WikiLeaks



Current bases:

• Issyk Kul (Kyrgysztan): Russia gained control over Dastan torpedo factory here in exchange for 2 billion dollar loan

• Kant (Kyrgyzstan): 999th Air Base, CSTO administered (4 comd AF & AD (Rostov). 250 pers., 5 Su-25, 2 An-26, 5 L-39, 2 Mi-8, 2 Il-76, an-30)

• Osh (Kyrgyzstan): CSTO administered

• Kyrgyzstan: Russia also gained control over several other military facilities as part of Osh deal

• Dushanbe (Tajikistan):

▪ 201st motorized rifle infantry division (ex- 201 mot div, 5500 people, Kurgan-Tyuba, Kulyaba. 3 x rgt, 4 separate bn. Spent RUR 3 bln for garrison reconstruction)

▪ Psychological Ops

▪ 670 Air Force Group (5 SU-25s)

▪ fighter group (5 Mig-25s)

• Gissar (Tajikistan): 303 separate helicopter squadron, (6 Mi-24, 4 Mi-8)

• Nurek (Tajikistan): “Okno” Space surveillance center; (possible air base as well)

• Kulyab (Tajikistan): Air Base

• Tyube (Tajikistan): Air Base

• Tajikistan: Russian “advisors” apparently still operate at Tajik border posts, after 2005/2006 transfer to Tajik control

• Baikonur Cosmodrome (Kazakhstan): Russia’s Space Forces

• Saryshagan (Kazakhstan): Military firing range

• Kustanai (Kazakhstan): air force base, 21 separate mot bde (?)

Soviet Bases:

• Manas (Kyrgyzstan): Air force base

• Chirchik-Andizhan (Uzbekistan). 12 PVO, 9 IAP. 32 Su-27.

• Nebit-Dag (Turkmenia). 12 PVO, 179 IAP. MiG-23M.

• Aktepe-Bezmein (Ashkabad). 12 PVO, 152 IAP. MiG-23M, MiG-25PD.

• Lugovoe (Kazakhstan). 12 PVO, 715 IAP. MiG-23M.

• Taldy-Kurga (Kazakhstan) air force base

• Zhangiz-Tobe (Kazakhstan) air force base

• Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan) air force base

• Zhana-Semei (Kazakhstan) air force base

• Alma-Ata airfield junction (Kazakhstan) air force base

• Karshi-Khanabad (Uzbekistan)

• Ayn (Tajikistan) Air Base

• Xonobod (Uzbekistan) Air Base

• Kakaydi (Uzbekistan) Air Base

• Kostanay (Kazakhstan) Air Base

• Baykonur (Kazakhstan) Air Base

• Mary (Turkmenistan)*Russia held this after FSU fall, but left soon after

Maps:

(Kaz)

(Kyrg)

(Tajik)

(Uzbek)

(*Note: Maps do not show military installations, but rather show energy installations)

Sources:





(These first two link to an exhaustive site on Russian military installations including equipment types and troop deployments at each base)







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|CDI Russia Weekly #200 Contents   |Plain Text - Entire Issue |

#12

Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye

No. 10

2002

[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

RUSSIA SURROUNDED WITH US MILITARY BASES

Moscow still doesn't know whether this is good or bad

By Mikhail KHODARENOK

In spite of Moscow's really emotional protests, the United States and NATO, which have now established a bridge-head in Central Asia, continue to expand their military presence on former Soviet territory. The geo-political importance of some CIS countries is too great during the forthcoming re-alignment of the South-West Asian and Mideastern balance of forces. That's why the concerned parties are in no mood to heed the objections of Russia, which has seriously depleted its military-economic potential over the last decade.

Central Asia -- The Intermediate Result

The Central Asian heart-land has never seen such a multi- national US-European troop contingent ever since the epic expeditions of Alexander the Great. A tactical group of the third British mechanized division (400 soldiers, all told) is now stationed in Kabul. A tactical group of a German airborne brigade numbering 200 soldiers is also located there. Add to this units of an Italian infantry regiment (100 soldiers), a 300-strong French armored-cavalry regiment, a Spanish military unit numbering 50 soldiers, a joint 150-strong German-Dutch unit, as well as up to 300 US Marines. Apart from that, US and NATO military units are stationed in Kandahar. The US Army's 101-st air-assault division has contributed 1,000 soldiers. A 1,500-strong expeditionary USMC (United States Marine Corps) battalion is also staying there. Moreover, 100 British and 300 Canadian soldiers are stationed in Kandahar. 100 soldiers serving with US special forces have settled down in Herat; yet another 200-strong American SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) unit is based in Shindand. Meanwhile 400 soldiers from the US Army's 10-th light-infantry division, as well as a 600-strong battalion of British Marines, are stationed in Baghram. All in all, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan comprises the following national troop contingents -- Great Britain, 2,000 soldiers; France, 500 soldiers; Germany, 900 soldiers; Norway, 100 soldiers; Italy, 100 soldiers; Turkey, 200 soldiers; Denmark, 200 soldiers; Jordan, 500 soldiers. As of today, about 12,000 soldiers, including 8,000 Americans and about 1,000 Canadians, are involved in the Afghan counter-terrorist operation.

US and NATO military installations on the territory of former Soviet Central Asian republics are instrumental in providing logistics support for multi-national forces and their operations. As is known, the United States and NATO have reliably asserted themselves at Uzbek, Kirghiz and Tajik bases, i.e. Manas (Bishkek), Karshi, Kulyab, Kokaidy and Termez. All these airfields were to have been used for re-supply missions, for transporting humanitarian relief aid and for deploying search- and-rescue units. However, the first few French Mirage-2000 fighters have landed in Manas not so long ago. Until then, reconnaissance aircraft, including Predator drones, used to operate rather actively from all bases in the interests of the US-NATO air-force formation being used against Al-Qaeda units. Moreover, ranger units, AWACS-type aircraft, psychological- warfare and reconnaissance planes were deployed there.

The appearance of Mirage-2000 fighters is seen as yet another US-NATO military build-up phase in this region. One has every reason to believe that this move is not some isolated occurrence, and that it highlights a certain trend instead. Few obstacles impede now the conversion of former Soviet military bases into full-fledged Western outposts. Among other things, the stockpiling of aircraft fuel and weapons is seen as the most labor-consuming process, which requires more time to complete than all other processes. Nonetheless, all local airfields could be used for sustaining the most determined attacks, once this process is complete.

It should be emphasized that Central Asian countries themselves consider US military presence quite profitable. The configuration of their borders, which had been arbitrarily drawn by the Bolsheviks, is always fraught with the danger of bloody inter-ethnic wars, which would inevitably entail the uncontrollable massacre of civilians, causing a multitude of people to flee their native parts. The latter would lead to absolutely unpredictable consequences. Besides, not a single post-Soviet republic has sufficiently powerful armed forces capable of rectifying the hypothetically unfavorable regional situation.

Even Uzbekistan, which has weighty reasons to aspire for regional leadership, has a rudimentary army, which, at best, can accomplish only a limited range of objectives. Consequently, Central Asia simply can't do today without a powerful "sergeant of the relief," or "neighborhood cop." Therefore one can safely say that US-NATO military presence is perceived as a regional blessing and a guarantee of sorts against terrible blood-baths in the struggle to control land, water and other natural resources. By the way, such terrifying clashes had already taken place in the early 1990s.

The Second Asian Wave

Quite possibly, after gaining a foot-hold in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirghizia, the United States will be sorely tempted to spread its military presence over Kazakhstan, which looms over the whole of Central Asia like some kind of a tremendous horse-shoe. The US side will, most likely, establish control over former Soviet air-force bases in Taldy-Kurgan, Zhangiz-Tobe, Semipalatinsk, Zhana-Semei and the Alma-Ata airfield junction (i.e. the south-eastern axis), for openers. The Americans will most likely be acting in line with time-tested methods; if necessary, US specialists will upgrade the local tarmac, subsequently improving radio-technical landing aids and beacons in line with NATO standards. Kazakh airfields will then be used by NATO cargo aircraft, with military planes arriving later on.

A paradoxical and hitherto unthinkable situation can shape up, when Russian military installations in Kazakhstan, i.e. an early-warning radio-technical facility on cape Gulshad (Lake Balkhash), the Saryshagan ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) testing range, as well as state-run testing range No. 5 in Baikonur, find themselves surrounded with NATO military bases. Moreover, it can't be excluded that Russia might have to coordinate all military shipments to these facilities with both local authorities, as well as US and NATO representatives. Some people may think this forecast is too fantastic and pessimistic. However, it should be reminded that some Kremlin high-placed officials had also perceived any possible US military presence in Central Asia as an non-viable hypothesis not so long ago.

A Scenario for Tbilisi

Right now, a relatively small US troop contingent is stationed in Georgia. Technically speaking, US servicemen would be expected to render military-technical assistance in organizing several Georgian SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) battalions.

Tbilisi subsequently intends to use such units for fighting terrorist groups and in order to enhance Georgia's territorial integrity. How feasible is this task? Our article doesn't aim to discuss this issue; however, several world-class units boasting state-of-the-art weaponry might eventually constitute the new Georgian army's nucleus.

One should also keep in mind that Georgian society aims to restore the country's territorial integrity, regarding this as a top-priority national goal. As is known, the end justifies the means. Georgia could even forsake part of its sovereignty in favour of a powerful ally that would help it suppress the separatist movement. Given these realities, one should say that the Georgian leadership is acting in a well thought-out manner, expressing priority national interests; such actions can also be long-term. By all looks, official Tbilisi intends to radically solve the problem of its rebellious territories, before their self-determination process goes too far, and before it becomes irreversible.

It's therefore hardly surprising that the Georgian infrastructure will be used by the United States and NATO, which continue their crusade against international terrorism at this stage. Geo-politically Georgia plays the part of a bridge for the transit of Central Asian crude oil and other mineral resources. Consequently, the leadership of this young independent republic can obtain numerous advantages as a result of its foreign- political maneuvers. Moreover, one should not under-estimate Georgia's territory as a convenient bridge-head for waging a war against Iran and Iraq. Incidentally, the United States has already announced its decision to fight such a war rather loudly. Therefore possible US control over this Trans-Caucasian republic would apparently benefit Tbilisi and Washington alike.

The Georgian leadership's aspirations therefore tally with the US diversification theory, which implies that Kazakh and Central Asian natural resources should be delivered along different routes. Georgia is therefore becoming a natural US ally. Consequently, it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that US Air Force and NATO bases will be deployed in Georgian territory soon after the arrival of first several hundred US servicemen. Such bases might well appear at former Soviet airfields, which had belonged to the former Soviet 34-th air army and the USSR's air-defense force -- Marneuli, Vaziani, Senaki (Mikha Tskhakaya) and Gudauta. After that, Turkish military units might well be deployed there; by the way, Ankara has already hinted that this is theoretically possible. There is no doubting the fact that the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be predetermined, after this happens. In that case, Moscow, which has repeatedly advocated Georgian territorial integrity, and which boasts a limited military potential, would merely be able to observe the outcome of a brief conflict.

Baku and Counter-Terrorist Plans

Azerbaijan, which borders on Iran, is regarded as a convenient air-force base for tactical US and NATO warplanes, that is, if Washington and Brussels decide to go ahead with a possible counter-terrorist operation, attacking Iran in the process. As of today, Washington considers Iran to be the bulwark of international terrorism. In this case former Soviet first-category air-force bases in Kyurdamir and Nasosnaya (Pumping Station) will prove to be a highly valuable asset for the United States. Surely enough, their current state leaves a lot to be desired. However, the US side, which boasts tremendous resources, can upgrade these two bases in no time at all. If necessary, the United States and NATO could also use the international airport in Baku. However, all these airfields can accommodate no more than 90-100 tactical aircraft, reconnaissance planes and flying tankers. Nonetheless, even this number is enough to conduct limited air strikes and to seriously threaten theoretical enemies from the northern axis.

The distance between Azeri bases and vital Iranian facilities is negligible; moreover, one should keep in mind that warplane pilots have every chance of ejecting to safety over the Caspian Sea, if their aircraft are damaged during combat missions. Search-and-rescue teams would fish them out from international waters with almost 100-percent chances of success just because the Caspian Sea lacks any hostile and fanatical population. The US side perceives this as a highly important factor.

As a reward for possible collaboration Azerbaijan may be offered substantial US and NATO support in settling the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. It's an established fact that the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) is unable to deblock this conflict. Official Baku links any possible withdrawal from the Karabakh impasse with Washington and Brussels. This implies coinciding interests, and only such consensus provides real-life allies. Any project aiming to transport Caspian, Central Asian and Kazakh hydro-carbon resources elsewhere would seem a bit far-fetched, unless Azerbaijan takes part in such projects.

The Results

On the one hand, Russia stands to gain a lot from that US blitzkrieg on Afghan territory. The Talib "thorn," which could have entailed "sepsis" and even "death" for the entire Central Asia, as well as utterly unpredictable consequences for the Russian Federation's southern flank, has now been almost pulled out. Analysts are inclined to think that extremist groups are highly unlikely to re-assert themselves in Afghanistan and newly independent Central Asian countries in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, though, there can be no power vacuum in regional politics. Moscow perceives Russia's withdrawal from the geo- political scene in the obtaining situation as a painful inevitability. Meanwhile the appearance of a new Central Asian leader is perceived as an objective necessity because regional countries might otherwise plunge into bloody small wars.

It's becoming absolutely clear nowadays that many of the Russian leadership's extremely costly and painstaking projects had been false from the very outset, thereby leading us into a blind alley. Frankly speaking, the most far-sighted Russian analysts had warned about this back in the early 1990s. Quite possibly, the list of such projects includes the collective CIS peace-keeping forces, which have virtually become redundant today, as well as the protection of the CIS external perimeter. Russian society apparently doesn't know that the latter idea has also lost its topicality; nonetheless, it had been the subject of heated debates, with the Russian treasury spending a lot of money on this project. The epoch of open borders within the CIS is also nearing its completion, upon benefiting most of our neighbors, rather than Russia itself. In fact, Russia is engulfed by millions upon millions of illegal migrants.

In the obtaining situation, the United States has obtained more benefits than all other countries, virtually gaining access to the immense regional natural resources. And, most importantly, for today Moscow stands to gain from NATO's Central Asian military presence after the successful operation against the Taliban. However, such military presence would provide some dubious advantages in the foreseeable future. Washington acquires powerful leverage for influencing subsequent Russian political aspirations in line with any possible scenario, thus reducing Moscow's maneuvering room on the global political scene still further. Quite possibly, this constitutes the main result of America's penetration into this hitherto walled-in strategic region.

The second stage of expanded NATO military presence on former Soviet territory couldn't but evoke serious irritation on the Kremlin's part from the very outset. Washington then made some soothing statements. However, Moscow lacks any real-life military-economic leverage for influencing the situation. Consequently, one has every reason to believe that the Kremlin's persisting imperial moods won't be enhanced. Naturally enough, Russia opposes the second stage of expanded US and NATO military presence in post-Soviet republics; the same can be said about a hypothetical third stage. Nonetheless, Moscow is so far unable to clearly formulate the relevant political goal of countering expanded US and NATO influence on CIS countries. The Kremlin merely says that it opposes such a policy. Any arguments in favour of this position don't sound convincing enough; meanwhile it's an open secret that the subordination of strategic goals and tasks to political goals constitutes a highly important military- strategy principle. It would be well-nigh impossible to implement specific Trans-Caucasian and Central Asian policies in line with long-term national interests, unless such political goals are explained to all strata of Russian society in an easy-to- understand language.

 

Russian daily looks at Moscow's military strategy in CIS

BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union. London: Oct 11, 2005. pg. 1

Abstract (Summary)

Russia still considers military force to be an element in its foreign policy towards the CIS. This is illustrated not just by the statements made by Sergey Ivanov, the Russian defence minister, regarding the positive role played by Russian peacekeepers in settling conflicts in the post-Soviet area and the war on terrorism. It is also indicated by Moscow's specific actions aimed at beefing up military bases and installations in Central Asia and the South Caucasus as well as in the Dniester region, [Ukraine's] Crimea and Belarus. I am talking about the territory of the former USSR, which Moscow has declared to be a zone of its vital interests.

As troops serving in the far abroad are scaled down, the CIS is also no longer a priority. Moscow is trying to optimize expenditure on the upkeep of nearby groups in the CIS. Thus, whereas in 2003 expenditure on the budget heading "preparation for and participation in ensuring collective security and peacekeeping activity" totalled R1.4bn, in 2004 just R63.7m was allocated, and in 2005 R61.1m. It is not known how much money Moscow will earmark under this heading in 2006. In the opinion of military experts, the spending will fall. They attribute this decision to the fact that the staff for the coordination of military cooperation in the CIS has been wound up.

Wings are the main thing when it comes to realizing the idea of maintaining and deploying troops abroad. Emphasis is being placed on the possibility of using aircraft. It is no coincidence that when the Black Sea Fleet was being divided up Russia held on to its two main airfields in Crimea - at Gvardeyskoye [Hvardiyske] and Kacha - along with two backup airfields - at Sevastopol (Cape Khersones and Yuzhniy). Kant airfield in Kyrgyzstan is being prepared for operation not so that Russian aircraft can be deployed there instantly but as a backup. Airfields in Tajikistan (Ayni, Dushanbe), Uzbekistan (Xonobod, Kakaydi), Armenia (Yerevan, Gyumri), Belarus (Minsk, Vileyka), Kazakhstan (Kostanay, Baykonur), and Moldova (Tiraspol) are viewed similarly. Even in Abkhazia the airfield at Gudauta has been modified as a peacekeeping facility. Aircraft belonging to the United Nations and to the collective peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone have been deployed in Gudauta among others.

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Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, in Russian 10 Oct 05 p 10/BBCMonitoring/(c) [pic]BBC

According to the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, military force remains a key factor in Russia's relations with its CIS partners. However, the emphasis is no longer on numerical strength, the newspaper argues. "Moscow realizes that upholding its geopolitical interests in the post-Soviet area solely by means of extensive arms build-ups is a hopeless business." The following is the text of a commentary by Vladimir Mukhin published in the paper on 10 October. Subheadings have been inserted editorially:

Russia still considers military force to be an element in its foreign policy towards the CIS. This is illustrated not just by the statements made by Sergey Ivanov, the Russian defence minister, regarding the positive role played by Russian peacekeepers in settling conflicts in the post-Soviet area and the war on terrorism. It is also indicated by Moscow's specific actions aimed at beefing up military bases and installations in Central Asia and the South Caucasus as well as in the Dniester region, [Ukraine's] Crimea and Belarus. I am talking about the territory of the former USSR, which Moscow has declared to be a zone of its vital interests.

The trends are obvious when characterizing the special features of our troops' military presence outside Russia. I should point out the main trends. First, there are still Russian military contingents and installations in virtually every state that formed part of the USSR. Or else Moscow is trying to maintain close military and military-technical ties with these states, which is what is now happening with Uzbekistan. Neutral Turkmenistan is the only exception, which, while developing military economic ties with Russia, is trying to develop military relations with the United States, Ukraine and Georgia but not with the Russian Defence Ministry.

Russia's influence in CIS still strong

Despite all the conflicts and problems Russia's military influence in the CIS has not grown weaker. And the Russian troop withdrawal from Georgia that began this year heralds not so much the latest stage in the carve-up of spheres of influence in the post- Soviet area as Moscow's transition to a new, tougher format for dealing with Tbilisi on questions relating to the economy and humanitarian relations. At the same time Russian peacekeepers feel comfortable in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and for all the Georgian parliament's tough statements about the need for their withdrawal, the status quo is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The same conclusion presents itself in respect of the Russian military presence in the Dniester region.

Second, I should point out the fact that the number of Russian troops outside the CIS is constantly declining. Thus, peacekeeping groups were completely withdrawn from the Balkan peninsula - from Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina - by 1 August 2003. The Russian Federation armed forces military formation that previously took part in the UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone ceased to exist on 1 October. Henceforth there will be no Russian troop units in the far abroad and there are only officer observers operating at the United Nations and the OSCE.

As troops serving in the far abroad are scaled down, the CIS is also no longer a priority. Moscow is trying to optimize expenditure on the upkeep of nearby groups in the CIS. Thus, whereas in 2003 expenditure on the budget heading "preparation for and participation in ensuring collective security and peacekeeping activity" totalled R1.4bn, in 2004 just R63.7m was allocated, and in 2005 R61.1m. It is not known how much money Moscow will earmark under this heading in 2006. In the opinion of military experts, the spending will fall. They attribute this decision to the fact that the staff for the coordination of military cooperation in the CIS has been wound up.

At the same time the Russian Federation Defence Ministry is increasing expenditure on upgrading military installations and bases abroad within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO]. Thus, Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov said in Kant in Kyrgyzstan that R100m would be earmarked over the coming years for infrastructure development at the airfield there. Money is also being allocated for kitting out the Russian Federation military base in Tajikistan and for performing the CSTO's new missions to deploy coalition groupings in Central Asia. The collective rapid deployment forces have already been formed within the CSTO and the amalgamated CSTO staff is up and running.

At the same time Russia may agree to increase the lease payment for basing the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. This payment currently stands at 97.75m dollars. And the payment is made by annually reducing Ukraine's gas debts. The lease expires in 2017. However, the Russian military are worried not so much about the future of the Black Sea Fleet installations in Crimea after this date as about modernizing the fleet, to which Ukrainian politicians are so opposed.

Back in 2001 Russia succeeded in moving Su-24 bombers to the Crimean peninsula and several Black Sea Fleet warships were repaired and replaced. However, Moscow intends to increase the submarine fleet and is preparing to move another Project 877 diesel submarine from the Northern Fleet. Vice-Adm Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy, former commander of the Ukrainian navy, said that Kiev is opposed to this move.

Quality above quantity

However, Moscow realizes that upholding its geopolitical interests in the post-Soviet area solely by means of extensive arms build-ups is a hopeless business. Hence, secretly emphasis is being placed on the qualitative parameters of the troops and naval forces stationed in the near abroad. Thus, the Black Sea Fleet has adopted a programme of modernizing fleet forces and materiel. It is not just Russian repair firms that are being used in the process but also the local Sevastopol shipyard, which comes under the command of the Black Sea Fleet.

Wings are the main thing when it comes to realizing the idea of maintaining and deploying troops abroad. Emphasis is being placed on the possibility of using aircraft. It is no coincidence that when the Black Sea Fleet was being divided up Russia held on to its two main airfields in Crimea - at Gvardeyskoye [Hvardiyske] and Kacha - along with two backup airfields - at Sevastopol (Cape Khersones and Yuzhniy). Kant airfield in Kyrgyzstan is being prepared for operation not so that Russian aircraft can be deployed there instantly but as a backup. Airfields in Tajikistan (Ayni, Dushanbe), Uzbekistan (Xonobod, Kakaydi), Armenia (Yerevan, Gyumri), Belarus (Minsk, Vileyka), Kazakhstan (Kostanay, Baykonur), and Moldova (Tiraspol) are viewed similarly. Even in Abkhazia the airfield at Gudauta has been modified as a peacekeeping facility. Aircraft belonging to the United Nations and to the collective peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone have been deployed in Gudauta among others.

Thus, Moscow is not trying to build up its troop contingents in the near abroad. Expenditure on the operation of troops deployed outside Russian Federation borders is generally diminishing year in year out. Although this expenditure is increasing considerably on individual projects such as radars (Baranavichy, Belarus and Qabala, Azerbaijan), the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet, and the equipping of bases in Central Asia. It is hard to glimpse them in the country's budget since the figures are not included under international headings but dotted over general programmes concerned with maintaining the combat capability of troops at the level of a Russian Federation armed forces' branch of service or combat arm.

Credit: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, in Russian 10 Oct 05 p 10

[pic]Features

Russia Expands Its Military Presence In Central Asia



An airborne unit of the Tajik Army during joint exercises in southern Tajikistan

November 12, 2008

By Sultan-Khan Zhussip

The secretary-general of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Nikolai Bordyuzha, recently announced the planned formation of an international force in Central Asia that "should be prepared to repel any threat."

On November 9, after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev submitted an agreement on the expected 5,000-strong force to the State Duma for approval, Bordyuzha said that the force is to be formed immediately upon the agreement's ratification by all participating states.

On November 11, he began a working visit to Kazakhstan to discuss the security situation in the CSTO's zone of responsibility. The CSTO comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

But experts argue that, as Moscow touts its efforts to strengthen military cooperation under the umbrella of the CIS and the CSTO, Russia is really pursuing its own goal of expanding its military presence and influence in Central Asia.

Under the working title "Creeping Expansion Of Mysterious And Unpredictable China" on one side, and "Concerns About the Aggressive Policies of the United States in the Region" on the other, Russia is strengthening its cooperation in the military-political and military-technical spheres in the framework of such alliances as the CIS and CSTO, especially with the countries of Central Asia.

Bordyuzha said on September 12 that five members of the CSTO -- Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan -- have agreed to dramatically increase the military capabilities of the bloc.

According to Bordyuzha, an international force would be created in Central Asia that "should be capable of repelling any threat from outside." Units of the unified special rapid-reaction force would be part of such a force. It would be composed of 10 battalions, with added protection of the unified air-defense system. The new structure would be financed by all the participants on an equal basis, but Russia would provide weapons under agreeable conditions.

Following this big announcement, there was a meeting on October 15 of CSTO defense ministers in St. Petersburg, where they discussed questions pertaining to the common air-defense system.

Besides this, in recent years the members of the CSTO have held a number of joint military exercises for their forces. Just this September and October there were two joint military exercises: one in Russia, "Center-2008," and another in Kazakhstan, "Aldaspan-2008." A third exercise, "Shield-2008," is to be held in western Kazakhstan in the coming weeks.

'Russia Never Left'

According to General Alibek Kasymov, a former Kazakh defense minister and chief of staff, Russia is pursuing a concrete goal -- to pull its allies closer and give a signal to the West that military cooperation among CIS states is continuing.

But in the opinion of other experts, all these measures are a clear indication of Russia's aspirations to expand its military presence and influence in a strategically vital region.

In the first years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia preserved its position in Central Asia. In particular, it had a large military unit in Turkmenistan (in Mary), in accordance with an agreement between Moscow and Ashgabat under which Russian citizens were serving in the Turkmen Army, and Russian border guards kept watch along the border of Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

During the years of civil war in Tajikistan, several Russian units were based in the country. An elite paratrooper commando unit was stationed in Tajikistan to support the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force (which included troops from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan).

Moscow-based military expert Vladimir Mukhin says Russia has lost much of its position in Central Asia since then.

But Russia still has troops and bases in Central Asia in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and in Kazakhstan, where Russian troops are based at the Baikonur Cosmodrome (Russia's space forces) and at the Saryshagan military firing range.

Mukhin believes that for Russia it is expedient to strengthen its military presence in several countries of the region.

"First, it was expedient for Russia to stake out its presence at first in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Khanabad base in Uzbekistan, where earlier strategic bombers were stationed that could reach India, was good air base, a "springboard," and was for us a very important base," Mukhin says.

"One problem was Tajikistan where we did not have a large infrastructure and where it was necessary to practically build everything from scratch. It is a different matter when the base is prepared, the Americans fixed it [the Khanabad base] up very well," he adds. "Secondly, Russia could use, as it did previously, the military base at Mary. A large part of the air defense was deployed there as large air force units."

Fighting For Influence In Central Asia

Russia wants to regain its previous position in this region on the basis of bilateral agreements, Mukhin says, but the countries of Central Asia are not hurrying to allow the Russian military back in. "Some kinds of agreements exist," he says. "But as is known, the Uzbeks do not want to host Russian military units. We also cannot deploy anything in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan."

According to Peter Felstead, a military and defense expert from the London-based "Jane's Defense Weekly," the energy resources of Central Asia are also attractive to Russia and Moscow will continue to try to make advances into the region.

"I think the one thing you can say is that what happened in Georgia fits a pattern, so it's all part of a resurgent Russia that believe that they have been sort of wronged on the world stage and want to come back to a position of major-power status," Felstead says.

"What I would say is that Russia a lot of time has tried to use energy to try and wield its way and extend its influence with its neighbors and certain neighboring countries are almost in a stranglehold from Russia because of their reliance on Russian energy," he adds. "Where their energy comes from Central Asia, then I think that you will find that they will be moving to secure that because that is what they are using to fuel their resurgence."

On the other hand, Tajik analyst Marat Mamadshoev says that merely strengthening its military presence in Central Asia doesn't necessarily mean Russia's influence there will rise.

"Recently we see the politics of China also, which does not have a military base but which is gradually and persistently advancing its influence in this region and in many other regions," Mamadshoev says. "Using this example, it seems to me that the use of economic means is the best way to get a foothold in the region."

All the same, Kasym Bekmukhammad, another independent expert from Dushanbe, says that after the Russia-Georgia conflict in the Caucasus, Russia has found the grounds to expand its presence in Central Asia and strengthen its position in the region. During the existence of the CIS, Russia has strongly warned against the presence of external threats in the Central Asian states.

Bekmukhammad says that so far no one has seen the clear threats Moscow has been warning about, widely read as cross-border terrorism coming from Afghanistan or other regional hot spots, and that Russia is simply pursuing its geopolitical goals in an important region like Central Asia.

Besides that, Bekmukhammad notes hat the experience of the Russian military does not show that Russian troops have played the expected role in resolving internal crises in the countries where they are based. "Russia always takes a passive position and we witnessed such a situation in Kyrgyzstan," he says.

Here the Tajik analyst is speaking about the passive position of Russia during the Tajik civil war in 1992-97, the Andijon bloodshed in May 2005 and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, when the regime of Askar Akaev was overthrown.

Sultan-Khan Zhussip is a correspondent in RFE/RL's Kazakh Service

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Khaleej Times Online >> News >> INTERNATIONAL

Kyrgyzstan grants permission for new Russian base



(AFP)

10 July 2009

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BISHKEK - Kyrgyzstan has granted permission for Russia to open a second military base in the Central Asian country, a source in the Kyrgyz government told AFP on Friday.

The source said the base would be in located in Osh, a city in southern Kyrgyzstan, and would operate under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).

The CSTO is a security grouping of Russia and six ex-Soviet states that Moscow has touted as a counterweight to NATO.

In addition, Russia will gain control over several Kyrgyz defence-industry sites in exchange for a two-billion-dollar loan package that Moscow offered the impoverished Cental Asian state in February, the source said.

The moves boost Russia’s hand in Kyrgyzstan just days after Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev signed an accord allowing the United States to keep using an airbase in the country to support operations in Afghanistan.

“Kyrgyzstan will give Russia control over an array of defence sites in exchange for the two-billion-dollar credit. The sides also agreed on the opening in Osh of a second CSTO military base,” the source said.

The source specified that Russia would gain control over the Dastan torpedo factory on Kyrgyzstan’s Lake Issyk-Kul, a former top-secret Soviet base that supplies equipment to the Russian navy.

The agreements were concluded after a high-level Russian delegation led by Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin visited Kyrgyzstan on Tuesday.

Also on Tuesday, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev signed an agreement allowing the United States to continue using the Manas airbase outside Bishkek.

The Kyrgyz-US agreement — which renames Manas a “transit centre” and raises the rent that Washington pays for its use — effectively reversed a decision from February in which Bishek ordered US forces to quit the base.

Last winter’s decision to force the United States to leave Manas was widely believed to have been masterminded by Russia, which had long been uncomfortable about the presence of US troops in ex-Soviet Central Asia.

If Moscow opens a new base in Osh, it would be the second Russian base in Kyrgyzstan, after the Kant airbase outside Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the world to house both Russian and US bases.

The CSTO comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

RUSSIA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN TAJIKISTAN TO BE LEGALIZED AND DILUTED

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Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 1 Issue: 100

October 5, 2004 08:00 PM Age: 5 yrs

Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Central Asia, Tajikistan

By: Vladimir Socor

Russian President Vladimir Putin's official visit to Tajikistan, originally due earlier this year, rescheduled for the first half of September and then for October 4-5, is now expected in the second half of October (Avesta, October 1). Differences over both substance and details on four main issues have held up the visit. Those issues are: arrangements for protecting the Tajik-Afghan border, use of the Nurek radar facility, the status of Russian army troops in Tajikistan, and the legal status of Tajik migrants in Russia.

 

Tajikistan insists that Russia pay rent and associated costs for using the "Okno" space-surveillance center at Nurek (southeast of Dushanbe). The center's construction has recently been completed after a decade-long standstill. The Russian side complains that Tajikistan does not recognize the validity of a 1994 bilateral agreement whereby the installation was to have been handed over to Russia for use gratis. A new agreement now being drafted envisages that Tajikistan would be compensated through deep cuts in its debt arrears to Russia. In Moscow, the Finance Ministry is raising objections. But the Russian military deems the Nurek radar irreplaceable and proposes to accommodate Tajikistan on financial issues. According to Lieut.-General Vladimir Popovkin, Commander of Russia's Space Forces, "We simply have no other place to go. Russia's territory does not have such high mountains and such a clean atmosphere" (Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, October 4).

 

From September 29 to October 4 the deputy commander of Russia's border troops, Lieut.-General Alexander Manilov, led a delegation to Dushanbe for negotiations over the scope and pace of transferring the responsibility for guarding the Tajik-Afghan border from Russian to Tajik troops. In April of this year, negotiators had seemed on the verge of agreeing on a two-year transfer process; but in June Putin prevailed on Tajikistan's President Imomali Rahmonov to hold up the transfer, pending a review of its terms. Manilov's visit to Dushanbe seems to have put the process on track again.

 

The sides have drafted an agreement on the "mechanism and details of the handover of border sections from the Russian to the Tajik [troops]." Under the document, Russia's border troops will retain an operational group (liaison mission) in Tajikistan, train Tajik border troop officers, and provide Tajik border troops with "modern technical equipment meeting international standards" (a questionable proposition, as Russia itself needs such equipment). The draft is being submitted for the presidents' approval. If they sign it during Putin's expected visit, the handover would proceed section by section from east to west along the Tajik-Afghan border. The Ishkoshim, Khorug, and Kala-i Khum border detachments would in that case be handed over by the end of 2004. According to the Tajik communique, the Dushanbe talks were held "in an atmosphere of mutual understanding," and Manilov "at his request" was received by the Tajik border troops' commander afterward. Such formulations are usually employed to hint at difficulties in negotiations (Asia-Plus, October 1; Dushanbe Radio, October 4).

 

Since 199 Dushanbe has agreed in principle to confer basing rights on Russia's 201st motorized-rifle division, mainly stationed in the Dushanbe area and in southwestern Tajikistan. Touted a few years ago as one of Russia's high-readiness units, reinforced with armor, aviation, and other elements that augmented its total personnel to 11,000 (well above division size) and manned entirely by contract soldiers, the 201st division looks far weaker today. Its manpower was reported at 8,000 (standard division size) last year, and is currently reported at 5,000. Moreover, the division has switched from all-contract to mixed-manning enrollment, due to low military pay that necessitates using conscripts. The troop rotation currently underway is bringing more than 1,000 conscripts from Russia into this division. (Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, October 4).

 

This presence of this force in Tajikistan has lacked legal status even by Russian legal standards since its "CIS peacekeeping mission" was officially terminated in 1999. A status-of-forces agreement, signed in that year by Rahmonov with Russia's then-president Boris Yeltsin, has not been ratified and is being renegotiated. Tajikistan seeks a significant say regarding base operations, movements of Russian troops, and their use in various contingencies. It also wants satisfaction on financial compensation and property issues arising from the Russian military's use of Tajikistan's land and infrastructure.

 

For its part, Moscow pressures Tajikistan on this issue by withholding agreement on the legal status of Tajik labor migrants in Russia, whose remittances are critical to Tajikistan's economy. Tajikistan wants a long-term agreement that would ensure visa-free travel to Russia for Tajik workers, their legal rights and access to social guarantees in Russia, and at least a measure of protection from widespread abuse and depredation by Russian police. This issue is a chronic irritant in Tajikistan-Russia relations at all levels. A Russian-Tajik working group failed in September to work out an agreement on this issue in time for Putin's then-expected visit (Asia-Plus, October 5).

TAJIK BORDER GUARDS TAKING OVER THE TAJIK-AFGHAN BORDER

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Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 1 Issue: 128

November 15, 2004 07:00 PM Age: 5 yrs

Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Central Asia, Tajikistan

By: Vladimir Socor

On November 16, Russian border troops began the handover of sections of the Tajik-Afghan border to Tajikistan's border guards. The handover is regulated by the intergovernmental agreements on Cooperation on Border Protection and On Procedures for the Transfer of Border Units and their Property, signed on October 16 during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Tajikistan. The transfer, due to be completed by mid-2006, will proceed sector-by-sector from east to west along the 1,400 kilometer border.

 

Tajikistan is due to take over the Ishkoshim, Khorug, and Kala-i Khum border sectors and the eponymous troop detachments by mid-December. In each of them, a checkpoint is scheduled to be opened this month for cross-border travel and trade with Afghanistan's districts opposite. These three sectors make up the border's Pamir stretch, which accounts for more than half of the total length of the Tajik-Afghan border. A 70 kilometer, relatively safe section of the Pamir border had been handed over by Russian to Tajik border troops two years ago as an experiment, which proved satisfactory.

 

The remaining border sectors and corresponding troop detachments, Moskva and Panj, are scheduled to pass from Russian into Tajik hands in late 2005 and by the summer of 2006, respectively.

 

The transfer process seems well planned and orderly. A Russian-Tajik Joint Commission for Border Handover, co-chaired by Maj.-Generals Valery Rubyanin and Nuralisho Nazarov, chiefs of staff respectively of Russian border troops in Tajikistan and of Tajik border guards, is overseeing the ongoing transfer in the three Pamir sectors. Russian border troops are handing all fixed and movable assets, including surveillance equipment, arms, and ammunition, to the Tajik border guards. Some Russian officers are staying on with Tajik units as advisors. Moreover, Russia's Border Troop Service is retaining an Operational Group -- in essence, a liaison and assistance mission -- in Tajikistan for a transitional period.

 

The border detachments now being handed over consist largely of Tajik enlisted ranks that were serving mostly under Russian officers in the Russian-flagged border units. With the upper ranks mainly Russian and lower ranks overwhelmingly Tajik, those units are now being re-flagged Tajik, without dramatic changes in personnel, while some of their Tajik personnel are moving up to warrant officer and officer rank. Several units of Tajikistan's Defense Ministry are being placed under the State Border Protection Committee's command and deploying alongside the border guards.

 

The Deputy Head of Russia's Border Troop Service, Lt.-General Alexander Manilov, is overseeing the start of the process on-site. In remarks quoted by Tajik media, Manilov is expressing confidence that Tajik border guards will generally be up to the task, assuming that the situation in northern Afghanistan remains stable. Indeed the Afghan districts opposite the Pamir border are under the control of Afghan Tajiks friendly toward Russia. By the same token, on the strength of that relationship, Afghan Tajik commanders profit massively from the cross-border drug trade, posing major challenges to the Russian border troops and, henceforth, their Tajik successors.

 

In what looks like a last-minute move to complicate the transfer, Russia's Audit Chamber issued a report on November 9, claiming a shortfall of 263 million rubles (nearly $10 million) in Tajikistan's financing of Russian border troops as of June 2004. Under bilateral agreements, Dushanbe was obligated to defray 50% of the operating costs of Russian border troops in Tajikistan. Russia's Audit Chamber has officially referred the issue to the cabinet of ministers, Finance Ministry, Federal Security Service (which has the border troops under its jurisdiction), and both chambers of the Russian parliament for possible action. Some in Moscow blame General Andrei Nikolayev, former commander of Russia's border troops and currently a presidential aide, for inspiring the decision to hand over the border protection to Tajikistan as a cost-cutting measure. (Itar-Tass, November 9; WPS Defense and Security, November 15).

 

Western assistance to Tajik border guards seems likely to materialize. On November 10, Lt.-General Lance Smith, deputy commander of the U.S. Central Command, held talks with Tajik State Border Protection Committee chiefs in Dushanbe and offered U.S. assistance. Several French warplanes, based at Dushanbe airport, are temporarily reconnoitering Afghan territory.

 

The incipient withdrawal of Russian border troops from Tajikistan leaves Armenia as the only post-Soviet country where Russian border troops are in charge of the border by agreement with the host government. Russian troops are stationed unlawfully on the Georgian side of the Abkhaz and Ossetian sectors of the Russia-Georgia border, against Georgia's will.

 

(Interfax, Khovar, Asia-Plus, Avesta, Tajik Television First Channel, November 10-15; see EDM, October 19).

RUSSIAN FORCES IN TAJIKISTAN: A PERMANENT PRESENCE?



By Stephen Blank (06/16/2004 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: By March 2004 it seemed clear that Russian troops and advisors were going to leave Tajikistan. Yet it also seemed that Tajik-Russian relations were good and improving. Key Tajik officials certainly made public statements to that fact and did so even into May, even granting the necessity of a base for Russian forces there. Nevertheless on March 1 the Tajik and Kazakh governments signed an agreement creating a basis for deepening cooperation between them as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. This agreement occurred during a time when Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rakhmonov decisively moved against some of his own military advisors to begin reforming the Tajik armed forces with evident Russian and NATO support. Three days later, it was revealed that talks with Russia over a new base were deadlocked. Tajikistan wanted complete operational command control over this base and its infrastructure during times of threat. It also wanted what Russian authorities claimed were exorbitant financial payments for leasing the base, or the writing off of Tajikistan’s debt to Russia. For its part, Russia wanted a base not just for the 201st division and the FSB troops on the border but also to protect the “Nurek” space complex as part of its space and missile defense systems. And it certainly did not want to pay for these privileges. Even so, its desire for the base gave Tajikistan some leverage.

The Russian forces in Tajikistan are being reorganized to form part of the broader forces of the new Russian-led Collective Treaty Security Organization (CSTO) in Central Asia. Nonetheless, this amenability did not lead to resolution of the financial or status of forces issues surrounding the 201st division or the Nurek facility and the new base that Russia wanted to build.

By early May, Tajikistan had decided to send Russian military advisors home and was exploring new ways to defend the border including the phasing out of Russian troops. Tajikistan was demanding that Russia assume Tajikistan’s $300 million debts, pay another $50 million for Nurek, and grant Rakhmonov emergency command over the 201st division in an emergency. Although this decision reflected Tajikistan’s greater sense of security than at any time in the past, Russian officials and commanders immediately complained that the Tajiks could not defend the border against narcotics like they could or maintain the infrastructure they had built and launched a press campaign to that effect. Since there had been numerous scandals involving Russian troops themselves moving large amounts of narcotics to Russia, for example shipping drugs in military transports from Tajikistan, this argument is suspect and might conceal the usual reluctance of the Russian military establishment to yield any of the remaining “wrecks of empire” that it still owns. Given the neo-imperial mentality that dominates the Ministry of Defense and the Russian political elite, this motive seems to be equally as important as more practical, tactical, considerations. Russia’s unhappiness quickly expressed itself in a crackdown on Tajik migrant workers, whose remittances home are vital to Tajikistan’s economy.

At the same time Tajikistan was establishing highly improved relations with Washington, including signing the agreement that gave U.S. soldiers immunity from the International Criminal Court. India too established a base in Tajikistan. All these actions indicate Tajikistan’ increasingly open efforts to move away from dependence upon Moscow and Russia\'s ire over this turn of events.

IMPLICATIONS: Russian reports were contradictory, some saying a retreat was taking place and other officials contradicting this and saying that a tactical group would be placed in Tajikistan. Thus matters continued until the announcement of June 4 which apparently represents Tajikistan’s surrender to Russian pressure. It appears that Russia successfully prevailed here by assuming some of Tajikistan’s debts and will invest in Tajikistan’s energy sector, particularly the Sangtuda hydroelectric station. As long as Tajikistan continues to invest in this project, Russia will suspend its interest payments but when the project is finished Russia will own part of it through the UES monopoly, another example of the liberal empire program sponsored by UES chairman Anatoly Chubais. It also conforms to Russia’s established practice of taking equity in key sectors in return for CIS countries’ debts. What made Tajikistan change its mind is not clear, but it is unlikely that it would have abandoned its earlier position so completely without such pressures being employed. Thus Russia will retain its military presence there and continue in its accelerating efforts to make the CSTO into a viable military force and representative of Russian interests in Central Asia.

These events reveal many key aspects of the ongoing great game in Central Asia. First, regardless of protestations of win-win or mutual benefit, Russia regards the area as an exclusive sphere of influence, especially in military terms. Thus in the same interview that he lamented that Russia was leaving Tajikistan, Deputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov forcefully reiterated Russia\'s opposition to any foreign military presence in Central Asia. Second, Moscow will not hesitate to use all the instruments of power to achieve that goal. Today that largely means economic pressures such as debt for equity swaps but it could increasingly mean military ones as well. Third, Russian actions evidently confirm American reports in testimony to Congress by the heads of the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency that Russia now knows where it wants to deploy its military and is moving to do so. Fourth, Russia’s sense of threat from foreign influence in Central Asia is overwhelming and will probably preclude efforts to arrive at multilateral cooperation there. Fifth, while this rivalry creates opportunities for Central Asian governments to play off rival great powers, it also could lead to heavy-handed efforts to pressure them into acquiescence in agreements contrary to their interests. This would especially pertain to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two most vulnerable states to foreign pressure.

CONCLUSIONS: By inference, these events underscore the importance for the United States, if it wishes to maintain its presence in the region, to develop appropriate instruments for training and development of indigenous military forces from among Central Asian governments so that they do not have to look to Moscow for help. The same principle applies to economic policies because these states are and will long remain vulnerable to foreign economic pressure, particularly if they do not begin to undertake serious economic and political reforms that can only strengthen their own independence and sovereignty – the stated goals of U.S. policy – over the long run.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War college, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.

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