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The word 'systems' indicates that every decision should be considered in as broad a context as necessary; the word 'analysis' emphasizes the need to reduce a complex problem to its component parts for better understanding. Systems analysis takes a complex problem and sorts out the tangle of significant factors so that each can be studied by the method most suited to it. The method was developed in the 1950s at the RAND Corporation as part of a suite of techniques for supporting wartime assessments in creating a “science of war” to evaluate alternative nuclear weapons scenarios. It was subsequently the basis for social policy analysis across areas such as housing, poverty, healthcare, education, and municipal services. The field is quantitative (focused on mathematical modeling) and qualitative, but its goal is enabling managerial decision-making. It combines several mathematical techniques such as Operations Research, Game Theory, Probability and Statistics, Econometrics, Linear/dynamic Programming, and later in social policy analysis, Regression Analysis, Survey Research, and Experimental Design. It is useful to distinguish systems analysis from other similar approaches. Systems engineering was developed primarily to manage large projects, an example being ICBM design and development. Operations research was developed in England in the pre WW2 days to plan and analyze military operations, for example planning military bombing raids. Systems analysis enabled comparison of systems that offer alternative solutions to problems, for example help choose between use of long-range bombers vs. ICBMs. Finally, system dynamics emerged to develop models for predicting and comparing downstream consequences of outcomes of alternative policies. 2. Origin and Evolution 2.1 Origins and Early Applications in Weapons Systems (1940s-1950s) The success of scientists and engineers in improving military operations during WW2 led to the creation of the RAND (Research ANd Development) Corporation in the late 1940s. The organization’s goal was to pursue a science of war based on rigorous social scientific methodologies and cutting edge research. To attain its goal, RAND created interdisciplinary working groups that concentrated on developing a scientific methodology for analyzing warfare along immediate, intermediate, and long-range problems. The work of these groups, incorporating several (then) new applied math techniques – such as game theory, linear and dynamic programming, network theory, cost analysis, and monte carol methods – came to be known as “systems analysis.” The groups’ objective was to provide information to military decision-makers that would sharpen their judgement and provide the basis for more informed choices. The first major publication of the approach was the 1949 RAND report Strategic Bombing Systems Analysis, which advocated using decoys to mask bombers from the enemy. A 1954 report Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases proposed relocating bomber forces away from the bases near the Soviet Union and toward home where US bombers could survive a first-strike attack and then carry out a retaliatory second strike, shifting US defense policy from a first-strike to a second-strike posture. While RAND’s efforts to create a science of war were largely unsuccessful, systems analysis, the method that came out of these efforts, became quite successful. It was codified in a 1960 RAND publication, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. The book’s authors and systems analysis’ key proponents were Roland McKean and Charles Hitch, the latter being the Head of RAND’s economics division. The book introduced a new concept of military strategy: it suggested that the army and defense requirements should be subordinated to the national economy on a long and short-term basis 2.2 Wider Applications in the Defense Department - 1960s The book made a deep impact on President John F. Kennedy’s new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. The ideas in the book meshed well with McNamara’s own disposition for systems thinking and quantitative rational management. He quickly brought the key principals of the approach – most from RAND and hailed as the “whiz kids”- under his administration appointing Charles Hitch as the Asst. Sec. for Defense, and Alain Enthoven, also of RAND, as Dep. Asst. Sec. for Defense. McNamara established the Office of Systems Analysis at the Pentagon and used systems analysis as an aid in decision-making on weapon development and budgeting. The new system was to treat the defense establishment as a whole rather than as a proliferation of autonomous units. Production of National Security  The complex but finite set of relations within this system could be quantitatively modeled and analyzed such that the outputs both matched national objectives and optimized the employment of available resources. The approach necessitated centralization of policymaking authority in the hands of those who could view the national security system holistically, and required that there be a range of policy alternatives in such a way that these alternatives could be compared with precision and in relation to policy objectives. Such an analysis was based on quantitative methods, cost-effectiveness rationale, and a multi-year time horizon. It harmonized budgeting, policy planning and weapons development. It was initially a wild success and the centerpiece of the “McNamara revolution.” McNamara made several controversial decisions using systems analysis and related quantitative approaches: cancellation of the B-70 bomber and vetoed its proposed successor RS-70 increased focus on faster, less vulnerable and less costly ICBMs (rather than manned bombers) termination of the Skybolt project (ballistic missile with 1000 nautical mile range designed for launching from B-52 bombers as a defense suppression weapon) initiation and continuation of the TFX (later F-111 aircraft); based on systems analysis, awarded contract to General Dynamics – (failed project) introduction of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS), originally developed at RAND in the 1950s, to overhaul budgeting practices within the Defense Department institution of a much-publicized cost reduction program which (he reported) saved $14 billion from 1961-1966 2.3 Evolution into Social Policy Analysis (mid-1960s onward) The early 60s saw migration of primary national concerns away from global nuclear warfare toward counterinsurgency, limited warfare and social revolution; connections between national security and social welfare began the next wave of applications, again spearheaded by RAND and its expatriates. In 1965, President Johnson directed the implementation of PPBS and the creation of systems analysis offices across the federal government: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Economic Activity, and the Bureau of the Budget. The key architects of this implementation were Charles Schultze of the Bureau of Budget, Henry Rowen, again of RAND, Sargent Shriver of the Task force on anti-poverty programs, and Roger Levian, of RAND. Systems analysis methods saw widespread use in social policy programs. RAND and other defense sector companies like TRW started shifting resources to applying quantitative methods to social problems. In health care, systems analysis was used for the design and experimental testing of health insurance systems; in education, design and experimental testing of school voucher systems; in housing, for the analysis of rent control and the design of a housing allowance system; and in design of public systems for transportation, water supply and communications. Internationally, especially at IIASA, they were used for climate modeling and other global problems. In the social arena, this innovation did not see as much success. In a Phi Beta Kappa lecture in 1978, Hitch commented on this: I thought at the time that this was foolish, almost certain to lead to confusion and likely to end up discrediting the management techniques it was trying to promote. Both happened. For one thing, a tremendous amount of preliminary research performed for a decade at RAND alone by several hundred professionals had gone into the development of applications for military planning. Nothing remotely comparable had been done in any other area of government. For another, there was not enough trained manpower available - too few understood what PPBS was all about, and they were spread hopelessly thin. In addition, most of the planning problems of most of the civilian departments, like those of higher education, were far different from those military planning problems which had proved susceptible to systems analysis." (from Alain Enthoven’s eulogy to Hitch) 3. Evaluation and Legacy Systems analysis was championed as a scientific means of policymaking – in contrast to sloppy, politics-driven methods of earlier years. It created (and was created by) an environment of centralized, top-down decisionmaking. In the military, it served to “civilianize” policymaking pulling it out of the individual services and relocating it in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Outside of the military, it gave rise to a vast market for policy-oriented social science research (and institutions such as the Urban Institute and IIASA). The application of the approach in the defense arena seems to have had largely positive impacts – it streamlined operations at the Department of Defense, and brought defense under a greater degree of civilian control (presumably a good thing). On the other hand, it became a tool – perhaps an excuse – to promote one set of interests over others, under the guise of a scientific approach. For example, the approach could have been used to dilute the power of those within the defense establishment who promoted long-distance manned bombers with respect to those who favored unmanned missiles. Many presumably poor policy decisions, such as the Vietnam war, have been blamed on the use of such “scientific methods.” There is however some consensus that the essence of systems analysis has been integrated within the military, and systems analysis is now an integral part of the establishment. In the public arena, however, its success was more mixed. As shown by the experience of TRW and RAND, in the end, it proved too centralized, too fine-honed, and too focused on technical and economic factors, to respond to messy, politicized urban problems. For most practitioners, while the promise of the “scientific” approach replacing political bargaining with technocratic expertise as the primary means of policy formulation seemed enticing, the recognition that it also insulated critical public issues from open democratic political processes came fast and the hard way. In the view of this author, at least in civilian decision-making, systems analysis is and ought to be used today as a tool, and only one of several inputs into the decision-making process. 4. References Hughes, T., Rescuing Prometheus, 1998 Hughes, T., Systems, Experts and Computers, 2000 RAND Publications, 1998 50 Years of Looking Forward ( HYPERLINK http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.fall.98/50.html www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.fall.98/50.html) Out of the Blue Yonder ( HYPERLINK http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.fall.98/50.html www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.fall.98/blue.html) Other Web-based Publications Biography of Robert McNamara ( HYPERLINK http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/mcnamara.htm www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/mcnamara.htm) 5. Relevant Historical Readings Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? E. S. Quade and W. I. 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