ࡱ> y bjbj A{{- /HH"X"@:#:#:#N#N#N#8#2$$N# kVV'l''''(((BjDjDjDjDjDjDj$_mpThj:#(((((hj:#:#''H}jD333(:#':#'Bj3(Bj33_lc'C&Pv.l4a*.jjH k^ajep(3epTcc6ep:#h0((3(((((hjhj3((( k((((ep(((((((((H h!:  Immigration, Latinos, and White Partisan Politics: The New Democratic Defection Zoltan Hajnal, University of California, San Diego* Michael Rivera, University of California, San Diego* Abstract Immigration is profoundly changing the racial demographics of America. In this article, we seek to understand if and how immigration and increasing racial diversity are shaping the partisan politics of individual white Americans. We show that whites views on immigration and Latinos are strongly related to their core political identities and vote choices. Using a range of different surveys, we find that, all else equal, whites with more anti-immigrant views or more negative views of Latinos are less apt to identify as Democrats and less likely to favor Democratic candidates. This rightward shift harkens back to an earlier period of white defection from the Democratic Party and highlights the enduring but shifting impact of race on American politics. *Authors are listed in alphabetical order. Zoltan Hajnal and Michael Rivera can be reached at the Department of Political Science, UCSD, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521. Please direct all correspondence to Zoltan Hajnal  HYPERLINK "mailto:zhajnal@ucsd.edu" zhajnal@ucsd.edu. The authors wish to thank Marisa Abrajano, Karen Ferree Jessica Trounstine, Nicholas Valentino and participants in the Politics of Race and Place conference at CCIS at UCSD , the American Politics workshop at Harvard University, and the American politics workshop at the University of California, Davis for their invaluable comments. Immigration is transforming the demographics of America. In the last half century, the U.S. has become more diverse, Latinos have surpassed African Americans as the largest minority, and the proportion of the country that is white has fallen from roughly 90 percent to 65 percent. The future is likely to bring even more change. The Census projects that by sometime in the middle of this century, the U.S. will no longer be a majority white nation. In this article, we investigate the extent of the influence of immigration and racial diversity on the core political identities and voting preferences of individual white Americans. When white Americans choose to align with one of the two major parties, when they decide which candidate to support in Presidential contests, and when they vote in a range of other elections, do attitudes about immigration and Latinos help shape the outcome? Although widespread attention has been paid to the causes of our attitudes about Latinos and immigration more broadly, little research has focused on the consequences of immigrant-related views (on causes see Schildkraut 2011, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Kinder and Kam 2009, Brader et al 2008, Pettigrew et al 2007, Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Quillian 1995, Citrin et al 1997 but see Hopkins 2010). To date there is almost no direct evidence that the basic choices of individual white voters in American politics strongly reflect their views on immigration or the Latino population. Major recent studies of the presidential and Congressional vote tend to fall into one of two categories. Either they ignore immigration and race (McCarthy et al 2006, Miller and Shanks 1996, Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1998), or if they focus on race, they limit that focus to the impact of Americas old black-white divide (Lewis-Beck et al 2010, Valentino and Sears 2005, Abramowitz 1994, Carmines and Stimson 1989). No study that we know of has demonstrated a connection between immigration and the white vote in national contests or revealed a link between immigration and white partisanship. Nevertheless, we believe that immigration and the Latino population do impact whites electoral calculus and we offer an account of how large scale immigration can have real partisan consequences for the white population. First, immigration and the rapid growth of the Latino population have dramaticallyaltered the racial group membership and imagery of the Democratic Party. Further, we believe that an oft repeated Latino(or immigrant) threat narrative has fueled individual white fears and insecurities about Latinosview. Finally, when Republican and Democratic leaders take divergent stances on immigration and other issues of particular relevance to the Latino community and in particular when Republicans stand more strongly against immigration, the two parties present individual white Americans with a compelling partisan logic. For those who are concerned about the Latino population, there is a powerful motivation to choose the Republican Party. Does Immigration Matter? There is incontrovertible evidence that race has mattered in American politics at different times in our history (Klinker and Smith 1999). And there is evidence that race still matters in American politics. Studies contend that whites policy preferences on welfare, education, crime, and a host of other cores issue are shaped by attitudes toward blacks (Gilens 1999, Hurwitz and Peffley 1997, Kinder and Sanders 1996 but see Sniderman and Carmines 1997). More critically, for our study, scholars have also linked partisan choices with racial attitudes. Several studies assert that whites defected from the Democratic Party in the 1960s in response to the Civil Rights Movement, the increased political participation of African Americans, and growing black support of the Democratic Party (Carmines and Stimson 1989, Huckfledt and Kohfeld 1989, Giles and Evans 1994). As blacks joined the Democratic Party in large numbers and as the Democratic and Republican Parties diverged on the main racial policy questions of the day, white identification with the Democratic Party especially in the South sharply declined. According to this view, whites sentiments about blacks helped Republicans dominate national elections (Valentino and Sears 2005, Edsall and Edsall 1991). And more recently racial views had, by many accounts, a substantial impact on Barack Obamas presidential bid (Lewis-Beck et al 2010, Bobo and Dawson 2009, Tesler and Sears 2010 but see Ansolabehere and Stewart 2009). There are, however, two concerns with this line of research. First, there are a number of authors who dispute just how much of this partisan shift was due to racial considerations (Abramowitz 1994, Lublin 2004). According to this view, other factors like social morality and more recently war, terrorism, and economic crisis have replaced race as the underlying basis for partisan choice (Adams 1997, Layman and Carmines 1997, Miller and Shanks 1996). If racial considerations do play an ongoing role in white partisan decision making, it is one that is questioned. Another concern with this research is that it focuses exclusively on the black-white divide while ignoring immigration and other racial dynamics. It is attitudes toward blacks and not views of Latinos or immigration that are purported to drive partisanship and the vote. Given dramatic growth in the Latino and immigrant populations, it is at least plausible that these groups have become more central in the political thinking of white America. Perhaps more significant is the literature on minority context. An extensive set of studies has demonstrated the relevance of immigrant or Latino residential context for white Americans (Hopkins 2010, Ha 2010, Hero and Preuhs 2007, Campbell et al 2006, Brader et al 2008, Citrin et al 1997). But these findings are limited in one important way. Rather than look at the consequences of immigrant or Latino context for broad political outcomes like partisanship and the vote, this literature tends to focus more narrowly on how immigrant or Latino context affects attitudes toward these minority groups (Ha 2010, Hero and Preuhs 2007, Campbell et al 2006 ). What research on the American case has not yet attempted to demonstrate is how immigrant context relates to the basic partisan choices of the white electorate. Comparative studies in Europe have identified clear links between the size of the national immigrant population and support for right-wing parties (Arzheimer 2009, Lubbers et al 2002). But the same has not been done in the United States. Ultimately, what is missing is compelling evidence that immigration is a core element of American politics. Why Immigration, Latinos, Party, and the Vote Are Linked In spite of the limited attention that scholars of the vote have given to immigration or the Latino population, we contend that there is ample reason to believe that immigration and the Latino population impact the partisan politics of white Americans. First, the sheer size of the racial and demographic change that has occurred and that continues to occur is impossible for white Americans to miss. Immigrants and their children now represent one in four Americans (U.S. Census 2005). All of this demographic change is, of course, accompanied by the extensive presence of Latinos, Asians, and other immigrants in the media and almost daily interactions with non-native speakers in the nations streets, workplaces, and neighborhoods. It would be surprising if such a massive change in the makeup of the nation did not result in immigration playing a more central role in the minds of white Americans. Second, irrespective of the actual fiscal consequences of immigration, there is an on-going and oft repeated threat narrative that links Americas immigrant and Latino populations to a host of pernicious fiscal, social, and cultural consequences (Chavez 2008, Hopkins 2010). This narrative emphasizes cultural decline, immigrants use of welfare, health, and educational services, their propensity to turn to crime, and their tendency to displace native citizens from jobs (Huntington 2005, Borjas 2001, Gimpel and Skerry 2008). Others have underscored how the growth of the Latino population could lead to cultural change and the demise of the traditional American way of life (Huntington 2005). Each of these concerns has been spelled out repeatedly and in great detail in the media, in the political sphere, and in scholarly outlets (Chavez 2008). Moreover, although many inside and outside of the political arena dispute the threat narrative, it appears that the narrative has been absorbed by a significant segment of the white population. Across the white population attitudes on Latinos and immigration are diverse, but there is little doubt that many white Americans have expressed real concerns about immigration and hold negative attitudes toward Latinos. Recent polls suggest that well over half of white Americans feel that immigrants are a burden on the nation, a slight majority think they add to the crime problem, and about half believe they take jobs away from Americans (CNN 2010). For many, the changes that are occurring in America represent a real threat. Exactly why Latinos and immigrants represent a threat to individual Americans is a subject of widespread debate in the literature. Most contend that cultural and racial considerations are behind the white response. Views on immigration have been linked to ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam (2009), social dominance and the authoritarian personality (Pettigrew et al 2007), nationalism (Citrin et al 1990), and racial prejudice (Schildkraut 2011, Brader et al 2008, Burns and Gimpel 2000). But others point to economic considerations. At the aggregate level, studies have linked economic conditions to opposition to immigration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Quillian 1995). Although we are convinced by recent tests which demonstrate that individual economic circumstances play little role in shaping views on immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Citrin et al 1997), our theory is consistent with either an economic or cultural threat mechanism. If white Americans feel threatened by immigration or Latinos regardless of why they feel threatenedit could have political consequences. Critically, for our account, this threat narrative has recently taken on increasingly clear partisan implications. Although there is still considerable variation within each Partys leadership on the issue of immigration, empirical studies demonstrate growing partisan divergence on immigration between leaders of the two parties (Jeong et al 2011, Miller and Schofield 2008). These divergent stances on immigration are borne out by interest group rates. Interest groups like Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), the National Latino Congreso, and Numbers USA rate Democratic members of Congress as distinctly liberal on immigration and Republican members as strongly conservative. There is also compelling evidence that Democratic and Republican leaders at the state and local level are also divided on immigration (Ramakrishnan N.D). For example, no Democrat in the Arizona legislature supported the controversial immigrant enforcement bill, SB 1070, while all but one Republican voted for it (Archibold 2010). When Republican leaders criticize immigrants, condemn their actions, and bemoan the costs to America, and Democratic leaders either ignore immigration or offer lukewarm support for the plight of immigrants, they present citizens with a choice on an issue that many feel is threatening America. In short, many white Americans will see that America is changing, will believe that immigration is driving many of the negative changes they see, and will know that the two parties represent two different responses one largely on the side of immigrants and one largely in opposition to immigration. For many white Americans, this may be a powerful motivation to defect to the Republican Party. Research Design In order to assess the impact of immigration and immigration-related views on the politics of white America, we turn to a standard tool of American public opinion survey research the American National Election Study (ANES). We choose the ANES because it includes a long list of questions that get at each of the many different factors known to affect partisanship and the vote. This is critical, since we cannot know if immigration matters, unless we can control for all of the core aspects of American elections. We begin with an analysis of the 2008 ANES for two reasons. First, it contains questions on immigration a requirement that rules out most years of the ANES survey and many other surveys. Second, 2008 was ostensibly not about immigration. Barack Obama, the first African American nominee for President was on the ballot, McCain and Obama outlined similar plans on immigration, the nation was in the midst of two wars, and it faced an almost unprecedented fiscal crisis. Immigration was supposedly not a critical issue in the campaign. If anything, 2008 was going to be about whites acceptance of blacks and their concerns about the economy, war, and terrorism. As such, 2008 represents a relatively exacting test of our immigration hypothesis. We realize, however, that if we want to make a more general statement about American politics, we need to assess the influence views of Latinos and immigrants have across a wider range of data sets, years, elections and contexts. To do this we repeat our analysis using the ANES cumulative file, and the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Surveys (NAES). This allows us to test the immigration hypothesis across different years (contests from 1970-2010), different types of elections (President, House, Senate, Gubernatorial), different types of survey instruments (including a wide variety of questions that vary the wording of the key independent variable immigration related feelings and the key dependent variables partisanship and vote choice), and different survey methodologies and samples. Finally, since party choices may impact rather be impacted by immigrant related views, we undertake Granger causality tests on the three ANES panel data sets that include questions on immigration. If all of these different data points lead to the same story, we can be reasonably confident of that story. Because our theory focuses on the reaction of white Americans to Americas changing racial demographics, we include only those individuals who identify themselves as white and as non-Hispanic. . Defining and operationalizing our key independent variable views toward Latinos and immigration is not straightforward. The process is complex because we believe that white Americans tend to conflate several distinct categories of people. Although in theory categories like illegal immigrant, immigrant, and Latino are all distinct, in the practice and rhetoric of American politics these concepts often blur together. In light of these muddled categories, we will test a series of different measures of Latino and immigrant views to try to get a clearer sense of just who it is that white Americans are reacting to. At the same time, it is clear in surveys that white Americans express the most reservations about illegal immigrants. Almost 90 percent of white Americans feel that illegal immigration is a very serious or somewhat serious problem (NBC 2011). Given the especially strong opposition to illegal immigration, we begin by focusing on a summary measure of views on illegal immigration. Specifically, we use the four questions in the 2008 ANES that explicitly address illegal immigration to create an Alpha factor score for each respondent. The four questions are: 1) a standard feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants that ranges from 0 (meaning extremely cold or negative feelings) to 100 (for extremely warm or positive feelings), 2) Should controlling and reducing illegal immigration be a very important. not an important foreign policy goal? 3) Do you favor/oppose the U.S. government making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens? and 4) Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose allowing illegal immigrants to work in the United States for up to three years after which they would have to go back to their home country? The four items cohere well with a scale reliability of .65 and an average inter-item correlation of .32. In practice, it matters little how we combine these questions or whether we focus on a subset of these questions or on just one of these questions. A simple additive scale performs similarly in the regressions that follow. Also, in alternate tests when we substitute each single question or combinations of two or three of these questions into the regressions, the pattern of results is similar. Since we think concerns about a range of different groups (immigrants, illegal immigrants, Latinos) are clustered together in the minds of many white Americans, we incorporate a range of different measures of feelings toward these groups into our tests. Specifically, in alternate tests of the 2008 ANES data we examine attitudes toward immigration in general (Should immigration levels be increased a lotdecreased a lot?), and attitudes toward Latinos (a standard feeling thermometer for Hispanics). The results of these alternate tests are described below. Across the other public opinion surveys that we examine, questions on immigration vary substantially. Earlier and later versions of the ANES address whether immigration is a burden and include a standard feeling thermometer toward Hispanics. The NAES focuses on whether the federal government should do more to restrict immigration. Despite the substantial variation in the content of these questions, there is a consistency of findings. In each case, Latino or immigrant-related views are significantly and substantively tied to partisan choices. The main focus of this study is on partisanship and the vote. Our main measure of partisanship is the standard 7 point party identification scale. Respondents place themselves on a scale that ranges from strongly Democratic (1) to strongly Republican (7). To assess the robustness of our results, in alternate tests, we also direct our attention to party feeling thermometers, dummy variables isolating Democratic identifiers and Republican identifiers, and unordered party identification models (utilizing multinomial logistic regressions). We assess the vote in as many ways as possible. The ANES has the vote for Presidential, Congressional, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial contests. In the 2008 Presidential contest we focus primarily on a simple dummy variable which indicates either a vote for the Democratic candidate (0) or a vote for the Republican candidate (1). In other contests with significant third party candidates, we utilize an unordered 3 point scale (Democrat, Republican, Third Party). With the ANES we can also assess the effects of Latino and immigrant related attitudes on intended vote choice and candidate feeling thermometers. One of the most difficult aspects of this empirical endeavor is ensuring that we include controls for all of the different factors that could drive whites electoral decisions and be correlated with white views on immigration (see Miller and Shanks 1996 for an overview of the partisan choice literature). In short, our empirical models have to incorporate key elements of American politics. With that in mind, we include measures for: 1) basic ideology the standard seven point liberal-conservative self-placement scale (from extremely liberal to extremely conservative); 2) war, terrorism, and security Do you approve/disapprove of the way the U.S. federal government has handled the war in Afghanistan? Do you approve/disapprove of the way the U.S. federal government has handled the war in Iraq? and Should federal spending on the war on terrorism be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?; 3) the economy and retrospective evaluations Do you approve/disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president? and Would you say that over the past year the nations economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?; 4) redistribution People who make more money should pay a larger percent of their income in taxes to the government than people who make less money, and Should federal spending on the welfare be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?; 5) morality and religion - Do you strongly favor strongly oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination and Is religion an important part of your life?; 6) views of blacks the four standard racial resentment questions (i) "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." (ii) "Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors." (iii) "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve." (iv) "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class."; 7) other racial attitudes/ethnocentrism standard feeling thermometers for blacks, Asian Americans, and Whites.; 8) other issues in alternate tests we add questions on universal health care, womens rights, the environment, abortion, crime, schools, science and technology. Also, since partisan choices have been linked to class, religion, and other individual demographic characteristics we control for education (number of years of school completed), household income (divided into 25 categories), gender, age in years, whether the respondent is unemployed or not, whether anyone in the household is a union member or not, marital status (married or not), and religious denomination (Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, or Other). In alternate tests, we also account for self-identified class status, church attendance, whether the respondent is born-again or not, and years living in the community. All told, we have controls for basic ideology, retrospective evaluations, a range of core issues, racial attitudes, and individual social characteristics many if not all of the factors that are presumed to dominate the vote. Views on Immigrants and Latinos and Partisanship In Table One, we begin to assess the connection between immigrant or Latino related views and partisanship. The table displays a series of regressions that control for an increasing number of factors from socio-demographics characteristics to issue positions, ideological views, and racial attitudes all purportedly central to partisan choice in America. Each model is an OLS regression with the standard seven point party identification scale as the dependent variable. Table One. Views on Immigration and White Partisanship 2008 ANESParty Identification (High=More Republican)Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 4IMMIGRATION Views on Illegal Immigrants-.61 (.09)**-.24 (.09)**-.22 (.09)*-.19 (.09)*DEMOGRAPHICS Education-.01 (.03).02 (.03).01 (.03).01 (.03) Income.04 (.01)**.03 (.01)**.03 (.01)**.03 (.01)** Unemployed.16 (.33).22 (.29).25 (.29).29 (.29) Age-.08 (.04)*-.05 (.03)-.03 (.03)-.07 (.04) Female-.20 (.14).06 (.12).04 (.12).03 (.12) Married .57 (.14)*.14 (.12).14 (.11).16 (.12) Union Member-.53 (.21)*-.51 (.16)**-.52 (.17)**-.54 (.17)** Jewish-1.30 (.52)*-.23 (.42)-.14 (.42)-.31 (.42) Catholic.16 (.18)-.09 (.16)-.05 (.16)-.11 (.16) Protestant.80 (.16).17 (.14).21 (.14).11 (.14)IDEOLOGY Liberal-Conservative.62 (.05)**.60 (.05)**.61 (.05)**ISSUE POSITIONS War and Terrorism Terrorism Iraq Afghanistan -.02 (.03) .02 (.04) -.08 (.04)* -.02 (.03) .02 (.04) -.08 (.04)* -.02 (.03) .02 (.04) -.08 (.04)* Economy/Retrospective Economy Improving President Job Approval -.10 (.09) -.43 (.05) -.09 (.09) -.42 (.05) -.10 (.09) -.43 (.05) Redistribution Higher Taxes on Rich Welfare Spending -.14 (.06)* -.01 (.03) -.12 (.06)* -.02 (.03) -.15 (.09)* -.01 (.03) Morality/Religion Gay Rights Importance of Religion .05 (.04) .05 (.03) .06 (.04) .06 (.03) .05 (.04) .06 (.03) Racial Resentment to Blacks Blacks Deserve Less Blacks Special Favors Blacks Suffer Discrimination Blacks Try Harder .17 (.07)* .12 (.06)* .02 (.06) .03 (.06) Other Racial Considerations Feelings Toward Blacks Feelings Toward Asians Feelings Toward Whites -.81 (.52) 1.18 (.52)* .59 (.43)Constant4.39 (.50)**3.36 (.69)**2.46 (.74)**3.36 (.69)**N803581578569Adj R Squared.12.60.61.61**P<.01 *P<.05 We start with a basic model that includes a traditional set of socioeconomic characteristics and other demographic variables. Given claims about class and religious based support for each party, we include basic markers of class (education, income, employment status, union membership), and a series of dummy variables measuring religious affiliation (McCarthy et al 2007, Adams 1997, Layman and Carmines 1997). Model 1 suggests that many of these measures are important for partisanship but more importantly, it shows that net basic demographic controls, attitudes toward illegal immigration are closely linked to partisan attachments. All else equal, non-Hispanic whites who have more negative feelings toward illegal immigrants are predicted to be just over one point more Republican on the seven point party identification scale than are whites with less negative views. Given that a one point shift equals the difference between a strong Democrat and a weak Democrat, immigrant views could be greatly re-shaping American politics. Political choices in America are obviously about much more than immigration or Latinos. There is little doubt that recent elections have focused significantly on Americas ongoing economic recession, its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the enduring terrorist threat facing the nation, social morality issues like gay rights, and a core ideological dimension liberalism vs conservatism (Abramson et al 2007, Layman and Carmines 1997, Fiorina 1978, MacKuen et al 1989). In Model Two, we incorporate each of these different elements in our model of party identification. What we find confirms much of what we know about American politics. Most of these issues, the basic ideological orientation, and retrospective evaluations greatly influence which party individual Americans choose to support. What is striking, however, is that the inclusion of all of these different elements of American politics does not eliminate the impact of views on immigrants. Views of illegal immigrants still significantly shape white partisanship after controlling for a range of measures of issues, ideology, and retrospective evaluations. Moreover, alternate tests indicate that it does not matter which issues we include or how we measure issues, ideology, and retrospective evaluations. When policy questions on health care, crime, foreign aid, schools, womens rights, the environment, and science are added to the model, the impact of immigrant-related views on partisan attachments is largely unaffected. Further, immigrant-related views remain significant when we substitute in alternate measures of economic policy preferences or retrospective evaluations. No matter what ones views on the economy, the war, abortion, and other factors, views of illegal immigrants are strongly associated with being a Republican. Immigrants and Latinos or Blacks and Ethnocentrism? One element of American politics that we have largely ignored to this point is the black-white divide. When race has mattered in American national elections, the main issue has usually been the rights and interests of African Americans (Klinker and Smith 1999, Carmines and Stimson 1989, Key 1949). Especially in 2008, with Barack Obama, the nations first black presidential nominee on the ballot, and evidence that racial resentment played a role in the white vote, these kinds of racial attitudes need to be integrated into the analysis (Lewis-Beck et al 2010, Bobo and Dawson 2009, Tesler and Sears 2010 but see Ansolabehere and Stewart 2009). Thus, in Model Three, we add four different questions from the racial resentment scale developed by Kinder (Kinder and Sanders 1996) and included in most bi-annual editions of the ANES. All four measures explicitly ask about attitudes toward African Americans and combined the four measures have been shown to play a critical role in white public opinion (Kinder and Sanders 1996). The results in Model 3 indicate that the black-white divide remains significant in white partisanship. Whites who are more racially resentful of blacks are predicted to be 1.1 points more Republican on the party identification scale than are whites who are less resentful of blacks. But the results also suggest that immigration represents a distinct dimension that helps to shape white partisan ties. Even after considering the effects of racial resentment toward blacks, those who have more negative views of illegal immigrants continue to be significantly more apt to identify as Republican. Attitudes on immigration are not merely proxies for racial attitudes. Immigration appears to be a highly relevant dimension of American politics. In the last model of Table 1, we further investigate the role of race and the possibility that immigrant-related views are a stand in for some deeper aspect of Americas racial dynamics like racial prejudice or ethnocentrism (Kinder and Tam 2009, Brader et al 2008, Burns and Gimpel 2000). Specifically, we incorporate whites views of African Americans, their views of white Americans, and their views of Asian Americans. In each case, we utilize a basic feeling thermometer toward each group. Despite the inclusion of feelings toward the three different racial groups in the model, we still find that immigrant-related views are important for white partisanship. Whites with the most negative views of illegal immigrants are predicted to be one third of a point higher on the seven point party identification scale than are whites with the most positive views of illegal immigrants. The impact of immigration on American politics cannot be wholly reduced by incorporating traditional measures of stereotypes and ethnocentrism.. To assess the robustness of these results, we repeated the tests in Table One with a range of different measures of immigrants and Latinos. Specifically, when we substituted in a measure of feelings toward Latinos (a Hispanic feeling thermometer), a measure of feelings toward legal immigration (should immigration levels be increased or decreased), and a simpler measure of feelings toward illegal immigrants (an illegal immigrant feeling thermometer), all were significant in the regression model. Regardless of how we measure attitudes toward immigrants or Latinos, these attitudes are closely connected to party identification. In alternate tests, we also assessed different party-based dependent variables. Specifically, we examined feeling thermometers toward each party, dummy variables for identity with each party, and an unordered three point party identification scale (multinomial logistic regression model). In each case, views toward illegal immigrants remained significant and the effects were generally substantial. For example, all else equal, those with more positive views of immigrants scored 6 points higher on the Democratic Party feeling thermometer. Regardless of how one measures partisanship, it appears to be closely linked to views on immigration. One concern with the analysis that we have presented is the possibility of reverse causation. It is possible that party identification may impact rather than be impacted by immigrant related views. Indeed, much of the literature in American politics suggests that party identification stands near the beginning of a funnel of causality that drives factors like issue positions (Campbell et al 1960 but see Dancey and Goren 2010). We do not dispute that party identification is the prime mover in American politics but we nevertheless maintain that deep seated attitudes on immigration and race can shift the partisan leaning of some members of the population. We directly test that proposition in three ways. First, we preform Granger causality tests on the 2008-2010 ANES panel to demonstrate that changes in party identification are, in fact, caused by immigrant related views. Second, later in the article we shift the focus to the vote rather than partisanship, where we find that immigrant views are correlated with vote choice after controlling for party identification. Third, and also later in the article, we look separately at Democrats, Independents, and Republicans to see if views on immigrants matter within each party. These later two tests allow us to see if views of Latinos or immigrants have a relationship with the vote that goes beyond partisanship. For our Granger causality test we focus on the most recent ANES panel. The basic idea is to determine if past views on immigration predict current partisanship net the effects of past partisanship. In other words, do past views on immigration help predict future changes in party identification? As Table Two illustrates, there is a clear, causal link between immigrant views and partisanship. Views on immigration (measured by a question about whether illegal immigrants should be given a chance to become citizens) in 2008 have a significant effect on party identification measured in 2009 after controlling for party identification measured in 2008. Indeed, even after controlling for past partisanship, a two-standard deviation shift in views of illegal immigrants is tied to about a one quarter point shift on the 7 point party identification scale. Attitudes on immigration are not leading to a wholesale shift from strong Democrat to strong Republican over the course of a year but feelings about immigrants do appear to be leading to some very real changes in partisanship. This is true whether we use the 2008 ANES panel or instead perform the Granger causality test on the two other recent ANES panels from 2000-2004 and 1992-1993 (see online appendix). The influence of immigrant-related views on partisanship even persists when we control for a range of other major issues typically linked to partisanship (see online appendix) Table Two. Granger Causality: Immigrations Impact on Party Identification (2009)Party Identification (2008).89 (.01)**Views on Illegal Immigrants (2008).03 (.01)*N1171F2603 *****P<.01 *P<.05 Immigrant Views and the Vote Are the right-ward shifts that we see on partisan attachments accompanied by a shift to the right in national electoral contests? In Table Three, we attempt to answer this question. The Table presents results for a series of logistic regressions that analyze the vote in the 2008 presidential election. The dependent variable in each case is a dummy variable indicating support for the Republican candidate - McCain (1) or support for the Democratic candidate - Obama (0). Table Three. Views on Immigration and the White Presidential Vote 2008 ANES Support for the Republican Candidate in 2008 Presidential ElectionsVote ChoiceIntended Vote ChoiceIMMIGRATION View on Illegal Immigrants-.66 (.34)**-.62 (.27)*DEMOGRAPHICS Education.10 (.09).07 (.08) Income.01 (.03)-.02 (.03) Unemployed-2.75 (.93)**-1.5 (.68)* Age-.00 (.01).02 (.01) Female.25 (.38)-.22 (.31) Married .59 (.36).54 (.29) Union Member-17 (.49)-.80 (.44) Jewish1.25 (1.1)1.3 (.95) Catholic.73 (.48).37 (.39) Protestant-.26 (.45)-.47 (.37)IDEOLOGY/PARTY ID Liberal-Conservative1.19 (.46)**.65 (.33)* Party Identification.82 (.12)**.76 (.09)**ISSUE POSITIONS War and Terrorism Terrorism Iraq Afghanistan -.05 (.11) -.18 (.12) -.18 (.11) -.02 (.08) .15 (.10) .13 (.10) Economy/Retrospective Economy Improving President Job Approval .30 (.29) .66 (.16) .42 (.22) .55 (.13)** Redistribution Higher Taxes on Rich Welfare Spending .33 (.18)-.03 (.10) -.26 (.15) -.01 (.01) Morality/Religion Gay Rights Importance of Religion -.39 (.14)** .10 (.10) .03 (.01)** -.06 (.08) Other Racial Considerations Feelings Toward Blacks Feelings Toward Asians Feelings Toward Whites .00 (.01) -.04 (.02)* .03 (.01)* -.02 (.01) -.01 (.01) .01 (.01)Constant-3.04 (2.3).06 (1.8)**N556633Pseudo Squared.68.61**P<.01 *P<.05 In the first column we focus on the reported vote of respondents queried after the election. In the second column, we examine intended vote choice for those surveyed before election day. Since we are particularly interested in determining if immigration has an effect on the vote that goes beyond party affiliation, we add the standard 7 point party identification scale to the list of controls. By including party identification in our vote models, we can conclude with some confidence that views on immigration have an independent effect that is not wholly driven by party identification. The results in Table Three indicate that how we think about immigrants is strongly related to the vote. As we saw before, whites with more negative attitudes toward illegal immigrants are significantly more likely to opt for Republican options. All else equal, more negative views of illegal immigrants are associated with a 23.7 percent increase in the probability of voting for John McCain, the Republican presidential candidate. The effect for intended vote choice is almost identical a 22.9 percent increase in the probability of voting for McCain. Impressively, in an election that occurred in the midst of one of the nations sharpest recessions in history, that coincided with two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that included the nations first black presidential nominee, views on immigrants still mattered. To further test the role of immigrant and Latino views on the vote, we assessed the impact of immigrant-related views within each party. By looking within party, we get another look at how attitudes toward immigration matter beyond partisanship. Among those who claim ties to the Democratic Party, views of illegal immigrants are significantly related to vote choice. The vast majority of Democrats vote for Obama but those who have more negative views of illegal immigrants are 6.5 percent less likely to vote for Obama than those with more positive views of illegal immigrants. This is a small sign that immigration is pushing whites Democrats away from their party. By contrast, the results indicate that views toward immigrants matter little for Republicans. This is, however, what we would expect to find if immigration is pushing whites in one directiontoward the Republican Party. Also as one might expect, views toward immigrants and Latinos have the largest impact on non-partisans. White independents who hold more negative views of immigrants are 67.7 percent more likely to vote for McCain than white independents who hold more positive views of immigrants (analysis in the online appendix). Views of Latinos and Immigrants in Other Elections To make a general statement about the impact of immigration in American politics, we have to look more broadly at a number of different presidential elections as well as across a range of different types of electoral contests. This is exactly what we do in Table Four. Specifically, we turn to the ANES cumulative file to assess the impact of immigration views on Presidential, Congressional, Gubernatorial, and Senate contests. Since the ANES does not generally ask about views on illegal immigrants, we utilize a different measure for attitudes towards immigrants and Latinos. The key independent variable here is the standard feeling thermometer toward Hispanics. Also, since policy questions vary from ANES year to year, we include a modified set of policy control variables. Specifically, we control for attitudes toward the military (should military spending be increased or decreased), the size and role of government (should government provide more services or spend less, should government guarantee a job and a basic standard of living), retrospective voting (presidential approval), the state of the economy (is the economy improving), womens rights (whether women should have an equal role as men) and feelings toward other racial groups (feeling thermometers toward blacks, Asian Americans, and whites). Table Four. Views on Latinos and the Vote Alternate Measures ANES Cumulative FilePresidential VoteSupport for the Republican Candidate. (Multinomial Logit) Dem vs Ind Rep vs IndIntended Pres VoteVote for CongressVote for GovernorVote for SenateIMMIGRATION Views of Hispanics-.67 (.62)-1.41 (.61)*-1.03 (.45)*-.72 (.47)-3.80 (1.35)**.23(.39)DEMOGRAPHICS Education.36 (.08)**.30 (.08)**-.07 (.07)-.07 (.07)-.03 (.15)-.01 (.06) Income.01 (.06).04 (.06).03 (.05).02 (.05)-.08 (.13).02 (.04) Unemployed-.06 (.37)-.44 (.40).12 (.34)-.45 (.38)-2.0 (1.4)-.38 (.34) Age.02 (.00)**.01 (.05)-.01 (.01)-.01 (.01)-.01 (.01)-.01 (.00)* Female.32 (.15)*.62 (.15)**.09 (.12).33 (.13)**.09 (.28).04 (.11) Married -.46 (.16)**-.11 (.16).39 (.13)**.30 (.13)*.32 (.30).16 (.11) Union Member.35 (.19)-.11 (.19)-.64 (.15)**-.56 (.15)**-.56 (.36)-.40 (.13)** Jewish.95 (.58).32 (.62)-.43 (.39)-.83 (.41)*-.51 (.90)-.90 (.37)** Catholic-.15 (.23).20 (.24).37 (.20).27 (.22).76 (.45).07 (.18) Protestant-.06 (.21).25 (.22).26 (.18).20 (.20)-.45 (.43)-.15(.11)IDEOLOGY/PARTY ID Liberal-Conservative-.25 (.06)**.20 (.07)**.35 (.05)**.44 (.06)**.19 (.13).24 (.05)** Party Identification-.54 (.05)**.31 (.05)**.84 (.03)**.83 (.04)**.65 (.09)**.55 (.03)**ISSUE POSITIONS War and Terrorism Military Spending .09 (.06) .38 (.06)** .28 (.05)** .29 (.05)** -.01 (.11) .14 (.04)** Economy/Retrospective Economy Improving President Job Approval -.45 (.08)** .13 (.08) -.48 (.08)** -.40 (.07)** .10 (.06) -.56 (.06)** -.03 (.06) -.51 (.06)** .22 (.15) .24 (.15) -.01 (.05) .07 (.05) Role of Government Govt Services Guaranteed Job .25 (.06) .00 (.05) .03 (.05) -.11 (.05)* -.22 (.05)** -.15 (.04)** -.27 (.05)** -.13 (.04)** -.01 (.11) -.17 (.09) -.11 (.04)** -.12 (.04)** Social Issues Womens Rights  .00 (.06) -.15 (.05)** -.09 (.04)* -.15 (.04)** -.23 (.10)* -.14 (.04)** Racial Considerations Feelings of Blacks Feelings of Whites .37 (.63) .92 (.52) .45 (.62) 1.36 (.51)** .34 (.47) .39 (.39) .20 (.49) .52 (.42) 2.79 (1.40)* .09 (.91) -.14 (.42) -.20 (.34)Constant-59 (24)-27 (24)49 (18)**36 (19)-4.1 (1.5)**N3674367434064702672Adj R/ Pseudo Squared.47.59.60 .42.34**P<.01 *P<.05 Our results suggest, once again, that how white Americans think about Latinos can be a central component of white Americans electoral calculations. Looking first at the first two columns which display the results of a multinomial logistic regression with presidential vote choice Democrat, Independent, Republican as the dependent variable, we see that those who feel more warmly to Hispanics are significantly less apt to choose Republican candidates for president. The third column, which displays the results for intended presidential vote choice (with a Republican vote as the dummy dependent variable) reconfirms the results. Again, more positive views of Latinos are significantly tied to Republican vote choice net party identification and a range of other controls. Moreover, the magnitude of the relationship is substantial. A two standard deviation negative shift in view of Hispanics is associated with a 9.8 percent increase in the probability of Republican vote choice in the multinomial model. For intended vote choice, the comparable figure is a 10.9 percent increase in Republican voting. And for recalled vote from the last election (analysis not shown), the figure is an 8.9 percent gain in Republican vote probability. Across a range of presidential elections no matter how we measure vote choice we see that attitudes toward Latinos are very much a part of vote choice. Importantly, the relationship is not isolated to presidential vote choice. As the rest of the columns demonstrate, white views of Latinos are significantly linked to gubernatorial vote choice and almost significantly tied to the Congressional vote. Moreover, in gubernatorial contests, the magnitude of the relationship is large. All else equal, those who hold more negative views of Latinos are 35 percent more likely to favor Republican gubernatorial candidates. The one case where there is no apparent relationship is in Senatorial contests. Robustness Checks To help ensure that the results in Tables 1 through 4 measure the underlying relationships between immigration related views and white partisan choices, we performed a serious of additional tests. First, we repeated as much of the analysis as possible with a number of different data sets. Using the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES) we examined the link between immigrant related views (should the federal government do more to restrict immigration and is immigration a serious problem) and party identification in 2000 and 2004, vote choice in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, and intended vote choice in presidential (2000 and 2004), Senatorial (2000), and House elections (2000). Once again, in every case except for Senate elections, after controlling for a range of factors that were purported to drive electoral behavior in that year, views on immigration remained robust and in each case more negative views of immigration led to substantially greater support for Republicans (see Table A2 in the online Appendix). The fact that views on Latinos and immigration mattered across different data sets, different elections, different measures of immigration-related views, and different sets of control variables greatly increases our confidence in the role that Latinos and immigration play in white politics. Immigration, Latinos, and the Aggregate Transformation of White Partisanship What our cross-sectional results have not yet demonstrated is the larger story of aggregate change over time. If the growth of the Latino or immigrant populations, the attachments of Latinos to the Democratic Party, and the Democratic Partys support of immigrants rights and interests represent a threat to many white Americans that is pushing them to the right politically, then we should see a slow but steady shift in white party identification over time. We have not focused on aggregate shifts in white partisanship and the vote since a robust and systematic test is essentially impossible given a small number of years and an almost endless array of events and issues that many would claim are responsible for shaping changes in white partisanship over time. Nevertheless, it is instructive to briefly note the dramatic shifts in white partisanship and the vote that have occurred in recent decades (see FIGURE ONE). Even after the well-known and well documented white Democratic defection that occurred in response to the Civil Rights Movement, the Republican Southern Strategy, and other factors, whites have been leaving the Democratic Party and joining the Republican Party in droves. In 1980, according to the ANES, white Democratic identifiers dominated white Republican identifiers (36% vs 25%). But over the ensuing 30 years that Democratic advantage has been totally reversed. By 2010, white Republicans greatly outnumbered white Democrats (36% vs 29%) a remarkably large and largely overlooked shift. If we look at everyone in the nation, Republicans are not gaining on Democrats. But if we isolate the white population as we do in these numbers, there is a clear, ongoing, and important trend. Obviously, much is going on in American politics over this time and there is little doubt that many factors are contributing to the shift. But one can make a plausible case that the ongoing transformation of the U.S. by immigrants and Latinos helps to explain the partisan transformation of white America. And if that conjecture is true, one of the most significant developments in the last half century of American politics can be linked to the demographic and political changes that immigration has wrought in America. Figure One  Discussion The patterns illustrated in this paper suggest that the nations increasingly large and diverse immigrant population is having a real impact on the politics of white America. What is striking about these results is not that views about Latinos or immigrants matter. What is striking is how broad the effects are. In a political era, in which many claim that the significance of race has faded, we find that Latino or immigrant related views are linked to a fundamental shift in the political orientation of many members of the white population. Party identification the most influential variable in American politics is at least in part a function of the way individual white Americans see Latinos and immigrants. So too is the vote in national contests for President and Congress. In short, who we are politically at our core is shaped substantially by deeply felt concerns about immigration and racial change. What is also clear from this pattern of results is that the larger Latino population has become a more central factor in American race relations. In American history, when race mattered, it was more often than not driven by a black-white dynamic. That may no longer be true today. The increasing visibility of immigration and its widespread impact on the nations economic, social, cultural, and political spheres appear to have brought forth a real change in the racial dynamics of our politics. Blacks still matter but when we talk about the role of race in American politics, we have to talk about the fears and concerns that a growing Latino population provokes. Much remains to be explained, however. We have shown that immigration is a central factor in the politics of white America. But we have not clearly demonstrated why. More work needs to be undertaken to try to uncover exactly how and why changes in the demographics of this country translate to changes in electoral behavior. Are cultural factors driving white views or are economic factors more central in this process (Schildkraut 2011, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Kinder and Kam 2009, Pettigrew et al 2007, Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Quillian 1995, Citrin et al 1997)? Second how are these cultural or economic concerns triggered in the political arena? Is it the rhetoric of Democratic and Republican leaders, the tone of media coverage, or the actions and the political progress of Latinos and other immigrants (Hopkins 2010, Brader et al 2008)? Finally, where and by whom are the political effects of immigrations most deeply felt? Some Americans live in areas where there is little evidence of immigration and racial diversity and others live in neighborhoods, cities, and states, that have been dramatically re-shaped. That uneven transformation means that the salience of Americas immigrant transformation and any perceived threat posed by a growing immigrant population will likely vary across different geographic contexts. Immigration is also likely to matter for certain types of individuals. Immigration is likely to be especially threatening for those Americans who are less well educated and thus more likely to experience far greater direct competition with low-skilled immigrants for jobs and public services. One could also theorize about the role of racial intolerance in shaping white responses to immigration. White Americans who are more racially intolerant may be especially sensitive to the kinds of changes that immigration is bringing to America (Kinder and Kam 2009, Citrin et al 1997). One could also imagine other mediating factors like age, industry, or religion. And on the other end of the spectrum, there are many Americans who welcome immigration and the changes it produces. The larger question then becomes, for whom does immigration matter more? BIBLIOGRAPHY Abramowitz, Alan I. 1994. Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the US Electorate. American Journal of Political Science 38 (1): 1-24. Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich, and David W Rohde. 2007. Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Adams, Carolyn T. 1994. "Race and Class in Philadelphia Elections." In Big City Politics, Governance, and Fiscal Constraints, ed. George E. Peterson. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois. Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 2005. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Alvarez, Michael R., and Jonathan Nagler. 1998. Economics, Entitlements, and Social Issues: Voter Choice in the 1996 Presidential Election. American Journal of Political Science 42: 1349-1363. Alvarez, R. Michael, and Lisa Garcia Bedolla. 2003. The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 Election. Journal of Politics 65 (1 (Feb)): 31-49. Alvarez, R. Michael, and Jonathan Nagler. 1995. Economics, Issues, and the Perot Candidacy: Voter Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election. American Journal of Political Science 39 (3): 714-744. Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Charles Stewart III. 2009. "Amazing Race: How Post-Racial was Obama's Victory?" Boston Review. Arzheimer, Kai. 2009. Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002. American Journal of Political Science 53 (2): 259-275. Bean, Frank D., and Gillian Stevens. 2003. America's Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity. New York: Russell Sage. Black, Earl, and Merle Black. 1973. The Wallace Vote in Alabama: A Multiple Regression Analysis. Journal of Politics 35: 730-736. Bobo, Lawrence, Melvin Oliver, James Johnson, and Abel Valenzuela, eds. 2000. Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Bobo, Lawrence D. 2001. "Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth Century." In America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, eds. Neil Smelser, William Julius Wilson and Faith Mitchell. Washington DC: National Academy Press. 21-39. Brader, Ted, Nicholas . Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat. American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 959-978. Burns, Peter, and James G. Gimpel. 2000. Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy. Political Science Quarterly 115: 201-25. Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Campbell, Andrea, Cara Wong, and Jack Citrin. 2006. "Racial Threat", Partisan Climate, and Direct Demcracy: Contextual Effects in Three California Initiatives. Political Behavior 28 (1): 129-150. Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations. The Journal of Politics 59 (3 (August)): 858-81. Corzine, Jay, James Creech, and Lin Corzine. 1983. Black Concentration and Lynchings in the South: Testing Blalock's Power-Threat Hypothesis. Social Forces 61: 774-796. Edsall, Thomas Byrne, and Mary D. Edsall. 1991. Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gilens, Martin. 2001. Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gimpel, James G., and Peter Skerry. 1999. "Immigration, Ethnic Competition, and Crime." In American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Atlanta. Ha, Shang E., and J. Eric Oliver. 2010. The Consequences of Multiracial Contexts on Public Attitudes Toward Immigration. Political Research Quarterly 63 (1): 29-42. Hajnal, Zoltan L. and Taeku Lee. 2011. Why Americans Dont Join the Party: Race, Immigration, and the Failure of Political Parties to Engage the Electorate Princeton: Princeton University Press Hanson, Gordon H. 2005. Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance and Political Opposition to Open Border. Institute for International Economics Hero, Rodney. 1998. Faces of Inequality: Social Diversity in American Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Hero, Rodney E., and Rogert R. Preuhs. 2007. Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: Examining Policies in U.S. States. American Journal of Political Science 51 (3): 498-517. Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 1996. A Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the U.S. American Journal of Political Science 40 (3): 851-71. Highton, Benjamin. 2004. White Voters and African American Candidates for Congress. Political Behavior 26 (1): 1-25. Hood, M.V., and Irwin L. Morris. 1998. Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor,...But Make Sure They Have a Green Card: The Effects of Documented and Undocumented Migrant Context on Anglo Opinion Toward Immigration. Political Behavior 20 (1): 1-15. Hopkins, Daniel. 2010. Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition. American Political Science Review 104 (1):1-21 Huckfeldt, Robert, and Carol Weitzel Kohfeld. 1989. Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Huntington, Samuel. 2005. Who We Are: The Challenges to America's National Identity. New York: Simon and Schuster. Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1997. Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of Racial Stereotypes. American Journal of Political Science 41 (2 (April)): 375-401. Johnson, Martin. 2001. The Impact of Social Diversity and Racial Attitudes on Social Welfare Policy. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 1 (1): 27-47. Kinder, Donald, and Tali Mendelberg. 1995. Cracks in American Apartheid: The Political Impact of Prejudice among Desegregated Whites. Journal of Politics 57 (2): 402-24. Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Klinkner, Philip A., and Rogers M. Smith. 1999. The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Layman, Geoffrey C., and Ted Carmines. 1997. Cultural Conflict in American Politics: Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S. Political Behavior. Journal of Politics. Lee, Taeku. 2000. "Racial Attitudes and the Color Line(s) at the Close of the Twentieth Century." In The State of Asian Pacific Americans: Race Relations, ed. Paul Ong. Los Angeles: LEAP. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., Charles Tien, and Richard Nadeau. 2010. Obama's Missed Landslide: A Racial Cost? PS 43 (1): 69-76. Lubbers, Marcel, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. Extreme Right Wing Voting in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 41 (3): 345-378. Lublin, David. 2004. The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press. MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1989. Macropartisanship. American Political Science Review 83 (4): 1125-1142. McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Boston: MIT Press. Miller, Warren E., and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. The New American Voter. Cambride: Harvard University Press. NAHJ (National Association of Hispanic Journalists). 2005. The Portrayal of Latinos and Latino Issues on Network Television News. Austin. NALEAO. 2008. National Roster of Hispanic Elected and Appointed Officials. NALEAO. Scheve, K.F., and JM.J. Slaughter. 2001. Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy. Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (1): 133-145. Schildkraut, Deborah. 2011. Americanism in the Twenty-First Century: Public Opinion in the Age of Immigration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schuman, Howard, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, and Maria Krysan. 1997. Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations. Revised Edition ed. Cambride, MA: Harvard University Press. Sniderman, Paul M., and Edward G. Carmines. 1997. Reaching Beyond Race. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Valentino, NIcholas A., and David O. Sears. 2005. Old Times There are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South. American Journal of Political Science 49 (3 (July)): 672-688.  One important exception is an article by Hero and Preus (2007) that reveals a relationship between the size of the state immigrant population and welfare policy at the state level.  Theoretically Americans could make important distinctions between illegal immigrants, legal immigrants, and Latinos but our analysis suggest they do not. Answers to the six questions in the 2008 ANES that asked about different aspects of these different groups are highly correlated (average inter-item correlation is .22) and no measure stands out as being particularly divergent from the others.  In each case, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement and how strongly. According to Kinder and Sanders (1996) these four questions all focus on the central element of American race relations: the extent to which blacks face barriers in American society.  These other issues are not included in the main model because they are only asked of half of the respondents.  Simpler, bi-variate tests show that views on immigrants are strongly and significantly correlated with not only partisanship (r=.22 p<.001) but also the Presidential vote (r=.33 p<.001), the Congressional vote (r=.30 p<.001) and the Senatorial vote (r=.30 p<.001).  For this and all other predicted probabilities reported in the paper, estimates were calculated using Clarify holding all other independent variables at their mean or modal value and varying the independent variable of interest plus or minus one standard deviation.  When we replaced the four different racial resentment questions with an additive racial resentment scale or with a racial resentment alpha factor scale, the basic pattern of results did not change.  Since we believe that attitudes toward immigrants and Latinos are closely linked, we do not include a Latino feeling thermometer in the basic model.  Lagging immigration views by two years leads to similar findings.  At the same time it is important to note that by the same test party identification does cause changes in immigrant related. The relationship between party identification and immigrant-related views is reciprocal.  Dropping or including voters who favor third party or Independent candidates makes little difference to the results.  These results are robust to different ways of measuring the dependent variable. If we focus on feelings toward the Democratic and Republican candidates rather than on the vote itself, we once again find that more negative views of illegal immigrants are associated with stronger, more positive feelings for the Republican side and less positive views of the Democratic option.  Unfortunately, given the irregularity with which the ANES asks questions about immigration, it is, difficult to assess changes in the relationship between immigrant views and partisan choices over time. We do find a significant link between views of Hispanics and partisanship after 1990 and no significant link before 1990. Similarly, we find that views of immigrants granger cause partisanship in 2008-2010 (as shown above) but not in the period from 2000-2004 (the only other recent ANES panel with questions about immigration). However, with so few years of available data, firm conclusions are over time changes are unwarranted.  The same reversal occurs over the same period for the white vote. In the 1980s, Democratic Congressional candidates dominated the white vote but by 2010 Republicans won 56 percent of the white vote.      PAGE \* MERGEFORMAT 33  z { WX}~vn^^RChBUXhjCJOJQJaJhY=DCJOJQJaJhBUXhgV6CJOJQJaJh">OJQJh dgd>>hBUXhgV6CJOJQJaJ hBUXhgV0JCJOJQJaJ)jhBUXhgV0JCJOJQJUaJhBUXh+1CJOJQJaJhY=DCJOJQJaJhBUXhgV5CJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJhBUXh_/CJOJQJaJ0G,H,, 0c3>6:?:A;AKARCCF_KMZTVXZK]fKjLj}j\l dgdVyd7$8$H$gdgV d`gdgV dgdgV>>;AKAAADDFFFFmGqGiI.JJJ]K`KRRRRRXUYU V VUVVV-^|^______`♊ueehBUXhgV>*CJOJQJaJ)jhBUXhg60JCJOJQJUaJhBUXhyxCJOJQJaJhyxCJOJQJaJhBUXhY7[CJOJQJaJhBUXhg6CJOJQJaJhBUXh'CJOJQJaJhBUXhgV5CJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJhBUXh"CJOJQJaJ'```aaaaabbbbccccceeeeeeNfOfPfSf_fffLj|j«‰w›bRhBUXhR-5CJOJQJaJ)jhBUXhgV0JCJOJQJUaJ"hBUXhR->*CJOJQJ\aJ"hBUXhgV>*CJOJQJ\aJhBUXh"CJOJQJ\aJ,jhBUXhgV0JCJOJQJU\aJhBUXhgVCJOJQJ\aJhBUXhgV>*CJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJhBUXh"CJOJQJaJ|j}j~jjjjjjj[l\l]l_l`llllllllllm­࢓}n\J\n<hY7[hj5OJQJ\"hBUXhj5CJOJQJ\aJ"hY7[hj5CJOJQJ\aJhBUXhjCJOJQJaJ+hBUXhj5B*CJOJQJ\aJphhY7[hjCJOJQJaJhBUXhjOJQJ)jhBUXh0JCJOJQJUaJhBUXh'CJOJQJaJhBUXhR-CJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJhBUXhgV5CJOJQJaJ\lllllxg$d$Ifa$gd dxkd$$Ifl$&  t O0OOOO&O44 laPp Oyt dd$Ifgd dllllllludddd$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd d|kd$$Ifl0~ $  t0OOOO&44 laPyt dllmmmJ<++$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dkd3$$Iflr <$ T t0OOOO&OOOOOOOOOOOO44 laPyt dmmmm$m<kd$$Iflr <$ T t0OOOO&OOOOOOOOOOOO44 laPyt dd$Ifgd dmm$mWmdmimvmmmmmnnHnLnSn}nnnnno3o@olo{oooooooppppJpppppEqHqWqqqqqrWr[rwrrss2sssssss tt+t9xhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJhY7[hjCJOJQJaJhBUXhj5>*OJQJ\hBUXhj5OJQJ\hY7[hj5OJQJ\hBUXhjOJQJA$m1m>mJmVmWm9kd $$Iflr <$ T t0OOOO&OOOOOOOOOOOO44 laPyt d$d$Ifa$gd dWmdmemfmgmhm$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dhmimvmmmJ<++$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dkd$$Iflr <$ T t0OOOO&44 laPyt dmmmmm7)d$Ifgd dkd$$Ifl0r <$ T t0OOOO&OOOOOOOOOOOO44 laPyt d$d$Ifa$gd dmmmmmm9kd$$Iflr <$ T t0OOOO&44 laPyt d$d$Ifa$gd dmmmmnn$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dnnn&n1nJ<++$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dkdO$$Iflr <$ T t0OOOO&OOOOOOOOOOOO44 laPyt d1nBCEFGIMNOQUʾʾʾ訙xixixxixiZxixihBUXh CJOJQJaJhIh CJOJQJaJhBUXh*CJOJQJaJ"hBUXh*5CJOJQJ\aJhIh*CJOJQJaJ+hBUXh*5B*CJOJQJ\aJphhs)TCJOJQJaJhBUXCJOJQJaJ#jh 0JCJOJQJUaJh*CJOJQJaJh CJOJQJaJ# oY$d$Ifa$gdIo-'d$IfgdIo''|kd$$Ifl$h%  t O0OOOO644 lag'p OytI;Fs`J$d$Ifa$gdIo-'d$IfgdIo('kdE$$Ifl0H$ t0OOOO6OOOOOO44 lag'pytIFGINs`J$d$Ifa$gdIo*'d$IfgdIo''kd$$Ifl0H$ t0OOOO644 lag'pytINOQZs`J$d$Ifa$gdIo*'d$IfgdIo''kd$$Ifl0H$ t0OOOO6OOOOOO44 lag'pytIUZ[jkcdfgijpushYC0Ch%h,5B*CJOJQJ\aJph+hBUXh,5B*CJOJQJ\aJphhY7[h,CJOJQJaJhBUXh,OJQJh,CJOJQJaJ)jhBUXhgV0JCJOJQJUaJh*CJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJ"hBUXhgV56CJOJQJaJ"hBUXhrT56CJOJQJaJhY7[h*CJOJQJaJhIh*CJOJQJaJhBUXh*CJOJQJaJZ[jkgsi__QCd$Ifgdw d`gdgV dgdgV dgd*kdw$$Ifl0H$ t0OOOO644 lag'pytI)u$d$Ifa$gdwxkd $$Ifl$&  t O0OOOO&O44 laPp Oytw()*+LMXY[\yzŞƞО,-18MNR[optğşٟڟ-EF^vwܲܲܲܲܲܲܲܲܲܲܲhBUXh,CJOJQJaJhBUXh,5CJOJQJaJhBUXh,OJQJ"hBUXh,5CJOJQJ\aJ"hY7[h,5CJOJQJ\aJE)*+7Lww$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwikd$$Ifl$& t0OOOO&44 laPytwLMYZ[pbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd2$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytw[\zpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwŞpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$IfgdwkdN$$IflF $   t0OOOO&    44 laPytwŞƞОڞn`OO$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd$$Ifl0F $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd$$IflF $   t0OOOO&    44 laPytw",pbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd6 $$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytw,-8BMpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd $$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwMN[eopbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd!$$IflF $   t0OOOO&    44 laPytwoppbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd6"$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd"$$IflF $   t0OOOO&    44 laPytwşϟٟpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd#$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwٟڟpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd6$$$IflF $   t0OOOO&    44 laPytwpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd$$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytw-:EpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd%$$IflF $   t0OOOO&    44 laPytwEF^jvpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd&$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwvwpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd&$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwϠР۠pbbbbQQQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd'$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytw Ϡ+^ϡ?ops&'0HIKSTZckl89uiuhq5WCJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJhBUXh,CJOJQJaJh,CJOJQJaJhY7[h,CJOJQJaJ"hY7[h,5CJOJQJ\aJhBUXh,OJQJhBUXh,CJOJQJaJ"hBUXh,5CJOJQJ\aJ%hBUXh,5>*CJOJQJ\aJ(+B^__QQQd$Ifgdwkd6($$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytw$d$Ifa$gdw _ist~ϡ_QQQd$Ifgdwkd($$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytw$d$Ifa$gdw ϡС"?_QQQd$Ifgdwkd)$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytw$d$Ifa$gdw ?@MWXdop_QQd$IfgdwkdR*$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytw$d$Ifa$gdw Ǣ&$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdw &'0<HpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd+$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwHIKOSpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkd+$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytwSTcgkpbQQ$d$Ifa$gdwd$Ifgdwkdn,$$IflF $   t0OOOO&    44 laPytwklέ/pffXJ@X dgdgV d`gdBUX d`gdgV dgd,kd-$$IflF $   t0OOOO& OOO O OOO 44 laPytw ͭέ .017;F֡֕p]pG8hBUXhg/CJOJQJaJ+hBUXhg/5B*CJOJQJ\aJph%h*5B*CJOJQJ\aJph+hY7[hg/5B*CJOJQJ\aJphhBUXhjCJOJQJaJh,CJOJQJaJhBUXhgV5CJOJQJaJhBUXh*6CJOJQJaJ)jhBUXhgV0JCJOJQJUaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJhBUXh*CJOJQJaJh*CJOJQJaJ/1³j\KK$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dxkd-$$Ifl|)-  t O0OOOO-O44 la,p Oyt dd$IfgdBUX d`gdgV³óijCDPWmôɴʴ״&cdr LMZEFS޷߷WXpʸиѸԸJKNd&'*źźźźźźźźźźźźźźźźūźūźhBUXhg/5>*OJQJ\hBUXhg/OJQJhBUXhg/5OJQJ\hBUXhg/CJOJQJaJhBUXhg/5OJQJ"hBUXhg/5CJOJQJ\aJC³óij߳!3_QQQ@@@$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dkdc.$$IflF|)   t0OOOO- OOO O  O44 la,pyt d3C$d$Ifa$gd dCDkdT/$$Iflֈ#|)  F t0OOOO-44 la,p<yt dDPQRSTUVWmxôĴŴƴǴȴɴʴFfD8Ff4Ff1$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dʴ״&0:DNYcdr}FfAFf>Ff[;$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dȵҵݵ ",8BLMZgr~FfvKFf'HFfE$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dĶѶ޶ !-8EFS^hr|FfTFfQFfN$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dɷԷ޷߷)5AKFfY[FfBX$d$Ifa$gd d$hd$If^ha$gd dd$Ifgd dKWXp}ʸ˸̸͸θϸиѸ FfeFfad$Ifgd dFf^$d$Ifa$gd d$%12=>JKd{ʹ˹չd$Ifgd dFf%h$d$Ifa$gd d&'=Qfgq{|ȺɺԺߺd$Ifgd dFftk$d$Ifa$gd d*=f 'vwz»HIR˼HQ jkȹ}q_"hBUXhgV56CJOJQJaJhgVCJOJQJaJ#jhN?0JCJOJQJUaJhN?CJOJQJaJhBUXh.-CJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJhBUXhg/CJOJQJaJhBUXhg/CJOJQJaJhBUXhg/OJQJhBUXhg/5OJQJ\hBUXhg/5>*OJQJ\% '(23@AMN[\hivw»ûͻ׻Ffqd$Ifgd dFfn$d$Ifa$gd d׻ػ'12=HIR[dnvFfDxd$Ifgd dFft$d$Ifa$gd d$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd dkdFz$$Iflֈ#|)  > t0OOOO-44 la,p<yt düǼ˼$d$Ifa$gd dd$Ifgd d˼̼kdG{$$Iflֈ#|)  > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,p<yt d̼b1 dgdgV dgd"> $da$gd"> $da$gd"> d`gd"> dgd"> dgdgV d`gdgV dgdg//1)*ǻ~i^NANAh">5CJOJQJaJhh">5CJOJQJaJh">56CJaJ)jh">h">0JCJOJQJUaJh">CJOJQJaJ"h">h">56CJOJQJaJh">h">5CJOJQJaJh">h">CJOJQJaJhgVCJOJQJaJh">hgVCJOJQJaJhBUXhKCJOJQJaJh*CJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJ iiAƷ~o_MMMMMM"hBUXhgV6CJOJQJ]aJhBUXhgV5CJOJQJaJhBUXh.-CJOJQJaJhY=DCJOJQJaJhBUXh6CJOJQJaJhBUXhh7CJOJQJaJhBUXhI;CJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJhBUXhgV56CJaJhoh">CJOJQJaJh">CJOJQJaJ j|hUmh">UmHnHuQ?Q:Ims0dh7$8$H$^`0gd5 $da$gd.-dgd.-oG d`gdVy d`gdgV hd`hgdgV+8/H3BT.qr1>|8rDy)_AfMt Y ATe*=ĵhBUXhY=DCJOJQJaJhY=DCJOJQJaJhBUXh41CJOJQJaJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJ"hBUXhgV6CJOJQJ]aJGsE|@L\)wty$e0dh7$8$H$^`0gd5?v0_+-w  %    dgd5 dgdBUX0dh7$8$H$^`0gd5=df-fWNfy 4+-.&(wxy üüüwp hBUXhjhBUXh0JUhBUXhgV\hyxCJOJQJaJhBUXhg6CJOJQJaJ)jhBUXhg60JCJOJQJUaJ hBUXhgVjhBUXhgV0JUhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJ"hBUXhgV6CJOJQJ]aJhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJ,   $ % &         S _      ˾yyleZhBUXhN?mH sH  hBUXhN?jhBUXhN?0JUhBUXh mH sH  hBUXh jhBUXh 0JUhBUXh*mH sH  hBUXh*jhBUXh*0JU hBUXhgVjhBUXhgV0JUhBUXh'mH sH  hBUXh'jhBUXh'0JUhBUXh)mH sH hBUXhmH sH      dgdBUX$a$ dgdgVgd">  ȸȜhBUXhgVCJOJQJaJh'[mHnHuhgVjhgVUjheUheh5h">mH sH h">mH sH h">jh">0JUhBUXhN?mH sH hyxmH sH ? 0 00&P1h:pgV/ =!"#$% $$IfP!vh#v&:V l  t O0OOOO&5&/ OaPp Oyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5aPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555TaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l0 t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555TaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555TaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555TaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555TaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555TaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555TaPyt d$$IfP!vh#v #v#v#v#vT:V l t0OOOO&5 5555T/ O/  O/ O/ OaPyt d$$If!vh#vh%:V l  t O0OOOO65h%g'p OytI$$If!vh#v:V l t0OOOO65/ O/ O/ O/  Og'pytI$$If!vh#v:V l t0OOOO65g'pytI$$If!vh#v:V l t0OOOO65/ O/ O/ O/  Og'pytI$$If!vh#v:V l t0OOOO65g'pytI$$IfP!vh#v&:V l  t O0OOOO&5&/ OaPp Oytwz$$IfP!vh#v&:V l t0OOOO&5&aPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5aPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l0 t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5aPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5aPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5aPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5aPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5aPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5aPytw$$IfP!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO&5 5 5/ O/ OaPytw$$If,!vh#v-:V l  t O0OOOO-5-/ Oa,p Oyt d$$If,!vh#v #v #v:V l t0OOOO-5 5 5/ O/  O/ O/ a,pyt d $$If,!vh#v #v #v#vF#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5 55F55/ a,p<yt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkdc0$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d%$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ Oa,pFyt dkd3$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-O44 la,pFyt dk$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/ O/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkd6$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkdB:$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkdY=$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkd@$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkdC$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkdG$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkd%J$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkdtM$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkdP$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkdS$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkdV$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkd@Z$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkdW]$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkd`$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkdc$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkd g$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkd#j$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkdrm$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dO$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkdp$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55a,pFyt dkds$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-44 la,pFyt dS$$If,!vh#v #v#v#v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5555>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,pFyt dkdv$$Ifl֞ #|) > t0OOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO44 la,pFyt d$$If,!vh#v #v #v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5 55>55a,p<yt d7$$If,!vh#v #v #v#v>#v#v:V l t0OOOO-5 5 55>55/ O/  O/ O/ Oa,p<yt d̒Dd   S .AChart 13"UCPK!@A0[Content_Types].xmln0EU*.۪`5~c}',JAb(=';۲"6|"rio.5{ rFA|1Qa³k hѪDq-j rR{,|>+R6^L"ac* mJd*;g~Q#APr؃u4Яs4`*7eICZKZ|U5Dq9Fsݺ&6q:#x4caaV Npnw8d`Eٖnl9PK!8! _rels/.relsj0 }qN/k؊c[F232zQLZ%R6zPT]( LJ[ۑ̱j,Z˫fLV:*f"N.]m@= 7LuP[i?T;GI4Ew=}3b9`5YCƵkρؖ9#ۄo~e?zrPK!Q7 6drs/e2oDoc.xmlN0DHw*)R!qRb[kcڀ ivvN\ yחǻ)78O >)MU`ELQAslL"DŴGeNƩAS`9hJlgZDY j[?Xo6 7+1NϑD#:_Q]=r.,ݜJ_M{:M#|.i\>znQOfݝs\/PK!Oe9Z drs/charts/_rels/chart1.xml.relsRj0 #XPJi!C dg[5u= 4 N޽t;!&^Q^ |i_k8@ &~:R*>)cLikleN E o 1̖qYE>66`ՇOWZHzBE,c Dc,e4)7s(zma(hMi3m< |7.BA pב|b ^CN ɸA#Bԟb?] y=D=Xhj8P"3?yÃ-y#f_PK!F"drs/_rels/e2oDoc.xml.rels 0nz&ЫXIFooЋqvov1ONGgYqh{كYRC׫La,Ų!F@3r}z Mt\߃8ƿ03:Tt'2At {˗A"AVO_}PK!~.#drs/charts/chart1.xmlYo6AڒAb$i썖h[3%j:w][lu3jtSڎWCxKli {^ 'Cʘ!퓈d3đB+_CkLU_E  p=x9 QqzN]ϙ9+5hϦõhVdT7WjzNs? `Y#V=P9]kND& U!it;hsXt|$XA 43HFcˇ[H(-l\3./%j-8Ujf*"7$>< * ȳqowf"5YK#=]ÊRtryU^x?#D-gsђ`*ߕ m-y&`fJՓV*w*̓/s9` +Ҭ,0^=2(`Hh9`RXA@F4զ~ T<9b:j}aѩ&;0x6&S+d s{3CsYA1 ydP#/3@1'1($P=@a'NYCx{q < Pi`|O#xS88p8 w&!l0hPLT1 ~VǤ>JZg~p13YaF8R% >T>P|;Z{}9"=2c8j{&I= GnOWc-ixvQ>W:vSSn:CM\HlA)96 1 ~hVh{q{ZoHУycH^>8 #meKw8~dYLe}/g}>\h~~XKቝ!$~?Sg})9ZLxMm1{d"GmM}և'@>;zvSg}D!?8_SHEg}/F}H6+.iBL#U4[W3"%v8*ג>۪`Qv_٘lj2&ua*n{/iW`R+|}_|PdF,[\P WYT7dk-\~]3q{17Sm)Z|Tpۢ"$ TNjScoiCA($\SU5XV>r3Pu4j9tTzG-jU ;L=؆[V/hŢzlP7&'Zٓ_}w*!D718fZNF|3I(q =9S̲8vt; x}r1xwr:\TFaG*y8IjbRc|X'I x7"{ ' $! w RuK>V.EL+C2#fi yV vb{u8zH *:(W☕~Te\O*tHGHY5KIXieE Ed[8h(QrC3' }'ݧm:& D\^'ܩ11TpuL#nF#n_?mMXzfQ/.}y O= 1D#wyQ?_<%XZEFlㅻ1elܐf-a 0$)Nai_u' l GTEi{ZH(3ѡD)pX4Õ565bCb;F!XJ*ZΪlJ&|{eumԙՍim:P!/\"A(q^f$q9bbr)s~nʜ##}p<%j%m-- %IeuI e lG%M8m{c8'8K,$_ [6.ùcn}aR!- *+hM&`YYqtSKcrK#:v1R>QD DcH.U'; #6\rΚ|#fpv4; !6y[ƹbZ\)J3EHwJBEX(q0 AsVik8D}"Aa=R dhT)eEL2f!aĆzmPn$;YsAPor0Yw>)͆&ab=veG6wMιZƚxY Q wHH _0:~ l/ٍiGq(l뤣/-,>g͙ŋ va'vla!'[A$%l/PK-!@A0[Content_Types].xmlPK-!8! a_rels/.relsPK-!Q7 6`drs/e2oDoc.xmlPK-!Oe9Z drs/charts/_rels/chart1.xml.relsPK-!F"drs/_rels/e2oDoc.xml.relsPK-!Gdrs/downrev.xmlPK-!~.#drs/charts/chart1.xmlPK-!#l'T^drs/theme/themeOverride1.xmlPKbz; 0 3~z| nz; 0 3~PNG  IHDRYsRGBgAMA a pHYs&?z!IDATx^]Y+UAwDe.)]q](Nlf0gP@@(c+v x '$`('1(ljOrD6"0BRM5Ww^ݽvio}׿#w}??0` Xk5` :t<b Xk5` nA @H$` E"0 @n@P @ q" @ ` @ @ (zD@ @A @z@PFlj @5@ &荎!@ k @MA'B @  @ Л7:N @@ @7Eot@  (X @@o8 @@P @ q" @ ` @ @ (zD@ @A @z@PFlj @5 <}~NpGn Χg!@AQ,ЇIOJ7yk׮R}ߝs8ȑ#UtA{{{w|w==Ujޏ 0lmg}ԏgARf~J@_fGr ׹}|_~ȱf_Ћ&|Ym~7~z_|d \ZMZÅ-={^aK[X)qkaƷ# Mozӡ/׾4EZrlb"[[$Ξ=[9sfjk|fC0e>ZuZs_BeeVD.Lf5X2Œgw"$~uM Q_a˱ђ@]KԏN2ggsK2LXS\t^g}5C%+A ?E~\P[VP#-)XS7)qcKh649akS}f ڤ aY$bz}-Mvzgq&1[q [3.ﳏm\c_v6ZtjUf /R-gN+Ei jO$y a\'zޗ^BS$O Թ'#=w|S Qx66ZzY0{W5ogu5=>0܂A_O`naWC6B)B.O+V&kQ''dfBE׷Mƪ>aX7y`t =^)YL5k^5/}iƨB1ElGX5֔dSo:zYHSm=6< ox=ͽ b>;eMeC!lmMFsߔ_΁@ijB`1G`=MPhm_zˮ pjh{hc5!EPO >3&~cu]m@b> ۞{kGߞm]k}m\ÿsSm>t}ivm}oe}6 }7|(w]\ r  0%[l k f5.c;DͿ6xO U)∉:Guqu_аozۄž_[#ey 1{{ta'$6}6m$<_%f)>t]6~,)֎N (k֥**l9޿ؚ]HiEP46um}`X)$Y Rf~f!1y$m/67i{enã/==m}Aƞ}ߺ,*BV}OìW4馬Xu"(ha?mS\\lD\t> cCд7cZyf+Au<}x%o:[UJ-эY=x[7_< mbB^[1bՔKe`j8gK=ޙ@,"ܼj~YxXԲUЭɧM |958>_s&(o~S{)koV}u7uOִZuq[X} 㡬?>u8\߮._z,>ͯm?lئ\ O@Norç~}/X.MF.A%X_]ݞ(놬Ka; I1 sZlzs<6Tk 2ʥH(d5؛m}޶>s^}P򂢩]k̲ -H޿]]>p)~NsŠc!5"cDY"͇҆KͿ^:eԶknt\c =Ilzzo6|,m%em+ghY(^BiSS#m\nܽ;\KK הXI5Kʱ=RE.}qLA٣ '#7'~cdnP)_crl5|{ N*(\¾-(*#ِ9:oZKYa1ױXQL[6X:=Lhn3u6b>ܘaoTAm*'Z (2ׁ=_KC]q*Tw&:ɨYT!V݆Cwej octa:ư.񦬵{*{͙,W^Tk<悦MOBgR_ϡ0i]݋\6CKj-hXVCs!"'M(MUTcO2F(ԗFSKα׺6? c."JOPqPtW`r ],rh E*ö xjrFK M5޶֧m~/UPb3ӗ=A`9s"Ğ$K.K,}i |qh ;g?:¿ǪhPKJQ_b-6uNa߇S(lK9֗9PxSX($[ Rf~f' 6tj6Uj֗?-!6hv^`kEx혋Qul2~̕KK:MI1m*&Y 6[Ï1R1l\Bk)m[k}ºޚ6zon|ZN@GypMZ8un qSC޿mX4=m}i?c7& u\2|!9S@PLMA )O݀!@E'\ @s@P=A V ,bQEg! @Pl`" 5@Pi6  5"c ! M6CAAi `u ʑ=u@`~@ @`::@ (z@ @P,v8 @' @KAة @b9 @X,bC @`~@ @`::@ (z@ @P,v8 @' @KAة @b9 @X,bC @`~@ @`::@ (z@ @P,v8 @' @KAة @@6AqѣՑ#G:u~v9v~D @#]P;w c[/ @l @X>@ @`6sc@ ,@vAჲO>}R]Pv#f @X/l"hĉյk)v96vW6{7zX^VwÀk5k@߱4@uF N]MR @ C`tAaM)L]MŁH%q @NAѝg@ @L`tAq̙]Ņ Zw9bS8@ @lbooqݝm8i(A· @@=l.l2ءJ!@ 0(2ԙ_ @k BQ* E3C @@AYd  @b& @k X,2@ DA1xn @ 5@Pa @f" < @ (0 @3@PB @` kE@  (fm!@ 5"c @L3 @Xf1@ @`&s[@ b  @ 0L- @@AYd  @b& @k X,2@ DA1xn @ 5@Pa @f" < @ (0 @3@PB @` kE@  (fm!@ 5"c @L3 @Xf1@ @`&s[@ b  @ 0L- @@ xbuȑ#~N:U]~Ǟ8qvZV  @@vAqܹ֞^r:vX WV'O?^]| (RIq @EP9s&*q#9A % @! Dܠo9]z@ G`rAfP\EN'x+C @ A} A @zd1$,N W6߳gF_kwFV0 X5X : D ,,F@  AAPz# @X7ՠhTWT݇@ @ B5'Gq…=hH}q @d >'2=&EPG!(\@ 4&(̺Ɔ+& sVȶ{!(x @ @`<x]ve0~ @ & G1^vzσ_ru(_t @Q =^շbFG @""odgx[_| @ , To/쥬xRὦ{ @X(XEb?>Sc7𧟪^7:@ LA G?͘BnO4@ r (ʝML Tʇ,4@ r (ʝM챯.[nN>w P'6AB @P,uVo ՝PSP~P'4@ 2 (ʜMJ^<tQab%xp-Kܞ,zٝC I (&ŝfۀkJ'z/(koc!a1/  @,So'&]Y U.ETXL65+Q!aDN˃!@$`& <IMOMTeH駄q-, Y(nX# @@P 7dN>Ap ̖U@B9EY$tgg5f( ][C b (N6ʪ)}eHP … =is.!QM>r_hK JR5{ @P(ڂaيz^4sw I>Jhm[;9BIp]C GAё6r9R3_OY:W mU=ZTկ})E|I?b+AD @("q.2Iմypx^>rR3w ٞ.Q1~0 7UShq  @k/!z')>B4^0)=l)EYodMT&Rx4Wr  @pڀk'[JVsy\ mx{$~BٞtĐɘM׷lT~X>Όg @ FA8)@5rяK8h Y*t=uk+]:$7.Di-*lt3 -1&J)ׅ=B 5@P*a.EdaV=h~Iqٞ$m+wP]Ƚē x@ 7jShڼjo)6{y7 ۤk<(Ô+)g['f9 @`<&h#-w&hj TL qڠOC%d/v^ lqk}ZIPjv@شyYlRwX {Rj-CBҧqwlO&~KͿC %4pXLEw!\@ 6-(,6ڬdmw @[_O%\$.;{cU`xHf]?𤹛Fr @M hcs<.ubN7ӖIBªK}l+7ACB49 !iAX7mx5ihsdOKɆY,n\Ocf(Q&8-U|@ hb:r… z{ѣ7nSNUׯ_3WnHkCН;IX\N16rMR-fCHlbO,Wa\Iyн-C}jv\ '0rJuرVAqܹ=Or-@ 8- - mJ)w]XIi\l]IJ<ذT>4 =6V#Gb@ 0 6AcӧOg0G ".)t;+,s7+'kF_BCob* R@D zjuYE ؋k׮uf|]F'scsλUd;>\?};Kʷz]poﮕCwzw.Yw߻g8!o:_Ď_/X溇0 k`5X :?^]|潺 d猭B1e9t+ȥhnwE$+ƥ3RMb,jհ fEB vY.K]tt}[PBw1H+cKrw[RjBHH'e˳0ÓZ B #EPE|\DwyBctLDJ棰ނP^i^Ya'\9Ӯ# @"(B!Xe!CB[iEݝ}VIK‹@ 0-YR8 9ݝA~(}Y&$,llCw'=u O 3<1Ӿ @6Y6y6>SU0a Bw lVzd)>V5[<}@ UPA!a;^IYΣ&1SJ fKQ5w} @`Kvh0+@M-pwj0ÓȨΌ# @@N4lO;~I'h OTf@ (&fnd'20@ 0>w w ewvܝOZ@fw @/E_r -;YLl0Óෙg LA1hkuT΂x Z: h8 c*ү @} (PtNXNLwe$dc*3zF @!ͻ*=nY)p7)Jkd~W,@ J#PN⸬>4@  (cteLJ'SAP=*"H <9 @PDͯ,"Q&+Ě\dATgʙ @:eJ% ,?j@@L]OLT(-ܡYsE@MA_x xzeB @@PU %`&*d@T:at  @P,npWa'ۓD2?)bH!@(slOJ#E@ e-.Qf{Pж\h @ (q㬅=o2@!*:t " (:1%0ۓ A t#ƋWB $xx4@ ttV2?~d?2@ 0xllO;K  @G{>H$Qn#gx @`8p\a|]'D &!@ 0*ŨxPCv;\),  @0G|n'",OPU~g`@  (Xp,+UV\\ڥgf @LAR@ăY+$*[xk_A @['0߯9pBct܉'k׮e TBNW 5Y0<@ t+WTǎP@\z:yduٸ"(ay~C_$h{C 08spG-{L8\x:zhul3Ȇru܁mSXж @d& Ν;WSdSNUׯAt}BPlmI;^R(,$&_ANW @0"L,EBt{BPV-(&' ղ h{%0 @h$UPx`jS4m?? @` +SKTP?={6zX^V7u]~vw+λ^sGSox3[A#MPPD@AJ%X Ul!@J 4>;S_AAPZ%.Dܝ,O>!@$,",bgb*ۓ,O㼾$*IU.^A "(,:.N"L9 4"IӅS2*'u*X@B`Aa!D4Y.DP ǹCb*>TH\ @"(DBMbMuYcxPJYդܞD @k"0(YnIO V(@m @X ZfqK@ڧ{|?U*YO )@@^<uB Y+,@ß~ R[r7S-й lbsS΀  ЖxgvYʦ ~ @@PLl2=IPHXSs# bxkP`9W m@Pls TU9q'G*$w3 򵂃ޝCCAfPpլN'bUd!8: g!@`۝{F>hkCnXb" 'YGgp 0 й hcwa-˪%kY*Ka!KE\  &&`ryR TLܕUN&L٧wOϵA:#n5[Sn (tqY E u6N__G .:.!5Zq,.|ܧ8 HLX<+@[u*he,ugXA@٬~l=[1ޢy晝 IhxK@}C2kM-oa| Hε>+uDN9;oik֯kA&ׂɲ%T jO ׅ X\e E9@] 7(&/ ܘCe/Bz^.1u#6~s]Ox8Ą0o3Y0ΦB)곦APɵ 0=5Wgmek00#DX Ȋ%([>V'(bcm, mxMd6F[A}BA7M"O[l,ucMs{ue ccI@_J  c}ꩺyU3S s9sPJQMioz w׉>4MCPtwO&8v]RA1.~%E*)D,@2i/)}Y鵭Ns O"LPaYr!`,,Gъ []zTohJ .)IPtwpo8cFPɵ O>rlզFX?[Saw5<z#1BEe 02YKvwRbmdž.Uiw&}K(( .mMA mC_}j+˅Ri}kYumE욦AĞ$Zvi2nH]6m)m)(Z %KPq ]R͙&yP~|"(rZ霞~)k#,a>Ժf3v u(FX\RE]&.KPإC=FPv7i c-cHVjYeRГv:nbK$Ƭ6;ą,B4@9 ӎO% |*ٺLNkfbRUPte/9EG_"y"f/sJruEN\ #F2_׉2edh+bA^&.BbbORƮR.)V#?mж ICP^puژ7YaTucnWw%"'M(HQ S!Q ^)sYIҸ&놄Z(.\s!@[$3MI-<c-,\ץ]Ӹ} (& ,x.@[  ]j%Bc`2`1$C(z· b  pRȪnEXOifMloդK}6W},!GAk@ (艾\c͹s:pHX*5BVBnaQ" NAQ ? ˄'Y&9`n]Ǖ亥LNB1!fy*U"/ ,@VAB apS^ LS }j4l@_C>tVNV a>ņLAß~j=JbkǷ` @6Ab,1Q5/"(ܵx ja,65&lz)>d`Q3q1@Xl"j"b K1,=~LKhP=t<'";R.2aJ{>9~UAu.OsbJ1c|>{מ;>}/mti@` fYbb'NT׮]%pWԧw굷W?vѯl~MoRO@`EF],q…lPr!2Q驽5qA+^ZEp{m c\Go?\^COuN 0@Aa|Y| ^5I`CB`;I"k H"ݦ{-@ɊB.ح3\W: MkD 0T "m@oyXj =yKD8N=icbn侳3(P s\ 'Хe-  DE Gs$cMwO|{R@ZIWIam|v"RpjϔYg)Wx|ge"*Ql sɔEPLI{A `P\,A':a$ L#x늹ɺ6>6rQ񶥻x4k:ӵqmR3TP]6}.Pl :c7@h.ڮ;?Z 8kKȵI")T9]ڹ=ܢrL^bn|K< =1kxW$ Uc}"(0!d6/˫: m_DZ}LPxQ&PR,!hxA]7EP,T~^vsP7Gcc" ,=āb",ӓjOG?'sSU;ń\y1j nPǘ[—d.susk YHeu@6 ئy˓1kGP\7EPS=%ԮW%w@`4S ri(ɶ6mB K(b S˚S>Ʈ?O o"i'ܨnN2-&(ls>1oڌk>ć. $4gyws]C}AnHY%nubv0b,\X4HMB1(Ql!kSF60Jt^, )4Y6$Br$&XS ۠DqTaCKm"e~bI1 t% S.ݪ(ÒJ1 IH5횾h61JZTO(t OB*r=|Z1!OcEf3R^[*4}ޔ^+̘8UdzzF}W]ߺym" vB1'.b"+$`A&.چi䔎:|Y(WM{:_Wc k^$7rs {OV N%$`ІW{ =;`е ҚRAVV&k=5];gM Ŭ0=$*6wXv)Ѧ%*(MrͬO%{^w ې.EPt Ԩ}]YXְbTmmPSeKf2Gc~Ǥ˵!E݇| $$$(tڣO>{o sm2˄6v] s >KsUoYM %$$vs~ceM:z)_"(#VgMjP]#],;Sͪ,kؔҴlEJ7-NfinH'?ް!bO,3@XG`mo}p\\m'x ߴ!')V_lAƀ2t TDQ]1͹5=k$[_}R릌a18_̚4)u)M)({X(>ÌDQh3S(YuT?L:ԣM6ϡ)ez2xm%ܞЧ,&KBBG!koCٔqg3Żang]bj=w@@Nɖ`0C]jض! Y+[H(R=3YwTaIn[6S΀`$HHPn\&2>FVnyL]F)ב) k%ofjI˱԰Cb]J'޽/?-jص$tLOZ9t\)KmL7&p,o8.}>;Dԛӑ;uobJ=wBާ3LȪ'zW.3_쁍 H1jO*)W17ccM5$*G`:9k|/=W>s@`˘'z H@w=U`k8էNY'cg=xI{ {>=ɂk9MLXO>8$*RuhSϢ3s G}D  %J!3/.P/oUI>z9Ƣ\MBLbbn{ fidu_瓕2=Ϳ7EGuBkN] ~}U< P9X5X]mJe$3{e{mo=l+זܞTiH1΄'K@fid%nf/\aKX\bX(_6ҏ`^mN߶[ߴ̙j eZ[w{ZLh<@OVKFVV1?yJ- V(eJ ϕ+wl0BI q d{{{Ց#G;wv'NT׮]:b @\g1{{߿#5s Wx'7ݞnOCMfAЦ?gTnXC& O> R%[g9ɋX  !MPԩSoGI`xQqʕرcU( ^Z~ ^d(U,z4?TLz:d1&AB#&.^X=z:}t6l(6E !7c}kTx޴L׽s@ij;Td-}Nѿڐbnޤ ߱ėbN b'4 hӬΌ5zr &&25C }Cq.Kg1=m9X/‚-SSD]Y()iz $!5[ۈ@,R]ZM goH)|烽B2! _ me!3=o,EsK~W= (~靵!Gnb0F vݸB6o"%7XQ<[bXqBYG4wٳcNڽwY=ںT}XS5;,mT~;jÿtLxko{ַzo~cq׻WSqz]i}󝿾;gowUիsG_uǿlý3^{~K|޿8ps{= wn\|/eMy!v:wj?ˏ{]Gٿ{h5uҧ9ԍ`pE߱4@uF HmNW=W@O}ԩWV?\Bw(Yh\Ca [O|*nH1Δ{άl]bR1v.(j P}TA+HM dU*FB y)V 6 aE=R8f"R6'mt6*|x{-Oƀ69+~C\ҥ+וyj\49s-@K"0 0T]+OGiűrU(^(Y暜Z@]a;o5 -WjmtGϧ3Urep{O_Lr! ^WES\l "( _s"zbۮ͇61ky%D)= y\ %NVVW.SMY!wmz2/apn B˄,@jI2#_AAY.i"2<ٿu9+d0Ku~ֹS^Atku|1<,3'Lb\Ǵ",[ -ʰ%B4)DLo 0'lbA4ݻA=^R)qm|:6V DxW%Y,w=RuLGZ=9Ss=1o1Z>V\1D[>eb>W16= &u#uMb!UA)`[!!!AyO0@`0`/ 1Q:r{Ixc"c֘@?H4:'0!%Wιd5,,#Y1y_@4fgWu#ܪK>9r姚O:(]yR3/- U@j%`,\.T)n'G_leRZ_q/@D̳"&e~ 4@͵ZRR]g>֘::Tŷ^\bb#}  (2΂zhƌ]RcfЙ|0pU5Z'l]W)ZfZb0W(\2AՉP@E@Pd//oSl- J wS| s_^ tmjsY꽟|JUDoC+Nl ",T vԐR%bfּy+r>PYrYd]] !bĆܢ$6xAc]^7YP.X`׹\*x[_l4Xsq5a'exؐȠAX*M ="RO2 1 7{ꬍy V!GgAӬɧǛifĆ Z ,E\h;.%>RtBv(UJ ~x4&yf^OV'uB1J=K\hXMȊ aamͪ:P4(VBNe٤Rir #`]J FɭF.,J1M#]OKMXhH޼P՘dZYl(-$swR܃UnM(d02t!w@`;ۙ"GSjkn|F ?(D}Թx&ۜլV7YhX*Y$dߊr!KC]Cג@+sR9o@?Ev6@,IuBBK XR)umXӜKwJlm( $&Ɋ੺vX :G $Ik"`P0h+Z6wCǶ=nmJ+7&sw m"4i$۰)ُ6Y#Y)@}h %,>e΍{qL=cP X3)Z` (XP,Taj@> q)׊e䚫qL=c԰$kESٱu!@VAq̙ȑ#~.\pŋG:V:u~ziX"m},$ᕚJB%]+]q,q=g@@ /vܹso¿>$Td=h_!~˒\bٟΟ?Ϟ=}=<эupwV[8 ?Ƭc?s;ߙC7,*^1[<;@(Qt B2"Yb~ե \ e>AؗH}p^"~4@#UPXDj&FI!BFC?L{bToL@Rdf]HP&FX6HY57T w8 VaTP@Lk 0t)K;VB@@ R(ufךBwZtiJ1jftB Н;3΀M-t:$&$.dA P>EsD!P<M⧜Bn@P ,T[)23)Wg @`i8să+tc}܅Z='@Xf@`Fܙ|P] {mƞsk@@P%y!~Bw^LH` @X&2^CXН\ɥɋ £ vI @8B@i`hP X[M.t9 PEysB x: ?CbBT^T3@@`@ Bw2J  @'X2I VcBBe)\W)@@/^8 h# ݙ?}T@ (4YtK"MݝY+ @  8G@ǐ @@P>C @@P<9t  @@P>C @@P<9t  @@P>C @@P<9t  @@P>C @@P<9t  @@P>C @@P<9t  @@P>C @@P<9t  @@P>C @@P<9t  @@P>C @@P<9t  @@P>C @@P<9t  @@P>C @*(Μ9S9rυ jw'NT׮]ˊKA @&($&N:U]~fOM0;w@\R;v իW'OVǏ._ml( @&(blM8x!/^=Z>}:T!(B @VP!f"C=?tC r> @ LnhBM*@ *(wAa b @h}Զcz p?@ '0 O>mXW6߳gF_kwFa X5N3!EPX="EPG#kc9gc ,J몬5|7Q1@l@vAab.k]*ÝI2@#6e}0G‚A]D[|E|A/{9698x>,;s e&(L adҡz~M[k06~l }=?gMk0WC9(@6AaAJ& csV6|!Bs96 98XW#Q{ %!@%MPகp C1}q qmU*kM0/c.K`Xt  @+ X$2@ EA1y @ @P` @"< @  (V0  @s@PEB @`M)ULJv3,4xCo13gT'N]6:m'" .ʿ6N+벌eκ<<S2VJ!h>ybnc?f:V¦nƚ~DEEŘLXic΁`iR 2m]9=H@`6)(u݆y/GۤO^Z}mt ne5`W 4vaPL.uKu=d]ޚfz΁O`s"Ͼ(yLA>}aҋ=,~1Pƭiu1Śp6Uf Re ku6%(,6q'9c&A1I:-{֊mVl5m,+BŵɺgAoJ LmO-6vcmfҎ}Yر6],]{,|9"6u)&[+s2u|fƿ.3s[z M`S"۲o5vps]vƿbICߺc &ZPR/e]6.C+b̃f ]k8M <=m/H=n;2iJ:EpTi@&f"6@1#S)֥憵yxnu]yk-ێ -؜MY/%(lqu cAԘc6=?Kʯ~LՇ0˩WJ?40+3mcЇK=sy{QBbb겿Qcq]@`Y6%(l꾤/a*`oXѼ/ʱ1wbmc|̔ҏQ< ΍VXj17Kꃯgb~׃M`.6ӥ}h7)%!\~#;aϱx+v|͊n3}8H,5ps/mb?5%wZGs NuCA~S!V"r P7*S~4 Pp>ԉ~{9ʺ~vUk}Hcfݏs (.^=M7F b>ľ۾p7*%IPz1>JGLǘ>cQ7'clKCU [emWXB}lRP[ø)~|>Ĭ/ޅ!\L)E,R7ASh;1KfmgW]vчuc}fҏF!bDcFqnI]k9X7M .S9/nI}hJ;Zqh~ɢFzl)ͅ6gR1<ч[CXCi w'R!u@P{~Fה=g8F-Џ9PF~h>1'}*B;Nό>7 :kwױ_J?R1 (?nj @ج(*}a8ҏXޣ۷ եc E`s"q{/(C)(}=SKǢv:tEIW^yVx=^RQ pߣmq;Y~|ݏ<@`6%(OYq5eʳ(a]2o}]&TceϊؤH- 7ƗBIU_nVqx|\;Vm4GÇ)1d: lRP=yRh{>< yRuhĭ55%.׹abT@=M aK%AY|ĭ5Al\ lNPPe^RQ| (a>JkⰕ"VۿF-n3M`sB]BUpX~>mJP]J?bؤ`!@ <y8r@ la1}aSV}E /(C)(}=Y1LA0c-bxE JG ,Q^š(=;!e@P (ZW._lbuASn-%eu:uTuCoe)h@`36%(bY[Rvy[xE JG ,:]}ዥ)(4e?6Kb@ő#U@P'76emژQÚ&RZ+#iwAlJPhf@ .NX_ zXĢha [/&8(_lfxooӤYK>$|ģt,2P'(D ?~Fҏ0 J`žxSOkLAAnцK,JPJ?J`Ax Umac[k(}y: lRPs* EBۃ(c R1g ,bF!@ PE@' @ Le @@EL @2 (9o @E@P1 t @$Xk@ AAQ4 @ ,bF!@ PE@' @ Le @@EL @2 (9o @E8$( Xk5` Xik PV,85` Xk5pk u]O)"TIENDB`j)  OJPJQJ_HmH nH sH tH J`J u\Normal dCJ_HaJmH sH tH DA D Default Paragraph FontRi@R 0 Table Normal4 l4a (k ( 0No List ^o^ [{Default 7$8$H$)B*CJOJQJ_HaJmH phsH tH >> &|0HeaderdH$.. &|0 Header Char> @"> &|0FooterdH$.1. &|0 Footer Char`@B` P] Footnote Text d CJOJPJQJaJmHsHtHToQT P]Footnote Text CharCJOJPJQJ^JaJ@&`a@ P]Footnote ReferenceH*xOrx  Medium Grid 1 - Accent 21d^m$CJOJPJQJ^JaJtt Dl Table Grid7:V0 d@ DlColorful Grid - Accent 5G:V0dd44j;@ j; jDddjDdd2dfdfd5B*ph_Iz5\5\5\5\O DlLight List - Accent 11:V0OOOO44j.@OOOOj.OOOOj.OOOOj O2dfdfd55\5\5\5B*\ph4O4 DlMedium Shading 2 - Accent 11U:V044j@ j; j; OjQ OjQ jQ OjDjD2dfdfdX5B*\ph5B*\ph B*ph5B*\ph B*phO Dl  Bibliography1+:V0KKKK44j;@ j; jQK jQK jQK jQK j j d&B*OJPJQJ^Jph CJaJZ@Z s0 Balloon Text dCJOJQJaJmHsHtHNoN s0Balloon Text CharCJOJQJ^JaJB'`B }0Comment ReferenceCJaJH@H !}0 Comment Text CJaJmHsHtHBoB }0Comment Text CharCJaJ@j@@ #}0Comment Subject"5\No1N "}0Comment Subject Char5CJ\aJ6U`A6 10 Hyperlink >*B*ph<+@R< &=!0 Endnote Text%CJaJ:a: %=!0Endnote Text Char>*`q> =!0Endnote ReferenceH**W`* H`Strong5\PK![Content_Types].xmlN0EH-J@%ǎǢ|ș$زULTB l,3;rØJB+$G]7O٭V$ !)O^rC$y@/yH*񄴽)޵߻UDb`}"qۋJחX^)I`nEp)liV[]1M<OP6r=zgbIguSebORD۫qu gZo~ٺlAplxpT0+[}`jzAV2Fi@qv֬5\|ʜ̭NleXdsjcs7f W+Ն7`g ȘJj|h(KD- dXiJ؇(x$( :;˹! I_TS 1?E??ZBΪmU/?~xY'y5g&΋/ɋ>GMGeD3Vq%'#q$8K)fw9:ĵ x}rxwr:\TZaG*y8IjbRc|XŻǿI u3KGnD1NIBs RuK>V.EL+M2#'fi ~V vl{u8zH *:(W☕ ~JTe\O*tHGHY}KNP*ݾ˦TѼ9/#A7qZ$*c?qUnwN%Oi4 =3N)cbJ uV4(Tn 7_?m-ٛ{UBwznʜ"Z xJZp; {/<P;,)''KQk5qpN8KGbe Sd̛\17 pa>SR! 3K4'+rzQ TTIIvt]Kc⫲K#v5+|D~O@%\w_nN[L9KqgVhn R!y+Un;*&/HrT >>\ t=.Tġ S; Z~!P9giCڧ!# B,;X=ۻ,I2UWV9$lk=Aj;{AP79|s*Y;̠[MCۿhf]o{oY=1kyVV5E8Vk+֜\80X4D)!!?*|fv u"xA@T_q64)kڬuV7 t '%;i9s9x,ڎ-45xd8?ǘd/Y|t &LILJ`& -Gt/PK! ѐ'theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsM 0wooӺ&݈Э5 6?$Q ,.aic21h:qm@RN;d`o7gK(M&$R(.1r'JЊT8V"AȻHu}|$b{P8g/]QAsم(#L[PK-![Content_Types].xmlPK-!֧6 0_rels/.relsPK-!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xmlPK-!0C)theme/theme/theme1.xmlPK-! ѐ' theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsPK] G"XM]^b:p0~&3c )  Jn]{p    ++.1>`|jm9xM U*=G,\lllm$mWmhmmmmn1nSn}nnno3okoooooppppDqqqrVrrsssssst|FNZ)L[Ş,MoٟEv_ϡ?&HSk/³3CDʴK׻˼̼s W} X $'1!T # @H 0(  0(  B S  ?3>EPU[mpw}y':RYFL_f$+gk $"*"##))* ***Z/]////0000000s1~11144v66klqqqrux|xyyyyv|(.ثݫ CGNP !36SYnvv}%:Cmqsy`f LRnt\b  w~t} KP[_kqjr,-a"!             u : @ @"F"44TT]]>aBabb'q*qRww)T5w0< WQ~&+9Ifmlr Eg;|@j5;Lu9 Az)I)`! 04tye*>4vPG0r_-/y $'!           333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333 ,--w      j {s[s@eSk4?v>nh:[Ah%wƅ Y{.Xvr., ,BKH5`n{_91WtRb3W^JJN|ae>nUZjRa>qJWZaw6$0*1|8LD}(!^`OJPJQJ^Jo(^`OJQJ^Jo(hHop^p`OJQJo(hH@ ^@ `OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHo^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoP^P`OJQJo(hH ^` o( ^` o(.0^`0o(..0^`0o(... 8^8`o( .... 8^8`o( ..... `^``o( ...... `^``o(....... `^``o(........^`OJPJQJ^Jo(^`OJQJ^Jo(hHop^p`OJQJo(hH@ ^@ `OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHo^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoP^P`OJQJo(hH^`OJPJQJ^Jo(-^`OJQJ^Jo(hHop^p`OJQJo(hH@ ^@ `OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHo^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoP^P`OJQJo(hH ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo(  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo(" ^`o()^`.pL^p`L.@ ^@ `.^`.L^`L.^`.^`.PL^P`L. ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo(  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo(" 2 ^`OJQJo(  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo(  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo(  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  pp^p`OJQJo(  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  PP^P`OJQJo( h^h`o(h^h`o(.0^`0o(..0^`0o(... 8^8`o( .... 8^8`o( ..... `^``o( ...... `^``o(....... `^``o(........ ^`OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  pp^p`OJQJo(  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo(  PP^P`OJQJo(  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo(  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  pp^p`OJQJo("  @ @ ^@ `OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  ^`OJQJo("  PP^P`OJQJo(" *1|tRW^n{_9D} Y{.|aer.BKH5ZawUZj[Ah%Skj {s@>q4?        r"        HE        \ nM[J8j%Ѕr"8Vx1          ..LBʶS4z: z!L?X hO L?޳||>U0>A@^4~\]~>}2%؄tx>A:,R)fgv zEHH+LrbѬo1'M.l4:`w9y::`%R;+H*s<=w9#sc?"TU`Z@+H*#g%A:`PG"TU`O9M:Kd#q]RRNp\sA>Rw9#s"TUv^W"TU`W"TU`iXNp\snY"TU#8a\Np\Y\)#gLd:#:Kd-e:`dDfj:`'qxmw9`;vsdDf`.D{+H*{)#d<|:`t~'M.`:4dDfWNp\#FE\ 415rTz/&*.-R-_/g/+1g6p+7I;">N?^@Y=DI?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~Root Entry FO&PvData L1TablepWordDocumentASummaryInformation(DocumentSummaryInformation8CompObjr  F Microsoft Word 97-2003 Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89q