020564 \h 31 Gregg v. Georgia (U.S. 1976) 72 Stewart, Powell, & Stevens pageref _Toc470020565 \h 31 Coker v. Georgia (U.S. 1977) 72 White pageref _Toc470020566 \h 31 implementation pageref _Toc470020567 \h 31 Bifurcated trials pageref _Toc470020568 \h 31 Burden of Proof pageref _Toc470020569 \h 32 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS pageref _Toc470020570 \h 32 Crafting a statute pageref _Toc470020571 \h 32 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES pageref _Toc470020572 \h 32 General comments pageref _Toc470020573 \h 32 Some specific factors pageref _Toc470020574 \h 32 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES pageref _Toc470020575 \h 33 General comments pageref _Toc470020576 \h 33 May not be limited by statute to a specific listLockett v. Ohio (U.S. 1978) Burger, C.J. pageref _Toc470020577 \h 33 Eddings v. Oklahoma (U.S. 1982) Powell, J. pageref _Toc470020578 \h 33 CATEGORICAL LIMITS pageref _Toc470020579 \h 33 The Mens Rea Limit: A Reprise on Felony Murder pageref _Toc470020580 \h 33 Age of Defendant pageref _Toc470020581 \h 33 Mental capacityvery low standard. pageref _Toc470020582 \h 34 Victim-Race Discrimination and the 8th AmendmentMcCleskey v. Kemp (U.S. 1987) Powell, J. pageref _Toc470020583 \h 34 COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES pageref _Toc470020584 \h 34 Stephen B. Bright. Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer. pageref _Toc470020585 \h 34 ATTRIBUTION OF CRIMINALITY pageref _Toc470020586 \h 34 ATTEMPT pageref _Toc470020587 \h 34 PUNISHMENT FOR ATTEMPT pageref _Toc470020588 \h 34 Why Punish Attempt? pageref _Toc470020589 \h 34 Retributivist perspectives: pageref _Toc470020590 \h 34 Utilitarian perspectives: pageref _Toc470020591 \h 35 The Emergence of Attempt Liability pageref _Toc470020592 \h 35 Criteria pageref _Toc470020593 \h 35 How early to intervene? pageref _Toc470020594 \h 35 Punishment pageref _Toc470020595 \h 35 MENS REA/ACTUS REUS pageref _Toc470020596 \h 36 THE ACTUS REUS OF ATTEMPT pageref _Toc470020597 \h 36 Preparation vs. AttemptPeople v. Murray (CA 1859) pageref _Toc470020598 \h 36 The substantial step test Model Penal Code 5.01. Criminal Attempt. pageref _Toc470020599 \h 36 Subjectiveness of the act requirement in practiceMcQuirter v. State (AL 1953) pageref _Toc470020600 \h 36 Proximity to success testPeople v. Rizzo (NY 1927) pageref _Toc470020601 \h 37 DEFENSES to attempt pageref _Toc470020602 \h 37 Abandonment pageref _Toc470020603 \h 37 Impossibility pageref _Toc470020604 \h 37 COMPLICITY pageref _Toc470020605 \h 38 Introduction pageref _Toc470020606 \h 38 Complicity under the common law pageref _Toc470020607 \h 38 Complicity today pageref _Toc470020608 \h 38 Thorny Issues pageref _Toc470020609 \h 38 Elements of complicity pageref _Toc470020610 \h 39 Abandonment defenseMPC 2.06(6)(c) pageref _Toc470020611 \h 39 THE ACCESSORIAL ACT (actus reus) pageref _Toc470020612 \h 39 State v. Tally (AL 1894) pageref _Toc470020613 \h 39 Why is no but-for analysis required? pageref _Toc470020614 \h 39 MENS REA OF COMPLICITY pageref _Toc470020615 \h 40 Community of purpose pageref _Toc470020616 \h 40 Minority approach pageref _Toc470020617 \h 40 Majority approach pageref _Toc470020618 \h 40 Mens rea with respect to principals criminal intent and mens rea with respect to facilitative effect of accomplices conductPeople v. Beeman (CA 1984) pageref _Toc470020619 \h 40 Mens rea with respect to principals criminal intent and mens rea required for principals crimeWilson v. People (CO 1939) pageref _Toc470020620 \h 40 Rex v. Othello pageref _Toc470020621 \h 40 Rex v. Iago pageref _Toc470020622 \h 40 CONSPIRACY pageref _Toc470020623 \h 41 Introduction pageref _Toc470020624 \h 41 Comparison between Conspiracy and Attempt. pageref _Toc470020625 \h 41 Comparison between Conspiracy and Complicity. pageref _Toc470020626 \h 41 Elements of conspiracy pageref _Toc470020627 \h 41 Agreement requirement pageref _Toc470020628 \h 41 Overt act requirement pageref _Toc470020629 \h 41 Withdrawal/abandonment pageref _Toc470020630 \h 42 THE NATURE OF CONSPIRACY pageref _Toc470020631 \h 42 State v. Verive (AZ 1981) pageref _Toc470020632 \h 42 Unilateral conspiracy pageref _Toc470020633 \h 42 THE MENS REA OF CONSPIRACY pageref _Toc470020634 \h 42 With limited exceptions, state must show two components: pageref _Toc470020635 \h 42 People v. Lauria (CA 1967) pageref _Toc470020636 \h 43 THE Scope of conspiracys net pageref _Toc470020637 \h 43 The Pinkerton rule pageref _Toc470020638 \h 43 Proving the scope of an agreement pageref _Toc470020639 \h 44 Hypothetical bank robbery conspiracy pageref _Toc470020640 \h 44 Conspiracy charge has big advantages for the state pageref _Toc470020641 \h 44 Conspiracy model examples pageref _Toc470020642 \h 45 THE RICO STATUTE AND THE FRONTIER OF CONSPIRACY pageref _Toc470020643 \h 45 The Statute pageref _Toc470020644 \h 45 Elements pageref _Toc470020645 \h 45 Penalties pageref _Toc470020646 \h 45 Forfeiture pageref _Toc470020647 \h 45 1961. Definitions. pageref _Toc470020648 \h 46 1962. Racketeering activities. pageref _Toc470020649 \h 46 Elements of proof of substantive crimes pageref _Toc470020650 \h 46 1964. Civil remedies. pageref _Toc470020651 \h 46 Section 1962(a) Violations pageref _Toc470020652 \h 46 Section 1962(b) Violations pageref _Toc470020653 \h 46 Section 1962(c) Violations pageref _Toc470020654 \h 46 justification and excuse pageref _Toc470020655 \h 47 General comments pageref _Toc470020656 \h 47 Why have a justification defense? pageref _Toc470020657 \h 47 Why have excuse defense? pageref _Toc470020658 \h 47 Four defenses pageref _Toc470020659 \h 47 Burden of Proof. pageref _Toc470020660 \h 47 Distinguishing justification and excuse pageref _Toc470020661 \h 47 Wrongdoing. pageref _Toc470020662 \h 47 Legality. pageref _Toc470020663 \h 48 Third parties. pageref _Toc470020664 \h 48 Defensive Force pageref _Toc470020665 \h 48 General comment pageref _Toc470020666 \h 48 Justifiable Homicide pageref _Toc470020667 \h 48 Defensive Force and the Battered Spouse pageref _Toc470020668 \h 49 Reprise on the Reasonable Self-Defender pageref _Toc470020669 \h 50 The self-defense standard applied by most courts is a mixed standard pageref _Toc470020670 \h 50  Criminal Law outline OVERVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM The Big Questions of Criminal Law Society v. Individual Values Social Control & Order Ensuring the rights of the accused Ensuring the safety of the community Dealing with the most emotional issues of rights and justice Minimizing infringements on individual freedom. Why do we have criminal law? mechanism for social order guide to behavior restriction on state power system of norms and values safety providing examples of both proscribed and desirable behavior punishing wrongdoing providing national identity standardization of punishment Criminal law defines and declares the limits and structure of state power. What makes a good penal code? Specificity v. breadth and flexibility Where laws come from is critical to their legitimacy and quality. Notice Specific definitions of right and wrong. Vagueness can mean constitutional trouble. Structure of the Criminal Justice System Burden on the state The bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Burden on the accused The accused is not required to prove innocence; innocence is presumed. Defense counsel can challenge evidence, subpoena, bring witnesses, make arguments. Trial by jury: Unanimity Division of legal and factual decision-making powers Lay perspective Closer to society, culture, and local norms Ability to nullify Flexibility of the system Cases are decided individually. Mitigating factors are considered. Record of prior offenses Remorse Nature of offense and likelihood of repeat for the particular offense Victims feelings Penal resources Damage caused to public by the crime Politics The prosecutor has flexibility in deciding whether to charge, what to charge, and whether to plea bargain. The judge has flexibility in sentencing. The police have flexibility in their conduct and their strategies. The correctional system can parole or release early. Juries can nullify. Criminal Procedure State supreme courts can decide federal and constitutional questions. Habeas Corpus Protected by Article III. Only place in criminal law where state defendants can get federal review below the Supreme Court level. 28 U.S.C. 2254 is the jurisdictional statute that gives prisoners the right to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus in District Court. Because they are trial courts, District Courts can conduct factual hearings with respect to federal legal questions about imprisonment (but not on matters previously adjudicated). District Court must review petitions for writ of habeas corpus on the merits; they cannot simply pass on review (unlike the Supreme Court). District Court can grant writ, deny writ, or remand for resentencing. WHY DO WE PUNISH?PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF PUNISHMENT Purposes and Goals of Punishment Retribution Incapacitation (a utilitarian goal) Segregation (a retributive goal) Rehabilitation (an individual goal) Deterrence (both general and specific) Countering recidivism People respond to it Denunciation: definition of norms Maintenance of state power and political control; the monopoly on violence. Political ends, such as masking economic inequalities, war on drugs. NB: Punishment is a social choice. We dont have to punish. Alternatives, such as incentives and rewards are theoretically possible. Incarceration Achieves retributive goal of segregating the dangerous, not the utilitarian goal of incapacitating the dangerous. Protection of others. Deterrence As currently applied, it doesnt work, at least not fully. Success depends on: Information Free will Logic/reason Economic rational choice Capacity and possibility of making another choice Costs will be perceived as costs by the individual General Discouraging future unwanted acts by anyone. Specific Discouraging future unwanted acts by a specific person. Retribution Goal: just deserts, redressing wrongs, making victims whole, making society whole, preventing vigilantism (monopoly on power of retribution), vengeance. Assuring proportionality. Rehabilitation DEFINING CULPABILITY Basic Elements of a Crime Punishment must be for (1) past (2) voluntary (3) bad (4) conduct (5) specified (6) in advance (7) by statute. Actus reus + mens rea + circumstances + causation + result defenses = crime ACTUS REUSCULPABLE CONDUCT Actus Reus defined Past, voluntary (avoidable) conduct within the jurisdiction, specified in advance (notice; avoiding vagueness) by statute. Actus Reus: The Requirement of the Act There must be an act, not the likelihood of an act. (Non-act crimes do not change the philosophical requirement of an act.) The act can consist of an attempt or of steps taken. The entire system is conceptually predicated upon the notion of self-control. Penalties for losing self-control within prescribed codes of permissible behavior (values). Mere urges to transgress do not pass the threshold of criminality; the act of transgressive loss of self-control is the point at which we punish. Herbert Packer Punishing conduct constrains us from pure utilitarian prophylaxis. Punishing conduct permits us to define a line of criminality and to hold people accountable when they that line but to permit freedom as long as they dont. Mens Rea is necessary but not sufficient Otherwise, we would negate the importance of choice and self-control. Circumstances Circumstances may determine whether conduct is criminal. Causation Conduct must still cause the offense. Result Often the result need not be harmful and/or there need not be any victim. Defenses Act may be justified or excused. Involuntariness: Insanity, Compulsion; Automatism, etc. Illustration: Burglary It is unlawful to break into a dwelling or enter such dwelling without permission with the intent to commit a[ny] crime. If the dwelling is occupied at the time, the offense is first-degree burglary. If the dwelling is unoccupied at the time, the offense is second-degree burglary. The prior intent requirement means, in theory, one could get off if the intent to commit a crime came after the entry. VOLUNTARINESS Proctor v. State (OK 1918) {Defendant kept a place and intended to sell booze (during Prohibition) but no allegation that he ever actually sold liquor.} Keeping a place expressed but unexecuted intent is not enough of an act. Punishing intent alone raises liberty concerns. There must be an overt illegal act. Martin v. State (AL 1944) {Cops arrested D in his home, took him into street, charged him with being drunk in public. Statute said Any person who, while intoxicated, appears in any public place and manifests a drunken condition by boisterous or indecent conduct, or loud and profane discourse, shall, on conviction, be fined.} No voluntary act. NB: Literal voluntariness is slippery. People v. Grant (IL 1977) {D had psychomotor epilepsyprone to seizures and violent outbursts. D threw himself on officer and was arrested. D had seizure later and was hospitalized. Jury was instructed on insanity, but not on automatic behavior.} No voluntary act, no crime. Lack of conscious control over acts precludes criminal responsibility. Court careful not to conflate involuntariness with insanity. Distinction between involuntariness and insanity Involuntarinessacquittal. Insanitypossible civil commitment. Involuntariness is an affirmative defense. People v. Newton (CA 1970) {Cop shot Huey in stomach at close range. Huey shot and killed another cop. Huey claimed defense of involuntary action due to automatism. Experts testified that gunshot that penetrates body cavity is likely to produce profound reflex shock reaction.} Reflex shock condition may make action involuntary. OMISSIONS Act and Failure to Act: Crimes of Omission and Status Crimes Omission in the face of a legal duty constitutes actus reus. Liability is tied to relationship between the defendant and the victim. Jones v. United States (DC 1962) {Mother of illegitimate kid placed baby in Ds care, in Ds home. Baby died of malnutrition.} Only omission of legal duties, not moral duties, is criminal conduct. The actus reus element is the omission itself. The mens rea element is the negligence of a legal duty. Most jurisdictions apply four categories of legal duty, rooted in common law: statutory duty status-based duty contractual duty voluntary assumption of care of an individual and seclusion of that individual from others (Narrow categories mitigate jury inclination to convict for what feels like irresponsibility.) STATUS OFFENSES General comments Criminalizing status may mean people can be in a position of continuous guilt. Logically, this could mean infinite prosecution and permanent punishment. [It seems that crimes be preterit as opposed to imperfect. That is, they must have determinate locations in time, with both beginnings and ends.] Robinson v. California (U.S. 1962) Stewart, J. {D arrested under CA statute that made it a crime to be addicted to the use of narcotics.} Statute improperly punishes addiction, an illness, which may be contracted involuntarily. Offends 8th Amendment. Future propensity to commit a crime (such as drug use) cannot be criminal. Powell v. Texas (U.S. 1968) {D charged under TX statute that makes it a crime to get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place. D relies on Robinson, arguing affliction with disease of alcoholism, making his conduct involuntary.} Robinson defense rejected. Powell had a choice and chose to be drunk in public (mens rea). Criminal sanction was for public behavior (actus reus), not for alcoholism (status), a disease. Policy concern behind statute: public health and safety. (Act requirement looser here than in Robinson or Grant.) White, J., (concurring): If it cant be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use drugs, how can it be a crime to yield to the compulsion? Pottinger v. Miami (FL 1992) {Class-action on behalf of homeless arrested for performing life-sustaining activities in public such as sitting, standing, eating, drinking, etc.} Conduct inseparable from status. Status involuntary. Acts are necessary; homeless have no meaningful choice in where or whether to perform them. Arrest for performing otherwise lawful, harmless acts they are compelled to perform in public punishes them for being homeless. Offends 8th Amendment. Comparison of Pottinger and Robinson Homelessness is a status that no one voluntarily chooses. Comparison of Pottinger and Powell Pottinger concerned not just status, but specific acts that violated Miami ordinances. No health and safety issue in Pottinger. Pottinger is a lower-court case. Entirely different conduct. Johnson v. State (FL 1992) {Mother charged with delivery of drugs to newborns through umbilical cord in seconds between birth and severing of cord.} Conviction overturned as absurd, as contrary to legislative intent and public interest. Lenity Rule: Ambiguous statute should be read narrowly and in light most favorable to defendant. Possible defense arguments: punishment for addiction (status) punishment for pregnancy (status) punishment for being a woman (status)this is a crime no man can commit act was non-volitional; even if ingestion was volitional (arguable), delivery was not Possible prosecution arguments: the timing of ingestion makes it at least knowing, if not volitional policy concern for not permitting this conduct punishment is for the act, not for the status following Grant logic, she knew the propensity, she knew the results from previous experience (drug-addicted baby) she chose to take the drugs, knowing from her first pregnancy that doing so could result in delivery LIMITATIONS ON PUNISHMENT OF CULPABLE CONDUCT PROPORTIONALITY General comments Judiciary defers very heavily to legislative and executive with respect to proportionality. The area of egregious error where the courts will step in is very small. The Supreme Court has been extremely tentative in assessing proportionality, especially in non-capital cases. Proportionality is one of the places where the lack of uniform criminal code shows its problems. Solem v. Helm (US 1983) Powell, J. {D had 6 prior non-violent felony convictions. SD recidivism statute permitted sentencing for a Class 1 felony for any felony conviction beyond 3. D received maximum Class 1 sentence: Life in prison without possibility of parole.} Sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime, in violation of the 8th Amendment. Three-prong test for gauging proportionality: (1) Gravity of offense vs. harshness of penalty. (2) Sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. (3) Sentences imposed for commission of same crime in other jurisdictions. [Under Harmelin, only if sentence fails (1) are (2) and (3) considered.] Harmelin v. Michigan (U.S. 1991) {Automatic sentence of life without parole for possession of 672 g. of cocaine. D argued automatic sentencing unconstitutional for excluding mitigating factors.} Sentence deemed not disproportionate. Scalia, J. (for majority) Automatic sentencing only unconstitutional for capital crimes. Scalia, J. (joined only by Rehnquist, C.J.) 8th Amendment doesnt require proportionality. Kennedy, J. (for 3-Justice plurality) Five principles that guide proportionality considerations: (1) Sentencing requirements for individual crimes is a matter for the legislature, which weighs policy goals. (2) 8th Amendment does not mandate any one penological theory. (3) State sentencing schemes may embody different penological assumptions, making interstate comparison of sentences a difficult and imperfect enterprise. (4) Review should be as objective as possible, meaning type of imprisonment is easier to assess than term. (5) 8th Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. (Citing Solem.) LEGALITY Keeler v. Superior Court (CA 1970) Mosk, J. {D killed his ex-wifes unborn fetus by battery and was charged with murder.} To permit conviction by defining an unborn but viable fetus as a human being for purposes of CA murder statute would violate the fair-warning requirement since it would be an enlargement of the crime from what was intended at enactment. The only exception would be if the enlargement were foreseeable to the defendant. Fair-warning requirement is a due-process matter. Only legislatures can expand the criminal law. Judicial enlargement would constitute creation of an ex post facto law. After Keeler, the California legislature amended the statute to include feticide. SPECIFICITY Ricks v. District of Columbia (DC 1968) {D convicted under incredibly vague vagrancy law.} Statute held unconstitutional. 5th Amendment due-process problems: Vagueness and lack of fair warning. There must be a reasonable degree of guidance and notice to citizens, cops, and courts. Too much free rein to cops to define criminality at will. Imprecise statutes fail the fair-warning rule. Ordinary people must be able to know and understand whats prohibited. The line must be clearthere can be no room for speculation. Notice requirement not held simply because cops had previously told her of the statute. Papachristou v. Jacksonville (US 1972) Douglas, J. Vagrancy law struck down for vagueness and for punishing status. Mostly nouns, not verbs. MENS REATHE GUILTY MIND History Only in the late 18th century did this element emerge as essential. Purpose Limiting punishment to those morally blameworthy. Bad thoughts Desire to harm others or violate social duty. Disregard for welfare of others or for social duty. STRICT LIABILITY General comments Intent is not required. Liability for actual or potential effects without regard to fault. Generally public welfare offenses (safety, health, etc.) where it seems theres no other way to protect the public Generally for offenses that are mala prohibita, not mala in se. Usually relatively minor. Usually punishable by fines and/or less than one year in jail. Most jurisdictions have some strict liability offenses, but they are usually limited. Examples Speeding some weapons offenses statutory rape carnal knowledge tax violations food-quality laws miscellaneous misdemeanors. Strict liability and the Model Penal Code The Model Penal Code is opposed to strict liability offenses. It employs a scheme of culpability and mental states and sees criminal responsibility as requiring choice and awareness of consequences. United States v. Balint (U.S. 1922) Taft, C.J. {Appeal by U.S. of quashing of indictment for failing to state a mental element in case charging violation of the Narcotic Act.} Public welfare offenses need not contain a mental element. 5th Amendment doesnt require all criminal statutes to include mental element. Congress decided the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to penalty was justified by the greater interest in preventing exposure of innocent purchasers to dangerous drugs. High risk of the activity provides the basis for putting the burden on the defendant to know the law and that there is no mental element. The risk itself satisfies the notice requirementduty to inquire when engaging in highly risky activities. Speidel v. State (AK1969) Public welfare cases are a narrow class caused primarily by the industrial revolution, out of which grew the necessity of imposing more stringent duties on those connected with particular industries, trades, properties, or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare. United States v. Park (U.S. 1975) Burger, C.J. {President of Acme Markets charged with allowing food stored for interstate shipment to become contaminated, a federal offense. Knew about and did not remedy unsanitary conditions. Claimed he delegated that responsibility.} Criminally liable. Statute is regulatory in nature. Notions of individual blameworthiness and personal choice abandoned because of public interest in high-quality food. Public interest justifies imposing highest standard of care on distributors. D violated duty to know and to ensure that contamination did not take place. Morissette v. United States (U.S. 1952) Jackson, J. {D convicted of conversion of government property under statute that doesnt explicitly require mental element.} The mere omission of any mention of mental element will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crime it defines. This crime was clearly not in the public-welfare offense category. CATEGORIES OF CULPABILITY Regina v. Faulkner (U.K. 1877) {Defendant, a sailor, sought to steal rum on board his ship. In the process, he struck a match, igniting the rum and destroying the ship. Charged with feloniously, unlawfully, and maliciously setting fire to the ship. Crown argued that felonious intent to steal was sufficient to satisfy intent to burn the ship.} For the established mental element of felony A to eliminate the need to establish the mental element of felony B, felony B must be the natural and probable consequence of felony A. Other courts have permitted a looser standard than natural-and-probable. Model Penal Code 2.02(2). Definitions of Culpability A person acts [1] with respect to [2]: [1][2]CircumstanceResultConductPurposelywhen he is aware of such circumstances or hopes they existwhen it is his conscious object to cause such a resultwhen it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that natureKnowinglywhen he is aware that such circumstances existwhen he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a resultwhen he is aware that his conduct is of that natureRecklesslywhen he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element existswhen he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element will result from his conductNegligentlywhen he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element existswhen he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element will result from his conductMPC mens rea provisions are largely accepted for analyzing intent issues. Purposely Actors conscious objective, positive desire, is to cause such a result. Knowingly Although the result is not the actors conscious objective or positive desire, the actor is practically certain her conduct will cause such a result. Recklessly Actor consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Negligently Actor should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Since the actor was not aware of the risk, however, negligence is usually not criminally punishable. The old specific intent and general intent categories Specific intent corresponds with Purposely and Knowingly. General intent corresponds with Recklessly and Negligently. MISTAKE Model Penal Code 2.04. Ignorance or Mistake (1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. Mistakes of Fact General comments May negative the requisite mental state. The defense is not available in strict liability situations, since it is about mental element. State v. Guest (AK 1978) {Defendants had sex with a 15-year-old, thinking she was at least 16.} Honest and reasonable mistake as to age of victim is an affirmative defense to statutory rape and negatives the mental element. Statutory rape not a public welfare crime, so without intent, there is no crime. N.B.: While this is also the Model Penal Codes view, the majority of jurisdictions reject mistake of fact as a defense to statutory rape and define it as a strict liability offense. Evidence problems with testimony of minors. Protection of minors. Deterrence. Mistakes of Law General comments Generally not a valid defense. Exceptions Justifiable reliance, particularly on officials. Wholly passive conduct (omission) with respect to a law not widely known where there is no probability of learning of the law. We want to reward knowledge, not ignorance of the law. Ignorance is treated as more blameworthy than mistake. Due-process requirement of notice protects against being caught in violation of crazy, unforeseeable new laws. United States v. Baker (5th Cir. 1986) {Defendant dealt in counterfeit watches, knowing the watches to be counterfeit, but claimed not to know that his conduct was, as of 1984, illegal.} Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Long v. State (DE 1949) {After his attorney told him is AR divorce would be valid in DE, D remarried. Convicted of bigamy.} Ignorance of the law is a valid excuse where defendant made diligent, good faith, appropriate effort to learn the law and received incorrect information from a reliable source. [Full Faith and Credit clause might have worked; she likes the idea.] Commonwealth v. Twitchell (MA 1993) {Christian Scientist parents relied on erroneous AG opinion about the legality of not providing medical treatment to their kids, as a result of which they did not seek medical treatment and their kid died. Convicted of involuntary manslaughter.} Where defendants diligently attempt to obey the law and rely on an official interpretation of the law that proves to have been wrong, they may assert an affirmative defense of entrapment by estoppel. (The governments official interpretations estop it from holding people to a different standard.) Cheek v. United States (U.S. 1991) White, J. {D argues hes not guilty of willful tax evasion because he believes income taxes are unconstitutional, wages are not income, and he was not a taxpayer within meaning of IRS.} Belief that law is unconstitutional Irrelevanthe knew of duty to pay and chose to ignore it. A persons own judgment that law is unconstitutional is not a defense. Belief that wages `" income Relevant even a morally virtuous person could have made such a mistake. Interpretation of an individual interpretation as inapplicable is a defense in tax cases. (Court has since limited this defense.) Lambert v. California (U.S. 1957) Douglas, J. {D convicted of violating statute requiring all people previously convicted of a felony to register with cops when they enter the state. Did not know of the requirement.} Due process does not permit conviction of a crime of which one has no knowledge and no reasonable probability of acquiring such knowledge. Statute offended Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment. Conduct was entirely passivea crime of omission. Balint not on pointno reason to suspect possibility of an ordinance. D was given no opportunity to comply once she was informed of the ordinance. Holmes: A law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear. CAPACITY FOR MENS REA Insanity People v. Wetmore (CA 1978) Tobriner, J. {D had history of mental illness. He entered apt. belonging to another, thinking it was his apt., put on the mans clothes, and acted as though nothing was amiss. Convicted of burglary. D argues that mental illness prevented him from forming the requisite mens rea to commit the crime.} Evidence of diminished capacity is admissible at the guilt phase even if it is also evidence of insanity (which is admissible only at sentencing). We dont want to punish people who dont understand wrongfulness of their conduct. Today most jurisdictions permit insanity evidence to negative intent element in specific-intent crimes (diminished-capacity defense), resulting in acquittal. For general-intent crimes, insanity can only come in for lack of guilt for reason of insanity, usually resulting in civil commitment. Voluntary Intoxication State v. Cameron (NJ 1986) {D sought to introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication as a defense to multiple charges stemming from a fight. Trial court refused to permit such evidence and D was convicted.} Voluntary intoxication may be a defense for crimes requiring purposeful or knowing conduct (specific-intent crimes), but degree of intoxication must be so extreme as to render the person incapable of purposeful or knowing conduct. Because specific-intent crimes usually have lesser included offenses requiring only general intent, voluntary intoxication wont get one off the hook entirely. RAPE Definition Traditional definition. Vaginal intercourse by force or threatened use of force. Absence of consent. These are the basic elements in MPC 213.1. Proof Burden used to be essentially on the woman She had to show that she resisted to the maximum extent of her ability. She had to find corroboration of her testimony. Recently, the burden on the woman has been reduced. Largely because of feminist impact on the law. Prosecutrices no longer are subject to cross examination. Corroboration requirement abolished. Resistance is now seen as often futile or counterproductive and as of little value in showing nonconsent. Now its more her word against his. Rape shield laws prevent introduction of evidence about a womans sexual past. Marital, Relationship and Date Rape 24 states consider rape within marriage a lesser offense; 15 have abolished the distinction. Several extend some impunity to live-in non-marital relationships. Force is a central evidentiary problem in these cases. Actus reusFORCE, NONCONSENT, AND RESISTANCE General comments Force If force is to be an element, the term must be defined. Force at least provides good evidence of lack of consent. A force requirement would afford some protection to the accused. Consent What must be proved, consent or nonconsent? Is consent a defense or is nonconsent an element? Both the actions of the accused and the responses of the complainant are considered. Complainants conduct is still an issue. People v. Barnes (CA 1986) Bird, C.J. {They knew each other, had hung out. On this occasion, he acted belligerent, threatened her, and demanded sex. She complied out of fear for her safety.} Court of Appeal incorrectly dismissed for lack of evidence of measurable resistance No requirement that she resist. Nonconsent can be satisfied by finding of reasonable and genuine fear of physical violence. State v. Rusk (MD 1981) {They met in a bar, she drove him home, he took her car keys, he coaxed her up, she was terrified, she went up, she submitted and they had sex, she left and went to the police.} Both force and nonconsent are an essential elements. Court defined force as acts and threats of the defendant . . . reasonably calculated to create in the mind of the victimhaving regard to the circumstances in which she was placeda real apprehension, due to fear, of imminent bodily harm, serious enough to impair or overcome her will to resist. Evidence of reasonably grounded fear can obviate need to show resistance. Reasonableness is a fact question. MENS REA People v. Mayberry (CA 1975) {Considerable violence beforehand. She finally submitted. D argues he honestly and reasonably believed she had consented.} If a defendant has a reasonable and bona fide belief that a prosecutrix has voluntarily consented, he does not possess the requisite intent for conviction of rape. Jury will still decide whether it beliefs him. HOMICIDE Homicide under the common law Malice The dividing line between murder and manslaughter Intent to cause, or willingness to undertake a serious risk of causing, the death of another, when that intent or willingness is based on an immoral or unworthy aim. Gradations have to do with extent of risk, awareness of risk, and unworthiness of the motivating aim. Categories Murder Unjustified killing with malice. Unjustified killing manifesting Purpose to cause death; or Intent to inflict serious bodily harm; or Extreme recklessness with regard to a serious risk of harm to anothers life in the context of such immoral or unworthy motives as to suggest callous indifference to life; or Willingness to undertake even a tiny risk of death in the course of a felony (Felony Murder). Manslaughter Unjustified killing without malice Contemporary gradations Murder First-degree murder Intentional and premeditated; or Felony murder Second-degree murder [NB: MPC has eliminated degrees because they arose in order to isolate cases in which capital punishment would be automatic.] Manslaughter Voluntary manslaughter Intentional killing without malice because killer Acted in the heat of passion after adequate provocation; or Acted in the honest but unreasonable belief that the killing was necessary for self-defense. Involuntary manslaughter Unintentional killing committed recklessly or highly negligently. Some states also have a misdemeanor-manslaughter rule that functions like the felony-murder rule. Some states further subdivide it into Reckless manslaughter Negligent homicide Some states have a separate rule for vehicular homicide Kansas Statute (1995) Murder in the first degree Intentionally and with premeditation; or In commission, attempt, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony. Murder in the second degree Intentionally; or Unintentionally but recklessly manifesting extreme indifference to human life. <1214 years> Voluntary manslaughter Intentionally Upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion; or Upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justified deadly force. <67 years.> Involuntary manslaughter Unintentionally Recklessly; or In the commission, attempt, or flight from a misdemeanor or a felony that is not inherently dangerous perpetrated to protect life or safety; or During the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. <45 years.> Vehicular homicide Unintentionally In the operation of a motor vehicle in a manner which Creates an unreasonable risk of injury to the person or property of another; and Constitutes a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the circumstances. Alabama Code (1995) Murder With intent to cause death does cause death; or Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person and causes the death of another person; or In the course of committing, attempting, or fleeing from of one of various felonies. Manslaughter Recklessly causes death of another; or Causes death of another under circumstances that would constitute murder except that act is due to sudden heat of passion caused by legally recognized provocation and before a reasonable time for passion to cool and for reason to return. <220 years; 1020 if a deadly weapon is used.> Criminally negligent homicide Causes death by criminal negligence. California Penal Code (1995) Murder Unlawful killing with malice aforethought. Intentional killing with express or implied malice constitutes malice aforethought. First-degree murder With destructive device or explosive or poison Lying in wait Torture Willful, deliberate, and premeditated Felony-murder (including drive-bys) Second-degree murder All others. Sample jury instructions First-degree murder Definition Specific intent to kill; and Malice; and Premeditation and deliberation. Government must prove Defendant inflicted the injury from which decedent died; and Defendant acted with malice at the time; and Defendant acted after premeditation; and Defendant acted after deliberation. Second-degree murder Government must prove Defendant inflicted the injury from which decedent died; and Defendant acted with malice at the time; and Defendant was not acting in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation. Manslaughter Definition Unlawful killing without malice; or In the sudden heat of passion caused by adequate provocation. Government must prove Defendant inflicted the injury from which decedent died; and Defendant acted without legal justification or excuse in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation. What to look for ActPossible level of homicideEvidence must showIntentional killing1st degree murderpremeditation and deliberation2nd degree murderimpulsive actVoluntary manslaughterheat of passion and adequate provocationUnintentional killing2nd degree murderExtreme recklessnessInvoluntary manslaughterShould have been aware of or consciously disregarded riskgross negligence; or misdemeanorINVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER Definition Unintentional killing with state of mind of recklessness, negligence, or gross negligence. Or misdemeanor manslaughter. Negligence State v. Williams (WA 1971) {Indian child with toothache turned into abscess, eventually caused death. Parents treated with aspirin, didnt realize gravity, and feared loss of child to welfare agency. Convicted of involuntary manslaughter.} Conviction upheld on the basis of an objective standard for determining negligence. Comparison of Williams and Twitchell Williams was more a mistake than the careful attempt to obey the law in Twitchell. In both cases parents sought to do what was best for their child. The typical standard not the simple negligence in Williams. The typical standard is: Gross negligence or recklessness; and A greater likelihood of particularly serious harm; and Actual awareness of that risk or at least a greater likelihood of awareness of that risk. Gross negligence is really rather subjective; juries get some discretion. Vehicular Manslaughter Porter v. State (FL 1956) {Drove through stop sign at 6065 mph on unfamiliar road, killing another driver.} Conviction reversed. Because its so common to run stop signs, its not gross negligence. [Standard found in custom.] Vehicular manslaughter is typically placed under the heading of involuntary manslaughter. Misdemeanor Manslaughter United States v. Walker (DC 1977) {D dropped unlicensed pistol and it went off, killing someone.} Convicted of involuntary manslaughter on misdemeanor-manslaughter theory. Burden on prosecution is to show the underlying misdemeanor and causal relationship between that infraction and the death. There need not be any negligence in the death itself. Misdemeanor-manslaughter rule is rarely used. Usually limited to mala in se violations. Not applied to strict-liability misdemeanors. Mens rea for underlying misdemeanor obviates need for mens rea for the homicide. VOLUNTARY manslaughter General comments An intentional killing is reduced to voluntary manslaughter where there has been adequate provocation to cause the defendant to act in the heat of passion. Pure, reasonable self-defense, is justified, excusable, and completely exculpatory. If the conduct falls below that standard, it leads to manslaughter. Reasons for recognizing mitigation Partial justification. Retributivist view: Provoked killing merits less punishment. Utilitarian view: We only seek to deter excessive responses to provocation. Partial excuse. Retributivist view: Provocation mitigates culpability. Utilitarian view: Acts in the heat of passion are less vulnerable to deterrence and such killers are less dangerous than those who kill without provocation. Guiding questions What is adequate provocation? How immediate must it be? When is the response to provocation response unreasonable (criminal)? How flexible are we in defining the reasonable person? Provocation under the Model Penal Code Two essential requirements: Adequacy (Objective). Provocation must be adequate. Reasonable-person standard. With few exceptions, mere words are not enough. [Almost every jurisdiction concurs that mere words are not enough.] Causation (Subjective). Defendant must have in fact been provoked and acted in response to such provocation, not from any previous intention to kill. State of mind must be assessed. Cooling-off time is also relevant. Adequate provocation First, did decedents conduct amount to adequate provocation? Second, was the defendants response reasonable? If the answer to either is negative the killing is a murder, not a manslaughter. Under common law, adequacy was held to an objective/reasonableness measure. The objective component protects predictability. [No longer true??] Categories of adequate provocation at common law Physical battery. Man witnessing wife committing adultery. Father witnessing son being sodomized. Categories of adequate provocation today are broader Battered woman syndrome, battered spouse syndrome, &c. Who decides? In some jurisdictions, judge first decides whether there may have been adequate provocation. In others, such as CA and PA, all evidence about provocation goes immediately to the jury, there are no arbitrary guidelines, and the judge stays out of the determination of adequacy of provocation. Jury Instructions [Do I have these backwards??] Subjective instruction Courts tend to permit the jury to apply a subjective test for adequacy of provocation, asking them to place themselves in the place of the accused, considering personal factors of the accused. In some jurisdictions, courts also inject some objective guidelines regarding reasonableness. Objective instruction Courts usually instruct the jury with an objective standard regarding restraint and self-control. People v. Walker (IL 1965) {Decedent was armed, belligerent, violent, drunk, persistent. He harassed D and his friends, demanded they gamble, and came at them repeatedly with a knife. D hit decedent in the head with a brick, knocking him out. D then took decedents knife and, as friends told him not to, D cut decedents throat.} D stated his intent to kill but was in the heat of passion. Court found the lack of a cooling-off period to be critical. Courts treat a break in the action, removal from the situation, and an opportunity to cool down, as evidence of greater culpability. Court felt it wasnt the moral equivalent of premeditation. Rowland v. State (MS 1904) {D witnessed his wife committing adultery. In a fit of rage, he shot at the man, but hit and killed his wife instead. Appeals murder conviction.} A man finding his wife in the act of adultery is adequate provocation. If he responds instantly with deadly force, the grade of homicide is reduced from murder to manslaughter. Deliberate design in conditions of adequate provocation is manslaughter. People v. Tapia (CA 1988) {Defendants, heroin addicts, had been beaten, threatened, assaulted on multiple occasions by their supplier. After several threats to kill them, they ambushed and killed him instead.} Proper instruction was manslaughter, not murder. Prolonged fear can provide sufficient provocation to support a manslaughter verdict under a heat-of-passion theory. Anger is not the only intense emotion that may support a heat-of-passion theory. Cultural Relativism and the Reasonable Person People v. Wu (CA 1991) {Chinese immigrant had bad relationship with father of her illegitimate son. Very depressed. Discovered father was treating son poorly. Decided to kill him and herself so she could care for him in the afterlife. Killed son and attempted suicide. Has no memory of killing her son. Convicted of second-degree murder.} Reversed and remanded for new jury instructions Fugue state She was entitled to a jury instruction on unconsciousness, because of evidence that she acted in a fugue state. If the jury accepts the fugue defense, that would mean a verdict of not guilty (no intent). Culture She was entitled to a jury instruction that he jury may take into account the considerable testimony about her culture and how it affected her mental state. If it accepts the culture defense, that could lower the charges (different intent). A defendants cultural background and beliefs may be taken into account in assessing her possession of the requisite mental element of a crime. Cultural issues and differences from Williams We make allowances for angry responses to emotional offenses. Counsel in Wu was attempting to expand the ways in which provocation can be understood. Counsel in Williams was much less concerned with use of culture to explain away lack of intent. Tough issues raised by Wu Shifting, fluid standard of reasonableness based on culture. Cultural mitigation is extremely difficult to assess. Cultural mitigation can undermine the predictability that is crucial for fairness. What constitutes a culture? MURDER Intent to kill Intentional killing with express or implied malice establishes the malice or malice aforethought necessary for murder. Malice California Penal Code (1995) definitions Express malice Deliberate, manifest intent unlawfully to kill. Implied malice No considerable provocation; or Circumstances show extreme recklessness (abandoned and malignant heart). Possible evidence of malice Witness testimony of prior but recent statements of intent. Conscious disregard of risk. Manifest indifference to value of human life. Circumstances. Insufficiency of provocation. Past relationship of the parties. Weapon used. Overkill. Particular characteristics of the defendant (sharpshooter, golden-gloves champ, etc.) Defendants past is generally inadmissible May be admitted for motive, signature (identity, mistaken identity, common scheme), and certainly at penalty phase. Intentional Murder (Second Degree) Francis v. Franklin (U.S. 1985) Brennan, J. {D, convict, seized guards gun, escaped, took hostage, knocked on doors demanding a car. Decedent said he had no car and slammed door. Gun went off, killing decedent. D immediately confessed, insisted killing was an accident, that he had no intent to kill. Circumstantial evidence of lack of intent: slamming of door, trajectory of second bullet, immediate confession, lack of injury to anyone else along the way despite ample opportunity.} Burden to prove intent remains at all times on prosecution. Defendant bears no burden to disprove intent to killno presumption of intent. Bad jury instruction: Rebuttable presumption that acts are a product of will, consequences are intended. Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment prohibits jury instructions that shift burden of proof on the critical question of intent in a criminal prosecution. Proper jury instructions with respect to intent Must not shift burdens to defendant. Must be specific to this defendant and these facts. Must not lower the standard of proof. Must not undermine presumption of innocence. Must not permit presumptions of intent (though inference is another matter). Commentary to Model Penal Code 210.2. Purposeful or Knowing Homicide. Both are murder if unjustified and unexcused and unmitigated by mental or emotional disturbance or provocation. No useful distinction between purpose and knowledge as mental elements. To say that a person is presumed to intend the natural or probable consequence of their acts is misleading, though courts do it often. Prosecution must establish that defendant acted (1) with conscious objective of causing death of another or (2) at least with awareness that the death of another was practically certain to result from the act. (This may be established circumstantially.) EXTREME RECKLESSNESS (Second-degree Murder) General comments Extreme recklessness is considered the moral equivalent of intent. Extreme recklessness is more than mere recklessness, more than gross negligence. How to distinguish extreme recklessness (second-degree murder) from gross negligence(involuntary manslaughter)? Actors awareness of the risk. Conduct without social utility. Inherently reckless conduct, such as Russian roulette. Pattern and practice in face of evidence of extreme risk. Use of a weapon. Russian PokerCommonwealth v. Malone (PA 1946) {D killed friend while playing Russian Poker.} Second-degree murder conviction upheld. Gross recklessness. Death was likely. Death was reasonably to be expected. Total absence of social utility. Combination of these establishes malice. Malone Hypotheticals Didnt pull trigger but gun went off anyway: involuntary manslaughter. Put the bullet in the wrong chamber by mistake: negligent homicide. Paid no attention to which chamber he put the bullet in: murder. Killer DentistPeople v. Protopappas (CA 1988) {Dentist killed three patients with anesthesia. Knew that the patients were unusually sensitive to anesthesia. Left them in care of unqualified people.} Second-degree murder convictions on basis of implied malice upheld. Knowing the clear risk and in violation of professional standards of care, defendant repeatedly acted with extreme recklessness. The pattern served as evidence of extreme recklessness, the basis for implied malice. Killer DogBerry v. Superior Court (CA 1989) {Defendant warned neighbors his dog was a killer. Dog was tethered but fence was ajar. Defendant kept dog to guard pot plants. Toddler wandered in and was killed.} Second-degree murder instruction allowed on grounds of awareness that conduct was life-threatening and antisocial. Court applied two-part test for second-degree murder for an unintentional killing. (1) Extreme indifference to the value of human life, as evidenced by probability that conduct will result in death. (2) Awareness either of the risks or of the illegality of the conduct. (Ultimately convicted of involuntary manslaughter.) Intent to do serious bodily injuryCommonwealth v. Dorazio (PA 1950) {Former boxer beat rival union activist to unconsciousness, then returned and beat him to death.} Second-degree murder conviction upheld. Intent to inflict serious bodily harm need not go so far as intent to do permanent or fatal injury in order to meet the mens rea for second-degree murder if the assailant employs a deadly weapon. Vehicular murderPeople v. Watson (CA 1981) {Drunk driving resulting in death.} Second-degree murder charge available for drunk driver who causes fatal car accident. Evidence supports implied malice. Going to a bar in a car meant he must have known he would drive later and so willfully drinking to intoxication satisfied the intent element. Bird, C.J. (dissenting): This conduct happens all the time and rarely produces death. Danger of overbreadth. AGGRAVATED MURDER FIRST-DEGREE MURDER General comments First-degree murder carries the most severe penalties, usually mandatory minimums of 2025 years. Killing with intent is second-degree murder unless aggravating factors can be established to up it to first-degree murder. Aggravating elements Premeditation. Deliberation. Some states use other elements to elevate to first-degree murder CA: Torture, Ambush, Poison, Explosives, etc. Proof Premeditation Evidence of planning or preparing Prior statements Motive Stalking Murder weapon Manner and circumstances of killing Relationship between the parties Deliberation Reflection Passage of timesome jurisdictions say seconds are not enough. Lack of provocation, heat of passion, hot blood, aggravation. PREMEDITated murder (first degree) United States v. Watson (DC 1985) {Defendant fled cops investigating auto theft. Cop came in with gun drawn, attempted arrest, said, Do you want me to blow your motherfucking head off? Defendant struggled, knocked gun away, immobilized cop, retrieved gun. Cop said, Its not worth it, twice. Defendant rose up and killed cop with a single shot to the chest.} First-degree murder conviction upheld. State must prove Premeditation Defendant planned and calculated. Deliberation. Defendant gave thought to the idea and reached a definite decision, made a choice to kill. Defendant weighed the idea, gave it a second thought, considered it, didnt act impulsively. No specific amount of time is necessary but some appreciable time must elapse between formation of the design to kill and the actual execution of the design. Time need not be long; a pause is enough. Intent (malice). Circumstantial evidence may form basis for inferring intent. Evidence must be sufficient to persuade, not compel. [Given the evidence of hot blood and reasonable basis for fear, this case might have been voluntary manslaughter were the victim not a cop. KTT amazed no second-degree instruction.] Cold blood testAustin v. United States (DC Cir. 1967) Discusses deliberation, quoting Cardozo: There can be no intent unless there is a choice, yet . . . the choice without more is enough to justify the inference that the intent was deliberate and premeditated. Usually cold blood suggests deliberation and lack of impulse. Hot-blooded first-degree murder Even in hot blood there can be the intent for first-degree murder if there is some appreciable time during which there is further thought and considering, if the killing isnt spontaneous. Fully formed purpose testCommonwealth v. Scott (PA 1925) {Cop killing. Are you carrying any moonshine? This is what I have for you. Bang.} It is the fully formed purpose, not the time, which constitutes the higher degree of murder. First-degree murder, perhaps because: Defendant knew the cop would ask him next. Defendant was carrying a gun. Defendants statement suggests rehearsal. No significant provocation. Insanity and capacity for premeditationCommonwealth v. Gould (MA 1980) {Paranoid schizophrenic convinced he had to kill girlfriend because she was impure. First-degree murder conviction because he failed to establish inability to appreciate wrongfulness or to exercise restraint.} Capacity for intent does not establish capacity for premeditation. Evidence of voluntary drug or alcohol use is permitted for this same purpose. FELONY MURDER General comments Felony murder is the only way an unintentional homicide can be a first-degree murder. U.S. is virtually the only western country to still permit the most serious sanctions for accidental killings. Abolished in U.K. in 1957. Common criticisms include overbreadth, transference/substitution of intent, etc. Partly in response to criticisms, courts have limited scope to exclude deaths of participants, to require foreseeability, etc. Inherently dangerous felonies When someone is killed in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony, most jurisdictions permit a first-degree felony murder charge. Inherently-dangerous felonies usually include kidnapping, rape, arson, burglary, robbery, and distribution of drugs. Escape from prison and grand theft are not inherently-dangerous felonies. Mens rea for first-degree felony murder Intent to commit the felony substitutes for intent to kill. States burden State must prove the felony and the causal link. Theoretical foundations Agency theory (the leading theory) On is liable only for ones own acts and for those of ones accomplices in furtherance of perpetration of felony. Most states follow this theory Critique May be too narrow because it excludes foreseeable deaths. Proximate-cause theory (a minority theory) Liability where felony is the proximate cause of the death. A few states have held onto this theory. Critiques But felonies are the proximate cause of many deaths that dont reach the felony murder threshold. Since this is criminal law and not tort, were dealing with moral culpability, so proximate cause isnt enough. Overinclusive. Protected-person theory (a minority theory) Liability only extends to innocent (protected) persons killed. Critiques Assigns different values to different lives. A certain arbitrariness and attenuation of act, mental element. Felony Murder Found Defendant and co-defendant commit felony (armed robbery). Victim has heart attack and dies. Stamp. Defendant and co-defendant commit felony (burglary). Cop kills cop. Hickman. Defendant and co-defendant commit felony. Victim kills innocent. Payne. Co-defendant kills co-defendant during felony. Cabaltero. Felony Murder not Found Co-defendant commits arson and kills self in the process. Ferlin. Defendant and co-defendant commit felony (armed robbery). Victim kills co-defendant. Washington. Defendant and co-defendant commit felony. Police kill victim. Rationale Deterrence is the usual argument. Counterarguments These deaths are so rare that deterrent effect probably doesnt exist. Felony already has adequate deterrence. Possibility that a felon can receive the maximum punishment we have for the acts of an accomplice. Virtual Strict LiabilityPeople v. Stamp (CA 1969) {Decedent died of heart attack after armed robbery. Underlying heart condition.} Felony murder upheld. Foreseeability is irrelevant. You take your victims as you find them. Divided expert testimony on causation. [Weak case for involuntary manslaughter because of lack of foreseeability.] Immediate flightPeople v. Gladman (NY 1976) {Police killing during escape 15 minutes after armed robbery.} Killing in immediate flight from a qualifying felony is felony first-degree murder. Tests Homicide and felony at same location? How far apart? How much time since felony? Had loot been secured? Had felon reached temporary safety? Were police or others in pursuit? Generally, the criteria still go to the jury for determination of fact. One Accomplice Killed by AnotherPeople v. Cabaltero (CA 1939) {Armed robbery. One accomplice shoots at two workers on the scene. Another accomplice, in anger, kills the first accomplice. Third accomplice got felony murder.} Any killing by one engaged in a qualifying felony is first-degree felony murder. Killing need not be done in the furtherance of the offense. Felon Causes Own DeathPeople v. Ferlin (CA) {Felon killed himself in course of arson.} Accomplice cannot be charged with first-degree felony murder. Killing oneself is not a homicide. [Some jurisdictions have allowed first-degree felony murder charges in such cases.] Cop Shoot CopPeople v. Hickman (IL 1973) {Cop killed cop as they were attempting to prevent escape of felon.} first-degree felony murder conviction upheld. Court looks to legislative history of felony-murder statute. A killing by a third person trying to prevent the commission of the felony is intended to be covered by the statute. [Court equates escape and commission.] Accomplice Killed by Robbery VictimPeople v. Washington (CA 1965) Traynor, C.J. {Defendants accomplice killed by robbery victim.} First-degree felony murder conviction reversed. Killing was not committed by defendant in perpetration or attempt of felony. Therefore, defendant lacked malice aforethought. Foreseeability is not enough. Such a conviction would have negligible deterrent value. If decedent had shot first, it would have gone the other way. [Washington seems to contradict Hickman.] CAPITAL MURDER/THE DEATH PENALTY General comments 38 states have death penalty for first-degree murder All have separate statutes that spell out substantive criteria and trial procedures for determining whether someone convicted of first-degree murder should get the death penalty. 1997: highest number of executions since W.W.II. >3,000 on death row. Disproportionately black, Latino, and poor. More than half the executions since 1976 have been in FL, TX, and LA. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Before Furman First-degree murder meant eligibility for death penalty. Little guidance in sentencing. Furman v. Georgia (U.S. 1972) 54 per curium Supreme Court struck down death penalty. Brennan and Marshall found it incompatible with evolving standards of human dignity and had no deterrent value. Douglas, Stewart, and White found defects in sentencing and application, wanton and freakish imposition, randomness. Burger, Blackmun, Powell, & Rehnquist dissented. Woodson v. North Carolina (U.S. 1976) 54 Stewart Mandatory death penalty unconstitutional way around problems with discretionary statute. Need for particularity. White, Burger, Blackmun, & Rehnquist dissented. Gregg v. Georgia (U.S. 1976) 72 Stewart, Powell, & Stevens New GA statute upheld. White had switched sides. Can be constitutional if procedurally sound: Separate penalty phase, rigorous appellate review, rational procedure for guiding the jury in weighing aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances. Brennan and Marshall dissented. Coker v. Georgia (U.S. 1977) 72 White Death penalty limited to first-degree murder (plurality). Burger and Rehnquist dissented. implementation Bifurcated trials At penalty phase, jury must be unanimous in finding aggravating factors, but they need not be unanimous in which aggravating factors are decisive. Must be unanimous in finding that aggravation outweighs mitigation. Must reach the same result but need not reach it in the same way. If unanimity is not reached, some states retry that phase, others apply life sentence. In a number of states, life recommendations can be overridden by the judge. This is very common in Florida and North Carolina. Jury must be death qualified. This is accomplished during voir dire before the initial empanelling of the jury. The impact of this is to get prodeath penalty juries. Burden of Proof State must show aggravating factors. Defense may show mitigating factors. Some states permit defendant to make a statement without cross examination. Some states permit victim-impact statementsfamily members testifying about the loss. Some jurisdictions dont permit victims family to tell the jury they oppose the death penalty. The 10th Circuit does permit this testimony. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS Crafting a statute Should mitigating factors be delineated like aggravating factors are? AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES General comments Enumerated by statute Typically 220 factors. While the idea is individuality of sentence and determination, the generalizations in the statutes make this difficult. Some specific factors The murder itself First-degree felony murder Murder while avoiding arrest or escaping from custody Heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Big struggle to unpack this traditional language. CA has given up and struck this language. In hindrance of governmental functions For pecuniary gain Committed in jail Multiple victims Previous violent-felony convictions Nonstatutory aggravating factors Psychological evaluations Victim-impact statements MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES General comments No clear consensus on how to weigh mitigating and aggravating factors. Quantitative or qualitative? In 1989, FL S.Ct. overturned a death sentence where there was only one aggravating factor and ten mitigating factors. May not be limited by statute to a specific listLockett v. Ohio (U.S. 1978) Burger, C.J. {Defendant was getaway driver for robbery. Accomplice accidentally killed. Did not foresee killing. Convicted of felony first-degree murder. Trial judge excluded the mitigating factor she arguedthat she did not cause or intend the deathbecause it didnt fit the three mitigating factors enumerated in Ohios death penalty statute.} Individualized sentences are required by the 8th and 14th Amendments. Sentencing of capital defendants must not be less particularized than sentencing of non-capital defendants. Jury should not be precluded from considering any aspect of defendants character or record, or the circumstances of the offense, proffered as mitigation. Eddings v. Oklahoma (U.S. 1982) Powell, J. {Trial court excluded mitigating evidence of minor defendants turbulent family history and abuse-filled childhood as irrelevant to immediate circumstances of the crime. Appeals court held evidence was properly excluded because it did not excuse his behavior.} Court may determine weight of proffered mitigating evidence but may not give it no weight. Just as the state may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. CATEGORICAL LIMITS The Mens Rea Limit: A Reprise on Felony Murder Tison v. Arizona (U.S. 1987) OConnor, J. {Sons arm convict father and cellmate for prison escape. On the lam, they rob a family of four. Father and cellmate murder the family. Sons do not assist directly but do nothing to stop. They didnt actually kill nor did they intend to. Convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death. Court relied on an expansive theory of intent to kill.} 8th Amendment does not prohibit death penalty for a defendant whose participation is major and whose mental state is reckless indifference to human life. After Tison: Minimal intent for death penalty for accomplice convicted of first-degree felony murder: Reckless indifference to human life. Minimal intent for death penalty for actual killer convicted of first-degree felony murder: Negligence. Age of Defendant Thompson v. Oklahoma (U.S. 1988) Execution of defendants under 16 (at time of crime) is beyond the realm of decency. To determine evolving standards of decency, S.Ct. looked at how state legislatures (supposed embodiment of popular opinion and will) wrote statutes. Then they looked at the statistics of application of the statutes to determine what would be considered consistent with popular standards and what would not. Stanford v. Kentucky (U.S. 1989) Scalia, J. Execution of defendants 16 and 17 years-old (at time of crime) is within the realm of decency. Execution of those who were juveniles when they committed their crimes does not necessarily violate 8th Amendment. Both evolving standards of decency and the standards at the time the 8th Amendment was adopted (execution for 7-year-olds theoretically legal) are relevant. Mental capacityvery low standard. Victim-Race Discrimination and the 8th AmendmentMcCleskey v. Kemp (U.S. 1987) Powell, J. {Petition for writ of habeas corpus on 8th Amendment Cruel and Unusual and 14th Amendment Equal Protection grounds. Baldus study: death penalty more likely where defendant is black and/or decedent is white. District Court found study irrelevant; 11th Circuit found it inadequate. Sentenced to death.} Evidence fails to show discrimination in his particular case. Showing that the system is discriminatory isnt enoughotherwise wed have to reexamine everything. He must show that discrimination made it more likely than not that hed get the death penalty. Constitution doesnt require consistent results. Brennan (dissenting): Court has abdicated its responsibility and fears too much justice. COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES Stephen B. Bright. Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer. Many get death penalty because of the poor quality of their representation, not because of their crime. Often their lawyers lack skill, resources, commitment, competence, and good faith. ATTRIBUTION OF CRIMINALITY ATTEMPT PUNISHMENT FOR ATTEMPT Why Punish Attempt? Primarily for prophylaxis and to permit early intervention. Also, to some degree, deterrence and establishment of codes of conduct. Retributivist perspectives: For Why should the morally irrelevant factor of luck protect one from punishment? Against There should be no punishment without wrongdoing. We take harm into account in other areas, why not here? We dont punish harmless negligence or recklessness, so why malevolence? Utilitarian perspectives: For Maximizes deterrence, which depends on predictability, unaffected by luck. Against Those who fail are less dangerous so theres less value in punishing them. Vagueness of conduct undermines predictability. The Emergence of Attempt Liability Not until the late 18th century, hand in hand with the development of the element of intent, did the common law begin to punish attempts. Since then, the threshold has gotten lower and lower until today it is fairly stable at a threshold that makes it fairly easy to convict for attempt. Criteria Mens rea Defendant must exhibit mental culpability. Usually an intent to cause harm is required. Actus reus Some significant conduct must manifest the bad thoughts. How early to intervene? The inherent tension. Early enough prevents crime. Too early tramples the Constitution. We need strong prediction that crime will be committed if not interrupted. Black-letter law Threshold is the point at which mere preparatory activity ends and a substantial step is taken. Punishment Typically less than punishment for a success. Reduced sentence gives incentive to not follow through. Evidentiary problems. Punishment for actual harmsretributive. MENS REA/ACTUS REUS THE ACTUS REUS OF ATTEMPT Preparation vs. AttemptPeople v. Murray (CA 1859) {Convicted of attempted contract of incestuous marriage with niece.} There must be evidence of more than intent and preparation. Attempt is the direct movement toward the commission after the preparations are made. Attempt must be manifested by acts which would end in the consummation of the particular offence, but for the intervention of circumstances independent of the will of the party. The substantial step test Model Penal Code 5.01. Criminal Attempt. Acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the crime. A purposeful act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the crime. Conduct must strongly corroborate criminal purpose. Some illustrative acts: lying in wait; stalking; enticing; reconnoitering; unlawful entry; fabrication or possession of specially designed or unlawful materials; recruiting. Emphasis is on the acts accomplished, not on what remains to be done before success. Something of a blend of proximity and unequivocality tests. Tests rejected by the drafters: Physical proximityact proximate to completed crime. Dangerous proximitynearness of danger, greatness of harm, degree of apprehension felt, nearness to completion. Indispensable elementanything indispensable to the crime not yet under the actors control is exculpatory. Probable desistanceseemed to require judgment that actor reached a point at which it was unlikely theyd turn backnot workable in practice. Abnormal stepwhere the normal citizen would stopbut whos to judge and how? Unequivocalityact that is unequivocally aimed toward a completed crime. Res ipsa loquiturtoo subjective. Most commonly used tests today: substantial step and dangerous proximity. Subjectiveness of the act requirement in practiceMcQuirter v. State (AL 1953) {Black man convicted of attempt to commit assault with intent to rape. Only evidence against him was police testimony that he told them once in custody that hed intended to rape a white woman. Defendant denied it. There was no real act except walking; prosecutrix testified that he followed her, he testified that he was merely walking toward the black neighborhood.} Evidence was enough to get to a jury and to sustain a verdict of guilty. Court stressed validity of taking social norms and standards, including racial ones, into account. Implication: certain black behavior can be construed by whites as off limits. Proximity to success testPeople v. Rizzo (NY 1927) {Defendant and accomplices looked all over for man with payroll but never found him. Fully planned to rob him. Two were armed. Police grew suspicious and made arrests. Convicted of attempt to commit first-degree robbery.} Attempt should be limited to acts which are so near to its accomplishment that in all reasonable probability the crime itself would have been committed, but for timely interference. There can be no attempt if the opportunity to commit the crime never arises. DEFENSES to attempt Abandonment People v. Staples (CA 1970) {Defendant rented office above bank vault, began drilling, but never completed hole before landlord alerted police. Sworn statement indicated that he began to think the plan was crazy and abandoned it. Charge of attempted burglary. Once acts reach the attempt stage, abandonment is not exculpatory. At that point, abandonment is no different from any other intervening event. Arguments for the abandonment defense Provides incentive to desist. Takes account of differences in moral culpability. Availability of the abandonment defense Not available under traditional common law. Many jurisdictions continue to deny it. Where available, abandonment must be at a relatively early stage and often fails. Both NY Penal Code and MPC recognize it as a complete defense when it is voluntary and complete. Some other jurisdictions are moving in this direction. What is not abandonment Involuntary abandonment (discovery, equipment failure, etc.). Abandonment based on fear of discovery or apprehension. Postponement. Impossibility Booth v. State (OK 1964) {Defendant agreed to buy stolen property from thief but thief was arrested before the transaction. Police set up a sting and arrested defendant. At trial, defendant argued that since the property was recovered by the police before the sting, it was no longer stolen. Convicted of attempt to receive stolen property.} Legal impossibility defense accepted; conviction reversed. If the completed act would not be a crime, the attempt cannot be either. Legal Impossibility The act, if completed, would not be illegal. Attempt is not a crime. Factual Impossibility The intended crime cannot be completed because of a physical or factual condition unknown to defendant. Attempt is a crime. Theres practically no agreement on what is a legal impossibility and what is a factual impossibility. MPC solution is to abolish the defense by defining an attempt as conduct which would be criminal if circumstances were as the actor believed them to be. MPC 5.01. COMPLICITY Introduction Not a crime in and of itselfDepends on another offense, committed by another person. One cannot be charged with complicityOne is charged with the crime itself. Complicity is an alternate way of charging someone with a particular crime. Complicity under the common law The common law distinguished four roles: principals in the first degree (e.g., killer); principals in the second degree (e.g., aider or abettor); accessories before the fact (provided the gun); and accessories after the fact (helped escape). Accessories could only be charged if a principal had already been convicted. Accessories could only be charged with a crime of which a principal had been convicted. Complicity today Prior conviction of a principal is no longer required, but there must be proof that another person committed a crime. In four states the old law still remains that an accomplice cannot be tried if a principal isnt. The only remaining vestige of the common-law roles is accessory after the fact. All other players are now tried as principals and can be tried in the jurisdiction where the crime occurred, regardless of where their part was played. Sentences are the same and no legal distinction is drawn with regard to culpability. Accomplices may be charged with any crime a principal may be charged with, even if that principal is in fact charged with a lesser offense. MPC approach: A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when he is an accomplice of the other person in the commission of the crime. Thorny Issues Must accomplices conduct in any way cause the crime? Must mens rea of accomplice and of principal be the same? State v. Foster (CT 1987) says yes; MPC says no. If act and mental state are different, why is it not always a distinct crime? When can accomplice be liable and principal not? When can inducer be liable and actor not (perpetration by means)? Elements of complicity Actus reus An act in assistance. Conduct must go beyond mere presence, even if only slightly. Exceptions Lookouts, people providing emboldening support, people whose presence increases the likelihood of completion by creating the impression of unequal odds. Mens rea Community of purpose. Communication between actors is unnecessary, though helpful to establish community of purpose. Community of purpose may be inferred by conduct. Beeman: Mere knowledge is not enough; there must also be intent to commit, encourage, or facilitate. Abandonment defenseMPC 2.06(6)(c) Actor must terminate complicity and either deprive it of its effectiveness or inform the police or attempt to prevent the crime. Actor must take clear steps to prevent commission of the crime. THE ACCESSORIAL ACT (actus reus) State v. Tally (AL 1894) {Defendants brothers in law set out to murder man who had sex with defendants sister. Defendant sent telegram in attempt to intercept warning telegram sent by targets brother. Charged with aiding and abetting murder.} Although defendant did not encourage, command, etc., the homicide, or enter into any conspiracy to murder the decedent, he did aid and abet the murder. He acted in a way as to further the killers attack. His act contributed to the murder (even if it was not a necessary contribution). He would not be liable if his act did not contribute to the murder. Why is no but-for analysis required? Both mens rea and actus reus are established. Punishing this sort of conduct does have a deterrent effect. MENS REA OF COMPLICITY Community of purpose Intent to aid in the commission of the crime, to facilitate the crime, or to encourage the commission of the crime. Minority approach Accomplice must share in or know of principals purpose or intent. Majority approach A different mens rea for accomplices than for principals: Knowledge or purpose that ones conduct will have the effect of facilitating or encouraging the crime. The four principal mens rea standards for accomplices Mens rea with respect to principals criminal intent only. Mens rea with respect to principals criminal intent and mens rea with respect to facilitative effect of accomplices conduct. Mens rea with respect to principals criminal intent and mens rea required for principals crime. Mens rea required for principals crime and mens rea with respect to facilitative effect of accomplices conduct. The second clause in the two-prong standards is also called the intent to aid or abet. Mens rea with respect to principals criminal intent and mens rea with respect to facilitative effect of accomplices conductPeople v. Beeman (CA 1984) {Defendant provided accomplices with considerable information in order to set up the burglary. Promised to sell the stolen goods and in fact received them. Did nothing to stop the crime. Not present during commission. Convicted of multiple crimes on aiding and abetting theory.} State must prove that accomplice knew perpetrators intent and rendered aid with intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating commission of the targeted offense. Mens rea with respect to principals criminal intent and mens rea required for principals crimeWilson v. People (CO 1939) {Defendant boosted burglar into the building and then ran off to get the cops. Convicted of burglary and larceny on aiding and abetting theory} An accomplice who lacks the criminal intent required for the principals crime cannot be guilty of that crime. A feigned accomplice acting with the purpose of entrapping a principal is not criminally liable. Rex v. Othello First-degree murder: premeditation and deliberation, malice (intent to kill), actual killing. Second-degree murder: hot blood, malice (expressintent to kill), actual killing. Voluntary manslaughter: murder with sufficient provocation (XVI-century adultery; more than mere words: handkerchief), heat of passion, actual killing. Rex v. Iago Aiding and abetting: encouragement, Kill her in her bed, plants handkerchief. Mental state: intends to have Othello to kill Desdemona (Kill her in her bed). Clear community of purpose: planting the idea, assisting in the preparation. We can convict Othello of voluntary manslaughter, and convict Iago of first-degree murder. What matters is whether the principal may be charged with a crime, not whether they are so charged or convicted. If Othello acted immediately and so cannot be charged with first-degree murder, Iago can still be charged with first-degree murder because he had the full mens rea. [It was almost as though Iago was the principal and Othello the accomplice.] CONSPIRACY Introduction Conspiracy is an inchoate or preparatory crimethe underlying intended crime need not take place. Conspiracy is an instrument to establish wide vicarious liability. Comparison between Conspiracy and Attempt. Unlike attempt, conspiracy is a group crimeit requires at least two participants. Both punish arguably harmless conduct that falls short of accomplishing crimes. The act requirement for conspiracy is less substantial than for attempt. Because all that is needed to establish conspiracy is an agreement and an overt act, cops can intervene at an earlier stage in conspiracy than in attempt. Comparison between Conspiracy and Complicity. Conspiracy tends to bring a lower penalty than complicity, because complicity involves a completed crime. Unlike complicity, conspiracy is a crime in itself, not a way of committing a crime. Like conspiracy, complicity is a means of getting people for the crimes of their coconspirators, not merely their own direct acts. One can be convicted of both complicity and conspiracy. Elements of conspiracy Mens rea Agreement. Intent to promote the objective of the conspiracy. Actus reus Overt act. Agreement requirement Agreement may be inferred on the basis of the overt act requirement. The conspirators dont all have to enter the agreement; there can be constructive agreement based on acts. Where the agreement can be conclusively demonstrated without reference to an act, some jurisdictions waive the overt act requirement. Overt act requirement At common law, there was no requirement for an overt act. Most modern jurisdictions require an overt act (except for aggravated crimes, such as drug trafficking). The overt act must be a move beyond the plan or agreement, toward implementation. The act requirement is less substantial than for attempt; the line between preparation and criminal liability is drawn earlier. Merely preparatory acts may be enough in some jurisdictions, so long as they are more than the formation of the agreement itself. A few states require more of the overt act, more like the substantial step of attempt. One act is sufficient to cover all conspirators. The act can be equivocal, unsuccessful. The purpose of the overt act is to demonstrate the conspiracy. A very few jurisdictions require no act at all. Withdrawal/abandonment Much easier to establish than with complicity. Defendant must make clear an intent to withdraw. Telling only one coconspirator of intent to withdraw is enough. As long as theres some evidence of intent to withdraw, defendant need demonstrate no further act. But defendant is still liable for the crime of conspiracy and for any crimes under committed by any member of the conspiracy before defendants withdrawal. THE NATURE OF CONSPIRACY State v. Verive (AZ 1981) Primary focus of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement itself, the collusion, secrecy, and resulting threat to society posed by such an agreement. The act requirement provides evidence of a step toward execution of the illicit agreement. Any act sufficient to corroborate the existence of the agreement and to show that it is being put into motion is enough to support the charge. The act may be just a part of preliminary arrangements to commit the crime. It merely has to show things have gone beyond a mere meeting of the minds. Unilateral conspiracy A single member of a conspiracy may be indicted and/or convicted. As long as defendant intended to enter into conspiracy, defendant can be convicted, even if other conspirators didnt so intend. Traditional view required that conspiracies be bilateral; that is no longer the case. THE MENS REA OF CONSPIRACY With limited exceptions, state must show two components: (1) Intent to enter into the conspiracy. (2) A particular level of purpose, knowledge, or awareness. People v. Lauria (CA 1967) {Defendant ran answering service used by call girls. Sting. Defendant and three prostitutes indicted for conspiracy to commit prostitution. Dismissed for lack of reasonable or probable cause. People appeal. Affirmed.} Mere knowledge of anothers criminal activity does not constitute conspiracy to further that activity. In order to establish criminal liability of a supplier of lawful goods or services put to unlawful use, the state must show: 1. Knowledge of the illegal use of the goods or services (ordinarily a straightforward fact question) and 2. Intent to further that use. Such intent may be established by: (a) direct evidence (such as advise to criminal actors) or (b) circumstantial evidence from which an intent to further a criminal enterprise may be inferred (such as the sale itself and its surrounding circumstances). (c) inference based on special interest in the activity or the aggravated nature of the crime itself. Special interest: Mere knowledge may provide basis for inference of intent by virtue of special interest where: (1) defendant has acquired a stake in the venture, or (2) no legitimate use of the goods or services exists, or (3) the volume of business with the criminal actors is grossly disproportionate to any legitimate demand or amounts to a high proportion of sellers total business. Aggravated crimes: Mere knowledge that goods or services supplied will be used to commit felonies may be sufficient basis for inference of intent to further that use. Mere knowledge that goods or services supplied will be used to commit misdemeanors is not sufficient basis for inference of intent to further that use. The distinction is based on different degrees of duty. Other felony/misdemeanor distinctions are grounded in different degrees of duty: It is a crime to withhold knowledge of a felony (misprision of felony) but not a misdemeanor. It is a crime to aid in the escape of one charged with a felony (complicity) but not a misdemeanor. THE Scope of conspiracys net The Pinkerton rule Pinkerton v. United States (U.S. 1946) A party to a conspiracy may be responsible for a substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy even though that party doesnt participate in the substantive offense or even know about it. United States v. Diaz (7th Cir. 1988) {Appeal of drug conviction based on DEA sting: conspiracy to distribute cocaine, possession and distribution of cocaine, and use of a firearm in relation to the commission of a drug trafficking crime (a penalty enhancement). Defendant was unarmed but one of his several coconspirators was carrying a gun (which he didnt use). Defendant alleges firearm conviction based on the conspiracy charge was improper. Affirmed.} Firearm violation may be imputed to other members of a conspiracy under the Pinkerton rule. Each conspirator may be liable for acts of every other conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. States burden under the Pinkerton rule: (1) A crime was committed, and (2) The crime was committed within the scope and in furtherance of the conspiracy and was a natural and reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy, and (3) The defendant was a member of the conspiracy. Under the Pinkerton rule, incarcerated conspirators who do not actually withdraw from a conspiracy can still be liable for offenses committed after their incarceration. Proving the scope of an agreement Implications from steps taken, nature of investment. Records of communications. Plea bargain for a conspirator. Hypothetical bank robbery conspiracy A is organizer and ringleader. A hires B to rob bank 1. A hires C to rob bank 2. B and C do not meet face to face but both know theyre members of larger conspiracy, know of each other, and know of each others assignments. At As instigation, D, knowing of conspiracy, steals car for use in robberies. B and C perform their robberies. B uses Ds stolen car. Party liableConspiracy to rob banks?Bank robbery or auto theft (accomplice theory)?AYesYesB for Cs robberyYesNoD for robbery of bank 2YesNoD for robbery of bank 1YesYesB & C for Ds theftYesNoConspiracy charge has big advantages for the state It is a very big net, much bigger and more powerful than complicity. Ability to join defendants into a single trial, where the full scope of criminal activity is presented to the jury as a package. Where states case is stronger against some defendants than against others, it is more likely to convict all than if they were tried separately. Turning someone states evidence (they dont even have to testifyan exception to the hearsay bar). Extending the statute of limitations if there is a continuing conspiracyclock starts running from the time of the last overt act, not the time of the conspiracy. Conspiracy model examples Rimless wheelno single conspiracy Drug supplier uses multiple sellers who are wholly independent and unaware that there are any other sellers. In this case, there are multiple conspiracies and the sellers cannot be charged with one anothers crimesa rimless wheel. But even if they dont know one another, if they have reason to believe there are other sellers, then there is one conspiracythe spokes are connected. Chain of conspiracy Drug supplier works with distributor, who in turn works with seller. If theres interdependence, theres one conspiracy. If theres no evidence of interdependence, there are multiple conspiracies. THE RICO STATUTE AND THE FRONTIER OF CONSPIRACY The Statute Passed in 1970. Original target: the mob. United States v. Salerno (2d Cir. 1988). Means: Strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process; Establishing new penal prohibitions; and Providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies. Elements Conviction under RICO is fairly easy. All the state must establish is: (1) Agreement on an objective. (2) Involvement in an enterprise. As long as the participants know about the existence of the enterprise and are participants in it, the rimless wheel becomes rimmed. Unlike traditional conspiracy, foreseeability is not necessary. Its a lasso that can capture many participants at many levels in an enterprise and many different kinds of criminal activity. Penalties Often worse than under other statutes. Forfeiture Property can be seized upon probable cause before actual conviction. Defendant cannot get it back even if acquitted. This is supposedly constitutional because showing of probable cause constitutes due process. 1961. Definitions. (1) Racketeering activitylong list of acts preceded with the phrase any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, . . . etc. An enormously wide net. (4) Enterpriseany individual or entity. (5) Pattern of racketeering activityat least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of each other. 1962. Racketeering activities. (a)(c) substantive crimes. (d) inchoate crime of conspiracy. Elements of proof of substantive crimes (1) pattern of racketeering activity, and (2) involvement in an enterprise that is engaged in or affects interstate commerce. 1964. Civil remedies. These are largely equitable but also legal (treble damages). Civil RICO case need not wait for criminal conviction and need not be based on a racketeering injury but can be based on any other particular predicate act. 1962(c) also provides that criminal RICO conviction estops defendant from litigating the violation of a subsequent civil case. Section 1962(a) Violations Investment or laundering of racketeering profits by any individual in interstate commercial enterprises. Under this subsectionas distinct from 1962(c)the individual and the enterprise may be one and the same entity. Act may be rather passive. Section 1962(b) Violations Racketeering activity such as bribery or extortion directly aimed at acquiring or infiltrating an otherwise legitimate enterprise. Section 1962(c) Violations Racketeering activity that springs from the business affairs of an enterprise, that corrupts an enterprise from within. The enterprise need not be a commercial one. The enterprise itself need not be a legitimate one. A commercial enterprise may be no more than a sole proprietorship. White-collar crime prosecutions under 1962(c) have seen big growth, e.g., insider trading. RICO can be used against both big and little fish; the individual may be a low-level player, as long as their work is necessary to the enterprises operations. First amendment issues are raised when the enterprise is a political one. But the S.Ct. has held that any fundraising makes an enterprise not strictly political. And in a concurrence, Souter, J. said the economic motive test was neither necessary nor desirable to ensure that RICO didnt trample protected speech. justification and excuse General comments These are defenses based on desert or utility arguments. They are arguments that, in spite of the act and the mental state, the defendant should not be punished. They are fact-based arguments that the defendant can make after the state has proven the act plus the mental state. They are not refutations of the states proof. Why have a justification defense? We dont want to deter the behavior. The behavior has social utility. Why have excuse defense? We shouldnt punish what we cannot deter. We punish voluntary conduct. Four defenses Force. Insanity. Necessity. Duress. This is a defense of last resort. Burden of Proof. Because the criteria of justification are part of the criminal laws proscriptive norms, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on justification defenses is usually placed on the state. Until lack of justification is proved, a crime is not established. Distinguishing justification and excuse Wrongdoing. Justification In committing the offense, a social interest was advanced or right was vindicated sufficient to counterbalance the offense. Actor did no wrong. The offensive act didnt constitute wrongdoing. The conduct was right. Excuse Circumstances limited voluntariness so as to render conduct neither morally blameworthy nor susceptible to deterrence. Actor not responsible for the act. The conduct was wrong but the actor was blameless. Legality. Justification Conduct rules/standards that permit responsible choices by actors and decision rules/standards that permit discretionary application of the law. Knowledge of justifications ought to play a part in actors decisions about their conduct, so justifications should be public and prospective but need not be specific. More flexible than other parts of criminal definitions; application requires more discretion. A way of setting aside an overbroad rule in order to account for circumstances. Sometimes legislated, sometimes judicially developed. Excuse Decision rules/standards that permit discretionary application of the law. Knowledge of excuses should have no impact on actors conduct. Third parties. Justification Since the conduct is at bottom right, third parties may perform the same conduct and ought not to interfere with or attempt to stop it. Justification may extend to other parties. Excuse Third parties ought not to perform the same conduct and may try to stop it. Excuse does not extend to other parties; they must be individually excused (and may not be). Defensive Force General comment Allowance for human tendency to protect our own life or that of another. Defensive force is a complete, exculpatory defense. Justifiable Homicide People v. La Voie (CO 1964) {Defendants car was rammed by another car with four occupants and he was pushed for some distance, through a red light. The four then got out of their car and threatened him. He had a licensed gun. He shot the one who was advancing toward him, killing him. Defendant charged with [second-degree (express malice)] murder. Directed verdict for defendant on grounds that evidence established justifiable homicide.} One who has reasonable grounds for believing one is in imminent danger of being killed or receiving great bodily harm, and who does so believe, may act on such belief in self-defense, even to the point of killing if necessary, even if ones belief of danger or of the extent of danger turns out to have been mistaken. Two-part test for justifiable homicide. Actual belief. (Subjective.) Reasonable grounds for that belief. (Objective.) In NDand in Proposed New Federal Criminal Code and MPCa mistake would render the conduct excused but not justified. Imperfect defense Actual belief without reasonable grounds: voluntary manslaughter. Two-part test is met but conduct is an overreaction: voluntary manslaughter. Defensive Force and the Battered Spouse State v. Leidholm (ND 1983) {Long-term abuse and alcoholism in marriage. One night after an argument turned violent before husband went to sleep, wife stabbed him to death in his sleep. Convicted of manslaughter. Reversed and remanded with new jury instructions.} Self defense Person must actually and sincerely believe that the conditions exist which give rise to a claim of self-defense. And person must reasonably believe that circumstances exist which permit use of defensive force. The job for the jury is to decide whether the defendants belief was reasonable, regardless of whether it was correct. The standard is subjective: What was reasonable for the defendant in her circumstances and considering such contextual issues as battered-woman syndrome? If belief is unreasonable, conviction on full offense. If belief is reasonable, act is justified (acquittal). If reasonable but mistaken, act is excused (lesser included offense). If mistake was reckless, manslaughter. If mistake was negligent, negligent homicide. [Most jurisdictions dont break it down and just convict for manslaughter.] Battered woman syndrome This is relevant to the mental element and to the subjective determination of the reasonableness of defendants reaction and conduct. It helps us understand the retreat question, the imminence question, etc. It must remain within self-defense thoughit wouldnt cover proactive execution of batterer in order to save herself. It is subsumed under a proper self-defense instruction and need not be separately instructed. Duty to retreat This, too, should be evaluated from the subjective standpoint of the defendant. If it was reasonable for her to retreat (leave) rather than exercise deadly force, then the killing was not justified. But theres no duty to retreat from a cohabitant. As long as she felt retreat was not possible, she had no duty. Lesser-included-offense instruction A lesser-included-offense instruction is necessary where a self-defense instruction is given since reasonableness but mistake is a possible outcome. The subjective standard Factors to consider: History. Relative size. Battered-spouse evidence (e.g., learned helplessness). Gender. Psychological information. It is not purely subjective: Defendants belief in need to use deadly force must be reasonable for a person in her circumstancesobjective. Reprise on the Reasonable Self-Defender People v. Goetz (NY 1986) Wachtler, C.J. {Appellate Division dismissed attempted murder and assault counts because prosecutor indicated to the grand jury that the reasonableness standard for self defense was objective. Order vacated and counts reinstated.} The reasonableness standard for self defense is an objective one. Citizens may not set their own standards for conduct, no matter how aberrational or bizarre their thoughts, so long as their thoughts are reasonable to them. That would allow a legally competent but deluded defendant to kill or visit violence on others with impunity. [Essentially what Goetzs supporters wanted.] Objective standard means ordinary person in defendants circumstances, which do take into account prior history of being victimized, understandable fear, etc. The self-defense standard applied by most courts is a mixed standard 1. Subjective portion: Was defendant afraid for life/limb? 2. Objective portion: Was fear reasonable? 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