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Logic and Epistemology[pt/]
[I]Introduction[I/]
As it was indicated in the main introduction, logic in medieval philosophy was not as narrowly construed as it tends to be in contemporary philosophy. Logic was regarded not merely as the study of the validity of arguments, but rather as the universal instrument of reason (which is why the name Organon -- Greek = tool, instrument -- was given to the collection of Aristotles logical works), the universal discipline that reflects on and regulates the activity of reason in all disciplines in its search for knowledge. This conception conferred on logic (or dialectic) a particularly important status in medieval learning. Considered the art of arts, the science of sciences (ars artium, scientia scientiarum), logic had within its scope detailed reflections on the relationships between language, thought, and reality, reflection on all forms of rational argument (including fallacious arguments, in order to detect logical errors), and on all sorts of epistemic and methodological considerations, including problems of the acquisition and justification of the first principles of scientific demonstrations, and the organization of arguments, their premises, and conclusions into scientific disciplines. Accordingly, it was also taken to be the task of logic to consider the divisions of various scientific disciplines, their distinctions and interdependencies, and thus their organization into the entire body of humanly attainable knowledge.
It is in accordance with this broad medieval conception of logic that in this part we have selections discussing such diverse topics as the division of sciences (in particular, the status of theology as a science, obviously bearing on the general issue of faith and reason discussed in the General Introduction above), selections concerning the problem of universals (the primary issue in medieval logical semantics, explaining the relationships between our common terms, common concepts, and singular items of reality), the foundations of scientific knowledge both according to the Augustinian illuminationist and the Aristotelian abstractionist account, and the issue of knowledge and skepticism.
The first set of selections, therefore, deals with the methodological considerations involved in the distinction of philosophical and scientific disciplines, and their relation to religious faith and rational theology. The first selection, from Augustine, presents the threefold distinction of the three major philosophical disciplines that also served as the rationale for organizing the selections of this volume into three main parts. Augustines discussion, which forms part of a larger discussion in his monumental work De Civitate Dei (The City of God), provides a brief survey of the history of philosophy, culminating, according to Augustine, in Neoplatonic philosophy, which laid the foundations of the three major philosophical disciplines: logic, metaphysics, and ethics. For Augustine, Neoplatonic philosophy elevates human understanding just about as high as it can get on its own, and this is precisely what allows it to realize its need for supernatural help in the form of illumination (to aid failing human reason) and grace (to provide proper direction to human will, corrupted by original sin).
The anonymous twelfth-century author of the next selection, in the introductory discussion of an elaborate treatise on logic from the booming post-Abelard period, takes his cue from the same conception of human nature, but has much more this-worldly material to accommodate and organize into a coherent system of philosophical and scientific disciplines. It is with remarkable smoothness that the author integrates the basic threefold division we find in Augustine with the disciplines of the Seven Liberal Arts (Septem Artes Liberales) of late antiquity and with the Aristotelian system.
Finally, the last selection of this section provides Aquinas discussion of his conception of theology as a science, which differs methodologically from secular science only in that it takes its principles from a supernatural source, i.e., divine revelation. It is also here that we can find Aquinas main argument (already presented in the main introduction) for the necessary concordance between faith and reason.
The section on the problem of universals surveys the issue from Boethius to Buridan, as it formed part of logical discussions prompted by the opening remarks of Porphyrys Isagoge, i.e., introduction to Aristotles Categoriae. The selection from Boethius second commentary on this work sets the stage for all later medieval discussions. His solution provided in terms of Aristotles theory of abstraction recurs in ever more refined forms e.g., in Abelard,1 John of Salisbury,2 and Aquinas.3
Unfortunately, Abelards sophisticated discussion (his detailed refutation of contemporary alternative theories and the presentation of his own original theory) proved to be too long for this volume, but it is easily available in Spades excellent translation cited above, along with other longer selections from Porphyry, Boethius, Scotus, and Ockham. In the present volume Abelards period could only be represented by the short, but vivid, description provided by John of Salisbury in his Metalogicon.
The selection from the Summa Lamberti (dubiously attributed to Lambert of Auxerre, a Dominican author who flourished in the mid-thirteenth century) illustrates the way the moderate realist theory of universals that prevailed in the thirteenth century was put to work in logical semantics, in discussions of the so-called properties of terms, which describe the various semantic functions terms have in various propositional contexts.4
The selections from Ockham present his arguments against Scotus version of the moderate realist position, and his alternative accounts, first in terms of his ficta, and then in terms of his mental act theory, discussed in the General Introduction.
Finally, the short selection from Buridan (ostensibly written in the form of a commentary on Peter of Spains corresponding treatise, but in fact presenting Buridans own ideas) illustrates how Buridan puts to use Ockhams nominalist conception, simply identifying universals with the predicables of Porphyry, i.e., with the common terms of various written and spoken human languages and the language of thought that is the same for all human beings (i.e., our common concepts).5
The selections of in the next section deal with the epistemological aspect of the problem of universals, insofar as universal intellectual cognition is the precondition of the possibility of acquiring scientific, i.e. universal, necessary knowledge. Of the two short selections from Augustine, the first presents the link between his conception of Divine Ideas and his theory of illumination; the second presents Augustines main argument for the necessity of divine illumination for the formation of our intellectual concepts. This is the argument that is fundamentally challenged by the Aristotelian conception of the possibility of forming our intellectual concepts without the need for supernatural illumination in the natural process of abstraction, as explained in the subsequent selections from Aquinas Summa Theologiae. The next selection, from Aquinas commentary on Aristotles Analytica Posteriora (Posterior Analytics), explains how abstraction can ground universal scientific knowledge in the process of the induction of the first principles of scientific demonstrations.
It is this Aristotelian conception that is further challenged by the selection from Henry of Ghent, who (while granting the role of abstraction in the formation of our mundane universal concepts) argues that the attainment of pure truth is not possible without the supernatural help of divine illumination.
Finally, the selection from Scotus argues against Henrys solution, and presents the Aristotelian position that came to dominate late medieval philosophy until the arrival of an Augustinian backlash against the dominant Aristotelianism of the late Middle Ages, in the form of Cartesian Rationalism.6
The selections of in the last section of part I deal with the epistemological problems of the very possibility of acquiring knowledge. The short selections from Augustine present his reaction to the challenges of ancient skepticism, in terms of the absolute certainty of self-knowledge, serving as the starting point of his introspective theology, most aptly summarized in his oft-quoted admonition: Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiori homine habitat veritas -- Do not want to go outside, return into yourself; truth dwells in the inner man (De Vera Religione 39, 72) It is important to note that the same idea of the absolute certainty of self-knowledge would be put to a very different systematic use by Descartes, who made it the Archimedean point of his system in grounding all knowledge, including the scientific knowledge of physical reality.
The question from Aquinas Summa Theologiae illustrates Aquinas radically different, abstractionist foundation for the possibility of acquiring certain knowledge about physical reality, namely, the idea that since simple intellectual apprehension consists in the conformity of the intellect and its objects, the simple concepts of the mind are necessarily related to their proper objects, and so such simple intellectual apprehensions must always be veridical (i.e., they must represent the true nature of the things they apprehend), and the judgments apprehended to be true on the basis of such simple apprehensions are also necessarily true and known to be such without error. (Error arises in judgment by taking the nature of one thing apprehended by some concept to be that of another, or by constructing an at least implicitly inconsistent definition, e.g., the greatest prime number.)
The selection from Henry of Ghent presents his unique combination of Aristotle and Augustine in his response to the challenges of ancient skepticism that he learned about mainly from these two sources. Henrys response still reflects the characteristic epistemological confidence of the period in the veridicality of our cognitive powers with respect to their proper objects and our ability to sort out veridical from non-veridical cognitive acts in a reliable, rational process.
It is this sort of confidence that is undermined by the radical skepticism reflected in the selection from Nicholas of Autrecourt, obviously paving the way for Descartes Demon-skepticism. The fundamental novelty of this new kind of skepticism (grounded by {in?} OK the post-1277 emphasis on Gods absolute power and by the post-Ockham possibility of abandoning the idea of the formal unity of the knower and the known) is that it allows for the possibility of the complete cognitive isolation of a thinking subject from an external physical reality. Accordingly, in contrast to ancient skepticism, which merely doubted whether we are ever reliably able to distinguish our veridical cognitive acts from our non-veridical cognitive acts, this sort of skepticism allows for the possibility of our having no veridical cognitive acts whatsoever that would faithfully represent the nature of external physical reality as it is.
Finally, the selection from John Buridan represents his pragmatic nominalist reaction to this sort of radical skepticism in terms of a surprisingly modern naturalistic reliabilism, which (while granting the abstract possibility of absolute deception by an omnipotent agent) argues that the mere logical possibility of this sort of supernatural deception should not suffice for undermining the reliability of our scientific or ordinary knowledge-claims, given the various degrees of certainty and various kinds of evidence that can reasonably be demanded in different fields and disciplines.
[footnotes]
In his Logica Ingredientibus, see Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, tr. P. V. Spade (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1994), p. 48.
2 Metalogicon, bk 2, c. 20, 877c7--878a9.
3 Summa Theologiae I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1-um.
4 A larger selection from the same work is available in the source of this brief selection: see the List of Sources on page 000 above. The Suggestions for Further Reading also provides a sampling of the vast and fast-growing modern literature on the subject. An excellent survey article is easily available online: Stephen Read, Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2002 edn), ed. Edward N. Zalta, {?}. OK
5 Of course, the selection presented here provides only a tiny fragment of Buridans logical theory. For those who are interested in pursuing the intricacies of his nominalist logic, now his entire Summulae is now available in English translation: John Buridan: HYPERLINK "http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=0300084250" Summulae de Dialectica, an annotated translation with a philosophical HYPERLINK "http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/FILES/Intro.pdf" introduction, tr. Gyula Klima, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. (see the Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of this volume {Which item in the further reading are you referring to? Summulae doesnt appear there.). [Actually, its not there, because later on I decided to list only secondary literature.]
6 An easily accessible survey of the problem of the ontological, logical, and epistemological aspects of the medieval problem of universals is available online: Gyula Klima, The Medieval Problem of Universals, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 edn), ed. Edward N. Zalta. .{?}
[footnotes/]
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