ࡱ> kmj@ T<bjbjFF 2T,,\-lll$,4Illllllll/I1I1I1I1I1I1I$fJRLfUIl!Ell!E!EUI:@,lljIEFEFEF!E4llll/IEF!E/IEFEFHllIl` rkrUE(H/II0IH,M}EMIllMlIl Z+< EF4d;' lllUIUId 5FdPresentation Paper Seminar on the Indo-Pacific: Geostrategy and Development, Henry Jackson Society 1 November 2018 _______________________________ The UK in the Indo-Pacific: challenges, choices and concerns David Scott Context/Background Three key phrases are in play for the UK; namely Global Britain, Indo-Pacific and Return to East of Suez. The Global Britain report by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee said of the governments Global Britain rhetoric - the slogan must be backed by substance. The same point also applies to Indo-Pacific and Return to East of Suez rhetoric. Since 2016, the Indo-Pacific term has been used by (a) Prime Minister Theresa May, (b) Foreign Secretaries Boris Johnson and Jeremy Hunt, (c) Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson as well as MOD Permanent Secretary Stephen Lovegrove and (d) Trade Secretary Liam Fox - with regard to closer UK relations with Australia, India, France and Japan in the Indo-Pacific. The UK navy, including First Sea Lord Admiral Philip Jones, have also used the Indo-Pacific term since 2016; with regard to its general importance, strategy and deployments. The biggest think tank pickup of the term is of course the Henry Jackson Society profile by John Hemming, Global Britain in the Indo-Pacific published in May 2018, complete with a parliamentary launch. UK strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific are, in order of priority, (a) the Indian Ocean, (b) the South China Sea and (c) Western Pacific. The UK has few strategic interests in the South Pacific, where there are no British possessions, other than the small island of Pitcairn. Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and energy security are not particularly under threat in the South Pacific. The Indian Ocean is not only important for the UK in terms of energy security and SLOC stability, but also in terms of the UKs British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) 60 sq km land (the Chagos Islands), 54,340 sq km sea and 638,568 sq km Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The military base at the island Diego Garcia is a powerful projection point. Uncomfortably for the UK, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) began hearing arguments in September 2018 for an advisory opinion the UN General Assembly requested (in a vote that the UK lost in June 2017) on the legality of British sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. In the Indo-Pacific, at that General Assembly vote Japan, Australia and New Zealand voted on the UK side, France and Indonesia abstained, but all African Rim countries and, significantly, India voted against the UK. Economics The economic driver is that post-BREXIT Global Britain seeks to achieve new (free-ish) trade agreements across the Indo-Pacific region. UK policy is to roll-on existing EU economic agreements with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore. Both Japan (August) and Singapore (October) have indicated they would be willing to do so. The UK-India Joint Trade Review was set up in January 2018 for preliminary discussions on increased economic links. However substantive negotiations await UK exit from the EU, the terms of that exit, and whether India gives more priority to its re-launched FTA discussions with the EU. An Australia-UK Working Group was set up in September 2016 to provide expeditious transition to a future ambitious Australia-UK free trade agreement. The 2018 AUKMIN reiterated this. Increased UK trade with Taiwan may be an emergent avenue, seen in September 2018 when President Tsai received UK Minister of Trade Policy George Hollingbery, in Taiwan for the 21st annual Taiwan-UK trade talks. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is suspicious of increased government-to-government links between Taiwan and the UK The UK is unsurprisingly extremely keen on reaching an economic agreement with China, some sort of FTA which has eluded EU-China negotiators. The rhetoric on both sides is positive though vague, pending the shape of BREXIT negotiations between the UK and the EU. Given the existing (and growing) trade deficit that the UK has with China, increased post-BREXIT trade with China would in all likelihood merely mean an even bigger trade deficit for the UK? More subtly if the UK is more enmeshed with the Chinese economy then it may prove less able to resist Chinese pressure to gain core interests control of Taiwan and the South China Sea.  UK announcement that it seeks membership of the reconstituted Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). A Public Consultation on TPP accession was launched by the DIT in July 2018, with final comments due in on 26 October 2018. Japan and Australia have publicly supported UK entry. BREXIT provides the imperative for increased economic engagement with the Indo-Pacific, but any UK-EU customs union arrangements may also restrict future trade agreement opportunities for the UK with non-EU countries. Geo-economics Geo-economic instability is also a concern to the UK. This is explicitly with regard to piracy threats in the Western Indian Ocean, but also with regard to piracy threats in the Strait of Malacca and southern parts of the South China Sea. Implicit geo-economic challenges for the UK government revolve around its response to Chinas Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative being pushed by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Liam Fox judged that the United Kingdom is Chinas natural partner in this endeavour; while Baroness Fairhead waxes enthusiastically about the huge opportunities for the UK in the MSR. However, there remain concerns over whether there will be an open playing field operating or whether the MSR will privilege Chinese companies. The UK joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in December 2015, with a $3,054.7 million subscription and 2.9% voting powers. In this China-led mechanism (China had $29,780.4 million subscription and 26.6% voting powers) the UK has now agreed to pay four equal payments of $12.5 million by the end of March in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 into the AIIBs Special Fund for Project Preparation. As with the MSR, it remains to be seen how far transparent and level-playing field Indo-Pacific infrastructure projects emerge from the AIIB. The UK has remained outside non-Chinese initiatives like the US Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC), and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) backed by India and Japan. The US-Japan-India trilateral set up their Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group (TIWG) in February 2018, while the US-Japan-Australia trilateral set up their own Infrastructure Fund in July 2018. The UK could consider working with those non-Chinese settings? Geopolitics UK government and naval officials identify the geopolitical tension in the Indo-Pacific region in the short term emanating from North Korea; but increasingly in the longer-term from China. UK officials and naval figures pinpoint Chinas general naval rise and specific Chinese actions in the South China Sea, in particular construction of artificial islands and militarization of such holdings as well as Chinas rejection of Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling in 2016 which can be seen as threatening the rule of law and SLOCS security. UK naval leaders have pointed out the growing challenge to UK interest posed by Chinas string of pearls basing and facilities across the Indian Ocean Road, and with it the need for closer cooperation between other states (who are also concerned about China). Maritime considerations The opening of the Joint Logistics Support Base at Duqm (Oman) in October 2018, complete with deep water access and dry docks, enables powerful East-of-Suez forward projection by the UK into the Indian Ocean. It remains to be seen how far the UK actively uses Duqm for ongoing naval basing and deployment purposes. The opportunity is now there. Signs in 2018 emerged of the UK using Diego Garcia for UK naval purposes, rather than just leaving it for continuing US basing use. The increased UK role in the Indian Ocean, leads to the question of strengthening bilateral UK-US naval cooperation in these waters, including Diego Garcia. In terms of maritime cooperation with India it remains to be seen how far (a) the UK increases its participation in the KONKAN joint naval exercises, (b) signs any Logistics support Agreement (India has one with the US and France), and (c) perhaps extends cooperation with India into the South China Sea and Western Pacific Signs are emerging of increased political support and naval and air force contributions by the UK to the 5 Power Defence Arrangements (5PDA) with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. It remains to be seen how far the UK expands its present small berthing facilities at Singapore (for example, stationing Type 31 frigates, as suggested by the First Sea Lord), alongside the recently established defence staff office In terms of cooperation with Australia, it remains to be seen how far the UK increases cooperation (e.g. sending its new future aircraft carrier group) with Australia not just in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, but also in the South China Sea. The Japan-UK Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (August 2017) has been delivered with recent bilateral naval cooperation in the Western Pacific (HMS Sutherland and HMS Albion in 2018) into the Indian Ocean (HMS Argyll in 2018). The South China Sea remains a possible future venue? The trilateral cooperation agreement drawn up between the Japan, US and UK naval chiefs in October 2016, for exercises and operations looks set to be implemented by HMS Argyll in autumn 2018 in the Western Pacific. UK-French cooperation in Jeanne dArc mission deployments to the Indo-Pacific (including the South China Sea) seen in 2017 and 2018, may be developed further into bilateral naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific (including in the South China Sea) An importance issue for the future is whether the UK will deploy its new aircraft carrier battle group, headed by HMS Queen Elizabeth, into the Indo-Pacific, including the South China Sea, as stated firmly by UK ministers and naval officials. While the deployment readiness date remains relatively long term, around 2020/2021. Such aircraft carrier deployment by the UK has been welcomed by Australia and Japan, but criticised in the Chinese state media UK involvement in the South China Sea increased in significance in 2018, with regard to frequency and nature of operations On frequency, three deployments were made across the Indo-Pacific and into the South China Sea during 2018; successively by HMS Sutherland, HMS Albion and HMS Argyll. On nature, it was significant that their deployments included military exercising with India, Australia and Japan, but none with China. On nature, it was significant that in the South China Sea deployment involved Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations to challenge Chinas excessive maritime claims, with the deployment of HMS Albion around the Paracels attracting particularly strong Chinese denunciations in their Foreign Ministry and state media. The question arises of whether the UK is ready to continue such Freedom of Navigation operations against rising Chinese maritime strength, and the risk of jeopardizing post-BREXIT economic relations with China, a point made by naval leaders. This of course returns the UK position and interest in the Indo-Pacific as still being shaped by post-BREXIT imperatives and uncertainties over what arrangements will or will not be reached with the EU. REFERENCES  Boris Johnson, Britain is back: East of Suez, 9 December 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-speech-britain-is-back-east-of-suez.  House of Commons. Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Britain (HC78), 12 March 2018, p. 15.  Mark Field, Global Britain: supporting the rules based international system, 17 August 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/global-britain-supporting-the-rules-based-international-system.  Fields, The UK and all of Asia, a modern partnership, 14 August 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/minister-mark-field-speech-the-uk-and-all-of-asia-a-modern-partnership; Minister Hollingbery supports EU-Japan EPA as foundation for UK deal, Statement to Parliament (DIT), 29 June 2018.  Liam Fox and Steven Ciobo, Joint Statement (Establishment of Australia-UK trade working group), 6 September 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/establishment-of-australia-uk-trade-working-group.  Michael Auslin, Brexit Britain is eager for a sweet deal with Beijing. But at what price?, The Spectator, 4 August 2018, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/08/making-china-great-again/.  Liam Fox, UK-China trade relations, 19 June 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/liam-fox-on-uk-china-trade-relations; Baroness Fairhead, Why Chinas Belt and Road offers the UK huge opportunities, 10 May 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/why-chinas-belt-and-road-offers-the-uk-huge-opportunities.  Philip Jones, Speech (DSEI Maritime Conference 2017), 11 September 2017, http://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/dsei-maritime-conference-2017  Jones, Speech (RUSI Seapower Conference), 24 May 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/first-sea-lord-speech-at-the-rusi-sea-power-conference. sd e h k y      ) : F G L M f p q r  @̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̝̈wq hK10JhwBhK16hK10J5\h1PhK10J5\h&hK10Jjh&hK10JU\hWhK10J5hg`hK10J5h1PhK10J56 hK10J5jhK10JUhyAhK16hxhK15>*h xhK15 hK15hK1,csf g q r dh-DM gdK1 & Fdh-DM gdK1 hdh^hgdK1 & FdhgdK1dhgdK1 $dha$gdK1$a$gdK1\5S< [ \ ?@QR*+56de hdh^hgdK1 & FdhgdK1dhgdK1 & Fdh-DM gdK1@^|~QR )+5+,AB456S_`a C0":";"="q%r%t%|%%%%%]&㨣㝗㏣㨣 h|QhK1h2,hK15 hK10J hK10J hK15hMhK15h=;hK10J hhK1 hhK1jhK10JUhrvhK15h=;hK10J>*hK1h hK10Jh hK10J\ hK10J378uvRSabQRWX{ | /"0"=">""#k$l$s%t% & FdhgdK1dhgdK1t%%%&&k'l' ( (N)O)****++----..00!1"1 hdh^hgdK1 & FdhgdK1dhgdK1]&&+%,&,L,44\5g5h5i55555556 6 6 696G6P6_6d6e6f6g666666666,7-7.7/707|qqqqqqhhK1CJaJ!jhhK10JCJUaJh9]hK16CJaJh9]hK1CJaJ!jh9]hK10JCJUaJhK1CJaJhhhK1CJaJh8MhK15CJaJjhK10JU hK10J6h6hK10J6 hK10JhK1 h\XhK1*"111V2W23344W5X5Y5Z5\5g5 6f6.7\8)99(;;R<S<dhgdK1gdK1 hdh^hgdK1dhgdK1 & FdhgdK107/8F8Z8\8]8y8888&9(9)9*9+999999999:p:&;';(;);*;1;@;A;F;G;O;P;r;x;;;;;;;;P<Q<R<T<ѾѾѴ픉~hhK1CJaJhFhK1CJaJ!jhFhK10JCJUaJhhK16 hhK1jhK10JUhK1CJaJhsGHhK1CJaJhG.hK1CJaJ!jhG.hK10JCJUaJhK1hOxhK16 hOxhK11S<T<01hBP. 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