ࡱ> M qbjbj== PWWYlt t t F 4> > > $b jjjPjkb q4w"VwlwwxCX$ X> xxã lwwããã 8lw> wãããëԷ& > lwhq Vu>b B]jܸ t04?0? ãb b  BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN SELECTED GOVERNMENTS Table of Contents  TOC \h \z \t "Heading 3,1,Heading 4,2,Heading 5,3"  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819928" I. Introduction  PAGEREF _Toc72819928 \h 1  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819929" II. Cross-Country Summary  PAGEREF _Toc72819929 \h 3  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819930" 1. Assignment and Level of Expenditure  PAGEREF _Toc72819930 \h 3  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819931" 2. National Coordination Role  PAGEREF _Toc72819931 \h 4  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819932" 3. Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers  PAGEREF _Toc72819932 \h 5  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819933" 4. Borrowing  PAGEREF _Toc72819933 \h 6  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819934" 5. Budgeting and Reporting  PAGEREF _Toc72819934 \h 8  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819935" III. Country Summaries  PAGEREF _Toc72819935 \h 10  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819936" 1. Turkey  PAGEREF _Toc72819936 \h 10  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819942" 2. Australia  PAGEREF _Toc72819942 \h 11  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819948" 3. Colombia  PAGEREF _Toc72819948 \h 13  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819954" 4. Denmark  PAGEREF _Toc72819954 \h 15  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819960" 5. France  PAGEREF _Toc72819960 \h 16  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819966" 6. Greece  PAGEREF _Toc72819966 \h 18  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819972" 7. Indonesia  PAGEREF _Toc72819972 \h 19  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819978" 8. Korea  PAGEREF _Toc72819978 \h 21  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819984" 9. South Africa  PAGEREF _Toc72819984 \h 22  List of Tables  TOC \h \z \c "Table"  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819997" Table 1. Legal Framework for Expenditure Assignments  PAGEREF _Toc72819997 \h 3  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819998" Table 2. Definition of Expenditure Responsibilities  PAGEREF _Toc72819998 \h 4  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72819999" Table 3. Role of National Government on Overall Local Expenditure  PAGEREF _Toc72819999 \h 4  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72820000" Table 4. Content of Coordination Role of the National Government  PAGEREF _Toc72820000 \h 5  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72820001" Table 5. Role of National Government in terms of General Government Aggregates  PAGEREF _Toc72820001 \h 5  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72820002" Table 6. Legal Basis of the Intergovernmental Transfers System  PAGEREF _Toc72820002 \h 6  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72820003" Table 7. Limits on the Borrowing Activity of Subnational Governments  PAGEREF _Toc72820003 \h 7  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72820004" Table 8. National Government Guarantees on Subnational Debt  PAGEREF _Toc72820004 \h 7  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72820005" Table 9. Common Standards for Budgeting  PAGEREF _Toc72820005 \h 8  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72820006" Table 10. Common Financial Reporting Requirements  PAGEREF _Toc72820006 \h 8  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72820007" Table 11. Collection of Subnational Financial Reports  PAGEREF _Toc72820007 \h 9  HYPERLINK \l "_Toc72820008" Table 12. Reporting of General Government Aggregates to Legislature  PAGEREF _Toc72820008 \h 9  Introduction Over the past two decades, the trend towards devolution of spending responsibilities to lower levels of government is clear in federal countries and unitary states. The decentralization of public expenditure, as well as the subnational provision of goods and services, have a critical impact on the overall economic activity of a country, its resource allocation, and social equity. At the same time, financing lower-tier governments affects the levels and types of taxation, and subnational borrowing activities may influence monetary conditions and interest rates.  Thus, in decentralized settings, a clearly defined system of intergovernmental fiscal relations including intergovernmental transfers -- is crucial. It is also important to acknowledge that, in practice, the efficiency gains from decentralization can be undermined by various institutional constraints. A key challenge posed by decentralization of expenditure responsibilities is having coordinated budgetary and financial management policies across levels of government, so as to ensure correspondence with national macroeconomic objectives for inflation, growth, fiscal and monetary stabilization. To create adequate conditions for macroeconomic stability and aggregate expenditure control, spending, revenue raising, and borrowing plans among national and subnational governments should be coordinated. In addition, allocation and distributional goals are more likely to be met if there is agreement on resources allocated among spending programs. Agreed and accurate forecasts of expenditures, revenues, timing of cash flows, and borrowing needs, across levels of government are also important. But above all, for effective subnational service delivery, there must be a clear definition of expenditure assignments, thereby promoting accountability and avoiding duplication and wasted resources. On the other hand, budget harmonization calls for comprehensive, standardized, and transparent budget classification and accounting rules shared across all levels of government. Also, accurate, reliable, and coordinated budget projections should be provided to subnational governments with sufficient time to be incorporated in preparing their budgets. Ideally, harmonized budget policies also require coordination of budget plans in aggregate. For efficient budget implementation, clear budget authorization processes must be in place, along with an efficient payment system, and a suitable accounting framework. It is particularly important to have an integrated information system that allows monitoring and control of all phases of public expenditure management, as well as timely and accurate reports on budget implementation. Unfunded mandates imposed by higher levels of governments, and non-payment, sudden withdrawals or reductions of intergovernmental transfers must be avoided. From a financial management perspective, coordinating the timing and amounts of borrowing across levels of government has several potential benefits: managing overall borrowing levels, avoiding excessive pressure on financial markets, allowing local governments to borrow at lower interest rates, providing a potential instrument to control subnational access to borrowing, and preventing unsustainable levels of debt. However, such practices can impede the autonomy of subnational governments, and many federal governments will have political as well as legal grounds to oppose such a consolidated approach. Whatever the case, benefits can be gained from transparency about subnational borrowing plans and levels.  The conditions described above are rarely achieved in full in industrialized countries, and many gaps exist in developing countries as well. Consequently, experiences on subnational budgeting and financial management around the world reflect a wide range of responses to the challenges listed above. This note draws on the results of the OECD/World Bank Survey on Budget Practices and Procedures, launched in 2003 in over 60 countries. At present, more than 40 countries have responded to the survey or are in the process of finalizing their response. The note starts with a cross-country analysis of subnational budgeting and financial management practices. It reviews, in particular, the legal basis and practices on expenditure assignment, the coordination role of the central government, the legal framework for the intergovernmental transfers system, as well as common practices on subnational borrowing, budgeting and financial reporting. Finally, it summarizes in an annex the detailed survey responses for nine countries: Turkey, Australia, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Indonesia, Korea, and South Africa. Cross-Country Summary Assignment and Level of Expenditure The most common legal framework that defines the spending roles and responsibilities of subnational governments (expenditure assignments) is for the Congress to delegate functions to subnational governments through specific legislation, which is the case for Turkey. In about 20 percent of the countries in the survey, the Constitution lists the functions to be assumed by the national government, with the remaining (or residual) functions assigned to lower levels of government (see  REF _Ref72721666 \h Table 1).  However, while the Constitution lists national government functions such as providing defense, printing money, and issuing patents, in practice national powers are broad and encompass numerous functions not specifically enumerated. This happens, for instance, in the United States. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 1. Legal Framework for Expenditure Assignments TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.The Constitution lists the functions to be covered by the national government. All the other functions are assigned to other levels.821 %217%623%The Constitution lists both the functions to be covered by the national government and the concurrent responsibilities. All the other functions are assigned to other levels.25 %18%14%The Constitution lists the functions to be covered by subnational governments. All the other functions are assigned to national government. 13%00%14%The Legislature may delegate specific functions to subnational through specific legislation.1642%650%1038%Other, please specify 1129%325%831%Total answers381226 Even though two-thirds of the countries in the sample, including Turkey, claim that national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles for most expenditures, more than half of them also point out that there are concurrent and even overlapping responsibilities between the different tiers of government (see  REF _Ref72726097 \h Table 2). Korea is a case in point: its survey response notes both that the national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles, but also that there are overlapping responsibilities and duplicated programs across government levels. In sum, there is a general lack of clarity on the expenditure roles of national and subnational governments. Lack of clearly defined expenditure assignments may become an an obstacle to implement decentralization effectively. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 2. Definition of Expenditure Responsibilities Most of the expenditureSome expenditureFew expenditureTotal answersThe national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles.67%23%10%39There are concurrent responsibilities: national government sets the policy strategy and lower levels decide on public services within that context.26%56%19%27There are concurrent responsibilities: the national government sets the nation-wide standards and the subnationals decide on public services with those constraints.32%55%14%22National and subnational governments responsibilities overlap. Programs implemented in the same sectors by different levels create duplications.20%17%63%30There is a central assignment of responsibility and a decentralized provision of public goods12%47%41%17 According to the results presented in  REF _Ref72726155 \h Table 3, in most of the countries the national government plays no role in determining the overall expenditure levels of subnational governments. This is specially true for OECD countries. In some countries, including Turkey, consultations regarding the level of subnational expenditures occur, but they are not binding. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 3. Role of National Government on Overall Local Expenditure TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.The national government has no role2153%643%1558%The national government sets limits for the level of total expenditure or the growth in total expenditure 615%536%14%The national and subnational governments conduct formal consultations on the level of expenditure by lower levels of government, but these are not binding717%214%519%Other, please specify 1025%17%935%Total answers401426National Coordination Role In order to ensure consistency between budgetary policies and national macroeconomic objectives, 26 countries in the sample assign the central government the role to set targets for the deficit, expenditures, and primary expenditure for subnational governments (see  REF _Ref72727049 \h Table 4). In over half of these cases, the national government also plays a monitoring role. In OECD countries, this role is generally related to the implementation of the budget, while in non-OECD countries, as well as in Turkey and Greece, the central government monitors budget trends. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 4. Content of Coordination Role of the National Government TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.To set the targets for subnational governments in order to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives.1246%440%850%To set the targets and monitor the implementation of the budget, publishing the relevant figures727%110%638%To set the targets and monitor trends. To suggest corrections and, if necessary, to enforce them727%550%213%Total answers261016 In most countries, the national government also plays a coordination role in generating aggregate fiscal data on general government. Usually, as is the case in Turkey, the national government has the power to ensure that budgetary policies are consistent with the countrys macroeconomic objectives. In Germany, Austria and Australia, the main aspects of budget policy are agreed within an institutional forum involving national and subnational actors; the forum then monitors the implementation of agreed plans. In over one-third of the countries in the sample, subnational government aggregates are not even calculated due to independent financial authority between national and subnational governments (see  REF _Ref72727095 \h Table 5). Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 5. Role of National Government in terms of General Government Aggregates TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.No, national and subnational governments are completely independent. The general government aggregates are not calculated.1538%542%1037%Supranational or domestic commitments make the general government aggregate relevant. The main lines of budgetary policy are agreed within a body in which all actors are involved.38%00%311%Supranational or domestic commitments make the general government aggregate relevant. The central government has the coordination power to ensure the consistency. 2154%758%1452%Total answers391227Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers As shown in  REF _Ref72727419 \h Table 6, of the 37 countries that responded to this question, all but Colombia define the legal framework for intergovernmental transfers by national law; most of them with the prior agreement of lower levels of government. In addition, 14 countries, including Turkey, also incorporate the principles for intergovernmental transfers in their Constitution. Colombias Constitution defines the elements of the intergovernmental transfer system such as rates and flows. The existence of a legal framework for intergovernmental transfers, however, does not guarantee that the transfers are paid on a timely basis nor in full. Given their often heavy reliance on intergovernmental transfers, and generally weaker capacity, the predictability and stability of transfers is critical to subnational governments. To promote sound expenditure choices and strong financial management systems, subnational governments must be able to anticipate the level and timing of their transfers. Thus, it is crucial that transfers be predictable and stable, not only in their design, but also in their implementation. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 6. Legal Basis of the Intergovernmental Transfers System TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.The system is precisely determined by the Constitution13%18%00%The principles are contained in the Constitution and the actual criteria are approved with national law, with prior agreement of lower levels of government.1438%431%1042%The system is decided with national law, with the prior agreement of lower levels. 1541%431%1146%The system is approved with federal law and lower levels have no voice in its determination.719%431%313%Total answers371324Borrowing Subnational debt has grown significantly over the past decade, and when not managed responsibly, such debt has resulted, in some instances, in macroeconomic instability. Indeed, 40 percent of OECD countries in the sample do not impose any limits on subnational borrowing, whereas non OECD countries are more likely to enforce some form of borrowing limits ( REF _Ref72741031 \h  \* MERGEFORMAT  Table 7). Where subnational borrowing limits exist, they are either through a nationally defined maximum borrowing amount (18%), or national government approval of each subnational loan on a case-by-case basis (13%), as in Turkey. In Norway, although there are no limits to local borrowing, subnational governments are only permitted to borrow for investments, but not for current expenditure. This golden rule prohibiting local borrowing for operating purposes is common among industrial countries (e.g., Germany, Switzerland and the United States.) However, weaknesses in the formulation and application of such restrictions, or creative accounting or other financial gimmicks, can circumvent this rule, resulting in a flexible interpretation of what constitutes investment. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 7. Limits on the Borrowing Activity of Subnational Governments TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.No.924%00%1040%The subnational governments have fixed the limits in their Constitution or statute.38%00%312%Lower levels of government are not permitted to borrow by the national/federal Constitution.25%214%00%The national government imposes maximum levels of borrowing for subnational governments which cannot be exceeded.718%429%312%Each loan must be approved by the national government on a case-by-case basis.513%214%312%The national and subnational governments hold formal consultations on the level of borrowing (not binding). 411%321%14%Other, please specify 1026%321%728%Total answers391425 Moreover, in the majority of OECD countries (76%), the national government does not guarantee the borrowing activity of lower levels of government, neither explicitly nor implicitly (see  REF _Ref72740997 \h Table 8). However, in Japan, Ireland, Mexico and the Netherlands, all subnational borrowing is implicitly guaranteed by the national government. In Turkey, Greece and Suriname, on the other hand, the national government generally guarantees subnational borrowing on a case-by-case basis. Guarantees on subnational borrowing occur only exceptionally in Colombia and Uruguay. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 8. National Government Guarantees on Subnational Debt TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.NoThe national government does not guarantee the borrowing activities of lower levels, neither explicitly nor implicitly2668%754%1976%YesAll borrowing activities of subnational governments are implicitly guaranteed by the national government513%18%416%All borrowing activities of subnational governments are explicitly guaranteed by the national government00%00%00%Most borrowing activity by subnational governments is guaranteed by the national government on a case-by-case basis. 38%18%28%In exceptional cases only, activity by subnational governments is guaranteed by the national government on a case-by-case basis. 25%215%00%Other, please specify 411%215%28%Total answers381325Budgeting and Reporting OECD countries have varied practices on standardized budget and accounting systems. About two-thirds of them do not have common standards for budgeting, with roughly half of these countries setting the rules for subnational governments nationally, whereas the other half allow subnational authorities to define their own budget classification. The latter is the case for Turkey and Canada. The remaining one-third of OECD countries in the sample have the same budget classification and accounting rules for national and subnational governments, and those standards are set by the national government. In contrast, over two thirds of non OECD countries have common budgeting standards for national and subnational governments. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 9. Common Standards for Budgeting TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Use common standardsSet by the national government.1847%969%936%Set by external body00%00%00%Do not use common standardsStandards for the subnational levels are set by the national government.1129%323%832%Each authority decides on its budget classification.924%18%832%Total answers381325 Non-OECD countries, except for Argentina and Surinam, have common financial reporting requirements for subnational governments, and these are defined by the national government. Less than half of OECD countries follow that practice. Instead, in four OECD countries, subnational governments agree upon their financial reporting practices, and over a third do not have common financial reporting practices. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 10. Common Financial Reporting Requirements TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Common financial reporting requirements for lower levels of government, set by the national government2462%1286%1248%Common financial reporting practices, agreed among lower levels of government.410 %00%416%Lower levels of government have different financial reporting practices1128 %214%936%Total answers391425 Sixty percent of the countries in the survey collect subnational taxation and expenditure budgets. In addition, OECD countries tend to collect annual audited financial statements and in-year reports (typically quarterly) on budget implementation. This is the case, for example, in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Korea, and Portugal. South Africa and Israel are good examples of non-OECD countries that collect these three types of reports. On the other hand, Turkey, Sweden, the Slovak Republic, New Zealand, France and Australia collect annual financial statements from subnational governments, but not budgets nor in-year reports of their implementation. In Canada, none of these reports are officially collected by the Federal Government, while in Italy local authorities are required to present their final statements of account to the State Audit Court, but not to the Central Government. In the United States, the Bureau of the Census in the Department of Commerce does a survey of state and local governments every five years with the primary purpose of collecting financial information. In between these periods, the Census and other agencies estimate spending and receipts for the State and local sector as a whole. It should be noted that financial reporting plays an important role in ensuring local accountability, and hence such subnational reports should be shared with local citizens, in addition to being shared with higher levels of government. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 11. Collection of Subnational Financial Reports TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Budgets of lower levels of government 1860%660%1260%Annual financial statements (audited)1653%330%1365%In-year reports on the implementation of the budgetNot specified413%330%15%Monthly00%00%00%Quarterly620%110%525%Biannually13%00%15%Other, please specify 413%110%315%Total answers301020 Most OECD countries, including Turkey, incorporate the general government aggregates in the budget document presented to the Legislature, but only for information purposes. Ireland, Bolivia, Cambodia, Kenya and Morocco include the aggregates to be voted by the Legislature. In the remaining countries (27%), the Legislature only examines the national budget. In the United States, general government data, based on consolidating the federal budget and the state and local subsector in the National Income and Product Accounts, are published only for historical periods in the Historical Tables volume of the annual Federal budget. Table  SEQ Table \* ARABIC 12. Reporting of General Government Aggregates to Legislature TotalNon OECDOECDFreq.Perc.Freq.Perc.Freq.Perc.They are includedAnd voted by the Legislature512%429%14%For knowledge purpose2561%536%2074%They are not included. 1127%536%622%Total answers391427Country Summaries Turkey Assignment and Level of Expenditure Legal basis The Legislature may delegate specific roles and responsibilities of spending assignments to subnational through specific legislation. Definition of expenditure responsibilities The national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles for most of the expenditure by lower levels of government. In a few cases, national and subnational governments responsibilities overlap, and programs implemented in the same sectors by different levels create duplications. Role of national government on overall local expenditure level The national government and lower levels of government conduct formal consultations on the level of expenditure by lower levels of government, but these are not binding. National Coordination Role Setting targets and monitoring The central government has a coordination role to set the targets and monitor trends, to suggest corrections and, if necessary, to enforce them. Calculation of government aggregates Supranational (EU, international organization rules) or domestic commitments make the general government aggregate relevant. The central government has the co-ordination power to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives. Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers The principles of the system of intergovernmental transfers are contained in the Constitution and the actual criteria are approved with national law, with the prior agreement of lower levels of government. Borrowing Limits to borrowing activity There are limits on the borrowing activity of lower levels of government. Each loan must be approved by the national government on a case-by-case basis. National government guarantees Borrowing by lower levels of government is guaranteed by the national government on a case-by-case basis. In practice, this applies to most borrowing activity. Budgeting and reporting Common standards National and subnational governments do not use common standards. Each authority decides on its budget classification. Common financial reporting requirements Lower levels of government have different financial reporting practices. Collection of subnational financial reports The national government collects annual financial statements (audited) from lower levels of government. Reporting of general government aggregates to Legislature General government aggregates are included in the budget documents presented to the Legislature, for knowledge purpose. Australia Assignment and Level of Expenditure Legal basis The Constitution indicates that the Commonwealth has powers to make laws in relation to certain areas, and has concurrent powers with the States and Territories. Also, the list of powers given to the Commonwealth Parliament does not expressly refer to a number of important subjects including education the environment, criminal law, and roads - but this does not mean that those subjects are outside the Commonwealth's powers in so far as they relate to the subjects that are listed. Obviously the Australian Constitution does not necessarily use the exact categories expressed in this question. In some areas the expressed powers relate to only a portion of the categories ticked. Definition of expenditure responsibilities The national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles for most of the expenditure. There are concurrent responsibilities for some of the expenditure, where national government sets the policy strategy and lower levels decide on public services within that context. For few of the expenditure, the national government sets the nation-wide standards and the subnationals decide on public services with those constraints. In some cases, national and subnational governments responsibilities overlap, and programs implemented in the same sectors by different levels create duplications. Role of national government on overall local expenditure level The national government has no role on the overall expenditure level of lower layers of government. Of total State expenditure, about 16% is funded by the Commonwealth through Specific Purpose Payments that have come conditions attached (e.g. policy guidelines or funding requirements by the States). National Coordination Role Setting targets and monitoring The central government has a coordination role to set the targets and monitor the implementation of the budget, publishing the relevant figures Calculation of government aggregates Supranational (EU, international organization rules) or domestic commitments make the general government aggregate relevant. The main lines of budgetary policy are agreed within a body in which all actors are involved (institutional forum). The same body should monitor the implementation of agreed plans. Non-borrowing general government aggregates are calculated and reported by the Commonwealth and some States and Territories for comparative purposes in annual budgets. No level of government has a defined reporting responsibility for these aggregates. Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers The basis of the system of intergovernmental transfers includes federal legislation, often involving some consultation with lower levels of government. In relation to bulk and conditional grants, Specific Purpose Grants comprise the bulk of Commonwealth payments to other levels of government, and may or may not be subject to conditions. All GST revenue is provided to states and territories, and is distributed according to population share, adjusted by a relativity factor which embodies per capita financial needs based on recommendations of the Commonwealth Grants Commission. Borrowing Limits to borrowing activity There are limits on the borrowing activity of lower levels of government. The national government and lower levels of government hold formal consultations on the level of borrowing, but these are not binding. The Australian Loan Council is a Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministerial Council that coordinates public sector borrowing. Present arrangements are voluntary and emphasise transparency of public sector financing rather than adherence to strict borrowing limits. National government as guarantor The national government does not guarantee the borrowing activities of lower levels, neither explicitly nor implicitly. Bottom of Form Budgeting and reporting Common standards The Commonwealth, States and Territories report against a uniform presentation framework (UPF). While many States and Territories continue to prepare their budgets using different budget classification and accounting standards, each jurisdiction will attach data to their Budgets in the UPF format. Common financial reporting requirements Lower levels of government have agreed upon their financial reporting practices. Subnational financial reports collected by the national government The national government collects annual financial statements (audited) from lower levels of government. Reporting of general government aggregates to Legislature General government aggregates are included in the budget documents presented to the Legislature, for knowledge purpose. Colombia Assignment and Level of Expenditure Legal basis The Legislature may delegate specific roles and responsibilities of spending assignments to subnational through specific legislation. Definition of expenditure responsibilities The national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles in regard to expenditure by lower levels of government for most of the expenditure. The responsibilities are concurrent, for the national government sets the nation-wide standards and the subnationals decide on public services with those constraints. For some of the expenditure responsibilities overlap, and programs implemented in the same sectors by different levels create duplications. Also, in some cases there is a central assignment of responsibility and a decentralized provision of public goods. For few of the expenditure, the national government sets the policy strategy and lower levels decide on public services within that context. Role of national government on overall local expenditure level The national government has no role in regard to the overall expenditure level of lower layers of government. National Coordination Role Setting targets and monitoring The national government has a coordination role to set the targets (deficit, expenditures, primary expenditure, etc.) for subnational governments (directly or in case of no agreement) in order to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives. Calculation of government aggregates The national government does not have a coordination role in terms of general government aggregates. National and subnational governments are completely independent. The general government aggregates are not calculated. Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers The system of intergovernmental transfers is precisely determined by the Constitution (rates, flows, etc.). Borrowing Limits to borrowing activity There are limits on the borrowing activity of lower levels of government. The national government imposes maximum levels of borrowing for lower levels of government which cannot be exceeded. Subnational governments need the endorsement of the Minister of Finance to borrow (see below). National government as guarantor Borrowing by lower levels of government is guaranteed by the national government on a case-by-case basis. In practice, this applies in exceptional cases only Budgeting and reporting Common standards National and subnational governments have the same budget classification and accounting rules, set by the national government. Common financial reporting requirements There are common financial reporting requirements for lower levels of government, which are set by the national government. Subnational financial reports collected by the national government Generally the national government collects budgets of lower levels of government (taxation and expenditure). Reporting of general government aggregates to Legislature The Legislature examines only the national budget. The general government aggregate is not included in any budget document. Denmark Assignment and Level of Expenditure Legal basis The Legislature may delegate specific roles and responsibilities of spending assignments to subnational through specific legislation. Definition of expenditure responsibilities National and subnational governments responsibilities overlap for most of the expenditure by lower levels of government. Programs implemented in the same sectors by different levels create duplications. For some of the expenditure, there are concurrent responsibilities, where the national government sets the policy strategy and lower levels decide on public services within that context. In some cases, the national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles. Role of national government on overall local expenditure level In regard to the overall expenditure level of lower layers of government, the national government and subnational governments conduct formal consultations, but these are not binding. In an economy whit a high degree of decentralization, it is a challenge to combine and coordinate macroeconomic control with local government authority. Since the late seventies Denmark has sought to balance these objectives through formalized budget. The budget cooperation works through annual negotiations between the central government and each of the two local government associations. The negotiations result in a framework agreement for each of the two levels of local government. National Coordination Role Setting targets and monitoring The central government has a coordination role to set the targets (deficit, expenditures, primary expenditure, etc.) for subnational governments (directly or in case of no agreement) in order to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives. Calculation of government aggregates Supranational (EU, international organization rules) or domestic commitments make the general government aggregate relevant. The central government has the co-ordination power to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives. Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers The system of intergovernmental transfers is decided with national law (budget or other law), with the prior agreement of lower levels. Borrowing Limits to borrowing activity The national government imposes maximum levels of borrowing for lower levels of government which cannot be exceeded. National government as guarantor The national government does not guarantee the borrowing activities of lower levels, neither explicitly nor implicitly. Budgeting and reporting Common standards National and subnational governments do not use the same budget classification and accounting rules. The standards for the subnational levels are set by the national government. Common financial reporting requirements There are common financial reporting requirements for lower levels of government, which are set by the national government. Subnational financial reports collected by the national government Budgets of lower levels of government, annual financial statements and in-year reports (quarterly). Reporting of general government aggregates to Legislature General government aggregates are included in the budget documents presented to the Legislature, for knowledge purpose. France Assignment and Level of Expenditure Legal basis The Legislature may delegate specific roles and responsibilities of spending assignments to subnational through specific legislation. Definition of expenditure responsibilities National and subnational governments responsibilities overlap for most of the expenditure by lower levels of government. Programs implemented in the same sectors by different levels create duplications. In some cases, the national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles. Role of national government on overall local expenditure level The national government has no role in regard to the overall expenditure level of lower layers of government. National Coordination Role Setting targets and monitoring The central government has a coordination role to set the targets and monitor the implementation of the budget, publishing the relevant figures. Calculation of government aggregates Supranational (EU, international organization rules) or domestic commitments make the general government aggregate relevant. The central government has the co-ordination power to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives. Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers The principles of the system of intergovernmental transfers are contained in the Constitution and the actual criteria are approved with national law, with the prior agreement of lower levels of government. Borrowing Limits to borrowing activity There are no limits on the borrowing activity of lower levels of government, but loans are exclusively destined to finance investment expenditures. National government as guarantor The national government does not guarantee the borrowing activities of lower levels, neither explicitly nor implicitly. Budgeting and reporting Common standards National and subnational governments do not use the same budget classification and accounting rules. The standards for the subnational levels are set by the national government. The budgetary and accounting data aggregates follow the rules of the system of comptabilit nationale SEC 95, shared by EMU countries. Common financial reporting requirements Lower levels of government have different financial reporting practices. Subnational financial reports collected by the national government The national government collects in-year reports on the implementation of the budget from lower levels of government. Reporting of general government aggregates to Legislature General government aggregates are included in the budget documents presented to the Legislature, for knowledge purpose. Greece Assignment and Level of Expenditure Legal basis According to the constitution, the administration to local issues is assigned to local authorities. Legislation defines the categories of local issues and their distribution to municipalites and prefectures. Definition of expenditure responsibilities The national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles for some of the expenditure by lower levels of government. For the other portion, they have concurrent responsibilities, by which the national government sets the policy strategy and the subnational governments decide on public services within that context. Role of national government on overall local expenditure level The national and subnational governments conduct formal consultations on the level of expenditure by lower levels of government, but these are not binding. National Coordination Role Setting targets and monitoring The central government has a coordination role to set the targets and monitor the implementation of the budget, publishing the relevant figures. Calculation of government aggregates Supranational (EU, international organization rules) or domestic commitments make the general government aggregate relevant. The central government has the co-ordination power to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives. Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers The principles of the system of intergovernmental transfers are contained in the Constitution and the actual criteria are approved with national law, with the prior agreement of lower levels of government. Borrowing Limits to borrowing activity There are no limits on the borrowing activity of lower levels of government. National government as guarantor Borrowing by lower levels of government is guaranteed by the national government on a case-by-case basis. In practice, this applies to most borrowing activity. Budgeting and reporting Common standards National and subnational governments do not use the same budget classification and accounting rules. The standards for the subnational levels are set by the national government. Common financial reporting requirements There are common financial reporting requirements for lower levels of government, which are set by the national government. Subnational financial reports collected by the national government No data available. Reporting of general government aggregates to Legislature General government aggregates are included in the budget documents presented to the Legislature, for knowledge purpose. Indonesia Assignment and Level of Expenditure Legal basis The Legislature may delegate specific roles and responsibilities of spending assignments to subnational through specific legislation. Definition of expenditure responsibilities The national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles for most of the expenditure by lower levels of government. There are also concurrent responsibilities, by which the national government sets the policy strategy and nation-wide standards and lower levels decide on public services within that context and with those constraints. In a few cases, national and subnational governments responsibilities overlap, and programs implemented in the same sectors by different levels create duplications. Role of national government on overall local expenditure level The national government has no role in regard to the overall expenditure level of lower layers of government. National Coordination Role Setting targets and monitoring The central government has a coordination role to set the targets and monitor trends, to suggest corrections and, if necessary, to enforce them. Calculation of government aggregates Supranational (EU, international organization rules) or domestic commitments make the general government aggregate relevant. The central government has the coordination power to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives. Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers The system of intergovernmental transfers is decided with national law (budget or other law), with the prior agreement of lower levels. Borrowing Limits to borrowing activity The national government imposes maximum levels of borrowing for lower levels of government which cannot be exceeded. National government as guarantor All borrowing activities of lower levels of government are implicitly guaranteed by the national government Budgeting and reporting Common standards National and subnational governments have the same budget classification and accounting rules, set by the national government Common financial reporting requirements There are common financial reporting requirements for lower levels of government, which are set by the national government Subnational financial reports collected by the national government Generally the national government collects budgets of lower levels of government (taxation and expenditure). Reporting of general government aggregates to Legislature General government aggregates are not included in the budget documents presented to the Legislature. The Legislature examines only the national budget. The general government aggregate is not included in any budget document Korea Korean local governments have a two-tier structure, both levels are equally important, and have local legislative assemblies. Upper-level local governments include Seoul, Metropolitan city, and Do(province). Lower-level local governments are Si(city), Gun(county), and Gu(autonomous district). Assignment and Level of Expenditure Legal basis The Constitution lists the roles and responsibilities of spending assignments to be covered by the national government. All the other functions are assigned to other levels. Definition of expenditure responsibilities The national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles for most of the expenditure by lower levels of government. However, in practice, national and subnational governments responsibilities overlap, and programs implemented in the same sectors by different levels create duplications. There are also concurrent responsibilities for some of the expenditure, where national government sets the policy strategy and lower levels decide on public services within that context. Role of national government on overall local expenditure level The national government has no role in regard to the overall expenditure level of lower layers of government. National Coordination Role Setting targets and monitoring The national government has a coordination role to set the targets (deficit, expenditures, primary expenditure, etc.) for subnational governments (directly or in case of no agreement) in order to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives. Calculation of government aggregates The national government does not have a coordination role in terms of general government aggregates. National and subnational governments are completely independent. The general government aggregates are not calculated Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers The system of intergovernmental transfers is decided with national law (budget or other law), with the prior agreement of lower levels. Borrowing Limits to borrowing activity There are limits on the borrowing activity of lower levels of government. Each loan must be approved by the national government on a case-by-case basis National government as guarantor The national government does not guarantee the borrowing activities of lower levels, neither explicitly nor implicitly. Budgeting and reporting Common standards National and subnational governments do not use the same budget classification and accounting rules. The standards for the subnational levels are set by the national government. Common financial reporting requirements Lower levels of government have different financial reporting practices. Subnational financial reports collected by the national government Generally the national government collects budget reports, annual financial statements (audited), in-year report from lower levels of government. Reporting of general government aggregates to Legislature General government aggregates are included in the budget documents presented to the Legislature, for knowledge purposes. South Africa The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes provision for a 'Chamber of the Regions' known as the National Council of Provinces. The council is composed of a single delegation from each province consisting of ten delegates. It represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interest are taken into account in national government. Assignment and Level of Expenditure Legal basis No data available. Definition of expenditure responsibilities With regards to expenditure by lower levels of government, the national and subnational governments have clear and separate roles for some of the expenditure. There are also concurrent responsibilities, by which the national government sets the policy strategy and nation-wide standards and lower levels decide on public services within that context and with those constraints. Role of national government on overall local expenditure level The national government and lower levels of government conduct formal consultations on the level of expenditure by lower levels of government, but these are not binding. National Coordination Role Setting targets and monitoring The central government has a coordination role to set the targets and monitor trends, to suggest corrections and, if necessary, to enforce them. Calculation of government aggregates Supranational (EU, international organization rules) or domestic commitments make the general government aggregate relevant. The central government has the co-ordination power to ensure the consistency of budgetary policies with national macroeconomic objectives. Legal Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers The principles of the system of intergovernmental transfers are contained in the Constitution and the actual criteria are approved with national law, with the prior agreement of lower levels of government. The provincial share of the budget is allocated to the nine provinces on the basis of an 'Equitable Share Formula' that comprise of six components. The components relate to the provinces health, education and social welfare needs; economic activity; institutional capacity; and a backlog component. Provinces receive 95% of their budget in the form of transfers from national government. Ten percent of these transfers are conditional grants with strict rules governing their disbursement and monitoring. Ninety percent of the transfers are in the form of the provinces equitable share (Equitable Share Formula). Although provinces have a greater say in the allocation of the equitable share, the disbursement thereof is largely determined by national policy. Borrowing Limits to borrowing activity The national government and lower levels of government hold formal consultations on the level of borrowing, but these are not binding. National government as guarantor The national government does not guarantee the borrowing activities of lower levels, neither explicitly nor implicitly. Budgeting and reporting Common standards National and subnational governments have the same budget classification and accounting rules, set by the national government. Common financial reporting requirements There are common financial reporting requirements for lower levels of government, which are set by the national government. Subnational financial reports collected by the national government Generally the national government collects annual financial statements (audited), in-year reports on the implementation of the budget, and budgets from lower levels of government (taxation and expenditure). Reporting of general government aggregates to Legislature General government aggregates are included in the budget documents presented to the Legislature, for knowledge purpose.  Prepared by Ines Kudo (PRMPS) for the World Banks Decentralization Thematic Group.  Potter, B. (1997). Budgetary and Financial Management. In Teresa Ter-Minassian (Ed.), Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.  Ter-Minassian, T. (1997). Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in a Macroeconomic Perspective: An Overview. In Teresa Ter-Minassian (Ed.), Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.  Potter, B. (1997). Op.Cit.  To access the complete survey results, see  HYPERLINK "http://ocde.dyndns.org/" http://ocde.dyndns.org/  Consistent with the OECD surveys usage, this document uses the term national government to refer to the central government.  See the case studies of Argentina and Brazil in Jonathan Rodden et al. Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (MIT Press, 2003.)  However, under certain conditions, such as financial difficulties, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development may further restrict local governments possibilities to borrow.  Ter-Minassian, T. and Jon Craig (1997). Control of Subnational Government Borrowing. In Teresa Ter-Minassian (Ed.), Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.  In Canada, provinces often voluntarily adhere to the standards of the Public Sector Accounting Board, the independent and authoritative standard-setting body for the public sector.  It should be recognized that the Federal budget and the State and local subsector are measured with different concepts. PAGE  PAGE 1 RS,-./01234OPQRTUxyzɺɤCJOJQJaJj>*B*UphjqUj>*B*Uphj{U jU5CJOJQJ\^JaJj>*B*Uph0J j0JUPJaJjPJUaJ4'?R2jjP2      pSnpIJKdefghijkl۷ۡjIUj>*B*UphjSUj>*B*Uphj]Uj>*B*Uph0JCJOJQJaJ j0JU jUjgU<  /01267HIJcdeghijklܩܓj+Uj>*B*Uphj5U5CJOJQJ\^JaJj>*B*Uphj?U jUCJOJQJaJj>*B*Uph0J j0JU: !"#%&./0IJKMNOPQRmnoprsz{|ܷܡj >*B*Uphj Uj >*B*Uphj Uj >*B*Uphj! U jUCJOJQJaJ0J j0JUj>*B*Uph:       + , - / 0 1 2 3 4 O P Q R T U ^ _ ` y z { } ~  jUjj>*B*Uphj Ujt >*B*Uphj Uj~ >*B*UphCJOJQJaJ j0JUj U jU0J<         / 0 F G H I d e f g 潲{o{jUmHnHumHnHu&jV>*B*UmHnHphu mHnHu0JmHnHuj0JUmHnHuB*PJ^JaJphjB*PJU^JaJphjUj`>*B*Uph0JCJOJQJaJ j0JU jU& / 0 3 A B&ABef78[$\$- !     * + , - . / 0 1 2 M N O P ѽѽޕѽѽsѽjUmHnHu&jB>*B*UmHnHphujUmHnHu&jL>*B*UmHnHphu mHnHu0JmHnHuCJOJQJmHnHuj0JUmHnHumHnHujUmHnHujUmHnHu*    - . / 0 1 2 3 4 5 P Q R S ! " ; ϵߩף׏ρߩףm&j$>*B*UmHnHphujUmHnHu&j.>*B*UmHnHphu mHnHuCJOJQJmHnHujUmHnHujUmHnHumHnHu0JmHnHuj0JUmHnHu&j8>*B*UmHnHphu&; < = > ? @ A B C ^ _ ` a !"#<=>?@ABCD_`ѽѽޕѽѽsѽjUmHnHu&j>*B*UmHnHphujUmHnHu&j>*B*UmHnHphu mHnHu0JmHnHuCJOJQJmHnHuj0JUmHnHumHnHujUmHnHujUmHnHu*`ab9:;<qrsϵߩף׏ρߩףm&j>*B*UmHnHphujwUmHnHu&j>*B*UmHnHphu mHnHuCJOJQJmHnHujUmHnHujUmHnHumHnHu0JmHnHuj0JUmHnHu&j>*B*UmHnHphu&$%&^_`ѽѽޕŅzsj_Pjj0J(OJPJQJU^J0J(OJPJQJ^JOJPJQJ^J j0J(UB*PJ^JaJphjB*PJU^JaJphjcUmHnHu&j>*B*UmHnHphu mHnHu0JmHnHuCJOJQJmHnHuj0JUmHnHumHnHujUmHnHujmUmHnHu3458c d G""""$$$$$$$$$$$ &&#&$&%&&&T&U&c&d&h&j&Ƹ|n^5B* CJPJ\^JaJph5B* CJ\^JaJph'5B* CJPJ\^JaJmH phsH #5B* CJ\^JaJmH phsH 5B* CJPJ\ph j0J(U0J( mHnHujU jUPJ^Jj0J(U^J^J0J(OJPJQJ^JOJPJQJ^Jj0J(OJPJQJU^J"8f g """""&&T&U&[&d&i& $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$,[$\$i&j&k&q&w&}&&&&g^UUUUUU $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If44  \Hp!&H ( ( (  t0  !4aj&k&&'''!'"'#'$''')''''''''''z({(|(~((((((((((((((())))))) )!)")/)4)6)8):);)<)=)********,,ż mHnHujYU jUCJPJ^JaJ5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJ5CJPJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJB&&'+d" $$Ifa$$$If44  ֞Hp,!H        t0  !4a''''"'$'(' $$Ifa$(')'''.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H        t0  !4a'''''' $$Ifa$''u(w(.t% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4aw(z(|(((( $$Ifa$((((.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4a(((((( $$Ifa$(()).% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4a)))))!) $$Ifa$!)")0)3).l% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H&&&& t0  !4a3)4)7)8);)<) $$Ifa$<)=)>)y,z,.,,,$$If  ֞Hp,!&H   & & & &  t0  !4a,,,,,, --V-W-Z-[-^-_-b-c-e-f-g-----.... . . ............Q/R/U/V/Y/Z/]/^/`/a/b////////////// 0ȾȾȾȾȾ CJ^JaJ5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJ5B* CJ\^JaJph5B* CJ\^JaJph mHnHu jUAz,,,,,-- $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$,--W-+`" $$Ifa$$$If4  r,[!@ e  e  e  &e  t0  !22 2 22 22 22 24aW-[-_-c-f- $$Ifa$f-g--,# $$Ifa$$$If  <r,[!@ e e e &e  t0  !22 2 22 22 22 24a--.. . $$Ifa$ . ..,# $$Ifa$$$If  br,[!@eee&e t0  !22 2 22 22 22 24a..... $$Ifa$..R/,# $$Ifa$$$If  r,[!@eee&e t0  !22 2 22 22 22 24aR/V/Z/^/a/ $$Ifa$a/b//,# $$Ifa$$$If  r,[!@eee&e t0  !22 2 22 22 22 24a///// $$Ifa$///S1T1,***$$If  Br,[!@e e e &e t0  !22 2 22 22 22 24a 000000Z1[1p1q1r1s1111111112222222!2#2222222222A3B3C3F3G3H3I3L3N3l3m3n3p3ʶCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ5B* CJPJ\^JaJph5B* CJ\^JaJph'5B* CJPJ\^JaJmH phsH #5B* CJ\^JaJmH phsH 5B* CJPJ\^JaJph mHnHu jUjU2T1111111111P$$If44  \Hp!&H ( ( (  t0  !4a $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$, 11111 $$Ifa$112+" $$Ifa$$$If44  ֞Hp,!H        t0  !4a222222"2 $$Ifa$"2#222.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H        t0  !4a222222 $$Ifa$22;3=3.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4a=3A3C3G3I3M3 $$Ifa$M3N3e3h3.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4ah3l3n3q3s3w3 $$Ifa$p3q3r3s3v3w3x333333333444444445556666P6Q6_6`6d6žŴse5B* CJ\^JaJph'5B* CJPJ\^JaJmH phsH #5B* CJ\^JaJmH phsH 5B* CJPJ\^JaJph jU mHnHujOPJU jPJUPJCJPJ^JaJ5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ"w3x333.l% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H&&&& t0  !4a333333 $$Ifa$33355.,**$$If  ֞Hp,!&H   & & & &  t0  !4a5P6Q6W6`6e6f6g6m6s6S$$If44  \Hp!&H ( ( (  t0  !4a $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$, d6f6g66777"7#7$7%7(7)7*7+7.7077777777777777888 8 8 8 8888888%8*8,8.8081838::;;;;;;&;';<;=;>;漰 mHnHujU jU5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ5B* CJPJ\^JaJph>s6y6666 $$Ifa$667+" $$Ifa$$$If44  ֞Hp,!H        t0  !4a77#7%7)7+7/7 $$Ifa$/70777.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H        t0  !4a777777 $$Ifa$7788.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4a8 8 8888 $$Ifa$88&8)8.l% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4a)8*8-8.81828 $$Ifa$283848; ;.,,,$$If  ֞Hp,!&H   & & & &  t0  !4a>;?;;;;;;;;;E<F<G<J<K<M<N<Q<S< = ========================ĶwwwnCJPJ^JaJ5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ5B* CJPJ\^JaJph5B* CJ\^JaJph'5B* CJPJ\^JaJmH phsH #5B* CJ\^JaJmH phsH 5B* CJPJ\^JaJph jU+ ;;;;;;;;;;S$$If44  \Hp!&H ( ( (  t0  !4a $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$, ;;;;; $$Ifa$;;><+@" $$Ifa$$$If44  ֞Hp,!H        t0  !4a><A<E<G<K<N<R< $$Ifa$R<S<= =.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H        t0  !4a = ===== $$Ifa$====.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4a====== $$Ifa$====.l% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4a====== $$Ifa$==>@@.,**$$If  ֞Hp,!&H   & & & &  t0  !4a=(>)>>>?>@>F>G>H>A'A,A6ABBBBBBBBBBBBBC$C%C[C\CaCbCcCeCfCgChCjCkClCD DDDƲؔ{r{rCJPJ^JaJCJOJQJaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ5B* CJOJQJ\aJph5B* CJ\^JaJph'5B* CJPJ\^JaJmH phsH #5B* CJ\^JaJmH phsH 5B* CJPJ\^JaJph6] mHnHujEU jU,@BBBBBBBBCQ$$If44  \Hp!&H ( ( (  t0  !4a $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$, CC CCCC$C $$Ifa$$C%C\C+" $$Ifa$$$If44  ֞Hp,!H        t0  !4a\C^CaCcCfChCkC $$Ifa$kClC D D.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!'H        t0  !4a DDDDDD $$Ifa$DDDDDDDDDqDrDyDzD{D~DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDE E E EEEEEEFFFFFFFFF:H;HIIIIIIII#Jȼ mHnHujU jU j0J(U5CJOJQJ\aJ5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJCJOJQJaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ=DDrDuD.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!'H t0  !4auDyD{DDDD $$Ifa$DDDD.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!'H t0  !4aDDDDDD $$Ifa$DDEE.l% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!'H t0  !4aE E E EEE $$Ifa$EEEFG.,**$$If  ֞Hp,!&H&&&& t0  !4aGGII#J$J*J3J8J9JQ$$If44  \Hp!&H ( ( (  t0  !4a $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$, #J$J2J3J7J9J:J_JeJhJiJjJkJmJnJpJqJtJvJJJJJJJJJJJJ:KK?KBKCKDKEKGKIKKKKKKKKKKKKL"L#L$L%L(LɻCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ5B* CJPJ\^JaJph5B* CJ\^JaJph'5B* CJPJ\^JaJmH phsH #5B* CJ\^JaJmH phsH 5B* CJPJ\^JaJph99J:J@JFJLJRJXJ^J $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$^J_JcJeJ+\% $$Ifa$$If$$If44  ֞Hp,!H        t0  !4aeJiJkJnJqJuJ $$Ifa$uJvJJJ.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H        t0  !4aJJJJJJ $$Ifa$JJ8K:K.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4a:K=K?KCKEKHK $$Ifa$HKIKKK.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4aKKKKKK $$Ifa$KKLL.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4aL#L%L)L+L/L $$Ifa$(L)L*L+L.L0LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLMMMMMMMMJOKO`OaObOcOOOȼB* CJPJ^JaJph mHnHuj;U jUCJPJ^JaJ5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ5/L0LLL.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4aLLLLLL $$Ifa$LLLL.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4aLLLLLL $$Ifa$LLLL.l% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H&&&& t0  !4aLLLLLL $$Ifa$LLLCODO.,,,$$If  ֞Hp,!&H   & & & &  t0  !4aDOOOOOOOOOOS$$If44  \Hp!&H ( ( (  t0  !4a $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$, OOOOOOOOQPTPUPVPWPZP[P]P^PaPcPPPPPPPPPPPPNQPQQQRQSQUQVQWQXQZQ\QQQQQQQQQQQQhRjRkRlRmRpRɻCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ5B* CJPJ\^JaJph5B* CJ\^JaJph'5B* CJPJ\^JaJmH phsH #5B* CJ\^JaJmH phsH 5B* CJPJ\^JaJph9OOOOO $$Ifa$OOONP+<"" $$Ifa$$$If44  ֞Hp,!H        t0  !4aNPQPUPWP[P^PbP $$Ifa$bPcP$$If  ִHp,!& ,        t0  !    4acPgPPPPPPPP $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$PP$$If4  ִHp,!&, t0  !    4aPPLQNQQQSQVQXQ[Q $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$[Q\Q$$If4  ִHp,!&, t0  !    4a\Q]QQQQQQQQ $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$QQP$$If4  ִHp,!&, t0  !    4aQQfRhRkRmRqRsRvR $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$pRqRrRsRuRwRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRZT[TUUUUUUUUUUUVVV}o5B* CJ\^JaJph'5B* CJPJ\^JaJmH phsH #5B* CJ\^JaJmH phsH 5B* CJPJ\^JaJph mHnHu jUCJ j0J(UCJPJ^JaJ5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ(vRwR$$If4  ִHp,!&, t0  !    4awRRRRRRRR $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$RRRR.l% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4aRRRRRR $$Ifa$RRRU.,*$$If  ֞Hp,!&H   & & & &  t0  !4aUUUUUVVVD$$If44  \Hp!&H ( ( (  t0  !4a $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$, 3"h^h`VV V.VfViVjVkVlVoVpVqVrVuVwVVVVVVVVWW W W WWWWWWWNWQWRWSWTWVWWWXWYW\W^WkWpWrWtWvWyWYY/Y0Y2Y3Y]Y^YlY#5B* CJ\^JaJmH phsH 5B* CJPJ\^JaJph mHnHu jU5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ5B* CJPJ\^JaJph:V VVVV!V'V-V $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$-V.VCVcV+$"" $$Ifa$$$If44  ֞Hp,!H        t0  !4acVfVjVlVpVrVvV $$Ifa$vVwV$$If4  ִHp,!& \        t0  !    4awVxVVVVVVVV $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$VV$$If4  ִHp,!&\  t0  !    4aVVWW W WWWW $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$WW $$If4  ִHp,!&\  t0  !    4aWWLWNWRWTWWWYW]W $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$]W^Wl$$If4  ִHp,!&\  t0  !    4a^WlWoWpWsWtWwWxW $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$xWyWzWYY.,,,$$If  ֞Hp,!&H   & & & &  t0  !4aY]Y^YdYmYrYsYtYzYYS$$If44  \Hp!&H ( ( (  t0  !4a $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$, lYmYqYsYtYYZ Z Z ZZZZZZlZmZnZpZqZrZsZvZxZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ``````aaĽĽĽĽĴĽĽĽĴĽĽĽĪ5B* CJPJ\^JaJph mHnHu jU5CJPJ\^JaJ5CJ\^JaJCJPJ^JaJ CJ^JaJCJPJ^JaJ5B* CJPJ\^JaJph5B* CJ\^JaJph'5B* CJPJ\^JaJmH phsH .YYYYY $$Ifa$YYZ+" $$Ifa$$$If44  ֞Hp,!H        t0  !4aZZZ ZZZZ $$Ifa$ZZeZgZ.% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H        t0  !4agZlZnZqZsZwZ $$Ifa$wZxZZZ.t% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4aZZZZZZ $$Ifa$ZZZZ.l% $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$$$If  ֞Hp,!&H t0  !4aZZZZZZ $$Ifa$ZZZ]].,,,$$If  ֞Hp,!&H   & & & &  t0  !4a]__``aaa a%a $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$, aa a$a&a'aLasauavayaza{a|aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaabbb b b b bbbbbbb b!b"b$b%b&b'b)b*b+b,b.b0b;bsisuv/wJwjwwxQyRyNz~z|||~~fv̀E)/wIwJwQyRyNz~z||΂ς"#]ڎێTnoԖÛěQklJz4NO-]z̶ͶĻŻ@Z[QRT 6CJ]CJ j0J(UPJ^JCJaJPJPJPJW*ςۂa[#C\] >_&͌I)I3ێmvTo̕Ԗ(I٘ę)ę@!ěЛVQlBJzHRo%Ƣ))r+eݥY4Oo%-]+5R`x);c߮"5o!ҰղNsz2<Yζ[s)s*VpvŻѻҾ@[{LVs ,),3x!L})Qr6yHQsQRS 'h^h` 'L^`L) 23XYZqrstv?|QRT "RSTZ[\`aghijkq0JmHnHu0J j0JU>*CJ 6CJ] j0J(U0JCJ^JaJjCJU^JjCJU^JCJCJ^J CJPJ^J1S\]^_`klmnopq)h]h&`#$ #01h/ =!"#$%) 0 001h/ =!"#$%{DyK  _Toc72819928{DyK  _Toc72819928{DyK  _Toc72819929{DyK  _Toc72819929{DyK  _Toc72819930{DyK  _Toc72819930{DyK  _Toc72819931{DyK  _Toc72819931{DyK  _Toc72819932{DyK  _Toc72819932{DyK  _Toc72819933{DyK  _Toc72819933{DyK  _Toc72819934{DyK  _Toc72819934{DyK  _Toc72819935{DyK  _Toc72819935{DyK  _Toc72819936{DyK  _Toc72819936{DyK  _Toc72819942{DyK  _Toc72819942{DyK  _Toc72819948{DyK  _Toc72819948{DyK  _Toc72819954{DyK  _Toc72819954{DyK  _Toc72819960{DyK  _Toc72819960{DyK  _Toc72819966{DyK  _Toc72819966{DyK  _Toc72819972{DyK  _Toc72819972{DyK  _Toc72819978{DyK  _Toc72819978{DyK  _Toc72819984{DyK  _Toc72819984{DyK  _Toc72819997{DyK  _Toc72819997{DyK  _Toc72819998{DyK  _Toc72819998{DyK  _Toc72819999{DyK  _Toc72819999{DyK  _Toc72820000{DyK  _Toc72820000{DyK  _Toc72820001{DyK  _Toc72820001{DyK  _Toc72820002{DyK  _Toc72820002{DyK  _Toc72820003{DyK  _Toc72820003{DyK  _Toc72820004{DyK  _Toc72820004{DyK  _Toc72820005{DyK  _Toc72820005{DyK  _Toc72820006{DyK  _Toc72820006{DyK  _Toc72820007{DyK  _Toc72820007{DyK  _Toc72820008{DyK  _Toc72820008{DyK  _Ref72721666{DyK  _Ref72726097{DyK  _Ref72726155{DyK  _Ref72727049{DyK  _Ref72727095{DyK  _Ref72727419{DyK  _Ref72741031{DyK  _Ref72740997DyK yK 0http://ocde.dyndns.org/. iF@F Normal$a$ CJOJQJ_HaJmH sH tH PP Heading 1$ & F @&5B*PJ\^JaJphb@"b Heading 2 $ & F dd@&[$\$a$5CJOJPJQJ\^JaJ$@2 Heading 3<$$ & F dhX&d@&Pa$+5@B*CJ(OJPJQJ\^JaJph~@~ Heading 44$$ & F  hX@&^h`a$%5;@ CJOJPJQJ\^JaJJ@J Heading 5$ & F x@&5PJ\^JH@H Heading 6$ & F <@& >*^JaJDD Heading 7 & F <@& CJOJQJJJ Heading 8 & F <@&6CJOJQJ]@ @ Heading 9 & F <@&^JaJ<A@< Default Paragraph Font.U@. Hyperlink >*B*phb\b z-Top of Form$&dPa$<CJOJPJQJ^JaJh]@hz-Bottom of Form$$dNa$<CJOJPJQJ^JaJ>V@!> FollowedHyperlink >*B* ph>O2> title2dd[$\$OJPJQJ^J~B~ minitableauF$d%d&d'dNOPQOJPJQJ^JxRx minicellF$d%d&d'dNOPQOJPJQJ^Jb tableauwithborderF$d%d&d'dNOPQOJPJQJ^JDBrD Body TextB*CJOJQJ^JaJph33JYJ Document Map-D M OJQJ^J xl24Tdd$d%d&d'dNOPQ[$\$CJOJPJQJ^JaJT^T Normal (Web)$dd[$\$a$CJOJPJQJ^JDPD Body Text 2$ Q3"a$PJ^J, @, Footer  !&)@& Page NumberZ@ZTOC 1$ h! h^h`5\^JaJ(mHnHuT@TTOC 2$ ! Lx^`LCJaJmHnHuHHTOC 3 L! ^CJaJmHnHu&& TOC 4 !^&& TOC 5 "p^p&& TOC 6 #L^L&& TOC 7 $(^(&& TOC 8 %^&& TOC 9 &^6@r6 Footnote Text'CJaJ8&@8 Footnote ReferenceH*DC@D Body Text Indent )h^hPJ^J:Q: Body Text 3*CJPJ^JaJ,, Header + !<"@< Caption ,$xx5CJ\aJD#@D Table of Figures-H^`H$ _4c A:DEZP(aq W  yW%X[qq%'?R2jjP2 /03A B    & ABef78fg""T"U"["d"i"j"k"q"w"}"""""####"#$#(#)#########u$w$z$|$$$$$$$$$$$$$%%%%%%!%"%0%3%4%7%8%;%<%=%>%y(z((((()))W)[)_)c)f)g)))** * *******R+V+Z+^+a+b++++++++S-T---------------......".#.........;/=/A/C/G/I/M/N/e/h/l/n/q/s/w/x//////////11P2Q2W2`2e2f2g2m2s2y2222233#3%3)3+3/3033333333344 4 44444&4)4*4-4.4142434447 777777777777777>8A8E8G8K8N8R8S89 9 9999999999999999999999:<<>>>>>>>>?? ????$?%?\?^?a?c?f?h?k?l? @ @@@@@@@r@u@y@{@@@@@@@@@@@@@AA A A AAAAABCCEE#F$F*F3F8F9F:F@FFFLFRFXF^F_FcFeFiFkFnFqFuFvFFFFFFFFF8G:G=G?GCGEGHGIGGGGGGGGGHH#H%H)H+H/H0HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHCKDKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKNLQLULWL[L^LbLcLgLLLLLLLLLLLMNMQMSMVMXM[M\M]MMMMMMMMMMfNhNkNmNqNsNvNwNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNQQQQQRRR RRRR!R'R-R.RCRcRfRjRlRpRrRvRwRxRRRRRRRRRRSS S SSSSSSLSNSRSTSWSYS]S^SlSoSpSsStSwSxSySzSUU]U^UdUmUrUsUtUzUUUUUUUVVV VVVVVeVgVlVnVqVsVwVxVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVYY[[\\]]] ]%]&]']-]3]9]?]E]K]L]s]v]z]|]]]]]]]]]]]]]]^^ ^ ^^^^^^ ^"^%^'^*^,^/^0^1^;^=^A^C^G^I^M^N^Y^[^^^`^c^e^h^i^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^``,a-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaabbbbbb b$b&b*b-b1b2bJbMbQbSbWbYb]b^blbobpbsbtbwbxbybbbbbIctcddeeeSfxfgghhh?i^iij'jjjkoioqr/sJsjsstQuRuNv~vxxxzzf{v{{{||E}}}*~~~~~a[#C\] >_&͈I3ۊmvTȏԒ(Iٔĕ@!ėЗVQlBJzHRo%ƞ)r+eݡY4Oo%-]+5R`x;cߪ"5o!ҬծNsz2<Yβ[s*VpvŷѷҺ@[{ĽLVs ,Ϳ3x!L}Qr6yHQsQRS\]^_`klmnor 0 0 0 0 0 0 00?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?@0?0?0?0? 0-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 ( 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ( 0  8 000,00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000,0000000000000000000000000000000000000000,0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008 00/0/,0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/,0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/8 009090909,0909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909098 00A0A0A0A,0A,0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A,0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0A8 00N0N,0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N,0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N,0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N,0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N0N( 0  8 0ybyb@ 0bbP 0bb)0bP 0bb)0IcP 0bb)0dH 0bbP 0ee)0eP 0ee)0Sf@ 0bb)0g@ 0bbP 0hh)0hP 0hh)0?i@ 0bbP 0ii)0jP 0ii)0jP 0ii)0kP 0ii)0k8 0ybybH 0VlVlP 0`l`l)0lP 0`l`l)0>oP 0`l`l)0qH 0VlVlP 0/s/s)0JsP 0/s/s)0s0s)0sH 0VlVl)0NvH 0VlVlP 0xx)0xP 0xx)0z0z@ 0VlVlP 0v{v{)0{P 0v{v{)0|P 0v{v{)0E}P 0v{v{)0}8 0ybybH 0~~P 0~~)0~P 0~~)0aP 0~~)0[H 0~~P 0)0#P 0)0\H 0~~)0]@ 0~~P 0)0P 0)0>@ 0~~P 0)0P 0)0P 0)0IP 0)08 0ybybH 0P 0)0ۊP 0)0mP 0)0vH 0P 0TT)0oP 0TT)0H 0)0Ԓ@ 0P 0)0P 0)0(H 0P 0)0ٔP 0)0P 0)0@P 0)08 0ybybH 0P 0)0ėP 0)0VP 0)0H 0P 0QQ)0lP 0QQ)0H 0)0J@ 0P 0HH)0RP 0HH)0@ 0P 0)0P 0)0P 0)0rP 0)0+8 0ybybH 0ݡݡP 0)0P 0)0P 0)0YH 0ݡݡP 044)0OP 044)0H 0ݡݡ)0-@ 0ݡݡP 0++)05P 0++)0@ 0ݡݡP 0``)0xP 0``)0;P 0``)0ߪP 0``)058 0ybybH 0P 0)0P 0)0P 0)0ծH 0P 0)0P 0)0NH 0)0z@ 0P 022)0<P 022)0β@ 0P 0[[)0sP 0[[)0P 0[[)0P 0[[)0V8 0ybyb)0pH 0ppP 0)0ŷP 0)0P 0)0H 0ppP 0@@)0[P 0@@)0H 0pp)0@ 0ppP 0LL)0VP 0LL)0 @ 0ppP 0)0P 0)0P 0)0P 0)08 0ybyb)0xH 0xxP 0)0P 0)0!P 0)0H 0xxP 0)0P 0)0}H 0xx)00)0@ 0xxP 0)0P 0)0Q@ 0xxP 0)0P 0)0P 0)0OP 0)0@'0@'0@'0@'0@'0@'0@'0@'0@'0@'0@'0 0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0@0 000  ; `j&, 0p3d6>;=D#J(LOpRVlYaBbe/wq)5>KT 8i&&'('''w(((()!)3)<)z,-W-f-- ...R/a///T1112"222=3M3h3w3335s667/77788)828 ;;;><R< ======@C$C\CkC DDuDDDDEEG9J^JeJuJJJ:KHKKKL/LLLLLLLDOOONPbPcPPP[Q\QQQvRwRRRRUV-VcVvVwVVVWW]W^WxWYYYZZgZwZZZZZ]%aKasaaaabbb/b0bMbNbhbbbbbdeeeff1f2f]fofxff`pIęs,Sq      !"#$%&'(*+,-./012346789:;<=?@ABCDEFGHIJLMNOPQRSUpR-/02QyJeghj 1Idghj"/JMNPo{,/02Q_z}~/FGf+-.0O.013R! < > ? A ` " = ? @ B a     ; r     "#"%"&&&(((+,,Z-p-r-000122677&7<7>7(:?:G:>>>BBBEEEIIIJK`KbKQQQU/U2U\\\3aIaLaq X%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%t̕ tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%tX%t̕t tt tt tt tt tt tt tt t t t t t !!8_w[X8@3f0(  B S  ?q _Toc72819928 _Toc72056058 _Toc72819929 _Toc72056059 _Toc72819930 _Ref72721666 _Toc72816520 _Toc72819997 _Ref72726097 _Toc72816521 _Toc72819998 _Ref72726155 _Toc72816522 _Toc72819999 _Toc72819931 _Ref72727049 _Toc72816523 _Toc72820000 _Ref72727095 _Toc72816524 _Toc72820001 _Toc72819932 _Ref72727419 _Toc72816525 _Toc72820002_Definition_of_expenditure _Toc72056065 _Toc72819933 _Ref72741031 _Toc72816526 _Toc72820003 _Ref72740997 _Toc72816527 _Toc72820004 _Toc72056071 _Toc72819934 _Toc72816528 _Toc72820005 _Toc72056072 _Toc72816529 _Toc72820006 _Toc72816530 _Toc72820007 _Toc72816531 _Toc72820008 _Toc72056076_Reporting_of_government _Toc72819935 _Toc72056086 _Toc72819936 _Toc72223029 _Toc72581774 _Toc72634789 _Toc72819937 _Toc72223030 _Toc72581775 _Toc72634790 _Toc72819938 _Toc72819939 _Toc72819940 _Toc72223031 _Toc72581776 _Toc72634791 _Toc72819941 _Toc72819942 _Toc72222979 _Toc72581778 _Toc72634793 _Toc72750289 _Toc72819943 _Toc72819944 _Toc72819945 _Toc72819946 _Toc72222983 _Toc72581782 _Toc72634797 _Toc72750293 _Toc72819947 _Toc72056079 _Toc72819948 _Toc72222985 _Toc72581784 _Toc72634799 _Toc72750295 _Toc72819949 _Toc72819950 _Toc72819951 _Toc72222988 _Toc72581787 _Toc72634802 _Toc72750298 _Toc72819952 _Toc72222989 _Toc72581788 _Toc72634803 _Toc72750299 _Toc72819953 _Toc72056080 _Toc72819954 _Toc72222991 _Toc72581790 _Toc72634805 _Toc72750301 _Toc72819955 _Toc72819956 _Toc72819957 _Toc72222994 _Toc72581793 _Toc72634808 _Toc72750304 _Toc72819958 _Toc72222995 _Toc72581794 _Toc72634809 _Toc72750305 _Toc72819959 _Toc72056081 _Toc72819960 _Toc72222997 _Toc72581796 _Toc72634811 _Toc72750307 _Toc72819961 _Toc72819962 _Toc72819963 _Toc72223000 _Toc72581799 _Toc72634814 _Toc72750310 _Toc72819964 _Toc72223001 _Toc72581800 _Toc72634815 _Toc72750311 _Toc72819965 _Toc72056082 _Toc72819966 _Toc72223003 _Toc72581802 _Toc72634817 _Toc72750313 _Toc72819967 _Toc72819968 _Toc72819969 _Toc72223006 _Toc72581805 _Toc72634820 _Toc72750316 _Toc72819970 _Toc72223007 _Toc72581806 _Toc72634821 _Toc72750317 _Toc72819971 _Toc72056083 _Toc72819972 _Toc72223009 _Toc72581808 _Toc72634823 _Toc72750319 _Toc72819973 _Toc72819974 _Toc72819975 _Toc72223012 _Toc72581811 _Toc72634826 _Toc72750322 _Toc72819976 _Toc72223013 _Toc72581812 _Toc72634827 _Toc72750323 _Toc72819977 _Toc72056084 _Toc72819978 _Toc72223015 _Toc72581814 _Toc72634829 _Toc72750325 _Toc72819979 _Toc72819980 _Toc72819981 _Toc72223018 _Toc72581817 _Toc72634832 _Toc72750328 _Toc72819982 _Toc72223019 _Toc72581818 _Toc72634833 _Toc72750329 _Toc72819983 _Toc72056085 _Toc72819984 _Toc72223021 _Toc72581820 _Toc72634835 _Toc72750331 _Toc72819985 _Toc72819986 _Toc72819987 _Toc72223024 _Toc72581823 _Toc72634838 _Toc72750334 _Toc72819988 _Toc72223025 _Toc72581824 _Toc72634839 _Toc72750335 _Toc72819989 _Hlt72228759 _Hlt72481762 """z(z(z(T-T-T-/111 7 7 79>>>AAAEEEDKDKDKNNQQQUU\\-a-aOaybybbbbbbbeeeeghiiiiVl`l`l`l`l`l/sNvxv{v{v{v{v{~~~~~~~]TԒQJHHHHHܡݡ4-+++++`````z22222[[[[[pp@LLLLLxx_fr  !"#%&$'()*+,-./01234589:67;<=>?@EFGHABCDIJKLMNOSTUVPQRWXYZ[\]^_`abfghicdejklmnopqrstuyz{|vwx}~@@$ &"S"S"(((s---/2N2N2?7779:>>>AAAE"F"FcKKKNNQQQ\U\U]]aaaybbbbbbbbeghhhhjjjj_llIs}vxxxxx{{{{{~~~"ڊnؔؔؔؔؔ×kyHHHHQQQQQN\++++44444wwwww2222;;;;;rrrrruuķZýLLLLUUUUU`gr q"u"}""""&&&&&&A(C(q*}*+,,,,,------000000m2q2y2}2226777 7%7777777(:E:F:H:J:L:? ????"?BBBBBBBB@FDFLFPFXF\FIIIIIIKKKKKKRRRR'R+RzU~UUUUU-]1]9]=]E]I]``aaaaaappizrzȟԟ՟ޟŢҢkmz17Ta"+RS[`jmnor0yJhIh/N{0_~.1! ? " @  r  E E -AOOTTY\ "&"&&((+,Z-s-001267&7?7(:H:>>BBEEIIJKcKQQU3U\\3aMaRS[^^`jlmr0yJhIh/N{0_~ /.1! ? " @  r   " "&"("&&z((((+,T-Z-s-u-00112267 7&7?7A7(:H:>>>>BBBEEEEIIDKJKcKeKQQQQUU3U5U\\\\-a3aMaOaaaybbeehhll#ۊToٔėЗQlHR4O+52<@[LVSmnr Ines Kudo_C:\Documents and Settings\wb247409\My Documents\Turkey\Draft 4 Budgeting and financial mgmt.doc Ines KudoC:\Documents and Settings\wb247409\Application Data\Microsoft\Word\AutoRecovery save of Draft 4 Budgeting and financial mgmt.asd Ines Kudo_C:\Documents and Settings\wb247409\My Documents\Turkey\Draft 4 Budgeting and financial mgmt.doc Ines Kudo_C:\Documents and Settings\wb247409\My Documents\Turkey\Draft 4 Budgeting and financial mgmt.docwb149356C:\Documents and Settings\wb149356\Application Data\Microsoft\Word\AutoRecovery save of Draft 4 Budgeting and financial mgmt.asdwb149356?C:\Decentralization\Draft 4 Budgeting and financial mgmt dw.doc Ines Kudo_C:\Documents and Settings\wb247409\My Documents\Turkey\Draft 5 Budgeting and financial mgmt.doc Ines Kudo_C:\Documents and Settings\wb247409\My Documents\Turkey\Draft 5 Budgeting and financial mgmt.docwb1493562L:\DECENT\Draft 5 Budgeting and financial mgmt.docwb149356GL:\DECENT\Subnational Budgeting and Financial Mgmt Practices May 04.docOsm $ުvZG=J,2K tutA^`o(.h^`o(h^`o(.^`o(..h^`o(.h^`o(H^`o(()^`o(()^`o(()hh^h`o(.P^`Po(..^`o(...x^`xo(....  ^`o( .....  X@ ^ `Xo( ......  ^ `o(....... 8x^`8o(........ `H^``o(.........h ^`OJQJo(h ^`OJQJo(oh pp^p`OJQJo(h @ @ ^@ `OJQJo(h ^`OJQJo(oh ^`OJQJo(h ^`OJQJo(h ^`OJQJo(oh PP^P`OJQJo(^`o(.h^`o(^`o(.p ^p`o(.h^`o(.h^`o(H^`o(()^`o(()^`o(()h^`o(.8^`o(^`o(.p ^p`o(.@  ^@ `o(()x^`o(.H^`o(()^`o(()^`o(()  $ $tutZG=tuttuttuttutOsOsKKK        T"U"["d"i"j"k"q"w"}"""""####"#$#(#)#########u$w$z$|$$$$$$$$$$$$$%%%%%%!%"%0%3%4%7%8%;%<%=%(((()))W)[)_)c)f)g)))** * *******R+V+Z+^+a+b+++++++--------------......".#.........;/=/A/C/G/I/M/N/e/h/l/n/q/s/w/x/////////P2Q2W2`2e2f2g2m2s2y2222233#3%3)3+3/3033333333344 4 44444&4)4*4-4.414243477777777777777>8A8E8G8K8N8R8S89 9 9999999999999999999999>>>>>>?? ????$?%?\?^?a?c?f?h?k?l? @ @@@@@@@r@u@y@{@@@@@@@@@@@@@AA A A AAAA#F$F*F3F8F9F:F@FFFLFRFXF^F_FcFeFiFkFnFqFuFvFFFFFFFFF8G:G=G?GCGEGHGIGGGGGGGGGHH#H%H)H+H/H0HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKNLQLULWL[L^LbLcLgLLLLLLLLLLLMNMQMSMVMXM[M\M]MMMMMMMMMMfNhNkNmNqNsNvNwNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNQQQRRR RRRR!R'R-R.RCRcRfRjRlRpRrRvRwRxRRRRRRRRRRSS S SSSSSSLSNSRSTSWSYS]S^SlSoSpSsStSwSxSyS]U^UdUmUrUsUtUzUUUUUUUVVV VVVVVeVgVlVnVqVsVwVxVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV]]] ]%]&]']-]3]9]?]E]K]L]s]v]z]|]]]]]]]]]]]]]]^^ ^ ^^^^^^ ^"^%^'^*^,^/^0^1^;^=^A^C^G^I^M^N^Y^[^^^`^c^e^h^i^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaabbbbbb b$b&b*b-b1b2bJbMbQbSbWbYb]b^blbobpbsbtbwbxbybr@Fq@UnknownG: Times New Roman5Symbol3& : ArialI& ??Arial Unicode MS5& z!Tahoma;Wingdings?5 : Courier New"1hԣԣ£:PXo!0d 2QPART 6 Ines Kudowb149356Oh+'0  4 @ L Xdlt|PART 6ART Ines Kudo nesnesNormald wb149356 214Microsoft Word 9.0@V@D>@0q>@0q>:P՜.+,D՜.+,D hp  World Bank GroupyoX PART 6 Title  8@ _PID_HLINKSAx ? _Toc72820008? _Toc72820007? _Toc72820006? _Toc72820005? _Toc72820004? _Toc72820003? _Toc72820002? _Toc72820001?} _Toc72820000?w _Toc72819999?q _Toc72819998?k _Toc72819997>b _Toc728199841\ _Toc728199781V _Toc728199720P _Toc728199660J _Toc728199603D _Toc728199542> _Toc7281994828 _Toc7281994252 _Toc728199365, _Toc728199355& _Toc728199345  _Toc728199335 _Toc728199325 _Toc728199315 _Toc728199304 _Toc728199294 _Toc728199287hhttp://ocde.dyndns.org/  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVXYZ[\]^_`abcdefgijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~Root Entry F}u>Data WW 1Tableh?WordDocumentPSummaryInformation(DocumentSummaryInformation8CompObjjObjectPool}u>}u>  FMicrosoft Word Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89q