ŠĻą”±į>ž’  ‰‹ ž’’’…†‡ˆŁNõpć’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’ģ„Į[ ųæT‚bjbjāā Uų€j€jf: ’’’’’’lŽŽŽ‚\$(ŠŠŠPŚ\6l(‹ād®…z (‘"J‘(r‘r‘i•.—•«• į į į į į į į$ļä ē|Dįu·•G•"i•·•·•Dįe®llr‘r‘Õ¹į(e®e®e®·•Ģllr‘r‘įe®·•įe®že®c°āzĤŲ,jĘr‘¢… €š&£@Ć(bwŠƒ¦LÅjĘ“įįŖ‹ā4Å6‹ēkĻ¦–öźjĘe®((llllŁFirst Draft, November 2002 Revised, April 2003 FLEXIBILITY AND DIVIDENDS by Kathleen Fuller* and Anjan V. Thakor** *439 Brooks Hall, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602 Phone: (706) 542-3637 Fax: (706) 542-9434 email:  HYPERLINK "mailto:kpetrie@uga.edu" kpetrie@uga.edu and 701 Tappan St., University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Phone: (734) 647-3308 Fax: (734) 764-3146 email: kpfuller@umich.edu **Edward J. Frey Professor of Banking and Finance, 701 Tappan St., University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Phone: (734) 647-6434 Fax: (734) 647-6861 email: athakor@umich.edu Acknowledgements: The helpful comments of Arnoud Boot, Amrita Nain, Gopalan Radhakrishnan, and seminar participants at the University of Delaware are gratefully acknowledged. Dividends and Flexibility Abstract We develop a model of corporate dividend policy without agency or signaling considerations. The model is based on the idea that management will value operating flexibility when there is a possibility that shareholders may disagree with management and block management decisions. By reducing dividends and conserving cash, management increases its flexibility. This improves its ability to invest in projects that it believes are good for the shareholders in the long run but which shareholders would not provide the capital for because they think at the time these are value reducing. However, the cost of not paying dividends is that the current stock price is lowered. Management trades off these two aspects of dividends. Flexibility considerations help us understand various dimensions of dividend policy that are hard to make sense of with existing theories. Our theory generates numerous testable predictions that we confront with the data. The evidence is supportive of the model. FLEXIBILITY AND DIVIDENDS 1. INTRODUCTION Disagreement about what a particular piece of information means and what the optimal course of action should be given that information is a fact of life. One reason why there may be disagreement is that information is asymmetrically distributed across agents. Such problems of asymmetric information can create opportunities for signaling (Spence (1974)) that can be exploited via dividends (Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Ofer and Thakor (1987)). The other reason for disagreement may be that there is a divergence of interests between the disagreeing parties, so that they may have different optimal courses of action even in the face of identical information sets. Such agency or free-cash-flow problems can also give rise to a role for dividends (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (2000)). Disagreement is actually encountered in the real world under much broader set of circumstances. Even two agents faced with exactly the same information and having the same objective function may disagree on the optimal course of action. For example, a CEO may provide the Board of Directors with all the information available to the CEO and yet some directors may disagree with the CEO about the optimal course of action, as in the recent Hewlett-Packard merger with Compaq. Or a company may have plans to make investments that expand its scope – as in the case of AT&T purchasing TCI Cable – because it views these investments as being consistent with its strategy, and find that its shareholders do not share the company’s assessment. In recognition of such possible future disagreement, management will value the “flexibility” to make decisions it views as optimal even when investors do not agree. This, in turn, will affect the decisions of management that will be driven by the desire to build up flexibility for future decisions. In this paper, we argue that a firm’s dividend policy affects management’s flexibility, and thus dividend policy will be influenced by the flexibility tradeoffs perceived by management. At a very basic level, the flexibility-dividend link comes about because paying a dividend takes money out of management’s control and puts it in the hands of investors. It can always be “retrieved” in the future via an equity issue, but not if investors disagree with management over the use of the funds. This way a dividend payment reduces management’s flexibility. We discuss this in a bit more detail later. There are numerous reasons why agents faced with the same incremental information may fail to come to agreement even when agency and signaling problems are absent. One is that divergent beliefs may not converge because of non-uniform prior beliefs, with insufficient time for objective information to be exchanged for convergence to occur (e.g., Allen and Gale (1999) and Morris (1995)). Another reason is that the information being exchanged is “soft,” subjective or otherwise prone to different interpretations by different agents. For example, Kandel and Pearson (1995) develop a trading model in which different agents interpret the same public information differently, and find that the empirical evidence on the relationship between trading volume and stock returns is consistent with their model. A third possibility is that decision makers often have a tendency to consider problems as unique and ignore historical data in evaluating current plans (Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)), so that disagreement would be encountered if different agents ignored different pieces of public information. Fourth, agents often tend to ignore information that conflicts with their earlier beliefs, which would impede convergence (White (1971)). Finally, agents often rely heavily on their intuition and disagree because each agent has a different intuition about the optimal course of action (Clarke and Mackaness (2001)). Boot and Thakor (2002) provide an extensive discussion of the many different strands of literatures in economics and psychology that explain the various reasons why people disagree. The precise reason why people disagree does not matter for our analysis. We take the possibility of disagreement as our starting point and consider situations in which those who disagree with management could block management. We propose that in such circumstances, a firm’s management will value the decision-making “elbow room” or flexibility that would permit it to overrule those who object. This means management will make decisions that affect this flexibility. We view the firm’s dividend policy as one such decision and explore the consequences. The specific question we address is: how does management’s desire for flexibility affect the firm’s dividend policy, and what are the testable predictions of this approach? The basic idea in the model we develop is as follows. In order to isolate the effect of flexibility, we start by assuming that management seeks to maximize shareholder wealth, so there is no agency problem, and that there is equal information between management and investors, so that signaling is not an issue. The firm has some cash on hand that management can keep within the firm to possibly finance a project that may come along in the future. Alternatively, the cash can be paid out as a dividend. The tradeoff management faces is as follows. On the one hand, if the cash is kept within the firm, management will have the flexibility to invest in the project in the future even though shareholders may think it is a bad idea. Thus, management can pursue actions they believe will maximize shareholder wealth even if they cannot convince shareholders that these are the optimal actions. Moreover, no transactions costs will be incurred in raising external capital to finance the project. But not paying a dividend lowers the current stock price precisely because shareholders recognize that by doing this management retains the flexibility to pursue actions shareholders may disagree with. On the other hand, if a dividend is paid, management will not be able to invest even in a project it believes is good if shareholders have to provide the investment capital and they think it is a bad project. Management’s dividend policy strikes the optimal balance between these considerations. Our focus on applying the concept of flexibility to dividends is motivated by the fact that, although our existing theories of dividends have helped us to cover much ground since Miller and Modigliani (1961) about why and how firms pay dividends, there are still puzzling tracts of terra incognita. We seem to have two dominant theories of why firms pay dividends: signaling and free cash flow. Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), and Ofer and Thakor (1987) all develop signaling models in which either taxes or distress borrowing costs create a dissipative cost that makes dividends a credible signal. The free-cash-flow hypothesis suggests that since managers cannot credibly precommit to shareholders that they will not invest excess cash in negative-NPV projects, dividend changes may convey information about how the firm will use future cash flows. Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), and Lang and Litzenberger (1989) all suggest that increasing dividends ensures that there is less free cash flow available to be wasted on inefficient projects, perks, and the like. The empirical implication from both hypotheses is that firms that increase (decrease) dividends should have positive (negative) price reactions. Indeed, dividend changes have been documented to generate significant stock price reactions. The empirical support for signaling is somewhat mixed. The evidence that supports the signaling is that stock prices following dividend change announcements have the same signs as the dividend changes and the magnitude of the price reaction is proportional to the magnitude of the dividend change (see Allen and Michaely (2002)). Bernheim and Wantz (1995) test whether changes in dividend taxation impact the “bang-for-the-buck” of dividend signals. If dividends are used as signals, then when dividend taxation changes, so too should the impact of the signal. Bernheim and Wantz find a strong positive relation between dividend tax rates and the bang-for-the-buck of dividends. This is consistent with the dividend-signaling hypothesis and inconsistent with other theories (including the free-cash-flow hypothesis). Moreover if dividends communicate information about future earnings, then dividend changes should be followed by earnings changes of similar sign. Empirical support for this implication is provided by Nissam and Ziv (2001) who find that after controlling for measurement error and omitted correlated variables, dividend changes are positively associated with earnings changes in the two years following the dividend change. However, Bernatzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) find that the relation between dividend changes and subsequent earnings changes are inconsistent with the theory; it appears that dividends are related more strongly to past earnings than future earnings. Further, there is a significant price drift in the years following dividends and, perhaps suggestive of the free-cash-flow hypothesis, it is the large and profitable firms (with less informational asymmetries) that pay most of the dividends (e.g., Fama and French (2001)). Similarly mixed evidence has been presented about the free-cash-flow hypothesis. Evidence supportive of the free-cash-flow hypothesis is provided by Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) who find that firms anticipating declining investment opportunities are likely to increase dividends, and Lie (2000) who finds that firms that increase dividends have cash in excess of that held by peer firms in the industry. However, Yoon and Starks (1995) have uncovered a symmetric price reaction to dividend changes across high-Tobin’s Q and low-Tobin’s Q firms, which goes against the free-cash-flow hypothesis. Our existing theories also do not help us understand why some firms never pay dividends whereas others consistently pay dividends, and why the payment of dividends seems dependent on the firm’s stock price. For example, companies like Cisco and Microsoft have for years operated with no dividend payout and significant excess liquidity. Similarly, firms like Wal-Mart, General Electric, and Florida Power and Light have had a long history of paying dividends while still maintaining relatively high growth. Why? It is hard to argue that Cisco and Microsoft have nothing to signal while Wal-Mart and General Electric do. It is also difficult to argue that managers at Wal-Mart and General Electric pay dividends so as to keep managers from consuming excess cash while Cisco and Microsoft have no such worries. Further, Baker and Wurgler (2002a) find that managers initiate dividends when investors place a premium on dividend-paying stocks and omit dividends when investors prefer non-dividend paying stocks. This suggests that managers are making dividend decisions based not only on the characteristics of their firms but also on their stock prices. We believe that flexibility considerations may well represent an important missing piece of the puzzle in understanding dividend policy. Our theory generates several predictions that we take to the data. First, dividend payments will be negatively correlated with stock prices. Second, investors will value dividends more when prices are lower. Third, as the risk of the investment increases, the dividend payment decreases. Fourth, there is a positive correlation between the firm’s stock price and its idiosyncratic risk that arises in our model from the endogenous dependence of dividends on stock prices and the endogenous link between the firm’s idiosyncratic risk and dividend policy. Fifth, firms with lower debt-equity ratios will have lower dividend payments. Sixth, firms that have lower dividend payments will have higher levels of liquidity. In our model firms keep cash in the firm but do not waste it or consume it. Thus, any excess cash is kept to invest in future projects. Seventh, the more management focuses on the current stock price, the higher is the dividend payment. Eighth, the more dispersed the firm’s ownership structure, the higher the dividend payment. Ninth, the higher the transactions cost of issuing new securities, the lower the dividend payout. The existing empirical evidence and our empirical tests provide support for these predictions. Our paper is related to Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) who find that stock repurchases are pro-cyclical while dividends steadily increase over time. Further, firms increase dividends following good performance while stock repurchases are used following poor performance. The authors interpret their results to be consistent with the idea that repurchases “preserve financial flexibility relative to dividends because they do not implicitly commit the firm to future payouts (pg. 563).” Similarly, in our paper those firms that do commit to pay dividends reduce their future financial flexibility, although our notion of flexibility is different from theirs. Lie (2001) also finds that firms pay special dividends or repurchase shares when temporary excess financial flexibility (excess cash and lower than optimal debt levels) exists. However, regular dividends increase only when permanent income increases. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and Section 3 contains the analysis. Section 4 summarizes the empirical predictions of the model. Section 5 describes the data, empirical tests and results. Section 6 concludes. 2. THE MODEL In this section we describe the model, explain how disagreement may arise and what flexibility means in that setting, and then examine the firm’s dividend policy. 2.1. Model Description Preferences and Time Line: There are three points in time and all agents are risk neutral. At t = 0 the firm, which is all-equity financed, has existing assets in place that have both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. With universal risk neutrality, the distinction between these two types of risk is irrelevant for valuation. However, this distinction is useful when we discuss the empirical predictions of our model and later when we take these predictions to the data. At t = 0 the firm’s assets in place have an expected value of V at t = 2 that everybody agrees on. Moreover, the firm has cash in the amount of R at t = 0. This cash can be used in one of three ways: it can be paid out as a dividend at t = 0, it can be used to invest in a new project at t = 1 or it can be carried over until t = 2 and distributed as a liquidating dividend. Thus, the key decision at t = 0 is whether to pay a dividend at that time or not. It is known at t = 0 that a new investment opportunity may arrive at t = 1 that will require financing. If this opportunity arrives and is sufficiently attractive, the firm will invest in it either using the cash it carried over from t = 0 or, if this cash was paid out as a dividend at t = 0, then by raising funds in the market at t = 1. All payoffs are realized at t = 2. The corporate income tax rate is zero, as is the riskless rate of interest. Thus, there is no discounting of payoffs. Project Investments and Payoffs and the Dividend Decision: As indicated earlier, at t = 0 the firm has cash of R and assets in place that will have a value at t = 2 whose expectation at earlier points in time is V. The firm’s manager must decide at t = 0 the size of the dividend, D, to be paid to shareholders at t = 0. For simplicity, we assume D ({0, R}. At t = 1 a new project arrives with probability  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  which was common knowledge at t = 0. This common-knowledge assumption means that there is no disagreement about the likelihood that a new project will be available, although there may be disagreement between the manager and the shareholders about what it is worth. This project will require an investment of R at t = 1 and will pay off a random amount  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  at t = 2. We assume that  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , where 0 < L < R < H < (. Thus, the project is worth investing in if the payoff is H, but not if it is L. Whether the firm will have internal liquidity available to finance the project at t = 1 depends on its dividend decision at t = 0. If D = 0 was chosen at t = 0, the project will be financed out of the firm’s internal liquidity. If D = R was chosen at t = 0, the firm will raise $R from investors at t = 1. We assume that doing so incurs a transactions cost of  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  We view the new project as possessing characteristics potentially different from the firm’s existing operations. It thus has more “unfamiliar” risks and is also subject to greater potential disagreement about its value. Examples are a new business design such as e-Bay’s launching of an online auction business, a company’s market entry into a new country, an appliance company like Whirlpool experimenting with a new high-end, horizontal-axis washing machine, a biotech company like Amgen researching a new drug, and so on. The basic idea is that the new project is an experiment of sorts, so that its prospects cannot be predicted based on the historical data the way one would predict the future (t = 2) value of the firm’s assets in place. To capture this, we assume that (almost) all of the risk in the payoff on the new project is idiosyncratic. Given universal risk neutrality, thus assumption will not affect any of our formal analysis, but will matter when we interpret the model for the empirical tests. Disagreement Over Future Payoffs: Everybody agrees that the firm has R in cash at t = 0 and that the assets in place at t = 0 have an expected value of V at t = 2. If the new project is available at t = 1, management receives a signal z about the t = 2 payoff on this project and can determine whether to move the project forward for the investors to see. If the investors look at the project, they observe the same signal z. The interpretation of this common signal z may differ across management and investors, however. Management will interpret the signal as x ({L, H} and investors (collectively) will interpret it as y ({L, H}. Management is the first mover here. If it interprets the signal as favorable (x = H), it will present the project to investors, who will then observe z and interpret it as y. But if management interprets z as x = L, it will simply not present the project to investors. Viewed at t = 0, x and y are random variables whose conditional probabilities capture potential disagreement between management and investors. We assume Pr(x = H) = q, Pr(x = L) = 1– q, and:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (1) We can interpret equation (1) as follows. The case of  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  = 1 corresponds to x and y being perfectly correlated. We view this as a case of “complete agreement” between management and investors. The case of  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  = 0 corresponds to x and y being perfectly negatively correlated. We view this as a case of “complete disagreement” between management and investors. When the views of management and investors are uncorrelated, we have:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  which means that  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  corresponds to zero correlation between x and y. We will refer to  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  as the “agreement parameter.” The higher the value of  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , the greater is the likelihood that management and investors will agree on the value of the new project at t = 1. Note that this disagreement is only about assessments at t = 1. All payoffs are publicly observed at t = 2, so there is no disagreement at t = 2. It is useful at this stage to pause and interpret the interpretations x and y. One way to think about x and y is that they are simply differing opinions about the future realization of a state variable, as in say, Allen and Gale (1999). More specifically, we view x as partly representing management’s intuition about the value of the investment opportunity (e.g., Clark and Mackaness (2001)). It is a belief, and not something management can communicate to outsiders on the basis of facts or documents or research findings. One could use a similar interpretation about y. That is, we could think of  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  where zh is based on “hard facts” and zs is based on “soft information.” Thus, even though both the manager and investors see the same signal components of zh and zs, only their interpretations of zh coincide with probability one. Their interpretations of zs will coincide only some of the time and may differ due to differences in intuition. Their intuitive interpretations of zs can be thought of as arising from psychological phenomena (as described by Bargh and Chartrand (1999) and Wagner and Smart (1997)) that deal with the ability to arrive at inferences that cannot be supported by documented data. This means that disagreements between management and investors could arise from different interpretations of zs that result in x and y being different, and no amount of communication can bridge this gap. Perhaps the simplest formal way to think about this is that management and investors agree on what the signal zh represents but attach a different precision to the signal zs. Hence, even if they start out with the same prior beliefs, their posterior means about the value of the project represented by x and y could be different. With this perspective, the higher the  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , the lower will be the difference between the precisions attached to zs by management and investors. An example of the kind of disagreement conditioned on the same information that we are thinking about would be the ubiquitous situation of two people placing opposite bets on a particular outcome, like a football game, or a CEO who is convinced a particular market expansion is right when members of the Board of Directors are not. Hence, we are explicitly precluding situations of asymmetric information in which one party knows more than the other, both parties recognize the informationally-advantaged party, and the less-informed party would immediately update his information set if he had access to the information possessed by the better-informed party. Management’s Objective Function: Management’s objective is to maximize a weighted average of the stock prices at t = 0 and t = 2. That is, management seeks to maximize the expected terminal (t = 2) wealth of those who are shareholders of the firm at t = 0, but it also cares about how this terminal wealth is perceived by investors at t = 0. Specifically, management seeks to choose D to maximize:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (2) where  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is the expected value of the firm at t = 2 to the shareholders at t = 0, as assessed by management at t = 0 (i.e., management makes this assessment based on the signal x it expects to receive), and  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is the firm’s stock price at t = 0 as set by investors (i.e., investors base this on their assessment of the firm’s terminal value at t = 2 using the signal y they expect to receive) after they have noted the firm’s dividend announcement at t = 0. Here  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is a positive weighting constant. Management’s Actions in the Face of Disagreement: It is clear that management will wish to invest in the new project when x = H and not when x = L, if it has internal liquidity available, which will be the case if it chose D = 0 at t = 0. If it chose D = R at t = 0, then it will need external financing at t = 1 to invest in the project. If x = H and y = H, then the investment will occur if H – ( > R (3) We will assume that (3) holds. It means that the project is worth investing in when x = H and y = H, even if the transactions cost of raising external financing has to be incurred. If x = L, then management will not invest in the new project, so that the investors’ possible interpretation of the signal is a moot point.. If x = H and y = L, then management’s ability to invest in the new project depends on whether the firm has internal liquidity available. If D = R was chosen at t = 0, management can invest in the new project only if investors are willing to provide external financing, and this happens only if y = H. Thus, if x = H and y = L and external financing is required, management will be unable to invest in the new project. But if D = 0 was chosen at t = 0, we assume that there is a probability  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  that management will be able to invest in the new project even when y = L. That is, if management observes x = H and investors observe y = L, management may be able to overcome investors’ disagreement and invest in the new project if internal liquidity is available in the firm. We refer to  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  as the “flexibility parameter.” The idea behind this setup is that management calls the shots in running the firm, so if it has the internal liquidity available, it can invest in the project if it believes the project has positive NPV. But this flexibility offered by internal liquidity is not unfettered. Depending on the intensiveness of corporate governance, shareholders may be able to pressure management into rejecting a project they think is a bad bet even if management likes the project. The higher  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is, the higher is the probability that management will be able to overcome such objections by investors and invest in a project it likes when it has the internal liquidity to do so. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events. Figure 1 goes here 2.2 Discussion of the Model The model described thus far has two essential elements that are important for the analysis that follows. First, we allow management (insiders) and investors (outsiders) to have different assessments of the value of the firm’s new project even though both observe the same information signal. This difference of opinions is not something that can be reconciled. Consequently, even though management is attempting to maximize shareholder wealth, a gap is opened between management’s actions on the one hand and shareholder preferences on the other. This is not a problem of asymmetric information (as in Bhattacharya (1979)). In our model, investors have as much information as management at t = 1. The difference lies in the interpretations of this information. Moreover, agency (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and free-cash-flow (Jensen (1986)) problems are also absent in our model since management is attempting to maximize the terminal wealth of initial shareholders without any self-interest. The second essential element is that we view a firm’s dividend policy as influencing the flexibility management has in making investment decisions. By paying a dividend, management reduces the firm’s internal liquidity, forcing (greater) reliance on external financing in the event that it wishes to invest in a new project. The crucial difference between external and internal financing that we exploit is that the former is simply unavailable if investors do not agree with management that the new project is a good bet, whereas the latter may be used to invest in a project even when investors disagree with management. Thus, an increase in dividend payments reduces management flexibility. 2.3 Interpretation of Key Parameters in the Model There are three key parameters in the model: the “agreement parameter”  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , the “flexibility parameter”  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , and the “management preference parameter”  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . We discuss each in turn below. We view  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  as being affected by the effectiveness and credibility of management’s communication with investors. The more persuasive this communication is in conveying management’s strategy as well as its views on the firm’s investment opportunities, the higher  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  will be. That is, in this framework, one of the challenges for management is to influence investors to interpret payoff-relevant information the way management itself does, and to make sure that relevant information is sufficiently salient in the eyes of investors. The flexibility parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  depends on management’s track record in delivering performance and building shareholder value. CEOs like Jack Welch of GE and Roberto Goizueta of Coca-Cola were second-guessed far less than their counterparts with poorer track records. Thus, the better the firm’s performance, the greater will be the flexibility enjoyed by its management. That is, more powerful CEOs will enjoy higher values of  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . We also expect  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  to be affected by the firm’s ownership structure. Firms with more diffuse ownership structures are likely to have less shareholder intrusion into the management of the firm, and hence higher values of  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  for management. Finally, the preference parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  represents the weight management attaches to the initial stock price relative to the firm’s terminal value. The more short-term the orientation of management, the higher will be  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . For example, a CEO close to retirement is likely to have a higher  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  than one with a longer planning horizon. 3. ANALYSIS The analysis in this section is in two parts. First, we examine the firm’s dividend decision at t = 0 and derive our main result about when firms will pay dividends and when they will not. Second, we do comparative static analysis on the optimal dividend policy and extract testable predictions. 3.1 The Optimal Dividend Policy To understand which firms will choose D = R and which will choose D = 0, we need to compare the values of management’s objective function in equation (2) for D = R and D = 0. If management chooses D = R at t = 0, the value of equation (2) (after the dividend announcement but before the dividend is paid), which is management’s assessment of the value of its objective function, is:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (4)  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  Note first that if the new project is unavailable, the firm is simply worth R + V, regardless of whether it is management’s assessment of the terminal value or the stock price at t = 0, where R is the dividend to be paid and V is the value of the assets in place. In management’s objective function, this translates into  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  If the new project is available (probability (), its value to the shareholders at t = 0, as assessed by management, will be  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , where  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is the probability that x = H and y = H (i.e., the probability that management will be able to raise the financing and invest in the project), and the value of the firm will be  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  where  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is the expected transactions cost of raising external financing for the project. Shareholders will value the firm similarly. If management chooses D = 0 at t = 0, the value of equation (2) is:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (5)  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  The main difference between equations (4) and (5) is that now management will invest in the new project with probability  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  even when x = H and y = L, and the probability of this joint event is  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . The project value in this case is assessed to be H – R > 0 by management and L – R < 0 by shareholders. We will assume henceforth that:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (6) This assumption is necessary and sufficient to guarantee that at least some firms will pay dividends. The reason is simple. Suppose  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  = 0, so management cares only about its own assessment of the initial shareholders’ terminal wealth at t = 2. In this case, it would never pay a dividend because paying a dividend entails two costs and no benefits: the loss of flexibility in that the new project must be passed up when x = H but y = L, and the transactions cost  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  associated with raising external financing in the state in which the new project is available and both management and shareholders want to invest. From the shareholders’ standpoint, however, a dividend payment has a benefit precisely because it reduces management’s flexibility. Reduced flexibility means management will not invest in the new project when x = H and y = L. It is this benefit from the shareholders’ perspective, reflected in the stock price at t = 0, that creates a role for dividends. With  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  > 0, management cares about the t = 0 stock price, and hence is willing to pay a dividend in some circumstances if  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is large enough. Comparing equations (4) and (5) now leads to our first result. Theorem 1: There exists a critical value of the agreement parameter, EMBED Equation.DSMT4 such that the firm pays a dividend (chooses D = R) if the firm’s agreement parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  and does not pay a dividend if EMBED Equation.3 . The economic intuition is as follows. As we indicated earlier, if management cared only about the terminal value of the initial shareholders’ wealth, it would never pay any dividends. What creates a preference for paying dividends is management’s concern with the stock price at t = 0. Now, when the agreement parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is low, the shareholders assess a high marginal cost of management flexibility associated with not paying a dividend. Consequently, the decline in the stock price at t = 0 becomes larger as  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  becomes smaller. Even though the benefit of flexibility is also larger when  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is smaller, the marginal cost associated with the negative stock price reaction to the increased flexibility associated with not paying a dividend exceeds the marginal benefit of increased flexibility to management, given equation (6). Hence, paying a dividend is more attractive to management when  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is lower. For a sufficiently high  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , the stock-price-induced marginal cost of flexibility is sufficiently low compared to the sum of the marginal benefit of flexibility to management and the expected saving in transactions cost from not paying a dividend, so no dividend is paid. Lemma 1: The firm’s stock price at t = 0, EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , is increasing in the agreement parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , regardless of whether the firm announces a dividend at t = 0 or not. The intuition is simple. As  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  increases, the probability that management will invest in a project shareholders do not approve of declines. So the stock price at t = 0 increases. This now leads to: Theorem 2: There exists a cutoff level of the stock price at t = 0, EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , such that the firm will be observed to pay a dividend if  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  and not pay a dividend if EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . Moreover, the marginal value assigned by investors at t = 0 to a dividend payment is higher when the stock price at t = 0 is lower. The intuition is based on Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. Theorem 1 tells us that there is a cutoff value  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 of the agreement parameter EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , such that a dividend is paid only if EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . Lemma 1 says that the stock price at t = 0 is increasing in  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . It follows immediately that dividends will only be paid when the stock price is sufficiently low. The second part of the theorem is also intuitive. As the stock price at t = 0 declines with  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , the marginal cost of flexibility as assessed by investors increases. Thus, a dividend payment is more highly valued at lower stock prices. This theorem has two empirical predictions that we later take to the data. One is that there will be an inverse relationship between stock prices and dividends. The other is that dividends will be more highly valued when prices are lower. Corollary 1: The probability (assessed at t = 0) that the firm will invest in the new project is lower when D = R is chosen than when D = 0 is chosen. Thus, the probability of investing in the new project is increasing the firm's stock price. The reason why the probability of the new project being taken is higher when no dividend is paid than when a dividend is paid is that the non-payment of a dividend leaves management with greater flexibility. The fact that this greater flexibility results in a higher probability of investing in the new project follows from our earlier discussion. From Theorem 2 we know that dividend payments are declining in firms’ stock price levels. It follows then that the probability of investing in the new project is increasing in the firm’s stock price. 3.2 Comparative Statics In this subsection, we analyze the comparative statics related to the optimal dividend policy. Theorem 3: The critical value,  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 of the agreement parameter, such that a firm with  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  pays a dividend D = R and a firm with  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 does not pay a dividend, is strictly increasing in the flexibility parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , strictly increasing in the management preference parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , and strictly decreasing in the transactions cost  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . It is independent of the probability q that management will see a high signal (x = H) about the new project. This theorem is intuitive. As the flexibility parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  increases, it becomes more likely that management will be able to overrule an objection by investors and invest in the new project even when y = L. This increases the marginal cost to the firm of not paying a dividend, as assessed by investors. Consequently, the adverse impact of not paying a dividend on the firm’s stock price at t = 0 is greater, leading to a greater propensity for the firm to pay a dividend, i.e.,  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  increases with  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . As  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  increases, so does the weight management puts on the stock price at t = 0 relative to its own assessment of the expected value of terminal wealth (at t = 2) of initial shareholders. Management thus attaches more weight in its decision making to the adverse impact of not paying a dividend on the firm’s stock price at t = 0. This leads to a stronger preference for paying dividends and hence a higher EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . An increase in the transactions cost  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  of raising external financing makes it more costly to pay a dividend, thereby reducing EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . Finally, while it may seem surprising at first blush why q, the probability that management will receive a high signal about the project, does not affect the firm’s dividend policy, the intuition is as follows. The difference between the costs and benefits of paying a dividend relative to not paying a dividend arises only in the state in which the firm has a new project available and management wishes to invest in it. Since the probability of this state,  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , is unaffected by whether a dividend is paid or not, this probability drops out in a comparison of the net benefit of paying a dividend with that of not paying a dividend. It might appear that if management cared solely about the stock price at t = 0, it would always (regardless of the agreement parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 ) pay a dividend. The following result shows that this is not true. That is, despite their aversion to giving management the flexibility to overrule them, shareholders may still want the firm to not pay dividends in some circumstances. Theorem 4: There exists a cutoff value,  EMBED Equation.3 of the agreement parameter such that the stock price at t = 0 is maximized by paying a dividend if  EMBED Equation.3  and by not paying a dividend if EMBED Equation.3 . Moreover,  EMBED Equation.3  where  EMBED Equation.3  is the corresponding cutoff value of  EMBED Equation.3  when management determines whether to pay a dividend. The reason why even the initial shareholders may prefer that the firm not pay a dividend is that the shareholders face a tradeoff between the cost of giving the management flexibility by not demanding a dividend and the expected transactions cost that would be incurred in raising external financing if the firm did pay a dividend. When the agreement parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  is sufficiently high, the shareholders assess a relatively low cost of conceding flexibility to management and a relatively high-expected transactions cost of raising external financing. Thus, the shareholders find it optimal not to receive a dividend payment. It is also intuitive that the optimal agreement-parameter cutoff from the shareholders’ standpoint,  EMBED Equation.3 exceeds  EMBED Equation.3 the cutoff that is optimal for management. Shareholders attach only a cost of management flexibility, whereas management assesses both a cost -- via the impact of flexibility on the initial stock price -- and a benefit to flexibility. Thus, management pays dividends under fewer circumstances than shareholders would like. 4. EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS In this section we summarize the empirical predictions that emerge from our analysis. Prediction 1: Dividend payments will be negatively correlated with stock price levels, i.e., more dividends are paid when stock prices are lower. This prediction is based on Theorem 2. The firm’s stock price is lower when the agreement parameter ( EMBED Equation.DSMT4 ) is lower, which increase the marginal value management perceives as being linked to paying a dividend. This result is reminiscent of the Baker and Wurgler (2002b) finding that firms’ capital structure decisions appear to be driven by their stock price levels. Our analysis predicts that this is true for the dividend decision as well. This prediction also distinguishes our flexibility hypothesis from the free-cash-flow hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. The signaling hypothesis has no prediction about the correlation between stock prices and dividend payments. While the free-cash-flow hypothesis does not directly speak to any relationship between dividends and stock prices, it indirectly suggests that stock prices should be positively correlated with dividend payments. When firms have higher earnings, their stock prices tend to be higher, and there is also more free cash flow to dissipate. To cope with this free-cash-flow problem, firms should pay higher dividends. Prediction 2: Dividends will be more highly valued by investors when stock prices are low than when they are high. This prediction also comes from Theorem 2. It indicates that investors will value dividends more highly when prices are low than when prices are high. This prediction is consistent with the findings of Fuller and Goldstein (2002) who find that dividend-paying firms outperform non-dividend-paying firms in bear markets (when prices are low) after controlling for various risk factors. Prediction 3: In the cross-section of firms, a firm’s idiosyncratic risk is inversely related to its dividend payout. This prediction follows from Corollary 1. That corollary asserts that the probability of investing in the new project declines as the firm’s dividend payment increases; the reason is that a dividend payment decreases management’s flexibility to invest in the new project. Given our assumption that the risk in the new project is mostly idiosyncratic, so that investing in it increases the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, it follows that as the firm’s dividend payment increases, its idiosyncratic risk decreases. Prediction 4: There will be a positive correlation between the level of a firm’s stock price and its idiosyncratic risk. This predication also follows from Corollary 1. A higher stock price leads to a lower dividend, which then leads to a higher probability of investing in the innovative project, which elevates the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Prediction 5: Firms with lower debt-equity ratios pay lower dividends. That it, there is a positive cross-sectional relationship between dividends and debt-equity ratios. This prediction is generated by joining together Theorem 2, which states that higher stock prices lead to lower dividends, and the empirical findings of numerous papers (e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2002b)) that higher stock prices lead firms to issue equity and causes their debt-equity ratios to decline. Prediction 6: Firms that pay lower dividends will maintain higher levels of liquidity (cash and marketable securities). However, the higher liquidity will not be at the expense of operating efficiency. This prediction arises from the fact that a firm that chooses not to pay a dividend in our analysis retains the cash to maintain the flexibility to make a future investment. That is, the cash is not just dissipated in wasteful spending or stolen by managers. This prediction sharply delineates our analysis from the agency-motivated explanation that a dividend payment is primarily a mechanism to minimize spending inefficiency (Jensen (1986)) or managerial expropriation (e.g. La Porta et al (2000)). Thus, in addition to examining the relationship between dividends and liquidity, we could look at the linkage between operating efficiencies and dividend payouts of firms in order to run an empirical horse race between flexibility and free-cash-flow as determinants of corporate dividends. The free-cash-flow prediction is that firms that pay less in dividends would have lower operating efficiency since the excess cash kept in the firm would be wasted. Flexibility predicts no relation between dividends and the firm’s operating efficiency. Prediction 7: The greater is management’s concern with the current stock price (as opposed to the future value of the firm), the higher is the dividend paid. This prediction follows from Theorem 3, which tells us that  EMBED Equation.3  the cutoff agreement parameter below which dividends are paid, is increasing in  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , the weight management attaches to the current stock price in its preference function. The reason for this result is that the more weight management attaches to the current stock price, the more it values the positive impact of the dividend on the current stock price. One possible way to test this would be to examine differences in dividend policies across firms whose CEOs have different planning-horizon durations, as represented perhaps by the number of years to retirement. Another would be to examine if the stock-option component of managerial pay (tied specifically to the future value of the firm) is inversely related to the firm’s dividend payments, since an increase in the stock-option component would imply a lower  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . Bhattacharya, Mawani, and Morrill (2002) find that the stock-option component of managerial compensation is significantly and negatively related to the dividends paid by the firm. Prediction 8: The more diffuse the firm’s ownership structure, the higher is its dividend payout. This prediction also comes from Theorem 3. According to this theorem, a higher flexibility parameter  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  leads to an increase in  EMBED Equation.3  and hence a greater set of values of the agreement parameter for which dividends are paid. We interpret  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  as a parameter that takes higher values as ownership becomes more diffuse, since shareholders with smaller ownership stakes have weaker incentives to produce information about the firm and intervene in management decisions. If greater institutional holdings indicate a less diffuse ownership, then firms with greater institutional holdings should have lower dividend payouts. Grinstein and Michaely (2002) find that institutional holdings are greater for low-dividend yielding stocks than for high-dividend yielding stocks. However, this is a pretty noisy test of this prediction since we do not know what the evidence is on the relationship between ownership distribution and institutional holdings. A more direct test would be to see if firms managed by more powerful CEOs (those with higher  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 ) pay more dividends. Prediction 9: Firms that face higher transactions costs of issuing new securities pay lower dividends. This prediction also follows from Theorem 3. There is significant cross-sectional dispersion in security-issuance costs across firms, so that one could conduct an empirical examination of the relationship between dividend payments and these security-issuance costs. We do not test this prediction since it is very difficult to reliably measure the all-in security-issuance costs for all forms of capital. 5. DATA, TESTS, AND RESULTS We confront these predictions with both dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms from 1980 through 2000. For a firm to be included in the sample, the following criteria must be satisfied: The firm is listed on the Compustat database. The firm is listed on the daily and monthly Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The non-utility and financial firms had to have an Altman’s Z score of 2.68 or greater. The first and second restrictions allow us to collect the accounting and return data necessary to test our predictions. The third restriction controls for high-credit-risk firms that are highly likely to become insolvent in the near future. Altman’s Z score suggests that firms with Z scores less 2.68 have a high likelihood of going bankrupt. The Z score is computed as follows:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (8) where X1 is working capital (Compustat item #4 minus Compustat item #5) divided by total assets (Compustat item #6) (in percentage), X2 is retained earnings (Compustat item #36) divided by total assets (in percentage), X3 is earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat item #13 minus Compustat item #14) divided by total assets (in percentage), X4 is market value of equity (Compustat item #24 times Compustat item #25) divided by book value of total debt (Compustat item #9 plus Compustat item #34) (in percentage), and X5 is sales (Compustat item #12) divided by total assets (actual number). Table 1 presents the sample statistics for the 2,407 firms in our sample. insert Table 1 here We begin by examining Prediction 1: when prices are high, dividend yields and dividend payments are low. We define high-price periods as those during which the Standard & Poor's 500 index (SP500) had a positive yearly return, and low-price periods as those during which the SP500 had a negative or zero return for the year. Next we calculate the firm’s dividend yield as the yearly dividend (Compustat item #26) divided by the year-end price (Compustat item #24). We also examine the firms’ yearly raw dividend payments, as well as the yearly dividend payment divided by the firm’s financial slack. We measure financial slack as the firm’s cash plus liquid securities. We also include the yearly dividend payment divided by the net income for those firms with non-negative net income. For the remainder of the paper, we will refer to the four dividend measures as dividend payouts. We test to see if the dividend payouts in low-price periods are significantly higher than those in high-price periods. Table 2 presents the results of the test of Prediction 1. The dividend payouts are all significantly higher during low-price periods than during high-price periods. insert Table 2 here Next we turn to Prediction 2: investors value dividends more when prices are low than when prices are high. We compare the returns of dividend-paying stocks to non-dividend paying stocks for low-price periods, and repeat this comparison for high-price periods. We define a firm as dividend paying if it paid a dividend in that year while a firm that did not pay a dividend is defined as non-dividend paying for that year. Thus, firms can change classification from year to year. In testing Prediction 1, we were constrained to use yearly definitions of low-price and high-price markets since the dividend payouts were defined as yearly payouts. However, since testing Prediction 2 does not directly involve dividend payouts (used only to classify dividend-paying and non-dividend paying firms) but examines firm returns, we can classify low-price and high-price markets based on monthly SP500 returns. A high-price market is defined as a month during which the monthly return on the SP500 was positive, while a low-price market is one where the SP500 posted a negative or zero monthly return. To control for risk we classify each firm into beta deciles where beta was measured using the firm’s daily returns for the prior year. Finally, we compare the monthly return for dividend-paying stocks versus non-dividend-paying stocks for each decile for low-price and high-price markets. As Table 3 Panel A indicates returns are significantly higher for dividend-paying firms than for non-dividend paying firms in low-price markets for all beta deciles. However, non-dividend paying firms significantly outperform dividend-paying firms for high-price markets across all beta deciles. insert Table 3 here We also examine the abnormal return for each firm f using the Capital Asset Pricing Model to determine expected returns. That is, we estimate  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (9) where Actual Returnf is the return for firm f for that month, rF is the three-month Treasury bill for that month, rM is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio, and  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 is the beta for stock f. We then compare the abnormal returns for dividend-paying stocks versus non-dividend paying stocks in low-price and high-price markets. Again, the results in Table 3 Panel B show that, compared to non-dividend-paying stocks, dividend-paying stocks exhibit higher abnormal returns during low-price markets, and lower abnormal returns during high-price markets. Another way to test Prediction 2 is to examine dividend changes. We would expect that in low-price markets dividend increases should have higher price reactions than in high-price markets and dividend decreases would have lower (less negative) price reactions in low-price markets than high-price markets. We examine changes (both increases and decreases) in quarterly dividends for 3,496 firms gathered from CRSP from 1980 to 2000. The only restrictions we place on the sample is that there must be five days of returns surrounding the announcement listed on CRSP, the dividend is paid on ordinary common shares of U.S.-incorporated companies, the stock price is greater than $2 per share, and the change cannot be a dividend initiation or omission. Our sample included 11,805 dividend increases and 8,760 dividend decreases. Two-thirds of our decreases occurred from 1990 to 2000 while increases were evenly spread between the 1980s and 1990s. We follow Brown and Warner’s (1985) standard event study methodology to calculate CARs for the five-day period (-2, 2) around the announcement date supplied by CRSP. We estimate the abnormal returns using a modified market model:  EMBED Equation.3  (10) where ri is the return on firm i and rm is the equally-weighted market index return. We do not estimate market parameters based on a time period before each change since some firms have frequent dividend changes and thus, there is a high probability that previous changes would be included in the estimation period thus making beta estimations less meaningful. Additionally, it has been shown that for short-window event studies weighting the market return by the firm's beta does not significantly improve estimation. As shown in Table 4, price reactions to dividend increases are less in high-price markets than in low-price markets but dividend decreases have less negative returns if announced during low-price markets than high price markets. Further, dividend decreases announced during low-price markets have an insignificant impact on the firm’s stock price. This is probably due to the fact that cutting a dividend when the market is doing well is a clearer signal that the firm is having problems. However, if a firm cuts a dividend when the entire market is doing poor, there may be less information in the dividend cut or the market may view the cut as an appropriate step by management to undertake given current economic conditions. insert Table 4 here Next we examine Prediction 3 that firms that pay less in dividends exhibit lower idiosyncratic risk. Using the market model, we construct a measure of idiosyncratic risk as follows. For each stock, we regress the past year’s daily excess returns on the market excess return:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (11) where rft is the daily return t for firm f, rF is the three-month Treasury bill for that month, rMt is the daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio, and  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 is the beta for stock f. The cross-sectional average of the residuals squared is used to construct the measure of average idiosyncratic risk. We define Risk as the measure of idiosyncratic risk computed as:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (12) We quartile our data based on the idiosyncratic risk estimated for each year. That is, for each year we classify each firm into one of four quartiles based on cutoffs for that year. Firms can and do change quartiles over time. Then, we compare the dividend payouts for the four quartiles. We would expect that firms with the lowest idiosyncratic risk would have the largest dividend payouts. Table 5 shows that indeed there is an inverse, monotonic relation between dividend payouts and idiosyncratic risk. Further, dividend payouts are significantly different across the quartiles. insert Table 5 here Prediction 4 says that a positive correlation exists between the level of a firm’s stock price and its idiosyncratic risk. According to our model, firms with price levels greater than the cutoff price will not pay dividends but will take projects that increase idiosyncratic risk. Thus, to test this prediction we must condition on stock prices. We partitioned our sample into higher-price firms, those with prices greater than the yearly median price, and lower-price firms, those with prices less than the yearly median price, and determine the correlation between risk and price. For higher-price firms, the correlation coefficient between stock price and idiosyncratic risk is 0.197, which is significant at the 1 percent level. For lower-price firms, the correlation coefficient is -0.328, which is also significant at the 1 percent level. Prediction 5 states that debt-equity ratios and dividends are positively related in the cross-section. We calculate the debt-equity ratio as the total debt for a firm divided by the market value of the firm’s equity. Again we divide the sample into quartiles based on the firm’s debt-equity ratio each year and compare the dividend payouts across the quartiles. Table 6 shows that indeed there is a positive and monotonic relation between dividend payouts and debt-equity ratios. Further, these values of dividend payouts are significantly different across the quartiles. insert Table 6 here Next, we test Prediction 6 that says first that firms with more liquidity will have lower dividend payments. We calculate the liquidity of the firm as the cash and short-term investments (Compustat item #1) standardized by the firm’s total assets each year. We quartile the sample based on the firm’ liquidity for each year and compare the dividend payouts across the quartiles. Table 7 reports an inverse and monotonic relation between dividend payouts and liquidity holdings of the firm. Further, these values of dividend payouts are significantly different across the quartiles. insert Table 7 here While our results are supportive of the flexibility theory of dividends, we must be careful in interpreting these univariate results. Since our data extend from 1980 to 2000, we need to control for any time trend in the data. Also, there may be interaction between liquidity, D/E, idiosyncratic risk, firm size, operating performance and growth opportunities, which suggests the need for a multivariate estimation. Further, we would also like to test the second part of Prediction 6: the higher liquidity maintained by the lower-dividend-paying firms will not be at the expense of operating efficiency. To test this, we use operating performance as a proxy for operating efficiencies. Following Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002), we measure operating performance as the ratio of operating income to total assets and the ratio of net income to total assets. To control for industry effects, we subtract the industry’s median operating performance from the firm’s operating performance for each year. The firm’s industry is classified by two-digit SIC codes. We run the following fixed-effects multivariate regression  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  (13) where Div is the firm’s dividend yield (Model 1), the firm’s cumulative dividend standardized by net income (Model 2), or the firm’s cumulative dividend standardized by financial slack (Model 3), Liq is the firm’s cash dividend by total assets, D/E is the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, Risk is the firm’s estimate of idiosyncratic risk, OpPer is the firms operating performance (ratio of operating income to total assets or net income to total assets), Size is the log of the firm’s market capitalization, Mktbk is the firm’s market-to-book ratio, and µ is the ordinary least squares error. The firm s market-to-book ratio is included as a proxy for growth opportunities of the firm. Table 8 presents the regression results for equation (12). For Model 1 (Div=dividend yield), all variables are significant and have the predicted signs. The firm’s D/E is positively related to the dividend yield, while Liq, Risk and OpPer (both measures) are negatively related to dividend yield. The fact that operating performance is inversely and significantly related to dividend payout does not support the free-cash-flow hypothesis but is consistent with the flexibility hypothesis. Size is also significantly positive, indicating larger firms pay more in dividends. However, Mktbk is insignificant. Further, the overall regressions are significant. Model 2 (Div=dividend payment standardized by net income) yields similar results for all variables. However, the F-statistics are lower, though still significant, and the adjusted-R2s are much lower. Finally, Model 3 (Div=dividend standardized by financial slack) produces significant results except for Mktbk. However, the adjusted-R2 is so low that little economic significance can be inferred. Overall, these regressions support the univariate results that firms that have more flexibility pay less in dividends. insert Table 8 here 6. CONCLUSION We develop a model of corporate dividend policy based on the idea that management will value operating flexibility when there is a possibility that shareholders may disagree with management and block management decisions. If the firm pays a dividend, it reduces management’s flexibility to invest in projects that it believes are good but which shareholders do not. However, paying this dividend increases the current stock price of the firm. Management trades off these two aspects of dividends. Viewing dividend policy this way as an instrument of management flexibility is consistent with existing stylized facts regarding dividends and generates several new testable predictions. Our tests of these new predictions produce empirical evidence that is largely supportive of the flexibility theory of dividends. Yet, we believe we have only begun to explore the empirical implications of this theory. Since the theory contains parameters that represent management flexibility and agreement with investors, direct proxies for these parameters will permit more powerful tests. Table 1 Sample Statistics Sample statistics for 2,407 dividend-paying and non-dividend paying firms listed on Compustat between 1980 and 2000. VariableMeanStandard DeviationMinimumMaximumD/E1.835885.66110.000029284.62Idiosyncratic Risk0.10010.80010.00211.3746Cash0.12010.17200.00001.0000Market Capitalization (in $000)976,752.564,596,975.133.7187256,593,797R&D0.07300.3116014.5968Dividend0.63061.0902045.0000Dividend Yield0.02760.108208.0000Dividend/Net Income 0.00160.005300.1371Dividend/Financial Slack0.28761.2540067.905 Table 2 Average Dividend Payouts Partitioned by Market Conditions Dividend payouts for 2,407 dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms between 1980 and 2000. Dividend payouts are measured as the firm’s dividend yield, the firms’ yearly raw dividend payments, the firm’s dividend standardized by net income, as well as the dividend payment divided by the firm’s financial slack. High-price periods are defined as those during which the SP500 index had a positive yearly return, and low-price periods as those during which the SP500 index had a negative or zero return for the year. Dividend YieldRaw DividendDividend/Net IncomeDividend/Financial SlackLow-Price Period0.03350.68950.06610.3281High-Price Period0.02680.61950.03700.2218 Difference0.0067**,w,k0.0700**,w,k0.0291**,w,k0.1063**,w,k* indicates t-test is significant at the 5% level ** indicates t-test is significant at the 1% level w indicates the Wilcoxon sign-rank test is significant at the 1% level k indicates the Kruskal-Wallis test is significant at the 1% level Table 3 Average Returns and Abnormal Returns for Dividend and Non-Dividend-Paying Stocks Partitioned by Risk and Low-Price and High-Price Markets Panel A reports the average monthly return to 2,407 dividend- and non-dividend-paying stocks in high-price and low-price markets from 1980 to 2000. High-price markets are when the SP500 index monthly return was greater than zero and low-price markets are when the SP500 index monthly return was zero or less. Panel A reports the average monthly returns once firms have been classified by their CRSP beta deciles for low-price and high-price markets. Panel B reports the average monthly abnormal return to dividend and non-dividend-paying stocks in low-price and high-price markets from 1980 to 2000. Panel A: By Beta Decile Low-Price MarketsBeta DecileNon-Dividend PayingDividend PayingDifferenceHigh-5.21%-4.02%-1.19%**,w,k2-2.90%-2.70%-0.20%**,w,k3-3.33%-2.30%-1.03%**,w,k4-2.61%-2.14%-0.47%**,w,k5-1.71%-1.70%-0.01%w,k6-1.72%-1.32%-0.40%**,w,k7-1.65%-0.69%-0.96%**,w,k8-2.34%-0.23%-2.11%**,w,k9-1.21%0.38%-1.59%**,w,kLow-1.72%0.33%-2.05%**,w,kHigh-Price MarketsBeta DecileNon-Dividend PayingDividend PayingDifferenceHigh6.21%5.57%0.64%w,k24.94%4.84%0.10%w,k34.69%3.93%0.76%*,w,k44.81%3.64%1.17%**,w,k54.04%3.12%0.92%**,w,k63.91%2.88%1.03%**,w,k73.90%2.52%1.38%**,w,k83.87%2.58%1.29%**,w,k92.71%2.43%0.29%w,kLow3.51%2.56%1.25%**,w,kPanel B: Abnormal Returns Low-Price MarketsNon-Dividend PayingDividend PayingDifferenceReturn-0.79%0.29%-1.08%**,w,kHigh-Price MarketsNon-Dividend PayingDividend PayingDifferenceReturn1.99%0.95%1.04%**,w,k* indicates t-test is significant at the 5% level ** indicates t-test is significant at the 1% level w indicates the Wilcoxon sign-rank test is significant at the 1% level k indicates the Kruskal-Wallis test is significant at the 1% level Table 4 Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Dividend Changes Partitioned by Low-Price and High-Price Markets Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated for the five days (-2, 2) around the announcement (day 0) of a dividend change. Abnormal returns are estimated using a modified market model  EMBED Equation.3  where ri is the return on firm i and rm is the equally-weighted market index return. The usual estimation period is eliminated due to the high probability of previous dividend changes for firms during the estimation period. Panel A reports the CARs for 20,565 dividend changes (11,805 increases and 8,760 decreases) announced between 1980 to 2000 for 3,496 firms. Panel B reports the CAR for dividend increases and decreases in high-price and low-price markets from 1980 to 2000. High-price markets are when the SP500 index monthly return was greater than zero and low-price markets are when the SP500 index monthly return was zero or less. Panel ADividend IncreaseDividend DecreaseDifference1.207%**-0.181%**1.388%**,w,kPanel BHigh-Price Market Low-Price MarketDifferenceDividend Increase 1.124%**1.357%**-0.233%*,w,kDividend Decrease -0.280%**-0.002-0.282%**,w,k* indicates t-test is significant at the 5% level ** indicates t-test is significant at the 1% level w indicates the Wilcoxon sign-rank test is significant at the 1% level k indicates the Kruskal-Wallis test is significant at the 1% level Table 5 Relation Between Idiosyncratic Risk and Dividend Payouts Panel A reports the average dividend payouts quartiled by the firm’s idiosyncratic risk for 2,407 dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms from 1980 to 2000. Dividend payouts are measured as the firm’s dividend yield, the firms’ yearly raw dividend payments, the firm’s dividend standardized by net income, as well as the dividend payment divided by the firm’s financial slack. Panel B reports the t-tests for differences in means reported in Panel A. The column mean is subtracted from the row mean to calculate the difference reported. For example, for the dividend yield, the quartile-2 mean, 0.0209, is subtracted from the Low risk quartile mean, 0.0502, for a difference of 0.0293. Panel A Dividend YieldRaw DividendDividend/Net IncomeDividend/Financial SlackLow risk0.05021.30160.10280.832820.02090.43270.05600.159530.00790.09780.03300.0852High risk0.00500.02720.02620.0306 Panel B Differences in Dividend Yield Low risk23High riskLow risk-0.0293**,w,k0.0423**,w,k0.0452**,w,k2-0.013**,w,k0.0159**,w,k3-0.0029High risk- Differences in Raw Dividends Low risk23High riskLow risk-0.8689**,w,k1.2038**,w,k1.2744**,w,k2-0.3349**,w,k0.4055**,w,k3-0.0706**,w,kHigh risk- Differences in Dividend/Net Income Low risk23High riskLow risk-0.0468**,w,k0.0698**,w,k0.0766**,w,k2-0.023**,w,k0.0298*,w,k3-0.0068High risk- Differences in Dividends/Financial Slack Low risk23High riskLow risk-0.6733**,w,k0.7476**,w,k0.8022**,w,k2-0.0743**,w,k0.1289**,w,k3-0.0546High risk-* indicates t-test is significant at the 5% level ** indicates t-test is significant at the 1% level w indicates the Wilcoxon sign-rank test is significant at the 1% level k indicates the Kruskal-Wallis test is significant at the 1% level Table 6 Relation Between Debt-Equity Ratios and Dividend Payouts Panel A reports the average dividend payouts quartiled by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio for 2,407 dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms from 1980 to 2000. Dividend payouts are measured as the firm’s dividend yield, the firms’ yearly raw dividend payments, the firm’s dividend standardized by net income, as well as the dividend payment divided by the firm’s financial slack. Panel B reports the t-tests for differences in means reported in Panel A. The column mean is subtracted from the row mean to calculate the difference reported. For example, for the dividend yield, the quartile-2 mean, 0.0111, is subtracted from the Low D/E quartile mean, 0.0043, for a difference of –0.0068. Panel A Dividend YieldRaw DividendDividend/Net IncomeDividend/Financial SlackLow D/E0.00430.11050.00190.008920.01110.19780.03290.121130.07790.79800.07790.4293High D/E0.11490.76410.11490.5644 Panel B Differences in Dividend Yield Low D/E23High D/ELow D/E--0.0068**,w,k-0.0736**,w,k-0.1106**,w,k2--0.0668**,w,k-0.1038**,w,k3--0.0370*,w,kHigh D/E- Differences in Raw Dividends Low D/E23High D/ELow D/E--0.0873**,w,k-0.6875**,w,k-0.6536**,w,k2--0.6002**,w,k-0.5663**,w,k3-0.0339High D/E- Differences in Dividend/Net Income Low D/E23High D/ELow D/E--0.0310**,w,k-0.0760**,w,k-0.1130**,w,k2--0.0450**,w,k-0.0820**,w,k3--0.0370**,w,kHigh D/E- Differences in Dividends/Financial Slack Low D/E23High D/ELow D/E--0.1122*,w,k-0.4204**,w,k-0.5555**,w,k2--0.3082**,w,k-0.4433**,w,k3--0.1351High D/E-* indicates t-test is significant at the 5% level ** indicates t-test is significant at the 1% level w indicates the Wilcoxon sign-rank test is significant at the 1% level k indicates the Kruskal-Wallis test is significant at the 1% level Table 7 Relation Between Cash/Liquidity and Dividend Payouts Panel A reports the average dividend payouts quartiled by the firm’s idiosyncratic risk for 2,407 dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms from 1980 to 2000. Dividend payouts are measured as the firm’s dividend yield, the firms’ yearly raw dividend payments, the firm’s dividend standardized by net income, as well as the dividend payment divided by the firm’s financial slack. Panel B reports the t-tests for differences in means reported in Panel A. The column mean is subtracted from the row mean to calculate the difference reported. For example, for the dividend yield, the quartile-2 mean, 0.0264, is subtracted from the Low cash quartile mean, 0.0394, for a difference of 0.0130. Panel A Dividend YieldRaw DividendDividend/Net IncomeDividend/Financial SlackLow cash0.03940.98840.08221.005320.02640.54170.07460.118430.01180.24150.06180.0164High cash0.00650.09640.01990.0042 Panel B Differences in Dividend Yield Low cash23High cashLow cash-0.0130**,w,k0.0276**,w,k0.0329**,w,k2-0.0146**,w,k0.0199**,w,k3-0.0053**,w,kHigh cash- Differences in Raw Dividends Low cash23High cashLow cash-0.4467**,w,k0.7469**,w,k0.8920**,w,k2-0.3002**,w,k0.4453**,w,k3-0.1451**,w,kHigh cash- Differences in Dividend/Net Income Low cash23High cashLow cash-0.00760.02040.0623**,w,k2-0.01280.0547**,w,k3-0.0419**,w,kHigh cash- Differences in Dividends/Financial Slack Low cash23High cashLow cash-0.8869**,w,k0.9889**,w,k1.0011**,w,k2-0.1020*,w,k0.1142*,w,k3-0.0122**,w,kHigh cash-* indicates t-test is significant at the 5% level ** indicates t-test is significant at the 1% level w indicates the Wilcoxon sign-rank test is significant at the 1% level k indicates the Kruskal-Wallis test is significant at the 1% level Table 8 Fixed Effects Regression Fixed-effect regressions of the following equation of dividend payouts on firm characteristics for 2,407 dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms between 1980 and 2000:  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  where Div is the firm’s dividend yield (Model 1), the firm’s cumulative dividend standardized by net income (Model 2), or the firm’s cumulative dividend standardized by cash (Model 3), Liq is the firm’s cash and short-term investments divided by total assets, D/E is the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, Risk is the firm’s estimate of idiosyncratic risk, OpPer is the firms operating performance (ratio of operating income to total assets or net income to total assets), Size is the log of the firm’s market capitalization, Mktbk is the firm s market-to-book ratio, and µ is the ordinary least squares error. P-values are in parenthesis below coefficient estimate. Model 1 Dividend YieldModel 2 Dividend/Net IncomeModel 3 Dividend/Financial SlackIntercept0.0114 (0.001)0.0055 (0.001)0.1213 (0.001)0.0025 (0.001)0.6126 (0.001)0.3780 (0.001)Cash-0.0105 (0.065)-0.0064 (0.034)-0.0792 (0.409)-0.0025 (0.056)-1.0007 (0.076)-0.8851 (0.100)D/E0.0084 (0.001)0.0077 (0.001)0.0178 (0.042)0.0178 (0.040)0.0814 (0.113)0.0891 (0.080)Risk-0.0156 (0.067)-0.0209 (0.004)-0.3463 (0.017)-0.0010 (0.668)-0.0331 (0.023)-0.0272 (0.012)OpPer = Op.Inc./TA-0.0437 (0.001)-0.1417 (0.013)-0.9951 (0.001)OpPer = NI/TA-0.0456 (0.001)-0.1989 (0.001)-1.0870 (0.003)Size0.0020 (0.001)0.0089 (0.001)0.0173 (0.001)0.0004 (0.001)0.0588 (0.010)0.0315 (0.012)Mktbk-0.0000 (0.417)-0.0001 (0.418)0.0002 (0.749)-0.0001 (0.629)0.0010 (0.815)0.0007 (0.864)N5,5245,5244,4064,4065,5245,524Adjusted R213.42%13.17%1.20%1.29%0.59%0.60%F-statistic115.87 (0.001)113.35 (0.001)10.00 (0.001)10.70 (0.001)5.42 (0.001)5.44 (0.000) Figure 1: Sequence of Events  Firm chooses a dividend payment D({0, R} and makes dividend payment to shareholders Management observes whether the new project is available All payoffs realized Management and investors agree that there is a probability  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  that a new project will be available at t = 1 If the new project is available, management observes a signal z about the payoff on the project at t = 2 and interprets it as x. If x = H, management presents the project to investors who also observe z, and interpret it as y. If x = L, management rejects the project. The firm’s assets in place will have an expected value V that will be realized at t = 2 If D = 0 was chosen at t = 1 and x = H, management can invest in the new project out of internal funds If D = R was chosen at t = 1 and x = H, management must raise external financing at a cost Ä to invest in the new project.  APPENDIX Proof of Theorem 1: Management will choose not to pay a dividend if W(0) > W(R). Using the expressing for W(R) and W(0) from (4) and (5) respectively, we see that:  EMBED Equation.3  (A-1) It is clear that at ( = 1, we have W(0) - W(R) > 0, so it is optimal not to pay a dividend, and at  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 , we have W(0) – W(R) < 0 given (6), so it is optimal to pay a dividend. Moreover, W(0) – W(R) is continually differentiable in  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  and  EMBED Equation.3  where ( ( H – R – ([R – L] < 0. Thus, we see that  EMBED Equation.3 . From this it follows that  EMBED Equation.3  such that W(0) – W(R) > 0 if  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 and W(0) – W(R) < 0 if  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . Solving (A-1) as an equality, we see that:  EMBED Equation.3  (A-2) ( Proof of Lemma 1: The firm's stock price at t = 0 if it announces D = 0 is (see (5)):  EMBED Equation.3  (A-3) Now,  EMBED Equation.3   EMBED Equation.3  since (((0,1)  EMBED Equation.3  > 0. The firm's stock price at t = 0 if it announces D = R (see (4)) is:  EMBED Equation.3  (A-4) So,  EMBED Equation.3  > 0 given (3). ( Proof of Theorem 2: It follows immediately from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 that, conditional on the firm choosing not to pay a dividend,  EMBED Equation.3  is increasing in  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . Similarly, conditional on the firm choosing to pay a dividend,  EMBED Equation.3  is increasing in  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . Since we know that the firm pays a dividend only if  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 we see that  EMBED Equation.3  (A-5) For  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  the firm will pay a dividend, so its stock price is given by  EMBED Equation.3 , which is given in (A-4). Comparing (A-4) and (A-5), we see that  EMBED Equation.3 . And since  EMBED Equation.3 , we know that  EMBED Equation.3 , where  EMBED Equation.3  is the stock price for  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 and a choice of D = 0. We will now prove that the marginal value assigned by investors at t = 0 to a dividend payment is higher when the stock price at t = 0 is lower. The improvement in the stock price at t = 0 due to the payment of a dividend – which is the marginal value assigned by investors at t = 0 to a dividend payment – is given by  EMBED Equation.3 , holding  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  fixed. Using (A-3) and (A-4), we see that:  EMBED Equation.3 . Now,  EMBED Equation.3  < 0. Thus, the marginal value assigned by investors at t = 0 to a dividend payment is higher when the stock price is lower, since the stock price is increasing in EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . ( Proof of Corollary 1: The probability that the firm will invest in the new project if it pays a dividend is given by  EMBED Equation.3 , whereas the probability that it will invest in the new project if it does not pay a dividend is given by  EMBED Equation.3 . It is clear that  EMBED Equation.3 . ( Proof of Theorem 3: Using the definition of (* in (A-2), we can write:  EMBED Equation.3  > 0 since ( < 0. Next,  EMBED Equation.3  > 0.  EMBED Equation.3  < 0.  EMBED Equation.3  Proof of Theorem 4: Using (A-3) and (A-4) we can write:  EMBED Equation.3  It is clear that  EMBED Equation.3  at  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  which means shareholders would prefer that a dividend be paid at  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  and  EMBED Equation.3  at  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  which means shareholders would like a dividend to not be paid at  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  Moreover,  EMBED Equation.3  (A-6) Thus,  EMBED Equation.3  such that shareholders would prefer that a dividend be paid if  EMBED Equation.DSMT4  and that a dividend not be paid if  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 . Moreover, comparing (A-2) and (A-6), we see that  EMBED Equation.3 . ( REFERENCES Adams, Renee, Heitor Almeida, and Daniel Ferreira, “Powerful CEOs and their Impact on Corporate Performance,” Working Paper, New York University, May 2002. Allen, Franklin, and Douglas Gale, “Diversity of Opinion and Financing of New Technologies,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 8, 1999, pp. 68-89. Allen, Franklin, and Roni Michaely, “Payout Policy,” Working Paper, forthcoming in North-Holland Handbook of Economics (eds. G. Constantinides, M. Harris and R. Stulz), 2002. Amihud, Yakov, and Kefei Li, “Declining Information Content of Dividend Announcements and the Effect of Institutional Holdings,” Working Paper, New York University, December 2002. Bajaj, Mukesh, Sumon Mazumdar, and Atulya Sarin, “Costs of Issuing Preferred Stock: An Empirical Analysis,” Working Paper, Santa Clara University, 2000. Baker, Malcolm, and Jeff Wurgler, “A Catering Theory of Dividends,” Working Paper, Harvard Business School, 2002a. Baker, Malcolm, and Jeff Wurgler, “Market Timing and Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance 57-1, 2002b, pp. 1-32. Bargh, John, and Tanya Chartrand, “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being,” American Psychologist 54, 1999, pp. 462-479. Benartzi, Shlomo, Roni Michaely, and Richard Thaler, “Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?” Journal of Finance 52, 1997, pp. 1007-1034. Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Adam Wantz, “A Tax-Based Test of the Dividend Signaling Hypothesis,” American Economic Review 85, 1995, pp. 532-551. Bhattacharya, Nalinaksha, Amin Mawani, Cameron Morrill, “Dividend Payout and Executive Compensation in US Firms,” Working Paper, University of Manitoba, 2002. Bhattacharya, Sudipto, “Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and ‘The Bird in the Hand’ Fallacy,” Bell Journal of Economics 10, 1979, pp. 259-270. Boot, Arnoud, and Anjan Thakor, “Financial System Architecture”, Review of Financial Studies, 10-3, 1997, pp. 693-733. Boot, Arnoud, and Anjan Thakor, “The Economic Value of Flexibility when There is Disagreement”, Working Paper, University of Michigan Business School, August 2002. Brennan, Michael, and Anjan Thakor, “Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy,” Journal of Finance 45, 1990, pp. 993-1018. Clarke, Ian, and William Mackaness, “Management ‘Intuition’: An Interpretative Account of Structure and Content of Decision Schemas Using Cognitive Maps,” Journal of Management Studies 38-2, 2001, pp. 147.172. Crabbe, Leland, “Estimating the Credit-Risk Yield Premium for Preferred Stock,” Financial Analysts Journal 52, 1996, pp. 45-56. Easterbrook, Frank, “Two Agency-cost Explanations of Dividends,” American Economic Review 74, 1984, pp. 650-659. Fama, Eugene, and Kenneth French, “Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?” Journal of Financial Economics 60, 2001, pp. 3-43. Fuller, Kathleen, and Michael Goldstein, “The Ups and Downs of Dividend Preference,” Working Paper, University of Georgia, 2002. Goyal, Amit, and Pedro Santa-Clara, “Idiosyncratic Risk Matters!” Working Paper, UCLA, 2002. Grinstein, Yaniv, and Roni Michaely, “Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy,” Working Paper, Cornell University, 2002. Grullon, Gustavo, Roni Michaely, Bhaskaran Swaminathan, “Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm Maturity?” Journal of Business 75, 2002, pp. 387-424. Hertzel, Michael, Michael Lemmon, James Linck, Lynn Rees, “Long-run Performance Following Private Placement of Equity,” Journal of Finance, forthcoming, 2002. Howe, Keith, Jai He, and G. Wenchi Kao, 1992, “One-Time Cash flow Announcements and Free Cash-Flow Theory: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends,” Journal of Finance 47, pp. 1963-1975. Jagannathan, Murali, Clifford Stephens, and Michael Weisbach, “Financial Flexibility and the Choice between Dividends and Stock Repurchases,” Journal of Financial Economics 57, 2000, pp. 353-384. Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 1976, pp. 305-360. Jensen, Michael, “Agency Costs of Free-cash-flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers”, American Economic Review 76, 1986, pp. 323-329. John, Kose, and Joseph Williams, “Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: a Signaling Equilibrium,” Journal of Finance 40, 1985, pp. 1053-1070. Kahneman, Daniel, and Dan Lovallo, “Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts” A Cognitive Perspective on Risk-Taking”, Management Science 39-1, 1993, pp. 17-31 Kandel, Eugene, and Neil Pearson, “Differential Interpretation of Public Signals and Trade in Speculative Markets”, Journal of Political Economy 103, 1995, pp 831-872 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, “Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World,” Journal of Finance 60, 2000, pp. 1-33. Lang, Larry, and Robert Litzenberger, “Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signaling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis?” Journal of Financial Economics 24, 1989, pp. 181-192. Lee, Inmoo, Scott Lochhead, Jay Ritter, and Quanshui Zhao, “The Costs of Raising Capital,” Journal of Financial Research 19, 1996, pp. 59-74. Lie, Eric, “Excess Funds and Agency Problems: An Empirical Study of Incremental Cash Disbursements,” Review of Financial Studies 13, 2000, pp. 219-248. Lie, Eric, “Financial Flexibility and the Corporate Payout Choice,” Working Paper, College of William & Mary, 2001. Loughran, Tim, and Jay Ritter, “The Operating Performance of Firms Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings,” Journal of Finance 52, 1007, pp. 1823-1850. Miller, Merton, and Kevin Rock, “Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information,” Journal of Finance 40, 1985, pp. 1031-1051. Miller, Merton, and Franco Modigliani, “Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares,” Journal of Business 34, 1961, pp. 411-433. Morris, Stephen, “The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory”, Economics and Philosophy 11, 1995, pp. 227-253. Myers, David, Intuition: Its Powers and Perils, Yale University Press, 2002. Nissam, Doron, and Amir Ziv, “Dividend Changes and Future Profitability,” Journal of Finance 56, 2001, pp. 2111-2133. Ofer, Aharon, and Anjan Thakor, “A Theory of Stock Price Responses to Alternative Corporate Cash Disbursement Methods: Stock Repurchases and Dividends,” Journal of Finance 42, 1987, pp. 365-394. Spence, A. Michael, “Competitive and Optimal Responses to Signals: An Analysis of Efficiency and Distribution,” Journal of Economic Theory 7, 1974, pp. 296-332. Wagner, Daniel, and Laura Smart, “deep Cognitive Activation” A New Approach to the Unconscious,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 65, 1997, pp. 984-985. White, Richard, “Selective Inattention”, Psychology Today 82, 1971, pp. 47-82. Yoon, Pyung, and Laura Starks, “Signaling, Investment Opportunities, and Dividend Announcements,” Review of Financial Studies 8, 1995, pp. 995-1018. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, “Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment”, American Economic Review 86, 1996, pp. 1197-1215.  The model could easily adapt to include stock repurchase programs since repurchasing shares would also reduce flexibility. However, stock repurchase plans are often discretionary and are not observable by investors, as noted by Howe, He and Kao (1992). Thus, these plans have a different signaling ability than regular dividend payments. Further, repurchases may be a “one-time-only” payout mechanism, while dividends are often viewed as a consistent future payout mechanism. This consistent payout enforces a reduction in flexibility over time where stock repurchases may not.  See the review by Allen and Michaely (2002).  This relies on the fact that equity is typically more flexible than debt.  The analysis is unchanged if the project investment was some amount, say I, where I d" R.  We believe that this is a natural assumption to use in the context of disagreement. It is unlikely that people will disagree too much over payoffs that are highly correlated with the overall market. However, payoffs that are more idiosyncratic – such as the success of a new drug – invite stronger individual-specific interpretations of the facts and hence greater potential disagreement.  We view y as arising from information-aggregation in the capital market. See Allen and Gale (1999) and Boot and Thakor (1997) for an analysis of this.  For example, Myers (2002) cites a “very high-ranking (unnamed) Texas public official” (from the time George Bush was governor): “I know there’s no evidence that shows that the death penalty has a deterrent effect, but I just feel in my gut it must be true” (syndicated column in Holland (Michigan) Sentinel, November 27, 1999).  Note that this expected transactions cost, conditional on project availability, is  EMBED Equation.3 which is increasing in  EMBED Equation.DSMT4 .  Other than the positive announcement effect accompanying a dividend increase. However, signaling models do not make any predictions about the dependence of dividends on the level of stock prices.  This has been theoretically predicted by Zwiebel (1996).  See, for example, Brennan and Thakor (1990).  They also find that institutional holdings are greater for paying-paying firms than for non-dividend-paying firms.  An empirical proxy for CEO power has been recently provided by Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2002).  See, for example, Crabbe (1996), Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996), and Bajaj, Mazumdar, and Sarin (2000). We access the primary industrial, supplementary industrial, tertiary, full coverage, and industrial research files of Compustat.  As a robustness check, we also classified high price periods as bull markets and low price periods as bear markets. To define a bull market, we obtain bull and bear market definitions from Ned Davis Research. Ned Davis Research defines a bull market as an increase of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) of at least 30% over 50 calendar days or a 13% increase over 155 calendar days and a bear market as a decrease of the DJIA of at least 30% over 50 calendar days or a 13% decrease over 145 calendar days. Ned Davis Research classifies each month as a bull or bear market. However, since our data are yearly, we define a bull (bear) market year as a year in which the majority (more than six) of the monthly observations were classified as bull (bear) markets. We also required that nine or more months be classified as bull (bear) markets for the year to be a bull (bear) year. This allowed some months to be fall as neither bull nor bear and these were removed from the analysis for this test. Results were qualitatively similar and are available upon request.  Again our results are robust to defining high- (low-) price markets as bull (bear) markets using data from Ned Davis Research.  See Brown and Warner (1980) for comparison of the market model with the market-and-risk-adjusted model.  As a robustness check, we divided the sample into the 1980s and the 1990s. We find that the same pattern holds across both decades; firms that increase (decrease) dividends in high-price markets have higher (lower) abnormal returns than firms that increase (decrease) dividends in low-price markets. Similar to Amihud and Li (2002) the abnormal returns are lower in the 1990s than 1980s.  Goyal and Santa-Clara (2002) find that the idiosyncratic component represents 85 percent of the total average stock variance according to the market model, and 80 percent according to the Fama-French three-factor model.  Operating income is defined as Compustat item #13 plus Compustat item #62, and net income is Compustat item #172. PAGE  PAGE 51 0 1 2 /:Ujk”•ABCRSźģ­Ææ_e  ØÕÜÄÉÜDK\ ] [%o%¦'©'?/D/Å0Ę0Ł2§3ą6\7b:c:l@€AŽA2BHBIBcBeBéG%HIIūųõńõńõńõźõąźŪźõńõ×ŃĶŃĶ×ĖÉĖĀÉĖ×ĀĶõ½²½®ŖõŃĶ£Ÿõ£õ6aJ 5\]aJ5aJaJhj0JCJUaJCJaJ j0JU]6]aJ 5]aJ6]0JaJjUaJ jUaJH*aJaJCJ\aJ</0123456789:TUVZ[‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹łłōōōōōōņņņōōšņņōōōōōņņņņņņņ$a$$@&a$n/‚I‚S‚żżżż‹ŒŽ‘’“”ėéź­®Æ_y‚e € ‘ ŌC†bA$żżżżżżżżżżżżżżżżõõķõččččßß„Šdą`„Šdą$dąa$$dąa$A$‡)u0Ł2\7Ģ<l@€AŽA2BIBŖBõELGéGRIŖJĄKHMFQĘS–U·UöéöéąąŽÕŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠöæ ĘX „ „Šdą^„ `„Šdą„dą^„$ ʐ$a$ „„Šdą^„`„Š„Šdą`„ŠIIJIƒI„I›IœIIžIKKKKKK'K(K9K:KQKRKSKTKlKmK,M-MDMEMFMGM P”PFQiQ3R4RšRńRųRSSS}SS€S¹S»S¼SĆSÄSTś÷š÷äŪš÷š÷ĻĘš÷½÷š÷±Øš÷¢÷š÷–š÷½÷†÷€÷€÷€÷€÷€ś÷€ś÷½÷ 6]aJ 5\]aJjÅEHś’UaJjWØA CJUVh j„šaJjĶEHō’UaJj{qA CJUVhj0JUaJjHEHö’UaJjüćA CJUVhjĆEHś’UaJj ģA CJUVh jUaJaJ jĪšaJ2TT]T^TsTtT”T•T™TšTēTéTķTļTsUwU|UU‚U†UŽUU–U—U®UÆU°U±UīUļUVVV VVV#V$V V”VøV¹VŗV»VĻVŠVÕVÖVšW›W²W³W“WµWĒWČWßWś÷ś÷ś÷ś÷ś÷ś÷ś÷ś÷ś÷ś÷ś÷š÷äŪš÷š÷ĻĘš÷ś÷ś÷š÷ŗ±š÷ś÷ś÷š÷„œš÷š÷jwEHņ’UaJj4VØA CJUVhjóEHö’UaJjmģA CJUVhjoEHö’UaJjdģA CJUVhj EHņ’UaJj VØA CJUVh jUaJaJ 6]aJ8·UšW¶WœY7aĶc^e~eægLiZiŗi n¾pźpżpquöīééēŽŃééĄééö³§ž” ĘŠø€€dą Ęø€dą $ Ęø€dąa$ Ęø€„Šdą`„Š ĘX „@ „Šdą^„@ `„Š ĘX „@ dą^„@  ĘX dądą$dąa$„Šdą`„ŠßWąWįWāW X XXX&X'X>X?X@XAXxXyXX‘X’X“XYćYäYéYźYZZ Z Z¦Z§ZĢZÖZŲ[Ł[ö[÷[\\\\\\\\8\9\:\n\s\Æ\°\±\¶\·\ø\ŗ\æ\Ų\ōėäįŪįŪįäįĻĘäįäįĻ½äį¹¹··¹¹¹Æ¹£™Æ¹¹”¹”·¹”¹”¹ 6H*]jÜ6EHö’U]js1ÉA CJUVhj6U]66]jXEHö’UaJjŌEHö’UaJjmģA CJUVh 6]aJaJ jUaJjEHö’UaJj€ģA CJUVh:Ų\Ł\Ś\]]]]]‘]t^u^ä^å^ē^ö^ų^ü^ž^²_³_“_ļ_š_ń_s`t`y`z`¶`·`Ī`Ļ`Š`Ń`aaaa7aĢcĶcķc^e_evewexeye„e…eœeežeŸe eéefü÷ü÷ü÷šü÷üüü÷ü÷üüéęŚŃéęü÷üĻĖÄęéęøÆéęéę£šé–ę 6]aJH*aJjd(EHö’UaJjA{qA CJUVhj<%EHö’UaJj5{qA CJUVh 5\]aJaJhhjø"EHö’UaJjmģA CJUVhaJ jUaJ j0JU 6H*]6]8fHfIfffgf~ff€ff×fÜfg g9g>g€gg˜g™gšg›gægņg:h>hMhQhii"i&iPiQiÆi³iŗi¾ijj£j§j­j±jĒkĖkŲkÜkākęklŽl„l¦l§lØlķlńlmm1m5mĪmĻmęmż÷żšżäŪšż÷ż÷ż÷żšżĻĘšżæż÷ż÷ż÷ż÷ż¹ż÷ż÷ż÷ż÷ż÷ż÷ż÷ż÷żšż­¤šż÷ż÷ż÷żšżjL0EHō’UaJjŖģA CJUVh jtšaJ 5\]aJjÅ-EHö’UaJjp[ØA CJUVhj+EHö’UaJjL{qA CJUVh jUaJ 6]aJaJ?ęmēmčmémźoėopppp¾pĒpźpópüpżpq'r+rõstĄwņw:x;xRxSxTxUxsxtx‹xŒxxŽxŗx»xŅxÓxŌxÕxyyyyyyōėäįäįÕĢäįĘįĘįĘæįĘįĘįæįäį³Ŗäįäįž•äįäį‰€äįäį³wäjė?EHö’UaJjd=EHö’UaJj[ØA CJUVhjß:EHö’UaJjķA CJUVhj[8EHö’UaJjmģA CJUVh 5\]aJ 6]aJj×5EHö’UaJjćģA CJUVhaJ jUaJjR3EHö’UaJjĖģA CJUVh.uĄwņw÷x?{E~Üé4äµ‚Ų‚ų‚|†Į†į†‡HˆõõõõõõõšõõęŁĘęõŗ؞ ĘŠøĄ€dą ĘŠ pŲ øX €€dą Ę ŠøX €€dą ĘŠ čŲ ˜ šŠødą ĘŠ øX dą ĘŠødądą ĘŠø€€dąyzz/z0z1z2zZ{[{r{s{t{u{õ{ü{ż{||}}}}} }2}3}J}K}L}M}~~0~1~2~3~h~i~€~~‚~ƒ~78OPQR—˜Æ°żöżźįöżöżÕĢöżĆ¼Ć¼żöżÕ³öżöżÕŖöżöżÕ”öżöż•Œöżöż•ƒöżöż•jŽQEHö’UaJjOEHö’UaJj[ØA CJUVhj‚LEHö’UaJjżIEHö’UaJjxGEHö’UaJ B*aJphB*\aJphjóDEHö’UaJjķA CJUVhjoBEHö’UaJjmģA CJUVh jUaJaJ3°±²Üé4µ‚·‚ø‚Ļ‚Š‚Ń‚Ņ‚Ó‚Ü‚Ż‚ō‚õ‚ö‚÷‚:„;„Q„R„S„T„ƒ„„„Ņ„Ó„é„ź„ė„ģ„ō„õ„ … … ……öļģåģåģą×ąĖĀ׹ģļģ¶­ļģļģ”˜ļģ’ģļģ†}ļģļģqhļjdEHö’UaJjÆ{qA CJUVhjõ`EHō’UaJj¦{qA CJUVh jqaJjģ]EHō’UaJjčWØA CJUVhjZEHō’UaJjĆWØA CJUVhjœVEHš’UaJj”WØA CJUVhj÷EHī’UaJEHī’aJ 5\]aJaJ jUaJjTEHö’UaJ(…'…+…1…5…Ą…Į…×…Ų…Ł…Ś…į…ā…ų…ł…ś…ū…Į†Ā†Ł†Ś†Ū†Ü†ä†å†ü†ż†ž†’†{‡|‡“‡”‡•‡–‡”‡„‡«‡Æ‡Ż‡Ž‡ō‡õ‡ö‡÷‡ż÷ż÷żšżäŪšżšżĻĘšżšżŗ±šżšż„œšżšż‡šż÷ż÷żšż{ršj×vEHō’UaJj¼XØA CJUVhjRtEHö’UaJjķA CJUVhj÷pEHō’UaJj“XØA CJUVhj—lEHš’UaJjXØA CJUVhjļiEHö’UaJj¹{qA CJUVhj”fEHō’UaJjĄ{qA CJUVh jUaJ 6]aJaJ,Hˆdˆ†ˆÆˆ³“¼Ž½ŽŲß“ą“²”³”—•˜• — —Į˜É™»š¼š±›²›ŚņRžõõŻõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõ Ę# Š pŲ ø Ø øX H!Ą€dą ĘŠøĄ€dą÷‡Žˆˆ¦ˆ§ˆØˆ©ˆ5‰6‰M‰N‰O‰P‰×‰Ż‰qŠuŠ{ŠŠœŠŠ“ŠµŠ¶Š·ŠŒ"Œ(Œ,Œ¶Œ·ŒĪŒĻŒŠŒŃŒEF]^_`“¾łśŽŽŽŽiŽjŽŽżöżźįöżöżÕĢöżĘżĘżĘżöżŗ±öżĘżĘżöżÕØöżöżÕŸöż˜żöżŒƒöżöżj ‡EHō’UaJjY|qA CJUVh 56\aJj…„EHö’UaJjžEHö’UaJjzEHś’UaJj*aJjÖŽEHö’UaJjüķA CJUVhj;ÜEHö’UaJj īA CJUVh6aJjŒŁEHö’UaJj×EHś’UaJjHWØA CJUVhjYŌEHö’UaJj kA UVaJh jUaJjŅŃEHö’UaJj[ØA CJUVhaJ,œ©¢©¹©ŗ©Ķ©Ī©Ļ©Š©3Ŗ4ŖGŖHŖIŖJŖjŖkŖ~ŖŖ€ŖŖ„Ŗ†Ŗ‘Ŗ’Ŗ„Ŗ¦Ŗ§ŖØŖÆŖ°ŖĆŖÄŖÅŖĘŖģŖķŖ««««§¬Ø¬æ¬ūųńųåÜńųńųŠĒńųńų»²ńų®ųńų¢™ńųńų„ńųńųxońųńųj`ļEHö’UaJj5SqA CJUVhj²ģEHö’UaJjFYØA CJUVhjĒéEHö’UaJj6YØA CJUVhH*aJjņęEHö’UaJj SqA CJUVhj äEHö’UaJjöRqA CJUVhj[įEHö’UaJjŪRqA CJUVh jUaJaJ]aJ*æ¬Ą¬Į¬Ā¬}­~­0®1®D®E®F®G®O®P®c®d®e®f®¬ÆĘÆ°,°±±2±3±4±5±u³v³µ'µ)µ'¶··Œ¹™¹źŗ÷ŗĒ¼Č¼Ź¼Ģ¼Ł¼5¾<¾øĮÅĮ—Ā˜Ā«Ā¬ĀōėäįŲįäįĢĆäįäį·®äįŖį¤įäįō›äįŲį¤—į¤į¤į¤įŲ“į¤į—į¤įäį‡j[ØA CJUVhH*aJ6aJjńłEHö’UaJ 56aJ5aJj-÷EHö’UaJjĪSqA CJUVhjhōEHö’UaJjŪRqA CJUVhj0JUaJaJ jUaJjåńEHö’UaJj%īA CJUVh4‹¹Œ¹ŗŗéŗźŗ˜»™»Ė¼Ģ¼˜½™½·ĮøĮYĀZĀĢĘĶĘ1Ē2Ē¼Ė½Ė%Ģ&ĢæĶŪĶĪõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõšē„Šdą`„Š$a$ ĘŠøĄ€dą¬Ā­Ā®Ā’ĀĆĆĆĆĆųÅłÅĘĘĘĘĶʦʙĒšĒ±Ē²Ē³Ē“ĒĶĒĪĒįĒāĒćĒäĒNČOČfČgČhČiČ"É#ÉxŹyŹŠĖ‹Ė¢Ė£Ėöļģļģą×ļģļģąĪļģČģļģ¼³ļģļģ§žļģļģ’‰ļģ€ģ€ģļģtjr\ØA CJUVhj0JUaJj} EHö’UaJjYīA CJUVhjĶEHö’UaJj’SqA CJUVhjGEHö’UaJjOīA CJUVh 56aJjĄEHö’UaJj9’EHö’UaJj[ØA CJUVhaJ jUaJjtüEHö’UaJ*£Ė¤Ė„ĖŗĖ»Ė½ĖĖĖ­Ģ®ĢæĶĪŹĪĖĪŃŃŃŃŃŃ*Ń+Ń©ŃŖŃ’ŃŅŅ€Ņ›ŅČŅķŅÓ/Ó0Ó;ÓZÓyӀÓÄÓŅÓ×ÓŲÓÕÕ ÕĖ×Ó×rŲ€Ų†ŲÜ ÜŃÜöļģćģŻģćģ׊ĖæøĖ¶¶¶¶²²¶²®®¬®Š²„²„¬ž˜Œ5B*CJ\hph 5CJ\ 5CJ\] 6]aJh66]aJhH* jˆEHö’UjTqA CJUVh jU j0JU 5CJaJ 56aJj0JUaJaJ jUaJj EHö’UaJ3ĪĶĪ(Ļ‚ĻŃ#ŃÄÓŲÓĖ×rŲ†ŲśŻ%ß9ßČßéß5āóó󟎟Öɼ°§§°§˜ dą7$8$H$$ Ę p@ X dąa$„Šdą`„Š $dą7$8$H$a$ „Šdą7$8$H$`„Š „„Šdą^„`„Š$dąa$ Ę Š X ĄĄdą ĘŠdą & F ĘŠdąŃÜŅÜÓÜżŻ Ž%ß3ß8ß9ß:ßkßlßČßÉߏßįßāßćßäßéßüßżßžßąą(ą)ą\ą]ą˜ą™ą°ą±ą²ą³ąÉąŹąkį{įŌęÕęčęéęķēąŁąŅŠŅąēĒēĽĵ¬½Ä§££””š—‹‚š££}oj5!= UVmHnHu jUj©EHņ’UaJjƒ¾A CJUVhaJ jUaJH*6] 6H*]jŁCJEHņ’Ujo‚¾A UV jCJUCJ56CJ\]6 6]aJh 56CJ\ 5CJ\] 5CJ\#j0J5B*CJU\hph*5āŌęõężčÜėšėķ(ķ¹īŚīhš(ń<ńōżõŠöäöcų/łCłö꯯ѯ¼Ż¼ŻÆŃ„ÆÆŃÆÆŃ ĘŠøĄ€dą „Šdą7$8$H$`„Š Ęą„p„Šdą7$8$H$^„p`„Š $dą7$8$H$a$ dą7$8$H$$„@ „Šdą^„@ `„Ša$„dą^„éęźęėęūęüężęēēēēēūčüč ééŲėŁėÜėźėļėšėńė§ģØģķķķ ķ!ķ"ķ(ķ/ķ0ķ2ķQķRķUķVķ‰ķ‹ķĢķĶķäķåķęķēķżķžķī¹īŗīŃīųóńķńńķęāęŪńŪ×Ģ×Ć×·¬Ćק„ā„„ž›†žā×Ć×jÜEHņ’UaJjƒ¾A CJUVhaJ jUaJH* 6H*]jcEHņ’UaJhj(‡¾A CJUVhjUaJhj0JUaJhaJh 6]aJh6] j0JU6H*6 jU jWEHö’U3ŃīŅīÓīŌīhšpš(ń6ń;ń<ńTń›ņŲņģņ÷ņócówóó€ó†óˆóōżõöŠöŽöćöäö€÷“÷cųkų/ł=łCłDł ūĒüČü”żĻżŠżŃżčżéżźżėż>Nhģķ‡ˆōéąÜÕÜÕÓÕÜŠĖĄĖĄĖĄµĄµĖŠÜÕÜÕÓÕÜ®ÜÕÜÕӬܬ£¬Üž’‹žÓ¬‰‰H* jq$EHö’Ujįą¾A CJUVh jUj0JU]] B*aJph333HhŠ#k&^JaJHhĻ#k&^JaJ^JaJaJ6 6]aJhaJhjUaJhjŠ EHę’UaJhjY‡¾A CJUVh6CłĻżńż>>Ra ” Ŗ ¼ ½ 2 3 < A T \ d öéäŪĻäŪŪŹĮĮ»»°°°°° $7$8$H$If7$8$H$ $7$8$H$a$$a$ $„Šdą`„Ša$„Šdą`„Šdą Ę(€pą€dą dą7$8$H$ˆ>Raž ¢ ½ 3 ” ¢ ķ õ / 0 E K ² kn:;ę÷ż $%&'X[‹ÓŌ  123?RSbcm‚ˆŽ ¦¬®¾ÄŹĢÜāčźśżū÷ōīčäŽäīčīčäčäččä×Ī×Ī×Ī×Ī×äūūĢĢäÅūĆūūääżżæżżæżżæżżæżżæżż6H*\ 5\aJhH*6H*]aJh 6]aJh H*aJhaJh \aJh 5aJhaJ]aJ56Kd e i p x € ˆ ‰ œ WLLLLLWĄL $7$8$H$If§$$If–lÖÖr”’` “Ęł,"Ģ 3333Ö0’’’’’’öööÖ’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöœ £ Ŗ ± ø ¹ ¾ Å Ģ ōōōōLˆōōō§$$If–lÖÖr”’` “Ęł,"Ģ 3333Ö0’’’’’’öööÖ’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $7$8$H$IfĢ Ó Ś Ū ū    & ōōL0ōōōōō§$$If–lÖÖr”’` “Ęł,"Ģ 3333Ö0’’’’’’öööÖ’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $7$8$H$If& ' + 2 9 ; C D M WtLLLLLWˆL $7$8$H$If§$$If–lÖÖr”’` “Ęł,"Ģ 3333Ö0’’’’’’öööÖ’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöM T [ ] e f u | ƒ ōōōōLœōōō§$$If–lÖÖr”’` “Ęł,"Ģ 3333Ö0’’’’’’öööÖ’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $7$8$H$Ifƒ … Œ  ¢ © ° ² ¹ ōōL“ōōōōō§$$If–lÖÖr”’` “Ęł,"Ģ 3333Ö0’’’’’’öööÖ’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $7$8$H$If¹ ŗ Ó Ś į ć ź ė WÄLLLLLW $7$8$H$If§$$If–lÖÖr”’` “Ęł,"Ģ 3333Ö0’’’’’’öööÖ’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöė ģ õ / 0 ;<=LYm†öķēįįįÖČČČČ $$7$8$H$Ifa$ $7$8$H$If7$8$H$7$8$H$ $7$8$H$a$ dą7$8$H$ †‡˜Ÿ¦­“µ[øPBBBB[¼ $$7$8$H$Ifa$ $7$8$H$If¤$$If–lÖÖr”’Ų b5°"tźźźźÖ0’’’’’’ö#6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöµĒĪÕÜćäńōęęęęBō¤$$If–lÖÖr”’Ų b5°"tźźźźÖ0’’’’’’ö#6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$ $7$8$H$Ifńž %&X‹ÓńńńńMKKK¤$$If–lÖÖr”’Ų b5°"tźźźźÖ0’’’’’’ö#6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$Ó Ŗ« 23?Scnżōņņżéą®šąąąą1$$If–l” Ö˜ž$€%ö€%Ö’Ö’Ö’Ö’4Ö laö’ $$Ifa$ $$Ifa$ $7$8$H$a$ not{‚”„‹‹‹‹ $$Ifa$j$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’’™ ­®°·¾ĖĢĪÕÜéź”x‹‹‹‹”x‹‹‹‹”x‹‹‹‹”l $$Ifa$j$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’źģóś"#%,3@ACöööö‹xöööö‹xöööö‹xöj$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’ $$Ifa$!#39?AQW]_ntz|“™›­»ĪĻŽßéü,168FKQSafln|‡‰—œ¢¤²·½æĶŅÕ×ēģņō!"#67FGQgmsuŠž­®øĶŅŲŚŪ ?A‡ˆüśśüśśüśśüśśüśųōōśśüśśüśśüśśüśśüśśüśśüśśüśśüśśüśņųōōśśüśōōśśüśųųššH*\aJh566H*_CJQ^_ahn{|€‡š›®ööö‹töööö‹|öööö‹Pöj$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’ $$Ifa$®Æ»ĻßźėšöüĶšÄÄÄÄYlÄÄÄÄj$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’ $$Ifa$1$$If–l” Ö˜ž$€%ö€%Ö’Ö’Ö’Ö’4Ö laö’  &,78:@FRS”`‹‹‹‹”h‹‹‹‹”l‹‹‹‹”l $$Ifa$j$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’SU[amnpv|ˆ‰‹‘—£¤¦öööö‹löööö‹löööö‹löj$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’ $$Ifa$¦¬²¾æĮĒĶÖ×Ūįēóōööö‹`öööö‹töööö‹ø‚ $$Ifa$j$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’ $$Ifa$!"#7GRSZałĒľ¾¾¾Sˆ¾¾j$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’ $$Ifa$1$$If–l” Ö˜ž$€%ö€%Ö’Ö’Ö’Ö’4Ö laö’$If agtuˆ‰Šž®¹öö‹P…SÄöööö1$$If–l” Ö˜ž$€%ö€%Ö’Ö’Ö’Ö’4Ö laö’$Ifj$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’ $$Ifa$ ¹ŗĮĒĶŁ”€‹‹‹‹ $$Ifa$j$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’ŁŚ ?‡ĖŌ67ö“””’’’’‰‡‡‡€v’’ $ ĘÜ#$€€a$ ĘÜ#$€€ $7$8$H$a$j$$If–l”Ö\˜žųXø$` ` ` ` ö€%Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö’ ˆĖĢŌö÷    -.345žÆ°ĮĀĢŌÕ׎ßįāčīš(*;CELNOV[]nwyˆŽ‘ĀÅõ÷=>‚ƒÄ‰B E {!|!„!Z""„"«"±"²"ūōļćÜļŚÖŅŚÖūūŚŚĪŚĪŚĪŚŚūĪĪŚĪŚūĪŚĪŚĢĢŹŹūľū¾ūÄūūŹ»PJ \aJh 5aJhH*56H*6]6H*6 j(EHö’Uj^/śA CJUVh jU 5\aJhaJhJ”œž°ĀĶĪĻŲłĒľ¾¾¾Sˆ¾¾j$$If–l”Ö\Ų ų8"Ų    ö8"Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laöl $$Ifa$1$$If–l” Ö8"8"ö8"Ö’Ö’Ö’Ö’4Ö laöl$If Ųāļšųłś )öö‹$…SÄöööö1$$If–l” Ö8"8"ö8"Ö’Ö’Ö’Ö’4Ö laöl$Ifj$$If–l”Ö\Ų ų8"Ų    ö8"Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laöl $$Ifa$ )*=FO\”Ģ‹‹‹‹ $$Ifa$j$$If–l”Ö\Ų ų8"Ų    ö8"Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laöl\]pzĀõ=‚‹Ä|!”Ģ‹‹‹‹”‰‰‰‰‰€€z7$8$H$ $7$8$H$a$ $$Ifa$j$$If–l”Ö\Ų ų8"Ų    ö8"Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laöl|!„!…!”!”!µ!Ī!Ļ!Ų!żļļļļļK˜ļ¤$$If–lÖÖr”’ņÜ Ę½8"^źź÷{Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$Ų!ß!ę!ķ!ō!õ!÷!ž!"ńńńńM|ńńń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’ņÜ Ę½8"^źź÷{Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$" """""$"+"2"ńńM|ńńńńń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’ņÜ Ę½8"^źź÷{Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$2"3"="D"K"R"Y"Z"["[œMMMMM[K $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’ņÜ Ę½8"^źź÷{Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö["c""‚"‹"""™"š"żūķķķķķIĢ¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$š"£"„"²"æ"Ģ"Ķ"Ļ"ńńčččD|ń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$²"ø"¾"æ"Å"Ė"Ģ"Ń"Ņ"×"Ż"Ž"ä"ź"ė"ļ"š"ń"ņ"ų"ł" #(#L#R#X#Y#_#e#f#l#r#s#x#y##…#†#Œ#’#“#—#˜#™#š# #¦#§#¹#Ż#$$ $$$$$!$'$($-$.$3$9$:$@$E$F$J$K$L$M$S$T$f$$³$¹$æ$Ą$Ę$Ģ$Ķ$Ó$Ł$Ś$ß$ą$ę$ģ$ķ$ó$ł$ś$ž$’$%%żśżśöśżśżśöśöśśööżśżśżśöśżśżśöśöśżśööżśżśżśöśżśżśöśöśśööżśżśżśöśżśżśöśöśaJhPJH*aĻ"Š"Ņ"Ž"ė"ģ"ī"ļ"ńčččD8ńń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$ļ"š"ņ"ł"ś"###öööR@DDD $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$## # # #(#)#2#ńńMGEńń7$8$H$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$2#4#6#@#A#J#L#Y#ńńńMĢńńD $$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$Y#f#s#t#v#w#y#†#ööR€DDöö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$†#“#”#–#—#˜#š#§#öRPDDööö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$§#Ø#²#³#“#µ#·#[@MMMMM $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö·#ø#¹#Ż#Ž#ē#é#ė#[USEEEE $$7$8$H$Ifa$7$8$H$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöė#õ#ö#’#$$$($ńMĢńńDDD $$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$($)$+$,$.$:$F$G$[xMMDDD[8 $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöG$I$J$K$M$T$U$_$ńńčččD@ń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$_$`$a$b$d$e$f$$ńńńńMGE7$8$H$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$$$™$›$$§$Ø$±$³$ńńńńńMĢńń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$³$Ą$Ķ$Ś$Ū$Ż$Ž$ą$öööR€DDö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ą$ķ$ś$ū$ż$ž$’$%ööR8DDöö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$%%%%%K%N%~%€%Ę%Ē% & &&'Ģ'Ļ'))ć) ***1*7*8*?*E*F*M*S*T*Y*Z*a*g*h*o*u*v*z*{*|*}*„*‰*Š*›*ø*Ł*ą*ę*ē*ī*ō*õ*ü*+++ +++++$+%+)+*+++,+2+3+D+g+ˆ++•+–++£+¤+«+±+²+·+ø+æ+Å+Ę+Ķ+Ó+Ō+Ų+żł÷÷õõłļéłéłłłõżõżõżłżõżõżłżłżõżłłõżõżõżłżõżõżłżłżżłłõżõżõżłżõżõżł \aJh 5aJhH*5aJhPJ\%% %%%%%%öR@DDDDD $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$%%K%~%Ę% &&L&[YYYYPJ7$8$H$ $7$8$H$a$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöL&))))+)?)X)Y)ł÷éééééF”¢$$If–lÖÖr”’ņ ø8"^£€Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$7$8$H$Y)a)h)o)v)})~)€)‡)ńńńńńN|ńń¢$$If–lÖÖr”’ņ ø8"^£€Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$‡)Ž)•)œ))Ÿ)¦)­)“)ńńńN|ńńńń¢$$If–lÖÖr”’ņ ø8"^£€Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$“)»)¼)Å)Ģ)Ó)Ś)į)ā)ńN˜ńńńńńN¢$$If–lÖÖr”’ņ ø8"^£€Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$ā)ć)ė) * *****ł÷õźÜÜÜÜ $$7$8$H$Ifa$ $7$8$H$If7$8$H$* *(***8*F*T*[ŌMMDDD $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöT*U*W*X*Z*h*v*w*[ˆMMDDD[P $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöw*y*z*{*}*Š*‹*”*ńńčččD<ń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$”*•*–*—*™*š*›*ø*ńńńńMDB $7$8$H$a$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$ø*¹*Į*Ć*Å*Ī*Ļ*×*Ł*ńńńńńMŌńń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$Ł*ē*õ*++++ +öööRˆDDö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ ++%+&+(+)+*+,+ööR8DDöö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$,+3+4+=+>+?+@+B+öR<DDDDD $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$B+C+D+g+h+p+r+t+[RPBBBB $$7$8$H$Ifa$ $7$8$H$a$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöt+}+~+†+ˆ+–+¤+²+ńMŌńńDDD $$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$²+³+µ+¶+ø+Ę+Ō+Õ+[ˆMMDDD[T $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöÕ+×+Ų+Ł+Ū+é+ź+ó+ńńčččD<ń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$Ų+Ł+Ś+Ū+ā+č+é+ś+#,D,K,P,Q,X,^,_,f,l,m,r,s,z,€,,ˆ,Ž,,“,”,•,–,,ž,®,Æ,ą,ć,--[-\-Ÿ-§-Ü-”.Z/]/”0œ0s1™1½1Ć1É1Ź1Š1Ö1×1Ż1ć1ä1é1ź1š1ö1÷1ż1222 2 2 2222*2G2k2q2w2x2~2„2…2‹2‘2’2—2˜2ž2¤2„2żłż÷żłł÷ż÷ż÷żłż÷ż÷żłżłżżłõõ÷÷ļéļłļłłł÷ż÷ż÷żłż÷ż÷żłżłż÷żłł÷ż÷ż÷żłż÷ż 5aJh \aJh5H*aJhPJ\ó+ō+õ+ö+ų+ł+ś+#,ńńńńMDB $7$8$H$a$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$#,$,,,.,0,9,:,B,D,ńńńńńMŠńń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$D,Q,_,m,n,p,q,s,öööRˆDDö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$s,,,,’,“,”,–,ööR<DDöö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$–,ž,Ÿ,Ø,©,Ŗ,«,­,öR<DDDDD $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$­,®,ą,-[-Ÿ-§-Ü-[YYYYSJ $7$8$H$a$7$8$H$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöÜ-”0œ00¬0¹0Ķ0ę0ē0ł÷éééééF˜¢$$If–lÖÖr”’ņ ø8"^£€Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$7$8$H$ē0š0÷0ž01 1 111ńńńńńN|ńń¢$$If–lÖÖr”’ņ ø8"^£€Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$11$1+1,1.151<1C1ńńńN|ńńńń¢$$If–lÖÖr”’ņ ø8"^£€Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$C1J1K1U1\1c1j1q1r1ńNœńńńńńN¢$$If–lÖÖr”’ņ ø8"^£€Ö0’’’’’’ö¤"Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$r1s1{1™1š1£1„1§1±1ł÷õēēēēē $$7$8$H$Ifa$7$8$H$±1²1»1½1Ź1×1ä1[ĢMMDDD $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöä1å1ē1č1ź1÷122[€MMDDD[P $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö222 2 222#2ńńčččD@ń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$#2$2%2&2(2)2*2G2ńńńńMGE7$8$H$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@,"ėėėėģÖ0’’’’’’ö6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$G2H2Q2S2U2_2`2i2k2ńńńńńMĢńń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$k2x2…2’2“2•2–2˜2öööR€DDö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$˜2„2²2³2µ2¶2·2¹2ööRPDDöö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$„2«2±2²2¶2·2ø2¹2æ2Å2Ę2Ų2ū23%3&3,3-33393:3>3?3@3F3G3M3S3T3X3Y3Z3[3a3g3h3z3£3Ē3Ķ3Ó3Ō3Ś3ą3į3ē3ķ3ī3ņ3ō3ś3’344 4 44444 41424c4f4–4˜4Ž4ß4#5E5õ5ö5 66669¶9==š=żśöśöśżśööśśżśöżśśżśöśöśżśööżśżśżśöśżśżśöśżśöōōżżīčć׊ćöż j +EHö’Uj ā¾A CJUVh jU \aJh 5aJh5aJhPJH*Q¹2Ę2Ē2Ń2Ņ2Ó2Ō2Ö2öR@DDDDD $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$Ö2×2Ų2ū2ü233 3[USEEEE $$7$8$H$Ifa$7$8$H$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö 33333&3-3:3ńMœńńDDD $$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$:3;3=3>3@3G3T3U3[hMMDDD[P $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöU3W3X3Y3[3h3i3s3ńńčččD@ń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ $$7$8$H$Ifa$s3t3u3v3x3y3z3£3ńńńńMDB $7$8$H$a$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$£3¤3­3Æ3±3»3¼3Å3Ē3ńńńńńMĢńń¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$7$8$H$Ifa$Ē3Ō3į3ī3ļ3ń3ņ3ō3öööRxDDö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$ō34 4 44444ööRPDDöö $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$4 4!4+4,4-4.404öR@DDDDD $$7$8$H$Ifa$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$0414c4–4Ž4"5+5D5E5[YYYYPPP $7$8$H$a$¤$$If–lÖÖr”’j U@+"ėėėėėÖ0’’’’’’ö—"6Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’Ö’’’’’4Ö laöE5õ56N9P9R9b9€99ø9Č9ś9łōņņģćććććć $$Ifa$$If$a$7$8$H$ ś9ü9::::&:-:5:<:D:n”h________ $$Ifa$$If‘$$If–l4ÖÖ\”’°Ų(#( ( ( Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’Ö’’’’4Ö laö D:K:S:Z:b:c:öööö-˜Č$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$c:h:p:x:€:ˆ::˜: :Ø:°:ø:Ą:Č:łšššššššššššš $$Ifa$$If Č:É:Ķ:Ō:Ü:6|0'' $$Ifa$$IfČ$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laöÜ:ć:ė:ņ:ś:; ;;;;';öööööööööö $$Ifa$ ';(;-;5;=;6˜0'' $$Ifa$$IfČ$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laö=;E;M;U;];e;m;u;};…;;öööööööööö $$Ifa$ ;Ž;—;¢;Ŗ;6 00' $$Ifa$$IfČ$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laöŖ;²;³;»;Ć;Ä;Ģ;Ō;Õ;öööööööö $$Ifa$Õ;Ö;ß;å;ę;6 00' $$Ifa$$IfČ$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laöę;ī;ö;÷;’;<<<<öööööööö $$Ifa$<<<%<-<6€0'' $$Ifa$$IfČ$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laö-<4<<<C<K<R<Z<a<i<p<x<öööööööööö $$Ifa$ x<y<<‡<<60'' $$Ifa$$IfČ$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laö<—<Ÿ<¦<®<¶<¾<Å<Ķ<Ō<Ü<öööööööööö $$Ifa$ Ü<Ż<ß<å<ė<6œ0'' $$Ifa$$IfČ$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laöė<ń<÷<ż<==öööö-ĢČ$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laö $$Ifa$====$=*=0=6=łšššššš $$Ifa$$If6=7=C=J=R=6„0'' $$Ifa$$IfČ$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laöR=Y=a=g=o=u=}=‚=Š==—=öööööööööö $$Ifa$ —=˜=™=ø=¹=»=64/44$a$Č$$If–lÖ֞”’°Ä Ųģ(#Ö0’’’’’’ö”#Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’Ö’’’’’’’4Ö laöš=ø=¹=ŗ=»=¾=ą=į=c>d> >”>ø>¹>ŗ>»>*?+?j?k?p?r?µ?ø?Ģ?Ī?Ņ?Ō?ś?ū?w@y@¾@æ@ā@ę@|B~B‚B”BøB¾BģBņBāCäCDDDD#D$DrDsDŠDśųģųąÜųÕŅĘ½Õ¹¹¹¹¹¹ų¹ų¹ųµ®µų©–©’© jrš j<1EHö’UjxdØA CJUVh jU 56\]5\6]jø.EHś’UaJjtīA CJUVhaJ jUaJ jĪšCJ]aJmHnHuj6UmHnHu6 5\]6»=¼=½=¾=æ=>>M>N>c>d>e>å>ė>ģ>żżżóéóéóé…\óé{ó „Š$If^„Šc$$If–lÖF”’P ¤,"¼ T ˆ tąö6ööÖ ’’’Ö ’’’Ö ’’’Ö ’’’4Ö4Ö laö & F$If „h$If^„hģ>ł?ś?ū?ü?O@U@V@½@¾@æ@Ą@Į@zB|Bõļ‹ļõļõļ‹ļļõļ „Š$If^„Šc$$If–lÖF”’P ¤,"¼ T ˆ tąö6ööÖ ’’’Ö ’’’Ö ’’’Ö ’’’4Ö4Ö laö$If & F$If|B~B€B”BąCDāD0EIEcF…FÜFūFGG›–‰ ĘŠ !dą $ ĘŠ !dąa$dhc$$If–lÖF”’P ¤,"¼ T ˆ tąö6ööÖ ’’’Ö ’’’Ö ’’’Ö ’’’4Ö4Ö laöŠD‹DŒDDEE'E(E)E*E1E2EEEFEGEHEOEPEQERE]E^E~EE’E“E”E•E²E³EĘEĒEČEÉEēEčE’EFFFFF2F3FōķččÜÕččÉĀč¾ŗ¶č¬„č虒čč†ččsj†iØA CJUVh jˆBEHö’UjaiØA CJUVh jI@EHö’UjN)zA CJUVh jĄ=EHö’UjētA CJUV jbš jŗš jyš j :EHō’Uj«bØA CJUVh j…7EHö’Uj–bØA CJUVh jU jĆ4EHö’UjlbØA CJUVh+3F4F5FdFeFxFyFzF{FƒF„F…F•FŻFŽFńFņFóFōFGGGGGGGG.G/G0G1G8G9G:GAGBGUGVGWGXG¤G„GøG¹GŗG»GĒGųóóēąóÜÕóÉĀóóø±óó§ óœ˜óŽ‡óó}vó j1WEHō’Uj·ĢtA CJUV jUEHö’UjqĢtA CJUV jĪš jhš jŪREHö’UjĢtA CJUV j@PEHō’Uj$ĶtA CJUV j LEHņ’Uj7cØA CJUVh 56\] jnš j0HEHā’UjcØA CJUVh jU j[EEHö’U.G@GYG_G£GĀGĘGßGńGžI½I>KųKéLMM!M'MćMYNsNõėį××××ĖĖ¾×××××ד“×× Ęb !dą Ę*@ h !dą Ę @ !dą ĘŠ !dą Ę !Ądą Ę !dą Ę !€dąĒGČGŪGÜGŻGŽGļGšGńGH>HIHvHwHŠH‹HŒHHŸH H·HøH¹HŗHüHżHIIII%I&I=I>I?I@IwIxIII‘I’IŸI I³I“IśšéśåŽŚśŠÉśś½¶śś¬„śś™’śś†śśsjRdØA CJUVh jEeEHö’Uj«dØA CJUVh jĮbEHö’Uj dØA CJUVh jÅ`EHō’Uj»ČtA CJUV jA^EHö’Uj”dØA CJUVh jD\EHō’UjģĶtA CJUV6] 56\] jnš jŠYEHō’UjQĶtA CJUV jU-“IµI¶IĮIĀIŁIŚIŪIÜIJJ.J/J0J1JtJuJˆJ‰JŠJ‹J˜J™J¬J­J®JÆJ¾JæJŅJÓJŌJÕJŻJŽJńJņJóJōJ K K$K%K&K'K€LL”LųóóēąóóÖĻóóžóó“­óó£œóó’‹óóxóó j;zEHö’UjĪdØA CJUVh j>xEHō’UjpÉtA CJUV jžuEHō’UjKÉtA CJUV j¶sEHō’Uj ÉtA CJUV jwqEHō’UjäČtA CJUV j{oEHō’Uj»ČtA CJUV j—lEHö’UjĄdØA CJUVh jU j)hEHī’U/”L•L–L—L”L¢L¹LŗL»L¼LźLėLžL’LMM M MMMM MÄMÅMÜMŻMŽMßMįMāMćM÷MųMZN[NnNoNpNqNŻNŽNńNņNóNōNõīééŻÖééĢÅé黓ééؔ靖’鈁ééwpé j‹EHö’UjsčtA CJUV jx‰EHö’Uj ĘtA CJUV5\ 56\] jnš jō†EHö’Uj$hØA CJUVh jˆ„EHö’UjĖtA CJUV jŪEHō’Uj¾ŹtA CJUV jVEHö’UjšdØA CJUVh jU j}EHō’Uj{ŹtA CJUV,sNÜNöN"OjOƒO–OœOµO¼OÕOÜOõO.PGPQ®Q“RĄRĮR]SņS”TUUõõõõõéééééééõõõõõä×ŅŅŅŅ$a$ $„Š„0ż^„Š`„0ża$$a$ Ę Š !dą ĘŠ !dąōNOOOOOO O!O"O4O7OOOPOQOkOlOO€OO‚OOOOžO±O²O³O“O½O¾OŃOŅOÓOŌOŻOŽOńOņOóOōOõOPP/P0PCPśšéśåŽŚÖŅśĘæś»śÆØśśœ•śś‰‚śŽŚś j¢œEHź’Uj'fØA CJUVh j~˜EHÜ’UjųeØA CJUVh jQ”EHÜ’Uj±eØA CJUVh jyš jEHÜ’UjŪeØA CJUVhH*aJ jrš5\ 56\] jnš jśEHö’UjuĘtA CJUV jU.CPDPEPFPXPYPlPmPnPoPsPtP‹PŒPPŽPŠPŃPčPéPźPėPšPńPQQQQ Q Q#Q$Q%Q&QhQiQ€QQ‚QƒQQ‘Q¤QōķččÜÕččÉĀčč¶Æčč£œč萉čč}včč jĘ²EHö’UjgØA CJUVh jūÆEHö’Uj’fØA CJUVh j²¬EHō’UjļfØA CJUVh jē©EHö’UjÜfØA CJUVh j§EHö’UjįfØA CJUVh jŅ£EHō’UjāfØA CJUVh jU jןEHō’Uj«fØA CJUVh*¤Q„Q¦Q§Q“QµQČQÉQŹQĖQ R R#R$R%R&RJRKRbRcRdReR™RšR­R®RÆR°R²R³R“RµRĮRŗSŻSEThTUUīUļU«V½VÕVW4W»WĪWōķččÜÕččÉĀčč¶Æčč£œč˜“Š‚Š‚ŠŠ‚Šyu6aJ 6]aJaJ6CJ]aJCJaJ5aJCJaJ jnš jyĀEHö’Uj#hØA CJUVh j¤æEHö’UjhØA CJUVh jŃ¼EHö’UjhØA CJUVh jœ¹EHō’UjcgØA CJUVh jU j’µEHō’Uj+gØA CJUVh.UUīUļUbVÕVLWMWčWéWxXyXYYuY±Y²Y)ZĶZņšėėįįįįįĮĮžĮĮĮėė"$ Ę) Š p@ ą°€P šĄ!„Š„0ż^„Š`„0ża$ Ę) Š p@ ą°€P šĄ!„Š„0ż^„Š`„0ż „Š„0ż^„Š`„0ż$a$ $„Š„0ż^„Š`„0ża$ĪWčWXGX`XwXxXyX€YšY²YóYZJZmZĶZņZ [3[ę[\\o\Š\ \į\ł\ˆ]¦]¼]=^š^§^®^_M_o_Ŗ_#`5`K`ā`ō` a˜a¶aĻaGbebŅbźbc`cżõķćÜõÜżÖżŃÉŃĆŃ½µ¬½¬½Ø¢ØżžżžżšżżżżÖż””żÖżØ†Ø†Øż 56]aJ 56CJ\ 5CJ\aJh6aJ 56aJ5aJ56CJ]aJ5CJ\aJ 5CJaJ CJ\aJ6CJ]aJCJaJ 6]aJ aJmH sH 6]aJmH sH \aJmH sH aJhmH sH aJ4ĶZK[L[\\Ÿ\ \]]»]¼]=^>^›^œ^__Ŗ_«_J`K`„`ś`ńńńńääŚŲŚŲÓŲŲŚŚŚŚŚŚŚŃĖ„Š`„Š $a$ „Š„0ż^„Š`„0ż $„Š„0ż^„Š`„0ża$  ʐ$„Š„0ż^„Š`„0żś` a aĪaĻa|b}bcc`cŒcc%d&dĶd|e}e&f'fµf¶fOgPgÄgłļļļāāāāąŚąļąÕāĖļąĖĖļĖĖ „Š„0ż^„Š`„0ż$a$„Š`„Š $„Š„0ż^„Š`„0ża$ „Š„0ż^„Š`„0ż„Š^„Š`crcücd&dšd¶dĶdUehe|e}ešef'f‚f f¶fg6gOg/hBh\h¬h¾hŲhŁh7iJibici¦i¾iÖiäijojjœj­j4kGkhkrkukĻkźkcllŅlāl[mvmŽmm mÜmōmnnnnXpYp‡pˆpÓpŌpūųņųķåķįŪįŅųūųŅČŅųūųŅ¼ŅųūųŅųūųŅķåķųņųņųųūųųøņųņųņųūųŅųņų³¬¬¬¬ j0JUCJaJ\aJ6CJOJQJ]aJ6CJOJQJaJCJOJQJaJ 56aJ5aJ6CJ]aJCJaJ 6]aJaJ6aJDÄgÅg[h\hŲhŁhbiciÖi$j%j›jœj_k`kllØl©lųlłlŽmmnõõõėõėõéėėėėėėėėėėėėėõŠ$ Ę¾ Tø€@€„äż„Š„0ż]„äż^„Š`„0ża$ „Š„0ż^„Š`„0ż „Š„0ż^„Š`„0żnnXp‡pÓp&rœtžt9u:u¼u…v'wīw*x+x,x-x^x_xŌx9y«y/zg~č~R܀ŗśųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųųdhŌp&r(ržtŸtØt©t:u;uTvov…v†vŚvŪvīvļvšvńvw w w!w"w#w'w(wīwļw-x.x_x`xŌxÕx9y:y[y‡y«y¬y/z0z"{{{| |f~g~h~č~é~ź~QRS܀Ż€ŗ»/‚0‚6‚7‚8‚:‚;‚A‚B‚ųųōųōųļēąļŁÖĪÅŁųųųųųųĆųųĄŗĄŗĄųųĄųųų³°³°³°³0J j0JU 6]aJaJ]jSĒEHö’UaJj.īA UVaJ jUaJ jQÅEHö’Uj%ŁkA UV jU6] j0JUEŗ.‚/‚8‚9‚:‚F‚G‚H‚I‚K‚L‚N‚O‚Q‚R‚S‚T‚żūņģūņģūūūūūūūūūēdh„h]„h„ų’„&`#$B‚D‚E‚F‚T‚÷šķ0J j0JU0JmHnHu' 01h/R °Š/ °ą=!°"°# $ %°* 00&P1F°Š/ °ą=!°"°# $ %°ĆDŠÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© kpetrie@uga.eduąÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© .mailto:kpetrie@uga.edu…Dd ČččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šēŠ–…÷Żxź%0ōń~čI’ĆDP`!š»Š–…÷Żxź%0ōń~čI*@ ļ„‰žxŚMQĶJĆ@žŁ4j ‰m‚Ų*Ø ØE|€¤m°‡VŠiń¢-4żK„öäÅ{|„¾„ąĮCĻ‚WŸC$žėģ6J‡Lö›ofggæEˆHY`Šn29CŒ²Łl&Š®E\’żÕ„ŲuLŚYR`f¼˜L%Ÿ~ć1µņȓQU jĪš¦1ī¹Ń%Īū1Ž2LĒ õųf“1<ņYĘS­±wŃmĆH'öINģV­ÆQ“E]bōߧ€nG ĪńL8$H”ŲĆ³Ō_Ō–æBU(2×Q…e½ˆW£>[ÖŲŗøH1‘ļ[ŌQœDJ‚’‹}oȅDd “,ččšJ² š* C šA(?æ ’"ń怚€2šē8C&?¼k5wz Ń [^×’ĆŒx`!š»8C&?¼k5wz Ń [^×* ąČ½čē‰žxŚMQĖJĆP=s“Ŗ}@R Alt!¾Ż7¶Į.Z)¶Åeˆ“Šm„ķŹūś ž€ąˆøÜŗī'ˆÄ•`{„7™Ü3ēĪĢœ!„m&ä ± ¢‘F mÓbĄEÅ_\L )IsŒÖ§ ,a$ƒy™l/ŒßŲ†Œø\4ˆŠ!ļv®Jż¦T•°¬'$š):ą:Ą·ø’QķąN¶BܞYģ×ĪUtSL<ź‘Ķ\ń«[f#· æ[ģša/•ōś/¢Üżžw¹üŠqJ¦˜/ķs§•ŗU­ŗķŹyŗqįÜKƍxØT©yķä±×Mž4jnq-č"J7®[Æ%×󄤯ė“\Ģbf%a2;VĮ7#Ē*|&–/|Ū_ó‡#ÓHĖm`ūNÖ(&ÅūM–µįdŪ—ÆeĤńd4ČĘaNæ}Öz“ŚŹ rJ‘±Ž&¦•÷¤¦FB¬ūķŽW“žIW§ć¼IÕų`RSü/9‘qUųDd ¬hččšJ² š+ C šA)?æ ’"ń怚€2šZ»Ÿ_r‡~ŠŁÄgāz]B’6x`!š.»Ÿ_r‡~ŠŁÄgāz]B†ą@ ų|üžxŚSĶkA’Ķģ®6ŪĄī¦zŠ=”ś÷l“Å &ĮćŗźRI#I$ „Z4x'Į[ž "Ršä„¼zOR֓ųŽd“‚¦čģ¾™ß¼}ó~ļcV h 1ƒD #!Ēć±B—Ä™X·(§vI™‘_%BNXXʘiŲ$ū„ߐģ‘į7r·[%Q :+żG!pWyI°?Éč”|-Rr™Š/ymōIÅó’Cž]ī7ī5ėčfHń=aīŹ?»U”ģ®@§ł"m(#\5”ŽŪżI¬ģ[3žĒ÷Ē„éĢ÷-Ōść/ŽĒ®xĒæ7Ā—×®Ōa;}+ģ¦o7ĮŽ‹Ā!ØRS¤°žw¾ą öå”éę0ĶĖ&õÆlĢ·¢wš™XqæF³~U«‡0ųP®\¬\–īŌ¶Üz}#h×īg›ĀR°¶įęéhq<Ž‘m>nÕĀ„£+iÆ×iHaį܊7Ģ]vK‘mŻōŻŅįŹYĀ§-‘†>!ŪŹņ2ō¢5? •&CėÓ<wĶĻł^ÄÆk%„*?‚2Õ ²5I§Žk=©æXX=Š 5eö¼@Ó³uFy.Ā«mžvø"G÷–o·@AÕpRy'Õīś#„”«å~»6xĒåŌ1ĒõXSśß’ܧņĖDd ččšJ² š, C šA*?æ ’"ń怚€2š-œ ɗH¼ęIčDZæ’  x`!šœ ɗH¼ęIčDZæ` Ą:„ĻžxŚuRĮjŪ@}³’ėX1HŽŻC!4n”=ā˜r1VlŃā`j›Uµ­ĮŠƒ­`ū!4'ēņ ż€rčµ?Šč¹õTØ3»VÜā&‹Fóv4ūfēi)@;%@`¹l‚(F$&“‰BzĒÅm^Z\Ńk-ĖčłĖ˜Čd^Ū5ćÆly ˜n1ĪJ£ę…š£#(*–”äåD™vÄ2£ßāźŗ.I9«Łü~žĄä_vļū_ƒŪ4”ßk¼1ŲoÓC/|ĀõŒ=‡yv>@’½1 Žt;”9ŗ4.īf'åp05«"3ĀĀßėtG’ÕŲJk÷u0­As5J\c«ų}¦b«õ y­j£ÖÜ²ÆŚ‡v§³ėõŪo+Żw~Ż{ļ÷‘IĢ«—ŃāŪd•īqÆķ÷äGdōZ3ļ ƞ‡%,Hšb1ˆūÓ ō4Xżģ‹ ż¼„’ĄĒ"'œšļŌČŁ"ģ+„¦śZHŖŻg5Ģū“1ź‡~ wR4·ŹŻ÷5æ*+Ž*ßDd TččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šAė0ŅšŲ+Åē»…Š’ P`!šė0ŅšŲ+Åē»…Š& €H€(hßćžxŚUMLA~3Óŗ„T·•ƒ($ ˆ`¼™&Øö°˜JŪp ¤©ŗŃ&”’mµŻ‹ ć­摋'¼{1/‘xņ¦ÜL”hČrŃH}3»Ū¬“uŅ™łśęĶūŽ÷fv—@{Ę° ¼9±SB,Dh©Th„tX¶fjūyč}ź?Ż‚Ø’˜ PāĪŲ¼Ų×æÄž·õįŽfĖĖÓÉÜ­˜¾¤, ­?qÕ'ø:p8KĢč­4OµŠj¢&ĪMĶÕ ²J:ż¢{æ·Äö'’3„#…½Āy‡®Į,“‘ujgs•Ī†4”MEńńr6Ü¢ōĀ]ę’fX…k·µ WµüŠŲ jz…ć«RŻj'x§–¹ĢĮc°mBöɱN·­·Ļkbæ}āń5āä)NE§cš)œM-&’ŁŌõÉĢ 5’¼©fĮē<\W³2ó9'3·µ”ŖńEš9¦cžP!§%į$øzŗCÅ©sĮˆį•/'‚‘Żī.ÄmrŒŃg'ˆ¼ņ$ŸŠ!c(6ŠĀ2Žó½0‚ąPb*2ų/({–„PlX‚ZˆŚŗy”–#|Šø‰Ź=Šń5ś(4‡Ńģ ¦¹pŠŒ†ēŅ71 šaĆŽļø(££"+Õ#+µ"/ūŃłį;¦įWļ&fĘ~<ŠĆŹ0Gcbóę9\į§Zł~šÆ EÜūūa7ūę™·Ź ’°¾XĮŽØžĶ©ižĻmyƒļą­bå›Ė„ż =&„Dd ÜččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~€‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—˜™š›œžŸ ”¢£¤„¦§Ø©Ŗ«¬­®Æ°±²³“µ¶·ø¹ŗ»¼½¾æĄĮĀĆÄÅĘĒČÉŹĖĢĶĪĻŠŃŅÓŌÕÖ×ŲŁŚŪÜŻŽßąįāćäåęēčéźėģķīļšńņóōõö÷ųłśūüżž’      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|ž’’’~€‚ƒ„Śż’’’ż’’’ż’’’ż’’’Š®Ž‘’“”•—–˜™š›œžŸ ”¢£¤„¦§ØŖ©«¬­Æ°Ń±²“³µ¶·ø¹ŗ»½¼æ¾ĄĮĀĆÄÅĒĘČÉŹĖĢĶĻĪŅŠÓ.ŌÕÖ×Ųż’’’ŪÜŻŽßąįāćäåęēčéźėģķīļšńņóōõö÷ųłśūüżž’Root Entry’’’’’’’’q ĄFFE£@ĆŒĄData ’’’’’’’’’’’’}ÖÉWordDocumentp’’’’’’’’UųObjectPools’’’’,€*3@ĆFE£@Ć_1099820064’’’’’’’’ĪĄF€*3@Ć€*3@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj’’’’iObjInfo’’’’’’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ ž’’’ž’’’ ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ ž’’’ž’’’#ž’’’ž’’’&'()*+,ž’’’ž’’’/ž’’’ž’’’234ž’’’ž’’’7ž’’’ž’’’:;<ž’’’ž’’’?ž’’’ž’’’BCDEFGž’’’ž’’’Jž’’’ž’’’MNOž’’’ž’’’Rž’’’ž’’’UVWXž’’’ž’’’[ž’’’ž’’’^_`až’’’ž’’’dž’’’ž’’’ghiž’’’ž’’’lž’’’ž’’’opqž’’’ž’’’tž’’’ž’’’wxyž’’’ž’’’|ž’’’ž’’’€ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „øqEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ę_1099817980€ ĪĄFąŲ=@Ć€_?@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj ’’’’ iž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q’ĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „¾xObjInfo’’’’ ’’’’ Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ ę_1097956110’’’’’’’’ĪĄFĄlB@ĆĄlB@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Įņ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „¾x†"ĪƒL‚,ƒHCompObj’’’’iObjInfo’’’’’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’_1101551382'ąĪĄFą J@Ćą J@Ć–{–}ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŚ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_EōOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj’’’’iObjInfo’’’’’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ö_A  „Ät†>>ˆ0‚.ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮ«@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_1101551117źĪĄF`(P@ĆÆQ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’!CompObj’’’’"iObjInfo’’’’’’’’$Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’%Ē_1099820132 "ĪĄF@¼T@Ć@¼T@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’-CompObj ’’’’.i_A  Prƒy†==Hƒx†==H–ģ–(–)˜ļ=˜ļPrƒy†==Lƒx†==L–ģ–(–)˜ļ= „Įr†"Īˆ0‚,ˆ1–[–]‚.ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qObjInfo’’’’!’’’’0Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’1ę_1099820141’’’’’’’’$ĪĄF°9Į@Ć°9Į@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’5ĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qCompObj#%’’’’6iObjInfo’’’’&’’’’8Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’9ę_1101551156’’’’’’’’)ĪĄF@ń`@Ć@ń`@ĆĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’=CompObj(*’’’’>iObjInfo’’’’+’’’’@Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’AøāĮœ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  Prƒy†==Hƒx†==H–ģ–(–)˜ļ=˜ļƒq,˜ļPrƒy†==Lƒx†==L–ģ–(–)˜ļ=˜ļ1†"-ƒq,_1099820160·.ĪĄFĄ g@ĆĄ g@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’HCompObj-/’’’’IiObjInfo’’’’0’’’’Kž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮÕ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†==ƒqEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Lń_1103704435]X3ĪĄF€3p@Ć€3p@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’PCompObj24’’’’Qiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q8Ā@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒz†==ƒz ƒh ObjInfo’’’’5’’’’SEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’T_10979561495;8ĪĄFąįz@Ćąįz@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’Y†*"Čƒz ƒsž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Į#@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_EōCompObj79’’’’ZiObjInfo’’’’:’’’’\Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’]?_1097956161’’’’’’’’=ĪĄF  „@Ć  „@Ć_A  W‚(D‚)†==P ˆ2ƒx †++„²bP ˆ0ƒyž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Įą@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’bCompObj<>’’’’ciObjInfo’’’’?’’’’eEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’füG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  P ˆ2ƒxž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Įą@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APō_10979561726|BĪĄFÄˆ@ĆÄˆ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’jCompObjAC’’’’kiObjInfo’’’’D’’’’mEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’nü_1101552496’’’’GĪĄF°e@ĆPģ‘@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’rCompObjFH’’’’siG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  P ˆ0ƒyž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōObjInfo’’’’I’’’’uEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’vę_1099820202’’’’’’’’LĪĄF›@Ć›@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’zG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „²bž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮņ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōCompObjKM’’’’{iObjInfo’’’’N’’’’}Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’~_1099820235JTQĪĄF.”@Ɛ.”@Ɓ‚ž’’’ž’’’…ž’’’ž’’’ˆ‰Šž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’‘’ž’’’ž’’’•ž’’’ž’’’˜™šž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ ”¢ž’’’ž’’’„ž’’’ž’’’Ø©Ŗž’’’ž’’’­ž’’’ž’’’°±²³“µ¶ž’’’ž’’’¹ž’’’ž’’’¼½¾æĄž’’’ž’’’Ćž’’’ž’’’ĘĒČÉž’’’ž’’’Ģž’’’ž’’’ĻŠŃŅž’’’ž’’’Õž’’’ž’’’ŲŁŚž’’’ž’’’Żž’’’ž’’’ąįāćäž’’’ž’’’ēž’’’ž’’’źėģž’’’ž’’’ļž’’’ž’’’ņóōõö÷ųłśž’’’ž’’’żž’’’ž’’’G_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „·h†"Īˆ0‚,ˆ1–(–)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ƒCompObjPR’’’’„iObjInfo’’’’S’’’’†Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’‡ęTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „·hž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePages_1099820259’’’’’’’’VĪĄF°Ļ؝@Ć°Ļ؝@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’‹CompObjUW’’’’ŒiObjInfo’’’’X’’’’ŽEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ę_1099820294O³[ĪĄFp÷±@Ćp÷±@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’“CompObjZ\’’’’”iTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „·hž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesObjInfo’’’’]’’’’–Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’—ę_1101552511mv`ĪĄF0µ @Ć0µ @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’›Times New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „·hž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesCompObj_a’’’’œiObjInfo’’’’b’’’’žEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ÿę_1099820314’’’’’’’’eĪĄFĄr;ž@ĆĄr;ž@ĆTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „²bž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’£CompObjdf’’’’¤iObjInfo’’’’g’’’’¦Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’§ęTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „·hž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮČ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePages_1101551521’’’’’’’’jĪĄF@Oų@Ć@Oų@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’«CompObjik’’’’¬iObjInfo’’’’l’’’’®Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Æä_1101551555å•oĪĄF`š’@Ćwž@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’·CompObjnp’’’’øiTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  W(R) = „øqR + ƒq„ĮrH†"-R–[–]†"-„Ätƒq„Įr†++„²bR†++ƒq„ĮrH†"-R–[–]†"-„Ätƒq„Įr–[–]–{–}ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮG@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A   +ˆ1†"-„øq–[–]R1+„²b–[–]+VObjInfo’’’’q’’’’ŗEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’»c_1101551592’’’’’’’’tĪĄFą ž@Ćą ž@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’Į1+„²b–[–]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_EōCompObjsu’’’’ĀiObjInfo’’’’v’’’’ÄEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Å!_1097956262’’’’’’’’yĪĄF¬ ž@Ƭ ž@Ć_A  ‚[R+V‚]1+„²b–[–]‚.ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Įņ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŹCompObjxz’’’’ĖiObjInfo’’’’{’’’’ĶEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ĪG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒq„ĮrH†"-R–[–]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=ĮĻ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePages_1097956271w†~ĪĄFĄÓž@ĆĄÓž@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ÓCompObj}’’’’ŌiObjInfo’’’’€’’’’ÖEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’×ė_1097956288{ƒĪĄF@īž@Ć@īž@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŪCompObj‚„’’’’ÜiTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒq„Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Į(@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesObjInfo’’’’…’’’’ŽEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ßD_1097956281’’’’’’’’ˆĪĄF`$ž@Ć`$ž@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’åTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  R+ƒq„ĮrH†"-R–[–]†"-„Ätƒq„Įr†++V, ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qCompObj‡‰’’’’ęiObjInfo’’’’Š’’’’čEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’éń_1101551642rĪĄF€0,ž@Ć€0,ž@Ć=ĮÕ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Ätƒq„Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ķCompObjŒŽ’’’’īiObjInfo’’’’’’’’šEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ńiāĮM@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  W(0) = „øqR + ƒq„ĮrH†"-R–[–]†++„·hƒqˆ1†"-„Įr–[–]H†"-R–[–]†++„²bR+ƒq„ĮrH†"-R–[–]+„·hƒqˆ1†"-„Įr–[–]L†"-R–[–]–[–]–{–} ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮB@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePages_1101551763’’’’’’’’’ĪĄFK2ž@Ć Ń3ž@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ūCompObj‘“’’’’üiObjInfo’’’’”’’’’žEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’’^_1101551804‹E—ĪĄF€>ž@Ć€>ž@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj–˜’’’’iž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’    ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’!ž’’’ž’’’$%&'ž’’’ž’’’*ž’’’ž’’’-./0ž’’’ž’’’3ž’’’ž’’’6789ž’’’ž’’’<ž’’’ž’’’?@Až’’’ž’’’Dž’’’ž’’’GHIž’’’ž’’’Lž’’’ž’’’OPQž’’’ž’’’Tž’’’ž’’’WXYZž’’’ž’’’]ž’’’ž’’’`abcž’’’ž’’’fž’’’ž’’’ijkž’’’ž’’’nž’’’ž’’’qrsž’’’ž’’’vž’’’ž’’’yz{|ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’Times New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  +ˆ1†"-„øq–[–]R1+„²b–[–]+V1+„²b–[–]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qObjInfo’’’’™’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’  _1097956349’’’’’’’’œĪĄF`.Iž@Ć`.Iž@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’āĮķ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒqˆ1†"-„Įr–[–]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathTyCompObj›’’’’iObjInfo’’’’ž’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’_1101551420’’’’’’’’”ĪĄF€ĻPž@Ć VRž@Ćpe EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Įü@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „²b†>> H†"-RR†"-LOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj ¢’’’’iObjInfo’’’’£’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ęž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Ät     O !"#$%&(')*+,-/0”124356789:;=<>?@ABCDEFGHJIKLMż’’’PQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~€€2šęUß„¦Łå8'2c’ĀšP`!šŗUß„¦Łå8'2c*`  !„ˆžxŚMQĶNĀ@žŁ‚ņgŚŠLŒT=˜ųćP ‘D0ÄB<ÖŖ6J {ņā½>/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “Nē›Ÿ™ż! €Aø$IbŒM§Söp5ŽeŁ_]Žńó„¶dXƒ)/&QH'„—ČjŌź™4Wå ao[AßhŠ.iŽq“ĀOØĄ7’ˆuą‰ļ‚“žbŻKÆ£ß+•é×ĶÆQ›EŻ$čæKŻ3<Ę3~0ażxöū’ģvū ’HGŖf£u˜?w{z§S¶īUÅ»všö35Łr»Ī@;uFŚ™×µ{ Jńj²āŻł®ćó$؉FK3ī‡¾ ĖŚ(au_oFŠ|léĶĻā:į‚¬CdD[QX¶)r…›Šˆv¬ZŠH‰ģC€¾cU-#āŸ.ēīŒ„H@bC¾8dˆ”Äć«äĻsĖ_”.™ńØĄ¢š^Ä«QŸM3 .÷8I ‘›ēQĢ€ J"ž U[lE„Dd ÜččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šęUß„¦Łå8'2c’ĀtP`!šŗUß„¦Łå8'2c*`  !„ˆžxŚMQĶNĀ@žŁ‚ņgŚŠLŒT=˜ųćP ‘D0ÄB<ÖŖ6J {ņā½>/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “Nē›Ÿ™ż! €Aø$IbŒM§Söp5ŽeŁ_]Žńó„¶dXƒ)/&QH'„—ČjŌź™4Wå ao[AßhŠ.iŽq“ĀOØĄ7’ˆuą‰ļ‚“žbŻKÆ£ß+•é×ĶÆQ›EŻ$čæKŻ3<Ę3~0ażxöū’ģvū ’HGŖf£u˜?w{z§S¶īUÅ»všö35Łr»Ī@;uFŚ™×µ{ Jńj²āŻł®ćó$؉FK3ī‡¾ ĖŚ(au_oFŠ|léĶĻā:į‚¬CdD[QX¶)r…›Šˆv¬ZŠH‰ģC€¾cU-#āŸ.ēīŒ„H@bC¾8dˆ”Äć«äĻsĖ_”.™ńØĄ¢š^Ä«QŸM3 .÷8I ‘›ēQĢ€ J"ž U[lEžDd hččšJ² š- C šA+?æ ’"ń怚€2šęĄéöÉH¼„>2ŪjĪ’Ü»x`!šŌęĄéöÉH¼„>2ŪjĪź@€€±(hߢžxŚTAOA~ofK” mA $Į)(ʛiBjSiµźF›P -ŅīE%$ÜLõ¢ÄxąbbŒ?Į'Īz“ąĮC¶Ö÷fw[‚UŖ“™oæ™yßūfg”@V€{ĄÅCU :E­VShū®SøóŗÄc1ŻßCč\› Ę“©Øī~Ķļż#“¢Ó™Õó™ÕūIsŁX†vbæŃhPiƒŠØ™@;ś)Q‚gF=¢OŲ؃µ…=ŗ‹Ū8@č»Øžų –?å“fīv~JÓD„¼¾z¢ZJQE5ļŲ:Čīį¢Ō2€QÓUŽÅĻķ­Äžōśn5-T’õ71³įīZ·ėĪF¬»y²EO[ņdėŠæx[ėmŃ[ę½mće°5¶BCX#™ĶÅ”ėFih!ŸĖ,Įq>N×5NPb±p(^ŠõšTv!%Ėņ~Ä·ČX—ļŠ‚'bGøyÜGóĄŹ£į5PĻ£ŖY^”ē”<ŠÖ“¹ÖÖP¼"›8oö_ēÜ_WäŲa*P–KŗÜŠvĞóG½A÷J„^”‡—Ļ%ꓗčdŻĢ.Eg2ÅģŁü]#ž¹g!č9ź<(Ģ‚žŁüƒBÖ(š µłäP“¼ZČ@7“ŸŒVęĪGāVĄ5‰ ž!Üė€µF¬ŹLšPĄ?Ė]%j§cVE1ÓŌ?ŠˆŒ§ēŅQ‹Ÿˆæ iKPP”Aņ,AłöńF­Ē¹)0'ÕĪm˜t5l†!LtŒh mŗ|˜&ā¹÷‹źF¹cø„ķÓ`ŲE+9Äƞżc„ōęBzKBėS¼¢{x¢”yųä›AW߯½Żāž;ūĄ«Ų÷jķŲpĀ,®9~ó9³Į‰wųÉś¹•Š’÷< ģæDd 0ččšJ² š. C šA,?æ ’"ń怚€2š!~ V•ļk„›@X±:” ’żYx`!šõ~ V•ļk„›@X±:” ž€ ųk„ĆžxŚuRŃjA=wvmucŁ56…Pm”}š”’WĮ. $‰J—m»“‚ĘŗO ¤“ęüüA’ČäBŲ>jīŒ›“Xvöž¹3œsļ™!$ķ>äˆńD"1™LZ£gQnIܟKŠ1iiFÆ™XÅDęańµ›8kčŪłÜ¤āõĮ?šÕĄ +nōÕ?Õ /ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “Nē›Ÿ™ż! €Aø$IbŒM§Söp5ŽeŁ_]Žńó„¶dXƒ)/&QH'„—ČjŌź™4Wå ao[AßhŠ.iŽq“ĀOØĄ7’ˆuą‰ļ‚“žbŻKÆ£ß+•é×ĶÆQ›EŻ$čæKŻ3<Ę3~0ażxöū’ģvū ’HGŖf£u˜?w{z§S¶īUÅ»všö35Łr»Ī@;uFŚ™×µ{ Jńj²āŻł®ćó$؉FK3ī‡¾ ĖŚ(au_oFŠ|léĶĻā:į‚¬CdD[QX¶)r…›Šˆv¬ZŠH‰ģC€¾cU-#āŸ.ēīŒ„H@bC¾8dˆ”Äć«äĻsĖ_”.™ńØĄ¢š^Ä«QŸM3 .÷8I ‘›ēQĢ€ J"ž U[lE„Dd ÜččšJ² š0 C šA-?æ ’"ń怚€2šęUß„¦Łå8'2c’Āœx`!šŗUß„¦Łå8'2c*`  !„ˆžxŚMQĶNĀ@žŁ‚ņgŚŠLŒT=˜ųćP ‘D0ÄB<ÖŖ6J {ņā½>/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “Nē›Ÿ™ż! €Aø$IbŒM§Söp5ŽeŁ_]Žńó„¶dXƒ)/&QH'„—ČjŌź™4Wå ao[AßhŠ.iŽq“ĀOØĄ7’ˆuą‰ļ‚“žbŻKÆ£ß+•é×ĶÆQ›EŻ$čæKŻ3<Ę3~0ażxöū’ģvū ’HGŖf£u˜?w{z§S¶īUÅ»všö35Łr»Ī@;uFŚ™×µ{ Jńj²āŻł®ćó$؉FK3ī‡¾ ĖŚ(au_oFŠ|léĶĻā:į‚¬CdD[QX¶)r…›Šˆv¬ZŠH‰ģC€¾cU-#āŸ.ēīŒ„H@bC¾8dˆ”Äć«äĻsĖ_”.™ńØĄ¢š^Ä«QŸM3 .÷8I ‘›ēQĢ€ J"ž U[lEÜDd ē@ččšJ² š1 C šA.?æ ’"ń怚€2š>Ś·4fZŒ‚““@Y_’ x`!šŚ·4fZŒ‚““@Y_4@8Æ ąžxŚRMka~fv7Ś4ø›Fb±± ‡€¶H²M 6L‚Ēuµ‹ $MÉFbāĮƒą©āÉ?Š³"zģÆš7ˆ¬'Į8ļ»‘ _vvž™yw>žĀ `¼#€q u,&Jń|>×č]N}«¼ø—cp%St#ccsuYŽ#r*ųDŁąDŅ­¦·rØ£Nkr eEåc….ņGśĀė‚~šŽĪ¼Ń½H{N«Ū£āżp\|0č‡Ųo~·EtŪ0å}SŒ¬čŪŁä# }ā·”dD÷d’󒲓Ö_řū]Å™N§k&ąS^TŚ¢åJŠNU©9é?ō0®ˆćŽ•-ükŽ¤-ĶS>{!UŽS6/Š‚Ķv›ÉRķ՚õÖPxŲ=t{½Ż ź>©ĀFš4Œ·–ēĢi?y«:x6ģ†CDŽ¬·ŠŽóŃ0ĄĪ_Ūšfµ-·;ö]ßm|Ūø*ų’ķ"öāėńl×äŲU„f^\ņ÷ā™öTDæÜą–üšļÅźqķ Ärd"’ h^³ŠžWS°łŗŒ²†®ČźhGč2$XŚ<[F:ųē–©]$ģkN“?įąœ¶>ėż•ś›ĶI4 ūŹRōš:J©üķŸŚ’ ń.•n„Dd ÜččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šęUß„¦Łå8'2c’Ā9"¬ `!šŗUß„¦Łå8'2c*`  !„ˆžxŚMQĶNĀ@žŁ‚ņgŚŠLŒT=˜ųćP ‘D0ÄB<ÖŖ6J {ņā½>/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “Nē›Ÿ™ż! €Aø$IbŒM§Söp5ŽeŁ_]Žńó„¶dXƒ)/&QH'„—ČjŌź™4Wå ao[AßhŠ.iŽq“ĀOØĄ7’ˆuą‰ļ‚“žbŻKÆ£ß+•é×ĶÆQ›EŻ$čæKŻ3<Ę3~0ażxöū’ģvū ’HGŖf£u˜?w{z§S¶īUÅ»všö35Łr»Ī@;uFŚ™×µ{ Jńj²āŻł®ćó$؉FK3ī‡¾ ĖŚ(au_oFŠ|léĶĻā:į‚¬CdD[QX¶)r…›Šˆv¬ZŠH‰ģC€¾cU-#āŸ.ēīŒ„H@bC¾8dˆ”Äć«äĻsĖ_”.™ńØĄ¢š^Ä«QŸM3 .÷8I ‘›ēQĢ€ J"ž U[lE(Dd TTččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šŠń„éŪGŻŠłõ"!†p’f½$¬ `!š^ń„éŪGŻŠłõ"!†p( رXJ,žxŚSĻkA~ov·5ŪĄnl=Õ®Š’6hCé5mv±‡F“ƒ‡eS $$‘dO©?ońŲKĮ³‚Šą!’€'/z+Ad= Ę7³•T‘:ģŪ÷ĶŪoߛļĶ B@Z` ö…Œ!ĘŁx<čžŒcslĀK2ƒź<” 3,Ā˜“ičd#ĀÆČØĄ{J7³’Pōŗ7ĖĮ-ĄY<ćh½Ć=e‘Š7¶.2Ą›Czšˆz¢Š8„«¼üMדŁi]ō#ņ*„ Yk5 —§čĒ„śé_ŗ?«pF-˜(ŁÅé½;Tc Ŗé£)Ée^°ŪĻĒ*NĪG„r¾0«T,ÆĢWė;f£±įuźŪ…ÖußńnųH)Ó}LIńzRJ”u»]÷Ūü#¤äbŁ°ūŻ¶ĒįŲ™%{h­šNØk—]Ół²tšš Ķ„ŠĻ‡Ć —®øŚįŠ»E$O~°IĄ\q-׳cjI¤F £AŠJ :ŖņöÜ©Ņėnš#‹£e`ņƒähīńŻ N{øuó^Ÿ:”%&ß.Õ¦‰Ł˜Dūšėfńū‡°%¢Ń^é0+fÆŝ„ž-®ßä3¾2LvśoēAń涓Dd TččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šĘIĶl`—īŽ×Ø<÷’©Ø’ņå'¬ `!šźĘIĶl`—īŽ×Ø<÷’©ØĄ HµXJøžxŚRæK#Qžę%ńW»Q<šĪx EĄ;×dŃ"‘Å$X.{ē¢ÄH1K #^aKK’ įŠüŚ‰¶Ē±W ē½¬w±š™Ģ7ó†oŽ|;„Q ō䉰 ¢‘čõz -ŅĒ /u1‘]š`4?¤a=YĢGgė2¾fk3Õ-[4؊!ē4ö Ž” XŠeTņ ‰&Å =0š$VpAŹ č…RÅ­'¶ÜćÄvµā ›’}\dė,#Ģ’ šDHÉœ¼Iy—ŌēnÓjĄ}õē’øIłŸÆzX^7x’=¦hšżōĪ÷÷{Š@&ĻŃ 4|ü«a±x‡ˆ|V&Ÿ+¬;„£\^wź„oéź®k9{nńČ`ļx(ļU¾VĖ|•®ÕJnM^"Īf³Qs0Ž‘Ł³“Y2,_×6lĆś5ó™ńĶ€ośs~gŻf¤kié:¦Ÿ“7żŽŹ¬±?Łd`$ķŒmśņgh1ā9Hša1ˆē Aé9FŸZ~ā-‘ĮyJŽ,pÖTŹüŪ¹_„¬ŹöUÖ1¬¢j'™żKŽ«7܊Œ¤ta¼č÷֗ ©ü3p?‘ö­Dd TččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šhM²°>?”Ō"øZ_9CĀ’ė™*¬ `!šćhM²°>?”Ō"øZ_9CĀĄ HµXJ±žxŚR=KA}³Iü ÜŏBš# Zj;ĻäŠĀČa,S $F’ˆ*ZŲÅŅŅæ!Xägh'Ö"g%g7§BÄB—LęĶģšfēŻ:Š9G'Ā&ˆD¢Ńh(4MA®[|ÖEE\Ō©—ŃD›†A4d1­Īų†ķ„©īŁŗƒŖ(ŅNu'ėķ¹€„X:%ŸØOÜŃóobN1—¤œ€žĶŻJ|Õ=ˆÆ•ŠĪ.V2Æ9¶fAažŸā€'Āl—Ģɛ„wEMīšøÆß’ĒMŹ?’čayõąż„Ö÷ÓßßģA-=<žć(ŠšéKĆ\īł¬T&z×ó»F”°čTņ›ÉŅ–k9Ūn±HkļX(ć7J¾J–öĖy·,/ §³qó°ZvŠƒŽŃ³–š1,_זlĆzfÜÆšMÜÆ-ŚŒt-)]Ķō'ķeæ¦2 ģ—“vŹ6}ł3“(ń$ų°Äó… ōģ"ŽO-‡xKdp‘# œyJ™ļĶ‘ūEXQŁ¦Ź:ŚUt«v’ŁĒ2^„źe$„ ćSæß¾dHå?tŪ‘ś‡Dd š,ččšJ² š  C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šéC:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé’Å F-¬ `!š½C:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé*€ąŲRčē‹žxŚMQĶJĆ@žŻ$Öž@k‚Ų*čAšń’¶ĮZ &ÅcH5h iJS©9éĮ{}_Ą‹g= ^=ū"ń$Xg·Q:d²ß~3;3ū-,€P"śĄLB§„¤ˆŠétŹŃ.YI¹<żĖ+ŠwrKŠˆ¶dX…)KFSŠ'ˆ_Ń5,õˆžO³ Šr‡—vÜ÷L^%ĖźQ†–©F ¬šM~ų8pĻf!8žbÅA'ģĀHC¶›É…MėkŌF'¶Pó?89^ˆĻQžļzq°¼V±Z÷Z©MƓŗßØ»;8-’‡ „†ļ/ÆŽż€-ģÉ!Ó N2‰ńÕģž_5ÄqYŒ©fÜiüś[5æsģG7ŗ½ćQ*Ąą“²…\ń6ÄōVuĒ®ÕÖÜVõa¦ńČĖ»½’ĘI%“Z”MŅČ4ž6«^“7‘ŌsŔó¬Żtq±KsN½aēCĖ¼W¶ós Ÿ3m„Nx% ÖŹ„,3ĆSą„Kåõ0P–4ĶĻ× ŲKålŁ ł³Ķ„ :„¤FbŖOƒŅ3Nā诏ZEźÆbóūdՔ^ÆWhx¹Ģh•oƛYŃĖą÷#°”čnaB­>©7G|óæÕöź¼b1u =ķl5e?ō¶…Dd ČšččšJ² š  C šA ?æ ’"ń怚 €2šēI2™Hł0ŒŠ‚Ō¹Ł«O«ņ’ĆÓ2¬ `!š»I2™Hł0ŒŠ‚Ō¹Ł«O«ņ*@€ļŲR‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žv Ź_ŅVą`4‚&z0Ań(ŠČ ˆĒ¦j#$@ `“¼×Gš<{ńĄŁšģ#SO&āģR “N÷›oggfæeˆJš} “sĘÄųl6“h­\œ’å%ųĖ³$”%ė˜‰d2|J8'*õD²ØŚ£VcŅw€š¬õø@)žŽÕ¾łćbFćiõI÷Üķ`œ'6‰­Uź_ć&9“yŃ?GŻ‡± 5Z“)ļ½ßž{7›Æ3:RŖWG`ɳvĻčt ö°}Qt/š}å ”‡ķ®3Ģž8ćģ©Ūµ{Š•` =\tÆmg 6”‡Ŗ¬y3ŲXAd3cz„}£ękź±eŌ>3„ÓŖßō·}Æ`ŅŌ¢X<ÓßµŹ¾'™<­·eĘ®U²L_|†š`tĘÉHFj(ƒ#F¢„īŸ•Ö¢¶ā*R‘¹Ž–eō"_źlÕ'ƑÓ‘)$wēēu”=šA¤"ł_…«lX„Dd ČšččšJ² š  C šA ?æ ’"ń怚 €2šę§‡ÆœtĀH×·«Ź>…Ųa’ĀX5¬ `!šŗ§‡ÆœtĀH×·«Ź>…Ųa*@€ļŲRˆžxŚMQĶNĀ@žv[”æ¤Eą`bMō@‚ćP ‘"MÕFH(ŠANzšŽą xöā³ąŁG0¦žLÄŁ„&ī7³ßĪĢ~Ė”48"ēŒˆńł|.Ń[r1žĒ‹ó;V`IB»+60d2|F8/*õD XqŌģQ»98@]V‰ˆz\ GŠźßüńGŽƒ1 £ńōĘÄ=ļw1.f8ŖW_ć9“¼ØōĻS@7Āa4hödĘAļ·’Ž­Ö+BŒŽ”µęXņ¬Ó3ŗŻ¢ķu.JżK§n_9”fĒu¼ģ‰3Īžö]»‡„L‘•ś×Ǝ3›HصfÖ¼ m¬!¼•1§å}£īėŚ±eŌ?3›„ÓšßōwüiŃ"¤k%±LM?gUü©Ģh½­0rVŁ2}ńZœŃ='#©”@ Ž(‰¢Ž?+ķemÅ 0T„" u¬ŹčE¾ÕŁnL¼‘ćŠHˆ¤ŹŻÅ¹ee|PR‘ł_flB„Dd ÜččšJ² š  C šA?æ ’"ń怚 €2šęUß„¦Łå8'2c’ĀÜ7¬ `!šŗUß„¦Łå8'2c*`  !„ˆžxŚMQĶNĀ@žŁ‚ņgŚŠLŒT=˜ųćP ‘D0ÄB<ÖŖ6J {ņā½>/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “Nē›Ÿ™ż! €Aø$IbŒM§Söp5ŽeŁ_]Žńó„¶dXƒ)/&QH'„—ČjŌź™4Wå ao[AßhŠ.iŽq“ĀOØĄ7’ˆuą‰ļ‚“žbŻKÆ£ß+•é×ĶÆQ›EŻ$čæKŻ3<Ę3~0ażxöū’ģvū ’HGŖf£u˜?w{z§S¶īUÅ»všö35Łr»Ī@;uFŚ™×µ{ Jńj²āŻł®ćó$؉FK3ī‡¾ ĖŚ(au_oFŠ|léĶĻā:į‚¬CdD[QX¶)r…›Šˆv¬ZŠH‰ģC€¾cU-#āŸ.ēīŒ„H@bC¾8dˆ”Äć«äĻsĖ_”.™ńØĄ¢š^Ä«QŸM3 .÷8I ‘›ēQĢ€ J"ž U[lE…Dd ČšččšJ² š C šA ?æ ’"ń怚 €2šēśŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo’Ć`:¬ `!š»śŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo*@€ļŲR‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žv[”æ¤Eą`bMō@āOŒ@F`ˆ@<6U!į/€Įžōą½>‚/ąŁ‹Ī>€gĮ˜z2g—j˜tŗß|;;3ū-CPŅ ąBXˆœ3 Ęēó¹D{l=ąbü//ĪļX% ķ¬hŲĄ\$“éä3Ā»" ROä± +Žš=i7Ż”Ōe•ˆØĒJńw¤ØšĶä8x³0Ooø½óAÓ±™pT­6¾¦-r&ó Ņ—ŗ£Ak“Ż½ßž{·ZÆ1:RnŌšG`ɳNßčv‹öøsQ\:uūŹ#jvzĪ8wāLs§ƒžŻGB ¦H„JƒėQĒ‰M$ŌZ3gŽLF6ÖŽĢš^yßØūŗvlõĻl†pZ3ą›ž¶ļ-BŗV‹gśy«ā{’)Šz[!`ä­²eśā3“8£{0NF"0RCQE½VŚĖŚŠ`ØJE:źX•Ń‹|5Ŗ³ÕpĒ§'"!’*wē–u”=šA¤"ł_c@l@‡Dd š,ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šéC:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé’Å å<¬ `!š½C:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé*€ąŲRčē‹žxŚMQĶJĆ@žŻ$Öž@k‚Ų*čAšń’¶ĮZ &ÅcH5h iJS©9éĮ{}_Ą‹g= ^=ū"ń$Xg·Q:d²ß~3;3ū-,€P"śĄLB§„¤ˆŠétŹŃ.YI¹<żĖ+ŠwrKŠˆ¶dX…)KFSŠ'ˆ_Ń5,õˆžO³ Šr‡—vÜ÷L^%ĖźQ†–©F ¬šM~ų8pĻf!8žbÅA'ģĀHC¶›É…MėkŌF'/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “Nē›Ÿ™ż! €Aø$IbŒM§Söp5ŽeŁ_]Žńó„¶dXƒ)/&QH'„—ČjŌź™4Wå ao[AßhŠ.iŽq“ĀOØĄ7’ˆuą‰ļ‚“žbŻKÆ£ß+•é×ĶÆQ›EŻ$čæKŻ3<Ę3~0ażxöū’ģvū ’HGŖf£u˜?w{z§S¶īUÅ»všö35Łr»Ī@;uFŚ™×µ{ Jńj²āŻł®ćó$؉FK3ī‡¾ ĖŚ(au_oFŠ|léĶĻā:į‚¬CdD[QX¶)r…›Šˆv¬ZŠH‰ģC€¾cU-#āŸ.ēīŒ„H@bC¾8dˆ”Äć«äĻsĖ_”.™ńØĄ¢š^Ä«QŸM3 .÷8I ‘›ēQĢ€ J"ž U[lE„Dd ÜččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šęUß„¦Łå8'2c’ĀšAP`!šŗUß„¦Łå8'2c*`  !„ˆžxŚMQĶNĀ@žŁ‚ņgŚŠLŒT=˜ųćP ‘D0ÄB<ÖŖ6J {ņā½>/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “Nē›Ÿ™ż! €Aø$IbŒM§Söp5ŽeŁ_]Žńó„¶dXƒ)/&QH'„—ČjŌź™4Wå ao[AßhŠ.iŽq“ĀOØĄ7’ˆuą‰ļ‚“žbŻKÆ£ß+•é×ĶÆQ›EŻ$čæKŻ3<Ę3~0ażxöū’ģvū ’HGŖf£u˜?w{z§S¶īUÅ»všö35Łr»Ī@;uFŚ™×µ{ Jńj²āŻł®ćó$؉FK3ī‡¾ ĖŚ(au_oFŠ|léĶĻā:į‚¬CdD[QX¶)r…›Šˆv¬ZŠH‰ģC€¾cU-#āŸ.ēīŒ„H@bC¾8dˆ”Äć«äĻsĖ_”.™ńØĄ¢š^Ä«QŸM3 .÷8I ‘›ēQĢ€ J"ž U[lE…Dd ČšččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šēśŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo’ĆšAŲ`!š»śŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo*@€ļŲR‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žv[”æ¤Eą`bMō@āOŒ@F`ˆ@<6U!į/€Įžōą½>‚/ąŁ‹Ī>€gĮ˜z2g—j˜tŗß|;;3ū-CPŅ ąBXˆœ3 Ęēó¹D{l=ąbü//ĪļX% ķ¬hŲĄ\$“éä3Ā»" ROä± +Žš=i7Ż”Ōe•ˆØĒJńw¤ØšĶä8x³0Ooø½óAÓ±™pT­6¾¦-r&ó Ņ—ŗ£Ak“Ż½ßž{·ZÆ1:RnŌšG`ɳNßčv‹öøsQ\:uūŹ#jvzĪ8wāLs§ƒžŻGB ¦H„JƒėQĒ‰M$ŌZ3gŽLF6ÖŽĢš^yßØūŗvlõĻl†pZ3ą›ž¶ļ-BŗV‹gśy«ā{’)Šz[!`ä­²eśā3“8£{0NF"0RCQE½VŚĖŚŠ`ØJE:źX•Ń‹|5Ŗ³ÕpĒ§'"!’*wē–u”=šA¤"ł_c@l@…Dd ČšččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šēśŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo’ĆłFP`!š»śŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo*@€ļŲR‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žv[”æ¤Eą`bMō@āOŒ@F`ˆ@<6U!į/€Įžōą½>‚/ąŁ‹Ī>€gĮ˜z2g—j˜tŗß|;;3ū-CPŅ ąBXˆœ3 Ęēó¹D{l=ąbü//ĪļX% ķ¬hŲĄ\$“éä3Ā»" ROä± +Žš=i7Ż”Ōe•ˆØĒJńw¤ØšĶä8x³0Ooø½óAÓ±™pT­6¾¦-r&ó Ņ—ŗ£Ak“Ż½ßž{·ZÆ1:RnŌšG`ɳNßčv‹öøsQ\:uūŹ#jvzĪ8wāLs§ƒžŻGB ¦H„JƒėQĒ‰M$ŌZ3gŽLF6ÖŽĢš^yßØūŗvlõĻl†pZ3ą›ž¶ļ-BŗV‹gśy«ā{’)Šz[!`ä­²eśā3“8£{0NF"0RCQE½VŚĖŚŠ`ØJE:źX•Ń‹|5Ŗ³ÕpĒ§'"!’*wē–u”=šA¤"ł_c@l@…Dd ČšččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šēśŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo’Ć~IP`!š»śŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo*@€ļŲR‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žv[”æ¤Eą`bMō@āOŒ@F`ˆ@<6U!į/€Įžōą½>‚/ąŁ‹Ī>€gĮ˜z2g—j˜tŗß|;;3ū-CPŅ ąBXˆœ3 Ęēó¹D{l=ąbü//ĪļX% ķ¬hŲĄ\$“éä3Ā»" ROä± +Žš=i7Ż”Ōe•ˆØĒJńw¤ØšĶä8x³0Ooø½óAÓ±™pT­6¾¦-r&ó Ņ—ŗ£Ak“Ż½ßž{·ZÆ1:RnŌšG`ɳNßčv‹öøsQ\:uūŹ#jvzĪ8wāLs§ƒžŻGB ¦H„JƒėQĒ‰M$ŌZ3gŽLF6ÖŽĢš^yßØūŗvlõĻl†pZ3ą›ž¶ļ-BŗV‹gśy«ā{’)Šz[!`ä­²eśā3“8£{0NF"0RCQE½VŚĖŚŠ`ØJE:źX•Ń‹|5Ŗ³ÕpĒ§'"!’*wē–u”=šA¤"ł_c@l@…Dd ČšččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šēśŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo’ĆLP`!š»śŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo*@€ļŲR‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žv[”æ¤Eą`bMō@āOŒ@F`ˆ@<6U!į/€Įžōą½>‚/ąŁ‹Ī>€gĮ˜z2g—j˜tŗß|;;3ū-CPŅ ąBXˆœ3 Ęēó¹D{l=ąbü//ĪļX% ķ¬hŲĄ\$“éä3Ā»" ROä± +Žš=i7Ż”Ōe•ˆØĒJńw¤ØšĶä8x³0Ooø½óAÓ±™pT­6¾¦-r&ó Ņ—ŗ£Ak“Ż½ßž{·ZÆ1:RnŌšG`ɳNßčv‹öøsQ\:uūŹ#jvzĪ8wāLs§ƒžŻGB ¦H„JƒėQĒ‰M$ŌZ3gŽLF6ÖŽĢš^yßØūŗvlõĻl†pZ3ą›ž¶ļ-BŗV‹gśy«ā{’)Šz[!`ä­²eśā3“8£{0NF"0RCQE½VŚĖŚŠ`ØJE:źX•Ń‹|5Ŗ³ÕpĒ§'"!’*wē–u”=šA¤"ł_c@l@‡Dd š,ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šéC:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé’Å ˆN¬ `!š½C:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé*€ąŲRčē‹žxŚMQĶJĆ@žŻ$Öž@k‚Ų*čAšń’¶ĮZ &ÅcH5h iJS©9éĮ{}_Ą‹g= ^=ū"ń$Xg·Q:d²ß~3;3ū-,€P"śĄLB§„¤ˆŠétŹŃ.YI¹<żĖ+ŠwrKŠˆ¶dX…)KFSŠ'ˆ_Ń5,õˆžO³ Šr‡—vÜ÷L^%ĖźQ†–©F ¬šM~ų8pĻf!8žbÅA'ģĀHC¶›É…MėkŌF' "Ąx¬5@C÷žxŚ­UMLA~3»„„T»< ,M4@S5†+ +Ó“%5!¤]µ „ŅÖ`ƒDō ‡jbō('ļšxą€‰4ŌpöÄÅH‚1ÕhˆŌ÷¦Ū±Ųbœģ¼yóöĶūŽ÷fv‡A-€ōXą° Ō Ų9cŗĘx6›ŚQÖ¤ŪźxŽĻĀ—ų¼½µ#5Vh†,9cS°/”žūY;Ą\Q§{Y`0œ¼H]Önˆ(µ“ÖČ?°»ęfŌ¶xėö[‘Ļ=J…azŠ?Įd7†Œę™’×É!ģLų„'ČN˜A,Når„ŲŚžjbĶĖåc31~žc¤#ÖTež7wĖ?‡ĮžĀćŌĮ*y¬ü+ļģ•!‡ńōg³{ć1U‚ń®µ ä±ŗ7ÓŒ%Ö 9Œłm(bŠqW‘Ø–POk“Ŗ/ C%- :ßĮ6_»Ś„śT‡źńł<¾~–€ HĄX†olCŒx?WLwä~üNņł¼7ķĢ‡ķ)Ÿ"ē}…|Č2mŻĘuc –\«ÜŽŖĽ”€e"¬x2>Š}EöÖ<`üóø‹l­±LĶĖķėėJĶ\śI|üqĶRd“(…·5“Īép8 ü¾d•ÓņB”ę]|­ń÷8Ÿ¶(Ī¦žGZcł?ŅŠŠ*3xŸ0Š ŠŒŒ»ĘĘzĀ‰Č¹ŽŲyĶ¾Ø%ĄfŲ¹S6Iēe3ōĘ®Ä#Zœ^‚M Øī«ÉxźĮŌŚāN÷sy3ŠõdČåżŅrõVdܙƙtO5ÅŚKCŚéy2iaéĘńŗWGØ/äĪŠć²Z”qlȈaÅ$U3S™g‚$ŚHųH““PItéš<÷\š€Kb[r^ĀĮ‘×f'Čė…—@Ņ½ļŗ• ˆ–;— ÅlQÜdXE»?•HjQš™õļ)×vū$a’ŃO„]Dd L hččšJ² š! C šA?æ ’"ń怚 €2šæ1Uą­KĢÄT;”T‹^FĄ’›ŒWŲ`!š“1Uą­KĢÄT;”T‹^FĄčą@pų|ažxŚTĶoQŸyo)-²“jŅ¤±“‰ŗ”ŠzóĀHS į£j±"čF‰P,`“ń†'¦'O&5žĘøÉlƒ6†Ų±µZ-i-ąTĒēdŻ8 °ć“dqĆ4“D0 •¤Iö+’­q€ļ”ĪŁ‰rA$S¹ØŻ5®Ė,c"Öö+8MÖ6»óAÖóL”‚TžÆ²Åæ˜)ēn‹7hę–Q­æĒŽ©Ęc ļ•rFI|IxĆ÷+„ LĄčģLø:„GMÕ½”Ö£æfŽ“}Ō­ƒ6O˜Å4YŖ;(¦FŲœO/› é Šü`™ }>J‡Mńčnd4ØHü8Č®:Dsź^”4ņq.»õŌLy21ēcŹć·|“<ĻSB­‹-SõėžöŸ÷†gūā4”V­Ćž›Qܟ+ŅŪ^Mģņķ¼s‰Å\¼V®…ī.T »Nķ.ż»Ų°½ Dd ĆhčךJ² š" C šA?æ ’"ń怚!€2šk‹0KōÅm2Ģ2-¼› Ā8’GéZŲ`!š?‹0KōÅm2Ģ2-¼› Ā8¦ @ŲŠ ų| žxŚ•S½oÓPæ{Žė4d›Ą€T‘ †FŠ˜QÜÄ“Cƒ¢|””DŽDJ”O„sĆŌu‰13db±šGt@ČLH w/N+•V‚“ļŽļŻ»wŸĻóŹ7°L*±@ ŠÉd"Q/‡ŗ1³‹‹¬8Š„®Ļé°6&2ˆĒ„ß×5€Cr·ZÅ”ąöŸVüg@]z™g‚ŃEńæ*‹„~‹„£/2Ÿ×œ RzFŁo7:-dIńP‹ 7ŹæUb”v· BņmØ"øy `ĖŸęŹ¾ßĪż‹ļŗ»w¶o”ėæbŌŽc¼Ä$LcĮI nÆQi¶½^ź¾7H•:mwĪĖ!q#Źu”Ņ›µ•tfį3Dń;|€»b,fqß©§ćāŁµ­ż_m ,öĀŁ™8›]µŖ¢ŹWņåBå@āAsŪjµVŻ^óQ®óŲ+ŗO¼˜źéšM%ĢĘTsēŻ¦×åC0#…JŹ~Ńļŗp¢KI{”æiC_s¬āĻäĀ—t ;øŒVB†žćedĖĪz0’š,­;ė¬e'ļŲ–GŖ5©Nd­1nĪp‹Än‰EšÅ&ėjd¢(²y»+įQäÕG„AxŸ/ģ×x Ć ÷čä]óėGŲ]ĪĀMī>É?†røZö{}ÆĶ;npftŽP¤žć,ŖqDd hģöšJ² š# C šA?æ ’"ń怚"€2šqs~ŌĄ€†nŪń¼ļ›2Ż’Mņ]Ų`!šEs~ŌĄ€†nŪń¼ļ›2ŻH€@ ų|žxŚ•SĻkAžf6Ķ6°›VB±iQ…Ų"ŽzÉ6Y ŅHČJYW»Ō@ŅŲMJŒ+ÆńäQü¼Š"āUüC³lą$ ;Ė¬JŠSĪB8ĀNāóæ*ł“Ćū£Æ„Øv"ļOWGŠ8ŗĮLn\„r UlɖņåėĄĀķź¾Y«m:ĶźżLc×-8{n õ¤† %Č&”f‡^ÕõÄO$"łrŅzŌņĢćģņ’ÕĖ®™ߊoŲfįxé"įóŗ ßņ/ū½M›”gÄŌ³üU;ē÷¤%Mó“sÕĪŚ–/>S3Ŗƒqj$£:ČZ5!Ī³šH÷£ā)P)×ÓYžĻƤÅ=x¹-†”Ēōå‰÷É°%énąŒ\}ošųVJfĖ­‹•3‚q›u¶Š“’% Ę"Dd TčÕšJ² š$ C šA?æ ’"ń怚#€2š’xæė²ba— k‚4ÄZŠ¾½’ŪaŲ`!šÓxæė²ba— k‚4ÄZŠ¾½”  XJ„”žxŚmRĶJĆ@žvŪŖ­•¤žŃ(čAšńęÅŲ‹X)¶Åcˆ“ŠZM*µ'zƏą ųźxōąÅG‰'Į:³¦EŌ!“łvvóķ|3ˆ‘-Hų`‹‘K!B$d§ÓQhQŒ‡¹AŁ=—”·Ā#„ęś4L Ć‡Étņ6į!Š/DuG>žJ"ēŌ‹ĶSČ+–8óIF£bx€yū©ŹĮŖ…ŹÓ‹åŖė;nĆŲ­UlŽ%rµeDé½@ R„•ēxē¬ŁīqKń·`īB³ŗ_« ±NŁ§xĀųŸ[ØųśēīšC}Ļ=}„Ņ#büI¦+®#{å³RŁpüņAŗvčę#×G*ö[W*V“Š„kē^Łõx©h®hXuĻĮ0¦§¬VfÉĢŗ¶i›ł·©IĀcš‰Ą fƒÖ†MH×ŅZV0ogƒ–Ź¬S¼Ģ0ēķŒmü˜ZR!ÉØ‚tF “&ø9WgŃė‡ˆ‡ŸSäY l«ž|wUGæZŻ«’ƒŲf MæīVyÅ­Š¢kæ'öŻU¾•ķ *žzČNDd 8 hęöšJ² š% C šA?æ ’"ń怚$€2š°ÄW”‰&Ÿ²ÅÓš*ļā·’ŒžcŲ`!š„ÄW”‰&Ÿ²ÅÓš*ļā·œĄ@ŠÜų|RžxŚ•TKkSAžf&sš›VB±iA‘¦Q‘ŗr“4 IJČ£J‰Q/Čó&³2Åā6-ˆKėŹ•KŻ¹ˆąšGø¬ r]‰g&ÆZSŖCĪ™ļž{ę|ē17 .@¬q€crŁI8cÄxÆ×Sč ;?°Mń”Ÿ›ywz–Š%‡sčIgZ:I—š[’ö4p@į¦^n$ņG™VÕīŖ(.Kt–æboÄ”Ÿ|įš³ŹgW¦Ā(==Ż*Ż«Ń ’aĆ„•ćéĶ, S~×`# Ŗ×5ØcĄf«Ÿ«ŒŻvžKģšÖ™›©żŪ_[#Ž6»‰>ĒėCŒ9d{õL”dŌ}kFӗŖ”ņeœ”ŸƒafÄį$Iłc©õe`·yÜń čņ!ėWvœ•żėø2mÄ*ĒR«}qŽYŽń ,“fS=­6÷ˆE˜ s7éxĮĘL¦}B'Mjļ“zžd üÕ÷|Otłžą>®°į}Ģf/3»<I'2+ĄģB9T,®ęė…ūįŹ#™hŌįµļØW rņŚĆ•ĒfĮ0åKxm‰Œ/ś¤aęi’gę£ČÕPŅŅ=·r”ä÷ł „ĻyB°¢ÖE«³š#¤{ĀrėD­„\Ģź(Kö§1”„\$µä/äq3jć“Ø%ŒŖPk²EŪ)©ü¤žÕĄm;…) „jßvŒ,ĻgŹ /7„ŚĀŠlŪł$GN’Ł?yÆĖÓĖRłpōk–ßäķ§*×Ŗ*Ļ(Ujn#µé6S[õšsˆ\ń½Y¦„Ī±Œ½hCa%Ī1>9nuzÜ£’q ę.¶j;õ*šk}ŽÅ’¹…ņÆŒ÷īąā}ļ†t8 ;|éuX.?!ŹeŠłŅ*0²]94«Õu§QŁM×÷܂³ļ6Œžķ,©…õ$£éś‰Wq=>D2’/„¬3ßs0Œé)«Y2 ”oŲfįmj’š˜n"°‚Ł ½n2ō4»¶ĢŪŁ ­"käĻ³Ģy;c[?¦ž$„dŌ‘ N5Ønć$OäźQó%.>hIš;Mž¹@Néō­®~µ»W’ qĪ[ ß­ńŽ%‹ąĒžNī[]¾›ķ Ø`^`Dd <øččšJ² š C šA ?æ ’"ń怚€2šĀ¾¢ŽO¾Ź™xR§Nß’žl¬ `!š–¾¢ŽO¾Ź™xR§Nß `0Ą žJ@CdžxŚVMLSAžŻ÷ZJ)“åĒØEx`$@S,蕄•€’G !µh…&”J[ƒ !H0ʋ©'Œ7½x¢x‘˜ GcāČAIżA"8»ż‹¼¾ĶŪŁyәłę›ķĖ.BaN@”…T’ŌŻŁŁįZ9’“єŸ.ŃĖö2Ōź“F؄ęŒĆ„s õ'8%;Ą5Œ(Jz ĒuGÆūnń,…,eZ9żLĪė+QŪ¢5ŪļY*øĻJ!Xž©/ŽĮd64ś£Ż}ß'ūqņ²Į"J¾ #hŃŒ&je¹J”äžFõ†Ü¹ _枃1”…1bVXæeæśä?<ęĖņ(VĻĆX”G„zk‡ņ(QĻc„Z!cźy<>®‡Q=gu yT©ēń©A!“zīF…<ŖÕó M y˜ÕņųEīi ą!åĒc* c³I ņ(ĶĒtc‰“AćŃ6d0Ųq`rū¾°tĪ7)ÉĮ€wāaKc°“b ŽŽ µJ²d•\r³K–­.ŁŚÜ-Kb ĆsĆEx ?Č:_Š.śT\ŗčŒø\’tUØ¢ļšŒIÕ:ÆŪ[+É«ÖL?ŠÓµ2Ė­.Rü” KĢ•kkźKYKĒ°B£”aœĖāķoį§ö”Xƒk ÷5Y¶äŲ\{^~G}—°k› „vĆīŖlV{l‹tEh©FwV{HLł·ŅeĖīl_¶X6vc`gś%š:Óūū{؆•ŠŁ×ć> P6ąwŒµ{Ćž+Į«¾^ļˆ/ fĶŽż2 IvfMGšFČļ ±Į,öø%ēĶHČ „ «©vĘ:O:zć&ć£w£ŗ õ £āĪų‰x¬ŻƒšÉŲĮ–˜3ŽčqÅcÜŅ†ėŒ G£§ÓćŒ³Ēa4l+”8Į¾ Ą{§gĶž`¢ž ; LHL“&5ńö+aB*šĶ™•Ó֔67Į¼Ž!„¤— -wJkm< óƒL 3[ĮŠī/…Q™Ž¹ŪœŠį¹²ƒņÉūBĪøĖ©:ó*‘‡Ø­°{æ“{õ)&¦!ŃDČ¾7²Ū%nžoO|#&(ąoÆł÷²¶/ŽųģMŸü¶cæoSąö扚ęG[Dd  hččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š½ÓVvz1Śmżļ²±.få’™xp¬ `!š‘ÓVvz1Śmżļ²±.fåą€@`zų|_žxŚTĶoA3³kŪ-–„µ1šĘŅ&öŠ *ź­–X“B,õŠ4ŗQ" ܓ%1ĘĻ€<’ʓ‡8yÖ?ĆÄCc֓±ųf€Ņ µ+“}3oŽ¾}æ÷{ovL°= @” |Č(”®Fh»ŻŚr¦k›¤=? Š©Ō–NøaŚÜ‡ŠŅB½‰˜ųŽį&»^.ˆf*w ė¾ pSD™ąń(×NŃwä4™Cķ]Ų’"ņišT¦§&­B¶˜‡j 1åŁZņg5…B„ß%pöįĮeÄgV'Wū¬ä$ö7ŖŌ‡Ē&bŻū cóĘ®ģ0’ēGåßĮ ’ąŃwČ£1:ßŠC/Fēńõ¤CÆGå±CV ƒń~śüø«F®`–½1³źM ™-8ŽĒģGÓü 榭ūµŲ ¹ĀJäō3TqmŃöÄ&Ćł½9ŽŸė›”lg³/ļIŗÜGŗN‡°Ö­W’×-ŸÕ¢ĶīŸ#½?7• ™'NF«37r[z>Ģ”s·BÅŪf*=žÄ¶ŃņvƒO›ü¬Ō}Ēšæó%ś}dŁ?OėNœ߈üŽ$°&:Ņé£ cb·+īZĢ1i•+fļxs$čučØƄżØ!…Dd ČšččšJ² š C šA ?æ ’"ń怚€2šēśŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo’ĆÓs¬ `!š»śŠevżķ» įšZ’ģĮo*@€ļŲR‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žv[”æ¤Eą`bMō@āOŒ@F`ˆ@<6U!į/€Įžōą½>‚/ąŁ‹Ī>€gĮ˜z2g—j˜tŗß|;;3ū-CPŅ ąBXˆœ3 Ęēó¹D{l=ąbü//ĪļX% ķ¬hŲĄ\$“éä3Ā»" ROä± +Žš=i7Ż”Ōe•ˆØĒJńw¤ØšĶä8x³0Ooø½óAÓ±™pT­6¾¦-r&ó Ņ—ŗ£Ak“Ż½ßž{·ZÆ1:RnŌšG`ɳNßčv‹öøsQ\:uūŹ#jvzĪ8wāLs§ƒžŻGB ¦H„JƒėQĒ‰M$ŌZ3gŽLF6ÖŽĢš^yßØūŗvlõĻl†pZ3ą›ž¶ļ-BŗV‹gśy«ā{’)Šz[!`ä­²eśā3“8£{0NF"0RCQE½VŚĖŚŠ`ØJE:źX•Ń‹|5Ŗ³ÕpĒ§'"!’*wē–u”=šA¤"ł_c@l@Dd hčÕšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šiEš>_ĄóńĶ“Ē ėŹs’EXv¬ `!š=Eš>_ĄóńĶ“Ē ėŹsBą@˜ų| žxŚ•SĻkAžfvÓŲ4°›V…b“‚ ±?P¼d›,öH0 JÜnķŅ’Ęn"qOJ+ā-žāXńŽł€ć†9ŲX£śŲ?Ē‘WB8Āöįżx}øē8nó­ĀöćŪx}¤‰ć 8oNĻ[„ņńK®T(ßfŌöŒz}ĶnÕe›ŪNŃŽqZHD†5L(A5‰H¶łÄ­9®ųˆ„Z('Ķ§m×Ę4.„ęĶnnÉ(śŗv×2Šæęƾ¢šM’šß]³éZVL]Ó_“Öż®Œdh~¶NĄX“r–é‹ĒŠāŒś`œ‰ĮØO²×˜ēpŸ\E‘B½ZW_N/¤¹śā“āRäĶ†xU„NgwNÜL†¼Œö5וŽGy›‰k”䵌NCxBHƒ1j_’`ĆŖDd üDččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šw„[‘?ś[ŒX”8¾ä+)’S_y¬ `!šK„[‘?ś[ŒX”8¾ä+)` Ųį ˜žžxŚ„S=oÓ@~ļĪ ‰ÉvK¤Š†J0T ÄÅM,"ä ČqÄh°h¤¤©’ ©Ŗ„Zu ?€”?€ĮŹ•ĄŹĘˆųį½'“1pņł?÷Žūųż8Y¦Q N€NJˆB„Īf3®“KŠ[”‰]Žž²é5D×ŅlĄŒć0qNæęOø O)«ŌĀį®?Ž^AŁočĻŚ@5|ˆō~‘~$/(GkˆVŅe¹6•»!yC7}§§?åńēDzÓow£Až^4Ź{½nønćĖ؉SÜ©C@Ēõ–.T½»tŖ¼ūģŻz§bż“¤ā¹Ī\„D8Ƃ^WiŒ»­^F%d›ŗžįo1HŹ+©TøEĖĪóō•ż!’%÷Y}’_‘œÕ(ø‹8ŽÉŁ½¢»Č¤®-Ÿ;Qż!I?4›? ÅĆ©4jžm¬śżöžŻéģ„ƒöĆrļQTG°Rē³o1…•*÷žōŪQŸo‚„Õü¼ótŲa2W6Iå†]MćN`×?o^F¼nŲ;ńÕx² 22_&N¼Tć‰`JøTŲŪA%pbžŲFŽ`„āĄ$Ģ Q“Ŗ={ĶZT;*B‘ń®ēy>¬"“ŗU@č)Ź[P®Čöā†š{D@²É IFRuYQ.ö­°Ą?ŚjŒĆØĖæte Źßļeó®a‚’°ˆ³$‡Dd š,ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šéC:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé’Å t|¬ `!š½C:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé*€ąŲRčē‹žxŚMQĶJĆ@žŻ$Öž@k‚Ų*čAšń’¶ĮZ &ÅcH5h iJS©9éĮ{}_Ą‹g= ^=ū"ń$Xg·Q:d²ß~3;3ū-,€P"śĄLB§„¤ˆŠétŹŃ.YI¹<żĖ+ŠwrKŠˆ¶dX…)KFSŠ'ˆ_Ń5,õˆžO³ Šr‡—vÜ÷L^%ĖźQ†–©F ¬šM~ų8pĻf!8žbÅA'ģĀHC¶›É…MėkŌF'ęG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qPĮą@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APō_1097568142D’’’’ŗĪĄFąE Ÿ@ĆąE Ÿ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’BCompObj¹»’’’’CiObjInfo’’’’¼’’’’EEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Fü_1097945724ĀžæĪĄFŸ@ĆŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’JCompObj¾Ą’’’’KiG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  P 0ƒyž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Įä@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōObjInfo’’’’Į’’’’MEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’N_1097568182øĢÄĪĄF ½&Ÿ@Ć ½&Ÿ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’RG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  P 0ƒyž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qPĮ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōCompObjĆÅ’’’’SiObjInfo’’’’Ę’’’’UEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’V#_1097568214’’’’’’’’ÉĪĄFP….Ÿ@ĆP….Ÿ@ĆG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  P 0ƒy †<<P 0ƒyž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qPĮ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’[CompObjČŹ’’’’\iObjInfo’’’’Ė’’’’^Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’_#Times New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  P 0ƒy †e"³P 0ƒyž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q_1097568266Ē©ĪĪĄFą£¢Ÿ@Ćą£¢Ÿ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’dCompObjĶĻ’’’’eiObjInfo’’’’Š’’’’gEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’h÷_1097961841¤ÕÓĪĄFP$SŸ@ĆP$SŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’lCompObjŅŌ’’’’miPĮŪ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr ‚*ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qObjInfo’’’’Õ’’’’oEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’pż_1097945792’’’’ōŲĪĄFPY_Ÿ@Ćšß`Ÿ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’t=Įį@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr ‚* ‚,ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qCompObjף’’’’uiObjInfo’’’’Ś’’’’wEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’x_1099820488’’’’’’’’ŻĪĄFhŸ@ƁhŸ@Ć=Įē@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†e"³„Įr ‚*ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’}CompObjÜŽ’’’’~iObjInfo’’’’ß’’’’€Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ęž’’’‚ƒ„ž’’’ž’’’‡ž’’’ž’’’Š‹Œž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’’“”ž’’’ž’’’—ž’’’ž’’’š›œž’’’ž’’’Ÿž’’’ž’’’¢£¤ž’’’ž’’’§ž’’’ž’’’Ŗ«¬ž’’’ž’’’Æž’’’ž’’’²³“µž’’’ž’’’øž’’’ž’’’»¼½¾ž’’’ž’’’Įž’’’ž’’’ÄÅĘĒž’’’ž’’’Źž’’’ž’’’ĶĪĻž’’’ž’’’Ņž’’’ž’’’ÕÖמ’’’ž’’’Śž’’’ž’’’ŻŽßž’’’ž’’’āž’’’ž’’’åęēž’’’ž’’’źž’’’ž’’’ķīļž’’’ž’’’ņž’’’ž’’’õö÷ž’’’ž’’’śž’’’ž’’’żž’ž’’’ĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „·hž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q_1101551432ŸhāĪĄF –ŸŸ@Ć –ŸŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’…CompObjįć’’’’†iObjInfo’’’’ä’’’’ˆāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Ätž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’‰ę_1099820505YēĪĄF°¦ŽŸ@ĆŪ‘Ÿ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjęč’’’’ŽiObjInfo’’’’é’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’‘ę_1099820557ļ!ģĪĄFĄ7§Ÿ@Ć`¾ØŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’•ĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „·hž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qCompObjėķ’’’’–iObjInfo’’’’ī’’’’˜Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’™ė_1099820540’’’’’’’’ńĪĄF@R­Ÿ@ĆąŲ®Ÿ@ĆĖĮĻ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒq„øqž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjšņ’’’’žiObjInfo’’’’ó’’’’ Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’”ęĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q_1097945819’’’’’’’’öĪĄF@öŸ@Ć@öŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’„CompObjõ÷’’’’¦iObjInfo’’’’ų’’’’Ø=Įį@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr ˆ0 ‚,ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’©ż_1097945846Ö’’’’ūĪĄFĄ”æŸ@ĆĄ”æŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’­CompObjśü’’’’®iObjInfo’’’’ż’’’’°Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’±_1097945867ł ĪĄFĄÖĖŸ@ĆĄÖĖŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’¶=Įē@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†<<„Įr ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathTyCompObj’’’’’·iObjInfo’’’’’’’’¹Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŗ_1101551926’’’’’’’’ĪĄF@ńџ@Ć@ńџ@Ćpe EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Įē@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†e"³„Įr ˆ0Ole ’’’’’’’’’’’’æCompObj’’’’ĄiObjInfo’’’’’’’’ĀEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ćž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮ’@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr ˆ0 †>>„Įr ‚* ‚,_1101551942 ĪĄFŪŸ@ĆŪŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ČCompObj  ’’’’ÉiObjInfo’’’’ ’’’’Ėž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŪ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr ‚*Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ģ÷_1097945909’’’’’’’’ĪĄF`ĒåŸ@Ć`ĒåŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŠCompObj’’’’Ńiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=ĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „ĮrObjInfo’’’’’’’’ÓEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ōę_1099820581’’’’kĪĄF°e @Ć°e @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ųž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „ĮrCompObj’’’’ŁiObjInfo’’’’’’’’ŪEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Üę_1097946062½@ĪĄFš=ųŸ@Ćš=ųŸ@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ąCompObj’’’’įiObjInfo’’’’’’’’ćEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’äżž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=Įį@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr ‚* ‚,_1101552384’’’’’’’’ĪĄFšr @Ćšr @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’čCompObj’’’’éiObjInfo’’’’ ’’’’ėž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮį@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr ‚* ‚,Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ģż_1099820623+#ĪĄF°& @Ć°& @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’šCompObj"$’’’’ńi‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽö‘’•“–“—˜™š›œŸž ”£¢¤„¦§Ø©«Ŗ­¬®Æ±°³²¶µŁø·¹ŗ»¼½¾æĮĄĀĆÄÅĘĒČÉŹĖĢĶĪŠĻŃŅÓÕŌÖ×ŲŚŪAŻÜŽąßįāäćåęēčźéėķģīļšņńóō67ż’’’÷ųłśūüżž’Dd š,ččšJ² š$ C šA ?æ ’"ń怚#€2šéC:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé’Å P`!š½C:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé*€ąŲRčē‹žxŚMQĶJĆ@žŻ$Öž@k‚Ų*čAšń’¶ĮZ &ÅcH5h iJS©9éĮ{}_Ą‹g= ^=ū"ń$Xg·Q:d²ß~3;3ū-,€P"śĄLB§„¤ˆŠétŹŃ.YI¹<żĖ+ŠwrKŠˆ¶dX…)KFSŠ'ˆ_Ń5,õˆžO³ Šr‡—vÜ÷L^%ĖźQ†–©F ¬šM~ų8pĻf!8žbÅA'ģĀHC¶›É…MėkŌF'QŽw‡’Ē1ĪćōkrŁåģ{Ų„ø/F\·`’ §÷ćĶÉņi{cŽ/8%Ÿi}y{²¾Ē ¼ws8ŗwµZ Už„X-[«³›õ³ŃXs:õū…Ö·āl¹HŖ“µL*a4IµŠzŌ®»m>„d¤l„J»mĪĄĢ……RæxĶ¬ų†~Ó6+?ĪžÓMšKž%ææf2ō/ż’Ÿ±×ż¾Ōäi}ŗNĄĢŲE»äógź ¤)m…»ēĻ3”Ŗ&"/gČN‘|•ć“,£e¾!ƗxJC „ʍß%æ^„ YŁ œ’»ņÅS‹UÆÓu›¼ÓĀ;Čq=W¤žÄēÖDd ”TččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š8Ī™*P5æß3T1ĒŽéŠ’²‰¬ `!š Ī™*P5æß3T1ĒŽéŠ  ądXJŚžxŚuRAkQžęķ®ŚM`7m=Å®‚=“„ō˜C7ÉjĮFB“ąqYė¢¤«›HĢ)""xJ=xōoā?čµ7ńŅkŃõ$˜Ī{»©ŚĒĪĪ÷ę ß¼łŽķ#Če° ¢ ‘˜N§ = [Y,'fyyįG_b“vĶĀ ¦2™—Ķ6aü•ķ‡œ0].ĖŹ£ō_6‡ÆB ®X$ŸhYüD¤­0ś+¶pHŹ ŲĶv7ģ9OĀ³uƒģ6ž ZliĀtžßē w„MSĘäIqų™Rīwō)÷—3n’IĢŻvŸE ¶9Z6ĢåĖ¹Ił3š5äåćų”˜ˆY•×4_—T96Ģ£«:H«Š\'„x"F™Šæ/TlµNaȋUµę°ō“}ąv:å ×ŽÆDĻĆzš"ģ”`Ģ«WŠ²ŪŒJō&n‡±ééä*[ķÉp d'šXźxŅ›:žD`“7…Dd ÜččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šēr1±ź$Äģ¶ ŚÉ3?„ä’Ć \¬ `!š»r1±ź$Äģ¶ ŚÉ3?„ä*`  !„‰žxŚMQĖJĆP¹I“/IbķB[]>Ż7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒŻ7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒŻ7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒŻ7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒŻ7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒC;±¶Y+Į8÷fUˆXč%“93w8sēģŗŠĒ'Ā&ˆD¢Łl*4KCA®W|ÖEE\4؟ŃT‡†a4e1­Įų†ķ”©īŁzƒŖ(ŅNm/ėķ»€„Xŗ%Ÿh@ÜŃóobA1—¤œ€žĶŻj|Ż=Œo”‹N k™×Ć[« 0’ĻpĄa¾GęäMĀ»¢÷)-Ü×ļ’ć&åŸō°¼FšžGŒSūūéļoõ ¶Ļqhųō„a.÷€ˆ|V*“Ī.ż›ł’Q(,;Õüv²¼ćZĪ®[E,ŅŽ;ŹxÅ­rÆ’åƒJŽ­ČKÄĀélÜ<ŖUō”k|Ģ¬§ę Ė×µŪ°^ĘFj|ӟōėĖ6#]KJW7żi{ÕÆ«Ģū“UĘ“²M_ž -J< >,ń|!(={ˆć3‹ĆŽ$äČēžRę{sä~ÖT¶„²ŽNŻŖdö‰ŒW­¹EIéĀųŌļ·/Rłq¶‘ó…Dd ÜččšJ² š$ C šA?æ ’"ń怚#€2šēr1±ź$Äģ¶ ŚÉ3?„ä’Ć Ÿž¬ `!š»r1±ź$Äģ¶ ŚÉ3?„ä*`  !„‰žxŚMQĖJĆP¹I“/IbķB[]>Ż7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒŻ7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒ¦—Iī³«ūåź¼øÅį†Ćäž?°Hć÷§;Ž_sˆ1Žė8Jś}qŻļFć'Ņņ—R­Z_ć®n5ģVkŻļ5wŠŻĄõ÷‚réqīœQ ŪŪ»ŠwŻfŠ•NäRÕzŽyßļś˜ÅŌā‚3(=·ŻČ27<Ūżµ0Ļų”i#r¢åh°ī1²Ģ¢<N“ź•£²¼āóC™½ź•<'’mf‰ė ĮĀĶ ®Ó€Ŗ5C¼›'.&xa <į­bN ²l”źĪĶ¦É}$T”u“i#MIOĄĀ¤²~UĢ¼T {ż -æ2I4’|’OĄøž²”ģ’W^šÜDd äTččšJ² š' C šA?æ ’"ń怚&€2šb„Ü~°S“"Ą§—*Gń’>€¦¬ `!š6„Ü~°S“"Ą§—*GńŽ  (+XJžxŚSMoÓ@YŪmćD²ŻĄ hŠ‡J@„zku‹d‘Dp3¬)iŖ$(õ‰VH\Ķ‘c’‚CÄ©?nˆ?s 3ūį* «¬öķųķ¼};„€ötH€ƒ&CTY–e]Ćs*Vd9ÆÄ*ģX/ŗ²`ĮyČ8™†MsJų%Ķ{:Ą;JWT¬4Ćń£v¼ų°DŃo”ĻŚĄˆ WQf?ĆīBQćØLč•@®Ķä×·ųž4¾³õLŽ2 Ųķn?UnE“ŹķA?܃Ö×I‡¦$TAź ˜“Ž0å!ŠWOŲ ”ŁqCe?žńŁ™X?ż¢āū'lŖ<|€Uœ÷€’čAŖ°9•8žõņć¹J+īßō`²ÉOę›æy)œŖpF-ž²DU¶Œye;E4ųÅ­f{źw§»ēöz[įØū >xłįn4Ē˜wčhź6ŽQ<v£!’ŽŽlW¼ƒń0„eXZ]ń’Ęu×OmėfąśŸW.>k¹zéå4Ł ŁV/‰—®Ūi""›“>Ł&ą®ĄKłĻµJH>Ń Ē@ņ§xQ“?Ī‘OŪ Ō»bS•/ö4&æ&ÓŸÕ Ę( Ō½ ĮlßóĀŽˆę}Ÿ¼–²J6,ŠčkĮ Ū]jÅ£qŌē;S±A园’vŚ šˆ’ ®īDd äTččšJ² š( C šA?æ ’"ń怚'€2šdōi_Q¤“>?kÅgJ–{’@€©¬ `!š8ōi_Q¤“>?kÅgJ–{Ž  (+XJžxŚSMoÓ@YŪmćD²ŻŠŠ“*ź­Ŗ›XōŠ ‹$‚›1`•HIS%A©O€z5GŽż=!8äŲŸ7?ęföĆU@V^ķŪńó¼};c„€ötH€ƒ&CTY–e]Į³*Vd9ÆÄ*ģH/ŗ4gĮ9Č8™†MsBų%Ķ»:Ą[JWT¬4ĀŃĆV¼ų°@Ńo”ĻŚĄˆ —Qf?Ćī@QćØLč•@®ĶäŪ7ųŽ4¾³õL~že°[^4¬ÜŒĘ•[ż^ø;ĶÆć6MI؂ŌA0i½fŹ(^=a/Pf‚*ūя’ĖĪÄśéß?aåį=¬ą¬üGR…ĶØÄń“—/ų/ČUšqļ^æ ćM |0ĢėóR8UįŒćxĀUŁ2ę•m·ēŃą«7­uŖßķĪžŪķn…ĆĪżZ’A䇻ŃcÖ”£©Ó8F­’hŠ‰ü%8z£UńFƒaaeŁKźW]?µ­ė^¾@xÉr!õŅ‹i²²­_/] ¶ÓDD6i}¼MĄ] ź—ņĒµJH>Ń Ė@ņ§øQ“_ĪSŸ¶ē©wŦ*oģYL~M¦F«Ē ‰2GŻūL÷=’;vD4ļū|䵔U²a^D_ nµGQļLÅ•oŗJŚi/h"ž™X°TÆDd TččšJ² š) C šA?æ ’"ń怚(€2š@°|涊7ŸĻ. ”妒ķ‚¬¬ `!šå@°|涊7ŸĻ. ”妠Ą HµXJ³žxŚmRßKŪPžĪM3g[H:ēĆ@“¬° ’c“lĖC¶…­ŠŚ‘VŗŌ?C|óÅW‘ų$XĻ¹IÜ99ß=÷äK¾ļ†0  1$LNE”!R“ÉD£×ō,ėŌt®ØŹjLsŒ^<²°€‰ sŲœcĘ9˜ź„³MQ_šńך4Ė¬š)AOÕ^Ņ£kµŖ™€_¤‹‚ŻlwĆ~y'–w{Ż`Ū«a‹3x‹ß_ń‚į]^z²S‰)å> -¤Ün¦Ü$CĢŻˆ»z ×ø{dę’Ÿ›t½ųēQŻ7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒŻ7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒŻ7mƒ[ 6ÅeŒ“Ši„våĘ}ü„ž€ą¢īÄš;DāJ°Ī½Ņ!“9óø3sĻEˆH`Š. )CŒ²Éd"Š.G±$ū«K±žcšŠęœ +0įÅ$阚Łµz"MFU)Øŗż{Ųõ,Ń%Īū1Ž–ą1õųf£±<ņ]ÖÓjĆÖE§ ƒŽļ‹‘˜TyIÓUpI•÷3ę÷«:H«ŠT'gńH 2^ØŲh|…!/V®UźĄüćęžŪjmęÓRō,¬ĻĆ Ę“z-»MĮ(EÆāfĖCōJŻń^wćsø~kŁ–×Üjb[|·ścł&ćĖEā%·“į–ĻȶJŅ ½¤čo'CŁd?Ųfąż²ļ%ņs­%¼#*õD²Ø:Ćf}Üsš¬õø@ižŽ4Õ¾łĆ÷bFćiÖŲ;ė¶1*kDbėkŌ g2o!śļP@7ĀA,hęxŹ{Aļ·’ŽĘ+ĀŒŽ”¬jż,uŚźčķvŃ“Īī…[s.Ż’įzĖs¹cw”;ézNI%˜"6ŗWż–Ū›H†Ŗõœy=ģ;XAd#kNJ{zĶ×Ō#[Æ}f× gT¾éoł“¢MHS ±LL?o—ż‰d “Ž” čy»d›¾ųt5ĮčŒ“‘ŒŌP GŒD Ż=+ĶEmÅ 0T¤"s5,ĖčE¾ÕŁ“ʃ”ė‰Hˆ’»ós‹:Źų R‘ü/m‡Dd š,ččšJ² š2 C šA?æ ’"ń怚1€2šéC:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé’Å Ä¬ `!š½C:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé*€ąŲRčē‹žxŚMQĶJĆ@žŻ$Öž@k‚Ų*čAšń’¶ĮZ &ÅcH5h iJS©9éĮ{}_Ą‹g= ^=ū"ń$Xg·Q:d²ß~3;3ū-,€P"śĄLB§„¤ˆŠétŹŃ.YI¹<żĖ+ŠwrKŠˆ¶dX…)KFSŠ'ˆ_Ń5,õˆžO³ Šr‡—vÜ÷L^%ĖźQ†–©F ¬šM~ų8pĻf!8žbÅA'ģĀHC¶›É…MėkŌF'%¼#*õD²Ø:Ćf}Üsš¬õø@ižŽ4Õ¾łĆ÷bFćiÖŲ;ė¶1*kDbėkŌ g2o!śļP@7ĀA,hęxŹ{Aļ·’ŽĘ+ĀŒŽ”¬jż,uŚźčķvŃ“Īī…[s.Ż’įzĖs¹cw”;ézNI%˜"6ŗWż–Ū›H†Ŗõœy=ģ;XAd#kNJ{zĶ×Ō#[Æ}f× gT¾éoł“¢MHS ±LL?o—ż‰d “Ž” čy»d›¾ųt5ĮčŒ“‘ŒŌP GŒD Ż=+ĶEmÅ 0T¤"s5,ĖčE¾ÕŁ“ʃ”ė‰Hˆ’»ós‹:Źų R‘ü/mÆDd TččšJ² š5 C šA?æ ’"ń怚4€2š@°|涊7ŸĻ. ”妒ķĢ¬ `!šå@°|涊7ŸĻ. ”妠Ą HµXJ³žxŚmRßKŪPžĪM3g[H:ēĆ@“¬° ’c“lĖC¶…­ŠŚ‘VŗŌ?C|óÅW‘ų$XĻ¹IÜ99ß=÷äK¾ļ†0  1$LNE”!R“ÉD£×ō,ėŌt®ØŹjLsŒ^<²°€‰ sŲœcĘ9˜ź„³MQ_šńך4Ė¬š)AOÕ^Ņ£kµŖ™€_¤‹‚ŻlwĆ~y'–w{Ż`Ū«a‹3x‹ß_ń‚į]^z²S‰)å> -¤Ün¦Ü$CĢŻˆ»z ×ø{dę’Ÿ›t½ųēQ%¼#*õD²Ø:Ćf}Üsš¬õø@ižŽ4Õ¾łĆ÷bFćiÖŲ;ė¶1*kDbėkŌ g2o!śļP@7ĀA,hęxŹ{Aļ·’ŽĘ+ĀŒŽ”¬jż,uŚźčķvŃ“Īī…[s.Ż’įzĖs¹cw”;ézNI%˜"6ŗWż–Ū›H†Ŗõœy=ģ;XAd#kNJ{zĶ×Ō#[Æ}f× gT¾éoł“¢MHS ±LL?o—ż‰d “Ž” čy»d›¾ųt5ĮčŒ“‘ŒŌP GŒD Ż=+ĶEmÅ 0T¤"s5,ĖčE¾ÕŁ“ʃ”ė‰Hˆ’»ós‹:Źų R‘ü/m‡Dd š,ččšJ² š7 C šA?æ ’"ń怚6€2šéC:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé’Å SѬ `!š½C:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé*€ąŲRčē‹žxŚMQĶJĆ@žŻ$Öž@k‚Ų*čAšń’¶ĮZ &ÅcH5h iJS©9éĮ{}_Ą‹g= ^=ū"ń$Xg·Q:d²ß~3;3ū-,€P"śĄLB§„¤ˆŠétŹŃ.YI¹<żĖ+ŠwrKŠˆ¶dX…)KFSŠ'ˆ_Ń5,õˆžO³ Šr‡—vÜ÷L^%ĖźQ†–©F ¬šM~ų8pĻf!8žbÅA'ģĀHC¶›É…MėkŌF'Ō?C|óÅW‘ų$XĻ¹IÜ99ß=÷äK¾ļ†0  1$LNE”!R“ÉD£×ō,ėŌt®ØŹjLsŒ^<²°€‰ sŲœcĘ9˜ź„³MQ_šńך4Ė¬š)AOÕ^Ņ£kµŖ™€_¤‹‚ŻlwĆ~y'–w{Ż`Ū«a‹3x‹ß_ń‚į]^z²S‰)å> -¤Ün¦Ü$CĢŻˆ»z ×ø{dę’Ÿ›t½ųēQŌ?C|óÅW‘ų$XĻ¹IÜ99ß=÷äK¾ļ†0  1$LNE”!R“ÉD£×ō,ėŌt®ØŹjLsŒ^<²°€‰ sŲœcĘ9˜ź„³MQ_šńך4Ė¬š)AOÕ^Ņ£kµŖ™€_¤‹‚ŻlwĆ~y'–w{Ż`Ū«a‹3x‹ß_ń‚į]^z²S‰)å> -¤Ün¦Ü$CĢŻˆ»z ×ø{dę’Ÿ›t½ųēQż‘Õé‚ ““¦7<©’Ł¼Ū¬ `!šŃ³š>ż‘Õé‚ ““¦7<©”ą čēŸžxŚmR=KA}»I4ĘĄ]Œ‚h“ü@“²É™Š &Įņ8õŠ@>L.SYh‚ĄŽĀ"½ˆ?ĄĘŸ rV‚qf=ƒ„ 77ogēŽĪ›= °+ l!r)„„ģv» -‹I?7*’ź¢ņM@Ę - i˜B—‹ÉtņįgņQŻ“śUQdģĘY¾uīYÅ2Ā|’ŃøLŠMā¾äŻ·j·ŖjOĻĖŽ›Ųwš‰ƒjŁ®`/÷Ł,«}¬"Hļ%Z"¬E8Ē;µV§Ēż4ˆ[0w®U>Ŗ–ŠLRv#‰ę*¾<Ćõõ½öō /ń'é\&æ?,VŒRiĖv‹Ē©ź‰“µO±Pæ®XĄļ&JU/źE§Ī›ˆ3ł„yŁØŪCxvĘl§WŒ¬§kŪ–‘ż˜™&<”šLoŽkoY„t-Å”mz‹ÖŽ×V™$Å«Ę¢•¶LC‹ Ņ!$ CĪ”Öēŗ¼yŌš’ł®öŌ|~§ŖcX­Õ’Als¹–ŪpŹ¼āQńgż7ö;U>•ķŒ …Dd ÜččšJ² š9 C šA?æ ’"ń怚8€2šēSĒ™„š>śpµŅo³Ą½¬ą’ĆWŽ¬ `!š»SĒ™„š>śpµŅo³Ą½¬ą*`  !„‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žŁåĻ“9˜A=ųćĮ#IC,Äc­Ś( R0Ų“ļõxߥ^}ŸĆ˜z2g—j˜t:ßüģĢģ· )‹ śĄ%FŹ#„l: “‹«Q,ÅžźŅlŒ˜!“½ ĄLy1‰J:!¼D6O­žISQUźöš¶é÷€†č’ążG+ š„ś|³ńXžų.Hė©¦ļ^ö:0*Rō(ž4kę×ØEŠ¢ndśļC7‚ƒ$ńŒēOX?šżž?»ÕzƒŅ‘ŠYofĪŪ]½Ó)ŁƒöU¹wķ4ģgZ¬ŁvAžŌåĻz®ŻMŠ¶Šb厝×v<žM®7óĘżŠ³aā9#ØģéPUŽ-½ń™['œUtp+ J!U)saĮŖ†ˆÉ>T č«b!’t%td$DšÅ!I¤ČÆ’7Ļ-„š`dĘ£ ‹Ā{ÆF}6M0t\īq’d‘›ēQĢ€ J"ž {Fl_ÅDd |TččšJ² š: C šA ?æ ’"ń怚9€2š'cŁ"“Śl[ÓÖ¼­[Śė¶’Üą¬ `!šūcŁ"“Śl[ÓÖ¼­[Śė¶ ` 0®XJÉžxŚRMKQ=÷MR5 ĢďEAtZ؋`5ˆ?Ą1™*h$˜„.Ēi;Ų@bd‰‚" Ż„ĖīŚæQџįR÷‚Čø*4Ž÷2i!āĘGnīy÷]Īy÷Ģ#ŒŚ)+Ī!ˆ"D¢Ūķ*4GÆ£ZRōūRĀ[bŒŃĢ+“čŹf^Ēćß&w_1]2źJ”ą¶¾–ƒ](*–É'$7X IFÄ¢b¾“JF¹Z÷šę†×67uwė„‡v…£×EŒ’ßó†'ĀBBÖäI6ųA=ī#:øż}7©|÷Dc6ø}5 jlbRP’ŌØ”½ÄÕƉŸĻŻæ§A>kDŽžó°R¹F\^+_*”±Õ«V[v›ÕĻ¹ĘÆčn{M¤ćƒó„µč6éx®±ēW=_"+”M{æå»Åš›i»“Ÿ·Š””Æ8Vń~zŠń„n!“ĆwagŁadč9™:v˜qVƎŖ,q>\e`eœ¼c‡ņgé)ā9Hšb3ˆēÓ üL°9±“KĶפsIy"š-Ė£&Žg9gžæłĀėŹ±žĻ†ŌīL½Ję[ š-Æ.wŅ¼ś>÷-5U“*įŅDd ”TččšJ² š; C šA!?æ ’"ń怚:€2š4šźZŚ×<ĮóY·Åƒ²v¤G’”ć¬ `!ššźZŚ×<ĮóY·Åƒ²v¤G  ądXJÖžxŚuRA‹ÓPžę%ÕnZHźźAXÜ(¬‡µČ{Ųl]p+Ŷx QƒŚ­¦•nOŃS=zōoźĻš&^¼ŠĘ“`œyIW(»Lę{ó†of¾÷k€ń–…dŲQŽH„iŖŃuŗ˜ĒJj™WV®rĶuFWĻŲŲ@*ɼ¶ćl_ ą ӕņ¬2šįųIgś4ZšeMų” óźŽŒ FŌŽfŽ‘v N§7ˆFīŻhāŽĀC“OŗlYB&’Æń†'ĀMKbrR¾§ŒūŻAĘżįļ’›$‰¹ŪÓĮƒa“]Ž®­ōdnŅž­ćŅ|ßR µ¬ņŒV«ą„*[EėåidUhe’Z¼P³\Å_Ē*v»ßQĘķfg‡»æß;ōśż½pŌ{X>ŠZįćh„JaU½Š‘wS)Ō‡Ļć^Ė!*f³ćśGć8Ä9/ośóĘ Æ•8öķĄkżÜ¼Äų‚ķ!ń“­d¾0rģŗø¹ŸlūÉ\GvŁĻöxŪA#šł<»L<)^,ń|“¢‹c¾ślÄŹ|]C-ƆÜUI²ŽT3%’æ!yi„ĶŌvpVļ>é×ÉU®“§£q4Hhb©ćiwjčų?ĀŠ’LÕDd ”TččšJ² š< C šA"?æ ’"ń怚;€2š7lh3ŚB?›Ļ&l`»Ūž’sę¬ `!š lh3ŚB?›Ļ&l`»Ūž  ądXJŁžxŚuRAkQžęķ¦¶›Ąn¬„bׂ Ö żŻ&[ 6%˜ĖŖ‹’F7‘4§xŃSzģ±’”'ŃCüŽD^Eד`œy»©ŚĒĪĪ÷ę ß¼łŽ–ć #ČŹ±)¢ ‘šN§mŠµ,–W³¼‚r•k.3ŗµ`cSIęå°MægūbŸ™.ŸeP ūĻĆēPÓ,KĀ§]Q_qh¬0ś£65pDŚ)8V'ź¹ūŃĄ}Šķ„Ų«’4ŁŅ„Lžßę w„»–Ää¤4<¦”ūŻGŹ}ņwĘM’ÄÜõaēQ·ĮGæ-XĪē&ķpŠ:«!—ć5Q³*/h¾ Ī©²¼hķ_ŌAZ…ę:9'j”©ųėLÅfó;rr±J½ŚŲdŽ‡­ÆŻŽ{­Ēåī“Ø>z(ęęÕ+ŁmŠ¹r÷e܊b9DѬ6\’°‡øŒÅ«žørĒ«%Ž}/šj?WÆ3¾j{Hüäf2Ž9vYÜŲOփŻd¬#[ģG» ¼õ ų‰|ž] īƒ/ƒø?ZQ‹Å1_2be¾‰ÖNSlČ[å%Kįm)Uņ’ ɤöt4UŪĮ%½ūا“«¬Õ‡½~Ō‘Hhb¦ćEojčų?nŠ“ÉėDd 4TččšJ² š= C šA#?æ ’"ń怚<€2šMCŸč",iÖÆ'øāEƒ’)Hé¬ `!š!CŸč",iÖÆ'øāEƒ  pńXJļžxŚSAkQžŽģʘMd7¶ Å®‚–Ŗ„ōŗM–l$˜ĖŖ‹’F6‘˜“RD E"ž<śś =¤7’BoŅ_ ²žć¼· ©=č°Ć|ofv¾™·9@ū"Ā>¤dXIˆ šL& Ż ©/OÓ¼ŁdgęŻ¾db™Ģb±Ž²~Ձ.—O³ Øżēį‹Ø©*9Y$š§S¬ŠEF?iMU>eV£Õ {öƒp`?ģv‚l× š¬IĀ ˜wų`°]5’—ŲļœŠ'‘T#ŽėIõĻæžÆŗPö;sXdĘ²3¦)Ē}Ģr™Äõaēq·Įŗœ_Ö8ø؃„CĢtE§tĘr…žŅÉ9–0k|ü·NJјöÓ]åÅtWĶ&ßłJ„^m¬sZ;n»½ōZOŹŻ§a-xöPĢĢN±Ø„_SĢ”»/£VÉ Šzµa{ÆśQ€«ø|cÉUī¹µŲ27}·ö}é:ćk¦‹Ų‹oÅ£ Ÿ‘e–„y±ćoÅ#åYgūz‹ėųߋåćšĮ}bįaīSƒźÕąįčoµH“ūÉĖao…[5HWBé|t×QQģ.Ė霯`yĻ¶Õ<“-XČŖӑś7˜żf}Ųė‡y’£Õ1•‹v­)’o¼g¤­®Dd TččšJ² š> C šA$?æ ’"ń怚=€2š÷™¶’’ _ÜiÓJ’m9 ’ģ3ģ¬ `!šä÷™¶’’ _ÜiÓJ’m9  Ą HµXJ²žxŚmRĮJQ=÷MRk˜‰ÖEA4Z0 -ā8&CML‚ĖajHŒL"qV•ā>.]śBqå7wnܖ2® Mļ}3iA{™;÷¼ūīœ™sŽ¦Ć%@!‚D–S„ˆŌx<Öh•^¦½¼šĢTIh–Ń›g&ę1–a‹sÄųŠó”©¾sęÓ©j~’s#: W³L ŸōBŻa™ężRėš 8']¬F«ōJ‚Ai·Ūń±S49“wČš}…¬k9éÉN9ŗ „ū”¶‘p_žžp“ 1w=ź|ģ¶1ŲąīžTīę’ܤė'ļ£‘ŠR}÷õ5›·ČŹ#Õz­±Ģīµķv{Óļµö+ŻOė=³uōkŠŁJ÷8l”l¢˜©5JĪI?ō1ƒēK‹Ī°śÖvcĖ|ļŁīĻÅĘs¦Ų‰_ĒĆM‘eV¤ øģmÅCŻŁąśe‹]öŖžĖe›b¤8Ų b“Ö›“9»6BCœĖĖŽĀ×rāŽæ•s'ģčnā°…)½ś¦’f~Uzż #+±-ƒI<>½Äał‰?dPY…Dd ÜččšJ² š? C šA%?æ ’"ń怚>€2šē‹Jpcxž5=ZąĘŲƒÖµ’Ćįī¬ `!š»‹Jpcxž5=ZąĘŲƒÖµ*`  !„‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žv ŹŸi9˜A=˜ųćP J""%kÕFI€’‚AN^¼|^Ą7š€WĄē0¦žLÄŁ„&Ī7?;3ū-CPŅ ąč@H˜”3 Ę'“‰D;l9ˆÅł_]‚Ų9KŚœS±‚‰(&ŃHĒ„Čf©Õ3i<ØJ b÷nĢAĒŖ²KTōć-q°cź|óя\ObFėiµAėĀm¢Ÿ£ča$öX®}õė¤LÖķ!D’mrčFŲ‰˜Čxƒ1ļ³ß’g×ėo3:R¬UĢ uÖhėĶfŽī6. ī•SµÆ.’a³ŃrŗŁ§Ÿ=u[vI%Ų".ø·^ĆńDÉPÅĢw=ĻĘ""kcXÜÕ«¾¦Yzõ3³J8­źš Ćę-BšZfhų[VÉŹHŽģ}‰€¾e-ĆŸ®&Żƒq" Äāˆ)”‡WśåV¼CY22åQĆ¼ō^ä«QŸõŚ ŪsZĀ$…dvzn–G9Tdüį…l¦ƒDd ÜččšJ² š@ C šA&?æ ’"ń怚?€2šåē&؛÷ˆå½n/«P=ł’Įfń¬ `!š¹ē&؛÷ˆå½n/«P=ł*`  !„‡žxŚMQĶNĀ@žŁRåĻ“9˜A=˜ųćP ‘D0@<ÖŖ’PJZ öäÅ;>/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “ĪĪ7?;3ż! å€AøȤ 1FȦө@{øĒ2ģÆ.ĖĘx9BŪ ¬Į”“ؤĀKd‹Ōź™4We”an[aß0E—ļĒ8Za€'Ōą›Ä:šÄwAZOm†ī„ׅa‰¢‡É“Zo~ Ū¤(ź Aē.9)žOóĻųį„õćŁļ’³Ūķ7‘®T›Ö`ī¼ÓÓ»Ż²t®*ŽµcŚ7NšÜźøNPkDŽžó°R¹F\^+_*”±Õ«V[v›ÕĻ¹ĘÆčn{M¤ćƒó„µč6éx®±ēW=_"+”M{æå»Åš›i»“Ÿ·Š””Æ8Vń~zŠń„n!“ĆwagŁadč9™:v˜qVƎŖ,q>\e`eœ¼c‡ņgé)ā9Hšb3ˆēÓ üL°9±“KĶפsIy"š-Ė£&Žg9gžæłĀėŹ±žĻ†ŌīL½Ję[ š-Æ.wŅ¼ś>÷-5U“*įÄDd hTččšJ² šB C šA'?æ ’"ń怚A€2š&‚Ē¼mƒü߉·rwv=Ū|’®ö¬ `!šś‚Ē¼mƒü߉·rwv=Ū| @ ų|XJČžxŚRAKQžęmRkŲ¶‡‚h*T0¤µ@ÖdQؑŠ$ōø¬ŗ“Ä”MJŗ “”öœ{ģŻ£'Įƒž õ.ˆ¬'”éĢĖĘBŠy™oę ß÷ęŪG˜Œļ(ģCV’·"Š©įpØŃ z×ŅjܗQ9UT³Œ–˜˜ĆPšyY¼OIĪŻgL—Ž»2Øx½÷õšƒT5Ė“š)AŌ9–iŽŃZÕLĄŅAĮŖ7Ū~7·å÷so:mo›µė~ƒ÷Øį%ü’œžÆRR““|ų“FÜ_č ęžõē~ܤćå…šD5^cRƒ¤‰5ja{»ÓBæČÕÓ©Ōį]÷iŠ„FĄū±‡·6摔k•k•ś*0ū¶¹g·Zk^·¹SźģśUļßE699_ֈo“M–:ƒ¦Č!²‰J=ē|źfššé‚3(ÆŲÕČ2×]»zµ0Ļų±i#r¢gŃ`Ķed™% 'Ź»Ń@WŠ?o0°ónŁu"łŁf†xR¼Ų āł h?SlNāŪ©ā\ZN¾ęyŌĒ‚XóļķČ #ljĒF>[˜ŅŁ±~•ĢæX »=æ-™˜—ĄŲĮ»¾„”ė–»‘ƒDd ÜččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šåē&؛÷ˆå½n/«P=ł’Į5śx`!š¹ē&؛÷ˆå½n/«P=ł*`  !„‡žxŚMQĶNĀ@žŁRåĻ“9˜A=˜ųćP ‘D0@<ÖŖ’PJZ öäÅ;>/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “ĪĪ7?;3ż! å€AøȤ 1FȦө@{øĒ2ģÆ.ĖĘx9BŪ ¬Į”“ؤĀKd‹Ōź™4We”an[aß0E—ļĒ8Za€'Ōą›Ä:šÄwAZOm†ī„ׅa‰¢‡É“Zo~ Ū¤(ź Aē.9)žOóĻųį„õćŁļ’³Ūķ7‘®T›Ö`ī¼ÓÓ»Ż²t®*ŽµcŚ7NšÜźøNP%hV]įĶ3ŗUš ųJ:(XµFĖļävü^īu»åķa»zÓ«ó6¼@‚’ŸsĀa=%59ɇßhČż…NcīļĘM:žžOc%?@Až’’’ž’’’Dž’’’ž’’’GHIJKLž’’’ž’’’Ož’’’ž’’’RSTUVWXYž’’’ž’’’\ž’’’ž’’’_`abž’’’ž’’’ež’’’ž’’’hijklmnož’’’ž’’’rž’’’ž’’’uvwž’’’ž’’’zž’’’ž’’’}~€ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „·h_1101552754’’’’’’’’2ĪĄF7O @Ɛ7O @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj13’’’’ iObjInfo’’’’4’’’’ ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „·hEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ ę_1097946134&7ĪĄFRU @ĆRU @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj68’’’’iž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q=ĮÖ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒZ†==ˆ0‚.ˆ0ˆ1ˆObjInfo’’’’9’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ņ_1103004271Š?<ĪĄFĄ4c @ĆĄ4c @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’2ƒX ˆ1 †++ˆ0‚.ˆ0ˆ1ˆ4ƒX ˆ2 †++ˆ0‚.ˆ0ˆ3ˆ3ƒX ˆ3 †++ˆ0‚.ˆ0ˆ0ˆ6ƒX ˆ4 †++ˆ0‚.ˆ9ˆ9ˆ9ƒX ˆ5ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qCompObj;=’’’’iObjInfo’’’’>’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ *_1103004447’’’’’’’’AĪĄF ‚’ @Ć ‚’ @ĆTĮ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  Abnormal˜ļReturn ƒf †==Actual˜ļReturn ƒf †"-r F †"-„²b ƒf r M -r F –(–)–(–)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qTĮŪ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_EōOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’)CompObj@B’’’’*iObjInfo’’’’C’’’’,Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’-÷_A  „²b ƒfž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qŽL„I¬ƒI ƒAƒR ƒi †=ƒr ƒi †"ƒr ƒm_1024926005’’’’’’’’FĪĄF€‘x @Ć€‘x @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’1CompObjEG’’’’2fObjInfo’’’’H’’’’4Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’5h_1103005480:SKĪĄF€Ę„ @ƀʄ @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’7CompObjJL’’’’8iž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qTĮ”@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  r ƒft †"-r F †==„±a†++„²b ƒfObjInfo’’’’M’’’’:Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’;°_1103005529’’’’’’’’PĪĄF`• @Ć`• @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’B r Mt -r F –(–)†++„µe ƒftž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qTĮv@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōCompObjOQ’’’’CiObjInfo’’’’R’’’’EEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’F’_1103028449N1UĪĄF€0 @Ć€0 @ĆG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  Risk†== 1Np„µe ƒft –(–) ˆ2i=1N t †"å ‚.ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’MCompObjTV’’’’NiObjInfo’’’’W’’’’PEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Q2§Į@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!G_DAōuōuōuņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒDƒiƒv†==„±a†++„²b ˆ1 ƒLƒiƒq†++„²b ˆ2 ƒD‚/ƒE†++„²b ˆ3 ƒRƒiƒsƒk†++„²b ˆ4 ƒOƒpƒPƒeƒr†++„²b ˆ5 ƒSƒiƒzƒe†++„²b ˆ6 ƒMƒkƒtƒbƒk†++„µež’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q3Į@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APō_1106915166’’’’’’’’ZĪĄF@X¦ @Ć@X¦ @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ZCompObjY[’’’’[iObjInfo’’’’\’’’’]Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’^5_1103028746’’’’’’’’_ĪĄF@² @Ć@² @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’cCompObj^`’’’’diG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒAƒR ƒi †==ƒr ƒi †"-ƒr ƒmž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q§Į@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesObjInfo’’’’a’’’’fEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’g2_1099820660’’’’’’’’dĪĄFµ» @Ƶ» @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’pTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!G_DAōuōuōuņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒDƒiƒv†==„±a†++„²b ˆ1 ƒLƒiƒq†++„²b ˆ2 ƒD‚/ƒE†++„²b ˆ3 ƒRƒiƒsƒk†++„²b ˆ4 ƒOƒpƒPƒeƒr†++„²b ˆ5 ƒSƒiƒzƒe†++„²b ˆ6 ƒMƒkƒtƒbƒk†++„µež’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „øqCompObjce’’’’qiObjInfo’’’’f’’’’sEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’tę_1101554808Ė’’’’iĪĄFš¤Ģ @Ćš¤Ģ @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’xCompObjhj’’’’yiObjInfo’’’’k’’’’{Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’|¬ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒW‚(ˆ0‚)†"-ƒW‚‚ž’’’ž’’’…ž’’’ž’’’ˆ‰Šž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’‘’ž’’’ž’’’•ž’’’ž’’’˜™š›œž’’’ž’’’ ž’’’ž’’’£ž’’’ž’’’¦ž’’’ž’’’©ž’’’ž’’’¬ž’’’ž’’’Æ°±²ž’’’ž’’’µž’’’ž’’’ø¹ŗ»ž’’’ž’’’¾ž’’’ž’’’ĮĀĆÄÅž’’’ž’’’Čž’’’ž’’’ĖĢĶĪĻŠŃž’’’ž’’’Ōž’’’ž’’’×Ųž’’’ž’’’Ūž’’’ž’’’Žž’’’ž’’’įž’’’ž’’’äž’’’ž’’’ēž’’’ž’’’źėž’’’ž’’’īž’’’ž’’’ńņž’’’ž’’’õž’’’ž’’’ųž’’’ž’’’ūž’’’ž’’’ž’(ƒR‚)†==ƒq‚[ˆ1†"-„Įr‚]„·h‚[ƒH†"-ƒR†"-„²b‚[ƒR†"-ƒL‚]‚]†++„Ätƒq„Įr‚[ˆ1†++„²b‚]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮÕ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePages_11015542840qnĪĄFPS× @ĆPS× @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ƒCompObjmo’’’’„iObjInfo’’’’p’’’’†Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’‡ń_1101554326’’’’’’’’sĪĄFŠmŻ @ĆŠmŻ @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’‹CompObjrt’’’’ŒiTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†==ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesObjInfo’’’’u’’’’ŽEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ę_1101554347l”xĪĄF•ę @Ɛ•ę @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’“Times New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮl@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesCompObjwy’’’’”iObjInfo’’’’z’’’’–Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’—ˆ_1098180375ß}ĪĄFšCń @ĆšCń @ĆTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A   †"¶ƒW‚(ˆ0‚)†"-ƒW‚(ƒR‚)–[–]†"¶„Įr†==†"-ƒq„·h„Čy†++„Ätƒq‚[ˆ1†++„²b‚]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’žCompObj|~’’’’ŸfObjInfo’’’’’’’’”Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’¢nuation Equation.3ō9²q¢ĮR°ó¤Õ )†"‚[ƒW‚(ˆ0‚)†"ƒW‚(ƒR‚)‚]†"„Į†>ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q_1098525006 ’’’’‚ĪĄFåų @Ć°kś @ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’¤CompObjƒ’’’’„fObjInfo’’’’„’’’’§Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ø[_1101556065%I‡ĪĄFp“”@Ćp“”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŖCompObj†ˆ’’’’«iĀ?ž¬¼ †"˜ė„Į ‚* †"‚(ˆ0‚,˜ėˆ1‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮē@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōObjInfo’’’’‰’’’’­Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’®_1101556102’’’’’’’’ŒĪĄFŠA”@ĆŠA”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’³G_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†>>„Įr ‚*ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮē@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesCompObj‹’’’’“iObjInfo’’’’Ž’’’’¶Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’·_1101554461’’’’’’’’‘ĪĄFi”@Ć0š”@ĆTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†<<„Įr ‚*ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’¼CompObj’’’’’½iObjInfo’’’’“’’’’æEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ą€āĮd@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr ‚* †a"ŗ †"-„·h„Čy„Ätˆ1†"-„²b–[–]†"-„·h„Čy†"Īˆ0‚,ˆ1–(–)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathTy_1101554487g–ĪĄF„”@Ć„”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ĘCompObj•—’’’’ĒiObjInfo’’’’˜’’’’Épe EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŁ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ˆ0‚)†==„øqƒq„ĮrH†"-R–[–]†++„·hƒqˆ1†"-„Įr–[–]Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Źõ_1098173732Ø­›ĪĄFŠ«&”@ĆŠ«&”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ŅCompObjšœ’’’’ÓfL†"-R–[–]†++R–{–}†++ˆ1†"-„øq–[–]R+Vž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½Į‰X,<ō )†"ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ˆ0‚)†"„Į†=„ø‚{ƒq‚[ƒH†"ƒR‚]ObjInfo’’’’’’’’ÕEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ö„_1098173454’’’’’’’’ ĪĄFą3”@Ćą3”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ł†"„·ƒq‚[ƒL†"ƒR‚]‚}ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½ĮM`ŗlk †>„ø‚{ƒq‚[ƒH†"ƒR‚]†"ƒq‚[ƒL†"ƒR‚]‚}CompObjŸ”’’’’ŚfObjInfo’’’’¢’’’’ÜEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Żi_1098173553ī™„ĪĄF`"9”@Ć`"9”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ßCompObj¤¦’’’’ąfObjInfo’’’’§’’’’āEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ćEž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½Į)Č,dŃ †=„øƒq‚[ƒH†"ƒL‚]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q_1098173623’’’’’’’’ŖĪĄFŽF”@ĆŽF”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’åCompObj©«’’’’ęfObjInfo’’’’¬’’’’č½Į”˜Ņ¤ó ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ƒR‚)†=„ø‚{ƒq„Į‚[ƒH†"ƒR‚]†+ƒR†"„ăq„Į‚}†+‚[ˆ1†"„ø‚]ƒR†+ƒVž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’é°_1098173777’’’’²ÆĪĄF@ V”@Ć@ V”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ģCompObj®°’’’’ķfObjInfo’’’’±’’’’ļEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’š…_1098173932’’’’’’’’“ĪĄF€be”@Ć€be”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ó½ĮiX $Ż )†"ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ƒR‚)†"„Į†=„øƒq‚[ƒH†"ƒR†"„Ä‚]ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½Į,@ßdŃ ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ˆCompObj³µ’’’’ōfObjInfo’’’’¶’’’’öEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’÷H_1101554836^…¹ĪĄF@Šn”@Ć@Šn”@Ć0‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_EōOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’łCompObjøŗ’’’’śiObjInfo’’’’»’’’’üEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’żęž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ ž’’’ž’’’  ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ !"#$ž’’’ž’’’'ž’’’ž’’’*+,-ž’’’ž’’’0ž’’’ž’’’3ž’’’ž’’’6ž’’’ž’’’9ž’’’ž’’’<ž’’’ž’’’?ž’’’ž’’’Bž’’’ž’’’Ež’’’ž’’’Hž’’’ž’’’KLMNž’’’ž’’’Qž’’’ž’’’Tž’’’ž’’’Wž’’’ž’’’Z[\ž’’’ž’’’_ž’’’ž’’’bcdž’’’ž’’’gž’’’ž’’’jž’’’ž’’’mž’’’ž’’’pqrž’’’ž’’’už’’’ž’’’xž’’’ž’’’{ž’’’ž’’’~ž’’’ž’’’_A  „Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½Į,˜,¼T ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ƒR‚)_1098172603’’’’’’’’¾ĪĄFPļ·”@ĆPļ·”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj½æ’’’’fObjInfo’’’’Ą’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’H_1101554848’’’’’’’’ĆĪĄFĄ”@ĆĄ”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjĀÄ’’’’iž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „ĮrObjInfo’’’’Å’’’’ Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ ę_1101554859ĮŠČĪĄFŠj™”@ĆŠj™”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjĒÉ’’’’iObjInfo’’’’Ź’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ _1101554770’’’’’’’’ĶĪĄFp&§”@Ćp&§”@Ćž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮķ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†<<„Įr ‚* ‚,Ole ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjĢĪ’’’’iObjInfo’’’’Ļ’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮõ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  ƒP ˆ0ƒy †==„øqƒq„Įr ‚* ¤€H†"-R–[–]†++„·hƒqˆ1†"-„Įr ‚* –[–]L†"-R–[–]†++R–{–}†++ˆ1†"-„øq–[–]R†++Vž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q_1101554880’’’’’’’’ŅĪĄFp[³”@Ćp[³”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’%CompObjŃÓ’’’’&iObjInfo’’’’Ō’’’’(āĮķ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†<<„Įr ‚* ‚,ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS EqEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’) _1098172644Ś×ĪĄFüŗ”@Ɛüŗ”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’.CompObjÖŲ’’’’/fuation Equation.3ō9²q½ĮK(Ėģz 2ƒP ˆ0ƒy †>ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ƒR‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qObjInfo’’’’Ł’’’’1Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’2g_1098172683’’’’’’’’ÜĪĄF1Ē”@Ɛ1Ē”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’4CompObjŪŻ’’’’5fObjInfo’’’’Ž’’’’7Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’8e_1098172747Ń£įĪĄFPYŠ”@ĆPYŠ”@Ć½ĮI’\Ī )†"ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ˆ0‚)†"„Į†>ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½ĮJ°©„{ ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ˆ0‚)†>2ƒP ˆ0ƒyOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’:CompObjąā’’’’;fObjInfo’’’’ć’’’’=Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’>f_1098172784’’’’’’’’ęĪĄFšŽ”@Ɛ›ß”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’@CompObjåē’’’’AfObjInfo’’’’č’’’’Cž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½Į,OÜ ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ˆ0‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathTyEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’DH_1101554894ĘėĪĄF¶å”@ƶå”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’FCompObjźģ’’’’Gipe EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮķ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†>>„Įr ‚* ‚,ObjInfo’’’’ķ’’’’IEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’J _1098173051äżšĪĄF°qó”@Ć°qó”@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’OCompObjļń’’’’PfObjInfo’’’’ņ’’’’REquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’So_1101554928’’’’õĪĄF°¦’”@Ć°¦’”@Ćž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½ĮS€2¼T ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ƒR‚)†"ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ˆ0‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’UCompObjōö’’’’ViObjInfo’’’’÷’’’’XEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’YęāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q      !"#$%&'()*+,-./012345q8:9;<=>?B@CcEDGFHIKJMLNOPQRSTUVWYXZ[\]^_`abdež’’’fghijklmon•–ż’’’rstuvwxyz{|}~€šJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šéC:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé’ÅAć`!š½C:Ž‹D€ģ)iO œé*€ąŲRčē‹žxŚMQĶJĆ@žŻ$Öž@k‚Ų*čAšń’¶ĮZ &ÅcH5h iJS©9éĮ{}_Ą‹g= ^=ū"ń$Xg·Q:d²ß~3;3ū-,€P"śĄLB§„¤ˆŠétŹŃ.YI¹<żĖ+ŠwrKŠˆ¶dX…)KFSŠ'ˆ_Ń5,õˆžO³ Šr‡—vÜ÷L^%ĖźQ†–©F ¬šM~ų8pĻf!8žbÅA'ģĀHC¶›É…MėkŌF'b|>ŸK“ĒÖ}.Ź’ņbü–åY‚ŠīŠŠ ĢE2™F>#œ•z$śY1T­q»9Ś@MV ‹z\ $G’źßüįGŽƒ{1 £ń“Ę“w6čb’'¶Š¼T_“9“yŠ?GŻ‡æ5ŚÓś½ßž{·ZÆ2:RjT›G`‰ÓN_ļv –Ó9/.ģšui;ˆ›žķdNģI¦>čY}ÄŠx°8øuģ‘ŲDT÷žŸØœ;įHw‡-ĢėÕ7żÆ0óz#ź‚®¬Ä¶ fqūō‡å $ž%O0†Dd ČšččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šč®§6Õ#¦&’žõqŻ»•’Äžć`!š¼®§6Õ#¦&’žõqŻ»•*@€ļŲRŠžxŚMQĶNĀ@žv Ź_Ņ"p01‚&z Ań(ŠČ į'›ŖšŠANzš^ĮšģÅńčxöŒ©'qv©†I§ūĶ·³3³ß2„%Ŏ!„É9c>b|>ŸK“ĒÖ}.Ź’ņbü–åY‚ŠīŠŠ ĢE2™F>#œ•z$śY1T­q»9Ś@MV ‹z\ $G’źßüįGŽƒ{1 £ń“Ę“w6čb’'¶Š¼T_“9“yŠ?GŻ‡æ5ŚÓś½ßž{·ZÆ2:RjT›G`‰ÓN_ļv –Ó9/.ģšui;ˆ›žķdNģI¦>čY}ÄŠx°8øuģ‘ŲD‚/ąŁ‹Ī>€gĮ˜z2g—j˜tŗß|;;3ū-CPŅ ą@Xˆœ3 Ęēó¹D{l=ąbü//ĪļX% ķ®hŲĄ\$“éä3ĀyP©'ņXGĶ·›ÓŌe•ˆØĒJńw¤ØšĶä8x³0OoLŻó~“±n8Z®6¾&-r&ó Ņ?OŻ‡Ń 5ŚÓ½ßž{·ZÆ1:RnŌšG@ņ¬Ó3ŗŻ¢=ź\”ś—NŻ¾rFH„š×eOœIö“ļŚ=$”`ŠDØŌævœ”ŲDB­5³ęĶxhc «[Ó+ļu_׎-£ž™Ł$œÖ ų¦æć{E‹®•Äā™~ĪŖųžd “ŽV9«l™¾ų -ĪčŒ“‘ŒŌP G”DQļŸ•ö²¶āŖR‘…Ž:Ā2z‘ÆFu¶ÓŃŲqE$DRåīāܲŽ²>ˆT$’ .©lĶQDd ˆ@ččšJ² šG C šA(?æ ’"ń怚F€2š³2“'BEB¦üž“FZÉsī’† P`!š‡2“'BEB¦üž“FZÉsīŠ@øq0 UžxŚTAoQžyĖ®…’,X=A=”Ų6į@Ā6öP ˆ¤ucI Ą z0jb/xōh@“=xčÆščɛiÖFc,Ī{»[„-5:»oŽ7ĆūŽĢ›‚@Zc ö€‹Lƒ!ŗŁh4(Žē\ß4óÖ°ld†ŠE…YńÅ$!;„·øŲ¢ķ¦ŻUA(Ō{kåĮ  (vńóżGgŲ;ÜTf ż`ŗŲ ą5Š‰AØÜhYŻču«½ŃnÕ×a„ōµ_”į,ŠĄGzž •ędĄĖ1‘Lé š]ž&KŠ¤¼A'Īm|ʜ8o÷’/Šł 9ēāń iq-‘äJ'•J‘Ņµx:ömC¶éy"yhó½:Ę·Ć¼\³p8WüĒš8¹¢ų2N® Õ*—Ēņ'y_ž)ū•ßūxLuG, ZwŚMčgÉqk*Pü[uĘæF&FŸ)Ö®ˆ·ēvÅGōŗ¢Rł€2§ēK…²0s³±n4›Kõnćn®}Ļ*Öļ[]Ė‡O–ÜĢĀr®ż°Ó°:üGū åØłØשĆi˜ŗ1‡ł«FŃ©×jFq7ršYÕŪ“/ŪĆ„”šćÓŠ“ējĖöPx²4?]&`ĢÕņ5ÓęÆ”‘J‚Œ„ ƒtf Ĺ¼P/Vł^f Ć`C#ūy\“‘ą*É×T‰ržžčøi+± ,ż+y2+å©qVźd–P‹GXśDVzL³ėĻ€ß+¢cœ> Į)a½w ÕōRiŠķY-nńęń'“:[ž_¹ŽŚüŠDd ččšJ² š2 C šA/?æ ’"ń怚 €2š2O9?<·Ļņ‰m cńÜĢD’x`!šO9?<·Ļņ‰m cńÜĢD”€€˜G/hßŌžxŚ­UMhA~3»©f›š¤µBµ”¶-Ś›ŗmÓm¤$)^ a7m$?e“s²EńRJOĻB< ^<ōąĮƒ ½xŻRAl|ov“ō/“Tw3o¾™}ó¾÷Ž¼™0pH·%Ķ šq`挣ˆńr¹,Š5ÖfĻ5ņŠž‹/ņÅĪDWÜŠeRĘĒƒmń:¶įN€\Ńhk¹  åęĆÅ`AXq’=Nč<ĆvŪŚżę7w?)xF®0tĻ*¦¢™$†qĀŪ §BŪ…lĀm„ÜP@,č-Z¾’ķ`ĒIlv(sGŪf¢’~ˆ£ÆŹ±É^“Z[Žń?TĻ‹ƒÕc“}ź8 Ę1Ś8~±ē,ŽA±£6•‰'œHéŁī»z”;˜Iii8.W•Ė Ęćó³ņk¶Ā,¦5v ,¦µŻÓ1Õ¢¬2aсMgŒ”– ź¹¼‘Vc¹|†ĻŲuńf”‰­ĀKų «ć-¾cćżów¤Yy‚„aƒWr$+sÄžKŽāńxā£³ąØåč‹rDŽŽŚńĒåØ©ŹD3C>_ō½ó’‰QŃł§z‘WNčĢĢ9ī „c”@“Ūr/‘V“É-›ˆfīėÓŚœžÆć`“^ÉöŹėĶ䍄nŠGšŹp·’aĪŠ Ī^īņ—Ę®«Ó¦Ē=Q§tu"nu«`śĶ+fi$‚Čć„®ä7ū#“fIĢ c’hŚ‹ųMś©nĆt0Ī^Āˆ˜JŅ’J"J"M"CĀ ‘"”‘H¢X‘æ! ŅP'‘#‘Æ*§Ńč%¼ÉČäć8ꟁĀå§C0T”ˆķ_õ†›{|…$ök:Kć{uøüä•=l”ĪŚ€½–|uģŅĒå^/÷‰j®į=·8Żõ ¦D•Yµé3bōVü?ą^ō„ŠŁœž¢‘bכõŌ;’˜’ -I®Dd @hččšJ² š3 C šA0?æ ’"ń怚 €2š8°Žh¤¬å>‘&2_¢’ģķx`!šä8°Žh¤¬å>‘&2_¢ @ ų|²žxŚmR=Oć@}»Ž9"Ł9 @ H\œNü€˜Ä"AIDiĪ‘ņ’ ąŠśPRņhØ((ņ?ųT„L…D˜Ł˜qŒ<Ł·³›ēyo,“¼$|pč”Rˆ Łļ÷ZamD¾Ż‹Ė”„%ōkČĄś|™Ā¤ģ¾ ģÕåHx+ŽœŪŽ+śū°ÆX¢Ģ'É+‘S„žåŠbNU/ŌžY¬Ō¼VrĆė$75·ŽõĀS§D©Īńś]¤ )ĀŸ×ųd×?īmacĄ}žņ‰[0wĮƕUtRT½×cåļ¹…Zž{GŁļI?Ōwū®ÆTŗĪÉrÅ`t«R·ŖÕU·UŁI7žzy÷Ÿ×BB’Ŗ+”…Ż$ōtć Yńš|ˆD$WLŚ‡ķ¦‹Ÿž±»™e+˜Ęšcåg¦ ;˜ŗ«!ÓHóŅµƒ'tU%EėQ–€µąd;ąĒ2ā‚tIAfŅ©Ai‘9‘“K­¬a’FČVļ’feĖĒDyīėŹ«Ć&~ØŻµśVˆy®ą·Ś^wl[ońuz‡¹ŽW ź\ Dd Ć@ččšB² šM S šA.?æ ’šL€2šv\įĀ«&'cÖĮ[;Żß¶]’RŲ¬ `!šJ\įĀ«&'cÖĮ[;Żß¶]ō ŲŠ žxœ…‘MJA…_ÕLfĢ$ą ā*ˆø‹ øuįɏėDHĄNÄdnįrąVĮ…gš9kŪ®źIƒŁ8Št}5ÆśUWź@ō€± łjnÕY¢X²Dš!¶Öję˜ö4sĀT©¼®k2x‘īøč(ŁĘ>¬!wüī¢„[ƒXŗĀF„iār8õŹūøÖ¾VĮ‰CĢČ{cSĢZWÅc«35Ć FÆŅIŪżŽrūiöBĻ‰hMą~,<±gļ°ųłĻ!w Ż?ƒÓ€ĪŌé!š*śĖ7q\tņ '±sź–ęvz¬oąĻ§PXi;š‡v~Ž¬šX¦S%=Õ{äH•Žōˆł [Īę…Įdó‘ź~gõGīyDd ° |ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šŪ‹įŽōŖö„r€kR †Óp’·äć`!šÆ‹įŽōŖö„r€kR †Óp€`š0®}žxŚTĻoQžy [JIvi5ĘŲX¬©iKP£½) kR ˆG\tQ ?še+r²¤Ę›Įƒiō`Ņ“ńŖ 7’/M<ś'³Ō¤8ļ±ŠZh4}»Ćūę½Łłfę a@zĘģn†č dŻnW óxŅY›`};»Ķ6”)Bēd¦”ĖiØ$ĀoI" €‡¾˜p¬|Ō­ū™Ęš°&¼ŒsŒ£cģ¶=ӄ~³Ė»ŸE<Ļy(Hį©éF9_-A=B 'dļŁÕōz–…ŻEpŃoˆŹ.yA|0ßčÅŹ}k¾’ń=%{­Ń¾QĢ߆8_šō8–D%^^5S,µĄ £øY-ė8,žŠ*ö8d+‘“–Ź^ĖmøŠ¤—ŲcÜĄ+ćöīŃ÷²RŒÜ·iš!ŖÄø‰č°~†‡2Ä#fčšI$…Ba]ū$ļeöGd6ź¼ž+³ÉÓß ėĮ|Š`יēš'|u»°ĆvœŻĘ~‡f³/ŠĶÄÓÉĢ1Ż*V¢„Ņ²^+Ž‰Uļ)żžQæū`Ž~ɉĻļŽU×Ķ¢aņMš»’™€öČ2uŠĒsfFkÅ/DS¶Ŗ\ĖESßgN>®DĮÖģ9»µœ#¤*1>µ4{1·b·ÄJ„ęĒ+¢‹¹xN³łU|H…Aʀ?K ²÷ņr5MROѐ+›¾bQ!¼Ģõtr6tĄ¢™l†!Ģ\OŽI:į  æ—ņł–D&ĮS3¹Ÿ š!MÄ7·ęIßZ 6źµ%ctŠūļ~ć ¬ŠSļõŠ*Nąƒø„Ø"³éFĶ2Ź\ć ą‚ž8¬+%±ž^ą’®Dd @hččšJ² šo C šAN?æ ’"ń怚I€2š8°Žh¤¬å>‘&2_¢’ģŚP`!šä8°Žh¤¬å>‘&2_¢ @ ų|²žxŚmR=Oć@}»Ž9"Ł9 @ H\œNü€˜Ä"AIDiĪ‘ņ’ ąŠśPRņhØ((ņ?ųT„L…D˜Ł˜qŒ<Ł·³›ēyo,“¼$|pč”Rˆ Łļ÷ZamD¾Ż‹Ė”„%ōkČĄś|™Ā¤ģ¾ ģÕåHx+ŽœŪŽ+śū°ÆX¢Ģ'É+‘S„žåŠbNU/ŌžY¬Ō¼VrĆė$75·ŽõĀS§D©Īńś]¤ )ĀŸ×ųd×?īmacĄ}žņ‰[0wĮƕUtRT½×cåļ¹…Zž{GŁļI?Ōwū®ÆTŗĪÉrÅ`t«R·ŖÕU·UŁI7žzy÷Ÿ×BB’Ŗ+”…Ż$ōtć Yńš|ˆD$WLŚ‡ķ¦‹Ÿž±»™e+˜Ęšcåg¦ ;˜ŗ«!ÓHóŅµƒ'tU%EėQ–€µąd;ąĒ2ā‚tIAfŅ©Ai‘9‘“K­¬a’FČVļ’feĖĒDyīėŹ«Ć&~ØŻµśVˆy®ą·Ś^wl[ońuz‡¹ŽW ź\ēDd ·ččšJ² šN C šA3?æ ’"ń怚g€2šI„®­2žä+‘¢Ē_Æ®’%Ų`!š„®­2žä+‘¢Ē_Æ®ŽĄ (©@2ėžxŚµ•ĻOAĒßĢī–v©i+x0"T X„r1¦ …6r€†Š6z+l ”“‹ø'D#I=ś˜x0!ÄC†£įĄÕƒ<™HL½h°¾7ūä‡æĄmgęķģ›÷™ļģŪé“ Ć Š„`įŒYćµZMX!vÜź«ē¶Ÿ—ƒ\QŠjsł  j䌗Kķe,·U€eŒ_oyya0«_OÓĄ*ø±÷+Ę 6p«3ĢŒŽČŻü¼LVZć Ybsóé×5”õæŪ\ĆÓ“pš'üÕĀ$Ģö`ĒI—śv łe6… æs`r©‡° b@»a“xĢó'±ƒ.5¹wl.Ś]Œ‡ŃČī¹LF¾[ F*—×JĮ„6.ä³S°ßüMßĮŠ6f2ŽĆÅdt’#c? ć‰ÅcĻĮūé;Œ%žĘżtčć…“¦–ÆĆĄŌ‡\¤+}Š`“ęŲŒl’ž?\5]FÅś:FųE8cKĻaPģį\i"aBČmót)õŸ4%MKüŃ®,`‡’icNŒšfi{}łW~§Cu“mE“g²­ä%jåŚĘ&üzļZū;%ėZP^±öŚyfļµéō ¦ŠXr0Ս;źåÜTtr²7[Źö®iCŁq­eē*$k6„Æ0SĢiEzy0ŒßŌ‹Y8 īS-ńrģltØź÷]ŹD‡>·4£}Ģ…j¼zŗZīĶ å÷õQSŽW;3żÕ²čéĮöV?ŃĪL,ÆŅ?źó2ŌĮ8ś‘-ŠŖŅāĢ S•£ŖDÕ÷#‘č|]V›ߞŚ @1ø|÷•¤Ip#r¹3F~:śćŗ©Ūń~±ƒ†5‘ #§a°Ž‹IüĢŃ¼l[ #8”@ė:œĮösNGā-Śēž}Ł™cę„źDļkįkњ4Jŗ–§;Õņ+ŽöœœĢ“D’¼4Sæ­Dd s@ččšP² š S šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š L9U险ļ½k—Śß[X’åņ#ć`!šŻL9U险ļ½k—Śß[X& 'h¦< «žxŚ•TĶkQ’½·»i›’X-ųÅVh°µŸ RiŚ{HlhR<ʤ.ŗ¤iŅlś‘z(X=UšV/ž…*<½ŠžED$‚AjœŁl—R¤ļe꿎ä7ofggŸ@ ¼€D§ D a#!ėõŗ…śÅYŪÖ.x øŅAØ×åÅŌ™LĆGR!¼Cņ„Ų”ćŚm–±téA²\ŠøuJŸ'–wÅ :ų#_ż…5ž[YQz¾¤‘ÓĶĄm}50›Ļ„MüZ#i®A%}•6ż“¹ŁvŽ$l¬D„pdÖ0³3…ø^Lėz,[Źd÷1Eķé¤R¦ņŠ3ĀūŲŶŃŖģ‘e7•ėb—Š.*v–ļĆ«‘åo'Kq¢,…µžZ5²u‘  ŒŽ­©­O»ģś¬śœŗ|ō­‹8a]æq;"3Ź'ĘKyLķĒH”s™üV'ČšµÅżįOÕåÄąēO3‡¦ī=¢S©į”ZĆ IP«į;ķ3š**’;‘{„[ōŹÜ\§Ōųųp"–:ī‹”……É“iĢOåļéńō}Ż„_;Z æbgīצņĖEC/ņŸš«±d ²V*¦q ­—ŗn„ĀŽŖĖ<v] Å«gx©öT·&S„|Ž)^¶"Õ¾ŌtuĖ²LŠŗ1M Ō— §"Už…¼!iRĶ¤”`¬V%ÜlŪ ³2X­@ŖOĘ1.ÕĒƕ4į ‚„ß(ēésaśÓA*怛čQĒq MČC™£<`r¤yŲ!Ļ:'›¬²Ķ°ś48µ;CƼØtOüŗ÷Ņļ”æiĮHĻSČVŗēQąG’D!Sk×żČĆ nÜŁrFÕ=»[ę#×®_nŻf¼fŚˆx'ŗŒ,³"ĆȉwŻ£x¤™ß1°wŻŖėÄņŁfžŲRÜųFÄ74 Ķ‰=oméĢmpéh&`ćŲ•yWF™ēŃõɕķŅ|2ŌIąüo J„Žµ×É YXŌ³oŗŗł\ŪĶaÆļ‡2Ė„/,O—ÄuÕ`hžj˜L«Dd s@ččšP² š S šA?æ ’"ń怚 €2š)“…£dŚÄsņćģ„ĄS0’ćévć`!šŪ)“…£dŚÄsņćģ„ĄS0& 'h¦< ©žxŚ•TĶkQ’½·»±MI¬üĄĘb+4ŲŚO©4m‚=$ŗ)cR]Ņ4i6żH=¬ˆž*x«’BrźUü ō‰`g6Ū„”é{™yæ7łĶ›ŁŁŁ'Š(Æ$ Ń%@C#‘B8HČF£a£qĪ±uČžOB†®vźóųq &ӐT ļ|ķvčø‡åC"S~”Ŗ iŸŅĪēIFgä}q“ĪžČ7a—vV”^ eę +tĒX Ķņ™EÄõ_«s$MĀuؤÆŃf€Öa/ŪĪ“DĶ•ø¹ĶšVīn1i”tsŻH䏣Ü>ę±Ø}&RźĀR¾zAx»ŲĆ6Ś”=²lć–rCģŚEÕÉņƒŲš4³üķf)N”„°×¢Y«f¶’”į‘ѱń5µØõkW<_Ō€[—O¾£u'¬K3¢ą7īDdĘ`„źĘx-©½ąz%Ÿ-,`u’­m^żOÕķĘąē›Č„³‡¦į½¢K©ć±ZĒIX«ć;ķ³š*Ŗ’;‘{„GōŹÜ\—Ōųų؞H÷ĢÅČĀĀTĘ2ē§ Œdę”a!Ø­EPq2jӅå’i”ųOÕD*[+—28¶ĖŻ·ÓQµež?»/E’µ³¼Õzk[SiB’4/[±Zz¦¶e[&iŻ˜!éOGÓ±’"~Ÿ4©fRJ0VH«^¶mFY™¬V Õg˜źÓ·J†paĀļ”¬‚ ō¹0żł•_ĄKōøėø„äa—ĢQž 29֊<ā’gŻ“-V¹V£®Ē]ęY%Y¬J­ÜĘ\7Ż “īøļ1īz$œ„°Yf•=’ß{Å8|Æšķ#·;²ŁĒœ²wķKHŁ£W¬²‘ē7§ŠƒŃź[Qlū?eFöå„Dd ČččšJ² š  C šA ?æ ’"ń怚 €2šęįÓ„…m†¤Ļó-sžf’Ār„x`!šŗįÓ„…m†¤Ļó-sžf*@ ļ„ˆžxŚMQĶJĆ@žŁ4Ś?HbŪƒ ¶ zŌ">@Ņ6ŲC+Ŷx Qƒš¦Rsņā=>Bߥ«= ^}‘x¬³Ū(]2»ß|3;3ł! å€Aų’Éb„Ķēsp=āRģ//Ķ¦Øc†ŠīŠ0ēÉ“T²į7īS)—,e„”noZ~ß(Š* ^q”e:f©Ą7›žˆqą‘Ļ‚4žŚōŻ Æ Ų£xņ©Öüš“ÉPä!Fū>9 OrŽGžŒõ£Žļ’½ŪķW‘®TšõÖ1`ę¼Ó3ŗŻ’=ź\–½+§a_;#ŠäVĒuF…SgR8ó\»šM”ÉeļvŲq†<Z¬Ž*˜wć” kߏ›AåŠh„ŖrbĻü&įœb@h†;aP²©J™īYÕ0ŒNē}•€±gU,3䟔¤‘ž-I ųą$QbĻŅ`Y[ž5”ČBGV…÷"^źl7żŃŲq¹ĒEŠ‰čāŽ²Ž¢|) ž•roŠ‡Dd °,ččšJ² š  C šA ?æ ’"ń怚 €2šér'<÷R‚|@TĶžął’ÅUˆx`!š½r'<÷R‚|@TĶžął€€ąÕ0čē‹žxŚ•TKkQ>÷Ž™“y@’>JIbAɃÄTÜ’&Į, “„B‰&˜‡y”4øPL©n$]ˆ øš"7."čĀ…«ž»påJdŗRLĻÉ‹Ś"ęÜsī¹ßœļÜsļ = R ‡ĄED„„Œ=BG£‘źłČ…qĢH'8="ķĖč]љa FŒbA¢’5hxéŒc” ÅN9Ż»'$Õ,zžro…É6YCļ}õG-ö‰j(XŅ•šÜvܔ»©Q+Ö!ž:īfP5€½8±”½fą13ŖÓļrŗrł\.ŸG=xĒō.Ł”[š™ŚÉŠ®ĻŚšmĮW:œVqNWAž« ¢Ś\Vƒ†lVjĘ$)Ž›šŠŗxŸ¾`>śœĶøŒgpĪźÕJ*tƒż­3|:Æ7QĻAćÖ”¶Ź„N«ä&z]I÷Œē3ģŒž’ÅųtĮšų_»]ž2.ņ•€Åć© GŌ(śp§ ­ Cz8¾ /Éä.d2ūDäi"©Dś:ęÉVź”ju³Ų®Ü 7nĖÉā¹ Vńt÷­l\”U 7¶[¹ÅĮ*$ŅŽčN§U„%X¼d"WCIÅb¾Q%ŚmčƚC D•ĖŹ`³€žÅęfU܅˜2P#A“bč„Ü…H!Ŗš'd6l ”(Ų ‚{g īߥÖĻāšČ‰Ć?÷\@…½„uļüJ_š® €ó&Ÿēų;ø°ūµ0šĒĄī;Vś±Y>i†}ĖJ€4ÄAK eŁó€”YGcœ0Ģx5€–+ó_,’® ÄÕ3×nŠŌŁ{õ_€ŻXOõŚ¹Ęgüų˜Čyw“©ńāuÜzĀDd ,ččšJ² š  C šA ?æ ’"ń怚 €2š$ žg‹ßģfŻiE,ķ Bé’܋x`!šų žg‹ßģfŻiE,ķ Béž`ąĄ:čēĘžxŚuRMkQ=÷Ķ˜flŅE!$¶Š.„&Rŗœč@bØt9Ö”4–ŃÄø’@ŁŁŸPčŗ’ ‹ōt™}ūB˜¬ 5÷=G[üxĢ{Ž}—sļ=ļ–­G€Ą)䊰 ¢‘  mŅ³0£¼øųEļµFÆ ¬a “y™l7Œ²%5ą;ÓÅĀ¬8 nūØÜżģEŲ,ł„D«"KēbŃńõÆj_H9³\kx­ä×I6ī1öK Ū0! ’ÆyĆįMTĘäIŗ{3ęŽĆ$7É$ę.ušut²­.FæĶę&åļ¦jų’Õ詌ž§jÜ-D{óśÖ ‰®qjų{¬a„r‹ˆl+_*”ß+ļjĒV½¾ķ¶jsĶŖWt?y-$"“Ś%“°›D$×<ńkž/‘Š å¤}Öö]<ĮŅó »Ÿß²Šiģ8Vń~cńSĆB`/ƒž¶ĆČ4rŅõķ åģ}ɲļķ2°RNŽ±łYFœx¼X āł4(=£,Ž~ńCó…~™AFą*-gž÷^ä«"ģ+•†ŚšXT»kõ™óE©Ūj{ ¹“‚é©6ļž4Š@G„Dd ÜččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šę.ÅC:–‹Æc¢éBāSµÕ’ĀžŽx`!šŗ.ÅC:–‹Æc¢éBāSµÕ*`  !„ˆžxŚMQĖNĀP=÷–ŠS‹3ŗć$D#6ˆÅ%RB/Š7Ė­x†¢ddŹ£Ž°ōžå«QŸõŹ Ūs›Ā$…dvzn–G9ļTdüQ%lō·Dd $hččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šG»Æž …z•“@_µŽ’õ"‘x`!šķG»Æž …z•“@_µŽB @č#ų|»žxŚ•TMLAžff t!i Š!!ü%š–¦ Fć© 9€ihIM)E7ŅŠRik ' äVOʓāŻƒz€˜x€ÄƒLQ~سF·ŒĒ%ŗĄ_0°NBĒ¼÷ä«”ē©”ĀĄį—ssł,–‡ČpĖ„īŽĒ—§Ø3Ćo€2BōBįŗ ć3`ŗlj•±?7żKģR£z©~lfĢ?’ā˜!Ž&š(Ÿńø­ĘäNą‹[¢6~Ģ¢nÓ¶Źöø©gū5=z™œVģ¹£-÷LęséEŌ×Ć-= mŽ©Ć?š¦IÖņ¶ØŽÅ7¾Ēm^åe’ÅkׁĆ暏ŲÉääŅŗ”ļĢß°®ŌųžØuųźķéūóņü“Æ0_.Ķį¹8@Œæ5¾›ØS×zūÜq^~­_#õŠN8 Ī,(a×ó²—b•X÷­“½Āģ“=5•e.d4>‘øA»žĢ,F²Łįt1so$_‹„hEų\g«ķ–>Ÿk$’ØŃ r>e"Ń])Ņ¤§©·;Z½‰é^ĻķT$ö«»‹šEOzTæ¬W†S„¼ž9U¢zjLÆ–!šˆō§FSQ]>O ]8ŗåŌØ<Œ20²W%jnUS6yߎ€F ד4¬łiŲ( ZūB§WÖ'ĶŸMĖaʬæ‰+ū¢ oČfaēć%2lģŠy?‰2™ƒž(Ję"Öd¤­A8KļÄYečŚæEžĘa߄#§ŁgÉ<^cG†U /^.–“œ|S-oXńNŸ įœEaŲµó*‰Dd t Tččš\² š c š$€€A?æ ’?#"ń æ`怚€2šŁ»æ)Į  ü7›F² qŒ ]’µŁ”x`!š­»æ)Į  ü7›F² qŒ ]Ö  ąqXJ{žxŚcdąd``Īf 2 Ą ĜL0##”ÅČō’’0KQ*Ę WĒƤĄ¤Ą/d©±ń3H1ü)fņYĖ€ųĆ1 aÜP5< ¾‰%!•©  @Ń_L ĄÄŗŒ³E˜¢sXĀL·=¹@īüĶŌš¢r#X=ƒ@Hfnj±‚_j¹BP~nbƒ˜ó‰ry V8pŖœĮj&#Ų.#®F9>VƒJß ģmĶX_‡$ē/bń5ą| 6?Ī7caDŃ_Ę 6Ī’ĄŖæ‚U’ ?:‹’˜€P ø27)?‡”ÜŖ\‹±ū L@ņēvp{īrųŪą|&V_Ī7a€Č£»(ŹÄ‚ꎵ\Sq…3ÄLpwLē™[ĖM\ąTŽ>ˆ] ģ`ŽpŗbdbR ®,.IĶńøŗĄŠA’> 1h:(G÷33X?õ”p›?Dd t|ččš\² š c š$€€A?æ ’?#"ń æ`怚€2šZm"ŌĶ0(ĻóéõCc’kb—x`!šcZm"ŌĶ0(ĻóéõCc’ ` 0®1žxŚcdąd``ödd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:¦&v! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČŚÄŲ¤€ź¹”jx|K2B* RĄv’fZšģ† `[Y˜B2sS‹üRĖ‚ņsóö%}-?Č`u ,@RČįŅF\‹Ų@2š•0¾+ˆÆē?`ń5*!ö= Ó>F0żnÆć° Z•čž` ŃsįžYvæ!ÜżŻ, ¾6{˜€P ø27)?‡”Ü(0ƒ+ž8÷`¼ĄRqn Ų?Ep¾)ˆÆRɍ=.p CL…øE€ĢŪNŒLLJĮ•Å%©¹ H  ąņ33X™énÜÓDd ”TččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š5Ž;ńL*LŽč×¾LŻ’”™x`!š Ž;ńL*LŽč×¾LŻ  ądXJמxŚuRA‹ÓPžę%µnZHŗ«aq£ ‡‚«ČžĖfŪą‚­Ūā1D Zh·’¶t{ŖˆžźŃ‹ąß<Ō߱ɛxń*O‚uę%]”ģ>2™ļĶ¾yó½!lĘkf•cSD"µ\.5Ś„KY¬ VyEå*×Übtżœm,%™—ƶ`üķ«|aŗB–UD#=mOŸE@S³lŸtA}ĆŲŲfōGķi&ą i§ą“»żh讋&īżA?ūŁ!ÆŌ?‘Ļ³‹Ä}āÅb÷g@+j±8ęĖOF¬ĢWTRlČ[$KįE9Uņ’ ɤź:šŖķ Æwõtr•«­épõe'šXéx֛:žJį’”ÕDd ”TččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š7„to‰üÖĻŠČCųXŒL’tœx`!š „to‰üÖĻŠČCųXŒL  ądXJŁžxŚuRĻ‹ÓPžę%µnZHźźAXÜ(蔹dĮK›m£ n„Ų!jŠB»Ń“R{ŖˆžźŃ›½y<Ō?ƛxń*O‚uę%]”ģ>2™ļĶ¾yó½!¬Ę+¦U`SD9"µX,4ŗD§óXI-óŹŹU®¹ĪčĀ1XH2/‡mĪų#ŪWųĀt„<«Œf8zŲ™<Š€–fY>%褜†ŲŲ`ōGmi&ą5i§ątzƒh變ĘīķxīcÆż{ÜeĖ®Ąä’EŽpGøjILNŖ“7”q?£›Čøßż]r“$1w{2ø÷1Žęč‡¢õöpnŅž­ƒrł$¹®ęjYå1­VĮ!U®­÷GuU”•NjÉ\MsØŲķ~GA.Öh7;[ĄśŽ¾×ļļ„ĆŽ½z|?j…¢!*…Uõ*F~›J”?IzQ"‡Ø˜ĶŽė?%!NąųŁMÖøģµRĒ¾x­Ÿ›gŸ²=¤~z>ķŒ».nę§Õ`7éČ6ūé.Æ4?•Ļ³ĖÄ}āÅb÷g@+j±8ę‹ĻF¢Ģ—5Ō2lČ[•$Kįy5Sņ’ ɤöt4SŪAQļ>ééä*ēŚ“į(ČN$4±ŌńØ75tüh’£ŪDd L ”ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š=ś{,AÖ‚Ø„ø=ēś ÉM’IŸx`!šś{,AÖ‚Ø„ø=ēś ÉM¬ą pądßžxŚ„TMhA~3“mŅml’VB±i@iC£­z4i,ŲH1©„”6v1¤)I¤īIŌRTĈńX¼źI”XØąĮƒOž{ō"Y/ŗ¾™ż³1ŚV‡·oŽ{ßūŽĢ>­ģ šĄ:š!į¤„X”†aé49néŚØmē§aĻV{'J§ZŠ7ĘŁņ œ«ķ1~›e凔RĖg“E`[Diåń(—ŽŅ Ūb](ż =»ŸD>x*(ÓZ)W.ĀR·¼ņīDśūŅN"ģ@ ?œ•AøĢjf®ŌŹ‡4äÓėpž”ĆķĮ@Ī÷’Ī™6`ō9ĻH11† p1€cd %µ¾¤.…/—KŹŽGT{JLŒ8}hÕju÷ß0\~ƒńżžAxÓ°aŻĄ ;ļł?¤?±Ōl … ·4bę§ņ`?6²ƒĮ£¼öŁa§2Øh.Kƒqöx¬Z.Æõ°;ŌõWČc©I%šŻOzøJÄ47Ē²—ĮŚęWŸ›e‡“w7{M7čŗÕK‰ŻK¦¦ę‰Ä‹2–Ne†š?›.,$ŠÅ„Zø:ZžW'•kjBRć †˜Å$$–ÆW j…oBȓŹ„“7j:Ą×ӝ¬ILźĮĄ…lbņ[÷ ” 'õ“z}$‹R00Ź—zRfĒõŗŠÄq½9ŽB"šĖ&už$~‚5 2"Xā4e,¬gł«0ģ¤ŠĘw(܎"U™zV”Čć=”­tDbhś†åńżiB¹üžÕ0&Īēī kö’åPód–æꠙ;׳"›čjypä~3wėåÆ>~nē½žĄ„8o»÷ŁĆ¾£ęķ ‚Whß dIk՚Zā_²e V¼_osī8śŸšKb5Dd ܐččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š—X›õ@¢³8,O”7ć’s$£x`!škX›õ@¢³8,O”7ć` `!€x½3hß9žxŚ­V]HÓQ?÷Žż§n‹}X‚åĒ&dźXĶzœ:1clÓDÖŖ‘ēÜfŲūRĀžV/ōāCą«/R03ė!šÉ^""č!č„ģ“’č:÷’ßW6ŪßŃe÷žĻ=;ēüĪļÜó’ PĄ6€'%$#šN§Eé(©ĶčŌ4k§”×é9S5JĶJ-ŌAšćŠį\Ay§Ńp=Ō+ ōłĒ‡½ń±Ą˜„ŠĒ£\ŚO—ÉfEJ›Ō“żRĢēO…`z:O<]Ø8)ؒNĻĻ‰~œD“³’ nWč0—rå±_©åľZ”śX<6ÆßžĀ*ĄØÖŹĢi·ü% ņŻ™<>•Ļ#iÉćIł<‚52y¬—Ėc•<$ŒÆ[%x,ļĒdFU­ äńyo<¦ jõö ĢóxZžy¼«—y_Ź= ņ$ŒńI‘Įą7 ČgFw8ä…½ń°Ęļ cŽ¬ cn»<Œ<C9Œ}8[¬­w»Óķnw›  p[8Mēk¬&©‘`ėšV2Ļ2Jld'Wņ_øĘ øŚa'WR&WMƒįtE"Ļ¶ee–ĶyØ(‚T¬Ÿ—b£Ķ!ńŲ‘čp4: üÅīŖóxIVä‹uć÷RĢŖsx•8;-f‹Ål¶h”‹t•Õ(ékŚLWčFę õdßPżżoˆĄĆōzś¼ēlpŌ62Ņķ/ō„/\žK腝•Ö³L†z”'|9 DłŸ Wōyö+ćQ? ŅŌhOō³¹R:ķ)ŸĶõ£±åZ¤ģ©Ć©D·%¶‡_öT›Ļ‘Jˆš.¼^s `kóõśģ)ž³i5KC(,Aī Dž*^°inėńĢ7³V©ŠÓxS‚ŠĀĶI‰R+PÅ­N褊™Ē,Ā€2É2‚ś™g,Ź€Išnih² čęĶvo/CĄÕf0£ł#6,zę|fŪ³>b¬B§|\g‰øYõ$_¦²ź¢ČąÜ3_x/äæHųw §Ų=RĻé BÜ-‰ß:X×&O<6ńo$dĒn=ĪDżo’-”›Dd t|ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šżonrfLģĘŖŌˆ;82cž’ŁY§x`!šŃonrfLģĘŖŌˆ;82cž† `0Ł#0®ŸžxŚ“1KĆPĒļ]ŚŚ¦ŃʶŚ"‚ƒØŠRÄUčØPEŚź ­PØ`mµ…„ą'GG?‹ ‚ NĪ~ÅAAŒļŽKŸt1į’ū]ž¹w¹waŠ®æ@ čšs aĻCĘ\”ć8ĀĖ°¤ +e“Qī"0‰Įä|ŽsnĆ ®»ę+ķZÉnVŹäŃ”oŠįć–f2wēżäÅPƶźüÄż/©‰“² x9JœW|7H¼Ŗ8)x[ńŹóäĖõ{ó]čijŠ3ŗ7ßnțļ>H¼§ųA#žPœœU|„Ä抟x±+ūe9’ėŠū‹źŪ+<‰™°ŻuO™¬ć—}A~šE»¾ŽŲ„NŽššn’µ/rTūs#Eś§_&qMq<ā}n^ž zūł žQ|ć'ŽQl>S< ’uwbu1Õ²jł­&ō ŗ’C-Ś­vµN¤»SLMų«§šˆį`„·=Dd ° @ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šŸ^ ļ-zIˆ(‚Š)„å’{ō©x`!šs^ ļ-zIˆ(‚Š)„år€š AžxŚcdąd``¶dd``baV ęd‚±˜”,F¦’’’ƒYzŒP1nø:&¦~! KŸAŠį?H1ƒČ:Äü Ē€†qCÕš0ų&–d„T¤20€ķžĶŌšģ† KX˜B2sS‹üRĖ‚ņsó|‚æ–‡1Xƒ Ōr8€“W£ČI±µ0>/HeœæŽ Ä÷óUĄüh8æ€Ä/„óē°3¢˜×ĆjŽ/fß”ŸÕ¼=LØꉀłÕµXü AąŹÜ¤ü†r Ą%V.uģžeӐüżŒ¤BnO*?‰•ŸĆˆź.+ß®– ;\ą„Ų q«;˜·ēŒLLJĮ•Å%©¹ H   Ē Ä­Œ Ģ`qćwX—Dd Ć@ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š{™žw½~X`Ktv)¤^Y’Wn«ć`!šO™žw½~X`Ktv)¤^Yņ ŲŠ žxŚcdąd``žÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu…QäŒąÆ˜ģæE>ü”#[‚"ņśĀ ¼~S“ķ79Ž„_ŽOCA^°5ļ”kü&øéÖF‡§;~w„ć%»m&®Rø•xŅÆ>>’[­ŽĢtDd Œ |ččšJ² š4 C šA1?æ ’"ń怚€2šÖ i02\œŻąæ`S“Ź%’²é°x`!šŖ i02\œŻąæ`S“Ź%ą`(0®xžxŚ’½JAĒgē._—h±)‚JK…” *!‰ ˆrFM ^g­ –)ó‚6y{}ÅB-i4)Ų®µ+Į‰P…øŒ~”ž‚–-mIčÜSø õy“hį£Mēüʋ­¼JąVŽ|ƕŁń:™RÓÆĆVł£³+M or µ×ŠÓ—Žž#.1_;ÄĢ¶ā}ęb‚ų”yĶ&^dĪZĆłŗH¼Ąü ÄÅ@ד ’WŖē×õ/źŸfĄ[Åłą¾”¼Ürą×› čdąÉvś£ś¦÷Aī_7MŠ6×s>N¼Äü™ęĖųpæöbÄėĢ¹(ńs#B|Ē¼ š3AŽš2}J]› 1Ej.b¶“ŚžO䘩¢¢FõŠRń_ˆ{uhżDd l|ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š_šJć–3x‚©ĢśOÜš”0’;]³x`!š3šJć–3x‚©ĢśOÜš”0Ņą`0®žxŚcdąd``~ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuž‘ėąIģĀh=­6l]všä)ŗ‰™•Ś× AŹdŻBōß%‡n„Ć˜ˆ‰Œ7œšn0ūżv£ń†0£#„Zµ~¤ĪŻ¶Žlģž{Uģ\;¦}ćō ׯ–ÓĖž:ƒģY§e·‘T‚-’įbēĪsO$‘ UėYć¾ļŁXĘāfĘ•öuÓ×ŌcK7?3„ÓŖßš·żQĮ"¤©EaF†Ÿ³ŹžHFņdŹōœU² _|ŗš`tĘIˆFl(‹#F¤„_ož[ń ÉȌG é½ČW£>[µaÆļ“„'H ÉģģÜ<r>(ØČų/J{l=üDd Ø|ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2š^Ģė²9@ģ¾%vskü!8’:Ž·x`!š2Ģė²9@ģ¾%vskü!8Ņ@`–0®žxŚcdąd``~ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuźy@Uu™–ż„DstĄ}€Oq’„ÖĮÜ…x=³6jŸv[īqtq2NåŚĒ°ĮJŖn:’7Ųįa'.c2揞D/šżś7»ŃxAŒųH±V©ļéćfĒjµņnæyVčž{U÷Āė#«7Ū^?{č ³GŻ¶ŪAJ‹¶HÅ Ż+æéł2‰”^©gķėļbS+{\ܲŖiģ;Võ=³ĢxŽ°ŲĮZ0Ī;ŒL£ ĶŲrN)«ČŪ›+ē;Ÿe$‰ļA‚…I fCƒ\q&Eæ}Öü’ÜŹ ”#?<š˜TŽ£z5ī³Zõ^[z’$]eĪżēQĶĄ5’Ł+kīäDd ŠTččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šFG|—·¦‡ģ rŽ Ė5’"^¼x`!šG|—·¦‡ģ rŽ Ė5|€ šłXJčžxŚSĻkQžŽŪMk7ŻX{(”6 öźJ9d›¬l$˜ĖŖ‹’®Ż¤¤{²é5Žģ±’FA$ž^zõ.جQŒ3o7-“ö Ć>ę{ófēŪłę­Ą  ½€Ä>Ų2“¤)r<+t[Ģ§±¬œäådAī鳄–§L,`ĢÉd­įcZe8”rŁ4+‡š×ь^ś@]U™įz’Ń5ł ¶@č§\S•€7B9 «Łīś½ĀCPxt½-l6¾Z“’„» "Ü¢ u„Uƒc|RŒER{O|MkżžæŚBł/8V¢‘œp<ĄyĮIÄшŗO‚eŠžš2>^öż ‡€qŹĮ…į=yĘ²-žŅÉ–åićķæuR Gr?ŌÓIµZŸ‘įWŖZs ˜}ÜŽ²;uÆ×~Z žłuļ¹ßC>s^ż–~M>S vĀ¶ņ!ņz­Ypvū”‡«ør}ÉVļŲõŲ2ļ»vżŪŅ"į9ÓFģÄ7ćįŗKČ2+ģ†N\t7ā”Š”ÉæŚ `ŻŖėÄüŲfNPB’‘‚śŌ z5Hżõ-”śA „k<«,gŃķ/RŪłÖāģ¶ņŲTź%š[˜V»wź? ®Ø×÷»¼c!uLģ²Éj*ž囄;nDd ĢččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šŠ\f7£<{Ē93‹šN”’¬Bæx`!š¤\f7£<{Ē93‹šN”’ Ą!ąˆR4xtržxŚ­V_H“Q?÷ŽĻmĪÕ6Ķ°ü·Ił°±Ņzœŗ5eĶ?=ˆŒUKźŚ¦ŲISDŸ&bf=ōA õ°z“^‚Ä ‘žŠ^"ęC‰®sæoߜ6sĪ.»ßw8÷œó;æ{īŻłä°E@98)! ‰Šx<.J§Č±„.ŹvŗJ£Ę”*Z(87Ę”ĆEł9Ī#Ą zä%¬4Šäéļn ßōLƒ µæqUā ˜Xˆż‡€( d$\ŹåŲTZ]!_%(­Sćę{Ń}š§M€‚®%Ü{Õ߃uØPŖ—-kƒm8EŠPįģįŒD7€Ž°Œ¼BŽŖ3‰=ŖTĻ¦MÅ÷æ0:S0¦ņ3Ģ’ćnłKō<ĪĶĒŻlylA0f7öąńi<†R0–Š2Į@sūć1œ²WOŽgXĻŁ×ćii†õø—m=*ČåĽ؉ĆpŒV_Æ7dhö\ž^OģÅCÄąĻdŠ«ē‰„RDæĄĮPvcRe’1¢dF)a<Ü<(“Ā$G³»Ŗ.Wµ«½¹’~ʅ2śŠŲYv‰F©¼‹²“ł/üĀ)ül°“ɒŸ&‰Įp:ū]Ā”Jf%‡X¤tēīĮ^l“I$;ģą]VT ē52Ž3R|8MåŅŻ„ÕżĮoæŁ«t{]k-f‹Ål¶˜›§ t½č­¤’>ińįķæÆóˆ¼ūńžDØܟŚŚÖHO£±„©µ»Š_Ÿµ§§Žņ]kš_÷:=]ŽčsvVJĻ õ9 ž Ļ䋠šZ ¶[żA䃏Xn‹4ž¶:c:ķ·Õł³¼ åB­b¶ŲÉX¤Ž’NŪĄ_[Ģä¶Ē"¢¦ß·ķ(XMīF·-ĘV­†ąÖŠÜ;āž©qĆɘŲ`”bę˜¬’*1† ¦ĀD-ŌRaü% 0 LZ `/ƂŒŠ<’Ā·gĄDÕć‘Q;ZMäWX(ŒŗųfĪušG'oäf0cˆ¬[Œ&{Įdµģ“>>&“&é5źŲIVńĒ°¬N‹Š<·ą®É(ķ<…­ožECĄ!žLł[Eņ½Ī¹”¢öµhµØh ‡ś½½"„„5$ā„žs–¼WLŌ’śćŸ¹äDd ŠTččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚€2šFG|—·¦‡ģ rŽ Ė5’"°Ćx`!šG|—·¦‡ģ rŽ Ė5|€ šłXJčžxŚSĻkQžŽŪMk7ŻX{(”6 öźJ9d›¬l$˜ĖŖ‹’®Ż¤¤{²é5Žģ±’FA$ž^zõ.جQŒ3o7-“ö Ć>ę{ófēŪłę­Ą  ½€Ä>Ų2“¤)r<+t[Ģ§±¬œäådAī鳄–§L,`ĢÉd­įcZe8”rŁ4+‡š×ь^ś@]U™įz’Ń5ł ¶@č§\S•€7B9 «Łīś½ĀCPxt½-l6¾Z“’„» "Ü¢ u„Uƒc|RŒER{O|MkżžæŚBł/8V¢‘œp<ĄyĮIÄшŗO‚eŠžš2>^öż ‡€qŹĮ…į=yĘ²-žŅÉ–åićķæuR Gr?ŌÓIµZŸ‘įWŖZs ˜}ÜŽ²;uÆ×~Z žłuļ¹ßC>s^ż–~M>S vĀ¶ņ!ņz­Ypvū”‡«ør}ÉVļŲõŲ2ļ»vżŪŅ"į9ÓFģÄ7ćįŗKČ2+ģ†N\t7ā”Š”ÉæŚ `ŻŖėÄüŲfNPB’‘‚śŌ z5Hżõ-”śA „k<«,gŃķ/RŪłÖāģ¶ņŲTź%š[˜V»wź? ®Ø×÷»¼c!uLģ²Éj*ž囄;üDd Ø|ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚 €2š^Ģė²9@ģ¾%vskü!8’:”Ęx`!š2Ģė²9@ģ¾%vskü!8Ņ@`–0®žxŚcdąd``~ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuŅc1#@ĖI&×N0„׊ŽlŖœ?—5ļ|ך‚ßyš¼Ėm=Ķģõ°ł¾u½ć¶¤ŹåG†·Tߧßń 6žG_Xž0RÉŁči[]?x™Õ[ż9a­ŲS›X`¦jwŁ\!|ĆĶ= ęµH'q¢Yą¦Ø‹fż³gü?¼_VHDd “|ččšJ² š! C šA?æ ’"ń怚"€2šŖkiŠūØS’GåĻ)²«’†ĻŹx`!š~kiŠūØS’GåĻ)²«– `%0®LžxŚ’ĮJĆ@†’4m“ *(ŅCš *(E<‹Wъ˜zo…€‚±b!7Į£GßAŠ‹O>…‡¾€āAAŒ;»ŪĮ^Ü0É|»2’ģFĄœm!oh‚‡+Ć£QFB˜LPY–*[³f®auu)ņ&e¶PĄJ#”ü ³;Ć:0#õ £ ŠīeGā,ŗ‹ų$żŠŒ”æ=M[ —³)r(«°Ļ/ŗųÖŹK”ō„°sœ&ƒh7É£ż~Ś;ÅNüžČP“Ģ7…Ŗµę_‹å:Æ“Š?9ĢK–›Īļõ+b^“üę½Bū‰Ź’ł!õ|µ¾Žš¬ö¼0u@7Būų£o’Wéa’ł¦œh×üįø¾u²żTY±aūyt™Ļ-Šo-ÆC³oNŠW§¬«ho!jŠīÕ!ˆęćb%)“oN•MćöĄQó?¤bö@Dd `|ččšJ² š" C šA ?æ ’"ń怚#€2š¢Cœ KTӐ2`Y×ø’~Ķx`!švCœ KTӐ2`Y×ø†`XŁ 0®DžxŚR=KĆP=÷&MMZ0Ø ˆCé uPŠ›"ø‰1ķ*­Ø`¬ŠBy›££?”³ĄÅ”?Ęą ‹‚ń¾»ųĀMĪ¹÷¼wļ†ŽÉ Š«$ņ 1‘CÄyž“Ck.W)tUī2ŹK‚6ƒE¬#×bÄĀ§‚ž$¦°*śŠÓTŃźśmu›],Höƒķ½|‰m²gÆšŽK- ŖŚē'×r«| £gÄķ«,ÖNÓqķ|õnp’¼;F€¦;“LÆŻč @W”²ŽT³śż®ē°uŪ’īėżŁ|_ j•“āLĶxĆÓ|«ą}žékB/ĘW£ąū°ū’šÅņĉŹ.×JāяīēŻ‹õŅÆŖÆ*r‹ĢTķ.Ū+FŁ°gós=QĆQši¹)jĄ¼;šLž†$]£żDd l|ččšJ² š# C šA!?æ ’"ń怚$€2š_^h 偦&oĢ„’*)JŚ2’;WĻx`!š3^h 偦&oĢ„’*)JŚ2Ņą`0®žxŚcdąd``~ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu5Ø^ Gß’”R?(¢cg•į,ŗżjŪ æĘZ\ŽV¾ÓU„^¬¹…;j÷MżĵŚCæĖ;RĒĢnš¬¦ā’„ž:Dd “|ččšJ² š% C šA#?æ ’"ń怚&€2šœæšmƒˆĢčkZĢš%*Ey’x5Ōx`!špæšmƒˆĢčkZĢš%*EyŠ `%0®>žxŚ’æKĆPĒæwIÓ&-\éD‡JqQœ\ÜT¤©{*ŒURossõOč_”‹ƒŠą?ąP'”ńżHźbĀ%÷y÷½Ü½{!ų€sL£ u5¤ł¼š˜ØņˆĖ²ŌŽ.­Wkm«ėpĀ‘æ*½-o(•”ä7é½H{okRß®4œŽ&WCq—‰®żĶsŻžTQøŒpx„yt–Ń`œnqŅ“}øņŁ“ ?Ž½`JIKEvçMÅ}Ė]ĶŪ–ó†āsĖN=?cÅĖTĻ?„É7żGå’ś'żž“ū˜įŽS QÕļ{æ÷1ĆÕćs˜ų’9²¼ĆXd—ćGrįŁ ņæęhś ;ĻŲUŠžŖS ōɚ,S+DSÓ«žˆy3ł$Ķ©,WG©²e{vōś½¬b$…Dd ÜččšJ² š& C šA$?æ ’"ń怚'€2šē{;AcQ'›rkóż"’ĆoÖx`!š»{;AcQ'›rkóż"*`  !„‰žxŚMQĶNĀ@žv "?¦Eä`bMō@āOŒ@FĮx¬U%”@ {ņāƒWߥ^}ŸĆ˜z2g—j˜t:ßüģĢģ· Q@I3€£!aRĪX€ŸN§ķ²Õ ēu >fē,Eh{AŦ¢˜D#^"›„VĻ¤ń *Ŗ5øix=ØÉ.Qя “ĀĮŽ©šĶĒ?r<Š]­§Õ=ē¢ŪĘ0OŃ^$öT© ›¤LÖķ#D’rčF8ˆ‰˜ČøŽ„÷‚Łļ’³›Ķ7„)Õ«C uÖźčķvĮź·.‹Ż+»f]Ū}$ƍ–c÷³'ö0{Śu¬’J°E2\ģŽŗ-ŪI$CÕFÖøø–±ø‘1F„=½ękź‘©×>3ė„ÓŖßš·üQĮ$¤©EaF†Ÿ3ĖžHFņdļĖōœY2 _|ŗš`tĘIˆFl(‹#F¤„^wž[ń ÉȌG é½ČW£>›uÆ?°į ’B2;;7Ļ£œ *2ž =Šlę­Dd ¼|čč_1098173118’’’’’’’’śĪĄF –¢@Ć –¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’]CompObjłū’’’’^fObjInfo’’’’ü’’’’`½Į«`K$Ø ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ƒR‚)†"ƒP ˆ0ƒy ‚(ˆ0‚)†a"…”‚(„Į‚)†=„·ƒq‚[ˆ1†"„Į‚]‚[ƒR†"ƒL‚]†"„ăq„Įž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’aĒ_1098173207ųž’ĪĄFąŲ¢@ĆąŲ¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’eCompObjž’’’’ffObjInfo’’’’’’’’hEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’iz_1101555748a’’’’ĪĄFą ,¢@Ć€”-¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’k½Į^€2¼Ø )†"…”‚(„Į‚)†"„Į†=†"„·ƒq‚[ƒR†"ƒL‚]†"„ăqž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesCompObj’’’’liObjInfo’’’’’’’’nEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’oę_1098171914’’’’’’’’ ĪĄF@¼6¢@Ć@¼6¢@ĆTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įrž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½Į)°| „¾‚(ƒR‚)†=„øƒqOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’sCompObj ’’’’tfObjInfo’’’’ ’’’’vEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’wE„Įž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q¢ĮQųLŃ „¾‚(ˆ0‚)†=„ø‚[ƒq„Į†+ƒq‚{ˆ1†"„Į‚}„·‚]_1098180723’’’’’’’’ĪĄFä?¢@Ćä?¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’yCompObj ’’’’zfObjInfo’’’’’’’’|Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’}m_1098172021¼ĪĄF`’J¢@Ć`’J¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj’’’’€fž’’’ž’’’„ž’’’ž’’’‡ž’’’ž’’’Š‹ŒŽž’’’ž’’’“ž’’’ž’’’–—˜™š›ž’’’ž’’’žž’’’ž’’’”¢£¤„¦ž’’’ž’’’©ž’’’ž’’’¬­®Æž’’’ž’’’²ž’’’ž’’’µ¶·ø¹ŗ»ž’’’ž’’’¾ž’’’ž’’’ĮĀĆÄÅž’’’ž’’’Čž’’’ž’’’ĖĢĶž’’’ž’’’Šž’’’ž’’’ÓŌÕž’’’ž’’’Ųž’’’ž’’’ŪÜŻŽßž’’’ž’’’āž’’’ž’’’åęēž’’’ž’’’źž’’’ž’’’ķīļž’’’ž’’’ņž’’’ž’’’õö÷ųłśūž’’’ž’’’žž’’’ž’’’ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²q½Į-Ø·„Ķ „¾‚(ˆ0‚)†>„¾‚(ƒR‚)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qObjInfo’’’’’’’’‚Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ƒI_1101555163ó ĪĄFNX¢@ĆNX¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’…CompObj’’’’†iObjInfo’’’’’’’’ˆEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’‰Ó_1101555121’’’’’’’’ĪĄF€h^¢@Ć€h^¢@ĆāĮ·@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A   d„Įr ‚* d„·h†== †"-ƒq ˆ2 „Čy„Ätˆ1†++„²b–[–]„Ätˆ1†++„²b–[–]†"-„·h„Čy–{–} ˆ2ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮ™@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_EōOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’‘CompObj’’’’’iObjInfo’’’’’’’’”Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’•µ_A   d„Įr ‚* d„²b†== „Ät„·hH†"-L–[–]„Ätˆ1†++„²b–[–]†"-„·h„Čy–{–} ˆ2ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²q_1101555192’’’’’’’’"ĪĄF0Kl¢@Ć0Kl¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’œCompObj!#’’’’iObjInfo’’’’$’’’’ŸEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ ¶_1101555239éC'ĪĄFp{¢@Ćp{¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’§CompObj&(’’’’ØiāĮš@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A   d„Įr ‚* d„Ät†== „·h„Čyˆ1†++„²b–[–]„Ätˆ1†++„²b–[–]†"-„·h„Čy–{–} ˆ2ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A   d„Įr ‚* dƒq†==ˆ0‚.ObjInfo’’’’)’’’’ŖEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’«#_1101555371’’’’’’’’,ĪĄFPVŒ¢@ĆPVŒ¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’°ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮČ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  P 0y CompObj+-’’’’±iObjInfo’’’’.’’’’³Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’“ä_11015554269>1ĪĄF~•¢@Ć~•¢@Ɓ0–(–)†"-P 0y R–(–)˜ļ˜ļ†==˜ļ˜ļ„øq„Ätƒq„Įr†"-„øq„·hƒqˆ1†"-„Įr–[–]R†"-L–[–]‚.ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’¼CompObj02’’’’½iObjInfo’’’’3’’’’æEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ą[āĮ?@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  P 0y 0–(–)†"-P 0y R–(–)†<<ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathTy_1101555425’’’’’’’’6ĪĄFŠ„ž¢@ĆŠ„ž¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ĘCompObj57’’’’ĒiObjInfo’’’’8’’’’Épe EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŚ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†==ˆ0‚,ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathTyEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Źö_1101555420*4;ĪĄFč­¢@Ćč­¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ĪCompObj:<’’’’Ļipe EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŚ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†==ˆ0‚,ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathTyObjInfo’’’’=’’’’ŃEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ņö_1101555439’’’’’’’’@ĪĄF“¢@Ɛ“¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ÖCompObj?A’’’’×iObjInfo’’’’B’’’’ŁEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’Ś[_1101555455/MEĪĄFP*½¢@ĆP*½¢@Ćpe EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮ?@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  P 0y 0–(–)†"-P 0y R–(–)†>>ˆ0Ole ’’’’’’’’’’’’ąCompObjDF’’’’įiObjInfo’’’’G’’’’ćEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’äöž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŚ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†==ˆ1‚,_1101555487’’’’’’’’JĪĄF°ŲĒ¢@Ć°ŲĒ¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’čCompObjIK’’’’éiObjInfo’’’’L’’’’ėž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŚ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†==ˆ1‚.Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ģö_1101555499HWOĪĄF0óĶ¢@Ć0óĶ¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’šCompObjNP’’’’ńiž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  †"¶‚[P 0ObjInfo’’’’Q’’’’óEquation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ōę_1101555555’’’’\TĪĄF@OŚ¢@Ć@OŚ¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’üy ˆ0–(–)†"-P 0y R–(–)‚]‚/†"¶„Įr˜ļ˜ļ†==˜ļ˜ļ„øq„Ätƒq†++„øq„·hƒqR†"-L–[–]†>>ˆ0‚.ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qCompObjSU’’’’żiObjInfo’’’’V’’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’+_1101555719RYĪĄF€‘é¢@Ć€‘é¢@Ćž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’    ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’"ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’ž’’’'ž’’’ž’’’*+,ž’’’./01234ž’’’6789:;<=>?@ž’’’Bž’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’āĮ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  †"$˜ļ„Įr ˆ0 †"Īˆ0‚,ˆ1–(–)ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjXZ’’’’iObjInfo’’’’[’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’ āĮē@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†<<„Įr ˆ0ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathTy_1101555718’’’’’’’’^ĪĄF@¹ņ¢@Ć@¹ņ¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObj]_’’’’iObjInfo’’’’`’’’’pe EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮē@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr†e"³„Įr ˆ0Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’_1101555747’’’’’’’’cĪĄF gż¢@Ć gż¢@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’CompObjbd’’’’iž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qāĮł@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įr ˆ0 †>>„Įr ‚*ObjInfo’’’’e’’’’Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’_1097586981’’’’’’’’hĪĄF œ £@Ć œ £@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’ ž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMicrosoft Equation 3.0 DS Equation Equation.3ō9²qĀ˜)o q„Į„Äž’ ’’’’ĪĄFMathType 4.0 Equation MathType EFEquation.DSMT4ō9²qCompObjgi’’’’!fObjInfo’’’’j’’’’#Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’$1_1099820590’’’’’’’’mĪĄFK£@ĆK£@ĆOle ’’’’’’’’’’’’%CompObjln’’’’&iObjInfo’’’’o’’’’(Equation Native ’’’’’’’’’’’’)ęĖĮŹ@6Mł6GčļDSMT4WinAllBasicCodePagesTimes New RomanSymbolCourier NewMT Extra!ED/APōG_APņAPōAōEō%ōB_AōC_AōEō*_HōAō@ōAHōA*_D_Eō_Eō_A  „Įrž’ą…ŸņłOh«‘+'³Ł0œ˜ ÄŠäšü $0 L X d p|„Œ‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”ž’’’ž’’’—˜ž’’’š›œžŸ©”¢£¤„¦§Ø™Ŗ«¬­®Æ°±²³“µ¶·ø¹ŗ»¼½¾æĄĮĀĆÄÅĘĒČÉŹĖĢĶĪĻŠŃŅÓŌÕÖ×ŲŁŚŪÜŻŽßąįāäż’’’åęēčéźėģķīļšńņóōõö÷ųłśūüżž’šJ² š' C šA%?æ ’"ń怚(€2šRzķ’-ČTŁZ›Ų“X;Ŗ8’ėōŲx`!šćRzķ’-ČTŁZ›Ų“X;Ŗ8Ś``@ż+0®±žxŚ“=KA†g7—ÆK4g F£H°-MA°«(bb”(¼DĶA¼F,-ż"V–v‚XˆųDÄŅVŃJńÜŁŪL\Hå{;ĻĪ;7;s· ¢WĄaš Šå-‹3¦,Ę=Ļ“Ö$ėWk1ŅÅy…W†’Ā % ŠĮ|+¬+1²āõi”)M7œ­’»[ØČÜ_üčGnN0)·UtķĶś4ēÄĀ·a¦ ÅĻęŖLź¦ĄĻ 1ēĢ3¶>ˆž}·ÅßČńs?ņq²Oē‡¤×£ūŸŗ‘·ˆ/ŗg‰ßczü”‰čń5.÷OüĀōųšćż>g½’õTŸ™źó4BØpUąłŠß:> Ļtæ¾ßT§Ą”'ÅĻāļĶ‚°¤y¶ē#E·įTm$Œ2¤—©ŃéČõ_ļƒFlDd ļ TččšJ² š( C šA&?æ ’"ń怚)€2šĪt=0’p©…ąt;×Ģ5ę’Ŗ”Ūx`!š¢t=0’p©…ąt;×Ģ5ęĪ€  XJpžxŚcdąd``Ng 2 Ą ĜL0##”ÅČō’’0KQ*Ę WĒƤĄŌ (d©±ń3H1ü)fņYĖ€ŲAįŠ0nØßĒŒŹ‚T† č/&ˆ`b]FˆŁ"LQ ®, –0Ó-ĘÓĢ wžfjųQ9¬ž‰A $37µXĮ/µ\!(?71Į'ųky(ƒ0@ĶdŪeÄÕĄX(’)¬„ńæņ‚ų±p>+˜ļē7sųApžON?ĪwåD5Ļ„ÄׄóŸ€ĆR£‹ū™€P ø27)?‡”Ü(ŠĀĀµ»ū™Ąō$œē©(Ū³žÄׅóŸr£ņ£9@ü „æŲQå½Ł@|[8_’Ä/‚óćY@ümp~Ŗü;ß õ\Š˜ē§ˆÆ a!ĄĄęķ§'F&&„ąŹā’Ō\ šĄ¦ Ē%$,˜€©W9fȄDd ÜččšJ² š) C šA'?æ ’"ń怚*€2šę]¢Ÿ}Ś8@ę“2“/„’Ā Žx`!šŗ]¢Ÿ}Ś8@ę“2“/„*`  !„ˆžxŚMQĖNĀP=÷P¦Edab¤ščĀÄGˆ@FĮø¬U%į•ƒ¬ÜøĒOąüøõücźJ#Ī½TƤÓ9óø3sĻeˆJš= “rĘÄųt:•h­±8’«Kš1;g)BŪk˜ŠbtBx‰¬N­žHćAU»Sö *»DE?.Š ;¦>Ą’Čuš(va“žV¶/ŗ- rżŽÄ²åŚē AŹdŻBōß%‡n„lLÄDĘNx/˜żö?»ŃxE˜Ń‘b­R?RgĶŽŃjåmÆyYč^9UūŚń כmĒÓOœ~ŚmŪ$•`‹døŠ½u›Ž+’H†*uŻ¼ė»6–±ø‘1GÅ}£źkź‘eT?2ė„ÓŖßō·üQŽ"¤©aF¦æc•ü‘ŒäČŽ—;VŃ2}ńj‚Ń='!±”@,Ž‘zxQÜynÅ 0”%#35,HļY¾õŁ¬ ½¾Óž )$³³só<Źx§ "ćæcIl’Dd ˆ@ččšJ² š“ C šAf?æ ’"ń怚€2šw7žK8ŽśOvģ0rŚ²Ø’SWŚŲ`!šK7žK8ŽśOvģ0rŚ²Øņ@0= žxŚcdąd``žÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpuŌ^“ä¬v‹Ļ+Æż ņ‚7¢>ub°Š^ķø~w“NŻ0ķŃõ ^?’Õ9ĆuVõ>ļ ņ•ö‹IĪiŸÄȋŚ…čpžAxøĪLˆ¼”½Źu“<3čžÉę6½³c½ņ?!¤œ+z¦S#™Čą”Ÿ¬Fļ+ģV×ō®_›@ˆļž?žb›Dd °@ččšJ² š• C šAh?æ ’"ń怚€2šz–Š–U8øųņĮ}±‚³’VŁŽŲ`!šN–Š–U8øųņĮ}±‚³€ Ÿ žxŚm‘ĮJĆ@†’¤M‹O"=¢„ˆOŅŠ"M½[!PĮX”•4·>‚GŸĆ³‡žś<ō$gf“E„ “oęĻĪģ¬AšŒmČŖ±5ØņHRź*ŠB½c³SʚN×"Š"Ųfo澅]"FļdoÅÖ €Ö,5-\Žfćaž˜WZū‹ߌž„(|B4¼K“i§ŸdĮ$=ą"žĢ®ŁT€.|ž1lš~Ž˜×ŗdóŠ_jĀĒ›ŹŽĻčÆ~®÷ķ:ž€ÕÆéoŒ(ĪÓŪÉ=²ĘAų“¾?£ūūÆ>ū¾(ę®NŪ>w| ›Ėi…:Q{Ŗķ%B ō¦o`ˆöā|:KR!łĖGµžĻŹöbąiü.yIz?Dd t ųččšJ² š– C šAi?æ ’"ń怚€2š”sSŃ_Ŗ+å—2FäC¬=’}ńąŲ`!šusSŃ_Ŗ+å—2FäC¬=ź Ąąq`\CžxŚµVĻOA~3³…²ō'čĮ„H! ¤µ ŽM(ŠČ ŚXj «mB©“UÜ`£‚1ܟɘp1ž ^H ‡’·ŁqģDńŪ *įģ”OeĄDŗ€¼L.šŖ‰ŻU/=-›*’Ļ›0&u *¼©«rż#•ÖÆbŠŠ<ØŠ&UÉćŁßņhęDćÓÆ?ššÖĘc¾ćrc5Čćym<2:F7Ķˆźiė¦Æ›T“<"*nŠøĄqŃX$i;™µŽĒB3P7{ś*Q1¾ŅżM[ĆØÄ­OĒȐ£ *ʍµ­ņt ^Œ^ßAŗ¢Uä;2[C©ÄdŹWĄ`§éæbR ćŪW’xōźāŽ„AŹWÆ¶IÉ×”ø#7¬ !3ŁÅÖŪĀr1ßÅFŻĘqRa9½‹£Æ Čą¶T&KåjņEmYrčėX ²°Žę,Y£Ń°žyć>žÅUķ¦¹E 7Ķųų5"ņt ūGżXįG¢3®éé”P2zĢŸŠŒ…ND’`7ī­•i<¬¢;~*$ø¬ĀhĄę™K%BŠ †ŽvOvxk,g1]c_ŚŪPŽnvAĪ“Ū™ĖQ²˜Żü—õäģAo.«hńʋ‚Ėzrüs™MYŠ Ģ eŸ%.įĶĖ³{v /ŹóY‚ńj3r/ ‹vž©hæĖĀüB½ą'ć·/įŹĒ,…ć=&3`L ęåNĶ}<W&ų0©¤›eśD}ŹR/ŸŅ=JÉ-”ć–ę†y>dš”Q²Ž„>ŠZńeĄß|Š¶š2(“Ā™WOœźķÅóÕéO'S‘˜’Ķ“x„'Žé5Ćżoʜy$Dd ` ųččšJ² š˜ C šAk?æ ’"ń怚’€2š†1·<ČøŚ÷\É %ć(!’b]éŲ`!šZ1·<ČøŚ÷\É %ć(! ĄØ@`\(žxŚµVMLSAžŻ}-“Ś‚Lˆ…“A…ĄÅ¤ 9€!“„’¦•Ę6”Ō“5õ…T@Ńą©žŒ‘‹ńąÕØć”FBāAIą¬Ń’ų©³ū^_ “”Ł¼}o23;ß~³³™GĄĄ–$ ցNJˆ*šĖå„tšWuu4ļg¢ ĢM(Ņ›”r܇gå'83 QŒ_§z™`ŌŸyå+A©Eķ/ŒgŲ@Ńŗˆż}qĘ„&zŽ= \2plŖXW‰ŻŠ‚ŅoŚ¶ó^,æĖ·M€‚Å#GŃYHö£b[o¼>āŁNNą$Āļ,(8„³‡#ˆeSry•DM•Äž©7~*›Šļ×}Ó•žė+Ü’B¹ż+“,*ż0TČćóæņؗĘu ʗ?šX¬ŽĒ|F¤¾ ä±Q”†ŃI'uJµuŅ§ ŠĪIŽ·7\ąøŽp$·]&mćшŖćf—ļć;mn8F9n=FŠÜQėąįĪ’åŃ-gŌūų‘ōĮį0Źń˜Ń0śX’ Ę&k¬9…\„Hó> RśĪ,ÄƤa0œ!9°¹·XįT¶öģ"V”Ķ¶Ū–(ŹĀ]½fćX‰@Hī`7éX\4–ČT©[¹U]¦Ś>逓Ūę,ŚćVQ³ńÖąčzI3t]ķ5I¾×LL`’ą)ņŒz{ńŽO†ē\³³žxųŅ`t&8ę挃U·÷|­LåaÕ FÆĘĀĮ7‚UõŚÜ×1?4Bm[«;=tĘ5–µ˜Ļū\cßZO ÜlvA֝=™MųP²˜ł'ķĪŚ}ĆŁ“Šōćwa—Ż7äsgłć2›²$2"˜ā¬\ĀŽĖ³»4ƒ­rł5‹1~ćźø…vžcĮž–%xK½ķ'濗på Ā÷;&3`L[éęNp ž  ęŽM‹|3 LY‰į*YƒśĘö®b$n˜ēÆ/ŃĀ†Wz”¢)ś7ąF„6’ołŗW*Ī5BūJx`¾Ś=r<ŒˆØŽ Ę+®8¦Ż&ō-ƒ‚ķ5Dd ü0ččšJ² š™ C šAl?æ ’"ń怚“€2š—V±ĻŚ§½|„W¬Õ-dź’sķŲ`!škV±ĻŚ§½|„W¬Õ-dź`€Ųį ųk9žxŚµT;oAžŁõ#¹X²”@Šˆ‰D #+JJ£œ"EŒ,l‹ņ0ųKvœų Ī) Dw””ü„ü„‚ų ””ō aföīlHŅ$ˆÕķķ§ŁoēŪ™Ł]„Y¹'"ą·(u ćńX!Ļ¶9ņā‰¼ĖZŠ%aĘL¦–¢~@ųõl ąš¤U+ÕÖšAĆŁ²öa†¬?Č_ZiƒˆŠļ śŽĻŠ"Ų’QF,Ź{Čh–µ…?ū >ą<”Ÿbeģ/…¾H5:=ĖĪŽ°FŁ›ż^k6źßFMź>!¾rō°¬±grĪkō}ļā*ų¾ßü:o”Ę/G4ŚĪA°’¬Xž›“‰'(ÆļCØņQ<’)}Ŗ±$ką)#ł[c{¢±‹Ÿį dŗÓ»ÓļĀh¬ß…Ö?Y}Z‘Ė‘cruD£×vNG4Üąd0¼Ķf£¼¤\Æ6VčœßźlŻn±ewī–śm«ÖŗoŁŽĪaZ»IGKż‡ƒŽ5ąIHGŖleg8hĮ˜¹øPqĖWš—J^7Ś×… „Ļ% š*Ž%Ļ-š„RÉnÅĖ™ėž«,k4>^'`äĢ²Yńų3’ ¤8PP£d Å)AÅŖ1¢sō“Mųł{9\©9f x–ćhį<ģm«{ž¢/óĢŠ™1}ųAŲPy ߇°…•ō«”‚ø²¾U ŚŻbŻ±‡VO)lüżY%99 RŁ»XŽ˜ūDd “hččšJ² šš C šAm?æ ’"ń怚”€2š]ķ¦[•ŽÕ_Eģ¦oü˜—ó’9¶šŲ`!š1ķ¦[•ŽÕ_Eģ¦oü˜—óp @Pņ&ų|’žxŚ­•ĻOAĒßĢl ,$Ż¶ Q ‰HZ‹r01M(„‘C1µ-ń€¤m¤ „ö‡ž%ʋÖ(ø’ ¢&0!ʛy*ÓS‚ŁųTbę†pĄc_psn+~N@`Ē*‚32ˆi½Y-WŪĀź‰½e”ŸTMÄūŪ_Œ¾ Ę%cł›÷Ź_cčųŃP§Ž§Õń‚¼W4Fw-–żé˜Ø`lZėa Ž„żé˜¬`Ģ¶Ö©ĆzpķuźxvP_”M?ƒā„é ~l•P,MŪ.FēlD<2 µtČ%?xŁģCi™h”/dG)+ŁIq:Ė”;ä¼Ny¹}X-Ö„«ßé |Ž6:OŃał#óŅ+d¹+Ķ»¹äæØK&§¤2åØ\…RmĒ©„N)QŒœ’I%§S«°D~“UųÉŹÄuVe=«ķæåZŗL%"mwŁķvpIó’ ęõųgRü‡ >}$8°^ŽĶŗgf†#éŲ5OāzŌ¹MƒŁ°{}ĶLĻĢlš$n„bŃ’fi,dóĪgR°@cw—77rŚķWӅ°Ū’½ėŚm&7Ø^õ¤š£„˜<ü•óŖżįQ5'F†š}{ wx$ģUłć6µ\B±ąĀŌĢ@薳B-ų±{o)Ńqj«·€ĒdtcP¦š¼—7}hJ÷-=ö:§vN…e) Ķcø4S J‹ÆYŪu–”p/‰”Åw,„³Š_±iń‘Óā?€’ ŗsĢo&”ģƒ9”RöA„ …»ؼ”ł=NĄ'öˆ¶³h½·āīĒUģ fәhœ÷ųv‘ XöŚĖLŒ’Ō5sbJDd ¤hččšJ² š› C šAn?æ ’"ń怚•€2š¬ˆ™Ęqbś ²µzõ$2i›’ˆ±ōŲ`!š€ˆ™Ęqbś ²µzõ$2i›n  @šwų|NžxŚ„TĻkA~ovÓŲm`7©9ˆÕʂŅ¢‹0›d±`#k~ąquŃ@ŅHI÷¤½ˆ‰'Ń[ļżDšC’oz³ōÜƒČ ŠŠųf²ijM5Śagē›·oŽ÷¾y³ƒ0 ½a 6€·u†č#dŻnW óxĀ·M°¾_ˆ%Łŗ2Ičܘ SŠåĪŌ4źĀo©/+ß)܄ļ‚l©ł ą>t–E”qqtœ½ĘMœ"ōƒ]Ś}/ņyĮSAJOĖ»Õ;µ “’døTŒ„ü×V‘: ?dzĒiBŠą¢bĄ¬ŪĖ•ĒŽH£Ä¾T> büüĒÜ>Ž[c#ęŸ:,’žAĒ·ąˆ:¶žWĒ6Dż:,ˆŠśü˜h…rÕiÄn:­X®V-­Ąßt({¼Š®ū\~…=–øGc(ł•E×,OšŖĻ²¾{T-ź méVN‡([e'ŁÖa}¾Miß°śl’›ŖxbGī° ’Oŗż?©X¼†¾(“Ļ&o—WŒJ%Uj”ļ¦k÷«tßi@8pPmXņó ŅµGõ²Sē!,g 1sµY/AŽ™6Ū™ †åiźuŪ°¾LŸ&U šLļ¬×NŁ„45Ķ‡¶éĶŪ‹^[X’4>^$`ĢŪŪōųcØ!¤@F!)•@ØUųö¬Y4=Ew…˜č½=[£C ¹IŠ73x9Ė_s姑™ųˆKs—& ĮąyĆĪą~ā·Ā’ØHƎÅģøł(ū™¼Ūh:U>ćő”ß;7’°’4›ķĒĖDd X,ččšJ² šœ C šAo?æ ’"ń怚–€2š-ŪĪѵ„Ī®™‰BÓ»’ ū÷Ų`!šŪĪѵ„Ī®™‰BÓ»ĄąŠĻčēĻžxŚuRAKQžęķn5k`7µ=R£Š$µ”x*²&K… MBĖjLLŁD’œl„ˆ·ų¼K’Aéč詧žE¶§‚é¼—5-©>vv¾7;ļ›7ß!hĒō —Į&ˆbDb4)“F qlNÜä%ÅjóŒžÜ³°ˆ‘Lęe³ cū Ÿ™n.ĪJ¢äwŽUūļ ¬X’OHō@äé£Xdō[œ_«ėąŒ”°«õfŠNoŻōėVÓ?ĄVåW·Ę6NČBē÷SŽ˜ģŸ›ćCĻ\`8a…iv>@’½Ņoī“čę9Z0Ģģķģ¤ü%“*2#Ģü­Ń„[:ųÆʋs’®Ę5hŖFŽkōbNT¬Õ¾Ć×*VJÕu`žMżĄi46üv}·Šz”ż½ ”1­^J‹o“2 ­Ć°„ņ#Rz©šv{ŠĒ}Ģ./¹ƒā3§ŁÖKĻ)_-=büŠr¹Ńćh°į1²­‚t7Zõ6£ŠäŁm2pV½¢ēFņq¬$q$x±ÄżiPzš,Žžé« ż$‡œĄi–Ž3ųwjäl¶”Rc}mĢØŻ5Ģ»Ré·;ASī¤h:n”»ėj*ž(/ĖDd X,ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚+€2š-ŪĪѵ„Ī®™‰BÓ»’ x`!šŪĪѵ„Ī®™‰BÓ»ĄąŠĻčēĻžxŚuRAKQžęķn5k`7µ=R£Š$µ”x*²&K… MBĖjLLŁD’œl„ˆ·ų¼K’Aéč詧žE¶§‚é¼—5-©>vv¾7;ļ›7ß!hĒō —Į&ˆbDb4)“F qlNÜä%ÅjóŒžÜ³°ˆ‘Lęe³ cū Ÿ™n.ĪJ¢äwŽUūļ ¬X’OHō@äé£Xdō[œ_«ėąŒ”°«õfŠNoŻōėVÓ?ĄVåW·Ę6NČBē÷SŽ˜ģŸ›ćCĻ\`8a…iv>@’½Ņoī“čę9Z0Ģģķģ¤ü%“*2#Ģü­Ń„[:ųÆʋs’®Ę5hŖFŽkōbNT¬Õ¾Ć×*VJÕu`žMżĄi46üv}·Šz”ż½ ”1­^J‹o“2 ­Ć°„ņ#Rz©šv{ŠĒ}Ģ./¹ƒā3§ŁÖKĻ)_-=büŠr¹Ńćh°į1²­‚t7Zõ6£ŠäŁm2pV½¢ēFņq¬$q$x±ÄżiPzš,Žžé« ż$‡œĄi–Ž3ųwjäl¶”Rc}mĢØŻ5Ģ»Ré·;ASī¤h:n”»ėj*ž(/IDd ¤hččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚,€2š«cüƒņĻ”Ž(E~łƒcžŽ[cęæ}Xžł‹Žoį1uĢUĒ'ˆūuXąõ9Ų1Q*µ†ŻNŻ“»©R³a­ĮætHū¬ŠŽóL|I<–÷ä#eØäwU²<&W}–Ķ½ćj‘÷YXlC5J*Äé:=M?Š> ųv„|£ź“ü?U™ģ®Ų§[žŸtƒRµz„Ų¢B¹XY˜¾][ÓźõE«][Ķ7ļŚ†uĻnC4tPmTšó‰†ņĶ‡­šŻb!*+)}½Ó² 'Ī&õ^į¢føŠ|ŻŌŒŻäÄqYWwĻ¹½E‘"ēŁŠÓŻ“¹äöø%‡ć£%ZŚ,˜ŗĖMŽÜB±”"‚Jąj%¶=Ngš®ąÕŪ³ <” ”›™Ā‹9öšG(>‰ĶfĘ\Z:ø4 Y OŃ>ļ'v‹XęńźØ@˜ĻŽņ›³Ÿ-;ķŽŻ`3V‚vŲ¹øż'QģVĖDd 0,ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚-€2š-ås›RVĮžG¹$,Ņ*ō’ x`!šås›RVĮžG¹$,Ņ*ō€ąųkčēĻžxŚuRĶNŪ@žfm1‘ģ=TB%Pµ”–q“XE‚TIŌ£ė«”ä%9P…ø…Gč ō z Šč„=õŒ*÷j˜Ż˜“Jaåń|;žżfēó€vB€@rl‚(F$ƒBĻéa›·yIńƒŽµYFO',Ģc “yŁlŒæ²å4ąÓMĒYIżöūJļ JŠ%!ł„Ds"GÆÅ<£+ńńŗĪI9»Rk­ōĖ “Žm6ü}ģ”wŖlƄUčü~Ę“żŗ9<¬eĪq1bßĘ8; É^ī5Ž4ėčä8z=a~曝”æä`bTEf„™æ5:tG’ÕČęćū:Ö ±Y®ŃUü9R±ZżC^«P.V6€ŁWµ}§^ßō[µ·łę^Pņß-¤ŒqõRZ|›”‘o†µ ”‘Ņ‹•“Ūm‡>f0µøąö +N)²­žSśµšˆńĖAäFO¢ž¦ĒȶņŅõŻhŁŪŠś*’c“ÅĄYö žÉĒ±’Ä}ąÅb÷§Aéi²8ś‡/Z(ōÓ,²gkœp’ĮæS#g‹°£”źkcRķ>«ydŽ„rÆÕr'EÓq«Ü}’PSńšłĢDd D,ččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚.€2š./“OüT°ā³ż©/ĄĖĮpy’ ß x`!š/“OüT°ā³ż©/ĄĖĮpy ą˜žčēŠžxŚuRĶJQžĪ‰6c`&¦]¤¦»L«ø d’ jJhŗ§:h ?2‰$Y ””nJś¾@ĮpaĄpÕU×"Ón MĻ½Óõ2gĪwĻœū{¾9„8  čC®› Š‰ńx¬P†G±q“—ßéDK1z>gb c™ĢĖb;g|Į¶£_™n!ŹJ äuŖƒC(+–øä=9ŚKŒ~‹“?ź:ųBŹ XÕzÓļ¤ßų½ōŪvÓka»ņ³Wc›$¼„Īļ5Žģ7ŒÉ!`=sŠó)ūkĢ²ó’ģ•Aó}»^Ž£æ„‘曝”æā`|ZEf™5ztG·jŲóĘēū:˜Ō ™Y®ŃTü1U±V»DL^«X)U7Ō»zĖn4ņ^§¾[hļłeoßļ ›U/©E·IĘ ķ£ īņ#’z©švśŻĄĆ"<]vFÅv9“ĢW®]¾^~Āų‘i#tĀ•p”wYfAŗ‘®ŗ[įHErģ·Ų«nŃuBłŲf‚ø¼X āž4(= G’šM „ž1‹¬Ą§uNfš’ŌČŁ"l+„&śZ˜W»35Ģū¬2čtż¦ÜIŃtÜ(wß?ŌTü/ų,Č Dd hččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚/€2šloŁų—1y•“?›ƒlśń’H« x`!š@oŁų—1y•“?›ƒlśńø€@š)ų|žxŚ­UĶOA3»µ²ōKT>ä+‘š‘ĀFš&ŲŠiŚŲŌŖiB©ż0P/P$F¦ AHāɃ‰DM<`ĀÉcŒńÄ?1õ`LØof·[Ąb‹8éĢ¼y3ó~æßėŪ]Ā7€Ā°fĄN Ń,Bs¹·ŗHę«¤łsUŌAgkmhµ1A=äŲalfģ«hæĆīØų‰į*µSU0JŽūS7€+&“­_“g{óyČؤgö„"W£0å@Ēy£“äöż˜ÅNų9Dķø@EpF~  -„re±e±œŲ­F©¦xlĀē­?0Św`DeņŗƒüEĒńŠ2uŌž«Ž%ņɦb4—Ņ±|0c;0ęN”ƒ:ź¦# cl@VO½¼25 Vīf8¢$š.*SMŽh$4 „tH:+ŲTźøHT”/d›„ d7Š,PfÉWPQ–·«å¤ŽĀžĖ1ģńŗ½n¹ f šNÓ:zŸ<‚s’‹.ӗ°Jó 2¦½ ČŃ‹Ż (—+‹ «½g„tšt;KĘĘį} Ļ±šĪĖk±:l(„ŹŖć±ÆŲWś:ķżšB\7Xéš`3<”«tK{~&ł7įččGb`A†|#ž^Ū„š¤sbb ”_Œ^W<”J,†½9¶?‹a0z+Vāl,āˆæÉ5Œ‡ĻŃęFWfØŪéɚM‚NĻ÷Ę“«MNČŗ²§³™ ZfÓ ›2®lGp8›įĪ3Ćh8;‚CAW–żœ¦*‚‰!¦‡ røz Ó%Ž„-+ęĘp+ķĮSX^,iYMgŸKš†Ą—÷döē/“±”Ų}k‹½¼«iļī«0`Cwž„8’AˆSX¤›8ˆ›čķƒ>ÕT×óo…ŽkB’Ā»Ö ŗū0ĪŻ:žNĻĶ”™Č…gŻż\ 肝_:ö=$ąęµ¢V˜™×Ą{ž Å<¶ųR‰¤a+V6"äŪ~-p’oĖWF5Dd LhččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚0€2š—›M$ ¢ˆp9aLø¢¶Č’sµx`!šk›M$ ¢ˆp9aLø¢¶Člą@ Ø ų|9žxŚSOkA3³IŚM`7Vb±1“„ US­m¶I°‡¦„&”Ēuk $l"qOžAÄ[„‚Ō[/žü‚‡ųŠAüŠl"4¾7»I ¦ųgŲŁłĶ›7ļ÷ŽofLˆ›€Ć>P aēŒˆń^Æ'Ńv>°Eyß/Ę3üsx Ń|Xƒič‘36{ń{ģ‡a€.xÅ `µī—Ż6Ąe’āqBgłv,¦żä×O>É|^Q* ÓÓKn}§Qƒv FD½µQ:nW°3é—’—q‚Į5ä6€×Ļ•b§Ā{3¢īŒĶäųķ7ŽÅĒ˜ē>ĒŠT"ą yõrµn7›v;±ÕØ[{pZž>įH»ĢēxĀž*>ĒįÉ’q ėˆ 8­/-ƾƒmčņ>Ó*ebćO#óoÕ8īćŒ©fÜ©ģž©uĄAWjöč-ļņżąŽ]`ż{W©h,D›r„By`j»ŗgŌjkV³z7ŪŲµ‹Ö=» ńŠØ–qäeŖķŠ"ĕB9‘Ōr,8—fņÜU£čéŚmÓ(~Ÿ¹ˆųœf€—÷ę¼Īš‰Hײ4tņ^Ź\÷:Ņ’Įńń:#eęĢ¼GŸ”Å Į86¬ˆa„dµ*Ź£¼ÉYŹW®<’(A2FɉĆĖ4V­¢ĖDņ·Œž-Z&…^/ŠoQj9|ō†lH«.:Däģƒ|÷˜M²ä6[vf$¶żvŚŁ i’1ĘXÓDd ”TččšJ² š C šA?æ ’"ń怚1€2š5Ą(Ö?ÆD^+%•%Ł5žŹĮ’źx`!š Ą(Ö?ÆD^+%•%Ł5žŹĮ  ądXJמxŚuRAkQžęķĘ“›Ąn¬„bWA5H9t›¬lJ0 —U$n"iNé”=Å£G’†ą!ž oāÅ«čzŒ3o7BūŲŁłŽ¼į›7ßĀ*`¼%@aY96E”!Rół\£Ūt%‹Ō"ÆØ\åškŒn^°±Ž¹$órŲfŒ?²}5€/LWČ²ŠØ‡Ćē­ńĖhh–UįS‚.©o84ÖżQ[š xGŚ)8­N/øūŃČ}Ųļ…ŲkžµŁŅ„2Lžßā w„»–Ää¤<~O)÷=@Źżįļ‚›$‰¹›ćŽć~£mŽVóVłlnŅž­Órł8¾§fjQå-WĮUöó֋ó:H«ŠR'•x¦&™ŠæNUl·æ#'«5ė­-`ķQēĄėvwĀAēIµ’4j„Ļ¢J¹eõJFv›R®Św¢XQ2ė-×?Ę!.båŚ†?­Żń‰cß¼ĘĻ«Œ/Ū?¹‘LwFŽ]7õ“Ķ`7™źČ6ūÉ.o3Ø~"Ÿg‰ū ŋŠīĻ€VŌbqĢćĻF¬Ģ“ *)6ä­ ’„š¦œ*ł†dŅ{:šŖķ ÆwŸōtr•ėĶń`õd'šXčxŽ›:ž 8‘¼ÕDd ”TččšJ² š  C šA ?æ ’"ń怚2€2š7LóŠĘø¼’ \‚'R·š[’½x`!š LóŠĘø¼’ \‚'R·š[  ądXJŁžxŚuRAkQžęķĘŲM`7­„bׂ jž€n“ÕˆÄ&Įć²ź¢¤±›HšS<ˆč)=śz<ğįM¼x]O‚qęķ¦Bh;;ߛ7|óę{CXŒ·(L +Ē¦ˆ2Dj>Ÿktƒ.e±‚Zä•«\sŃµs6Ö1—d^ŪŒńG¶Æš…é YVõpų¬5~ Ķ²"|JŠõ GĘ:£?j[3ļH;§ÕéE÷~4r÷ū½š{Ķߣ6[šP†É’ė¼įŽpĖ’˜œ”Ēļ)å~I÷rų»ą&Ibīęø÷ØßÅh‡£µ¼µ:7i’ƒƒÖI ¹|ßV3µØrHĖUpJ•yėīY¤Uh©“ćx¦&™ŠæNTl·æ#'«6ė­m`ķaēĄėvwĆAēq„’$j„O£J¹eõJFv›R®Ņw¢XQ2ė-×?Ę!VqžŹ†?­Žō‰cß ¼ĘĻĖŒ/Ś?¹šLwFŽ]7õ“­ –Lud‡ż¤ĘĄŪ ŖŸČēŁEā>Hńb1ˆū3 µXóÕg#Vęėhó8ņ¼UA²Ž”S%’ĻLaOGSµäõī“žN®²Ł†QOv"”‰…Žg½©”ć’ÅB’žŲDd äTččšJ² š  C šA ?æ ’"ń怚3€2š:„haĢĮfT*dx@›EI’’x`!š„haĢĮfT*dx@›EI&  (+XJÜžxŚuRĻkQžfvÓŚMd7­=ÅFAµ”žC·ÉbĄF‚Išø®ŗh id“sRD¤·zé±’†ą!ž½ö/YE0Ī{»‹Šę›yó¾Ł÷½!,ĘŒؕc¢ĻēsŃķ4—ē¬®Ą%>1W=X°±†¹*–åˆĶ{i§B—O« h£wķÉūhj–%ÅĒ Żā3lŅš ?¼„™€CŅŽį“»żpXzŽKĻż`»­ßćŽXR°i„‡Xā7­ääĖ§|L ū'zŠ„żäoĘ.H±·&żWƒĘŪ’=_°ųjvŅžē„.QtĘ3ĪŗÜä‹]pE—ś¢Õ»īIRƓvQ•hĘ©Ž9ŹtģtĪ%’#µV£½¬¼čī¹½ŽN0ģ¾®Ž„Ķąm8D1wQ梑žM1WģGŻ0R›(švÉū0Š,ćĘŻuoZ{ģ6cĒ~ā»Ķ_ėwÆŚ.b/¾Ow|AŽ]UnźÅeæOuf[üĒŗ·ģ×|/VŸkHīA,KÄ ¹Ÿ­Ø%ā˜_~‘”Ž'Ævd7äŖ›_+Ø\Žż\N“ż?Wjś»:›čļ`QGßõÄJß{­ÉpöU¤D5‘){Ż+:’՘’ėDd ččš\² šN c š$€€A/?æ ’?#"ń æ`怚„2šRņ ~]ēüėĖūžąƒŌ)g’.§¬ `!š&ņ ~]ēüėĖūžąƒŌ)g’€ hß„ōžxŚcdąd``>ÉĄĄĄÄ Ƭ@ĢÉc112BYŒL’’’³ō% bÜpu/ąxĄ«ąsSO&āģR “ĪĪ7?;3ż! å€AøȤ 1FȦө@{øĒ2ģÆ.ĖĘx9BŪ ¬Į”“ؤĀKd‹Ōź™4We”an[aß0E—ļĒ8Za€'Ōą›Ä:šÄwAZOm†ī„ׅa‰¢‡É“Zo~ Ū¤(ź Aē.9)žOóĻųį„õćŁļ’³Ūķ7‘®T›Ö`ī¼ÓÓ»Ż²t®*ŽµcŚ7NšÜźøNP'ž’ÕĶ՜.“—+,ł®DÕĶ՜.“—+,ł®H hp€ˆ˜  Ø°ø Ą ęäTerry u—”j2 FIRST DRAFT, OCTOBER 2002 Title”@æĒ7?Ww _PID_HLINKS_AdHocReviewCycleID_EmailSubject _AuthorEmail_AuthorEmailDisplayNameäAhJmailto:kpetrie@uga.edu¾ÆPsoting on FENpkpfuller@bus.umich.eduFuller, Kathleenh.ež’ ’’’’ ĄFMicrosoft Word Document MSWordDocWord.Document.8ō9²qg 1$$@&a$5\D@D Heading 2$7$8$@&H$ 5\aJhD@D Heading 3$7$8$@&H$ 6]aJh88 Heading 4$$@&a$6]<A@ņ’”< Default Paragraph Font8&@¢ń8 Footnote ()+,.:FGIJKMTU_`abdef™›§Ø±³ĄĶŚŪŻŽąķśūżž’         K ~ Ę  !!L!$$$$+$?$X$Y$a$h$o$v$}$~$€$‡$Ž$•$œ$$Ÿ$¦$­$“$»$¼$Å$Ģ$Ó$Ś$į$ā$ć$ė$ % %%%%% %(%*%8%F%T%U%W%X%Z%h%v%w%y%z%{%}%Š%‹%”%•%–%—%™%š%›%ø%¹%Į%Ć%Å%Ī%Ļ%×%Ł%ē%õ%&&&& &&%&&&(&)&*&,&3&4&=&>&?&@&B&C&D&g&h&p&r&t&}&~&†&ˆ&–&¤&²&³&µ&¶&ø&Ę&Ō&Õ&×&Ų&Ł&Ū&é&ź&ó&ō&õ&ö&ų&ł&ś&#'$','.'0'9':'B'D'Q'_'m'n'p'q's''''’'“'”'–'ž'Ÿ'Ø'©'Ŗ'«'­'®'ą'([(Ÿ(§(Ü(”+œ++¬+¹+Ķ+ę+ē+š+÷+ž+, , ,,,,$,+,,,.,5,<,C,J,K,U,\,c,j,q,r,s,{,™,š,£,„,§,±,²,»,½,Ź,×,ä,å,ē,č,ź,÷,---- - ---#-$-%-&-(-)-*-G-H-Q-S-U-_-`-i-k-x-…-’-“-•-–-˜-„-²-³-µ-¶-·-¹-Ę-Ē-Ń-Ņ-Ó-Ō-Ö-×-Ų-ū-ü-.. .....&.-.:.;.=.>.@.G.T.U.W.X.Y.[.h.i.s.t.u.v.x.y.z.£.¤.­.Æ.±.».¼.Å.Ē.Ō.į.ī.ļ.ń.ņ.ō./ / ///// /!/+/,/-/./0/1/c/–/Ž/"0+0D0E0õ01§3Ø3©3±3Ą3Č3Ü3ä3ż3ž34444&4-454<4D4K4S4Z4b4c4h4p4x4€4ˆ44˜4 4Ø4°4ø4Ą4Č4É4Ķ4Ō4Ü4ć4ė4ņ4ś45 5555'5(5-555=5E5M5U5]5e5m5u5}5…55Ž5—5¢5Ŗ5²5³5»5Ć5Ä5Ģ5Ō5Õ5Ö5ß5å5ę5ī5ö5÷5’5666666%6-646<6C6K6R6Z6a6i6p6x6y66‡66—6Ÿ6¦6®6¶6¾6Å6Ķ6Ō6Ü6Ż6ß6å6ė6ń6÷6ż677777$7*7076777C7J7R7Y7a7g7o7u7}7‚7Š77—7˜7™7ø7¹7»7¼7½7¾7æ788M8N8c8d8e8å8ė8ģ8ł9ś9ū9ü9O:U:V:½:¾:æ:Ą:Į:=;>;?;@;J;š;<ā<0=I=c>…>Ü>ū>??@?Y?_?£?Ā?Ę?ß?ń?žA½A>CųCéDEE!E'EćEYFsFÜFöF"GjGƒG–GœGµG¼GÕGÜGõG.HGHI®I“JĄJĮJ]KņK”LUMīMļMbNÕNLOMOčOéOxPyPQQuQ±Q²Q)RĶRKSLSTTŸT TUU»U¼U=V>V›VœVWWŖW«WJXKX„XśX Y YĪYĻY|Z}Z[[`[Œ[[%\&\Ķ\|]}]&^'^µ^¶^O_P_Ä_Å_[`\`Ų`Ł`bacaÖa$b%b›bœb_c`cddØd©dųdłdŽeeffXh‡hÓh.i·j¹jTkUk×k lBm nEnFnGnHnynznļnToĘoJp‚tumu÷vÕwIxJxUxaxbxdxfxgxixjxlxpx0€€0€€˜0€˜0€˜0€˜0€˜0€˜0€˜0€˜0€˜0€˜0€˜0€0€€˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜# i8@ń’8 NormalCJ_HhmH sH tH 8@8 Heading 1$$@&a$5\D@D Heading 2$7$8$@&H$ 5\aJhD@D Heading 3$7$8$@&H$ 6]aJh88 Heading 4$$@&a$6]<A@ņ’”< Default Paragraph Font8&@¢ń8 Footnote ReferenceH*6@6  Footnote TextCJh&)@¢& Page Number8 @"8 Footer  ĘąĄ! CJaJhFžOF Paragraph$ ʐ$Bdąa$ CJaJhNžOBN References$„Š„0ż¤š^„Š`„0ża$ CJaJh8B@R8 Body Text5CJ\aJh8Z@b8 Plain TextCJOJQJh,U@¢q, Hyperlink >*phf™@C@‚@ Body Text Indent„h¤x^„h@ž’@  Balloon TextCJOJQJ^JaJ0žO1¢0 Paragragh2 „Š`„Š>žO¢±>\kpfullerCJOJQJ^JaJo(ph’>V@¢Į> FollowedHyperlink >*B* ph€€JS@ŅJ Body Text Indent 3„Šdą`„ŠhRžOR MTDisplayEquation$$ ĘH$a$CJhHP@ņH Body Text 2$7$8$H$a$ 5\aJhPR@P Body Text Indent 2 „Š„0ż^„Š`„0żaJh4+4  Endnote Text!CJh6*@¢!6 Endnote ReferenceH*\Å,b6'G LĆOtZ}©uÆĒø"ÅxĘŗĒ­ČŹŹŃŃŲūäŲē§čĒųox HwĆ©E2ł8jßD ¶ : ró]ēÅ9< ox’’’’ ’’’’ ’’’’  ’’żloxų’’’’)ų’’’’/0123456789:TUVZ[‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”ėéź­®Æ_y‚e€‘Ō C†bA ‡%u,Ł.\3Ģ8l<€=Ž=2>I>Ŗ>õALCéCREŖFĄGHIFMĘO–Q·QšS¶SœU7]Ķ_^a~aæcLeZeŗe j¾lźlżlmqĄsņs÷t?wEzÜ{é{}4}ä}µ~Ų~ų~|‚Į‚į‚ƒH„d„†„Æ„³‰“‰¼Š½ŠŲ‹ßą²³—‘˜‘ “ “Į”É•»–¼–±—²—Ś™ņ™RšSš›œœœąž± ż£„‘„;§<§Ė©««¬«Ę«¬¬²¬³¬±±Ž±±³³Š³‹³‹µŒµ¶¶é¶ź¶˜·™·ĖøĢø˜¹™¹·½ø½Y¾Z¾ĢĀĶĀ1Ć2Ć¼Ē½Ē%Č&ČæÉŪɝŹĶŹ(Ė‚ĖĶ#ĶÄĻŲĻĖÓrŌ†ŌśŁ%Ū9ŪČŪéŪ5ŽŌāõāżäÜēšēé(é¹źŚźhģ(ķ<ķšżńŠņäņcō/õCõĻłńłŸü>Ra”Ŗ¼½23<AT\deipx€ˆ‰œ£Ŗ±ø¹¾ÅĢÓŚŪū&'+29;CDMT[]efu|ƒ…Œ¢©°²¹ŗÓŚįćźėģõ/0; < = L Y m † ‡ ˜ Ÿ ¦ ­ “ µ Ē Ī Õ Ü ć ä ń ž   % & X ‹ Ó   Ŗ «  23?Scnot{‚’™ ­®°·¾ĖĢĪÕÜéźģóś"#%,3@ACJQ^_ahn{|€‡š›®Æ»Ļßźėšöü &,78:@FRSU[amnpv|ˆ‰‹‘—£¤¦¬²¾æĮĒĶÖ×Ūįēóō!"#7GRSZagtuˆ‰Šž®¹ŗĮĒĶŁŚ ?‡ĖŌ67ö“”œž°ĀĶĪĻŲāļšųłś )*=FO\]pzĀõ=‚‹Ä|„…””µĪĻŲßęķōõ÷ž $+23=DKRYZ[c‚‹™š£„²æĢĶĻŠŅŽėģīļšņłś   ()246@AJLYfstvwy†“”–—˜š§Ø²³“µ·ø¹ŻŽēéėõö’0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜@0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜0€:˜ 0€:˜ 0€:˜ 0€:˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€0€€0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€˜0€€0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€(0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€©0€€© 0€€©0€€© 0€€©0€€© 0€€™0€€©0€€© 0€€©0€€©0€€© 0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€© 0€€©0€€©0€€© 0€€©0€€™0€€©0€€©0€€© 0€€©0€€™0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜ 0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€0€€0€€0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€š@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€ 0š@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€ 0˜0€€š€€˜0€€š€€˜0€€š€€ IITßWŲ\fęmy°…÷‡Ž#”ˆ—Ÿå¢œ©æ¬¬Ā£ĖŃÜéęŃīˆˆ²"%Ų+„2š=ŠD3FĒG“I”LōNCP¤QĪW`cŌpB‚T‚ĆČÉĖĢĶĪŠŃŅŌÕÖףŚŪÜŽßįćäęö /Bdhiklmopqsvy{‹A$·UuHˆRž‹¹Ī5āCłd œ Ģ & M ƒ ¹ ė †µńÓnźC®S¦a¹Ł”Ų)\|!Ų!"2"["š"Ļ"ļ"#2#Y#†#§#·#ė#($G$_$$³$ą$%%L&Y)‡)“)ā)*T*w*”*ø*Ł* +,+B+t+²+Õ+ó+#,D,s,–,­,Ü-ē01C1r1±1ä12#2G2k2˜2¹2Ö2 3:3U3s3£3Ē3ō3404E5ś9D:c:Č:Ü:';=;;Ŗ;Õ;ę;<-<x<<Ü<ė<=6=R=—=»=ģ>|BGsNUUĶZś`ÄgnŗT‚ÄĘĒŹĻÓŲŻąāåēčéźėģķīļšńņóōõ÷ųłśūüżž’     !"#$%&'()*+,-.0123456789:;<=>?@ACDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcefgjnrtuwxzS‚ÅBRƒE›EEGGG9GQGSG,IDIFI–Q®Q°QīQRR RøRŗRšS²S“SĒSßSįS&T>T@TxTT’TöWXX¶\Ī\Š\^avaxa„aœažafb~b€b€c˜cšch„h§hĪięičiźkll:tRtTtst‹ttŗtŅtŌtuuuv/v1vZwrwtwyyy2yJyLyz0z2zhz€z‚z7{O{Q{—{Æ{±{·~Ļ~Ń~Ü~ō~ö~:€Q€S€Ņ€é€ė€ō€  Ą×ŁįųśĮ‚Ł‚Ū‚ä‚ü‚ž‚{ƒ“ƒ•ƒŻƒōƒöƒŽ„¦„Ø„5…M…O…œ†“†¶†¶ˆĪˆŠˆE‰]‰_‰ł‰ŠŠiŠŠƒŠ£Š·Š¹ŠŒŒŒŽŒöŒųŒG_aŽ§Ž©ŽĪŽęŽčŽ "$PhjŃéėÜ‘ō‘ö‘2’J’L’g’’’o“‡“‰“¤“¼“¾“å“ż“’“?”W”Y”•7•9•ršŠšŒšæš×šŁš›››i››ƒ›Į›Ł›Ū›œ'œ)œÖœīœšœ˜ž°ž²žĆžŪžŻžäžüžžž’ Ŗ ¬ × ļ ń I”a”c”4£L£N£…¤¤Ÿ¤¹„Ķ„Ļ„3¦G¦I¦j¦~¦€¦‘¦„¦§¦Æ¦Ć¦Å¦ģ¦§§§ØæØĮØ0ŖDŖFŖOŖcŖeŖ­2­4­—¾«¾­¾’¾ææųĮĀĀ™Ć±Ć³ĆĶĆįĆćĆNÄfÄhĊĒ¢Ē¤ĒĶĶĶÉŪįŪćŪ˜Ü°Ü²ÜŌāčāźāéé!éĢéäéęé¹źŃźÓźŠłčłźłö  õ0 11 8ø8ŗ8ń;<<r<Š<Œ<='=)=1=E=G=~=’=”=²=Ę=Č=ē=’=>>2>4>d>x>z>Ż>ń>ó>????.?0?A?U?W?¤?ø?ŗ?Ē?Ū?Ż?v@Š@Œ@Ÿ@·@¹@ü@AA%A=A?AwAA‘AŸA³AµAĮAŁAŪAB.B0BtBˆBŠB˜B¬B®B¾BŅBŌBŻBńBóB C$C&C€D”D–D”D¹D»DźDžDE EEEÄEÜEŽEZFnFpFŻFńFóFGGGkGGGG±G³G½GŃGÓGŻGńGóG/HCHEHXHlHnHsH‹HHŠHčHźHšHII I#I%IhI€I‚II¤I¦I“IČIŹI J#J%JJJbJdJ™J­JÆJoxX’€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:’€:’€:’€:’€:’€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:’€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•„:”’•„:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•„:”’•„:”’•„:”’•„:”’•„:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•„:”’•„:”’•„:”’•„:”’•„:”’•€:”’•„:”’•€:”’•„:”’•„:”’•€:”’•„:”’•„:”’•„:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€:”’•€ !•!’•€åłū+-<:”’•€:”’•€š8š  @ń’’’€€€÷šŒš š*š( š ššņšN šŲ p$ō  š šˆšššTB š C šDæ’šŒ $ t"$ ššTB š C šDæ’šŒ pŒ Ų ššTB š C šDæ’š€p€Ų ššTB š C šDæ’št"pt"Ų ššZ¢ š  3 š€æ’     ž’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’šŲ Ų Ø ō š šš`¢ š  C š€Š æ’šĢŲ œō š ššZ¢ š  3 š€æ’šĄ!Ų $ō š ššB šS šæĖ’ ?š¹7oxŠ؈,t’’ OLE_LINK1 OLE_LINK2¹„µpxŠ„ĶpxSTWX[ƒEžEŸE¤E„EØEGGG G!G"G9GTGVG[G\G]G,IGIIIKILIPI–Q±Q²QµQ·Q¹QšSµS¶S»S¼SĮSĒSāSćSīSļSńS&TATBTDTETHTxT“T•T˜T™T TöWXXXXX^ayaza}a~aƒa„aŸa a¢a£a¦afbb‚b„b…bˆb€c›cœcžcŸc chØh©h­h®høhĪiéiźiģiķišiźklll:tUtWtZt[tgtstŽtt“t”t—tŗtÕtŲtŚtŪtātuuuuu$uv2v3v7v8v:vZwuwvw}w~w€wy y#y%y&y*y2yMyNyPyQySyz3z4z7z8zBzhzƒz„zŽzz’z7{R{U{X{Y{`{—{²{³{·{ø{»{·~Ņ~Ō~×~õ~÷~:€T€V€X€Y€\€Ņ€ģ€ī€ó€ ĄŚŪąłūĮ‚Ü‚Ż‚ą‚ż‚’‚{ƒ–ƒ—ƒ›ƒœƒ ƒŻƒ÷ƒśƒżƒžƒ„Ž„©„«„®„Æ„³„5…P…Q…R…S…T…œ†·†ø†Ā†Ć†Ē†¶ˆŃˆŅˆÓˆŌˆÕˆE‰`‰a‰c‰d‰i‰ļ‰ŠŠŠŠ!Š”ŠŗŠ¾ŠĮŠĀŠŹŠŒŒŒ!Œ"Œ%ŒŽŒłŒśŒ GbcefmŽŖŽ«Ž­Ž®Ž³ŽĪŽéŽėŽīŽļŽPkmwxzŃģķöŚ‘÷‘ł‘ż‘ž‘’›“æ“Į“Å“Ę“Ź“?”Z”]”_”`”g”•:•<•?•@•H•rššš“š”šš› ›!›$›%›(›i›„›†›Ž››™›Į›Ü›Ž›į›ā›ź›œ*œ-œ/œ0œ2œÖœńœņœūœĆžŽžįžćžżž’ž× ņ ó õ ö ż 4£O£Q£S£T£^£…¤”¤¢¤„¤¦¤§¤¹„Ņ„ӄքׄą„3¦J¦K¦N¦O¦Q¦h¦¦‡¦¦¦¦Ø¦Æ¦Ę¦Ē¦É¦Ź¦Ķ¦ģ¦§§§ §§§ØĀØĆØÅØĘØŅØ0ŖNŖdŖiŖjŖpŖ—¾®¾Æ¾²¾³¾¹¾’¾æææ æ&æųĮĀĀ"Ā$Ā*Ā™Ć“ƵĆŗĆ»Ć½ĆĶĆäĆåĆčĆéĆīĆNÄiÄjÄlÄmÄnĊĒ¦Ē§ĒŖĒ«ĒÆĒĶĶĶ"Ķ#Ķ(ĶÉŪäŪåŪčŪéŪīŪ˜ÜµÜ¶Ü¹ÜŗܾÜé"é#é'é(é-éĢéééźéķéīéņé¹źŌźÕźŁźŚźÜźŠłėłģłšłńłöłö õ011111 8»8¼8Ą8Į8Ā8ń;< <<<<r<<<‘<’<–<=*=+=.=F=H=²=É=Ź=Ī=Ļ=Ó=ē=>> > > >>5>8>?>@>E>d>{>|>>ƒ>„>Ż>ō>õ>ś>ū>ž>Ÿ@ŗ@½@Ę@%A@ACAHAIAKAwA”A•A˜A™AAŸA¶A·A¼A½AĄAĮAÜAŻAąAįAåA C*C+C,C-C3C”D¼D½DĀDĀEßEįEāEćEčEkG‚G…G†G‡GˆGG“G·GøG¹GŗG½GŌG×GŲGŁGŚGŻGōGõGśGūGżG/HFHGHIHJHLHXHoHpHrHŒHŽHŠHėHģHļHII I&I'I,I-I2IhIƒI„IŒI„I§I“IĖIĢIŠIŃIÕI J&J'J*J+J/JJJeJhJpJ™J°J²J³JµJæJéOGPHP`PaPwPfõl m#m>mIxJxRxUx`xcxdxmxpxVX€!ˆ!‡%ffHxJxUx`xpx33S_‚ƒEžEGG*G9GTGpG,IGI–Q±QšSµSĒSāS&TATxT“TöWX^aya„aŸafbb{c€c›cæchØhĀiĪiéi jźkl:tUtstŽtŗtÕtuuv2vZwuwy y2yMyz3zhzƒz7{R{—{²{·~Ņ~Ó~Ü~÷~:€T€Ņ€ģ€ō€ĄŚįūĮ‚Ü‚Ż‚ä‚’‚{ƒ–ƒŻƒ÷ƒŽ„©„5…P…œ†·†¶ˆŃˆE‰`‰ł‰Š£ŠŗŠŒŒŽŒłŒGbŽŖŽĪŽéŽPkŃģÜ‘÷‘¤“æ“?”Z”•:•ršš››i›„›Į›Ü›œ*œÖœńœĆžŽžäž’ž× ņ 4£O£…¤ ¤¹„Š„3¦J¦j¦¦‘¦Ø¦Æ¦Ę¦ģ¦§§ØĀØ0ŖGŖOŖfŖ—¾®¾’¾æųĮĀ™Ć“ĆĶĆäĆNÄiĊĒ„ĒĶĶÉŪäŪ˜Ü³Üé"éĢéēé¹źŌźŠłėł”Ŗ3õ= & 3ō#Ś¹ö ”| $®'”+1/õ01o3æ7N8e8 8»8å8ģ8O:V:ń;<r<<=*=1=H=²=É=ē=>>5>d>{>Ż>ō>õ>??A?¤?Ē?Ÿ@ŗ@%A@AwA’AŸA¶AĮAÜA C'C”D¼DÄEßEkG‚G…GG“G·G½GŌG×GŻGōG/HFHXHoHsHŽHŠHėHšHI I&IhIƒII§I“IĖI J&JJJeJhJ™J°JµJśX Yfõl m#m>mJxcxdxexgxhxjxkxpx’’Kathleen FullerKathleen FullerKathleen FullerKathleen FullerKathleen FullerKathleen FullerKathleen FullerKathleen Fullerkpfullerbuchanan`\\Bus-user1\b\buchanan\General Files\WEBPAGE\Working Papers\Thakor-FLEXIBILITY AND DIVIDENDS.docrs›>äÆ’’’’’’’’’ćd*-ŽPb’’’’’’’’’Ń!ß3öė‚ģ’’’’’’’’’n7 5ņ·Z’’’’’’’’’…ao:¶’’’’’’’’’X!6Kz~’’’’’’’’’’2sāY æōŖ’’’’’’’’’ÓCfe¶ 8ē’’’’’’’’’„h„˜žĘh^„h`„˜žo(.„ „0żĘ ^„ `„0żo()‚„„L’Ę^„`„L’.€„Ų „˜žĘŲ ^„Ų `„˜ž.€„Ø „˜žĘØ ^„Ø `„˜ž.‚„x„L’Ęx^„x`„L’.€„H„˜žĘH^„H`„˜ž.€„„˜žĘ^„`„˜ž.‚„č„L’Ęč^„č`„L’.„Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜ž5OJPJQJ^Jo(·š€ „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜žOJQJo(o€ „p„˜žĘp^„p`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „„˜žĘ^„`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „ą„˜žĘą^„ą`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „P„˜žĘP^„P`„˜žOJQJo(§š„Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜ž5OJPJQJ^Jo(·š€ „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜žOJQJo(o€ „p„˜žĘp^„p`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „„˜žĘ^„`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „ą„˜žĘą^„ą`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „P„˜žĘP^„P`„˜žOJQJo(§š„Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜ž5OJPJQJ^Jo(·š€ „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜žOJQJo(o€ „p„˜žĘp^„p`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „„˜žĘ^„`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „ą„˜žĘą^„ą`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „P„˜žĘP^„P`„˜žOJQJo(§šh„Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH·šh„ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜žOJQJ^Jo(‡hˆHoh„p„˜žĘp^„p`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH§šh„@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH·šh„„˜žĘ^„`„˜žOJQJ^Jo(‡hˆHoh„ą„˜žĘą^„ą`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH§šh„°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH·šh„€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜žOJQJ^Jo(‡hˆHoh„P„˜žĘP^„P`„˜žOJQJo(‡hˆH§š„Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜ž5OJPJQJ^Jo(·š€ „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜žOJQJo(o€ „p„˜žĘp^„p`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „„˜žĘ^„`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „ą„˜žĘą^„ą`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „P„˜žĘP^„P`„˜žOJQJo(§š„Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜ž5OJPJQJ^Jo(·š€ „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜žOJQJo(o€ „p„˜žĘp^„p`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „„˜žĘ^„`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „ą„˜žĘą^„ą`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „P„˜žĘP^„P`„˜žOJQJo(§š„Š„˜žĘŠ^„Š`„˜ž5OJPJQJ^Jo(·š€ „ „˜žĘ ^„ `„˜žOJQJo(o€ „p„˜žĘp^„p`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „@ „˜žĘ@ ^„@ `„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „„˜žĘ^„`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „ą„˜žĘą^„ą`„˜žOJQJo(§š€ „°„˜žĘ°^„°`„˜žOJQJo(·š€ „€„˜žĘ€^„€`„˜žOJQJo(o€ „P„˜žĘP^„P`„˜žOJQJo(§š…ao:rs›ćd*-2sāYX!6Kn7 5Ń!ß3ÓCfe’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’Q~'®ö›       üč9        üsLĀ        “‘¼                 ī€®Ą        ŽsĢą        üŲ2        23<AT\deipx€ˆ‰œ£Ŗ±ø¹¾ÅĢÓŚŪū&'+29;CDMT[]efu|ƒ…Œ¢©°²¹ŗÓŚįćźėģ0; < = L Y m † ‡ ˜ Ÿ ¦ ­ “ µ Ē Ī Õ Ü ć ä ń ž   % &  Ŗ 23?Scnot{‚’™ ­®°·¾ĖĢĪÕÜéźģóś"#%,3@ACJQ^_ahn{|€‡š›®Æ»Ļßźėšöü &,78:@FRSU[amnpv|ˆ‰‹‘—£¤¦¬²¾æĮĒĶÖ×Ūįēóō!"#7GRSZagtuˆ‰Šž®¹ŗĮĒĶŁŚ“”œž°ĀĶĪĻŲāļšųłś )*=FO\]pz‚|„…””µĪĻŲßęķōõ÷ž $+23=DKRYZ‚‹™š£„²æĢĶĻŠŅŽėģīļšņłś  ()246@AJLYfstvwy†“”–—˜š§Ø²³“µ·øŻŽēéėõö’()+,.:FGIJKMTU_`abde™›§Ø±³ĄĶŚŪŻŽąķśūżž’          !$$$$+$?$X$Y$a$h$o$v$}$~$€$‡$Ž$•$œ$$Ÿ$¦$­$“$»$¼$Å$Ģ$Ó$Ś$į$ā$ % %%%%% %(%*%8%F%T%U%W%X%Z%h%v%w%y%z%{%}%Š%‹%”%•%–%—%™%š%ø%¹%Į%Ć%Å%Ī%Ļ%×%Ł%ē%õ%&&&& &&%&&&(&)&*&,&3&4&=&>&?&@&B&C&g&h&p&r&t&}&~&†&ˆ&–&¤&²&³&µ&¶&ø&Ę&Ō&Õ&×&Ų&Ł&Ū&é&ź&ó&ō&õ&ö&ų&ł&#'$','.'0'9':'B'D'Q'_'m'n'p'q's''''’'“'”'–'ž'Ÿ'Ø'©'Ŗ'«'­'®'Ÿ(”+œ++¬+¹+Ķ+ę+ē+š+÷+ž+, , ,,,,$,+,,,.,5,<,C,J,K,U,\,c,j,q,r,™,š,£,„,§,±,²,»,½,Ź,×,ä,å,ē,č,ź,÷,---- - ---#-$-%-&-(-)-G-H-Q-S-U-_-`-i-k-x-…-’-“-•-–-˜-„-²-³-µ-¶-·-¹-Ę-Ē-Ń-Ņ-Ó-Ō-Ö-×-ū-ü-.. .....&.-.:.;.=.>.@.G.T.U.W.X.Y.[.h.i.s.t.u.v.x.y.z.£.¤.­.Æ.±.».¼.Å.Ē.Ō.į.ī.ļ.ń.ņ.ō./ / ///// /!/+/,/-/./0/1/"01§3Ø3©3Ą3Ü3ż3ž344&454D4S4b4c4h4x4ˆ4˜4Ø4ø4Č4É4Ķ4Ü4ė4ś4 55'5(5-5=5M5]5m5}55Ž5¢5²5³5Ć5Ä5Ō5Õ5Ö5å5ę5ö5÷566666-6<6K6Z6i6x6y666Ÿ6®6¾6Ķ6Ü6Ż6ß6å6ė6ń6÷6ż677777$7*7076777C7R7a7o7}7Š7—7˜7š7¾78M8c8d8ė8ł9ś9ū9U:½:¾:æ:Ą:=;>;?;f‡h‚tpxótA,Q:A,A,A,A,ayy’@€čŁtpüż34;<ijox`@``@`8`t@`B`ˆ@`r`č@’’Unknownkpfuller’’kpfuller20021104T151230815Ģ#k&’’kpfuller’’CN’’Fuller, Kathleen’’’’ G‡z €’Times New Roman5€Symbol3& ‡z €’ArialQ€€Euclid SymbolSymbolI&€ ’’’’’’’é?’?Arial Unicode MS_R €ZapfDingbatsMonotype Sorts?5 ‡z €’Courier New5& ‡z!€’Tahoma;€Wingdings"1ˆšŠähćJu¦ćJu¦h»tfĢ3>'—uq5Ÿ0›‰!š x£‚€0d”jf‚Ė3ƒQšÜH’’FIRST DRAFT, OCTOBER 2002kpfullerbuchananšĄF_>› ą€éZą€éZą€éZFLEXIBILITY AND DIVIDENDS2#ŹÜ#ŹÜ#ŹÜ`kpfuller`kpfuller`kpfuller`kpfuller ’Xܧ@ČĄB“¹+/į‚/o=University of Michigan/ou=UMBS/cn=Recipients/cn=kpfuller0"Fuller, Kathleen0EXž90x/o=University of Michigan/ou=UMBS/cn=Recipients/cn=kpfuller q:€ @: 0?EX:/O=UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN/OU=UMBS/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=KPFULLER :"Fuller, Kathleen’9kpfuller’_ż_ö_"Fuller, Kathleen÷_Xܧ@ČĄB“¹+/į‚/o=University of Michigan/ou=UMBS/cn=Recipients/cn=kpfuller