ࡱ>  bjbj 1Vf%3 = III]]]8Tl]FUk"hhhEEEEEEE$4HJ F9Ihhhhh FIIBF!!!hLIIE!hE!!j>BD]x?<EXF0F?K,!KdBBKIB hh!hhhhh F F!hhhFhhhhKhhhhhhhhh :  Syllabus (Version 1) June 20, 2014 PHIL 340 Ethics (49414R) VKC 210 12:00 1:45 MW Professor John Dreher Office: MHP 211 x05173  HYPERLINK "mailto:dreher@usc.edu" dreher@usc.edu Hours: Mon Aug 25 Wed Dec 3 Mon 2:15 3:15 Wed 10:45 11:45 Special Office Hour: Last Minute Review for Final Examination Fri Dec 12: 9:15 10:45; by appointment Final Examination Fri Dec 12: 11:00 1:00 MATERIALS: Aristotle, Irwin, trans., Nicomachean Ethics, second edition, Hackett, paper (NE) Bentham and Mill, Troyer, ed., The Classical Utilitarians, Hackett, paper (CU) Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford, paper (V&V) Hare, Moral Thinking, at the Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, paper (MT) Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ellington, trans., Hackett, paper (GMM) Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Clark and Swenson, trans., Hackett, paper (GM) Spinoza, Shirley, trans., Ethics, 2nd edition, Hackett, paper (E) Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, paper (ML) Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, paper (T&T) DESCRIPTION: This course is an introduction to ethics, approached from the perspective of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The course seeks to introduce the main current in Western ethical thought, via the works of Aristotle, Kant, Spinoza, and Mill, among the classics pertaining to the distinctions between good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice. These four philosophers offer significantly different approaches to ethics, but they all concern themselves with the main distinctions of ethics. Aristotle locates the ethical in the rational nature of human beings, arguing that the moral goodness is the end of the soul that chooses to act on a rational basis in accordance with moral virtue. Spinoza, an egoist, argues that what is good is that which we know to be certainly useful to us, by which he means those things that promote our health and secure our integration within a benign society. Kant disagrees, insisting that the good will, the only thing good in itself, chooses the right because it is right, where what is right conforms to imperatives that are validated by a priori rational principles. Mill departs from Aristotle, Spinoza and Kant, insisting that the overarching moral principle is to maximize goodness across the moral population, where goodness is broadly defined to be pleasure, which is principally the reduction and elimination of pain. By the end of the nineteenth century considerable doubt had arisen about the traditional ways of drawing the main distinctions of ethics. Indeed, Nietzsches philosophy profoundly undermined confidence in the possibility of discovering any moral truths. Nietzsche argued that value is essentially a human creation, those leading successful vibrant lives create their own values. The course examines these philosophies not only from a classical perspective but through the works of twentieth century champions of one view or another. PHIL 340 is meant to be preparation for more advanced courses in ethics, including PHIL 440, Contemporary Ethical Theory, and PHIL 442, History of Ethics to 1900 and PHIL 443, Value theory. REQUIREMENTS AND POLICIES: There will be a midterm examination, which will test for knowledge of the reading assignments as well as expository and supplementary information delivered during class. The midterm examination will emphasize the assigned philosophical texts. There will also be a final examination. The first part of the final examination will test for knowledge of the reading assignments as well as expository and supplementary information delivered during class sessions following the midterm examination. The second part of the final examination will be a comprehensive question dealing with the main theme of the course. The comprehensive question will be discussed towards the end of the semester. Class attendance is very strongly recommended. If you must miss a class, please make arrangements with a classmate to bring you up to date on the missed class. Lecture Notes: Lecture notes for each class will be distributed by e-mail and posted on Blackboard, ideally before each class. The lecture notes are meant to summarize the essentials of each lecture in a relatively non-technical, easily accessible form. They are not a substitute for class attendance. Papers: There will be two papers, the first approximately ten pages (3000 words); the second 15 - 20 pages. All papers should be submitted as hard copies and via Blackboard electronically on the due date and time. Paper Topic #1: Explain the distinction between teleological and deontological ethical theories, illustrating the distinction by reference to Aristotle and to Kant. Identify the principal challenges faced by each of the theories. How do Aristotle and Kant attempt to deal with the challenges of their respective theories? Is either successful? Paper Topic #2: Contrast the ethical theories of Mill with those of Aristotle, Kant and Spinoza. In which respects is Mill sympathetic to Aristotle? Can Mills happiness principle account for Aristotles eudemonia? Contrast Spinoza and Mill on the nature of moral motivation? Is Spinozas egoism diametrically opposed to Mills utilitarianism? In particular, is it ever right to act from self-interest according to MIll? Is it ever right to act for the good of another according to Spinoza? How does Mill characterize Kantian ethical theory? Is Mills characterization of Kants theory fair? Some Kantians argue that Mills theory fails to account for moral worth? How might Mill and other utilitarians respond to the Kantian criticism? Grading: Grades will be weighted as follows: Midterm Exam 15% Paper #1 20% Paper #2 30% Final Exam: Part I 15% Final Exam: Part II 20% Grading scale: 94: A 90: A 87: B + 84: B 80: B 77: C+ And so forth What Do Grades Mean? In general, a grade of 85, which is a B on the grading scale above, indicates a solid knowledge of the material covered on the hand-outs and a familiarity with the most important passages drawn from primary texts. Higher grades of B+, A- and A indicate knowledge that goes beyond the basics. In order of importance, those indicators are: 1. demonstrated capacity to analyze the logical structures of arguments, viz., to identify their premises and conclusions and to determine their strengths and weaknesses; 2. demonstrated knowledge of primary texts by apt and accurate references to them; 3. apt comparisons of primary texts to those of other philosophers; 4. tracing the development and critical analysis of a philosophical position; e.g., Utilitarianism from Mill to Hare to Foot to Williams. 5. explaining the relation of arguments in one sub-area of philosophy to those of another sub-area; e.g., metaphysics/ethics; epistemology/ethics. 6. explaining how fields other than philosophy have influenced and been influenced by philosophy, e.g., the influence of religion on ethics or of natural science on ethics during the modern period. Late Submissions and Missing Work: Work submitted within 48 hours after the due date and time will be penalized by 1/3 letter grade. Work submitted more than 48 hours but less than one week after the due date will be penalized by 2/3 of a letter grade. Work submitted later than one week after the due date but before the final examination will be penalized by one full letter grade. Work will not be accepted without an excuse after the final examination. Missing work after the final examination will be penalized as follows: For any examination or required paper, the final course grade will be lowered by one full grade. For example, suppose that only three of four, equally weighted, required pieces of work were submitted on time and received grades of 90, 85 and 93. The average of the three would be: 89.33, which is a B+. The course grade would be reduced by one full letter grade to C+. Integrity and Timeliness: Please remember that the University strictly prohibits plagiarism, which can be the mere failure to acknowledge the work of another as well as the deliberate misrepresentation of the work of another as your own. You must acknowledge your indebtedness not only to the ideas of others but also to their words. In general, excuses for late papers or missed examinations will be accepted only in extraordinary circumstances, including illness, genuine family emergency, or unavoidable absence for an approved University of Southern California activity. Please remember that it is impossible accommodate a special request by a single individual unless the same opportunity is extended to everyone in the class. This makes it virtually impossible to allow extensions of due dates for reasons other than those indicated above. SCHEDULE OF READINGS, ASSIGNMENTS AND EXAMINATIONS: 1. Mon Aug 25: Introduction: What are the traditional problems of ethics and the main strategies for dealing with those problems in Western philosophy? Does 'ethics' differ from 'morality'? The Hegelian conception of ethics; the strong and weak points of the Hegelian conception. How do Enlightenment and 19th century ethical theory differ from prior theories? How does twentieth century moral philosophy differ from preceding moral philosophies? What is meta-ethics? How is it distinguished from ethics? 2. Wed Aug 27: Aristotle, NE, Book 1: Virtue and the rational activity of the soul; virtue and the aim of human activity; happiness and virtue; the good for man is the rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Misfortune can blemish even a happy life, but virtue saves us from misery. Virtues do not arise in us naturally, but rather by habituation. Moral virtues are dispositions to deal with the anticipation of pleasure and pain rationally. 3. Mon Sep 1: University Holiday: Labor Day 4. Wed Sep 3: Aristotle, NE, Book II: Acquisition of virtue; definition of virtue; virtues of character; relations between mean and extremes; the virtuous act is the mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency. The mean is chosen for reasons, as a prudent person would define them. In the case of both character and health, good character (virtue) and good health tend to be ruined by both excess and deficiency; hence, virtue coincides with the mean between excess and deficiency. 5. Mon Sep 8: Aristotle, NE, Book III, VII: Aristotle on the Metaphysics of Virtue: Virtue and choice; voluntary and involuntary acts, acts done in ignorance, excusing conditions; the distinctions between decisions, wishes and desires; deliberation and deliberative desires; that the activities of virtue concern those things that promote ends, are voluntary and accord with our decisions. It follows that virtues are up to us. (Otherwise they would not be activities based upon deliberation.) Virtuous activity includes cultivation of virtues. 6. Wed Sep 10: Aristotle, NE, Book VII: Aristotle on Vice: Injustice and Intemperance: There are two types of injustice. In general, injustice refers to vice. But matters of profit are referred exclusively to justice, which is correlated with a special form of injustice, dealing with the distribution of honors and wealth. A second sub-specie of justice refers to the rectification of wrongs, which is essentially restoration. Restoration is a form of (what is usually called) retributive justice, which is making people suffer in proportion to the suffering that they have caused others. There are three person-types: virtuous/vicious; continent/incontinent; God-like/bestial. The pleasures of the intemperate are sometimes bestial (that is, resemble the pleasures of those who acts are completely irrational.). The temperate person takes pleasure in the right things, in the right way, with the right people, at the right time. Incontinence differs from intemperance. The intemperate person lacks practical knowledge, thinking that the intemperate act actually is the mean; the incontinent person knows that the act deviates from the mean, but does it anyway. 7. Mon Sep 15: Aristotle, NE, Book X: 1 - 9: Aristotle on Pleasure and Happiness: Pleasure is an activity, but not a process because the pleasure experienced in activity is complete each instant; pleasure is not something that is completed by a process, but pleasures can increase or decrease during a process (like music or sports). Happiness is not found in pleasure, but in those activities that accord with virtue. Virtuous activities give rise to pleasure. Happiness is always associated with independence; that is, with what cannot be taken away. Decent people (viz. those conforming to generally accepted standards ) respond to reason, but base people respond only to the threat of pain. Men generally live as they wish, laying down rules for their wives and children, in effect establishing private tyrannies. Thus the inculcation of virtue is a matter for legislation in the city, and so ethics is connected with politics. 8. Wed Sep 17: Foot, V&V, Essay 1: A contemporary neo-Aristotelian theory: Virtues are beneficial characteristic that belong to the will. Virtue and vice are revealed by our innermost desires as well as our intention. A wise person knows what is worth pursuing and how to get what is worth pursuing; a wise person wants to get what is good. The virtues should be viewed as correctives. The virtues provide necessary responses to temptation, and they correct deficiencies of motivation. Explaining the difficult case of charity 9. Mon Sep 22: Kant, GMM, Preface, Section I: What is moral worth? There are three key principles of morality: An action has moral worth only if it is done from duty; an action done from duty derives its moral worth not according to the purpose for which it is done but rather from the maxim from which it is done, and duty is the necessity of an action that is done out of respect for law. The moral law must bind all rational creatures; otherwise its necessity would be rooted in human nature. The only thing good in itself is a good will; nevertheless the virtues should be cultivated because they make it easier for us to resist temptation and to act in accordance with moral law. Contemporary responses to the Kantian program: Foot and W. D. Ross. 10. Wed, Sep 24: Kant, GMM. Section II; 1. According to Kant, all (ethical) maxims have: a. Form: They are chosen as if they are universal laws of nature. (Hence the first form of the Categorical Imperative: Act only so that the maxim of your action can be consistently willed to be a universal law of nature.) b. Matter: The relative ends of a human being or other creature with sensuous desire cannot provide the basis of a moral imperative because the imperative would be limited by interests. Thus, ethical maxims apply to all rational creatures and bind them by reason by reason alone. (Hence the maxim: Treat others as ends; never as means (to satisfy sensuous desire).) c. Form-in-Matter: A complete determination that harmonizes the maxims within a kingdom of ends that all rational creatures are bound by reason and hence motivated to cultivate. (Hence the maxim: Act from maxims that create a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.) Introduction to 19th century and contemporary criticisms: Mill, W.D. Ross, Williams, Foot. 11. Mon, Sep 29: Kant GMM: Section II; Heteronomy and autonomy of the will; autonomy and the kingdom of ends; the autonomy of the will is presupposed by morality and the heteronymous will is the source of all spurious principles of morality. A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a legislator who makes himself subject to the legislation. In the kingdom of ends price is distinguished from worth, and it is worth that gives a thing its dignity. If free will is presupposed, morality and the C.I. follow by analyzing the concept of freedom; To wit, the only possible way to be free is to act according to one rational nature.) 12. Wed, Oct 1: Kant GMM: Section III: Freedom and autonomy of the will rest on the foundation of pure practical reason; but still there is an issue about moral motivation: Why I should subject myself to the C.I. when I would at times rather act straightway to satisfy my desires? There is an apparent circle: In the order of efficient causes we suppose our actions (and even decisions) to be determined by antecedent events, but in the order of ends we think of ourselves as subject to moral laws, which we freely choose to accept or to reject. Indeed, we think of ourselves as subject to those laws because we think of ourselves as free or autonomous. Even so there may not really be a circle, because there may be two points of view, one when we conceive of our will as an a priori efficient cause and another when we represent ourselves (to ourselves) as effects of efficient causes. The categorical imperative is possible because the idea of freedom makes us parts of the intelligible realm. Respect for the law arises when competitors (sensuous motivations) are swept out of the way to make room for the motivational force of the moral law. 13. Mon, Oct 6: Contemporary Perspectives: The problem of moral motivation and the possibility of moral luck. Williams, ML, Essay 2, pp. 20 49; Is there moral luck? Agency and responsibility: Does it undermine the Kantian system of morality? Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck: To praise and blame, or to celebrate and deplore? Foot, V&V, Essay XI; Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, Can there be a categorical imperative that motivates? 14. Wed, Oct 8: Midterm Examination 15. Mon, Oct 13. Mill, CU, Utilitarianism, What is Utilitarianism? Where does it fit into the spectrum of moral philosophies? The Happiness Principle; intimations of rule utilitarianism that the cultivation of a noble character benefits the whole of humankind even if it does not always benefit the noble individual; that some pleasures are elevated does not show that they are intrinsically superior or different in character from other, lower pleasures; on the contrary, it is our sense of dignity that accounts for our desire not to fall into a lower states of existence. Utilitarianism only occasionally requires individuals to take the public good into account; it is sufficient for most to take into account only their private affairs (that is, the limited group of people affected by their choices). Virtue becomes habitual and therefore is not a burden but often a source of pleasure. 16. Wed, Oct 15: Mill, CU, On Liberty, Mill expresses sympathy with the idea of Wilhelm von Humboldt that the end of man prescribed by the dictates of reason . is a complete and consistent whole. (Cf. Williams) A person whose desires and impulses are ones own, as developed and modified by ones own culture, is said to have character. Punishment, viz. deliberately inflicting pain on others, is justifiable only to deter the violation of the rights of others. Personal vices, like egotism and other degrading personal traits, are a subject of moral reprobation only insofar as they involve a breach of duty to others. Duty to oneself can mean nothing more than ordinary prudence. (cf. Utilitarianism) Discussion of Paper #1 17. Mon, Oct 20: Hare, MT, Ch 1: Prescriptivity and Moral Reasoning: How can the language of morals can be related to the demandingness of morality? Can psychology plus logic reveal other-regarding action guiding principles that are commended by reason to all? The three principal logical properties of moral terms are universalizability, prescriptivity and overridingness. Imperatives are entailed by prescriptives. The must in you must  (viz. the deontic  must ) is treated exactly like the ordinary  must, except that the deontic  must is universalizable. A final property of the  ought and  must of moral language is its overridingness, that is, the property of taking precedence on rational grounds over all other oughts and musts. 18. Wed Oct 22: Hare MT Ch 2 4: (Suggested Reading Only: You may rely entirely on the handouts for this material): Moral Conflict and the possibility of resolution, error theories. Are the emotive and descriptive contents of terms logically independent? See; Foot, Moral Beliefs, in V & V, Essay 8 (Suggested Reading Only: You may rely entirely on the handouts for this material). PAPER #1 DUE 19. Mon Oct 27: Hare, MT, Ch 5, Ch 6 pp. 87 110: Taking on the sorrow of another; Preference utilitarianism; now-for-then preferences; then-for-then preferences argument for the claim that anyone who accepts the moral point of view must also accept preference utilitarianism. The simplifying assumption of prudence in defining preference utilitarianism 20. Wed Oct 29: Williams, ML, Essay 1: The stringent constraints of Kants moral philosophy and utilitarianism. Grounding values in the projects of life, defining personal identity and integrity. Partiality and equality; the essential error in impartial ethics, particularly in Utilitarianism and Kantian morality; the man who had one thought too many. 21. Mon Nov 3: Williams, Essay 3: Bearing the consequences and the unraveling of the self; utilitarianism us just as responsible for things that we do not do as it does for things that we do. Utilitarianism wrongly requires people to give up personal identity; that is, integrity in the sense of wholeness of character. Even if we grant the utilitarian view that the goal of morality is to promote happiness, we shall still need to concede that pursuing happiness is not an activity in itself. It must be that one pursues something else, a ground-level project, and in that project and its goals one finds happiness. 22. Wed, Nov 5: Spinoza, E, Pts I and II (Suggested Reading Only: You may rely entirely on the handouts for this material): Spinozas ontology: substance, attributes, infinite modes, the Imprint Theory of Causation; Parallelism, the nature of the human being and the human mind. 23. Mon, Nov 10: Spinoza, E, Pts III: (Suggested Reading Only: You may rely entirely on the handouts for this material) The distinction between adequate and true ideas; that we cannot have adequate ideas of finite modes Spinozas egoist psychology; the conatus, conceptions of joy and sorrow; the role of adequate ideas in Spinozas psychology; their relation to truth; the conatus. 24. Wed Nov 12: Spinoza, E, Pts IV and V: Spinozas definition of Good, egoist moral theory; its relation to conventional morality; freedom and adequate ideas Spinozas conception of happiness, viewing life sub specie aeternitatis, the intellectual love of God 25. Mon Nov 17: Nietzsche, GM, First Treatise, The origin and reconstruction of morality. The role of nobility in moral thinking. The weak seek to subdue the noble through the inculcation of an ethic that champions servility; religion and the origin of slave morality; Zarathustra champions a tightrope walker who fearlessly traverses a chasm, one side representing the culture of slave morality; the other a world freed of the slave morality. Zarathustras project is the re-valuation of values; that is, the eradication of the tablet, the unalterable Word that is written in stone. 26. Wed Nov 19: Nietzsche, GM, Second Treatise, Third Treatise, pp. 35 118. Bad Faith and bad conscience, authenticity, Spinozas influence on 19th century philosophy, especially, Nietzsche, Hegels influence on Nietzsche: frsich v. insich; the will to power, the ascetic ideal; Was Nietzsche an egoist? Foot, V&V, Essay VI, pp. 81 95; Revaluation of values 27. Mon Nov 24: Williams, T&T, pp. 1 83; Truth as a culturally invariant moral value: Accuracy and sincerity, the biological and intellectual survival value of virtue. The concept of narrative in contemporary philosophy; history contrasted with myth. Accuracy presupposes that there is a truth to be valued, and that truth is the validation history; that the state of nature is essentially a myth, which cannot be a vehicle of the truth unless it can be tied to actual history. The liberal society depends upon truth and truthfulness. Initial, brief discussion of paper #2 28. Wed Nov 26: No Class: University Holiday, Thanksgiving Day Eve 29. Mon Dec 1: Full discussion of Paper #2 30. Wed, Dec 3: Discussion of the comprehensive question for the final examination; course evaluation 31. Mon, Dec 8: (3:00 p.m.)  $%-.456;>EѺ}m[Km;m+hOh 5CJOJQJaJhOhW5CJOJQJaJhOhXl5CJOJQJaJ"hOhXl56CJOJQJaJhOhAf5CJOJQJaJhOhSX5CJOJQJaJhOh~5CJOJQJaJhD5CJOJQJaJhOh-1Y5CJOJQJaJ,jhOhK(0J5CJOJQJUaJhOhQ+5CJOJQJaJhOh+5CJOJQJaJhOh-1Y5OJQJ^J%>FVWXn  Y  b gdF$gdF$gd+js$a$gdW$a$gdAf$a$gd+gd^MEFKLOSUVXbn~￲taKa:a hOh50JCJOJQJaJ+jhOh5CJOJQJUaJ%jhOh5CJOJQJUaJhOh-1YCJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJhOh55CJOJQJaJhOh~R5CJOJQJaJhO5CJOJQJaJhOhE5CJOJQJaJhOhG~g5CJOJQJaJhOh 5CJOJQJaJhOhB+5CJOJQJaJ   < Y n o r ߒteV߱G;hDCJOJQJaJhOhG~gCJOJQJaJhOh+jsCJOJQJaJhOhWCJOJQJaJhOhOCJOJQJaJhOh;CJOJQJaJhOh+js5CJOJQJaJhOhkF.CJOJQJaJhOh CJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJhOh55CJOJQJaJhOh 5CJOJQJaJhOhS5CJOJQJaJ 1 K h 4 7 F G W j  J ` ³xxxp³hOh]H* hOh;hOh]6 hOh},T hOh]hOhF$CJOJQJaJhOh9CJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJhOh[5CJOJQJaJhOhA CJOJQJaJhOh~R5CJOJQJaJhOh~RCJOJQJaJ+b  _ @ YZhi/ !gdRlgdF$gdF$ z =6FLU#Op 2ĸӋċċċoċċhOh:6CJOJQJaJh[00CJOJQJaJhOh:CJOJQJaJhOhirCJOJQJaJhOhXlCJOJQJaJhDCJOJQJaJhOh)kLCJOJQJaJhOh@CJOJQJaJhOh {CJOJQJaJhOh7-&CJOJQJaJ&BIM&{Ĵ⥖ĴĖwhYIhOh55CJOJQJaJhOh},TCJOJQJaJhOhJCJOJQJaJhOhSCJOJQJaJhOhXl6CJOJQJaJhOhXlCJOJQJaJhOh {CJOJQJaJhOh:6CJOJQJaJhOh:CJOJQJaJhOh)kLCJOJQJaJhOh@CJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJK_ij ĵvgRChOhWCJOJQJaJ(hOh556CJOJQJ\]aJhOhXlCJOJQJaJh[00CJOJQJaJhOh)kLCJOJQJaJ"hOh)kL56CJOJQJaJ"hOh556CJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJhOh56CJOJQJaJhOh {CJOJQJaJhOhVCJOJQJaJhGt5CJOJQJaJ VXZghi#[ӷӨӖxiZKZ<hOhECJOJQJaJhOhNCJOJQJaJhOh;CJOJQJaJhOh@CJOJQJaJhOhOCJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJ"hOh},T56CJOJQJaJhOh@CJOJQJaJh[00CJOJQJaJhOh},T5CJOJQJaJhOh},TCJOJQJaJhOhXlCJOJQJaJhOh^CJOJQJaJdghitwĵsdUE5UhOh@5CJOJQJaJhOhW^5CJOJQJaJhOhW^CJOJQJaJhOh#-CJOJQJaJhOhVCJOJQJaJ"hOhO56CJOJQJaJ"hOh#-56CJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJhOh)kLCJOJQJaJhOhNCJOJQJaJhOhOCJOJQJaJhOhB+CJOJQJaJhOhXlCJOJQJaJ&$=rteVeGehOhW^CJOJQJaJhOh CJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJhOh;CJOJQJaJhOhOCJOJQJaJhOh@6CJOJQJaJhOh(5CJOJQJaJhOh@CJOJQJaJhOh},TCJOJQJaJhOh},T5CJOJQJaJhOh#-CJOJQJaJ"hOhW^56CJOJQJaJ-./HIJKZ|ǩ{l{l{]NhOh=2wCJOJQJaJhOhQ+CJOJQJaJhOh{ CJOJQJaJhOh{ 5CJOJQJaJhOh)kLCJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJhOhW^CJOJQJaJhOhLXCJOJQJaJhOhOCJOJQJaJhOh^CJOJQJaJh[00CJOJQJaJhOh6CJOJQJaJ/JKZajsz !!!"S""r#:$;$^$_$ & &''gdDX B M ! !""R"S""""""""q#r#s#w##zzzm]m]PhoM5CJOJQJaJhOhDX5CJOJQJaJhDX5CJOJQJaJhR5CJOJQJaJhE5CJOJQJaJhGt5CJOJQJaJhOh 5CJOJQJaJhOh^5CJOJQJaJhOhE5CJOJQJaJhOh{ 5CJOJQJaJhOh&:75CJOJQJaJhOh&:7CJOJQJaJ##$ $$7$9$:$}$$%%%>%T%^%q%{%%%%%%%% &&&'&:&&&&&&&&&''⵨wewe"hOh 56CJOJQJaJ"hOh^56CJOJQJaJh7Z56CJOJQJaJhOh;5CJOJQJaJhoM5CJOJQJaJhOh 5CJOJQJaJhGt5CJOJQJaJhOhO5CJOJQJaJhOh^5CJOJQJaJhDX5CJOJQJaJ''''''' )!)-)3)4)8)=)))))Ͽ|jXj|jF4F"hDXhQ+56CJOJQJaJ"hDXhDX56CJOJQJaJ"hDXhN756CJOJQJaJ"hDXhE56CJOJQJaJ"hDXh656CJOJQJaJhDXh[CJOJQJaJ"hDXh556CJOJQJaJhDXh&:75CJOJQJaJhOhE5CJOJQJaJhOh 5CJOJQJaJhOh^5CJOJQJaJhOh;5CJOJQJaJ''' )!)#+$+X+Y++,\,,-^----6...v>>6?7???W@@AvAA h^h`gd'gdM;gd gdoMD;U;g;n;;;;;;;;;<<M<T<V<W<<<<<<<<<<<<< =====>>>>N>u>|>>>>>> ?5?6?7?;?LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL³ѳ§³³³§§‰³‰hOh-tdCJOJQJaJhOhb"BCJOJQJaJh%yCJOJQJaJhOh !CJOJQJaJhOh#CJOJQJaJhOhZ!CJOJQJaJhOh)kLCJOJQJaJhOh !5CJOJQJaJ6}KK.LLLEMMM>N?NNNDOOO"P#PIPUPPPYQQRsRR/SSgdMUgdb"Bgd-tdgd#LMDMJM[M\MxM}M~MMMMMMMMMM0N1N>N?NMNPNNNNNNĸ񩚋yiYIhOhZ!CJOJQJ\aJhOh]TCJOJQJ\aJhOho\CJOJQJ\aJ"hOhZ!5CJOJQJ\aJhOhJCJOJQJaJhOhMCJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJh%yCJOJQJaJhOh-tdCJOJQJaJhOhb"BCJOJQJaJhOh !CJOJQJaJhOh#CJOJQJaJNNNOOOCOHOJOPOQOcOdOeOfOOOOOOOO!P"P#P+P-P2Pｫωyj[L[hOh,AoCJOJQJaJhOhMCJOJQJaJhOhMUCJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJ\aJhOhMUCJOJQJ\aJ"hOhMU5CJOJQJ\aJ"hOh]T5CJOJQJ\aJ"hOh-td5CJOJQJ\aJhOh]TCJOJQJ\aJhOhZ!CJOJQJ\aJhOh-tdCJOJQJ\aJ2P5PHPIPKPTPUPWP]P^PePfPiPPPPPPPPPXQaQQQQQQRRrRҥxiZiZZKZKZKZKZhOhh~CJOJQJaJhOh*CJOJQJaJhOh(5CJOJQJaJhOhCJOJQJaJhOhnCJOJQJaJhOhZ!CJOJQJaJhOhMCJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJhOh^MCJOJQJaJhOhMUCJOJQJaJhOhMU5CJOJQJaJhOhJCJOJQJaJrRzRRR.S7SSSSSSSS3T4T5T7T8T:TETHTIT]T_TU UUU0V1VCVDVVVVV!W/W0WDWZWĽwphhOhO5 hOhOhOh6h%y hOh(5 hOhhOhMU5hOh5 hOh\/ hOhM hOh^M hOh5 hOhMUhOhnCJOJQJaJhOhMUCJOJQJaJhOh*CJOJQJaJhOhh~CJOJQJaJ(SS4T5TTT^UU[W]WWXXXXYnZ>[ \W\X\\]X]]gdYgd gd h^h`gdO h^h`gdgdgdMUZW[W\W]W_WmWpWWWW X XXX_X`XXXXXXXXXXXXY"Y2Y8Yʻzzrjrb[TL[L[L[T[T[ThOh5 hOhY hOhhOh\hOhY\hOh\hOhYCJOJQJ\aJhOhCJOJQJ\aJ"hOh5CJOJQJ\aJhOhJCJOJQJaJhOhMCJOJQJaJhOhMUCJOJQJaJhOhK5CJOJQJaJhOh5CJOJQJaJ hOhO8YZZ6Z:Z6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666hH6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666662 0@P`p2( 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p8XV~_HmH nH sH tH @`@ NormalCJ_HaJmH sH tH ::  Heading 1$@&5\DA`D Default Paragraph FontViV 0 Table Normal :V 44 la (k ( 0No List 6U`6  Hyperlink >*B*ph4@4 Header  !.)@.  Page NumberFV !F FollowedHyperlink >*B* ph<2<  Comment TextCJaJdBd $Ache in this relationship? HowSacheT`RT F$ No Spacing$CJOJPJQJ_HaJmH sH tH >@b> K(0 Footnote TextCJaJ<q< K(0Footnote Text Char@&`@ K(0Footnote ReferenceH*L L M;0Footer  H$CJOJPJQJ^JaJFF M;0 Footer CharCJOJPJQJ^JaJPK![Content_Types].xmlj0Eжr(΢Iw},-j4 wP-t#bΙ{UTU^hd}㨫)*1P' ^W0)T9<l#$yi};~@(Hu* Dנz/0ǰ $ X3aZ,D0j~3߶b~i>3\`?/[G\!-Rk.sԻ..a濭?PK!֧6 _rels/.relsj0 }Q%v/C/}(h"O = C?hv=Ʌ%[xp{۵_Pѣ<1H0ORBdJE4b$q_6LR7`0̞O,En7Lib/SeеPK!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xml M @}w7c(EbˮCAǠҟ7՛K Y, e.|,H,lxɴIsQ}#Ր ֵ+!,^$j=GW)E+& 8PK!Ptheme/theme/theme1.xmlYOo6w toc'vuر-MniP@I}úama[إ4:lЯGRX^6؊>$ !)O^rC$y@/yH*񄴽)޵߻UDb`}"qۋJחX^)I`nEp)liV[]1M<OP6r=zgbIguSebORD۫qu gZo~ٺlAplxpT0+[}`jzAV2Fi@qv֬5\|ʜ̭NleXdsjcs7f W+Ն7`g ȘJj|h(KD- dXiJ؇(x$( :;˹! I_TS 1?E??ZBΪmU/?~xY'y5g&΋/ɋ>GMGeD3Vq%'#q$8K)fw9:ĵ x}rxwr:\TZaG*y8IjbRc|XŻǿI u3KGnD1NIBs RuK>V.EL+M2#'fi ~V vl{u8zH *:(W☕ ~JTe\O*tHGHY}KNP*ݾ˦TѼ9/#A7qZ$*c?qUnwN%Oi4 =3ڗP 1Pm \\9Mؓ2aD];Yt\[x]}Wr|]g- eW )6-rCSj id DЇAΜIqbJ#x꺃 6k#ASh&ʌt(Q%p%m&]caSl=X\P1Mh9MVdDAaVB[݈fJíP|8 քAV^f Hn- "d>znNJ ة>b&2vKyϼD:,AGm\nziÙ.uχYC6OMf3or$5NHT[XF64T,ќM0E)`#5XY`פ;%1U٥m;R>QD DcpU'&LE/pm%]8firS4d 7y\`JnίI R3U~7+׸#m qBiDi*L69mY&iHE=(K&N!V.KeLDĕ{D vEꦚdeNƟe(MN9ߜR6&3(a/DUz<{ˊYȳV)9Z[4^n5!J?Q3eBoCM m<.vpIYfZY_p[=al-Y}Nc͙ŋ4vfavl'SA8|*u{-ߟ0%M07%<ҍPK! ѐ'theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsM 0wooӺ&݈Э5 6?$Q ,.aic21h:qm@RN;d`o7gK(M&$R(.1r'JЊT8V"AȻHu}|$b{P8g/]QAsم(#L[PK-![Content_Types].xmlPK-!֧6 +_rels/.relsPK-!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xmlPK-!Ptheme/theme/theme1.xmlPK-! ѐ' theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsPK] AgAg $$$$$'E  #')+-B074 8D;S?FILN2PrRZW8Y}]V^_ bte.gJhqik,oo8:;<>?@ABCDFGHJKLMOPRSUVXYZ[]^_abcefghjklpb /'[09A}KS]dk9=EINQTW\`dioAgX  '!!8@0(  B S  ?Vfggg g!g#g$g&g'g?gBg-2## $$b$f$$$ %%d%f%%%;&C&&&&&A'D'((a(n((())j)t)w**++++,,1-:-q-y---B.H..../V/[///0 0j0x000112)2223.3?3C33333T4V44455Z5d5556 6}6666Q7[77778]8c888!9*9|9999+;-;|;;? ?V?^???@ @d@i@@@A!AAABBmBxBBBC)CCCCC4D9DDDDDKESEEFFFFFfGhGGGHHI IaIdIIIJ%J{J}J7K>KKKKKLLLLM MgMpMMMMM;NJNNNOO PP`PcPPP"Q/Q_QgQQQQQ[ReRRRSS]SSSSSTT!U)UzUUUUpVzVVV'W0WWW*E ^DZH=.a?NptvM``^`.^`.88^8`.^`. ^`OJQJo( ^`OJQJo( 88^8`OJQJo( ^`OJQJo(hh^h`. hh^h`OJQJo(^`.^`.pL^p`L.@ ^@ `.^`.L^`L.^`.^`.PL^P`L. ^`OJQJo( ^`OJQJo(o pp^p`OJQJo( @ @ ^@ `OJQJo( ^`OJQJo(o ^`OJQJo( ^`OJQJo( ^`OJQJo(o PP^P`OJQJo(^`.^`.pL^p`L.@ ^@ `.^`.L^`L.^`.^`.PL^P`L.^`o(. ^`hH. pL^p`LhH. @ ^@ `hH. ^`hH. L^`LhH. ^`hH. ^`hH. PL^P`LhH.^`o(.^`.pL^p`L.@ ^@ `.^`.L^`L.^`.^`.PL^P`L.^`.^`.pL^p`L.@ ^@ `.^`.L^`L.^`.^`.PL^P`L.^`o(.^`.pL^p`L.@ ^@ `.^`.L^`L.^`.^`.PL^P`L. ^`OJQJo( ^`OJQJo(o pp^p`OJQJo( @ @ ^@ `OJQJo( ^`OJQJo(o ^`OJQJo( ^`OJQJo( ^`OJQJo(o PP^P`OJQJo(^`o(. e^e`hH. 5L^5`LhH.  ^ `hH.  ^ `hH. L^`LhH. u^u`hH. E^E`hH. L^`LhH.^`.p^p`.@ L^@ `L.^`.^`.L^`L.^`.P^P`. L^ `L. ^`OJQJo(p^p`OJQJ^Jo(o @ ^@ `OJQJo( ^`OJQJo(^`OJQJ^Jo(o ^`OJQJo( ^`OJQJo(P^P`OJQJ^Jo(o  ^ `OJQJo(^`o(.^`.L^`L. ^ `.j^j`.:L^:`L. ^ `.^`.L^`L.~}|*E ^Q$1J [=YIk=.aj7vM`T^F         `                 Ĵ                                                                                                                         `/2M;nE'~:o  { (S.EV`z ]TIo*#+;Z!#7-&V&s*Q+!,#-kF.\/[00{1p4&:7N79\89e8t;q=N?@b"B F]GZK)kLoMN4NVO*Q T},TOVWy8XDXSX^Y-1YvYW^_#"c-tdAfG~gMiRjRlg3n?En,AoqXq=rirwrQs+js't=2wxy xYux:y>EyP|I}h~KH o\DLXMU9@+9&~Rft5=@E4/ 'M>~x6bkmrGtJ^!] wY\7Zl pNuls 7K@]J60r?Xl {Sh(5V# &*9MWF$Y[OO\3W#kn) !#-]yR:D:L"J%y4)EhK(I.6A ^M 1EB+R~JB; oVfXf@z"z"z"z"4IQIRAfAgx@xZx@x@UnknownG*Ax Times New Roman5Symbol3. *Cx Arial7.@Calibri?= *Cx Courier New;WingdingsA$BCambria Math"h&G&'ˣFW 4FW 4!20"f"f3QHP $PS2!xxContemporary Ethical TheoryJohn H. Dreher'USC College of Letters, Arts & Sciencesd                 Oh+'0 0< \ h t Contemporary Ethical TheoryJohn H. Dreher Normal.dotm(USC College of Letters, Arts & Sciences14Microsoft Office Word@~F@2@@ |@ FW՜.+,D՜.+,l( hp  (USC College of Letters, Arts & Sciences4"f Contemporary Ethical Theory Title(QY _PID_HLINKS _DocHomeAdQmailto:dreher@usc.edu   !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqstuvwxy{|}~Root Entry FLData r1TablezLWordDocument 1SummaryInformation(DocumentSummaryInformation8MsoDataStore#DJBVMZ0UGNTPV5Q==2#DItem  PropertiesUCompObj y   F'Microsoft Office Word 97-2003 Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89q