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West Coast PublishingSurveillance 2015AffirmativeEdited by Jim HansonResearchersAdam McKibben, Ben Menzies, Eric Robinson, Greta Stahl, Jonathan Barsky, Jonathan Shane, Kendra Doty, Matt Stannard, William James TaylorThanks for using our Policy, LD, Public Forum, and Extemp Materials.Please don’t share this material with anyone outside of your schoolincluding via print, email, dropbox, google drive, the web, etc. We’re a small non-profit; please help us continue to provide our products.Contact us at jim@ Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance.AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE FILE INTROSURVEILLANCE 2015-2016WEST COAST AFFIRMATIVEResolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance.Finding Arguments in this FileUse the table of contents on the next pages to find the evidence you need or the navigation bar on the left. We have tried to make the table of contents as easy to use as possible. 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TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance. PAGEREF _Toc420923692 \h 2AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE FILE INTRO PAGEREF _Toc420923693 \h 3SURVEILLANCE TOPIC OVERVIEW PAGEREF _Toc420923694 \h 14Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance. PAGEREF _Toc420923695 \h 15Affirmative Strategies PAGEREF _Toc420923696 \h 18Negative Strategies PAGEREF _Toc420923697 \h 21CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACTS AFFIRMATIVE PAGEREF _Toc420923698 \h 24Civil liberties key to democracy PAGEREF _Toc420923699 \h 25Civil liberties key to the economy PAGEREF _Toc420923700 \h 28Utilitarian civil liberties bad PAGEREF _Toc420923701 \h 30Answer to public health PAGEREF _Toc420923702 \h 31Answer to terrorism PAGEREF _Toc420923703 \h 33Answer to violations of liberties lead to rights PAGEREF _Toc420923704 \h 35Answer to only affects criminals PAGEREF _Toc420923705 \h 37CODIS AFFIRMATIVE PAGEREF _Toc420923706 \h 38Codis 1AC PAGEREF _Toc420923707 \h 391AC PAGEREF _Toc420923708 \h 431AC PAGEREF _Toc420923709 \h 441AC PAGEREF _Toc420923710 \h 45Privacy Advantage Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923711 \h 46General privacy Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923712 \h 47CODIS is a slippery slope PAGEREF _Toc420923713 \h 48CODIS is a slippery slope PAGEREF _Toc420923714 \h 50CODIS is a slippery slope PAGEREF _Toc420923715 \h 51Minority Report Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923716 \h 52Minority Report Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923717 \h 54Jim Crow Advantage Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923718 \h 55African Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODIS PAGEREF _Toc420923719 \h 56African Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODIS PAGEREF _Toc420923720 \h 58Familial targeting bad / expanding now PAGEREF _Toc420923721 \h 59Familial targeting bad / genetic discrimination PAGEREF _Toc420923722 \h 60Racism Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923723 \h 61Topicality Answers PAGEREF _Toc420923724 \h 63The national database system (CODIS) is a federal collection of DNA PAGEREF _Toc420923725 \h 64The national database system (CODIS) is a federal collection of DNA PAGEREF _Toc420923726 \h 65A2: Crime Disadvantage PAGEREF _Toc420923727 \h 66Non-Unique – Crime is high now PAGEREF _Toc420923728 \h 67Link Turn – We reduce the backlog PAGEREF _Toc420923729 \h 68A2: Politics PAGEREF _Toc420923730 \h 69General Case Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923731 \h 70Solvency PAGEREF _Toc420923732 \h 71Inherency Extension – No restrictions now / national database coming PAGEREF _Toc420923733 \h 72Inherency Extension – CODIS expanding now PAGEREF _Toc420923734 \h 73Inherency Extension – Maryland v. King PAGEREF _Toc420923735 \h 75Inherency Extension – Maryland v. King PAGEREF _Toc420923736 \h 76A2: DNA collection good / like fingerprinting PAGEREF _Toc420923737 \h 77A2: DNA collection good / fake DNA PAGEREF _Toc420923738 \h 78A2: DNA collection good / exonerates the innocent PAGEREF _Toc420923739 \h 79DRONE SURVEILLANCE AFFIRMATIVE PAGEREF _Toc420923740 \h 80Drone Surveillance Aff 1AC PAGEREF _Toc420923741 \h 81Solvency PAGEREF _Toc420923742 \h 82Advantage One: Accidents PAGEREF _Toc420923743 \h 83Advantage Two: Militarization PAGEREF _Toc420923744 \h 86Drone Surveillance Aff Extensions PAGEREF _Toc420923745 \h 89Inherency PAGEREF _Toc420923746 \h 90Solvency PAGEREF _Toc420923747 \h 93Accidents Advantage PAGEREF _Toc420923748 \h 96Harms PAGEREF _Toc420923749 \h 97Impacts PAGEREF _Toc420923750 \h 101Militarization Advantage PAGEREF _Toc420923751 \h 103Harms PAGEREF _Toc420923752 \h 104Links PAGEREF _Toc420923753 \h 107Impacts PAGEREF _Toc420923754 \h 109Privacy Advantage PAGEREF _Toc420923755 \h 1121AC Module PAGEREF _Toc420923756 \h 113Harms PAGEREF _Toc420923757 \h 115Impacts PAGEREF _Toc420923758 \h 116AT: Neg Offense PAGEREF _Toc420923759 \h 117AT: Terrorism DA PAGEREF _Toc420923760 \h 118AT: Politics DA PAGEREF _Toc420923761 \h 120AT: States CP PAGEREF _Toc420923762 \h 122AT: Gendered Language K PAGEREF _Toc420923763 \h 123EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 AFFIRMATIVE PAGEREF _Toc420923764 \h 125Thesis PAGEREF _Toc420923765 \h 1261AC PAGEREF _Toc420923766 \h 1271AC PAGEREF _Toc420923767 \h 1281AC PAGEREF _Toc420923768 \h 1291AC PAGEREF _Toc420923769 \h 1301AC PAGEREF _Toc420923770 \h 1311AC PAGEREF _Toc420923771 \h 132Topicality: Domestic Surveillance PAGEREF _Toc420923772 \h 133Curtail PAGEREF _Toc420923773 \h 134Substantially PAGEREF _Toc420923774 \h 135Solvency: 12333 Should Be Overturned PAGEREF _Toc420923775 \h 136Solvency: Congress Can Overturn Executive Orders PAGEREF _Toc420923776 \h 137Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of Citizens PAGEREF _Toc420923777 \h 138Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of Citizens PAGEREF _Toc420923778 \h 139Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of Citizens PAGEREF _Toc420923779 \h 140Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of Citizens PAGEREF _Toc420923780 \h 141Inherency: Won’t Be Overturned and Gives Unlimited Power PAGEREF _Toc420923781 \h 142Inherency: No Oversight PAGEREF _Toc420923782 \h 143Surveillance Totalitarianism Impact Scenarios PAGEREF _Toc420923783 \h 144Surveillance Totalitarianism Extensions PAGEREF _Toc420923784 \h 145Totalitarianism Impacts PAGEREF _Toc420923785 \h 146Totalitarianism Impacts PAGEREF _Toc420923786 \h 147Terrorism Disadvantage Answers PAGEREF _Toc420923787 \h 148Terrorism Disadvantage Answers PAGEREF _Toc420923788 \h 149Executive Order 12333 Undermines Separation of Powers PAGEREF _Toc420923789 \h 150Executive Order 12333 Undermines Separation of Powers PAGEREF _Toc420923790 \h 151Executive Order 12333 Undermines Separation of Powers PAGEREF _Toc420923791 \h 152Separation of Powers Impacts PAGEREF _Toc420923792 \h 153Separation of Powers Impacts PAGEREF _Toc420923793 \h 154Answers to Supreme Court Counterplan PAGEREF _Toc420923794 \h 155Answers to Supreme Court Counterplan PAGEREF _Toc420923795 \h 156Answers to Supreme Court Counterplan PAGEREF _Toc420923796 \h 157General Kritik Answers: Mass Surveillance Undermines Alternative PAGEREF _Toc420923797 \h 158MUSLIM SURVEILLANCE AFFIRMATIVE PAGEREF _Toc420923798 \h 159Muslim Surveillance 1AC PAGEREF _Toc420923799 \h 1601AC PAGEREF _Toc420923800 \h 1611AC PAGEREF _Toc420923801 \h 1621AC PAGEREF _Toc420923802 \h 1641AC PAGEREF _Toc420923803 \h 1661AC PAGEREF _Toc420923804 \h 169Affirmative Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923805 \h 170State and local law enforcement follows the FBI lead PAGEREF _Toc420923806 \h 171SQ does not protect Muslim rights / Inherency PAGEREF _Toc420923807 \h 172A2: FBI good PAGEREF _Toc420923808 \h 173A2: FBI good PAGEREF _Toc420923809 \h 174Radicalization theories are wrong PAGEREF _Toc420923810 \h 175Pre-emptive prosecutions / provocation bad PAGEREF _Toc420923811 \h 177Pre-emptive prosecutions / provocation bad PAGEREF _Toc420923812 \h 178Pre-emptive prosecutions / provocation bad PAGEREF _Toc420923813 \h 179A2: Community partnerships PAGEREF _Toc420923814 \h 180Informants bad / coercion PAGEREF _Toc420923815 \h 181Informants bad / coercion PAGEREF _Toc420923816 \h 182FBI manufactures Muslim “Terrorists” PAGEREF _Toc420923817 \h 183FBI manufactures Muslim “Terrorists” PAGEREF _Toc420923818 \h 184FBI manufactures Muslim “Terrorists” PAGEREF _Toc420923819 \h 185Solvency Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923820 \h 186Solvency Extension PAGEREF _Toc420923821 \h 188Racism / Whiteness internals PAGEREF _Toc420923822 \h 189Racism / Orientalism internals PAGEREF _Toc420923823 \h 191Islamophobia internals PAGEREF _Toc420923824 \h 192Islamophobia internals PAGEREF _Toc420923825 \h 193Islamophobia – Orientalism internal links PAGEREF _Toc420923826 \h 1941st Amendment / Freedom internal links PAGEREF _Toc420923827 \h 1951st Amendment / Freedom internal links PAGEREF _Toc420923828 \h 196A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (radicalization) PAGEREF _Toc420923829 \h 197A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (mistrust) PAGEREF _Toc420923830 \h 198A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (ineffective) PAGEREF _Toc420923831 \h 199A2: Terrorism is real / threat PAGEREF _Toc420923832 \h 200A2: Lone Wolf Terrorism PAGEREF _Toc420923833 \h 202A2: Liberalism Good PAGEREF _Toc420923834 \h 203SOCIAL JUSTICE AFFIRMATIVE PAGEREF _Toc420923835 \h 204Social Justice 1AC PAGEREF _Toc420923836 \h 205Inherency PAGEREF _Toc420923837 \h 206Advantage 1: Racism PAGEREF _Toc420923838 \h 208Advantage 2: Poverty PAGEREF _Toc420923839 \h 211Solvency PAGEREF _Toc420923840 \h 2152AC Extensions PAGEREF _Toc420923841 \h 217Inherency PAGEREF _Toc420923842 \h 218Solvency PAGEREF _Toc420923843 \h 220Institutional engagement key PAGEREF _Toc420923844 \h 222Debate key PAGEREF _Toc420923845 \h 223Racism PAGEREF _Toc420923846 \h 225Police = racist PAGEREF _Toc420923847 \h 226NSA = racist PAGEREF _Toc420923848 \h 228Predictive Policing bad PAGEREF _Toc420923849 \h 230AT: Body cameras PAGEREF _Toc420923850 \h 233R/C Terrorism PAGEREF _Toc420923851 \h 234Psychology impact PAGEREF _Toc420923852 \h 235Poverty PAGEREF _Toc420923853 \h 236Add ons PAGEREF _Toc420923854 \h 239Democracy PAGEREF _Toc420923855 \h 240Immigration PAGEREF _Toc420923856 \h 241Imperialism PAGEREF _Toc420923857 \h 243Terrorism PAGEREF _Toc420923858 \h 2442AC Answers PAGEREF _Toc420923859 \h 246T: Domestic Surveillance PAGEREF _Toc420923860 \h 247XO CP PAGEREF _Toc420923861 \h 248Courts CP PAGEREF _Toc420923862 \h 249State Bad K PAGEREF _Toc420923863 \h 250Fem K PAGEREF _Toc420923864 \h 251Cap K PAGEREF _Toc420923865 \h 252Post-modernism K PAGEREF _Toc420923866 \h 254Schmitt K PAGEREF _Toc420923867 \h 255Terrorism DA PAGEREF _Toc420923868 \h 256AT: “National Security Outweighs” PAGEREF _Toc420923869 \h 260Surveillance not effective PAGEREF _Toc420923870 \h 265AT: Guidelines PAGEREF _Toc420923871 \h 267COURTS COUNTERPLAN RESPONSES PAGEREF _Toc420923872 \h 268Permutation Solvency PAGEREF _Toc420923873 \h 269Permutation Solvency PAGEREF _Toc420923874 \h 270Legitimacy Turns PAGEREF _Toc420923875 \h 271Courts Ineffective in Checking Executive PAGEREF _Toc420923876 \h 272Counterplan Leads to Judicial Activism PAGEREF _Toc420923877 \h 273Counterplan Leads to Judicial Activism PAGEREF _Toc420923878 \h 274Legislature is Better than the Courts PAGEREF _Toc420923879 \h 275Counterplan Links to Politics Disadvantage PAGEREF _Toc420923880 \h 276Counterplan Links to Politics Disadvantage PAGEREF _Toc420923881 \h 277Court Stripping Turn PAGEREF _Toc420923882 \h 278Answers to Separation of powers PAGEREF _Toc420923883 \h 279Answers to Deliberation PAGEREF _Toc420923884 \h 280EXECUTIVE ORDER COUNTERPLAN RESPONSES PAGEREF _Toc420923885 \h 2822AC Perm – Do Both PAGEREF _Toc420923886 \h 2832AC Perm – Do the CP PAGEREF _Toc420923887 \h 2842AC Executive Rollback PAGEREF _Toc420923888 \h 2852AC Legislative Rollback PAGEREF _Toc420923889 \h 2862AC Agency Rollback PAGEREF _Toc420923890 \h 2872AC Judicial Rollback PAGEREF _Toc420923891 \h 2882AC Perception + Executive Rollback PAGEREF _Toc420923892 \h 2892AC Links to Politics PAGEREF _Toc420923893 \h 2902AC Links to Politics – Links to Elections PAGEREF _Toc420923894 \h 2912AC Tyranny DA PAGEREF _Toc420923895 \h 292Executive Rollback PAGEREF _Toc420923896 \h 293Legislative Rollback PAGEREF _Toc420923897 \h 295Agency Rollback PAGEREF _Toc420923898 \h 296Links to Politics PAGEREF _Toc420923899 \h 298Tyranny DA PAGEREF _Toc420923900 \h 302CRIME DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES PAGEREF _Toc420923901 \h 303No Uniqueness PAGEREF _Toc420923902 \h 304UQ—Will Expire Now PAGEREF _Toc420923903 \h 305UQ—Will Expire Now PAGEREF _Toc420923904 \h 306UQ—Will Expire Now PAGEREF _Toc420923905 \h 307No Link PAGEREF _Toc420923906 \h 308Link Defense—Crime Alt Causes PAGEREF _Toc420923907 \h 309Terrorism PAGEREF _Toc420923908 \h 310Doesn’t Prevent Crime PAGEREF _Toc420923909 \h 311Doesn’t Prevent Crime PAGEREF _Toc420923910 \h 312Doesn’t Prevent Crime PAGEREF _Toc420923911 \h 313No Int. Link PAGEREF _Toc420923912 \h 314No Data Analysis PAGEREF _Toc420923913 \h 315No Information Shortage PAGEREF _Toc420923914 \h 316No Information Shortage PAGEREF _Toc420923915 \h 317Link Turn PAGEREF _Toc420923916 \h 318Information Overload PAGEREF _Toc420923917 \h 319Information Overload PAGEREF _Toc420923918 \h 320Information Overload PAGEREF _Toc420923919 \h 321Impact Turns PAGEREF _Toc420923920 \h 322Freedom First—Prior Question PAGEREF _Toc420923921 \h 323Crushes Freedom—Surveillance Specific PAGEREF _Toc420923922 \h 324Crushes Freedom—Surveillance Specific PAGEREF _Toc420923923 \h 325Crushes Democracy PAGEREF _Toc420923924 \h 326Crushes Democracy PAGEREF _Toc420923925 \h 327Crushes Freedom of Speech PAGEREF _Toc420923926 \h 328Surveillance is Racist—Arabs/ Muslims PAGEREF _Toc420923927 \h 329Surveillance is Racist—African Americans PAGEREF _Toc420923928 \h 330Liberty Good—Vulnerable Populations PAGEREF _Toc420923929 \h 331Liberty Good—Privacy PAGEREF _Toc420923930 \h 332General—Laundry List PAGEREF _Toc420923931 \h 333Other Aff Answers PAGEREF _Toc420923932 \h 334Yes Abuse—Burden of Proof PAGEREF _Toc420923933 \h 335Yes Abuse PAGEREF _Toc420923934 \h 336Yes Abuse PAGEREF _Toc420923935 \h 337Parallel Construction Bad—Wrong PAGEREF _Toc420923936 \h 338Parallel Construction Bad—Illegal PAGEREF _Toc420923937 \h 339CYBERWAR DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES PAGEREF _Toc420923938 \h 340Cybersecurity Down – Snowden PAGEREF _Toc420923939 \h 341Cybersecurity Down – Generic PAGEREF _Toc420923940 \h 343Cybersecurity Down – Tech Investment PAGEREF _Toc420923941 \h 344Cybersecurity Down – Financial Incentives PAGEREF _Toc420923942 \h 345Link Turn – Surveillance Hurts Cybersecurity PAGEREF _Toc420923943 \h 346Link Turn – Surveillance Hurts Cybersecurity PAGEREF _Toc420923944 \h 347No Link – Private Sector Solves PAGEREF _Toc420923945 \h 348No Cyberwar PAGEREF _Toc420923946 \h 349No Cyberwar PAGEREF _Toc420923947 \h 350AT: Accidental War PAGEREF _Toc420923948 \h 351AT: China War PAGEREF _Toc420923949 \h 353AT: Iran War PAGEREF _Toc420923950 \h 354AT: Iran War PAGEREF _Toc420923951 \h 355No Link PAGEREF _Toc420923952 \h 356PRESIDENTIAL POWERS DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES PAGEREF _Toc420923953 \h 357UQ PAGEREF _Toc420923954 \h 358NU – Obama Won’t Act PAGEREF _Toc420923955 \h 359NU – AUMF Thumper PAGEREF _Toc420923956 \h 360NU – Syria Thumper PAGEREF _Toc420923957 \h 361NU – Congressional Restrictions PAGEREF _Toc420923958 \h 362NU – Court Restrictions PAGEREF _Toc420923959 \h 363Links PAGEREF _Toc420923960 \h 364No Spillover PAGEREF _Toc420923961 \h 365No Link – Congress PAGEREF _Toc420923962 \h 366Link Turn + No Spillover – Congress PAGEREF _Toc420923963 \h 367Link Turn + No Spillover – Courts PAGEREF _Toc420923964 \h 369No Link – Personality PAGEREF _Toc420923965 \h 370MPX PAGEREF _Toc420923966 \h 371AT: Cred – No MPX PAGEREF _Toc420923967 \h 372AT: Cred – AT: Heg – No MPX PAGEREF _Toc420923968 \h 374AT: Cred – AT: Arctic War – No MPX PAGEREF _Toc420923969 \h 375AT: Cred – Sequester Thumps PAGEREF _Toc420923970 \h 376AT: Cred – Shutdown Thumps PAGEREF _Toc420923971 \h 377AT: Econ – No MPX PAGEREF _Toc420923972 \h 378AT: Terror – No MPX PAGEREF _Toc420923973 \h 379No MPX + MPX Turn – Unilaterial Wars PAGEREF _Toc420923974 \h 380MPX Turn – Unilateral Wars PAGEREF _Toc420923975 \h 381TERRORISM DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES PAGEREF _Toc420923976 \h 382No Link – Surveillance Not Key PAGEREF _Toc420923977 \h 383No Link – Alternatives Solve PAGEREF _Toc420923978 \h 385Link Turn – Electronic Surveillance Trades Off with Intelligence PAGEREF _Toc420923979 \h 387Link Turn – Surveillance Enables Cyberterrorism PAGEREF _Toc420923980 \h 389No Impact – Cyber Security PAGEREF _Toc420923981 \h 390No Impact – Terrorism PAGEREF _Toc420923982 \h 391No Impact - Nuke Terror PAGEREF _Toc420923983 \h 393No Impact - Bio Terror PAGEREF _Toc420923984 \h 394No Impact – Cross Border Terror PAGEREF _Toc420923985 \h 395No Impact - ISIS PAGEREF _Toc420923986 \h 396No Impact - Al-Qaeda PAGEREF _Toc420923987 \h 397BIOPOWER KRITIK RESPONSES PAGEREF _Toc420923988 \h 398Biopower good PAGEREF _Toc420923989 \h 399Biopower inevitable PAGEREF _Toc420923990 \h 402State inevitable PAGEREF _Toc420923991 \h 404No Link—negative state action PAGEREF _Toc420923992 \h 405Permutation PAGEREF _Toc420923993 \h 407Feminism aff PAGEREF _Toc420923994 \h 411Policing aff PAGEREF _Toc420923995 \h 412Impacts PAGEREF _Toc420923996 \h 413AT: Bare life PAGEREF _Toc420923997 \h 414Alternative PAGEREF _Toc420923998 \h 415Solvency—Engagement key PAGEREF _Toc420923999 \h 417Solvency—History Key PAGEREF _Toc420924000 \h 421Solvency—No public support PAGEREF _Toc420924001 \h 422Framework PAGEREF _Toc420924002 \h 423Utilitarianism PAGEREF _Toc420924003 \h 424AT: Rights bad PAGEREF _Toc420924004 \h 425AT: Subjectivity PAGEREF _Toc420924005 \h 426AT: Disability Module PAGEREF _Toc420924006 \h 427AT: Charismatic Leader PAGEREF _Toc420924007 \h 428PRIVACY KRITIK RESPONSES PAGEREF _Toc420924008 \h 429Permutations PAGEREF _Toc420924009 \h 430Permutation solvency PAGEREF _Toc420924010 \h 431Permutation solvency PAGEREF _Toc420924011 \h 432Link Answers / Turns PAGEREF _Toc420924012 \h 433No link – Legal reforms / Statism PAGEREF _Toc420924013 \h 434No link – Intellectual privacy PAGEREF _Toc420924014 \h 435Link /Internal link answers PAGEREF _Toc420924015 \h 436Link Turn / Aff is a pre-requisite PAGEREF _Toc420924016 \h 437Link turns / Permutation solvency PAGEREF _Toc420924017 \h 438Link turn / Permutation solvency - Intersectionality PAGEREF _Toc420924018 \h 439Link turns – Surveillance is patriarchal PAGEREF _Toc420924019 \h 440Alternative Answers PAGEREF _Toc420924020 \h 441Feminist criticism fails PAGEREF _Toc420924021 \h 442Legal reforms are key PAGEREF _Toc420924022 \h 443Impact Answers / Turns PAGEREF _Toc420924023 \h 444Agency/ Value to life PAGEREF _Toc420924024 \h 445Anti-surveillance/Privacy policies are good PAGEREF _Toc420924025 \h 446Anti-surveillance/Privacy policies are good PAGEREF _Toc420924026 \h 447The public/private dichotomy is good PAGEREF _Toc420924027 \h 448Democracy Turn – 2AC PAGEREF _Toc420924028 \h 449Democracy Extension PAGEREF _Toc420924029 \h 450SURVEILLANCE TOPIC OVERVIEWResolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance.Overview of WordsMany of the words in the resolution are fairly standard for policy debate resolutions, while the key phrase “domestic surveillance” contains specific, field-contextual meaning, with the potential to strictly limit the scope of the resolution. In this section, we will examine the words “substantially,” "curtail," “domestic” and “surveillance” (and examine the contextual definition of the two words together, “domestic surveillance”). Substantially “Substantially” exists to limit the scope of the resolution, but its inconsistent and generic definition set cuts against its limiting qualities. The word’s various quantitative definitions are inapplicable to any context but their original ones (a particular act, administrative order, court decision, etc.). On the other hand, the various qualitative definitions tend to be vacuous (important, critical to, etc.) without more exacting application. Of the qualitative definitions of “substantially,” two directions emerge: “to a great or significant extent” and “for the most part, essentially.” The first definition is next to useless, but the second may hold affirmatives to curtailing most domestic surveillance--at least over 50% if quantifiable, but articulating “more than half” is also possible qualitatively, descriptively. Overturning Executive Order 12333 is obviously substantial, since it foundationally justifies most mass data searching. Or do we even know what “most” would be? The secrecy itself, of domestic surveillance, may make it impossible to measure how “substantially” an affirmative curtails We don’t know how big the U.S. surveillance apparatus is today, either in terms of money and people or in terms of how many people are monitored or how much data is collected. Modern technology makes it possible to monitor vastly more people -- yesterday's NSA revelations demonstrate that they could easily surveil everyone -- than could ever be done manually.(Bruce Schneier, “What We Don't Know About Spying on Citizens: Scarier Than What We Know,” The Atlantic, June 6, 2013, )The lack of public information concerning the scope and extent of domestic surveillance makes it difficult to have a procedural debate on the parameters of domestic surveillance. CurtailThere are three categories of meaning for the word “curtail.” The first category worth noting is the necessity of a specific object of curtailment within the policy. In other words, rather than curtailing the program as a whole, affirmatives would have to curtail some component of the program: the funding, personnel and staff, some objective within the program. An example of such a definition would be the Government Accounting Office definition in this file, where “curtail” is specifically contextualized as meaning “reduction of budget authority.” This category of meaning is consistent with the way policymakers use the word. A program as a whole is “reduced” or “eliminated,” while components of the program are curtailed. Affirmatives can use this definition if they want to advocate fairly specific types of reductions in programs; doing so would limit negatives’ ability to find disadvantage links or counterplan ground, as well as limit their solvency arguments. Negatives, on the other hand, can run topicality violations distinguishing between curtailing components of a program and reducing or eliminating the general scope of the program. The second category of meaning of “curtail” is reduction, or cutting back, while the third category is “curtail as complete elimination.” The second category is more consistent with traditional usage of the word than the third; normally, curtail is distinct from elimination. However, at least one definition of curtail in our file is “to end something before it is finished,” which implies elimination. The distinction between these is very important for the division of ground. If an affirmative eliminates all or nearly all surveillance, meaning virtually no surveillance is left after the plan, this allows affirmatives to claim a great deal of solvency--possibly more than even the literature base assumes, since most authors writing about domestic surveillance assume that at least some surveillance (perhaps what they deem to be legitimate surveillance) will be left after the plan. On the other hand, curtailing some (but not eliminating all) surveillance may allow affirmatives to dodge terrorism or other disadvantages premised on the need for continued surveillance. This suggests that the decision by affirmatives as to how much surveillance to curtail might influence negative strategy in myriad ways. It also means negatives can deploy topicality arguments in either direction, depending on the parameters of affirmative curtailment.DomesticOne question about “domestic” is how much activity and information-gathering must take place within U.S. borders. Executive Order 12333, authorizing the collection of information on Americans traveling abroad, is probably considered “domestic” within the scope of most operational definitions, because the targets are U.S. citizens, and the information is processed by agents of the United States within the United States. However, because it’s collected from out-of-country locations, and (more importantly) because the data might incidentally include information about foreigners, an affirmative to curtail 12333 may be extra-topical. Debaters will face such dilemmas when negotiating the parameters of “domestic surveillance” on this topic. Definitions of “domestic” range from “relating to a particular country” (meaning the information need only relate to the U.S. and not be in the U.S.) to “originating in the United States” (presumably meaning that the activity being monitored must take place in the United States. This will be a debate about limits and ground. If negatives can demonstrate that they are at a strategic disadvantage against affirmatives whose surveillance arguments go beyond U.S. borders, then they can probably persuade critics to limit the scope of activity to the U.S.Two other things seem clear concerning the word “domestic.” First, surveillance of suspected foreign terrorists inside the United States would fall under the definition. Second, surveillance of suspected foreign terrorists abroad is not usually called domestic surveillance. This is clarified in a piece of evidence in this file from the Council on Foreign Relations, but it’s also intuitive—neither the target nor the activity are, in any way, domestic.SurveillanceContextually, surveillance is electronic, gathered for a purpose, typically to provide evidence of wrongdoing, and yields information that must be processed and analyzed in some way.Why is surveillance contextually electronic? This is mainly a function of the policy literature on the topic. Although the constitutional protection against unauthorized searches did not originally contemplate electronic searches, there is simply no relevant topic literature on non-electronic surveillance. The topic paper was written mainly with National Security Agency surveillance in mind and, although police surveillance for non-terrorist crimes, and even corporate/private surveillance may fall into the broad parameters of the resolution, there is little on-point literature on the large-scale societal harms of such surveillance. However, within the scope of electronic surveillance is included both direct and indirect information-gathering. Direct information gathering would occur when the NSA or accompanying agencies do wiretaps, data-mining, and other searches directly. Indirect surveillance would be those instances when the NSA and accompanying agencies collect data from private corporations, as when the NSA receives data from Verizon or other telecommunications companies and then analyzes that data. Negatives might make the topicality argument that only curtailing direct surveillance is resolutional, a debate likely resolved at the standards level.By now you may have noticed that “surveillance” carries very different meanings from dictionary to policy context. For another instance, prevention of bad acts seems intrinsic to the functional definitions of “surveillance.” This makes the word distinct from the kind of violations of privacy done by the corporate world in an effort to better understand consumer behavior. Thus, if a private company monitors your internet behavior, and the NSA monitors your internet behavior in the same fashion, it would be contextually accurate to call the NSA's behavior surveillance, but not the private company’s behavior. Domestic SurveillanceAdd the word “domestic” to “surveillance,” and the range of cases gets even more particular. The most limiting interpretations of “domestic surveillance” may well hold the resolution to ten or fewer topical plans. Why? First, because of the word “its” in the topic, which indicates possession of (that definition is in this file). Second, because domestic law enforcement agencies are unlikely to use the phrase “domestic surveillance” when referring to their own surveillance practices. Only the federal government practices both foreign and domestic surveillance, and therefore, only literature specific to NSA (or other agency) surveillance is likely to make the “domestic” distinction. One very policy-particularized application of “domestic surveillance” in this file is the evidence specifying that, in the context of the Bush administration (and, by extension, the Obama administration), “domestic surveillance” has the attribute of occurring under a “blanket warrant,” an extremely broad warrant issued for a general search for wrongdoing, the kind of warrant issued by Section 215 of the Patriot Act, allowing “blanket warrants for federal authorities to obtain massive swaths of personal data, including bank, doctor and phone company records.” This gives law enforcement broad discretion to search unspecified places for unspecified things. Traditionally, general warrants are considered unconstitutional under the specificity requirements of the Fourth Amendment.With few words and even fewer topic-specific words, this is a manageable resolution from a procedural standpoint, although lack of information about what, who, and how much domestic surveillance the government conducts make some limits murkier than others. The hyper-specific literature on the term “domestic surveillance” enhances that manageability. Affirmative StrategiesSpecific PlansThis section doesn’t attempt to list all potential plans and cases on this year’s resolution, but rather to provide a small representative sample. The parameters of “domestic surveillance” may limit the topic to only a few NSA/FBI/CIA surveillance cases; if teams and critics end up preferring broader definitions, then more applications of law enforcement and even other surveillance may be debatable. Here is a brief executive agency/Patriot Act/general law enforcement case list. Racial profiling: At both the NSA/anti-terrorism level and the domestic law enforcement level, authorities use racial profiling on particular surveillance targets. Such profiling might be implicit, or even unconscious, but evidence exists of blatant profiling of Arab-Americans as a matter of policy in factions of institutions such as the FBI and even the NSA. Affirmatives can ban this repugnant practice, claiming not only racism as an impact, but also institutional credibility and law enforcement effectiveness, soft power, and international human rights credibility. Negatives may consider counterplan strategies that access those moral impacts, or kritiks of the paradigms or institutional methodologies that the affirmative uses to access them. Drones: The proliferation of drones as mechanisms of surveillance on ordinary U.S. citizens is a stark symbol of the way the ruling classes deploy technology to erase privacy lines and diminish individual and group autonomy. Through restrictive regulations or even the outright ban of some types of drones, affirmatives can substantially curtail the use of drones in gathering information. Such plans would access myriad privacy, totalitarianism, biopolitical and other kritik-level impacts; there may also be good resource-shift and focus arguments if affirmatives want to improve the good work of police and government agencies while eliminating the “bad apple” of drones. Negatives have a wide array of choices against such affirmatives, from specific counterplans to retain particular drone-types to arguments about their effectiveness in stopping high-impact crimes or acts of terror.Maryland v. King (or other court decisions): Maryland v. King is a 2013 United States Supreme Court decision holding that when officers make an arrest supported by probable cause, the officers are justified in taking and keeping a DNA sample from the arrestee. The decision was very close, and the dissent--by both ultra-conservative Scalia and the three liberal justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, arguing that “categorically” and “without exception,” “[t]he Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence.” A range of privacy and constitutionality impacts is possible. Affirmatives may write similar cases for other court decisions, and the use of the Supreme Court as an actor potentially avoids many generic disadvantages, and renders most agent counterplans useless. Negatives can argue a variety of court-specific strategies, from legitimacy to hollow hope to court-stripping, and there are legal-specific kritiks such as Critical Legal Studies, or legal-specific links to arguments like capitalism and biopower.Executive Order 12333: Originally implemented by President Reagan, Executive Order 12333 regulates many aspects of executive power to deal with enemies or threats, including assassinations and surveillance powers. Experts say XO 12333 is the fundamental document authorizing the expansion of data collection activities towards U.S. citizens. The Order has been used by the National Security Agency as legal authorization for the secret and systematic collection of unencrypted information flowing through the internet, emails, cell phones, and every other means of electronic information transmission. The affirmative can mandate that Congress render the Executive Order legally invalid, which Congress is empowered to do. The Supreme Court may be able to do the same. The main 1AC advantage would probably be totalitarianism, but separation of powers is also an important advantage to the plan. Negatives could counterplan with the agent the affirmative did not use; there is good literature on both sides of the question of whether Congress or the Judiciary are better equipped to check executive power, particularly of these sweeping executive orders. Patriot Act Section 215: The National Security Agency's phone sweeping program, collecting numbers, dates, and durations of phone calls made in the United States, constitutes the very essence of unconstitutional domestic surveillance, and is embedded in Section 215 of the patriot act, a provision allowing the government to demand that private telecommunications companies turn over information about their patrons. However, Congress is currently fiercely debating the extension of the Patriot Act, with 215 facing immanent expiration. By the time teams start debating in the fall, the issue will probably be resolved, and if 215 survives, affirmatives may want to do what so many members of Congress want to do and ban the provision. The advantages of totalitarianism and privacy, and the symbolic significance of the Patriot Act for the international reputation of the United States, are both potential advantage areas. Negatives can certainly execute a well-researched strategy holding that 215's data collection does stop terrorism, including high-impact disasters with WMDs, but negatives may also consider the courts or even an executive order as alternative agents.Section 702 of FISA Amendments Act: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act enables the surveillance targeting of foreign persons located abroad. Section 702 provides for targeting and minimization procedures, adopted by the U.S. Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, requiring a valid purpose for the surveillance. Several troubling allegations have emerged concerning the use of the section. We already know the Act is being used to target Americans abroad. Moreover, the U.S. appears to be sharing this information with British spies, and capturing mass collections of phone calls and emails "directly from the physical infrastructure of communications providers" (Nadia Kayyali, “The Way the NSA Uses Section 702 is Deeply Troubling. Here’s Why,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 7, 2014, ). Banning or amending this section would yield both international relations and anti-terrorism effectiveness impacts. If affirmatives broadly ban Section 702, negatives might consider going all in on the topicality argument that this is not domestic surveillance, given that the targets and activities are not U.S. citizens or within the United States, and the topic literature is quite specific about dividing foreign and domestic surveillance—as evidenced, even, by the title of FISA. If the plans are specific to only the targeting of Americans abroad, then many of the strategies against Executive Order 12333 may also work against FISA. The special advocate affirmative may even be a counterplan. FISA Courtroom Special Advocate: Civil libertarians have called for Congress to amend FISA to provide for a special advocate on the court, “whose job it would be to represent civil liberties in court proceedings, and establish a process for declassifying the court's orders.” As of last year, “Those reforms are included in a Senate version of an intelligence reform bill, but not the House version now under consideration” (Denver Nicks, “Privacy Advocates Call for FISA Court Reform,” Time, July 10, 2014, ). A plan to do this would incur civil liberties advantages, and probably some international human rights credibility. Negatives could mandate that the Supreme Court rule that due process requires such a special advocate.Impact AreasPrivacy: All domestic surveillance affirmatives can potentially deploy privacy impacts. At the substantive level, privacy is linked to effective democracy, individual rights, community cohesion, self-actualization, and a variety of other qualitative but real arguments about living in a good society. At the critical/philosophical level, privacy is linked primarily to biopolitical freedom, biopower, and the similar family of arguments about the state’s ability to monitor and control the individual. Totalitarianism: Government surveillance rips at the fabric of civil society and accountability, discouraging political engagement and punishing dissent. Surveillance creates the climate of fear useful to totalitarian leaders. Evidence is particularly passionate right now about these subjects, and history demonstrates that totalitarianism can cause massive loss of life alongside loss of freedom.Racism: Profiling cases can emphasize the “original sin” nature of racism, which makes it categorically more important than whatever small nooks of intelligence needs racial profiling actually fills. Racism is unacceptable for countless reasons, but some of the most easily articulated are dehumanization, genocide, and human dignity.Freedom to dissent: A subset of totalitarian impacts warranting its own specific mention, the closure of dissent space is a death-knell for democracy (and democracy, in turn, links to several substantive terminal impacts such as war and human survival). The idea that the government watches activists, monitoring their communications and tracking their activities and associates, discourages people from being activists at all. Without people willing to push the boundaries, democracy simply can’t survive.Soft power: Perception of U.S. adherence to protocols of privacy, decency, respect for other countries’ citizens and modes of communication, respect for our own citizens’ rights, all factor into the rest of the world’s perception of the U.S. as a moral and political leader. When the U.S. was caught listening in on communications of leaders in Germany, Brazil, and elsewhere, this damaged U.S. credibility. The impacts include influence and hegemony, trade and economic policies, and the ability to collectively engage on a variety of issues facing the planet. Effective Anti-Terrorism: Many scholars, former intelligence workers, and journalists assert that mass surveillance is simply ineffective, creates bottlenecks of resources and information flow, demands that agencies look for needles in haystacks, in general wasting a lot of time and money. Affirmatives wishing to sidestep or supplement privacy or other “moral” debates can emphasize that curtailing surveillance opens the door to better anti-terrorism strategies, including those premised on cooperation between the U.S. and key allies. International human rights credibility: The United States can’t effectively demand that other countries respect human rights if we are a surveillance state. Our ability to criticize slavery, genocide, persecution of minorities, and in particular, totalitarian regimes like North Korea, is undermined by our insistence on spying on our own citizensSeparation of powers: Many affirmatives on the topic will curtail executive powers that many believe should be balanced more equally among branches—particularly the legislative branch with regard to the authorization of operations, and the judicial branch with regard to constitutionality determinations. Separation of powers is necessary to preserve democracy, ensure international peace, and effective governance. Negative StrategiesCounterplansAlternative Actors: Topic literature on domestic surveillance, American intelligence, and counterterrorism reveals strong differences of opinion about which branch or agency controls what policies and outcomes. Thus, there is plenty of literature saying the Executive Branch should have primacy in intelligence, but there is an equal amount of compelling literature saying Congress must be the primary actor. There is also evidence speaking to the ability of those two branches to work together, justifying permutations. Courts, specifically: Since some lower courts have already ruled that warrantless surveillance is unconstitutional, and because having the highest court rule on its unconstitutionality is the best enabling mechanism to ensure that other branches of government ban it, negatives can argue that the Supreme Court is the best check on executive power or unconstitutional surveillance legislation. Also, because a Supreme Court ruling is less politically controversial than a congressional action, negatives can run the politics disadvantage and avoid the link with the counterplan. Affirmatives can respond that Supreme Court decisions are also political and will not avoid the disadvantage. Affirmatives can also argue that the Court cannot really control the executive, and that the Court risks backlash and loss of legitimacy by ruling on surveillance. Permutations would include Congress and the Supreme Court acting at the same time, Congress banning surveillance and the Court ruling against it, to ensure better solvency. DisadvantagesTerrorism: Although it sometimes appears as if the evidence against surveillance is more plentiful and passionate than the evidence for it, many policy experts believe it is critical in preventing terrorism. This argument works best in a utilitarian framework: If terrorists deploy weapons of mass destruction, this outweighs the impacts of the affirmative. The affirmative can link turn this disadvantage by pointing out the ways surveillance damages the war on terror, such as yielding faulty intelligence or alienating allies. Politics: Since much of the surveillance state is wrapped up in either executive actions or congressional legislation, negotiating the curtailment of surveillance will have political impacts. The President may need to expend capital to get Congress to compromise on new versions of the Patriot Act or FISA. Congress might give the President a loss by negating an executive order. There is typically fierce opposition to decreasing the tools available to fight terrorism, and political discourse lacks the nuance to be able to inform the public, or particularly ideological public officials, that surveillance might undermine anti-terrorism efforts. Congress may demand concessions from the President in order to push through some reform in surveillance or, if the policy “belongs to” the President, Congress may use the decreased political power of a president rebuked on surveillance to push through some other undesirable policies. Affirmatives can respond with the usual answers to politics—running links the other way, reading solid uniqueness takeouts (including the numerous ways in which surveillance is likely to be curtailed over the next several months), and, of course, impact turning the politics scenarios. Hegemony Good/Bad: Decreased surveillance may weaken our hard-power capacity, and that might be bad. Or, decreased surveillance may increase our soft power, and that might be bad. The opposite scenarios might be true: For example, decreased surveillance might strengthen our hard power (some affirmatives may even claim this in the 1AC, and negatives may argue that’s bad. It’s best to have good impact files both ways on hegemony good/bad, as well as the many hard power and soft power dynamics, when debating this resolution. Cybersecurity: Cybersecurity is important in ways that transcend terrorism prevention. Surveillance of cyber activity is vital to make improvements in our overall cybersecurity, improvements that are currently underway but may require more data to reach completion. Loss of cybersecurity at the governmental level means we’re vulnerable to attacks from Russia or China; loss of individual cybersecurity may be bad for the same reasons surveillance totalitarianism is bad. Affirmatives can respond to this disadvantage by demonstrating that wide scale surveillance hinders, rather than helps, America strengthen its anized Crime/Sex Trafficking: Deep surveillance is necessary to track organized crime, in particular the hard-to-detect network of underground human trafficking that occurs both globally and in the United States. The moral weight of sex trafficking makes it compelling as a juxtaposition to the moral weight of surveillance. Affirmatives can argue that sweeping data searches actually trade off with better techniques—surveillance or otherwise—for exposing and capturing human traffickers or other purveyors of organized crime. KritiksFoucault/Biopower: Although it’s more likely affirmatives will deploy Foucauldian notions of biopower than negatives, space exists for both. Foucault argues that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, power structures began to qualitatively change their methods of human governance, utilizing technology and methods that evolved from Enlightenment thinking. These became methods of managing populations, disciplining them, regulating their autonomy rather than just reacting to human action. Surveillance is a particularly comprehensive method of doing this. Discipline regulates the behavior of individual bodies within the social body--through the manipulation of space and time, movement and activity. Surveillance is a method of enforcing this management. The impact to allowing such methods of control is a level of totalitarianism beyond the political--a very personal totalitarianism that destroys any vestige of autonomy. Negatives, however, can utilize Foucault’s other argument about power--that it is diffusive, and not embodied exclusively in political institutions--to argue that banning surveillance by the government merely gives the illusion of less power, and that such power will manifest in other, more insidious, potentially violent and dehumanizing ways.Feminism/Privacy Bad: Privacy, as constructed in traditional liberal discourse, relies on a distinction between the public and private spheres that is untenable and potentially oppressive. Relegating personal relationships to the private sphere has long been a tool of patriarchy to justify the intimate subordination of women—keeping them in the home, regulating their sexual lives or justifying sexual brutality against them, covering up domestic violence. This kritik can also, in a complimentary fashion, claim that patriarchy’s subordination of women is a root cause of the kinds of war, terrorism, brutality, and instability that makes surveillance appear desirable in the first place. Affirmatives can respond with a permutation calling for criticism of both patriarchy and surveillance; they can also argue that the tendency of surveillance to crush dissent undermines the solvency of the kritik’s alternative, which is premised on the ability to spread feminist consciousness through both public and private channels. Capitalism/Marxism: Although there are many potential starting points for applying Marxist or anti-capitalist methodology to this resolution, the standard argument is that surveillance and the erasure of private life, rather than being the effect of security and militarism, is actually the byproduct of capitalism’s tendency to economically colonize every sphere of human life. Humans are reduced to data-subjects because doing so makes them easier to materially exploit. Ignoring this root cause makes it harder to struggle against capitalism, and more likely that the totalitarianism targeted by the affirmative will manifest in other ways. Failure to transcend capitalism results in terminal impacts (war, environmental destruction, genocide) greater than those claimed by the affirmative. Affirmatives have several options in answering this kritik: arguing the capitalism is good (saves environment, prevents war) and in particular that economic freedom checks totalitarianism; arguing that the anti-capitalist methodology breeds its own kind of totalitarianism; or deploying a permutation/link turn strategy arguing that preserving dissent and fighting against surveillance totalitarianism makes it more likely that anti-capitalist movements will succeed in their goals. Schmitt: Policies rooted in equality, or those that break down the distinction between enemies and allies, lead to worse forms of violence because they attempt to universalize the notion of “humanity” itself. It is better, this kritik says, to create clear “lines in the sand” designating some people as allies and others as enemies. Those lines contain war to specific parameters, where the erasure of those lines enables large-scale warfare against anyone deemed a threat to the entire humanistic order—“ontological damnation.” Affirmatives can answer this kritik by arguing that the so-called specific lines between enemy and ally are the true source of the otherization the negative fears; that a permutation is possible that preserves both the friend-enemy distinction and the embrace of liberal internationalist principles; and that Schmitt's role as a jurist of Nazism makes his call for the designation of enemies deeply dangerous.CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACTS AFFIRMATIVECivil liberties key to democracyCivil liberties are fundamental to democracyAaron Skaaning. Professor at Boston University. May 29, 2009. Civil Liberty and Democracy. Accessed May 10, 2015. Consequently, a democracy may deprive the individual citizen of civil liberties which he or she might have under another form of government (Berlin, 1997: 201-203). However, Habermas (1992: 610-616; 1996: 294-301), among others (e.g. K?gi, 1953: 134-136; Beetham, 2005), has criticized this schism between civil liberties and popular sovereignty to be flawed because certain rights are constitutive conditions for free political opinion formation and decision-making. Thus, some civil liberties can be understood as necessary conditions for the meaningful functioning of self-government because they are immanent to a democratic process. Among the most relevant civil liberties, we have a number of personal exertion rights: namely the freedoms of expression, association, assembly, and movement (Dahl, 1989: 221; Rawls, 1971: 225[§ 36]; Beetham, 2005; Lauth, 2004: 330-350), whereas freedom of religion, residence, and culture in addition to the economic rights regarding property, contract, and occupation are not democratic rights.Civil liberties are more central to the function of democracy than any other rightAriel BenYishay and Roger Betancourt. Professors at University of Maryland. January 2013. Unbundling Democracy: Tilly Trumps Schumpeter. Accessed May 10, 2015. (Draft%20submission).pdfSumming up, we have shown that liberal democracy as construed by Tilly in terms of two dimensions, political rights and civil liberties, provides an encompassing framework for analyzing the evolution of democracy at both the conceptual and empirical level. At the conceptual level, it contains electoral democracy as construed by Schumpeter and his followers as a special case in which civil liberties and political rights are independent dimensions of democracy and only the latter matter. At the empirical level, we have shown that a framework based on liberal democracy overwhelmingly dominates a framework based on electoral democracy as a basis for analyzing the evolution of democracy. Conceptually, the encompassing feature is grounded in the differentiation provided by the ability of civil liberties to provide citizens with satisfaction directly while political rights only do so indirectly. Empirically, this fundamental difference and other associated differences between civil liberties and political rights generate a setting where these two dimensions of unbundled democracy evolve in very different ways. First, the persistence effects of civil liberties on subsequent outcomes are substantial and statistically robust to the inclusion of political rights in the analysis. By contrast, the persistence effects of political rights on subsequent outcomes are far less substantial and most often disappear statistically when civil liberties are included in the analysis. Second, the complementarity effects of civil liberties on political rights are substantial and robust, whereas the complementarity effects of political rights on civil liberties are non-existent substantively and statisticallyCivil liberties can serve as a starting point for democratizing non-western culturesSean M Lynn-Jones. Editor at Belfer Center, Harvard University. March 2008. Why the United States Should Spread Democracy. Accessed May 10, 2015. argument that democracy exacerbates ethnic tensions also is unpersuasive. Managing ethnic tensions in multiethnic societies isn't easy, but democratic approaches may be at least as successful as authoritarian ones. Authoritarian states that appeared to control ethnic tensions often did so at a high price in human life. The Soviet Union avoided ethnic civil war, but under Stalin it decimated or deported many ethnic minorities. Tito's Yugoslavia avoided violent disintegration, but hundreds of thousands of suspected separatists were killed on Tito's orders, particularly in the late 1940s. Considerable evidence indicates that liberal democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance, cooperation, political accommodation, and respect for civil liberties, provides the best recipe for long-term domestic stability. The third argument's assertion that democratic government is incompatible with East Asian values is belied by the relatively successful growth of democracy in Japan, South Korea, and, more recently, Taiwan and the Philippines. These states have not emulated the Western model of democracy in all respects, but they are almost universally classified as democracies. In addition to conducting multiparty elections and maintaining civil liberties, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all have impressive economic records. Some East Asians point to the Philippines and argue that democracy is responsible for its domestic instability and economic malaise, but that country's economic performance has improved dramatically in recent years. In addition, the Korean and Japanese cases show that democracy and growth can go hand in hand. The former problems of the Philippines may be attributable to the Spanish colonial legacy, not the flaws of democratic political systems.Civil liberties are the essence of democracy—all else is frillVlasdislav Inozemtsev. Research fellow at the American Interest. February 2012. The Cultural Contradictions of Democracy. Accessed May 10, 2015. this begs an important question: Was the rise of democracy the main driving force behind the development of contemporary liberal Western societies, or were long gestating developments in Western societies that fixed concepts of liberties and individual rights instead the drivers of democracy? The default assumption among most Westerners is the former, but the truth is the latter. American society, observed Gordon Wood, the reigning dean of early American history, did not become liberally minded because it was democratic, it became democratic because it was liberally minded. And thus the late Daniel Bell: I am not a democrat. I don’t believe in democracy. I believe in liberty and rights. . . in certain elements which you can’t take away from people. Rule of law, the right of assembly, . . . hearings in open courtrooms—these are rights which guarantee the liberties of people. I basically prefer to deal with liberty rather than democracy.3 The system of civil liberties that exists today in all truly democratic countries comes from historical traditions nurtured by certain religious cultures turned outward into the temporal realm, and from the somewhat accidental felicities of good governance in key cases. They have nothing to do with the introduction of universal suffrage. No society can host a true liberal democracy that has not first become free and liberal-minded, and only people who have lost touch with their own histories can suppose otherwise. This account of causality, once understood, raises three questions. First, if the establishment of basic liberties and rights precedes democracy, and if those liberties and rights are now firmly established and well secured in law, then why do we need democracy? What, and who, is it good for?Removing civil liberties through domestic surveillance chills expression and threatens social progressLaurie Burkhart. Professor at Truman College. March 2010. The Effect of Government Surveillance on Social Progress. Accessed May 10, 2015. confronting/5CH1.pdfIn recent years the "chilling effect" has taken on a much larger role in American society, not only through increased government surveillance deterring political participation, but through a broad range of social functions as well. Simple examples will show that social internet networks such as and The Facebook are having detrimental effects to people's willingness to present information about themselves or their views. Some users of these networks have lost jobs or have been forced to censor what they publish in fear of what ramifications it may have on their job status or future wellbeing. In January, an undisclosed number of student-athletes were dismissed from the University of Colorado track team after posting indecent pictures of themselves on Facebook4. The enormous amount of voluntary and involuntary personal information that can be tracked and monitored in today's information age is causing people to give into the "chilling effect' in both political and social arenas. In all aspects of life citizens of the U.S. are trying to fit the surveillance system rather than tv to change or influence it. Once the people give into the system and refuse to participate or rebel out of fear of self-incrimination then all hope of social progress is lost.Civil liberties key to the economy The most robust studies show civil liberties are key to economic developmentAriel BenYishay and Roger Betancourt. Professors at University of Maryland. August 2008. Civil Liberties and Economic Development. Accessed May 10, 2015. skepticism prevails among economists over a possible connection between civil liberties and the level of economic activity. Until now, empirical research on economic growth has found mixed evidence on the influence of civil liberties. Disaggregation of the Freedom House Civil Liberties index allows a fresh empirical look at the effect of human rights on long-term economic growth and development. Our results show that one of the four subcategories of the index outperforms all available indicators of property rights institutions in explaining long-term economic growth. This subcategory, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights, captures the level of second generation human rights that affect the mobility of individuals with respect to housing, employment and higher education, as well as the level of protection of property rights. This result is robust with respect to reverse causation, important omitted variables such as geography and human capital, and a variety of sensitivity tests. We also lay out a conceptual framework discussing how civil liberties work as an indicator of the prevalence of the rule of law and how the latter affects growth or development as an essential public input.Violations of civil liberty can directly interfere with commerceMichael German. Senior Policy Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative Office. August 13, 2013. America, NSA Surveillance is Bad for Business. Accessed May 10, 2015. accomplished this ignoble task by altering the definition of "electronic surveillance" so as to exclude any government eavesdropping that is directed at an entity "reasonably believed" to be outside the United States from coverage under the protections of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Now when an American is calling his aunt in Italy, or e-mailing his business associate in Canada, or engaging in an Internet chat where one of the parties could be overseas [snip] the government can listen in without any court oversight. This is a fundamental change that has serious ramifications for all Americans, but especially for American companies that do business in the global economy. Congress gave the government this eavesdropping authority not to listen to terrorists, but rather to collect "foreign intelligence," which is loosely defined in FISA to mean any information that "relates to" the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. Make no mistake, this means business. The rapid expansion of e-commerce now allows small mom-and-pop companies in the heartland of America to sell their products in foreign markets. Because of the bill Congress passed your international business transactions can now be monitored by the government. Globalization and free trade agreements have made it easier for U.S. companies to have an international workforce. Now your communications with those foreign employees can be monitored by the government. The "flattening" of the world opened new opportunities for Americans to invest in growing world markets and to provide charitable gifts to areas in desperate need. Now your international investments and philanthropy can be monitored by the government- not because you are suspected of doing anything wrong, but simply because the government wants foreign intelligence information. Congress could have easily restricted this new authority to investigations of suspected terrorists, but it did not.Lack of civil liberties can deter international investmentMichael German. Senior Policy Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative Office. August 13, 2013. America, NSA Surveillance is Bad for Business. Accessed May 10, 2015. businessperson can easily see the ramifications of such unwarranted surveillance. How are trade secrets going to be protected? Are negotiations regarding government contracts being conducted in good faith, or are they being compromised by intercepted communications? How are confidential relationships- employer/employee; attorney/client; journalist/source; doctor/patient; priest/penitent; husband/wife- going to be protected? How are these captured communications going to be used against you and your business? The answer is nobody knows because it's all being conducted behind a massive cloak of secrecy. American companies have much to lose from these government surveillance programs. When foreign businesses and customers lose confidence that American companies can maintain confidentiality in their business dealings and financial transactions, they will likely look for other, more secure partners. According to a report released last week by The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, NSA surveillance could cost the U.S. cloud computing industry anywhere from $22 to $35 billion over the next three years if "foreign customers decide the risks of storing data with a U.S. company outweigh the benefits."Utilitarian civil liberties badThe only way insecurity affects our liberties is by forcing us to make bad decisions—only we can decide if we’re freeJoshua Holland. Writer at American Prospect. January 14, 2015. Terrorists Will Never Limit Our Free Speech, But Government Can. Accessed May 10, 2015. were only viable because the American public embraced the idea that terrorism represented an existential threat. Then, as now, we accepted the idea that terrorists had the capacity to undermine our rights. That day, George W. Bush told the American public that “our way of life, our very freedom came under attack.” In reality, as traumatic as that day's events were, it was airplanes, buildings and the people inside them that were attacked—our “freedom” was never in peril. It's important that we identify where the real threat lies because terrorism is still a tactic. Unlike a group or a specific ideology, a tactic can't be eradicated. We can fight terrorist organizations—killing their leaders, going after their sources of funding—but small groups of extremists and “lone wolf” attackers are ultimately just murderous criminals, with the same degree of institutional power as any other murderers. They pose a huge challenge for law enforcement; Attorney General Eric Holder says the prospect of such attacks keeps him awake at night. But we accept a certain amount of violent crime as the price of living in a free and open society. The only alternative is to accept life under a police state. That's not to say that we can't do anything to manage the risk posed by these kinds of attacks. But the one thing we shouldn't do is attribute power to extremists that they don't have, because that only leads to genuine threats to our liberty and values.Answer to public healthCivil liberty infringements are unnecessary and ineffective at preserving public healthGeorge J Annas, Wendy K Mariner and Wendy E Parmet. Research fellows at American Civil Liberties Union. January 2008. Pandemic Preparedness: The Need for a Public Health—Not a Law Enforcement/National Security—Approach. Accessed May 10, 2015. Daniels and Speaker cases are cautionary tales that illustrate the counterproductive nature of a punitive, law enforcement approach to preventing the spread of disease. Instead of recognizing these dangers, however, both Congressional leaders and the media presented these cases as demonstrating a need for even tougher new laws that permit aggressive and punitive action against individuals. In so doing, they did not note the futility of stopping a disease as widely prevalent as tuberculosis by detaining one single traveler, nor did they recognize the need to develop more rapid and accurate diagnostic tests and more effective TB treatments. Nor did they mention that existing treatments are not currently available to everyone with the disease. Rather, the spotlight remained on the alleged need to enact new laws to provide officials with more power to "get tough" with individual patients. This is unfortunate because: It's ineffective. The law enforcement approach has not and cannot prepare us for serious epidemics. Effective public health efforts, whether aimed at pandemic influenza or more common diseases such as TB and HIV/AIDS, are neither cheap nor glamorous. They are costly and difficult. These efforts require working with rather than against communities, providing communities with as healthy an environment as possible, health care if they need it, and the means to help themselves and their neighbors. Most importantly, to protect public health, public health policies must aim to help, rather than to suppress, the public. It's dangerous for civil liberties. The law enforcement approach to public health offers a rationale for the endless suspension of civil liberties. The "Global War on Terror" may go on for a generation, but the war on disease will continue until the end of the human race. There will always be a new disease, always the threat of a new pandemic. If that fear justifies the suspension of liberties and the institution of an emergency state, then freedom and the rule of law will be permanently suspended.Infringing civil liberties can harm public health effortsGeorge J Annas, Wendy K Mariner and Wendy E Parmet. Research fellows at American Civil Liberties Union. January 2008. Pandemic Preparedness: The Need for a Public Health—Not a Law Enforcement/National Security—Approach. Accessed May 10, 2015. reliance on coercion. Although most of the verbiage in these plans is vapid and vir- tually without content, and based on assumptions that will inevitably turn out to be mis- taken, the one commonality they all possess is reliance on coercive actions such as quar- antine and forced treatment. This is despite the fact that such measures are generally acknowledged by experts to be either completely ineffective or only potentially marginally effective in the case of flu. But law enforcement and national security continue to be the key elements, perhaps not surprising given President Bush's first suggestion to contain a bird flu pandemic: calling out the military to quarantine large sections of the United States to prevent flu from spreading across the country. A lack of specifics. Because these plans do not give those in charge any specific, use- ful tasks to perform (beyond distributing stockpiled drugs and vaccines, if and when they are developed and produced), public authorities are apt to take useless and counterpro- ductive anti-civil liberties actions to demonstrate that they are "doing something" to respond to the crisis. ? A loss of privacy. Planning for the worst case encourages health officials to view symptoms of almost any illness as the potential beginning of a pandemic. Pressure to find the first possible case of flu as fast as possible has encouraged wide-ranging surveil- lance systems to permanently monitor individual medical records and pharmacy purchas- es and link them to data bases in law enforcement, homeland security, agriculture, banking, customs and immigration. As a result, the punitive all-hazards approach encourages the wide-spread, unnecessary and permenant violation of individuals’ privacy.Answer to terrorismTerrorism must be defeated with moral superiority with regard to civil libertyTom O’Connor. Professor at American University. 2008. Fighting Terror Ethically. Accessed May 10, 2015. would say that moral superiority is how to win the war on terrorism (Netanyahu 1986), and indeed, Prof. Chris Harmon (in How al-Qaeda May End) suggests this also. Most terrorist movements do come to an end, and doctrinal ideologies can be defeated. Winning a war on terrorism requires that there be some moral conviction in the justice of the fight. A terror war must give expression to the morality involved, and fight as if it were a war of ideas. Terrorism, in may ways, is an attack on national will. Terrorists count on the fact that their targets are "soft and weak" and will not be able to sustain a coordinated grand strategy. Terrorists know that their targets will critique themselves, and debate among themselves. They know their targets will argue among themselves, and in fact, they are often counting on this kind of moral skepticism among their targets before they attack again. The moral argument that terrorism is permanently unjustifiable should be forcefully restated time and time again, and by as many voices as possible, globally. The language of morality can be powerful. Not only does it appeal to foreign audiences, but it can help with domestic morale also. Democratic-minded and moderate leaders of organizations in the host nations for terrorists should be assisted in having their "voices" amplified by the democratic nations. Religion can play a part, but as Temes (2003) wonders, how can a Christian nation like the U.S. get Muslim nations to reign in their extremists? Perhaps it is best if religion stays out of it. Morality should not be confused with religion.Violating civil liberties doesn’t stop terrorismPatrick Eddington. Writer at Reason. January 27, 2015. No, Mass surveillance won’t stop terrorist attacks. Accessed May 10, 2015. ’s worth remembering that the mass surveillance programs initiated by the U.S. government after the 9/11 attacks—the legal ones and the constitutionally-dubious ones—were premised on the belief that bin Laden’s hijacker-terrorists were able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to collect enough data. Yet in their subsequent reports on the attacks, the Congressional Joint Inquiry (2002) and the 9/11 Commission found exactly the opposite. The data to detect (and thus foil) the plots was in the U.S. government’s hands prior to the attacks; the failures were ones of sharing, analysis, and dissemination. That malady perfectly describes every intelligence failure from Pearl Harbor to the present day. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (created by Congress in 2004) was supposed to be the answer to the "failure-to-connect-the-dots" problem. Ten years on, the problem remains, the IC bureaucracy is bigger than ever, and our government is continuing to rely on mass surveillance programs that have failed time and again to stop terrorists while simultaneously undermining the civil liberties and personal privacy of every American. The quest to "collect it all," to borrow a phrase from NSA Director Keith Alexander, only leads to the accumulation of masses of useless information, making it harder to find real threats and costing billions to store.Violating of civil liberties directly force people into terrorismBill Berkowitz. Writer at Alternet. July 30, 2014. How the FBI Is Creating Terrorists. Accessed May 10, 2015. "Indeed, in some cases the Federal Bureau of Investigation may have created terrorists out of law-abiding individuals by conducting sting operations that facilitated or invented the target's willingness to act." In addition, there is a good chance that, without the government's active participation, many of those ensnared by the government did not have the mental or intellectual capacity to plan, finance and/or carry out a terrorist event. "Americans have been told that their government is keeping them safe by preventing and prosecuting terrorism inside the US," said Andrew Prasow, Human Rights Watch's deputy Washington director, in a statement. "But take a closer look and you realize that many of these people would never have committed a crime if not for law enforcement encouraging, pressuring, and sometimes paying them to commit terrorist acts." According to the report, entrapment, or what smells like entrapment, is writ large over several of the cases. However, the report points out that proving entrapment is not an easy task for defendants: "In theory, the defendants in these cases should be able to avoid criminal liability by making a claim of 'entrapment.' However, US law requires that to prove entrapment a defendant show both that the government induced him to commit the act in question and that he was not 'predisposed' to commit it.Answer to violations of liberties lead to rightsRemorse over the violation of liberty in wartime does not expand rightsRobert Pushaw. Professor at Chapman Law School. Spring 2009. JUSTIFYING WARTIME LIMITS ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES. Accessed May 10, 2015. obvious flaw of the “remorse theory” is that sometimes civil rights and liberties are actually enhanced during wartime. Indeed, perhaps the greatest grant of freedom and equality at the stroke of a pen, the Emancipation Proclamation, occurred smack in the middle of the supposedly liberty-destroying Civil War. 147 Furthermore, history refutes the notion that America has progressed in a linear fashion toward ever-expanding respect for civil liberties in each succeeding war and enhanced civil rights after each military conflict. 148 For instance, Lincoln’s alleged excesses in curtailing freedom, and civil rights laws enacted in the late 1860s, did absolutely nothing to prevent later Presidents like Wilson and Roosevelt from infringing individual rights and liberties in the course of waging war. Concededly, President Bush avoided some of the more egregious mistakes of the past, such as targeting people for mistreatment solely because they happened to be members of the same minority group as those of a nation America was fighting. 149 Nonetheless, perhaps this self-control reflected the fact that the War on Terror was small potatoes compared to struggles like World War II. 150 If 9/11 had been followed by major attacks on Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Houston, history does not fill me with confidence that the executive branch’s response would have been as restrained. Finally, it is almost impossible to prove a one-to-one correspondence between regret over wartime suppression of fundamental liberties and subsequent civil rights laws. For example, remorse over Lincoln’s interference with individual freedoms did not have much to do with the Reconstruction Amendments and statutes. Most importantly, the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or Immunities were not aimed at preventing the federal government in later wars from taking the same sorts of draconian actions as Lincoln. On the contrary, these Amendments completed the process Lincoln had started in the Emancipation Proclamation-perhaps grossly beyond the bounds of his Article II powers-by guaranteeing the newly freed slaves (and everyone else) their basic civil rights. 151Violations of liberty only beget more violationsRobert Pushaw. Professor at Chapman Law School. Spring 2009. JUSTIFYING WARTIME LIMITS ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES. Accessed May 10, 2015. final difficulty with the “remorse theory” is that many distinguished judges and scholars have posited the opposite hypothesis: that when the President asserts increased powers during an emergency, they tend to become permanent and diminish individual rights and freedoms, especially when the Court approves them. 169 A well-known articulation of this position can be found in Justice Jackson’s dissent from the Court’s decision to uphold the federal government’s internment of Japanese Americans: [A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency. . . . But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, this Court for all time has validated [a] principle . . . [which] then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes. . . . A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image. 170 Logically, the “collective remorse” and “loaded weapon” theories cannot both be correct. Rather, history demonstrates that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Every armed conflict is unique and requires a distinctive approach in balancing liberty against security. 171 Similarly, when a war ends, civil rights progress at a rate that depends on a huge number of legal, political, ideological, social, economic, and moral variables. More simplistic explanations fail to capture the messiness of the historical evidence.Answer to only affects criminalsEveryone is affected by the imbalance of power when civil liberties are violatedNeil M Richards. Professor at Washington University School of Law. May 2013. The Dangers of Surveillance. Accessed May 10, 2015. Harvard Law Review. Volume 126 Number 7. If we have no inkling that we are being watched, if we really do not care that we are be- ing watched, or if we fear no consequences of being watched, it could be argued that our intellectual freedom is unaffected. It can thus be argued that if the NSA Wiretapping Program had never leaked, it would have posed no threat to intellectual privacy. There are two problems with this account. First, no program of widespread surveillance is likely to remain secret forever. At some point, such a program will inevitably come to light, either by being leaked (as happened with the NSA program and the Army surveillance in Laird), or by actions taken pursuant to the program (such as prosecutions or disclosures). The injury suffered by those thus punished would serve as an example to the rest of us, and the mechanisms of intellectual privacy would come into effect at that point. Second, surveillance (even secret surveillance) can create additional harms that are separate from the ones suggested by intellectual- privacy theory. Scholars working in surveillance studies have explored the phenomenon of surveillance in all of its contemporary complexity, going beyond the Panopticon to consider private surveillance, the relationships between watchers and watched, and the wide variety of dangers that modern surveillance societies raise.97 Recall in this regard that Lyon's definition of surveillance notes that surveillance has a purpose,98 but in the modern era this purpose is rarely totalitarian domination. All the same, most forms of surveillance seek some form of subtler influence or control over others. Even when surveillance is not Orwellian, it is usually about influencing or being able to respond to someone else's behavior. And while surveillance can sometimes have benign goals (like traffic safety, or parents using baby monitors or GPS trackers to keep tabs on their children), it is invariably tied to a particular purpose. Critically, the gathering of information affects the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched, giving the watcher greater power to influence or direct the subject of surveil- lance.99 It might sound trite to say that "information is power," but the power of personal information lies at the heart of surveillance. The power effects of surveillance illustrate three additional dangers of surveillance: blackmail, discrimination, and persuasion.CODIS AFFIRMATIVECodis 1ACThesis: The federal government is rapidly collecting citizen DNA and storing it in national database, such as CODIS. While collected primarily on the state and local level, this collection comes at the direction and persuasion of the federal government. The impacts included here apply to local and state collection, but independently stem from federal government storage. That storage is what allows state and local officials to access the wealth of genetic data. Such data is not only a systemic threat to privacy rights, but also racially coded from overrepresentation.Contention One: The Status quoA. A national DNA database is coming. The Supreme Court has already paved the way Michael T. Snyder, former Washington D.C. attorney, July 9, 2013, “The Coming National DNA Database,” The Truth Wins, , ACC. 5-9-2015A national DNA database is coming.? Barack Obama has already said?that he wants one.? A major Supreme Court decision?last month?paved the way for one.? The DNA of those that commit “serious crimes” is already being routinely collected all over the nation.? Some states (such as New Jersey) are now passing laws that will require DNA collection from those charged with committing “low level crimes”.? And a law that was passed under George W. Bush allows the federal government to screen the DNA of all newborn babies in the United States.? So how long will it be before we are all required to give DNA samples to the authorities?? How long will it be before DNA collection is routinely done when we take a trip to the DMV?? This may sound like science fiction to some people, but “security experts” and law enforcement personnel all over the country are now pushing for a national DNA database to be established.? Unfortunately, there is nothing really standing in the way of that.? The Supreme Court has already spoken.? Justice Scalia understood very clearly what the Supreme Court was doing last month.? In his dissent, he made the following statement: “Make no mistake about it: because of today’s decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”B. The FBI is continually trying to expand its surveillance power. They are using funding to persuade state and local governments to hand over DNA to CODIS and the NGI to form a centralized federal databaseThe ACLU of Massachusetts, Staff Writer, January 27, 2015, “The FBI’s plan to collect everyone’s DNA just got a huge boost from congress,” Privacy SOS, , ACC. 5-7-2015The same is about to be true with DNA, thanks to funds congress has made available specifically for state and local law enforcement to purchase rapid DNA processing machines. The 2015 omnibus?budget?includes this provision: “$117,000,000 is for a DNA analysis and capacity enhancement program and for other local, State, and Federal forensic activities.” These funds will presumably help the FBI achieve goals it laid out in August 2014, as relayed?here?by Nextgov—one of the few news outlets to cover the FBI’s DNA collection plans: Various FBI divisions "are collaborating to develop and implement foundational efforts to streamline and automate law enforcement's DNA collection processes" including at arrest, booking and conviction, according to an Aug. 19?notice?about the industry briefing. The ongoing groundwork is expected to facilitate the "integration of Rapid DNA Analysis into the FBI's Combined DNA Index (CODIS) and Next Generation Identification (NGI) systems from the booking environment.” Current law requires state and local police to send collected DNA to an accredited lab before it is shipped off to the feds. But the FBI wants a “legislative tweak” to enable police to skip that step, and send DNA from arrestees directly to the federal CODIS database. If the feds succeed in changing the law, we’re in trouble: corporations and congress are already laying the groundwork for the logistic implementation of a nationwide DNA dragnet.C. DNA inclusion of misdemeanors is inevitable and moving toward a national databaseElizabeth E. Joh, U.C. Davis School of Law, December 5, 2014, “Should Arrestee DNA Databases Extend to Misdemeanors?,” Recent Advances in DNA & Gene Sequences, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 406, ACC. 5-9-2015, most American jurisdictions do not collect DNA samples from misdemeanor arrestees, it seems likely that some will consider expanding their existing DNA databases to include them. Such proposals would be consistent with historical trends toward DNA database expansion and fall within existing justifications for increasing the number of profiles in the national DNA database.D. CODIS is a federal database that incorporates federal and state DNADerek Regensburger, JD, Attorney and lead instructor in the Legal Studies department at Everest College, 2009, “DNA Databases and the Fourth Amendment,” Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology, 19 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 319, , ACC. 5-7-2015The United States has an interconnected series of computerized DNA databases known as CODIS (Combined DNA Indexing System). It is a series of interlinked DNA databases, including the National DNA Index System (NDIS) operated by the FBI, state DNA indexes maintained by each state, and agency databases maintained by local crime laboratories. NDIS primarily relies on the submission of offender profiles from individual states; less than ten percent of all felons are convicted of federal crimes. Plan: The United States Supreme Court should, in the next appropriate test case, should rule that federal collection, storage, and utilization of DNA databank systems violate the Fourth Amendment.Advantage One: PrivacyA. A centralized DNA database violates the 4th Amendment on several grounds, paving the way for genetic discriminationJessica Tam, LegalMatch Legal Writer, November 15, 2013, “Does DNA Testing and Database Cataloguing Violate the Constitution?,” , , ACC. 5-7-2015Attorneys and civil rights groups have questioned the constitutionality of this database. Opponents of DNA collection say it violates the?Fourth Amendment, which prohibits?unreasonable searches and seizures. Unreasonable searches and seizures may occur when the police target certain groups and detain them for DNA collection without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Our judicial holds that a person is innocent until proven guilty. The Constitution protects this idea as it gives citizens the right to remain silent and the right to a trial by a jury of peers. Yet, with the advent of a DNA database, a person in the DNA database can get hauled in for questioning when their DNA is only similar to the sample found at a crime scene. Finally, a DNA database may invade the right of privacy. Some state constitutions specifically protect the privacy of its citizens. Civil liberties groups argue that DNA information is linked with other unique genetic identifiers concerning one’s likelihood of acquiring diseases such as cancer. This information, which could potentially get into the hands of employers or insurers, could lead to?genetic discrimination.B. Federal DNA databases allow the government to surveil the people without their knowledgeAliya Sternstein, Staff Writer, September 23, 2014, “FBI plans rapid DNA dragnets,” Nextgov, , ACC. 5-7-2015In the meantime, the potential cataloging of hordes of DNA samples in a central government database is compounding concerns about domestic espionage.?“Your?DNA?data could be linked to all the other biometric and biographic information about you that is already in NGI," Lynch said. "Because we discard?DNA?wherever we go, this allows the government the ability to further surveil people without their knowledge."C. Uneven state protection and judicial discretion mean CODIS can be used for warrantless searches. A central database make it vulnerable to abuse HYPERLINK "" \o "View other papers by this author" \t "_blank" Adrienne N. Kitchen, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law, February 12, 2015, “Genetic Privacy and Latent Crime Scene DNA of Non-Suspects: How the Law Can Protect an Individual's Right to Genetic Privacy While Respecting the Government’s Important Interest in Combating Crime,” The Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 52, Issue 2, , ACC. 5-9-2015Regarding security, CODIS is in a secret location and encrypts all transmissions. So far, there is no evidence any DNA databank has been breached. However, the potential for abuse of these databases is great, particularly since states have varying degrees of protection. Potential database abuse has concerned courts since computerized data first entered the scene. In 1977, Justice Brennan articulated this concern regarding medical information: “[t]he central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information.” Regarding DNA collection, judges raise several valid concerns about court approval of “a programmatic search designed to produce and maintain evidence relating to ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” without “individualized suspicion.” There is also fear regarding judicial approval of permanent databases created from suspicionless searches, with “all of the dangers inherent in allowing the government to collect and store information about its citizens in a centralized place.”D. CODIS privacy protections are a sham. DNA samples are often fully retainedRachel Cox, Georgetown University Law Center, 2014, “Unethical intrusion: The Disproportionate impact of law enforcement DNA sampling on minority populations, “American Criminal Law Review, Unethical_Intrusion.pdf, ACC. 5-9-2015The risk of function creep is also made greater by the fact that “there is not one state or federal statute that requires that biological samples collected for identification purposes be destroyed after identification testing is completed,” allowing “an unlimited span of improper uses . . . so long as those samples are retained.” Proponents of DNA sampling of arrestees urge that the genetic information of innocent arrestees is protected because the samples will be destroyed when an individual’s record is expunged. However, in practice, after samples are analyzed in order to extract a profile for CODIS, the federal government, Maryland, and a majority of states retain whole samples indefinitely.1ACE. Those nightmare movie scenarios are real. Even if states never upload genetic profiles, crime scene DNA data alone is enoughAdrienne N. Kitchen, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law, February 12, 2015, “Genetic Privacy and Latent Crime Scene DNA of Non-Suspects: How the Law Can Protect an Individual's Right to Genetic Privacy While Respecting the Government’s Important Interest in Combating Crime,” The Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 52, Issue 2, , ACC. 5-9-2015One major concern is that much DNA obtained from a crime scene belongs to individuals who have no connection to the crime, particularly when the scene is a high-traffic location. Because police collect any and all DNA found at a crime scene, when the crime scene is a high traffic location there necessarily is genetic material from more individuals at the scene. When police collect all this DNA, they analyze and retain it, resulting in the inclusion of more and more individual’s genetic profiles in DNA databases. While states cannot upload genetic profiles of individuals who are never charged with a crime, CODIS does include forensic crime scene DNA of unknown individuals without requiring any apparent connection to the crime. This leads to concerns that the “government may intrude into the secret regions of man’s life at will” and thus “whittle away” American’s “privacy and dignity.” When courts deem these intrusions reasonable looking at “the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ we all have reason to fear that the nightmarish worlds depicted in films such as Minority Report and Gattaca will become realities.”F. Privacy is essential to preserving the value to life. In the face of advancing technologies, we must increase protectionsAlexandra I. Rengel, JD from Boston University School of Law, LL.M., J.S.D., 2013, “Privacy invading technologies and recommendations for designing a better future for privacy rights,” Intercultural Human Rights Law Review, 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 177, , ACC. 5-11-2015The concept of privacy has been discussed for centuries by philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and legal scholars.?The importance that individuals place on privacy is beyond question and transcends geographical, cultural and racial boundaries. Individuals' need for secrecy and private space is so fundamental to forging relationships with others, and to preserving our sense of self, that a society with a complete lack of individual privacy would be?unimaginable.?A right to privacy protects individuals from having the contents of certain private information made public and regulates the means and manner by which that information is obtained.?However, new technologies often make us wonder what level of protection for our right to privacy is possible in our world where personal information about us can easily be accessed without the need to infringe into our physical space, but by invisible hands that can get to know our most private secrets with a keystroke and looking at a screen. As technology becomes increasingly able to facilitate breaches in our privacy, it becomes most important to establish protections.1ACAdvantage Two: The New Jim CrowA. Inclusion from arrest is arbitrary and racist. CODIS disproportionately includes African Americans. The status quo will only exacerbate inequalitiesElizabeth E. Joh, U.C. Davis School of Law, December 5, 2014, “Should Arrestee DNA Databases Extend to Misdemeanors?,” Recent Advances in DNA & Gene Sequences, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 406, ACC. 5-9-2015, all of this means is that one’s chances of being included in DNA database based on an arrest for a minor crime may depend on seemingly arbitrary factors like one’s neighborhood, race, attitude, or just plain bad luck. And given the existing disproportionate representation of minorities in the criminal justice system, that discretion would likely translate into databases that are even more racially imbalanced than they are no. Based on felony conviction data, one study suggested in 2006 that African-Americans constitute about 40% of the CODIS offender index. With the additional reach of familial matches, that number means that as much 17 percent of all African-Americans could be identified through samples in CODIS. In the U.K., official estimates suggest that between 45 and 61% of young black men have profiles in the National DNA Database. Authorizing the inclusion of new profiles by relying primarily on the discretion of the police is a recipe to further exacerbate these inequities.B. CODIS is another chapter is American Jim Crow-style racial segregationHarry G. Levine, PhD-Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, Et al, 2008, “Drug Arrests and DNA: Building Jim Crow’s Database,” GeneWatch, GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=58&archive=yes, ACC. 5-7-2015Despite the technical errors and errors of interpretation, DNA databases are now being used, and will be used ever more in the future, to identify suspects and to convict people. As a result,? Black and Latino teenagers and young people who are disproportionately and unjustly arrested for marijuana possession and other misdemeanors are also disproportionally at higher risk of being falsely suspected, accused and even convicted of more serious crimes - and so are their genetically similar relatives. The racial segregation laws in the United States that ran for 89 years - from 1876 to 1965 - were commonly called Jim Crow laws. We suggest that continual expansion of CODIS and other racially-skewed DNA file and storage systems should be thought of as building Jim Crow's database.C. Overrepresentation in CODIS means it effectively codes the entire African American and Latino/a populations as “criminal”Kyla Kuvach, Staff Writer, April 6, 2013, “The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless DNA Testing,” Bill of Rights Defense Committee, , ACC. 5-8-2015By having information on such a large percentage of African Americans, the database effectively codes that population as inherently criminal and therefore in need of further surveillance. Because CODIS already overrepresents these individuals, it will likely encourage law enforcement to aggressively pursue warrantless DNA testing on a predominantly African American and Latino population. This database is also used to identify family members of those arrested and DNA tested. These family members are often used for police investigations, which is why?Howard University has dubbed DNA databases?"probable cause generators."1ACD. Not only do we have an ethical obligation to challenge racism, but that challenge is essential to effective policymaking. People should not be treated as means to an endPaul Gordon Lauren, Regents Professor, University of Montana, 1996, Power and Prejudice, p. 321.Yet despite these many problems and centuries of wrestling to find solutions, normative questions about the ought rather than simply the is of global politics and diplomacy remain before us. Indeed, such questions are particularly pressing and acute in the area of racial discrimination. Race was the subject that placed the whole issue of human rights upon the international agenda in the first place, and for a vast majority in the world race remains the most critical and universal test of how people deal with other people on the basis of an ethical standard. The principle of racial equality itself flows from a basic ethical concept, that of human dignity which implies in its simples terms that every human being is an end in himself or herself, not a mere means to an end, and should be treated as such. Thus, it is only natural for people to ask whether the conduct of politics and diplomacy supports or opposes racial discrimination, which is the very negation of the principle of equality. This should not be at all surprising, for as scholar Stanley Hoffman writes in his penetrating book Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics: “We must remember that states are led by human beings whose actions affect human beings with and outside: considerations of good and evil, right or wrong, are therefore both inevitable and legitimate.”Privacy Advantage ExtensionGeneral privacy ExtensionDNA databases inherently undermine privacy rights HYPERLINK "" \o "View other papers by this author" \t "_blank" Adrienne N. Kitchen, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law, February 12, 2015, “Genetic Privacy and Latent Crime Scene DNA of Non-Suspects: How the Law Can Protect an Individual's Right to Genetic Privacy While Respecting the Government’s Important Interest in Combating Crime,” The Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 52, Issue 2, , ACC. 5-9-2015The Fourth Amendment’s primary purpose is to protect privacy. This privacy protection is a “fundamental constitutional guarantee[] of . . . inviolability of the person.” Even courts upholding DNA analysis and the retention of genetic profiles in databases assume “individuals always have a subjective expectation of privacy in their DNA, unless and until a DNA sample is taken from them, with their knowledge, for law enforcement purposes.” Merely collecting a DNA sample for law enforcement purposes is not enough to prove a person does not retain a right of privacy in their DNA. Because DNA is the building block of every individual, there is a reasonable?even a significant?privacy expectation in its genetic information. Society recognizes individuals have a reasonable privacy expectation in their DNA even when that DNA is contained in a database. There is a reasonable privacy expectation in DNA, and individuals cannot lose their privacy rights by abandoning DNA they cannot help but leave behind. It follows courts should require reasonable particularized suspicion sufficient to obtain a warrant based on probable cause for the retention and searching of latent crime scene DNA in databases.Even junk DNA can be used for sensitive genetic data, which violates privacyStephanie Beaugh, Loyola Law School, Spring, 2013, “How the DNA Act violates the Fourth Amendment right to privacy of mere arrestees and pre-trial detainees,” Loyola Law Review, 59 Loy. L. Rev. 157, , ACC. 5-11-2015Furthermore, it is not out of the realm of possibility that the government might disregard or change its policy of using only "junk?DNA." Considering ongoing technological advances, "junk?DNA" could potentially reveal far more extensive information than it currently divulges.??Even though "junk?DNA" is a minimal?DNA?sample, the amount of information and detail extracted from it is huge. As mentioned,?DNA?can already be used to ascertain one's biological traits, medical conditions, and other relatives. This information is not only private, but it is irrelevant for identification purposes. Access to all this private information is an invasion of privacy of arrestees and pre-trial detainees, which the Fourth Amendment was enacted to protect.Allowing familial searches allows the government to gain sensitive genetic data. This is a significant invasion of privacyStephanie Beaugh, Loyola Law School, Spring, 2013, “How the DNA Act violates the Fourth Amendment right to privacy of mere arrestees and pre-trial detainees,” Loyola Law Review, 59 Loy. L. Rev. 157, , ACC. 5-11-2015The court states that "the amount and type of personal?information to be contained in the?DNA?profile is nominal."?However, this is a specious conclusion that evinces a fundamental ignorance of the amount and type of information actually available or a willful blindness to it. If familial and biological searches can be conducted, the information appears to be more than nominal. Even if the search merely yielded "nominal" information on matches, the government still possesses the sample from which the?DNA?profile is made. This intrusion on privacy is significant and unreasonable given that the scope of other personal information that can be obtained from a?DNA?sample is extraordinarily broad.? Significantly, as a district court correctly concluded, "DNA?is "an information science,' "not an identification science.'" CODIS is a slippery slopeIt’s a Brave New World in the making. The benefits of a federal DNA database system violates privacy and will soon expand to universal inclusionDavid Rangaviz, Esq., law clerk at the Federal District Court for the District of Vermont and Eric Morgan, third-year law student at Vermont Law School currently working as a judicial intern at the Federal District Court for the District of Vermont, Winter, 2013, “A Bridge too far: The Upcoming Mandatory DNA sampling of arrestees,” The Vermont Bar Journal & Law Digest, 38 Ver. B. J. & L. Dig. 18, , ACC. 5-11-2015All fifty states have enacted legislation that allows law enforcement to obtain?DNA?samples from offenders. The details of each state statute, however, vary widely; many, like Vermont, require those charged with a felony, as opposed to convicts, to submit data into the system. At the time of the publication of this article, the NDIS contains over 9,930,700 offender profiles and has aided law enforcement in more than 182,800 investigations. Vermont alone has contributed over 14,514 offender profiles to NDIS and the database has aided law enforcement in 146 cases. But critics dispute their effectiveness. In many states, large backlogs of samples wait to be uploaded due to high processing costs. These backlogs derive from the breadth of many state statutes, as twenty-eight states, including Vermont, allow?DNA?collection from arrestees. In some states approximately two-thirds of all individuals charged with a felony ultimately get convicted, calling into question the need for collecting and cataloguing?DNA from the remaining one-third of arrestees who are never convicted. These critics also argue that any aid to law enforcement comes at too high a cost. The ever-expanding breadth of the databases raises significant privacy and civil liberties concerns. As a warrantless search, the mandatory collection of?DNA?defies constitutional protection. The suggestion of taking profiles from newborn children and inserting them into a universal database conjures up images of a Brave New World society.?DNA collection stored in CODIS is a slippery slope of government intrusionAmerican Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), May 19, 2008, “Re: RIN 1105-AB24 Proposed Rule, DNA-Sample Collection Under the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 and the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, , ACC. 5-7-2015DOJ estimates that under the proposed regulations more than 1.2 million additional individuals will have their DNA (i) forcibly collected by multiple federal agencies (and potentially state and private organizations as well); (ii) profiled; and, (iii) maintained in the Combined DNA Indexing System (“CODIS”) each year. This represents a fifteen-fold increase in the number of DNA samples that will be collected from federal offenders. This number may increase over time, since the proposed regulations leave open the door to collection of DNA from even broader categories of individuals.Rapid DNA systems will make it easier for the government to surveil the entire populationAliya Sternstein, Staff Writer, September 23, 2014, “FBI plans rapid DNA dragnets,” Nextgov, , ACC. 5-7-2015The FBI is preparing to?accelerate the collection of DNA profiles for the government's?massive new biometric identification database. Developers of?portable DNA analysis machines have been invited to a?Nov. 13?presentation to learn about the bureau's vision for incorporating their technology into the FBI's?new database. So-called rapid DNA systems can draw up a profile in about 90 minutes.? The Next Generation Identification system, or NGI, the successor to the FBI's criminal fingerprint database,?is designed to quickly ID crooks through facial recognition, iris matching, tattoo cross-checks and vocal recordings, among other unique traits. But critics say aggregating DNA along with all this other data makes it easier for authorities to track the general population.?CODIS is a slippery slopeThere is a real threat of a slippery slope for government intrusion via a national DNA databaseJohn W. Whitehead, Analyst at The Rutherford Institute, March 09, 2015, “How DNA Is Turning Us Into a Nation of Suspects,” The Rutherford Institute, a_nation_of_suspects, ACC. 5-7-2015Whereas fingerprint technology created a watershed moment for police in their ability to “crack” a case, DNA technology is now being hailed by law enforcement agencies as the magic bullet in crime solving. It’s what police like to refer to a “modern fingerprint.” However, unlike a fingerprint, a DNA print reveals everything about “who we are, where we come from, and who we will be.” With such a powerful tool at their disposal, it was inevitable that the government’s collection of DNA would become?a slippery slope toward government intrusion. Certainly, it was difficult enough trying to protect our privacy in the wake of a 2013 Supreme Court ruling in?Maryland v. King?that?likened DNA collection to photographing and fingerprinting suspects when they are booked, thereby allowing the government to take DNA samples from people merely “arrested” in connection with “serious” crimes. At that time,?Justice Antonin Scalia warned?that as a result of the Court’s ruling, “your DNA can be taken and entered into a national database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”National DNA storage of some DNA makes DNA from everyone inevitable. It is an empirically proven slippery slopeMichael T. Snyder, former Washington D.C. attorney, July 9, 2013, “The Coming National DNA Database,” The Truth Wins, , ACC. 5-9-2015Those that are promoting a national DNA database claim that collecting the DNA of criminals is just like fingerprinting them, and that we should all be willing to submit to a slight intrusion to our privacy in order to make society a safer place. But is it really just a slight intrusion? Once they have the DNA of every American, the potential for abuse would be absolutely staggering.? It would only be a matter of time before DNA identification replaced Social Security cards and every other form of identification.? Eventually, there would be a very real possibility that we would all have to submit to “DNA verification” before we could get on an airplane, get a job, get a driver’s license or get a bank account. Of course that will not happen immediately, but that is the road that we are going down. At first, DNA samples were only taken from sex offenders. Once that precedent was set, they started taking it from all those charged with serious crimes. Now they are taking it from those charged with low level crimes. Eventually it will be all of us.CODIS is a slippery slopeIncluding DNA profiles into CODIS allows the federal government to bypass state expungement HYPERLINK "" \o "View other papers by this author" \t "_blank" Jessica D. Gabel, Georgia State University - College of Law, 2013, “Indecent Exposure: Genes are More than a Brand Name Label in the DNA Database Debate,” 42 University of Baltimore Law Review 561 (2013), Georgia State University College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-27, , ACC. 5-9-2015Not to be left in the dust, all fifty states now have similar provisions that establish DNA databases and mandate collection of samples from offenders, but the list of suspects is anything but usual. While databases were initially intended to store the profiles of sex offenders and other violent criminals—and some states do restrict the offender index to those individuals—state DNA databases have swelled to include those convicted of misdemeanor crimes. While the list of collectible offenses has multiplied, states also have begun to follow the federal practice of collecting samples from arrestees. Currently, twenty-eight states and the federal government actively collect DNA samples from arrestees and add them to the offender index. Should the charges be dismissed or the government otherwise fail to obtain a conviction, the DNA profile (and the sample from which it came) may be left in a legal vacuum. The majority of the states that permit arrestee collection put the onus on the individual to affirmatively seek destruction of the sample and expungement of the profile. But if that profile has already been uploaded into CODIS and added to the national database, then it will remain there indefinitely, regardless of what happens at the state level. The profile may also remain in a local database if there is no provision for removal from all DNA repositories. In contrast to the prevailing trend of placing the burden on the arrestee to request expungement, Maryland is one of only a handful of states that affirmatively requires the state to destroy the sample and eliminate the profile from the state database. Maryland law includes the corresponding duty to eliminate the profile if it has found its way into the national database maintained by the FBI. With the passage of Maryland HB 292 and removal of the sunset provision, section 2- 511(c) does now appear to require removal of the profile from local, state, and federal databases.Minority Report ExtensionDNA entered into CODIS risks a “Minority Report” scenario of widespread gnetic surveillance and discriminationAlbert E. Scherr, Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire, School of Law, Winter, 2013, “Genetic privacy & the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated surreptitious DNA harvesting,” Georgia Law Review, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 445, , ACC. 5-11-2015The informational-privacy dimension of?DNA?has been the primary focus of the genetic-database case law on genetic privacy. Though every court has, in the end, declined to act based on the informational-privacy features of?DNA, many of them have highlighted its potential. The classic description of?DNA's?informational value is Judge Reinhardt's dissent in United States v. Kincade: What type of information might the government eventually be able to extract from samples of junk?DNA? Even today, as the plurality admits, "DNA?profiles derived by STR may yield probabilistic?evidence of the contributor's race or sex." Yet that seems to be a dramatic understatement. The?DNA?"fingerprint" entered into?CODIS?likely has the potential to reveal information about an individual's "genetic defects, predispositions to diseases, and perhaps even sexual orientation."?DNA?analysis can reveal the presence of traits for thousands of known diseases, and countless numbers of diseases which are currently unknown. More ominously, some have predicted that the?DNA?profiles entered into?CODIS?will someday be able to predict the likelihood that a given individual will engage in certain types of criminal, or non-criminal but perhaps socially disfavored, behavior.Absent limits on government use and storage of DNA a “Minority Report” scenario becomes a real possibilityJohn W. Whitehead, Analyst at The Rutherford Institute, March 09, 2015, “How DNA Is Turning Us Into a Nation of Suspects,” The Rutherford Institute, a_nation_of_suspects, ACC. 5-7-2015Yet if there are no limits to government officials being able to access your DNA and all that it says about you, then where do you draw the line? As technology makes it ever easier for the government to tap into our thoughts, our memories, our dreams, suddenly the landscape becomes that much more dystopian. With the entire governmental system shifting into a pre-crime mode aimed at detecting and pursuing those who “might” commit a crime before they have an inkling, let alone an opportunity, to do so, it’s not so far-fetched to imagine a scenario in which government agents (FBI, local police, etc.) target potential criminals based on their genetic disposition to be a “troublemaker” or their relationship to past dissenters. Equally disconcerting: if scientists can, using DNA,?track salmon across hundreds of square miles of streams and rivers, how easy will it be for government agents to not only know everywhere we’ve been and how long we were at each place but collect our easily shed DNA and add it to the government’s already burgeoning database?The government can retain CODIS DNA data indefinitelyStephanie Beaugh, Loyola Law School, Spring, 2013, “How the DNA Act violates the Fourth Amendment right to privacy of mere arrestees and pre-trial detainees,” Loyola Law Review, 59 Loy. L. Rev. 157, , ACC. 5-11-2015Additionally, consider if a mistakenly identified person is arrested for a federal crime. The government receives "the automatic right to sample the arrestee's?DNA,?to analyze it, and to include a profile derived from the?DNA?sample in CODIS."?This mistakenly identified person, now an arrestee, has no recourse and is required to submit his?DNA?or be charged with a class A misdemeanor.?And should an innocent, mistakenly identified individual choose not to submit to the?DNA?test and be charged with a class A misdemeanor, when the mistaken identity comes to light and initial charges are dropped, that individual is still facing a federal offense for not submitting his?DNA?for a crime he did not commit in the first place. Moreover, "although his?DNA?profile will be expunged from?CODIS, the Government will retain his?DNA?sample indefinitely," leaving the government still in possession and control of an individual's person and property, whether it was lawfully obtained or not.Minority Report ExtensionThe “Minority Report” scenario is real. The NGI database allows total biometric knowledge accessible to federal and state law enforcementACLU of Massachusetts, Staff Writer, January 27, 2015, “The FBI’s plan to collect everyone’s DNA just got a huge boost from congress,” Privacy SOS, , ACC. 5-7-2015In 2011,?1 in 25 Americans was arrested. In a few years, if the FBI has its way, the federal government will possess the DNA of all of those people and more. Under the radar of most lawmakers and journalists, the Bureau—with private industry and congress’ help—is pushing?the most massive expansion?of biometric state surveillance since the invention of the fingerprint. Late last year, the FBI cut the ribbon on its one billion dollar biometrics database, called Next Generation Identification. Since NGI’s official launch, state and local law enforcement officials have been?encouraged?to submit face prints, fingerprints, retina scans, photos of tattoos and scars, and DNA collected from people nationwide to the FBI’s central database. Those state and local officials can also search against the FBI’s biometrics store, if they want to identify someone. With NGI in full operation, the scary future of Minority Report infamy takes a giant leap forward into the world of non-fiction.?DNA usage is approaching a genetic panopticonWalter Olson, Staff Writer, June 4, 2013, “Big Brother Invades Your Genes,” The Daily Beast, 2013/06/04/big-brother-invades-your-genes.html, ACC. 5-9-2015In his dissent, Scalia warns of such a “genetic panopticon.” (The reference is to Jeremy Bentham’s idea of a prison laid out so that inmates could be watched at every moment.) And it’s closer than you may think. Already fingerprint requirements have multiplied, as the dissent points out, “from convicted criminals, to arrestees, to civil servants, to immigrants, to everyone with a driver’s license” in some states. DNA sample requirements are now following a similar path, starting reasonably enough with convicts before expanding, under laws passed by more than half the states as well as Maryland, to arrestees. (“Nearly one-third of Americans will be arrested for some offense by age 23.”)? Soon will come wider circles. How long before you’ll be asked to give a DNA swab before you can board a plane, work as a lawn contractor, join the football team at your high school, or drive??Jim Crow Advantage ExtensionAfrican Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODISFederal DNA databasing discriminates against black and Latino/a peoples and undermines human rightsOsagie K. Obasogie, associate professor of law at UC Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco and a senior fellow at the Center for Genetics and Society in Berkeley, April 9, 2010, “The dangers of growing DNA databases,” Los Angeles Times, 5150, ACC. 5-7-2015The bottom line is, as UC Berkeley law professor Erin Murphy said in a 2008 article, "We're putting too much faith in a new technology whose limitations and uncertainties we don't yet fully understand." But the question is not only how many people this policy shift might affect, but which ones? Policies that expand DNA databases are almost sure to exacerbate racial bias in the criminal justice system. The grossly disproportionate number of imprisoned blacks and Latinos reflects, in part, the disproportionate policing of their communities. Although blacks make up only about 13% of the population, estimates show that they constitute at least 40% of the federal DNA database. Including arrestees who are not convicted will only widen such disparities. The U.S. criminal justice system is notorious for its long list of practices that others in the developed world consider to be blatant human rights violations. Our zealous pursuit of criminals must be balanced with respecting human rights.Racially biased arrests guarantee the national databank will be racist against black and latino/a peoples, including family membersErin Murphy, professor of law, New York University School of Law, March 2013, “The government wants your DNA,” Scientific American, Vol. 308 Issue 3, pp. 72-77, Ebsco.Finally, one very disturbing aspect of forensic DNA typing is the disproportionate impact that it has on minorities. Because blacks and Latinos make up a greater share of those arrested and convicted in our society, it is their DNA that is most likely to be collected and searched. Yet that is not necessarily because those groups commit more crime. For instance, studies show that across the country, the arrest rate for marijuana possession for blacks and Latinos is double, triple or even quadruple that for whites even though the first two groups do not use marijuana at any higher rate than the third. If police make arrests in a racially skewed way, then DNA databases will also be racially skewed. And it will be those groups whose relatives and family members will be most likely to fall under suspicion as a result of familial-match methods. The need to more closely regulate law enforcement's use of DNA collection and analysis goes beyond rules and policies related to mandatory collection and familial searches. So far the discussion has centered on the cases in which a person is ordered to give a DNA sample after arrest or conviction. It is also possible, however, for police to obtain DNA surreptitiously, as was done in the Grim Sleeper investigation. In such cases, Fourth Amendment law points in conflicting and often counterintuitive directions. Constitutional protection has traditionally not extended to discarded material -- if you throw your bloody shirt in the trash, you cannot complain that your rights were invaded when law enforcement snatches it up as evidence. But should the same reasoning apply to DNA, which is "discarded" routinely, albeit unintentionally? It is simply not possible to live in the world and not shed DNA. Given the myriad ways that DNA can be revealing of intimate personal details, does its ubiquity mean you have no grounds for complaint if the police pick up your discarded soda can and try to match your DNA profile with records in CODIS or store your information in a database or spreadsheet?African-American are disproportionately targeted by CODISJason Silverstein, PhD student in anthropology at Harvard University, March 27, 2013, “The Dark Side of DNA Evidence,” The Nation, 173554/dark-side-dna-evidence, ACC. 5-7-2015This is already happening here. By 2011, African-Americans made up 40 percent of the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), according to Jeremy Gruber, executive director of the Council for Responsible Genetics. Established by the DNA Identification Act in 1994, CODIS is used by the FBI to store and search DNA profiles collected by federal, state and local law enforcement. When exact matches cannot be found for an unknown sample, many states resort to partial matches, using different markers to track down potential family members.African Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODISOverrepresentation in CODIS allows the federal government to bypass state laws to target and map 17% of the African American population nowJason Silverstein, PhD student in anthropology at Harvard University, March 27, 2013, “The Dark Side of DNA Evidence,” The Nation, 173554/dark-side-dna-evidence, ACC. 5-7-2015Because African-Americans are significantly overrepresented in CODIS, it is possible to use the database to identify up to 17 percent of the country’s entire African-American population, researchers at Duke University’s Center for Genome Ethics, Law and Policy found in 2011. Although only four states explicitly permit familial searches, the ACLU has found that nineteen have used a partial match to connect an unknown sample with a potential relative of someone in CODIS—even though fifteen of those states prohibit using the database for this purpose. In California, which permits familial searching, an “initial candidate list” of up to 168 people is created. That list is then narrowed and nonrelatives removed. A potential relative who remains on the list becomes vulnerable to police investigation. This is why Howard University’s brief calls these efforts a “‘probable cause’ generator.”CODIS DNA violates the 4th Amendment and is easily manipulated for racial profiling HYPERLINK "" \o "View other papers by this author" \t "_blank" Adrienne N. Kitchen, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law, February 12, 2015, “Genetic Privacy and Latent Crime Scene DNA of Non-Suspects: How the Law Can Protect an Individual's Right to Genetic Privacy While Respecting the Government’s Important Interest in Combating Crime,” The Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 52, Issue 2, , ACC. 5-9-2015The collection of abandoned DNA is nearly limitless. Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, law enforcement officials can collect genetic information from anyone, whether they have an articulable suspicion or not. Law enforcement can collect DNA for one investigation then reanalyze it for several other investigations. The use of genetic profiles is difficult to control or limit. Currently law enforcement compares latent crime scene DNA against DNA stored in databases, but this limitation is not imposed by any outside organizations or laws. Rather, science is the only limit on governmental gene sequencing. For instance, the military started collecting DNA samples in 1992, collection supposedly restricted to the identification of soldiers killed in action, but four years later, the samples were already under consideration for medical research. Today CODIS contains all military DNA samples. Because courts uphold and accept repeated analysis, once geneticists isolate genes related to criminal behavior that could justify preventive detention or other social control. The criminal behavior connection could correlate with race, raising profiling concerns. Because the Fourth Amendment places no restrictions and requires no justification for abandoned DNA collection, and these profiles are retained indefinitely in CODIS, the Fourth Amendment fails to protect private citizens’ “sensitive genetic information”.Familial targeting bad / expanding nowDNA is unique. Law enforcement will turn to CODIS data for familial searchesValerie Ross, Staff Writer, January 2, 2014, “Forget Fingerprints: Law Enforcement DNA Databases Poised To Expand,” Nova Next, , ACC. 5-9-2015But unlike fingerprints, DNA is inherited in a far more consistent way. It shows who’s related to whom—something a standard fingerprint could never reveal. California, Colorado, Virgina, and Texas are using that to their advantage, employing a technique called familial search. Law enforcement agencies turn to familial search when a crime scene sample only contains a partial match. That partial match may point investigators to that person’s father, brother, son, or another close relative, giving them new leads where there otherwise may be none.Familial searches are racist and violate the 4th Amendment Mike Gloudemans and Nachi Shamaprasad, Genome Sciences & Policy Certificate Program Duke University, March 17, 2015, “Current Issues in Forensic DNA Applications,” , ACC. 5-9-2015One objection to familial searching is that it makes suspects out of innocent people; opponents therefore claim that it violates the Fourth Amendment. There are some concerns as to how far states might go to catch criminals. So far the states mentioned above have been cautious of privacy concerns, only using familial searching to test for immediate relatives in serious felony cases with no remaining leads. But some worry that as familial searching becomes more commonplace, these states might gradually ease some of these restrictions. A more relaxed definition of what constitutes a “partial match,” for example, might widen the circle of suspects from only first-degree relatives to second-degree relatives and beyond. Implicit racial and ethnic biases exist in the use of familial searching. Minorities whose relatives are overrepresented in the database have a greater chance of detection through a familial search. According to a 2011 estimate, 17 percent of African Americans have familial matches in the CODIS database, while only 4 percent of Caucasians have familial matches under the same search criteria.Police in several states already use CODIS DNA samples to target family members John W. Whitehead, Constitutional attorney and president of?The Rutherford Institute Forced Blood Draws, February 26, 2015, “DNA Collection and Biometric Scans: What Country Is This?,” , , ACC. 5-7-2015Capitalizing on this,?police in California, Colorado, Virginia and Texas use DNA found at crime scenes to identify and target family members for possible clues to a suspect’s whereabouts. Who will protect your family from being singled out for “special treatment” simply because they’re related to you? As biomedical researcher Yaniv Erlich warns, “If it’s not regulated and the police can do whatever they want … they can use your DNA to infer things about your health, your ancestry, whether your kids are your kids.” These are just a few of the questions we should be asking before these technologies and programs become too entrenched and irreversible. While the Fourth Amendment was created to prevent government officials from searching an individual’s person or property without a warrant and probable cause—evidence that some kind of criminal activity was afoot—the founders could scarcely have imagined a world in which we needed protection against widespread government breaches of our privacy on a cellular level. Yet that’s exactly what we are lacking.Familial targeting bad / genetic discriminationCODIS allows the government to analyze samples for a variety of genetic information beyond the 13-lociAlbert E. Scherr, Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire, School of Law, Winter, 2013, “Genetic privacy & the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated surreptitious DNA harvesting,” Georgia Law Review, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 445, , ACC. 5-11-2015Even if one only relies on the genetic nametag generated by the standard 13-loci?DNA?testing-the genetic fingerprint-the potential for intrusions on an individual's expectation of privacy expand beyond those associated with a fingerprint. For example, the provisions of the Federal?CODIS?database legislation allow for the inclusion of the?DNA?identification records of "other persons whose DNA?samples are collected under applicable legal authorities, provided that?DNA?samples that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in the National?DNA?Index System." This language suggests that one's harvested genetic nametag will appear in the FederalCODIS?database as long as such harvesting is constitutional. Once in the database, an "innocent" individual may be the subject of a coincidental match with a crime-scene sample, a match that would likely at least require explanation or a partial match, a match that might lead to a court-authorized search of the family members' genetic profiles.??That individual may also be the subject of an erroneous match, intentional or otherwise. More significantly, unlike the use of a?DNA?sample taken by authorization of state or federal statute, the use of a surreptitiously harvested sample is likely unregulated by statute.??It could be included in what has been referred to as?either a "linkage" or "rogue" database of suspects' or others' profiles.??The sample could be analyzed for information far beyond that provided by the more standard 13-loci STR testing, including not only skin pigmentation, bio-geographical origin, gender, and eye color but also a host of medical diseases, medical and behavioral predispositions, and perhaps even sexual orientation.Expanding CODIS means more innocent people get arrested and a higher risk of genetic discriminationMike Gloudemans and Nachi Shamaprasad, Genome Sciences & Policy Certificate Program Duke University, March 17, 2015, “Current Issues in Forensic DNA Applications,” , ACC. 5-9-2015Opponents of an all-inclusive national database liken the idea to a DNA dragnet that implicates many innocent people as suspects with the hope of finding a single actual offender. Under the current CODIS system, it might be possible for an innocent person to be linked to a crime simply because he or she was present at the crime scene at a different time than when the crime actually occurred. A national DNA database would exacerbate this problem. Furthermore, if the samples used to generate the database are not destroyed after extracting the STR information necessary for forensic comparisons, the possibility remains that the government might later extract further genetic information for purposes not related to crime-solving with probable cause. To avoid such complications, some have suggested destroying every person’s DNA sample immediately after typing its CODIS loci.Racism ExtensionRacism is constructed socially through rhetoric and human interaction. This means we can undo the structures of oppression that organize daily lifeDavid Hall, JD, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law School, Summer, 1999, “Giving Birth to a Racially Just Society in the 21st Century,” University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review, 21 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 927, 21+U.+Ark.+Little+Rock+L.+Rev.+927&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=7128c39417584ebb5f524e6401917bdc, ACC. 5-10-2015The history of racism and racial discrimination in this society is a classic example of this cycle of frustration and dashed hopes. As we approach the close of the 20th Century a retrospective analysis would provide numerous examples of what some have come to call the civil rights shuffle-one step forward, two steps backwards, side step, side step. This dance was eloquently and consistently choreographed for the last one hundred years and beyond. This dance does not negate or belittle the important and significant progress which was made during this century, but one could accurately say at the dawning of the 21st Century what W.E.B. DuBois said about the 20th Century-the issue of the century will be the color line. Therefore it is critically important and appropriate to not only learn lessons from the mistakes of this closing century, but to find the spiritual will to bring an end to this dance. Though a seminal symposium on race creates important opportunities to discuss these critical matters, one has to wonder if we are only engaged in a ritualistic exercise that pacifies our insecurities as the world around us gets worse. In the midst of those moments of sobering reflection, one must realize that each opportunity we have in life to touch each other's souls, to challenge each other's minds, and to lift each other's spirits, is a precious gift. The mere possibility that words and human interaction can make a difference in the reality of the world is what should inspire our future efforts and dedication, even when there is very little tangible evidence of progress.DNA profiling is rooted in biological determinist science of racism Christian B. Sundquist, Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Spring, 2009, “Beyond the Final Frontier: A "Post-Racial" America?: The Obligations of Lawyers, the Legislature, and The Court,” Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal, 25 Harv. BlackLetter J. 57, 2009-08-19&homepage=no, ACC. 5-10-2015Genetics has once again been relied on to scientifically interpret racial difference, notwithstanding the unfortunate lessons of history. Modern science and the courts apparently are easily lured by the folk notion that racial classifications in society are not simply arbitrary artifacts reflecting historical social and political processes, but rather account for enduring and naturally-occurring biological differences. It is thus now common and widely accepted for courts in the United States to admit statistical evidence claiming the scientific ability to interpret genetic racial difference.Biological determinism is a foundation of racialized hierarchal oppressionChristian B. Sundquist, Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Spring, 2009, “Beyond the Final Frontier: A "Post-Racial" America?: The Obligations of Lawyers, the Legislature, and The Court,” Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal, 25 Harv. BlackLetter J. 57, 2009-08-19&homepage=no, ACC. 5-10-2015Race was once understood as a scientifically meaningful taxonomic structure for human society. Science--whether in the guise of taxonomy, biology, anthropology, anthropometrics, anatomy, medicine, eugenics, or physiognomy--was utilized to define racial boundaries and groupings, as well as to empirically demonstrate supposedly innate and immutable differences among the "races" in intelligence, sexuality, morality, and other physical and mental human characteristics. Unsurprisingly, science played a pivotal role in reinforcing and legitimizing folk beliefs of white superiority and non-white inferiority, thus maintaining a rigid system of racial oppression and hierarchy. The pseudo-scientific theories of white racial superiority became applied science during the racial eugenics movement in the United States and Germany. Following the horrific and coldly technical application of unsound scientific theories of race by Nazi Germany in World War II, the world flatly rejected biological conceptions of race and advocated a perception of race as a social and historical construction. Topicality AnswersThe national database system (CODIS) is a federal collection of DNA The FBI supplies law enforcement with biometric surveillance technology to feed its central databaseACLU of Massachusetts, Staff Writer, January 27, 2015, “The FBI’s plan to collect everyone’s DNA just got a huge boost from congress,” Privacy SOS, , ACC. 5-7-2015The FBI has big goals when it comes to biometric databases, but they can’t achieve them without the active buy-in and assistance of state and local police. That’s part of the reason why Department of Justice and Homeland Security grant programs have paid for state and local police nationwide to purchase biometric capturing and processing technologies. Ask your local police department about their electronic fingerprint readers, for example, and you’re likely to hear that they were purchased with federal funds. Those devices make it easy for police and sheriffs nationwide to?submit fingerprints to the FBI—rapidly, from the field, and with very little effort on behalf of departments.All DNA collected goes into CODISValerie Ross, Staff Writer, January 2, 2014, “Forget Fingerprints: Law Enforcement DNA Databases Poised To Expand,” Nova Next, , ACC. 5-9-2015DNA databases help catch criminals, supporters say. And not just any criminals: because the majority of genetic evidence is collected in homicide and rape cases, the databases are particularly useful in identifying people who have committed violent crimes. To get a DNA sample—whether from an arrestee or a convicted criminal—law enforcement officers swab the inside of a suspect’s cheek. They then send the swab, now coated in DNA, to one of more than 200 public and private labs that analyze samples for the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which catalogs these genetic profiles at the local, state, and national level. The labs don’t read the full genome of each convict’s or arrestee’s DNA; in fact, they don’t analyze any actual genes to include in the database, none of the stretches of DNA that code for health risks or visible traits. They look at 13 locations, called loci, on each of two sets of chromosomes in what’s commonly called “junk DNA,” or bits of the chromosome that don’t code for anything in particular. Each DNA profile is made up of 26 data points.All 50 states collect DNA and feed it to CODISJohn W. Whitehead, Constitutional attorney and president of?The Rutherford Institute Forced Blood Draws, February 26, 2015, “DNA Collection and Biometric Scans: What Country Is This?,” , , ACC. 5-7-2015The National Highway Safety Administration, the same government agency that funds the “No Refusal” DUI checkpoints and forcible blood draws, is also funding?nationwide roadblocks aimed at getting drivers to “voluntarily” provide police with DNA derived from saliva and blood samples, reportedly to study inebriation patterns. When faced with a request for a DNA sample by police during a mandatory roadblock,?most participants understandably fail to appreciate the “voluntary” nature of such a request. Unfortunately, in at least 28 states, there’s nothing voluntary about having one’s DNA collected by police?in instances where you’ve been arrested, whether or not you’re actually convicted of a crime. The remaining states collect DNA on conviction. All of this DNA data is being fed to the federal government. Indeed, the United States has the largest DNA database in the world, CODIS, which is managed by the FBI and is growing at an alarming rate.The national database system (CODIS) is a federal collection of DNA The federal database system determines how states and local law enforcement access dataErin Murphy, professor of law, New York University School of Law, March 2013, “The government wants your DNA,” Scientific American, Vol. 308 Issue 3, pp. 72-77, Ebsco.Familial searching, in contrast, has yet to be decided by any court. Like the compiling of arrestee databases, the guidelines for familial searching vary greatly state to state. Yet unlike the rules about whose DNA must go in the database, which are set by democratically elected legislatures, the rules about how police can use the DNA database are often put in place internally by high-level federal or state officials, administrative agencies, or even the heads of individual state or municipal crime laboratories. In fact, the situation is so muddy that it can be difficult even to discern which states engage in what practices. Current data indicate that at least 15 states actively undertake familial searches, although the most prominent users are law-enforcement officials in California, Virginia, Colorado and Texas. Unquestionably, other states have informally conducted occasional searches, and a handful of states are now weighing authorizing legislation. Some states do recognize the potential for abuse. Maryland and the District of Columbia both forbid intentional familial searches by law, and more than 15 states in addition to Maryland prohibit it through written or unwritten policy.The FBI threatens state funding if they do not conform to federal databasing David H. Kaye, Distinguished Professor and Weiss Family Scholar, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law, Fall, 2009, “Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What is the FBI Afraid Of?,” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 19 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 145, upload/kaye.pdf, ACC. 5-9-2015The Bureau reportedly has threatened states with cutting off their participation in the national database system that pools the state and federal data if they release their databases to outside scientists or to defendants. The misperception that the study is a smoking gun for the usual random-match probabilities, combined with the FBI's defensiveness, prompted one prominent law professor to demand "an immediate congressional investigation" that "could raise questions of appeal in hundreds of cases and [could] lead to some FBI officials being fired." Likewise, the San Francisco Chronicle branded the FBI's opposition to the use of large, offender databases for population-genetics research "ridiculous and reprehensible" if not "criminal." The FBI is a federal agency and is in charge of federal databasesShane Bauer, Staff Writer, November 20, 2014, “The FBI Is Very Excited About This Machine That Can Scan Your DNA in 90 Minutes,” Mother Jones, , ACC. 5-11-2015The FBI is the only federal agency allowed to keep a national DNA database. Currently, police must use a lab to upload genetic profiles to it. But that could change. The?FBI's website?says it is eager to see rapid DNA in wide use and that it supports the "legislative changes necessary" to make that happen. IntegenX's Heimburger says the FBI is almost finished working with members of Congress on a bill that would give "tens of thousands" of police stations rapid-DNA machines that could search the FBI's system and add arrestees' profiles to it. (The RapitHIT is already designed to do this.) IntegenX has spent?$70,000 lobbying?the FBI, DHS, and Congress over the last two years.A2: Crime DisadvantageNon-Unique – Crime is high nowCrime will be high without Federal Code reformEvan Feinberg, Staff Writer, April 20, 2015, “Why are so many Americans criminals?,” CNN, opinions/feinberg-criminal-justice-reform/, ACC. 5-10-2015Criminal justice reform is rapidly becoming one of the few bipartisan issues of our time. It's about time. America has the highest incarceration rate in the world, with 5% of the world's population and 25% of its prisoners. Nearly 2? million Americans are in prison. Over 65 million people, or 20% of the country, have criminal records. Most disturbingly, nearly 40% of our country's prisoners are African-Americans, who only make up 13% of the general population. It's time for policymakers to address this criminal justice crisis head on. We must change the dismal status quo. We must start by asking a simple question: Why are so many Americans criminals? Look no further than Washington, which has spent the past century devising the most complicated — and nonsensical — criminal code known to man. The federal criminal code includes over 4,500 laws and counting, not to mention government regulations for which there are criminal penalties. The list of federal crimes is so long, so broad and so vague that you and I likely commit three felonies every day, unwittingly breaking numerous federal laws as we go about our daily business. No wonder America's prison population is out of control. Americans aren't addicted to crime; our politicians are addicted to criminalizing things.WalMart guarantees high crime ratesSimon McCormick, Staff Writer, February 12, 2014, “Walmart Linked To Higher Crime Rates: Study,” Huffington Post, , ACC. 5-10-2015"Always low prices" goes hand in hand with almost-always higher crime rates, at least according to a recent study?published in The British Journal of Criminology. Lead author Scott Wolfe, assistant professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of South Carolina, looked at counties where Walmart expanded compared to counties where the megastore did not. "The crime decline was stunted in counties where Walmart expanded in the 1990s," Wolfe said in a press release issued last week. "If the corporation built a new store, there were 17 additional property crimes and 2 additional violent crimes for every 10,000 persons in a county." The study looked at annual crime rates in 3,109 counties between 1991 and 2009. Wolfe was especially focused on the 1990s, when crime rates plummeted nationwide and Walmart experienced dynamic growth. The study found that the crime reduction was slowed in communities where Walmart expanded, a trend that continued in the 2000s.Link Turn – We reduce the backlogCODIS has an enormous backlog nowMike Gloudemans and Nachi Shamaprasad, Genome Sciences & Policy Certificate Program Duke University, March 17, 2015, “Current Issues in Forensic DNA Applications,” , ACC. 5-9-2015For more than a decade, the number of new DNA samples requiring processing in crime labs has exceeded labs’ capacity to handle these samples. This backlog is of obvious concern to law enforcement officials since unanalyzed samples cannot be used to close cases. Backlog includes both casework awaiting completion and profiles of arrested or convicted offenders waiting to be uploaded to CODIS. The NIJ did not adopt a formal standard for defining backlog until 2011; starting in 2011 the NIJ required all the labs it funded to report as backlogged all samples older than 30 days. The number of backlogged criminal cases increased from 83,603 to 91,323 during 2011. While the number of cases finished in 2011 (248,085) increased by 10 percent from the previous year, the number of new cases submitted also increased by 16.4 percent. At the start of 2011, there were 187,034 backlogged samples from arrested or convicted offenders waiting to be submitted to CODIS, but by the end of the year there were only 113,531 backlogged samples. Although the number of samples submitted is high, the labs can process many of these samples each year: in 2011, forensic labs finished processing a total of 793,457 CODIS submissions. Current CODIS expansion will compound the backlog in processing. The plan reverses this trendNaseam Rachel Behrouzfard, Southern New England School of Law, 2014, “Strengths, Limitations, and Controversies of DNA Evidence,”?University of Massachusetts Law Review?1.1, 5, , ACC. 5-9-2015Simoncelli also argues that expansion of DNA databases will create overburdened crime laboratories, crime framing, unjustifiable costs, and unfairness. She believes that if crime labs conducted DNA testing on every person who is arrested or indicted, it would be unconscionable because of the current state of laboratory backlogs. Because state and local government budgets have been shrinking, laboratories have been left with insufficient funding for hiring and training scientists. To support her claim Simoncelli refers to a recent Massachusetts case. In that case, law enforcement officials had a DNA sample from a suspect in Christina Worthington’s murder for over a year, but did not profile it because they were using their time and funding on testing local community members.DNA backlogs prevent effective prosecution and allows violent attacks to go unchallenged Ben Protess, Analysts at , May 5, 2009, “Complex strands of DNA backlog,” Politico, ACC. May 7, 2010, , ACC. 5-10-2015Kellie Greene knows firsthand what can happen when labs fall behind. In 1994, a stranger broke into Greene’s Orlando, Fla., home and beat and raped her. Greene lived in fear while waiting for police to find the man. But the DNA he left on her leggings went untested for more than three years. When the test results finally came back, she learned that her attacker had committed an earlier rape. His DNA from that case was backlogged for two years — the window of time in which he attacked Greene.A2: Politics The public would flip out at the prospect of a national DNA database. They would think it is 1984Brian Clark Stuart, JD, University of Mississippi School of Law, 2014, “Dethroning the King: Why the warrantless DNA testing of arrestees should be prohibited under state constitutions,” Mississippi Law Journal, 83 Miss. L.J. 1111, ACC. 5-11-2015The general public will almost certainly disapprove of an expansion of the?law enforcement's?DNA database?to cover everyone.?Ordinary citizens are likely to be wary of the government's possession of the most intimate details of their lives.?Despite the general public's concern, the government's admitted objective is to make the?DNA databases?as large as it can.?One may also find it disturbing that, after extracting the DNA profile from the DNA sample, the sample is not merely discarded.?Rather, the government keeps the sample?indefinitely, for possible future analysis.?The majority was not concerned with any potential abuse of the vast amount of information held by the government, stating that "statutory protections . . . guard against further invasion of privacy."?This is unlikely to bring comfort to the ordinary citizen with the recent news of the National Security Agency prying into personal communications and correspondence.?While this complete database encompassing everyone's DNA might be useful for both true identification and criminal investigation, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where it could be implemented without the general population justifiably thinking of "Big Brother" and?1984.General Case ExtensionSolvencyDNA collection is virtually useless without CODISTim Dees, former criminal justice professor and instructor at colleges in Wisconsin, West Virginia, Georgia, and Oregon, January 27, 2015, “A new way DNA tech can help you ID your unknown suspect,” Police One, 8193116-A-new-way-DNA-tech-can-help-you-ID-your-unknown-suspect/, ACC. 5-5-2015DNA analysis is a wonderful investigative tool. You can match evidence carrying biological trace to the person who left the trace, with near-certainty you have the right guy.?This assumes, of course, that you have an existing DNA profile that matches evidence, one already on a suspect list or that is found in CODIS. If you don’t, DNA evidence is only a little better than a fingerprint. You might be able to get close with a familial match, but mostly you’re still looking for some other connection to the crime. What if your DNA evidence could also show you what the donor looked like??Inherency Extension – No restrictions now / national database comingThe status quo is moving toward ever-expanding DNA databases that systemically undermine privacy HYPERLINK "" \o "View other papers by this author" \t "_blank" Jessica D. Gabel, Georgia State University - College of Law, 2013, “Indecent Exposure: Genes are More than a Brand Name Label in the DNA Database Debate,” 42 University of Baltimore Law Review 561 (2013), Georgia State University College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-27, , ACC. 5-9-2015It should not surprise us, then, that the criminal justice system wants to collect DNA from an ever-increasing spectrum of people who come into contact with it. The notion of privacy and the presumption of innocence are now blurred figures in this landscape. These concerns do not pertain to simply the collection of DNA profiles and samples, but also to the other information that may be kept. While criminal investigations and medical research previously operated in different genetic spheres, those spheres are starting to converge. When DNA is collected on arrest and uploaded into the database, it is not simply translated into an identity-free criminal bar code. Ultimately, that digitized profile must link to a name, to a location, and possibly to a criminal record. Other records may also be available, especially for released offenders because police must be able to track that person down if there is a hit in the database later. Ultimately, we may find that when police do contact a database offender they may also be able to tell that person his or her predisposition to kidney disease.There are no restrictions on government use and storage of DNA nowJohn W. Whitehead, Analyst at The Rutherford Institute, March 09, 2015, “How DNA Is Turning Us Into a Nation of Suspects,” The Rutherford Institute, a_nation_of_suspects, ACC. 5-7-2015The government’s questionable acquisition and use of DNA to identify individuals and “solve” crimes has come under particular scrutiny in recent years. Until recently, the government was required to at least observe some basic restrictions on when, where and how it could access someone’s DNA. That has all been turned on its head by various U.S. Supreme Court rulings, including the recent decision to let stand the?Maryland Court of Appeals’ ruling in?Raynor v. Maryland, which essentially determined that individuals do not have a right to privacy when it comes to their DNA.Inherency Extension – CODIS expanding nowFunction creep is a reality. The ever-expanding DNA database system will soon include all crimesRachel Cox, Georgetown University Law Center, 2014, “Unethical intrusion: The Disproportionate impact of law enforcement DNA sampling on minority populations, “American Criminal Law Review, Unethical_Intrusion.pdf, ACC. 5-9-2015Function creep has already started to occur with respect to DNA databases. For example, familial DNA searching allows law enforcement to connect DNA found at crime scenes to family members of individuals whose profiles are in DNA databases. Additionally, DNA analysis companies have been marketing services to law enforcement that would allow them to use DNA to predict the specific ancestry of an offender or infer the offender’s eye color. Although this information may allow police to better identify and arrest criminals, such expanded use comes with the risk of infringing on personal liberties. For example, DNA collection may be used to bolster racial profiling efforts, especially when DNA is generally collected from racial minorities. The risk of function creep is made greater by the fact that DNA databases are continually expanding. “[W]e have witnessed the ever-widening scope of the target groups from whom law enforcement collects DNA and rapid-fire proposals to expand genetic databases to include new categories and ever-greater numbers of persons,” one example of which is the subject of this note—the addition of arrestees to the group of individuals whose DNA can be sampled and stored: In less than a decade, we have gone from collecting DNA from convicted sex offenders—on the theory that they are likely to be recidivists and that they frequently leave biological evidence—to collecting it from all violent offenders; to collecting it from all persons convicted of a crime; to collecting it from juvenile offenders in twenty-nine states; and now to proposals, and laws... to collect it from mere arrestees.DNA database expansion is inevitable in the status quo and will outpace identity restrictions HYPERLINK "" \o "View other papers by this author" \t "_blank" Jessica D. Gabel, Georgia State University - College of Law, 2013, “Indecent Exposure: Genes are More than a Brand Name Label in the DNA Database Debate,” 42 University of Baltimore Law Review 561 (2013), Georgia State University College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-27, , ACC. 5-9-2015In the wake of the King case, the fingerprint–DNA analogy has overstayed its welcome. Nonetheless, it seems that it is not slated for retirement any time soon despite enduring concerns about the expansion of DNA collection. If the extension of DNA databases is in fact inevitable, then it should likewise be foreseeable that DNA technology may advance and outpace the restrictions once thought sufficient to keep databases sufficiently void of identifying information. As for now, it seems we would rather be content to operate databases at the margins of technology and tolerate a certain margin of error when things go awry. The criminal justice system hungers for the ability to solve crime and convict the guilty. Databases certainly feed that insatiable beast, but we need to respect that DNA is not the tame dormouse we once thought it to be.The FBI is expanding DNA surveillance efforts nowHannah Yang, Analyst at the Heartland Institute, October 9, 2014, “FBI Expands Spying Powers with New DNA Database,” The Heartland Institute, , ACC. 5-7-2015Instead of broadcasting an omnipresent face via telescreen, a new government program may be bringing “Big Brother” to street corners and traffic intersections near you. In September,?the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a statement heralding the expansion of the Next Generation Identification System (NGIS) data network,?including two new services, Rap Black and the Interstate Photo System (IPS).? A third new service,?called Rapid DNA, is also planned to be integrated into NGIS in the future.?Rapid DNA is a portable genetic testing program which will be plugged “into the FBI's Combined DNA Index (CODIS) and Next Generation Identification (NGI) systems from the booking environment.”Inherency Extension – Maryland v. KingThe Court’s decision in Mayland v. King means using DNA means anyone accused of a crime will be ensnaredPeter Fenn, Fenn Communications, June 4, 2013, “Your DNA in a Database,” US News & World Report, http:/opinion/ blogs/peter-fenn/2013/06/04/the-supreme-courts-invasion-into-dna-privacy, ACC. 5-9-2015The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday upheld the use of DNA databases to collect genetic information from suspects arrested but not yet charged, without any requirement that officers first show probable cause. The?5-4 ruling?overrules a state court determination that Maryland’s DNA collection law permits unconstitutionally invasive searches. In the short term, the ruling means that law enforcement officials can collect DNA from anyone accused of a violent crime or burglary and upholds existing DNA collection laws in?about 28 states. This DNA stays in a database and can serve as the basis for later accusing people of other, unrelated crimes. As the Maryland Supreme Court pointed out in their ruling, only?16 percent of people arrested for some felonies are eventually convicted, and more than one in four people charged with crimes that are much easier to prosecute are not convicted. This means widespread DNA testing ensnares a whole lot of innocent people. But even those who believe they could never be suspected of a violent crime may not be insulated from testing. Justice Antonin Scalia warns in a dissent joined by three of the court’s more liberal justices that the court’s reasoning would apply equally to someone accused of any crime or violation at all: When there comes before us the taking of DNA from an arrestee for a traffic violation, the Court will predictably (and quite rightly) say, ‘We can find no significant difference between this case and King.’ Make no mistake about it: As an entirely predictable consequence of today’s decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason. Maryland v. King gives approval for unlimited collection of DNA by the governmentJason Silverstein, PhD student in anthropology at Harvard University, March 27, 2013, “The Dark Side of DNA Evidence,” The Nation, 173554/dark-side-dna-evidence, ACC. 5-7-2015On February 26, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in?Maryland v. King, which presents the question of whether the Fourth Amendment permits the warrantless collection of DNA from people arrested for, but not convicted of, a crime. Currently, twenty-eight states and federal law enforcement collect DNA upon arrest—when a person is still presumed innocent. During oral arguments, Justice Samuel Alito called it “perhaps the most important criminal procedure case that this Court has heard in decades.”?The case goes back to April 10, 2009, when Maryland police arrested Alonzo King on assault charges. A DNA sample was collected, and four months later, it was found to match evidence from an unsolved rape, which led to King’s conviction for the crime. The case is precisely the sort of example given by proponents of broad DNA collection: DNA has the power to identify the guilty and exonerate the innocent. ?But in King’s case, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that arrestees have privacy expectations that outweigh the state’s crime-solving interest. In its petition to the Supreme Court, Maryland argues that collecting DNA is no more invasive than its twentieth-century counterpart, the fingerprint. But King and opposing groups filing friend of the court, or amicus, briefs respond that unlike fingerprints, DNA is a trove of personal, medical and ancestral information. What’s more, DNA solves cases far less frequently than the state suggests. In 2011, Maryland police collected 10,666 DNA samples; only nineteen led to an arrest. The state’s interest is thus not identification but investigation—and the Court has never?permitted suspicionless searches of suspects without a warrant. If it does in?King, there will be no principle limiting when our DNA may be collected in the name of fighting crime.Inherency Extension – Maryland v. KingThe King decision eroded protections against DNA collectionLesley Hall, JD, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, Summer, 2014, “Arrestee Number Two, Who Are You? Suspicionless DNA Testing of Pre-Trial Arrestees and the Fourth Amendment Implications,” Missouri Law Review, 79 Mo. L. Rev. 755, ACC. 5-11-2015The Court's holding in?King?distorts the Fourth Amendment's protections and erodes an arrestee's rights. While DNA testing aids in crime solving, taking DNA samples from pre-trial arrestees for suspicionless criminal investigatory searches violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches, and?King's?holding further erodes the protections of those who are presumed innocent. As Justice Scalia announced in his dissent, while solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, "it occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protection of our people from suspicionless?law-enforcement?searches. The Fourth Amendment must prevail."A2: DNA collection good / like fingerprintingDNA samples in CODIS provide unique genetic dataMike Gloudemans and Nachi Shamaprasad, Genome Sciences & Policy Certificate Program Duke University, March 17, 2015, “Current Issues in Forensic DNA Applications,” , ACC. 5-9-2015Is DNA fingerprinting truly the 21st century version of traditional fingerprinting? One important distinction between DNA fingerprinting and traditional fingerprinting is that DNA samples, if not destroyed following entry into a database, can potentially provide a wealth of personal health-related information that is not revealed in a traditional fingerprint. As for the system of maintenance, the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) currently contains fingerprints for over 70 million individuals; fingerprints are added for arrests as well as background checks for some jobs. Automated fingerprint matching is available for solving cold cases, and the FBI gives an annual “Latent Hit of the Year” spotlighting an investigator who uses IAFIS to solve a cold case with no remaining leads. In this regard, maintenance of DNA fingerprints within CODIS, as described previously, is quite similar to maintenance of traditional fingerprints. Of course, nationwide fingerprint searches in IAFIS have only become a real option recently due to technological improvements providing increased accuracy and efficiency, so it might be premature to gauge the uptick in the use of IAFIS.DNA samples can be easily exploited. They are uniquely different than fingerprinting HYPERLINK "" \o "View other papers by this author" \t "_blank" Adrienne N. Kitchen, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law, February 12, 2015, “Genetic Privacy and Latent Crime Scene DNA of Non-Suspects: How the Law Can Protect an Individual's Right to Genetic Privacy While Respecting the Government’s Important Interest in Combating Crime,” The Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 52, Issue 2, , ACC. 5-9-2015DNA differs significantly from fingerprints. Claiming DNA merely identifies an individual is like saying a Social Security Number only represents identity. The potential uses of a fingerprint are quite limited. DNA holds a person’s entire genetic blueprint. It identifies a person’s relatives, and provides information about health, race, familial ties, and ethnicity. DNA samples may be used for a myriad other purposes beyond law enforcement, including research, heredity, and potential for disease. Because of its many other uses, DNA samples and genetic profiles are easy to exploit.CODIS DNA collection is unique because it allows the government a way to survey citizens from birth to deathJohn W. Whitehead, Analyst at The Rutherford Institute, March 09, 2015, “How DNA Is Turning Us Into a Nation of Suspects,” The Rutherford Institute, a_nation_of_suspects, ACC. 5-7-2015All 50 states now maintain their own DNA databases, although the protocols for collection differ from state to state. That DNA is also being collected in the FBI’s massive national DNA database, code-named CODIS (Combined DNA Index System), which was established as a way to identify and track convicted felons and has since become a de facto way to identify and track the American people from birth to death.A2: DNA collection good / fake DNADNA can be faked by any biology undergradErnie Austin, Associate Editor, February 23, 2015, “DNA Evidence Can be Faked,” Forensic Magazine, news/2015/02/dna-evidence-can-be-faked, ACC. 5-9-2015In a?recent story?in?The New York Times, Andrew Pollack reports that "scientists in Israel have demonstrated that it is possible to fabricate DNA evidence, undermining the credibility of what has been considered the gold standard of proof in criminal cases. "The scientists fabricated blood and saliva samples containing DNA from a person other than the donor of the blood and saliva. They also showed that if they had access to a DNA profile in a database, they could construct a sample of DNA to match that profile without obtaining any tissue from that person." “You can just engineer a crime scene,” Dan Frumkin, lead author of the?paper, which has been published online by the journal Forensic Science International: Genetics, told the?Times. “Any biology undergraduate could perform this.” DNA in CODIS is prone to human errorNaseam Rachel Behrouzfard, Southern New England School of Law, 2014, “Strengths, Limitations, and Controversies of DNA Evidence,”?University of Massachusetts Law Review?1.1, 5, , ACC. 5-9-2015Even though some scholars view DNA evidence as infallible, the use of this evidence raises the same concerns as all other types of evidence. When humans perform tests, there is always room for human error. The existence of human error regarding DNA evidence should not be overlooked. Under the DNA Identification Act, federal laboratories must meet certain specified standards for inclusion in the Combined DNA Index System. CODIS allows DNA obtained from crime scenes to be matched against the profiles in the system. Most states, however, do not employ these rigid standards as laboratory personal are often in charge of testing procedures, which some people view as risky. For example, a recent investigation examining the Houston Police Department’s crime laboratory revealed a significant amount of quality issues including lack of training. In 2003, Josiah Sutton was convicted of rape and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison because DNA tests performed by the Houston Police Department’s crime lab showed he was the perpetrator. The supposedly definitive lab report revealed that DNA “consistent with Sutton was detected on the vaginal swab taken from the victim and on semen found on the backseat of the car.” Two reporters received a tip from defense attorneys that there were problems in the police department’s crime lab. These reporters decided to investigate. They dug up transcripts and lab reports and sent them to experts, including University of California criminology professor, William Thompson. Thompson found that [this case] was “the worst he had ever seen.” Thompson knew that Sutton was poorly represented: I found consistent distortions of the statistical certainty of the DNA evidence. I found instances that looked like fudging of results, to fit the prosecution’s theory of the case, and I found that the lab consistently failed to use appropriate scientific procedures. A2: DNA collection good / exonerates the innocentThere are multiple barriers to DNA exonerationMike Gloudemans and Nachi Shamaprasad, Genome Sciences & Policy Certificate Program Duke University, March 17, 2015, “Current Issues in Forensic DNA Applications,” , ACC. 5-9-2015Despite the promise of DNA-based exoneration to reverse injustices and improve the accuracy of criminal investigations, efforts to reverse wrongful convictions are often hampered by obstacles to access to DNA evidence. The procedural guidelines for providing DNA evidence for postconviction testing vary from state to state. For instance, the state of New York lacks any statute regarding the preservation of biological samples, and the state’s regulations regarding processing of biological samples do not meet criteria laid out by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Recent legislative action in Congress seeks to address this issue. H.B 1069, sponsored by Rep. Tina Orwall (D-IA) would require DNA evidence from violent or sex-related felonies to be preserved throughout the offender’s sentence. The alleged goals of the legislation are to standardize policies regarding preservation of DNA samples post-conviction across states, and to facilitate post-conviction appeals. The bill passed the house on a bipartisan vote in February, and has been referred to the Senate. Other obstacles to accessing DNA evidence posed by state laws include denying access when a guilty plea was made or requiring evidence that new DNA testing would reveal the true perpetrator. In addition, petitioning for access to DNA evidence is often prolonged by procedural requirements and prosecutorial objections, as seen in the high-profile prosecution and eventual exoneration of Michael Morton. Involvement of the Innocence Project in this case eventually led to the discovery of prosecutorial misconduct. Some scholars believe hiding such misconduct has led to district attorneys’ reluctance to allow retesting of DNA evidence.DRONE SURVEILLANCE AFFIRMATIVEResolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance.Drone technology has advanced significantly in the last 10 years, and has begun to be used by government agencies for surveillance purposes. The affirmative seeks to ban drone use by the government for a couple key reasons (advantages). First, drones frequently have accidents that can destroy themselves, injure people and destroy people when crashing, and sometimes harm other commercial airplanes while in flight (causing crashes, death, etc.). The affirmative prevents this proliferation of drones in the skies, preventing the risk of crashes and airplane collisions. Second, while drones have long been used by the military for both observational and destructive purposes, the use of drones domestically is new. The shift of drones from the military to the police force is a significant component of a parallel shift in police forces from a civilian protective agency, to a militarized oppressive one. Outfitting police forces with drone technology reifies their position of power as respondents to domestic insurgency, framing the domestic population and citizenry the same was as enemy combatants abroad: subjects of extermination. Third, the file includes an additional advantage (the Privacy Advantage). When the population is constantly subject to surveillance by drones, privacy is violated in ways destructive to freedom and identity. Drone Surveillance Aff 1ACObservation One: InherencyThe government is spending millions on drones already – intends to equip police departmentsJohn W. Whitehead, analyst for the Rutherford Institute, September 30, 2013, “From NSA Spying and VIPR Sweeps to Domestic Drones: A Round-Up of the Police State Programs NOT Affected by a Government Shutdown,” accessed May 23, 2015, drones. The domestic use of drones will continue unabated. As mandated by Congress, there will be 30,000 drones crisscrossing the skies of America by 2020, all part of an industry that could be worth as much as $30 billion per year. These machines will be able to record all activities, using video feeds, heat sensors and radar. A recent Inspector General report revealed that the Dept. of Justice has already spent nearly $4 million on drones domestically, largely for use by the FBI, with grants for another $1.26 million so police departments and nonprofits can acquire their own drones.Surveillance at all-time highMark Lerner, analyst for the American Policy Center, August 5, 2014, “The Chilling Effect of Domestic Spying,” accessed May 20, 2015, Snowden revelations are unique because of the depth and scope of the revelations and because Snowden had the official documents to back up his assertions. Previously people including former NSA analysts such as William Binney, Thomas Drake, Russell Tice and Kirk Wiebe had come forward asserting that our government was spying on citizens.? Too many in the government, the media, and the public dismissed the allegations of these men because it was “easy” to do so rather than believe the worst about our government, or actually having to do something about domestic spying. To be fair the NSA has not been the only ones accused of domestic spying. The FBI, DHS, and the CIA have also been proven to having done their own domestic spying; in the case of the FBI going back over seventy years.? I support the need for our intelligence community, law enforcement, and our military. Unfortunately in much the same way the “Stockholm Syndrome” results in a person who has been kidnapped falling victim to the goals and aspirations of the kidnappers, the “rank and file” of those responsible for protecting us and our freedom have fallen victim to corrupt leadership in our intelligence and law enforcement communities. The culture of corruption is just as infectious as any chemical or biological weapon of mass destruction.Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should ban and cease all of its agencies from using, developing, and deploying domestic surveillance drones.SolvencyState privacy laws creates a porous hodgepodge of laws across the country that is inconsistent and unpredictable – federal legislation solves betterWells C. Bennett, Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare, September 2014, “Civilian Drones, Privacy, and the Federal-State Balance,” accessed May 18, 2015, things stand out about this tripartite array. First, there’s a good-sized body of general privacy law out there, waiting to absorb the coming influx of domestic drones and associated surveillance. The second is diversity. Not all states define trespassing or drone surveillance in the same way, or apply identical privacy protections to identical places. Between its statutes and court-crafted doctrines, this jurisdiction might take a relatively stringent approach to the safeguarding of “private” privacy, while that one might take a relatively permissive approach. The phenomenon is most vividly on display with regard to drone-specific statutes; many states don’t have one to begin with, and thus accordingly handle nongovernmental privacy intrusions through a mix of laws in categories one and two. In this way, the law of “private” privacy is something of a hodgepodge. Its coverage can be expansive or porous or even non-existent, depending on where you are, and what sort of technology is deployed. ? That registers a second, related point in the drone federalists’ favor. We don’t quite yet know how effective any one’s state law will be, as the domestic drone population grows denser and private surveillance more pervasive; or which states’ laws will withstand court challenges. And we won’t have a better sense on either score for a while, either. The uncertainty will frustrate consensus about how best to regulate drones, snooping, and nongovernmental actors—and thus bolster states’ prerogatives in the short run.Advantage One: AccidentsDrones pose a huge risk to the safety of commercial airlinesCraig Whitlock, Pentagon and National Security specialist for the Washington Post, November 26, 2014, “Near-collisions between drones, airliners surge, new FAA reports show,” accessed May 24, 2015, around the United States have reported a surge in near-collisions and other dangerous encounters with small drones in the past six months at a time when the Federal Aviation Administration is gradually opening the nation’s skies to remotely controlled aircraft, according to FAA records.? Since June 1, commercial airlines, private pilots and air-traffic controllers have alerted the FAA to 25 episodes in which small drones came within a few seconds or a few feet of crashing into much larger aircraft, the records show. Many of the close calls occurred during takeoffs and landings at the nation’s busiest airports, presenting a new threat to aviation safety after decades of steady improvement in air travel.Risk of accidents and crashes is high – limited ability to detect and avoid trouble, pilots make errors, mechanical defects, and unreliable communication linksCraig Whitlock, reporter for the Washington Post, June 20, 2014, “When drones fall from the sky,” accessed May 22, 2015, Post’s analysis of accident records, however, shows that the military and drone manufacturers have yet to overcome some fundamental safety hurdles:? A limited ability to detect and avoid trouble. Cameras and high-tech sensors on a drone cannot fully replace a pilot’s eyes and ears and nose in the cockpit. Most remotely controlled planes are not equipped with radar or anti-collision systems designed to prevent midair disasters.? Pilot error. Despite popular perceptions, flying a drone is much trickier than playing a video game. The Air Force licenses its drone pilots and trains them constantly, but mistakes are still common, particularly during landings. In four cases over a three-year period, Air Force pilots committed errors so egregious that they were investigated for suspected dereliction of duty.? Persistent mechanical defects. Some common drone models were designed without backup safety features and rushed to war without the benefit of years of testing. Many accidents were triggered by basic electrical malfunctions; others were caused by bad weather. Military personnel blamed some mishaps on inexplicable problems. The crews of two doomed Predators that crashed in 2008 and 2009 told investigators that their respective planes had been “possessed” and plagued by “demons.”? Unreliable communications links. Drones are dependent on wireless transmissions to relay commands and navigational information, usually via satellite. Those connections can be fragile. Records show that links were disrupted or lost in more than a quarter of the worst crashes.Airplane crashes are devastating for airline companies – empiricsMelanie Schmitz, reporter for Bustle, March 24, 2015, “How Do Plane Crashes Affect Consumer Markets? Ticket Sales & Stock Prices Will Unsuprisingly Fall, If Only Briefly,” accessed May 24, 2015, a major catastrophe like the Germanwings Airbus A320 crash in France strikes, does it hit consumer markets equally as hard? For budget airlines, the outlook from their side of the fence might be worse than expected. After the tragic loss of 150 passengers and crew on Tuesday in the French Alps, several Germanwings flights were cancelled in order to give grieving and safety-concerned employees room to cope with the incident — but the full extent of the damage went much deeper as the day went on. ? “This is a sad and tragic day for Germanwings and the entire Lufthansa family,” said CEO Thomas Winkelmann in a press conference on Tuesday afternoon (Lufthansa is the parent company of Germanwings airlines). As the families and loved ones of crash victims began to flood into the crisis centers and meet with airline-provided psychiatrists in Barcelona and Düsseldorf however, it became clear that the airline itself would take a serious hit both among employee and passenger trust, as well as within its financial ranks.? By end of day on Tuesday, as the European markets closed, positive numbers began trickling in which showed curious potential for the airline company — but the lone bright spot in the day was short lived. CNBC reported a nearly 5 percent loss on shares of the German airline by midday on Tuesday, bouncing back slightly to an overall closing rate of 13.57 euros by the closing bell. The French Press Agency (AFP) reported that the stock finished the day as “the worst performer on the Frankfurt stock market.” And the airline wasn’t alone — The Telegraph reported that as news of the crash began trickling in, stocks of both Lufthansa and Airbus, the plane’s manufacturer, began to slump dramatically as well.Airline industry key to the economy – massive component of GDP that has positive effects on unquantifiable areas of the econFederal Aviation Administration (FAA), June 2014, “The Economic Impact? of Civil Aviation on the? U.S. Economy,” accessed May 24, 2015, aviation connects the entire globe, providing? much needed economic benefits both seen and unseen? for U.S. consumers and businesses. Civil aviation has? been a major force behind decreasing barriers to trade,? and U.S. civil aviation industry truly remains a unique? engine for innovation and technological progress.? The network connectivity of civil air transportation? provides a dynamic and real-time infrastructure that? keeps our nation competitive on the global stage.? Specific areas of civil aviation such as air cargo,? have contributed to more effective networking and? collaboration between companies near and far.? This report found that when all impacts are included,? civil aviation contributed 5.4 percent to the U.S.? economy in 2012. The total output of civil aviationrelated? goods and services amounted to $1.5 trillion? in 2012 and generated nearly 12 million jobs, with? earnings of $459 billion.? The economic impacts of civil aviation summarized in? this report, represent the quantifiable benefits made? possible by civil aviation. Other benefits are only just? beginning to be captured by researchers, and there is? hope that new indexes such as the World Bank Air? Connectivity Index will provide even more insight? into civil aviation’s influence on economic growth and? development. The industry contributes positively to? the U.S. trade balance, creates high-paying jobs, helps? keep just-in-time business models viable, and connects? us to friends, family, and market opportunities. Air? transportation will continue to move the U.S. and? global economy towards a bright and healthy future.Economic collapse causes massive armed conflicts – extinctionPhil Kerpen, National Review Online analyst, October 29, 2008, “Don't Turn Panic Into Depression,” accessed May 24, 2015, 's important that we avoid all these policy errors - not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn't end until the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even greater scale.Advantage Two: MilitarizationDrone use by law enforcement fetishizes weapons technology, fusing masculine fantasies of control with technologyMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, paper argues that the various and contradictory rationales offered for law enforcement drones are symptomatic of a ‘weapons fetish’ evident in popular culture. This fetishisation imbues military technology such as the drone with masculine fantasies of control and domination that obscure the practical limitations and ethical implications of drones for crime control and prevention. By linking the pleasures of militarism to crucial shifts in the social and economic order, the paper argues that counter-terrorism discourse functions to legitimate the militarised masculine subject positions of paramilitary policing specifically and the neoliberal state generally. In such a context, the drone features as a regressive ‘weapon-toy’ that fuses state control with technological transcendence.Even if domestic drones aren’t yet weaponized, the creep of police state power is incremental – allowing acceptance of surveillance drones makes their weaponization inevitableGlenn Greenwald, Salon Analyst, December 12, 2011, “The growing menace of domestic drones,” accessed May 22, 2015, those dismissing concerns about drones by claiming (falsely) that they are the equivalent of police helicopters, won’t those same people dismiss concerns over weaponized drones by arguing: there’s no difference between allowing the police to Taser you or shoot you themselves and allowing them to do that by drone? This is always how creeping police state powers are entrenched: one step at a time. For those who are perfectly content with having stealth, hovering drones over U.S. soil for sustained surveillance purposes — based on the reasoning that the police can already engage in surveillance so why not let them do it more efficiently? — what possible objections will there be to having the police use weaponized drones? After all, the police can already Taser, pepper spray and shoot people: why not let them do it with drones? AV itself certainly expects precisely that lack of resistance:? The fact is that drones vest vast new powers that police helicopters and existing weapons do not vest: and that’s true not just for weaponization but for surveillance. Drones enable a Surveillance State unlike anything we’ve seen. Because small drones are so much cheaper than police helicopters, many more of them can be deployed at once, ensuring far greater surveillance over a much larger area. Their small size and stealth capability means they can hover without any detection, and they can remain in the air for far longer than police helicopters. Their hovering capability also means they can surveil a single spot for much longer than military satellites, which move with the earth’s rotation (see AV’s Report at p. 11 — the section entitled “Stratospheric Persistent UAS” — for all the reasons drones can provide uniquely sustained surveillance in ways that satellites and police helicopters cannot).The conversion of military technology and strategy for police use reproduces war as a paradigm for solving social problems – this paradigm only replicates harms and causes more crime, violence, and disorderMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, (or perhaps because of) the risk associated with their use of violence, paramilitary police units are generally considered to be ‘elite’ and they are widely idealised by other police (Kraska 1997, 2007; McCulloch 2001). Given this privileged status, it is unsurprising that the paramilitary appearance and tactics of these units have exerted considerable influence over policing practice. Over time, paramilitary tactics and weaponry have become features of police responses to a variety of forms of crime and disorder (Kraska 2001b). This has been linked to the indiscriminate use of teargas, clubs, pepper spray and rubber bullets for the purpose of crowd control (Hill and Beger 2009). Police uniforms in some jurisdictions now mimic a form-hugging paramilitary fashion complete with combat boots, cargo pants and a utility belt which holds once-military technology such as tasers and capsicum spray (McCulloch 2001). The dissemination of paramilitary tactics into ‘normal’ police work has accelerated following the events of September 11 2001 due to the establishment of joint military-police counter-terrorism operations (Monahan 2010a) and the increasing prominence of ‘national security’ imperatives in the remit of law enforcement officers (Kraska 2007). This has been underwritten by formal institutional arrangements and government funding for the transfer of military and war technology to law enforcement (Haggerty and Ericson 2001).? There has been an increasingly military flavour to crime control rhetoric and policy with successive ‘wars’ on ‘drugs’, ‘crime’ and ‘terror’ (Kraska 2001a). However the generalisation of ‘war’ as a paradigm of response applicable to internal as well as external security concerns has proven to be a poor method of safeguarding social order; instead, it has produced a range of counterproductive effects (Hardt and Negri 2004; McCulloch and Pickering 2009). Each successive ‘war’ has tended to legitimise the expansion of law enforcement budgets (and a corresponding underfunding of social supports) and the differential targeting of disadvantaged, ethnic and racial minority communities (Meeks 2005). This has eroded rather than supported the capacities of those communities to develop the social cohesion and capital necessary for resolving collective problems such as crime and disorder (Wacquant 2009). Furthermore, such ‘wars’ have typically exacerbated the underlying determinants of social problems, complicated efforts at crime prevention and control, and estranged individuals and communities from the police and other authorities (Hill and Beger 2009; McCulloch and Sentas 2006; Meeks 2005).Constant surveillance by weaponized drones causes deep psychological trauma to the communities belowJ. Cavallaro and S. Sonnenberg, Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, 2012, “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan,” accessed May 22, 2015, hover twenty-four hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and public spaces without warning. Their presence terrorizes men, women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities. Those living under drones have to face the constant worry that a deadly strike may be fired at any moment, and the knowledge that they are powerless to protect themselves. These fears have affected behavior. The US practice of striking one area multiple times, and evidence that it has killed rescuers, makes both community members and humanitarian workers afraid or unwilling to assist injured victims. Some community members shy away from gathering in groups, including important tribal dispute-resolution bodies, out of fear that they may attract the attention of drone operators. Some parents choose to keep their children home, and children injured or traumatized by strikes have dropped out of school. Waziris told our researchers that the strikes have undermined cultural and religious practices related to burial, and made family members afraid to attend funerals. In addition, families who lost loved ones or their homes in drone strikes now struggle to support themselves.Mass killing of citizens – militarization causes police to treat citizens as enemy combatantsShirley Li, writer for The Wire, August 15, 2014, “The Evolution of Police Militarization in Ferguson and Beyond,” accessed May 22, 2015, Kraska, a professor at the School of Justice Studies at Eastern Kentucky University and author of Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System, told The Wire in an email interview that the term mostly calls out the police, but the escalation in the streets stems from both sides, creating a circle of distrust:? This expansion [of police militarization] is having a dramatic impact on how the police perceive the public (more as enemy combatants than citizens of the community they are serving) as well as how the public perceives the police (more as an occupying force that cares only about maintaining law and order through military style tactics, hardware, and appearance). ? This dynamic can readily lend itself to the police using deadly force inappropriately, and to the public reacting to these incidents with outrage and complete distrust of what they perceive as an occupying force that does not have their best interest in mind. ? In short, the police lose all legitimacy in the eyes of the people they are serving—which only reinforces a we vs. they mentality among the police. This has been the danger inherent in this well-documented trend toward police militarization; this is the ugly reality that is playing out in Ferguson.? "Even though I was the first academic to identify, research, and write about these trends," he added, "even I would not have predicted the extent to which the military model would overtake the community policing reform movement so rapidly."Rejecting drone use for surveillance ruptures the doublespeak of the term drone. The Aff’s rejection of domestic drones reorients the U.S. trajectory away from militarizing the civilian sphereSam Mutter, March 17, 2015, freelance researcher and journalist with an MSc in Politics and International Relations, “The doublespeak of drones,” accessed May 20, 2015, virtue of its development through America’s covert wars, the moral legitimacy of the military drone has always been dubious, and now the civilian drone, adopted by police forces to catch criminals and patrol borders, is edging too into murky waters. How long before these civilian technologies are weaponised? How long, too, before the affordability of small drones makes them the perfect vehicles for miniature explosives devices? In the sense that it implicitly accepts these transgressions, the current doublespeak paves the way for a wholesale militarisation of the civilian domain. The aim of separating the two meanings is not, however, to once and for all clear the conscience of the civilian drone, determining it as innocent, while the military drone remains (potentially) guilty. Rather, both must be made subject to thorough critique, but on different grounds: The civilian drone as an issue of rights to privacy and as an airborne hazard to commercial airliners; the military drone as a weapon of unaccountable war.? It is doubly necessary, therefore, to be wary of the civilian drone’s trivial allure as it expands its remit from tool to toy. Particularly evident in the build-up to Christmas – the first (but certainly not the last) Christmas at which quadcopters were the ‘must have’ gadget – was the recurrent portrayal of drones as playthings. From a Halloween video showing a drone garbed in a skeleton costume, terrorising morning joggers in an American park, to the new cultural vocabulary of ‘drone selfies’, gadgetry is one of the most insidious forms of normalization. A society of media is by definition a viral society, and we must take care that the ambiguous term ‘drone’ does not become infected with unreserved approval, nor with the cancer of apolitical indifference.Drone Surveillance Aff ExtensionsInherencyDomestic drone use and technical capability is rapidly expandingJennifer Lynch, writer for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, January 14, 2014, “Customs & Border Protection Loaned Predator Drones to Other Agencies 700 Times in Three Years According to “Newly Discovered” Records,” accessed May 18, 2015, noted in a recent Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) that it generally flies its drones in support of its primary mission—“border security.” Yet these records indicate just how blurred that mission has become. This is problematic because, as CBP also notes, drones like Predators enable “the monitoring of large areas of land more efficiently and with fewer personnel than other aviation assets.”? As the use of Predators moves from maintaining security at the nation’s borders to general law enforcement elsewhere within the country, more and more people in the United States will be subject to drone surveillance. CBP states in its PIA that it stores data unassociated with a particular investigation for no more than 30 days, but much, if not most of this data will be associated with an investigation and may therefore be stored indefinitely—even if it includes footage of property, vehicles and people unassociated with the investigation. ? CBP also states in the PIA that we shouldn’t be concerned about the privacy implications of its drones because their sensors cannot yet identify individual people. However, these sensors are becoming more sophisticated every day, and it won’t be long before surveillance capabilities like "facial recognition or soft biometric recognition, which can recognize and track individuals based on attributes such as height, age, gender, and skin color" are added to CBP’s arsenal. We need to address these issues before that happens.Defense department extensively monitors the U.S. with drones – the Pentagon controls about 10,000 dronesCraig Whitlock, Washington Post analyst, September 26, 2014, “White House plans to require federal agencies to provide details about drones,” accessed May 18, 2015, department flies more drones than the Pentagon, which has about 10,000 of the aircraft in its inventory, from four-pound Wasps to the 15-ton Global Hawk. While many are deployed overseas, Defense Department documents show that the military is making plans to base drones at 144 sites in the United States. Pentagon officials have said they soon expect to fly more drones in civilian airspace in the United States than in military-only zones.? The Department of Homeland Security also conducts extensive surveillance with unarmed drones. Its Customs and Border Protection service has nine large Predator B models, which account for about three-quarters of all drone flight hours reported by federal civilian agencies.? Customs and Border Protection drones patrol a 25-mile-wide corridor along the nation’s northern and southern borders, as well as over the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.? Records obtained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation show that the Border Patrol has also outsourced its drones on hundreds of occasions to other law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. Details of most of those operations remain secret.Lots of drones used by the government currentlyMelanie Reid, Associate Professor of Law, 2014, “ Grounding Drones: Big Brother’s Tool Box Needs Regulation Not Elimination,” accessed May 20, 2015, enforcement, in particular, has caught on to the drone craze. The Miami Police Department in Florida has drones—two Honeywell aircraft to fly no higher than 400 feet over the everglades. The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) currently operates ten Predator drones and hopes to expand their number of drones to twenty-four by 2016. CBP drones patrol the southern border, and the Department of Defense has sent drones into Mexico to gather information about major drug traffickers.? Two “nanodrones” are currently in production and garnering interest. The hummingbird drone “navigates by changing the angle and shape of its paper-thin wings—which beat twenty to forty times per second—and can hover in place for up to 11 minutes.” “It is also small enough to fly through windows or other small openings, strong enough to carry a microphone or camera, and stable enough to maintain a highly controlled hover, even in gusts of wind.” The mosquito drone can be remotely controlled and is equipped with a camera and a microphone. Once it lands, it can take a DNA sample or leave an RFID tracking device under the skin.? Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have used Predator drones inside the United States. FBI Director Robert Mueller commented to Congress that drones were “very seldom used” by his agents but that he was aware of at least three drones in FBI possession as of 2011. The police department in Mesa County, Colorado operates its Draganflyer drones in their county. Police in Arlington, Texas used drones to assist with security during the Super Bowl in February 2011 and also for “’training and evaluation’ purposes in unpopulated areas.” The Texas Department of Public Safety used a bird-sized “Wasp” aircraft to conduct aerial surveillance during the execution of a search warrant. The city of Ogden, Utah, sought FAA permission in 2011 to deploy an unmanned blimp for surveillance and crime prevention. National Guard units around the country operate drones to train for their use overseas and the United States Forest Service has been known to use drones to fly over national parks.Drones used by the police to respond to the Baltimore protestsMichael Gould-Wartofsky, analyst for In These Times, May 5, 2015, “From Ferguson to Baltimore, a 5-Step Guide to the Police Repression of Protest,” accessed May 22, 2015, the course of 24 hours, which would see economically devastated parts of Baltimore erupt in open rebellion, city and state police would deploy everything from a drone and a “military counter attack vehicle” known as a Bearcat to SWAT teams armed with assault rifles, shotguns loaded with lead pellets, barricade projectiles filled with tear gas, and military-style smoke grenades. The BPD also came equipped with “Hailstorm” or “Stingray” technology, developed in America’s distant war zones to conduct wireless surveillance of enemy communications. This would allow officers to force cell phones to connect to it, to collect mobile data, and to jam cell signals within a one-mile radius.Legislative gap – current law is insufficient to protect us against privacy violation from drones, drone surveillance is treated less harshly than human pilotsM. Ryan Calo, Director for Privacy and Robotics at the Center for Internet & Society, December 12, 2011, “The Drone as Privacy Catalyst,” accessed May 24, 2015, rules impede the use of drones for now; United States privacy law does not. There is very little in our privacy law that would prohibit the use of drones within our borders. Citizens do not generally enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in public, nor even in the portions of their property visible from a public vantage. In 1986, the Supreme Court found no search where local police flew over the defendant’s backyard with a private plane. A few years later, the Court admitted evidence spotted by an officer in a helicopter looking through two missing roof panels in a greenhouse. Neither the Constitution nor common law appears to prohibit police or the media from routinely operating surveillance drones in urban and other environments.? If anything, observations by drones may occasion less scrutiny than manned aerial vehicles. Several prominent cases, and a significant body of scholarship, reflect the view that no privacy violation has occurred unless and until a human observes a person, object, or attribute. Just as a dog might sniff packages and alert an officer only in the presence of contraband, so might a drone scan for various chemicals or heat signatures and alert an officer only upon spotting the telltale signs of drug production.? In short, drones like those in widespread military use today will tomorrow be used by police, scientists, newspapers, hobbyists, and others here at home. And privacy law will not have much to say about it. Privacy advocates will. As with previous emerging technologies, advocates will argue that drones threaten our dwindling individual and collective privacy. But unlike the debates of recent decades, I think these arguments will gain serious traction among courts, regulators, and the general public.SolvencyLaw enforcement should not be able to surveil without court order, plan solvesMelanie Reid, Associate Professor of Law, 2014, “ Grounding Drones: Big Brother’s Tool Box Needs Regulation Not Elimination,” accessed May 20, 2015, answer lies not in requiring a warrant or a particular exception to the warrant requirement, but in requiring law enforcement to seek a court order similar to that required for a pen register under 18 U.S.C § 2703. To obtain such a court order, law enforcement officials would need to demonstrate specific and articulable facts indicating that the data is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. This would prevent law enforcement from using drones to randomly search for crime in a particular area. The order would specify the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation and whom law enforcement would like to surveil and describe the particularized need for the information that can be gathered with the drone.? The order also should contain language requiring law enforcement to discard any information collected by the drone that is not relevant to the scope of the investigation within twenty-four to forty-eighty hours. This requirement would alleviate any concerns that the government would collect this information for other nefarious purposes in the future. Being that it is a court order, this requirement would have teeth as long as magistrates signing these orders follow up and demand that law enforcement demonstrate that they in fact have complied with the order and destroyed any irrelevant information. If a law enforcement officer fails to comply, a variety of sanctions could be used to demand compliance. Sanctions even as severe as jail time would cause any law enforcement agent to comply fully.? The court order also should include a penalty for disclosing to unauthorized persons data obtained from a drone, thereby limiting exposure of the information to government personnel working on the particular case, similar to grand jury secrecy requirements under the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(7), “[a] knowing violation of Rule 6 . . . may be punished as a contempt of court.” Moreover, if the drone is flown outside the FAA regulated navigable airspace and views activity not within the public’s vantage point, penalties should also be in place to punish those individuals in violation of strict flight guidelines provided in the court order. Punishing individual agents with contempt of court holds both law enforcement and judges accountable and likely will serve as a more effective means to prevent government abuse than requiring warrants prior to drone prehensive reform neededJane Harman, CEO and President of the Woodrow Wilson Center, May 4, 2015, “The Undercooked Debate on Domestic Drones,” accessed May 20, 2015, need a serious policy response that engages Congress; federal, state, and local government – and the private sector. This issue is too big for the FAA, too urgent to postpone, and too important to leave off the national agenda. Lately, Congress has devoted impressive attention to new risks in cyberspace. It should put at least as much effort into understanding drones. One option is to encourage commercial firms—through either voluntary or mandatory standards—to hardwire restrictions into the drones they build and sell. Some companies already program their drones to stay out of restricted airspace and away from sensitive sites. Those efforts need a push and a signal boost from government.The US should create usage restrictions, create image retention restrictions, give public notice in areas of drone use, and audit agencies using drones regularly to ensure complianceJay Stanley and Catherine Crump, ACLU analysts producing Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft, December 2011, “Protecting Privacy? From Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft,” accessed May 22, 2015, ACLU recommends at a minimum the following core measures be enacted to ensure that this? happens:? ?Usage restrictions. UAVs should be subject to strict regulation to ensure that their use? does not eviscerate the privacy that Americans have traditionally enjoyed and rightly expect.? Innocent Americans should not have to worry that their activities will be scrutinized by? drones. To this end, the use of drones should be prohibited for indiscriminate mass surveillance,? for example, or for spying based on First Amendment-protected activities. In general,? drones should not be deployed except:? where there are specific and articulable grounds to believe that the drone will collect evidence? relating to a specific instance of criminal wrongdoing or, if the drone will intrude? upon reasonable expectations of privacy, where the government has obtained a warrant? based on probable cause; or? where there is a geographically confined, time-limited emergency situation in which? particular individuals’ lives are at risk, such as a fire, hostage crisis, or person lost in the? wilderness; or? for reasonable non-law enforcement purposes by non-law enforcement agencies, where? privacy will not be substantially affected, such as geological inspections or environmental? surveys, and where the surveillance will not be used for secondary law enforcement? purposes.? ?Image retention restrictions. Images of identifiable individuals captured by aerial surveillance? technologies should not be retained or shared unless there is reasonable suspicion? that the images contain evidence of criminal activity or are relevant to an ongoing investigation? or pending criminal trial.? ?Public notice. The policies and procedures for the use of aerial surveillance technologies? should be explicit and written, and should made public. While it is legitimate for the police to? keep the details of particular investigations confidential, policy decisions regarding overall? deployment policies—including the privacy tradeoffs they may entail—are a public matter? that should be openly discussed.? ?Democratic control. Deployment and policy decisions surrounding UAVs should be democratically? decided based on open information—not made on the fly by police departments? simply by virtue of federal grants or other autonomous purchasing decisions or departmental? policy fiats.? ?Auditing and effectiveness tracking. Investments in UAVs should not be made without? a clear, systematic examination of the costs and benefits involved. And if aerial surveillance? technology is deployed, independent audits should be put in place to track the use of? UAVs by government, so that citizens and other watchdogs can tell generally how and how? often they are being used, whether the original rationale for their deployment is holding up,? whether they represent a worthwhile public expenditure, and whether they are being used? for improper or expanded purposes.Limiting drone solves surveillance intrusions on privacyWalter Simpson, environmental, peace and justice analyst, May 10, 2014, “The end of privacy? Government and private surveillance pose a growing threat to Americans,” accessed May 24, 2015, security cameras, license plate scanners and domestic drones. Laws are needed to limit and control the deployment of these technologies, recognizing that it’s all too easy to justify their use to enhance security while their cumulative impact is an unacceptable erosion of privacy. Potential application of these devices should be subject to a rigorous determination of need and compliance with serious privacy protection policies placing sensible limits on surveillance in public spaces.Existing drone use lacks transparency and data-minimization plans April Glaser and Jennifer Lynch, analysts for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, December 10, 2013, “The FAA Creates Thin Privacy Guidelines For The Nation's First Domestic Drone "Test Sites",” accessed May 18, 2015, number of drone bills have been introduced in Congress over the last two years, but Markey's proposed legislation is demanding of both the FAA and drone operators when it comes to protecting the constitutional rights of Americans. The Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act calls for the FAA to institute and enforce guidelines for all licensed domestic drone flights—not just test sites—that include clear data minimization procedures, as well as transparency rules that require drone test site operators to disclose their data collection practices and how drone operators use, retain, and share all collected data.? Markey's bill requires the FAA to create a publicly searchable database of all awarded drone operator licenses, the logistical details of their operation, and each drone operator's data collection and minimization statement. Creating a database like this is within the FAA’s purview. The agency already runs other databases about aircrafts in national airspace, listing who is in the air, accident reports, and safety information.? Law enforcement agencies across the country are already flying drones without set national privacy guidelines in place. But at this point our most successful tactic for learning more about drones has been to sue for access to information. The American public shouldn't have to submit a FOIA request just to know if drones are overhead. Markey’s bill is a strong start to what needs to be an ongoing conversation about the future of American privacy standards in light of the coming age of domestic drones. We need more lawmakers to speak up for greater transparency and accountability of both government and commercial operation of drones in our national airspace.Accidents AdvantageHarmsProliferating drone use poses significant risk of accidents and crashes – control signals can be jammed or hackedMelanie Reid, Associate Professor of Law, 2014, “ Grounding Drones: Big Brother’s Tool Box Needs Regulation Not Elimination,” accessed May 20, 2015, mandating safe minimum operating altitudes have not been set forth specifically for drones, and it is unclear whether some smaller drones may fall under the 1981 advisory circular for model aircraft. By contrast, the United Kingdom permits private use of RPAS [remotely piloted aircraft] under [twenty kilograms] to be flown within line of sight to avoid collisions and the operator must maintain constant visual contact with the aircraft. Flights less than 100 feet above the ground are nearly free of regulation and those between 100 and 400 feet are somewhat free for non-commercial uses, although all must comply with the basic rules of air. Traditional flight regulations apply to all aircraft over [twenty kilograms].? With an increase in drone usage, the biggest safety concern is the probability of mid-air collisions. Another concern is drone malfunctions and subsequent crashes due to third parties interfering with signals sent to the drone, causing the operator to lose control of the aircraft. Drones require satellites (and satellite links) to relay information to and from the pilots who operate the drones via remote control; a drone need only be in line of sight with its ground control station when it lands, the rest is done via satellite link. A third party could jam communications or target the drone’s GPS link and manipulate its flight position. In December 2011, Iran alleged that it was able to hack into a U.S. government drone’s GPS navigational controls as it was flying back to its base in Afghanistan and had it safely land in Iran where Iranian engineers were then able to design their own drones based off the U.S. model.? A number of domestic drone accidents have already been reported. Drones experience an accident rate over seven times higher than general aviation and 353 times higher than in commercial aviation.Drones crash frequently, more drones pose a significant risk to flight safety, especially over populated areasCraig Whitlock, reporter for the Washington Post, June 20, 2014, “When drones fall from the sky,” accessed May 22, 2015, than 400 large U.S. military drones have crashed in major accidents around the world since 2001, a record of calamity that exposes the potential dangers of throwing open American skies to drone traffic, according to a year-long Washington Post investigation.? Since the outbreak of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, military drones have malfunctioned in myriad ways, plummeting from the sky because of mechanical breakdowns, human error, bad weather and other reasons, according to more than 50,000 pages of accident investigation reports and other records obtained by The Post under the Freedom of Information Act.? Commercial drone flights are set to become a widespread reality in the United States, starting next year, under a 2012 law passed by Congress. Drone flights by law enforcement agencies and the military, which already occur on a limited basis, are projected to surge.? The documents obtained by The Post detail scores of previously unreported crashes involving remotely controlled aircraft, challenging the federal government’s assurances that drones will be able to fly safely over populated areas and in the same airspace as passenger planes.? Military drones have slammed into homes, farms, runways, highways, waterways and, in one case, an Air Force C-130 Hercules transport plane in midair. No one has died in a drone accident, but the documents show that many catastrophes have been narrowly averted, often by a few feet, or a few seconds, or pure luck.Crash rates of drones are way higher than normal aircraft and are also much easier to hackMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, are notoriously difficult to pilot with accident rates estimated to be several times higher than piloted aircraft (Haddal and Gertler 2010: 4). In 2009, the American Air Force reported that one third of their Predator drones deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan had crashed (Drew 2009). In the United States, there have been at least two incidents in which military drones have crashed during test missions (Benjamin 2013: 23). A large Predator drone being used for border surveillance crashed in Arizona in 2006 and all drone flights in Texas were grounded for a 6 day period in 2010 after a drone lost contact with the ground control system (Haddal and Gertler 2010: 2). The high rate of drone accidents raises obvious questions about the potential risks associated with police use of drones. This was further illustrated in 2012 when a Texas paramilitary police unit staged a photo opportunity for the local media to photograph a drone in action. Within minutes of launching the US $300,000 Shadowhawk helicopter there was a communication failure and the drone crashed into a police vehicle (Hill 2012). Concerns over the reliability and security of the communications signal between drones and the ground system are not limited to their accident rates and extends to the possibility that the signal can be hacked (BBC News 2013).Drones crash into larger airplanes, and can get sucked into the engine, causing crashesRishi Iyengar, analyst for Time, November 26, 2014, “Drones Are Beginning to Pose a Real Threat to Flight Safety Says FAA Data,” accessed May 24, 2015, small, remote-controlled drones that have recently grown in popularity are beginning to pose a significant threat to flight safety in the United States, according to new data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).? The data, released Wednesday at the request of the Washington Post and various other news outlets, reveals 25 near-collisions with airborne drones reported by commercial and private pilots since June 1. Many of these incidents reportedly occurred near New York and Washington, and several of them took place at major U.S. airports.? Drones, often mounted with cameras for aerial photography (although Amazon wants to use them to deliver goods as well), are becoming an everyday object. However, people who operate them often exceed the altitude limits set by the FAA, bringing them dangerously close to aircraft and helicopter flight paths.? “All it’s going to take is for one to come through a windshield to hurt some people or kill someone,” Kyle Fortune, a private pilot, told the Post. Fortune said he suddenly spotted a drone 100 feet underneath his aircraft during a Sept. 22 flight.? Other pilots said that drones getting sucked into engines, rotors or propellers could cause potentially fatal accidents.Border patrol drone is especially sloppy – frequent accidents and poor oversightCraig Whitlock, national security analyst for the Washington Post, June 23, 2014, “Drones pose serious threat to commercial air traffic! Close encounters with passenger aircraft increasing and FAA unable to handle problem,” accessed May 24, 2015, agencies have reported 236 unsafe or abnormal incidents to the FAA since 2009, the records show. The vast majority of incidents involved drones flown by Customs and Border Protection, which has accounted for more than three-quarters of all flight hours by FAA-certified drones. ? After the loss of the aircraft that crashed in January, Customs and Border Protection now operates a fleet of nine unarmed Predator B's from bases in Arizona, Texas, Florida and North Dakota. The agency's drone surveillance program began in 2005 but got off to a ragged start. One drone crashed 100 yards from a house in Nogales, Ariz., in April 2006, prompting the National Transportation Safety Board to chide the agency for "providing a minimal amount of operational oversight." ? NTSB records show that three Predator B's belonging to Customs and Border Protection have been involved in previously unpublicized hard landings that damaged the aircraft. A spokesman for the border agency declined to comment.Drones are easy to hack – malware programs and hacker communities have been developed specifically for dronesChristian de Looper, analyst for the Tech Times, February 4, 2015, “Drones Now Big Hacking Target, First Drone Malware Identified,” accessed May 24, 2015, aimed at connected devices, those falling under the auspices of the Internet of Things, is getting more prevalent and a first big piece of evidence is the discovery of malware, Maldrone, built specifically to infiltrate drones.? While drones are becoming more commonplace and being tapped for more uses, such as data collection, they're quickly becoming a bigger target for hackers who either want to seize the drone for nefarious purposes or the data being collected.? "Drones by nature are remotely operated, just like bank accounts, websites, smart home automation systems and so forth. Today it is the drones - in the future of cyber warfare, it will be UAV (Unmanned Armed Vehicles)," says Derek Manky, a global security strategist for Fortinet, told Tech Times.? "Military forces around the world are using UAVs to assist in missions as well as engage in warfare. Why risk human bodies if a machine can be sacrificed instead? Unfortunately, this is opening the door to a lot of scary scenarios moving forward as we further blend the physical world with the virtual," he adds.? As drones are essentially as smart as a smartphone, they are very easy to hack, explains Manky. In fact, drone hacking appears to be a cooperative and organized effort at this point, notes another expert.? "There has been a thriving community of drone hackers already and several open source projects available such as Skyjack which uses your drone to take over the drones around it created by the infamous Samy from the Samy Myspace worm fame," Greg Martin, CTO of ThreatStream, tells Tech Times.Famous myspace hacker has developed and shared drone hacking software – makes them easy to take control of and steal information fromJordan Crook, staff writer, December 4, 2013, “Infamous Hacker Creates SkyJack To Hunt, Hack, And Control Other Drones,” accessed May 24, 2015, gray sky darkens as the sun dips below the horizon. The hum of a thousand drones replace the quiet of sunset, charging through the city behind a single leader drone. Children tug on the hands of their parents, pointing at the aerial army with concern.? “How did this happen?” one man asks another.? “Amazon,” answers the second man. “And Samy Kamkar.”? That name might not mean much to you unless you’re a hacker, but Kamkar is the serial hacker responsible for the Myspace-crumbling Samy worm, which hit the social networking site in 2005 and later landed Kamkar in jail.? Now, he has released all the necessary hardware and software specs to create a drone-hacking drone. In other words, anyone can now create an aerial drone that will be able to hunt down other drones, hack into them, and control them.? Kamkar is calling the hack “SkyJack” and it requires a Raspberry Pi circuit board, as well as a Parrot AR.Drone quadcopter. You’ll also need a small battery and two wireless transmitters. There will also reportedly be a version of SkyJack that runs on grounded Linux machines to hack drones within radio range.Civilian surveillance drones lack the same communication encryptions that military drones use, meaning they are much easier to hack, jam, or crashCraig Whitlock, national security analyst for the Washington Post, June 23, 2014, “Drones pose serious threat to commercial air traffic! Close encounters with passenger aircraft increasing and FAA unable to handle problem,” accessed May 24, 2015, drones are vulnerable to another safety threat: hacking. ? Drones rely on GPS signals to navigate and are controlled by pilots or operators on the ground via a two-way radio transmission link. ? The military protects the communications and navigation links it uses to control drones with highly advanced encryption technology. Civilian drones, however, generally rely on unencrypted satellite links and radio transmissions that can be hacked, jammed or spoofed. ? In June 2012, a University of Texas at Austin aerospace engineering professor and a team of students gathered at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico to perform a demonstration. Before the eyes of officials from the Department of Homeland Security, the team of academics used a hand-built device to stealthily seize control of, or spoof, an $80,000 Hornet rotorcraft drone flying about a kilometer in the distance. ? The team transmitted false signals that fooled the drone into thinking it was flying high when it fact it was plummeting toward the ground. The spoofers from Texas changed course at the last minute and averted a crash. ? Todd E. Humphreys, the professor who led the team, said spoofing a drone is not simple. It took him and his students about three years to perfect their technique. But he said rapid technology improvements are making the task progressively easier. ? In an interview, Humphreys said it would not be cheap or easy to build defenses against hackers. If the FAA permits widespread commercial drone traffic before effective solutions are in place, he predicted, "the hackers will come out of the woodwork." ? The most pressing concern, he said, are the large Predator B drones that federal Border Patrol agents fly along the long borders with Canada and Mexico. Humphreys said he is skeptical that Homeland Security officials have secured the navigation links well enough to thwart hackers. ? "They've never offered any evidence of that, and I don't know how that can be true," he said. "It's a huge vulnerability."ImpactsLosing airplanes to crashes shatters consumer confidence and chills community interest in flyingJo Piazza, Managing editor for Yahoo News, July 24, 2014, “The Airline Industry's Hellish Summer,” accessed May 24, 2015, a normal day, consumer sentiment surrounding airlines is emotional and irrational, but plane crashes naturally trigger a fear response that leads to negative attitudes.? “People will absolutely think twice about getting on a flight right now,” said Jeff Wise, the author of “Extreme Fear: The Science of Your Mind in Danger.” “It feels like a completely rational thing to not want to get on their planes at this point.”? In March, Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, carrying 239 people, disappeared. On July 17, Flight MH17, a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 with 295 people aboard, crashed near the Russian border with Ukraine.? On July 23, a twin-engine turboprop plane crashed in Taiwan’s Penghu Islands, and on July 24, an Air Algerie flight crashed while traveling from Burkina Faso, Africa, to Algiers, Algeria, with 110 passengers onboard.? Malaysia Airlines flies approximately 37,000 passengers on 250 flights per day to 80 destinations and has won numerous awards for safety and general excellence. A review by earlier this year gave the airline a safety rating of five stars out of seven.? But, consumer perception has nothing to do with the airline’s actual safety record or whether or not the airline is officially to blame for the incidents.? “People are going to avoid Malaysia Airlines, rightly or wrongly,” says Alastair Rosenschein, an aviation consultant and former Boeing 747 pilot for British Airways. “They have lost two 777s in fairly quick succession. That is an appalling record for an airline. Who hasn’t heard of Malaysia Airlines now?”Airline industry key to econ – allows movement of passengers and goods over borders and long distancesTeresa Cederholm, analyst for Market Realist, December 29, 2014, “Economic impact of the travel and tourism industry,” accessed May 24, 2015, transport contributes to economic development by enabling the movement of passengers and goods across borders, irrespective of the distance. According to the IATA (International Air Transport Association), global air travel has expanded tenfold and air cargo fourteenfold compared to only a threefold to fourfold rise in world GDP. Share of air transport in the US GDP has also increased over the years, as shown in the chart below.? Airline business models? The business structure of airlines, including network, fleet, and cost structure, differ for legacy carriers and low-cost carriers (or LCCs). Legacy carriers operate a hub and spoke network structure with several aircraft types. Low-cost carriers operate on the point-to-point model. After the US airline deregulation in 1978 and the emergence of LCCs, competition intensified as air fares were reduced, making air travel more affordable. Southwest Airlines Co. (LUV) was instrumental in revolutionizing the US industry with a differentiated business model. The point-to-point model adopted by Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways Corporation (JBLU), and other LCCs focuses on short-distance, regional, nonstop routes between origin and destination rather than having connecting flights at hubs, as in the hub and spoke model adopted by legacy carriers such as Delta Air Lines, Inc. (DAL), American Airlines (AAL), and United Continental Holdings Inc. (UAL). Transportation ETFS such as iShares Transportation Average ETF (IYT) and SPDR S&P Transportation ETF (XTN) hold 35% to 40% in airline companies.Airline industry key to the economyFederal Aviation Administration (FAA), June 2014, “The Economic Impact? of Civil Aviation on the? U.S. Economy,” accessed May 24, 2015, ? Table 1 summarizes the total impact of U.S. civil? aviation on output, earnings, and jobs. In 2012, economic? activity attributed to civil aviation-related goods and? services totaled $1.5 trillion, generating 11.8 million jobs? with $459.4 billion in earnings. Aviation contributed 5.4? percent to GDP, the value-added measure of overall U.S.? economic activity.? Civil aviation’s recovery from the last recession? accelerated in 2011 with an increase in its contribution to? GDP from 5.2 to 5.3 percent by the end of 2011, followed? by 5.4 percent in 2012 (Table 1).. . .Excluding R&D, U.S. GDP was $15,826.8 billion in? 2012. GDP represents the sum of all value-added? activities in an economy, so intermediate goods and? services used in the production of goods and services? are not included. In the previous section, total output? calculation included intermediate goods and services? that were purchased as part of the production process.? In order to compare aviation’s contribution to? GDP, these intermediate goods and services must be? subtracted from the total output.? Each sector within the civil aviation industry has a? different impact on the economy. To estimate civil? aviation’s overall contribution to GDP, each impact? type is calculated separately using the RIMS II valueadded? coefficients and aggregated. The result is shown in Table 5. In 2012, aviation related? value-added economic activities totaled $847.1? billion, or 5.4 percent of U.S. GDP.? In 2012, commercial aviation contributed $807.1? billion or 5.1 percent to GDP. Within commercial? aviation, the largest component is commercial visitor? expenditures totaling $403.7 billion, or approximately? 2.6 percent of GDP (Table 5) followed by airline? operations at $189.7 billion or 1.2 percent of GDP.? General aviation, while quite small in comparison to? commercial aviation, still contributed 0.3 percent to? GDP, or nearly $39.9 billion.Militarization AdvantageHarmsDomestic drone use is the actualization of domestic police militarization, shifting the country from democracy to military oligarchyNaomi Wolf, analyst for The Guardian, December 21, 2012, “The coming drone attack on America,” accessed May 23, 2015, unclassified US air force document reported by CBS (pdf) news expands on this unprecedented and unconstitutional step – one that formally brings the military into the role of controlling domestic populations on US soil, which is the bright line that separates a democracy from a military oligarchy. (The US constitution allows for the deployment of National Guard units by governors, who are answerable to the people; but this system is intended, as is posse comitatus, to prevent the military from taking action aimed at US citizens domestically.)? The air force document explains that the air force will be overseeing the deployment of its own military surveillance drones within the borders of the US; that it may keep video and other data it collects with these drones for 90 days without a warrant – and will then, retroactively, determine if the material can be retained – which does away for good with the fourth amendment in these cases. While the drones are not supposed to specifically "conduct non-consensual surveillance on on specifically identified US persons", according to the document, the wording allows for domestic military surveillance of non-"specifically identified" people (that is, a group of activists or protesters) and it comes with the important caveat, also seemingly wholly unconstitutional, that it may not target individuals "unless expressly approved by the secretary of Defense".? In other words, the Pentagon can now send a domestic drone to hover outside your apartment window, collecting footage of you and your family, if the secretary of Defense approves it. Or it may track you and your friends and pick up audio of your conversations, on your way, say, to protest or vote or talk to your representative, if you are not "specifically identified", a determination that is so vague as to be meaningless.Law enforcement agencies are aggressively trying to procure and utilize dronesMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, of the most recent developments in the militarization of policing has been the attempts of law enforcement agencies to secure public funds to purchase drones. Despite the international controversy over the use of drones overseas, domestic law enforcement agencies have been pursuing the case for the use of drone technology in policing (McBride 2009). Their interest has been whetted by weapons manufacturers, aerospace companies and industry groups keen to open up new domestic markets in the wake of the Western withdrawal from the Middle East (Greenwald 2011, 2013; Singer 2009). These groups are directly marketing drones to police agencies and lobbying governments alongside expansive claims about the inexpensiveness, safety and usefulness of drones for law enforcement (Greenwald 2013).? In the United States, the Federal Aviation Authority was ordered by Congress in 2012 to integrate drones into national airspace by 2015 however there remains considerable uncertainty over the privacy, social and legal implications of drones (Levin 2012). In response, the American Civil Liberties Union has reported an ‘unprecedented surge of activity’ by state legislatures seeking to restrict or ban drone use, with legislation ‘proposed in 42 states, enacted in 6 states, and still active in 28 states’ (see Bohm 2013). Other jurisdictions have developed more comprehensive drone regulation frameworks, such as in Europe and the United Kingdom, where licenses and permits are required for all drones, with heavier drones and surveillance drones attracting closer scrutiny (Hopkins 2013). In some countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, there are no restrictions on the use of drones for civilian, commercial or state purposes.? Despite the ethical and legal ambiguities, select American police agencies have been able to use drones for law enforcement since 2005 and some British police forces have been using drone technology since 2008. Drone representations have been narrowly constructed as a single category – blurring the retributive violence of military drones with the benevolent assistance of domestic drone use – causing the militarization of the civilian domainSam Mutter, March 17, 2015, freelance researcher and journalist with an MSc in Politics and International Relations, “The doublespeak of drones,” accessed May 20, 2015, media’s conflation of military and civilian unmanned aerial vehicles is deeply problematic. Such blurred boundaries pave the way for a wholesale militarisation of the civilian domain. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is a technology that begs an unusually large number of categorical ambiguities. The origin of its common name, ‘drone’, is seemingly self-evident: it is logical to make a connection between the musical drone and the low hum of a jet engine. This is not, however, the true etymology. Instead, the name ‘drone’ derives from that of the male honey bee, a bee that, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, “does no work but can fertilise the queen”, and which shares the black abdominal stripes used to distinguish the first UAVs. And yet, the bee also buzzes, its wings whirr. Regardless of the intended meaning, the UAV both is and does drone.? More than a conventional fighter jet, the experience of the drone – for those who, as a result of military campaigns waged predominantly by the US (in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia) and Israel (in Gaza), spend much of their lives with UAVs loitering in the skies above – is one characterised by the low, continuous thrum laden with the imminent potential for destruction and death.? If the lesson of this first phenomenon is to accept that it is the very nature of language to collide, for its words to flow into one another, throwing forth unforeseen meanings, then it is the lesson of a second similar blurring that at times such unintended consequences must be resisted in spite of their inevitability.? Here I am talking of the softening of the boundary between two realms in which the UAV is used: what are usually termed the ‘military’ and the ‘civilian’ domains. Since 1995, when it flew the GNAT-750 surveillance drone over Bosnia, the CIA has used military drones as a tool of surveillance; since 2002, when the first CIA drone strike was conducted by an MQ-1 Predator on a ‘tall man’ in Afghanistan – believed to be Osama bin Laden, but in actual fact one of a group of innocent civilians collecting scrap metal – these drones have held lethal potential. The problem is that such positive narratives concerning civilian use often begin from the familiar ground of the military drone. Many of these articles carry the image of the MQ-1 Predator, which has become a sort of habitual mode of advertising, playing on a combination of brand loyalty and shock tactics to capture the attention of the potential reader. Or else the kind civilian drone is introduced by way of its troubled former self, constructing a redemptive narrative.? In the BBC piece on agricultural use for instance, an upbeat tone accompanies the notion that the drone is moving ‘from battlefield to farm’. Yet the dangerous reality is that, by viewing the drone as a singular technology, it is only our gaze that shifts from fields of destruction to those of production. The military UAV itself remains and continues to kill unabated. As Steven Poole has it, the personality of the drone appears split between two poles: “assassination or conservation”. The technology’s ambiguous media presence allows for the mutual contamination of these poles, facilitating a normalization of ‘that which destroys life’ via the benign discourse of ‘that which saves it’.? If we are not cautious of this contagion, the ramifications will be more than merely theoretical. If the discourses are blurred, the physical uses themselves will not lag far behind in being conflated. Already, it is the nature of contemporary ‘hybrid’ or ‘non-linear’ warfare for conflict to merge with the sphere of everyday governance, functioning through a collage of previously distinct agencies. Armies are no longer self-contained instruments, but are increasingly made up of, and used in coordination with, a milieu of special forces, police, intelligence, humanitarian NGOs, diplomats, media, and, last but certainly not least, civilian populations themselves.? Especially in the call and response of terrorism and counterterrorism, a soldier’s battlefield might be their own streets, and a policeman’s beat a foreign port; the soldier is trained to govern, while the policeman wields a gun; journalists render pens and cameras into weapons on the front line, and, as we have recently been made aware, come to be targeted like soldiers themselves.The threat posed by drones is not limited possibility of weaponization – drones are scarier than helicoptersGlenn Greenwald, Salon Analyst, December 12, 2011, “The growing menace of domestic drones,” accessed May 22, 2015, is always a large segment of the population that reflexively supports the use of greater government and police power — it’s usually the same segment that has little objection to Endless War — and it’s grounded in a mix of standard authoritarianism (I side with authority over those they accused of being Bad and want authorities increasingly empowered to stop the Bad people) along with naiveté (I don’t really worry that new weapons and powers will be abused by those in power, especially when — like now — those in power are Good). This mindset manifests in the domestic drone context specifically by dismissing their use as nothing more than the functional equivalent of police helicopters. This is a view grounded in pure ignorance.? The unique dangers of domestic drones, which I documented last week, exist completely independent of their weaponization potential, but weaponization nonetheless must be considered. Police officials are already speaking openly about their desire to weaponize their drones with “nonlethal weapons such as Tasers or a bean-bag gun.” Anyone who doubts that this is going to happen should just consider what the drone manufacturing industry itself is saying. They continuously emphasize to investors and others that a major source of business growth for their drone products will be domestic, non-military use.Overly powerful weapons are being developed for drone policing – 80,000 volt tasersDoug Aamoth, writer for Time Magazine, March 10, 2014, “Recently in Controversy: Drone Can Tase People with 80,000 Volts,” accessed May 22, 2015, tech firm is stunning the gadget world with a proof-of-concept demonstration at the South by Southwest Interactive festival featuring a remote-controlled flying "Stun Copter" capable of delivering 80,000 volts of electricity to a hapless target? This proof-of-concept demo that took place recently at South By Southwest seems to have resulted in some sharply divided opinions. Chaotic Moon — the outfit recently behind the fancy Pizza Hut touchscreen table concept and the virtual-reality shark-punching game — is back at it with C.U.P.I.D., which is short for Chaotic Unmanned Personal Intercept Drone.? Chaotic Moon shortens the description further by referring to the apparatus simply as a “stun copter,” capable of shooting “80,000 volts of pure projectile terror directly into the skin of an ill-intentioned hoodlum.”? The young man on the business end of the drone-mounted Phazzer Dragon is a 26-year-old intern at Chaotic Moon, reports ABC News. Unsurprisingly, comments on Chaotic Moon’s Facebook page and YouTube video page run the gamut from cheers to jeers, with many of the less-than-enthusiastic comments making the argument that shooting 80,000 volts into people might not be the safest activity in the world.Drones represent a new stage of Orwellian totalitarianismMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, drones were first imagined by George Orwell (1949: 2) who, in his famous fictional account of a police-controlled dystopia, described a miniature police helicopter that ‘skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and darted away again with a curving flight’. Given the dual association of the drone with war and totalitarianism, it is unsurprising that the integration of drone technology into internal policing in the United States, Britain and elsewhere has been greeted by civil libertarians and criminologists with considerable unease. Such transfers of military technology into policing are far from unprecedented2 but drones represents a new stage in the militarisation of policing that has been the subject of critical commentary since the advent of the Cold War.LinksJustifications for expanding drone surveillance rely on fantastical threat constructionK.B. Sandvik, Candidata Juris from the University of Oslo, 2015, “The Political and Moral Economies of Dual Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones,” accessed May 21, 2015, to Torin Monahan and Jennifer Mokos, an important element of the securitization process is the creation of compelling narratives to justify the surveillance systems under consideration; Mike Crang and Stephen Graham (2007) refer to such narratives as “technological fantasies” that position emergent technological systems as necessary — and effective — responses to dire threats. Such narratives are not, however, simply instrumental devices designed to achieve desired ends; they also actively shape the larger security cultures and afford them influence (Monahan and Mokos 2013). I would propose that the potential for the future deployment of armed police drones – the potential of the technological fantasy- may lie precisely in the lack of knowledge about the battlefield effectiveness of loitering munitions, including Switchblade. At the same time, it has been noted that the drone industry’s narratives evoke a level of havoc that is extremely rare in Western liberal democracies (terrorist atrocities, nuclear meltdown, high-speed car chases), for which a technological solution — the R&D and procurement of drones — is proposed, and thereby “used to justify both substantial public expenditure and the acquisition and use of drones by domestic police forces” (Hayes and Toepfer 2014).Drone use for policing fuses fantasy with weapon, creating an armament culture of control and destructionMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, present, no police drone is armed with lethal or non-lethal weaponry and any such development would likely be extremely controversial. Nonetheless the fetishisation of an object does not require the realisation of its full capacities. To the contrary, the fetishisation of the commodity can be signified by an ‘excess capacity’ that is never utilised (Dant 1996). Dant (1996) provides the example of cars manufactured with a capacity for speed that would be illegal to deploy on the road. It is this excess of capacity within the car that acts as a sign of prestige and value. In a similar fashion, drones may be appealing to police at least in part because their ‘excess capacity’ for weaponisation operates as a signifier of the individual power of the police officer and collective status of the police force. As such it accords with the increasingly stylised displays of militarised force that have come to characterise contemporary policing, marking the indeterminant boundaries between militarisation, gendered fantasies of domination, and the masculine pleasures of ‘playing war’. This fusion of fantasy and weapon is characteristic of the products of armament culture and generate considerable consumer interest (Luckham 1984). Drones are now available on the adult ‘toy’ market, and the bemusing intersection of weapon and toy in the drone became evident in 2012 when it emerged that an American police agency had purchased a toy drone although it would be illegal for an officer to use it in the field (Koebler 2013). Little wonder that the American Civil Liberties Union has suggested the police interest in drones as case of ‘boys with their toys gone wild’ (cited in Gruber 2011).Militarization of domestic policing conceptually redefines the purpose of policing – creating a domestic military intended to win a perpetual domestic “war” against insurgencyK.B. Sandvik, Candidata Juris from the University of Oslo, 2015, “The Political and Moral Economies of Dual Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones,” accessed May 21, 2015, criminological literature has paid significant attention to the tradition of military technology shifting to domestic law enforcement and creating a paramilitary police culture (Balko 2013; Holmqvist 2014; Li 2014) According to Abigail Hall and Christopher Coyne (2013b), the political economy underlying the militarization of domestic policing is premised on “crises” that prompt the government to take immediate action, but that ultimately become perpetual wars — the War on Drugs and the War on Terror being the primary examples. Hall and Coyne argue that as the police engage in military-style training, acquire military weapons, and employ military tactics in everyday operations, the protective state devolves into a predatory state that undermines the rights of the populace. Because of the entirely distinct forms of violence in which the police and the military are supposed to engage — domestic police are trained to use violence only as a last resort, whereas military forces are trained to achieve victory through combat — the militarization of domestic policing is highly problematic (Hall and Coyne 2013a). One corollary result is a shift in the conceptualization of the events and behaviours with which law enforcement is expected to deal: for example, criminality is redefined as insurgency, and crime control as low-intensity conflict; in a militarized law enforcement environment, both require counterinsurgency tactics and equipment (Kraska 2007).NDAA creates the framework for the military to legally transfer equipment to domestic agencies – transfers also aren’t public record – aff reverses this policy attrocityTaylor Wofford, Newsweek analyst, August 13, 2014, “How America’s Police Became an Army: The 1033 Program,” accessed May 23, 2015, has been quietly arming its police for battle since the early 1990s.? Faced with a bloated military and what it perceived as a worsening drug crisis, the 101st Congress in 1990 enacted the National Defense Authorization Act. Section 1208 of the NDAA allowed the Secretary of Defense to “transfer to Federal and State agencies personal property of the Department of Defense, including small arms and ammunition, that the Secretary determines is— (A) suitable for use by such agencies in counter-drug activities; and (B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense.” It was called the 1208 Program. In 1996, Congress replaced Section 1208 with Section 1033. The idea was that if the U.S. wanted its police to act like drug warriors, it should equip them like warriors, which it has—to the tune of around $4.3 billion in equipment, according to a report by the American Civil Liberties Union. The St. Louis County Police Department’s annual budget is around $160 million. By providing law enforcement agencies with surplus military equipment free of charge, the NDAA encourages police to employ military weapons and military tactics.? 1033 procurements are not matters of public record. And the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which coordinates distribution of military surplus, refuses to reveal the names of agencies requesting “tactical” items, like assault rifles and MRAPs — for security reasons, a spokesperson for DLA told Newsweek via email. One can only trace “tactical” items as far the county of the requesting agency. In the case of Ferguson, that means St. Louis County.ImpactsWeaponized domestic drone use is inevitable – relegates the population to status of criminality to be controlled and exterminatedMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, (2004) observed the inexorable repatriation of colonial strategies of control and domination into the governmental strategies of imperial powers. In a similar fashion, Moyn (2013) suggests that the drone is an important medium through which the ideology of technologically enhanced counter-terrorism, elaborated by Western powers in the ‘war on terror’ overseas, is being transposed from national to internal security. If the distinction between criminal and enemy combatant is increasingly one of perception (Kahn 2013) and drones typify the ‘logistics of military perception’ (Virilio 1984) then the incorporation of drones into policing necessarily has militarising impacts on the subject position of police officers vis a vis ‘the criminal’ and the ethos and culture of crime control. Technology, Corbet and Marx remind us (1991), is not politically neutral.? The military origins of the drone have been downplayed by police agencies who have instead described them as an extension of existing police aerial resources (Greenwald 2013). However this is a disingenuous trivialisation of the unavoidable association of the drone with the missile strikes that have terrorised civilian populations in the Middle East. Indeed, the potential for weaponisation has been a feature of police and political discourse on the domestic application of drones. In the United States, some police agencies and weapons manufacturers are openly speculating that law enforcement drones may be fitted with non-lethal weapons such as tasers, ‘bean bag’ guns, tear gas canisters and rubber bullets in the future (Stanton 2011; Benjamin 2013, p 79) while the Senator for Kentucky, Rand Paul, recently suggested that it would be legitimate for a police drone to be used to kill an armed robber (Johnson 2013). Infamously, American military drones have been used to target and kill American citizens overseas (Cole 2013c). Meanwhile the drone industry has developed weaponized drones for domestic application and is marketing these ‘assassin bugs’ to police agencies and governments (Greenwald 2013).Impact – drone use by police relies on threat construction but targets already disadvantaged groups and communitiesMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, invocation of dramatic (although usually rare) scenarios is typical of the manner in which police interest in drones has been legitimized. Frequently named situations include terrorist attacks, hostage situations, the pursuit of armed offenders, riots and protests. This is at times supplemented by references to the supposed utility of drones for more mundane policing activities. In the United States, Missouri Police Chief Captain Sam Dotson recently applied to the Federal Aviation Authority for a license to fly a drone, telling the media it would be used for ‘monitoring public spaces’ such as fairs and baseball games as well as ‘for terrorists, suspicious activity’ (Rush 2013). An article published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin in 2008 imagined a future scenario in which a drone would be launched to scan city blocks for ‘any known felons, prostitutes or drug dealers’ that might be ‘loitering’ in the area (Reed Jr. 2008: 16). This suggests that, like other examples of police militarisation, drones are likely to differentially impact on disadvantaged groups and communities (Meeks 2005), situating drones firmly within the politics of surveillance and risk minimisation (Lyon and Bauman 2013).Surveillance creates a chilling effect on people’s behavior, and risks discriminatory targeting and institutional abuseJay Stanley and Catherine Crump, ACLU analysts producing Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft, December 2011, “Protecting Privacy? From Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft,” accessed May 22, 2015, addition, drones raise many of the same issues that pervasive video surveillance brings in any? context. For example:? ?Chilling effects. What would be the effect on our public spaces, and our society as a whole,? if everyone felt the keen eye of the government on their backs whenever they ventured outdoors?? Psychologists have repeatedly found that people who are being observed tend to? behave differently, and make different decisions, than when they are not being watched.? This effect is so great that a recent study found that “merely hanging up posters of staring? human eyes is enough to significantly change people’s behavior.”? ? Voyeurism. Video surveillance is susceptible to individual abuse, including voyeurism. In? 2004, a couple making love on a dark nighttime rooftop balcony, where they had every reason? to expect they enjoyed privacy, were filmed for nearly four minutes by a New York police helicopter? using night vision. This is the kind of abuse that could become commonplace if drone? technology enters widespread use. (Rather than apologize, NYPD officials flatly denied that? this filming constituted an abuse, telling a television reporter, “this is what police in helicopters? are supposed to do, check out people to make sure no one is … doing anything illegal”).? ?Discriminatory targeting. The individuals operating surveillance systems bring to the job all? their existing prejudices and biases. In Great Britain, camera operators have been found to? focus disproportionately on people of color. According to a sociological study of how the systems? were operated, “Black people were between one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half times? more likely to be surveilled than one would expect from their presence in the population.”? ?Institutional abuse. In addition to abuse by the inevitable “bad apples” within law enforcement,? there is also the danger of institutional abuse. Sometimes, bad policies are set at the? top, and an entire law enforcement agency is turned toward abusive ends. That is especially? prone to happen in periods of social turmoil and intense political conflict. During the labor,? civil rights, and anti-Vietnam war movements of the 20th century, the FBI and other security? agencies engaged in systematic illegal behavior against those challenging the status quo.? And once again today we are seeing an upsurge in spying against peaceful political protesters? across America.? ?Automated enforcement. Drones are part of a trend? toward automated law enforcement, in which cameras? and other technologies are used to mete out justice? with little or no human intervention. This trend raises? a variety of concerns, such as the fact that computers? lack the judgment to fairly evaluate the circumstances? surrounding a supposed violation, and may be susceptible? to bugs and other software errors, or simply are? not programmed to fairly and properly encapsulate? the state of the law as passed by legislatures.Militarized police forces surpass their intended purpose and are dispatched to nonviolent crimes – empirics prove, SWATRadley Balko, Huffington Post analyst, September 12, 2011, “A Decade After 9/11, Police Departments Are Increasingly Militarized,” accessed May 23, 2015, post-September 11 era has also seen the role of SWAT teams and paramilitary police units expand to enforce nonviolent crimes beyond even the drug war. SWAT teams have been used to break up neighborhood poker games, sent into bars and fraternities suspected of allowing underage drinking, and even to enforce alcohol and occupational licensing regulations. Earlier this year, the Department of Education sent its SWAT team to the home of someone suspected of defrauding the federal student loan program.? Kraska estimates the total number of SWAT deployments per year in the U.S. may now top 60,000, or more than 160 per day. In 2008, the Maryland legislature passed a law requiring every police department in the state to issue a bi-annual report on how it uses its SWAT teams. The bill was passed in response to the mistaken and violent SWAT raid on the home of Berwyn Heights, Maryland mayor Cheye Calvo, during which a SWAT team shot and killed his two black labs. The first reports showed an average of 4.5 SWAT raids per day in that state alone.The impending surveillance state serves military, law enforcement, and commercial interests – functional equivalent of martial lawNaomi Wolf, analyst for The Guardian, December 21, 2012, “The coming drone attack on America,” accessed May 23, 2015, document accompanies a major federal push for drone deployment this year in the United States, accompanied by federal policies to encourage law enforcement agencies to obtain and use them locally, as well as by federal support for their commercial deployment. That is to say: now HSBC, Chase, Halliburton etc can have their very own fleets of domestic surveillance drones. The FAA recently established a more efficient process for local police departments to get permits for their own squadrons of drones.? Given the Department of Homeland Security militarization of police departments, once the circle is completed with San Francisco or New York or Chicago local cops having their own drone fleet – and with Chase, HSBC and other banks having hired local police, as I reported here last week – the meshing of military, domestic law enforcement, and commercial interests is absolute. You don't need a messy, distressing declaration of martial law.Privacy Advantage1AC ModuleDrone surveillance creates an Orwellian society where people are constantly aware of the visual and killing capabilities of airborne robotsM. Ryan Calo, Director for Privacy and Robotics at the Center for Internet & Society, December 12, 2011, “The Drone as Privacy Catalyst,” accessed May 24, 2015, have in mind the effect on citizens of drones flying around United States cities. These machines are disquieting. Virtually any robot can engender a certain amount of discomfort, let alone one associated in the mind of the average American with spy operations or targeted killing. If you will pardon the inevitable reference to 1984, George Orwell specifically describes small flying devices that roam neighborhoods and peer into windows. Yet one need not travel to Orwell’s Oceania—or the offices of our own Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency—to encounter one of these machines. You could travel to one of several counties where American police officers are presently putting this technology through its paces.Drones represent a unique and novel threat to privacyBen Jenkins, J.D., 2014, “Watching the Watchmen: Drone Privacy and the Need for Oversight,” accessed May 20, 2015, technology presents a unique threat to privacy by eliminating? practical safeguards against Fourth Amendment searches. First, drones can be? substantially smaller than traditional aircrafts, making them practically invisible? at altitudes where traditional aircraft could be spotted from the ground. Second,? unlike traditional aircraft such as helicopters, many drones can operate almost? silently, allowing them to conduct surveillance virtually unnoticed. Third, as? one legal scholar notes: “[w]ith the ability to hover or circle in the sky for hours,? [drones] present a potential intrusion far more pervasive than the mere flyover? of a plane or helicopter.” As Justice Alito observed in Jones, constant long–? term surveillance without technology (such as GPS tracking) requires many? agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance, practically rendering? such surveillance impossible. Drone capabilities have even further opened? the doors to previously unknown levels of invasive government monitoring by? rendering it relatively easy and cheap.? Similarly, drone surveillance allows a depth of information collection? previously impossible. Like the Jones concurrences’ concern with GPS? monitoring, drones allow the collection of a vast amount of intimate personal? information—travel patterns or shopping habits to name a few—but on a? much larger scale, and surveillance is not limited merely to an individual but all? people beneath the drone’s all–seeing eye.Drones revolutionize surveillance technology, we need new legislation like the plan to protect privacyM. Ryan Calo, Director for Privacy and Robotics at the Center for Internet & Society, December 12, 2011, “The Drone as Privacy Catalyst,” accessed May 24, 2015, shifts in technology and attendant changes to business practices have not led to similar shifts in privacy law, at least not on the order of 1890. Computers, the Internet, RFID, GPS, biometrics, facial recognition—none of these developments has created the same sea change in privacy thinking. One might reasonably wonder whether we will ever have another Warren and Brandeis moment, whether any technology will dramatize the need to rethink the very nature of privacy law.? One good candidate is the drone. In routine use by today’s military, these unmanned aircraft systems threaten to perfect the art of surveillance. Drones are capable of finding or following a specific person. They can fly patterns in search of suspicious activities or hover over a location in wait. Some are as small as birds or insects, others as big as blimps. In addition to high-resolution cameras and microphones, drones can be equipped with thermal imaging and the capacity to intercept wireless communications.? That drones will see widespread domestic use seems inevitable. They represent an efficient and cost-effective alternative to helicopters and airplanes. Police, firefighters, and geologists will—and do—use drones for surveillance and research. But drones will not be limited to government or scientific uses. The private sector has incentives to use drones as well. The media, in particular, could make widespread use of drones to cover unfolding police activity or traffic stories. Imagine what drones would do for the lucrative paparazzi industry, especially coupled with commercially available facial recognition technology.? You might think drones would already be ubiquitous. There are, however, Federal Aviation Administration restrictions on the use of unmanned aircraft systems, restrictions that date back several years. Some public agencies have petitioned for waiver. Customs and Border Protection uses drones to police our borders. Recently the state of Oklahoma asked the FAA for a blanket waiver of eighty miles of airspace. Going forward, waiver may not be necessary. The FAA faces increasing pressure to relax its restrictions and is considering rulemaking to reexamine drone use in domestic airspace.HarmsDrone use for policing threatens privacyK.B. Sandvik, Candidata Juris from the University of Oslo, 2015, “The Political and Moral Economies of Dual Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones,” accessed May 21, 2015, very capabilities that make microdrones effective — intrusiveness and silence — make possible new forms of privacy invasion. As the ACLU has noted, in light of the crowd-innovation that is characteristic of drone development, it is likely that “the technology will develop new and more advanced capabilities that have never existed for police helicopters — such as swarms, or more continuous surveillance” (Stanley 2013). The use of police helicopters has already raised privacy issues, as well as concerns about the use of lethal police airpower; however, because manned helicopters are expensive to acquire, staff, and maintain, cost has so far provided a natural limitation on their use. The ACLU have argued, however, that drones “erase natural limits” on aerial surveillance (Stanley 2013). As the developer of CUPID has noted, “This is something that’s affordable for almost everybody and in the next two or three years the technology will probably cut in half, by price” (Mass 2014).Impending ubiquitous drone use will be able to gather any and all details about a person’s lifeJonathan Olivito, Ohio State J.D., 2013, “Beyond the Fourth Amendment: Limiting Drone? Surveillance Through the Constitutional Right to? Informational Privacy,” accessed May 24, 2015, these examples illustrate, ubiquitous drone operation within the United? States is not far in the future. The widespread use of maneuverable and stealthy? drones equipped with powerful sensory tools leads to the unsettling conclusion? that domestic drones could gather an inordinate amount of information about? people, both inadvertently and intentionally. The information that government? drone operators could obtain through long-term drone observation might range? from the trivial—what gym a person frequents—to the intimate—a person’s? healthcare choices—but when considered as a whole, extended observation can? reveal “the full picture of a person’s life.” Also, regardless of whether UAS? operators actually record any information about people’s lives, the prospect of? constant government monitoring and recording “chills associational and? expressive freedoms.” The imminent mass arrival of drones in the United? States will almost certainly imperil privacy. But problematically, the Fourth? Amendment, and other current privacy safeguards, fall short of providing? sufficient privacy protection against UAS surveillance.ImpactsPrivacy – The aff turns their drone industry and econ impacts, privacy is key to innovation and a thriving intellectual cultureJulie E. Cohen, Professor at Georgetown Law Center, 2013, “What Privacy is For,” accessed May 24, 2015, described, privacy is anything but old-fashioned, and trading it away creates ? two kinds of large systemic risk, which Parts III and IV discuss. Privacy incursions can ? be episodic or systematic, but systematic deprivations of privacy also facilitate episodic ? privacy incursions. In this Essay, therefore, I will focus on the interplay between privacy ? and systems of surveillance. I will argue that freedom from surveillance, whether public or private, is foundational to the practice of informed and reflective citizenship. Privacy therefore is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic political systems. Freedom from surveillance also is foundational to the capacity for innovation, and so the ? perception of privacy as anti-innovation is a non sequitur. Innovation occurs in commercial and social contexts and is infused with particular commercial and social values; in particular, a commercial culture that sees privacy as threatening particular practices of knowledge production will register privacy regulation as a threat. But a society that values innovation ignores privacy at its peril, for privacy also shelters the processes of play and experimentation from which innovation emerges. In short, privacy ? incursions harm individuals, but not only individuals. Privacy incursions in the name of progress, innovation, and ordered liberty jeopardize the continuing vitality of the political and intellectual culture that we say we value.Privacy is key to identity construction, freedom, and happinessWalter Simpson, environmental, peace and justice analyst, May 10, 2014, “The end of privacy? Government and private surveillance pose a growing threat to Americans,” accessed May 24, 2015, is essential to our humanity. It permits us to create and maintain private lives from which spring personal identity, self-determination, freedom and, ultimately, happiness.? In contrast, surveillance is a direct assault on privacy. It attacks and eliminates privacy. Its chilling effect constrains and shrinks us through self-censorship of thought and action. When taken to the extreme, like in George Orwell’s “1984,” surveillance objectifies so thoroughly that it destroys our internal life.? Our nation’s founders recognized the importance of privacy in the Bill of Rights. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”? While this language is pre-9/11, Internet and cellphone, it speaks of the kind of nation the founders envisioned. In America, we have a constitutionally guaranteed right to a private life safe from unreasonable search and seizure. But our privacy is being eroded by leaps and bounds every day.AT: Neg OffenseAT: Terrorism DADrones aren’t actually useful for crime preventionMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, is becoming clear that police interest in purchasing drones far outweighs their practical utility. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration has reported that 7 % of approximately 300 permits issued for drone use by government agencies have gone to law enforcement (Balcerzak and Hiegel 2013). However it has emerged that the majority of those police agencies that purchased drones have never deployed them due to legal concerns and the ongoing costs (Balcerzak and Hiegel 2013). The theatrical scenarios envisioned by Minister O’Brien and Captain Dodson above, in which police drones foil terrorist plots or navigate through fiery towers, have yet to materialize, and are in stark contrast to the current reality of numerous drones gathering dust in police storage rooms.? Police and government rhetoric about drones are characterised by unrealised and unrealistic fantasies of total surveillance and swift intervention that are disrupted by an absence of supporting evidence and a tangle of technological, legal and practical limitations. Benjamin (2013) lists a number of incidents in which the capabilities of drones have been put to good use, such as when drones were used after the 2011 earthquake in Japan to monitor radiation levels in at the Fukishima nuclear plant, or when crisis services have used drones to monitor floods or fires. However it has yet to be established through research or experience that drones have any substantive place in crime prevention, detection or intervention.Drones are more expensive and less effective than aircraft piloted by a humanMichael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, and government claims about the utility and cost effectiveness of drones tend to blithely reproduce the marketing material of manufacturers and industry groups, falling into the ‘technofallacies’ identified by Corbett and Marx (1991). In their analysis of criminal justice enthusiasm for new technology, they emphasise a tendency to assume that new technology is more effective and promising than established approaches or non-technological methods. In the case of the drone, such assumptions are contested by independent analyses. While being considerably cheaper per unit than piloted aircraft, drones may not be more cost effective since their operation costs are substantially higher (Congressional Budget Office 2011; Haddal and Gertler 2010: 4; see also Boyle 2012). Law enforcement is likely to be using smaller drones than the military with a much lower unit cost but this is offset by the short flight time and limited endurance of small drones, their susceptibility to inclement weather, and the ongoing costs of pilot licensing, training and operation (Haddal and Gertler 2010: 5). As a result, ‘the life cycle cost of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] could actually be greater than the life cycle cost of manned aircraft’ (ibid.). The limited studies available have found that manned aircraft are more effective than unmanned aircraft in civilian law enforcement applications (Haddal and Gertler 2010: 6) with the ‘unimpressive’ results of drones coming at a high financial cost (Benjamin 2013: 75).Drones are more expensive than traditional equipment and pilotsK.B. Sandvik, Candidata Juris from the University of Oslo, 2015, “The Political and Moral Economies of Dual Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones,” accessed May 21, 2015, the possibility that the use of surveillance and armed drones will be more expensive than traditional methods of “keeping order” is rarely communicated: for example, an audit by the Homeland Security Department's inspector general criticized DHS for buying more Predator drones than the Border Patrol can use. Additionally, the former president of the National Border Patrol Council, the border agents’ union, has complained that “The big problem is that they [drones] are more expensive than traditional methods” of patrolling (Bennett 2012b). The same can be said of weaponised microdrones: even as the industry competes for more contracts, an analyst with the Teal Group Corporation has suggested that LMAMS will be “purchased in limited quantities, especially given the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The analyst notes that “It [LMAMS] is very expensive per mission compared to more conventional fire support methods” (Schechter 2014). While it has been reported that the United States is attempting to lower the cost of the War on Drugs by using drones in the Caribbean (Mick 2013), it has also been reported that Customs and Border Protection has raided budgets of its manned aircraft to pay for drones, resulting in a cut in flight hours of surveillance planes hunting smuggling ships (Bennet 2012a). Hence, although drones are cheaper than traditional police airpower, they may not be cheaper than traditional policing — an equation that is kept out of the industry’s promotional material.? Critics of the cost-effectiveness argument not only question the utility of police drones but also point to the high rate of vehicle loss, both civilian and military. Observing that “it is becoming clear that police interest in purchasing drones far outweighs their practical utility”, Salter (2013) proposes that the various and conflicting rationales offered by police forces in their pursuit of public support for drones can be understood as mystifications of the desire to embody and enact the militarized “subject position” made possible by such technology — including states seeking to legitimize particular governmental strategies through crime control.Impact turn – The war on terror is a dangerous construction used to justify expansions of surveillanceGlenn Greenwald, Salon Analyst, December 12, 2011, “The growing menace of domestic drones,” accessed May 22, 2015, the name of “homegrown Terrorism,” so many of the most recent War on Terror expansions have entailed application for domestic uses: from the Obama administration’s assault on Miranda rights to its claimed power to assassinate U.S. citizens to the latest detention bill about to pass Congress. The Surveillance State and the police powers ushered in by the War on Terror have been widely applied to domestic political dissent. The U.S. Government’s fixation on identifying and punishing dissidents is illustrated by the administration’s creepy new “hear-something, see-something” campaign against “domestic radicalization”: encouraging teachers and children to spot and then report those “making statements that indicate a rejection of American society.”? It takes little imagination to see the dangers of this militarization of domestic police powers; in fact, it takes extreme denseness and authoritarian trust to dismiss it as “paranoia” or “hysteria.”AT: Politics DAPlan is popular – lots of states trying to increase privacy protections against drones – privacy protections are much more popular than environmental protectionsWill Weissert, analyst for the Huffington Post, September 14, 2013, “Texas Drones Law Gets Tough On Public, Private Use,” accessed May 21, 2015, , Texas -- A hobbyist using a remote-control airplane mounted with a digital camera just happened to capture images last year of a Dallas creek running red with pig's blood. It led to a nearby meatpacking plant being fined for illegal dumping and two of its leaders being indicted on water pollution charges.? Yet, a Texas law that took effect Sept. 1 tightened rules not on polluters but on taking such photographs, an effort to better protect private property from drone surveillance.? More than 40 state legislatures have debated the increasing presence of unmanned aircraft in civilian airspace, with most of the proposals focused on protecting people from overly intrusive surveillance by law enforcement.Plan is popular – domestic use of drones is politically unpopularK.B. Sandvik, Candidata Juris from the University of Oslo, 2015, “The Political and Moral Economies of Dual Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones,” accessed May 21, 2015, drone lobby includes both drone manufacturers and providers of supportive services (training, maintenance, and consulting) (Hall and Coyne 2013a). Despite being open to “members . . . with an active interest in UAVs and the development of opportunities to use these systems on a routine basis for the overall benefit of mankind” (UAVS 2014), the industry’s lobbying organizations perceive themselves as having a “public relations problem” (Wolverton 2012), caused by its failure to properly “educate the public” about the benefits of drone use in civil airspace. It is useful to examine some of the reasons for this state of affairs: To begin with, the very use of the term? drone? continues to be contested. Both the military and the drone industry object to the word, and have for some time insisted on a variety of alternatives, including UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle), RPA (remotely piloted aircraft), RPV (remotely piloted vehicle), and UAS (unmanned aircraft system). Critics have responded by accusing the industry of failing to recognize the existence of “legitimate issues to be debated about how unmanned systems might be used”, and have observed that the industry appears to believe that a semantic shift will make the criticism go away (McNeal 2013). In the wake of broad coverage, including human rights reporting, on civilian deaths in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, the drone industry found itself being regarded as partially responsible for what are known as “drone wars” (Cavallaro and Sonnenberg 2012). In February 2013, Paul Applewhite, a member of the board of directors of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), which represents eighty companies based in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States, participated in a congressional hearing on drones. In response to a question regarding the backlash against drones, Applewhite said, “My opinion is that the way that we’re currently using drones in warfare, we’re moving away from indiscriminate killing to discriminate killing” (Thalen 2013). Yet the image of drone manufacturers as a particular breed of war profiteers is not the only problem; another concern is the lack of attention to safety and security as the industry? ? attempts to open civil airspace. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 for example, which was drafted with extensive involvement from the drone lobby, makes no explicit reference to privacy. To counter an outburst of criticism, AUVSI later issued a code of conduct, which has been strongly criticized for ignoring key concerns with respect to pilot skills, privacy, and sanctions for violating the code (Thalen 2013). Moreover, despite general support for drone wars abroad, Americans remain sceptical about the domestic use of police drones: in a 2013 poll, 58 percent of respondents agreed that law enforcement’s use of militarized weapons, armoured vehicles, and drones has gone too far (Detrick 2013).Drone use unpopular – makes plan regulation popularPaul Detrick, Reason analyst and documentary specialist on police militarization, privacy, civil liberties and the First Amendment, December 13, 2013, “Reason-Rupe Poll: Americans Still Uncomfortable with Cops and Drones,” accessed May 22, 2015, newest Reason-Rupe poll has found that 58 percent of Americans think law enforcement's use of militarized weapons, armored vehicles and drones has gone too far. While Americans may be able to see cops riding around in MRAPS wearing riot gear, it’s the militarized tools that Americans don’t see like drones flying over their backyards that may be just as scary to them.? When Sheriff Gregory Ahern of Alameda County said that he wanted to use a drone for search and rescue at a public protection committee meeting in February 2013, privacy advocates and residents pushed back, claiming that it would be too easy for the sheriff’s department to surveil citizens. “This drone is just another mechanism to invade people’s privacy and spy on them,” said one woman at the meeting.AT: States CPCP fails and gets rolled back – State regulation is a race to the bottom – even when states pass regulatory legislation it gets struck down, states want minimal regulation to be available for FAA test site statusBen Jenkins, J.D., 2014, “Watching the Watchmen: Drone Privacy and the Need for Oversight,” accessed May 20, 2015, have argued for state and local, rather than federal, regulation of drones, opining these governmental bodies are better equipped to handle? and react to the nuances of an emerging technology, but recent state drone? legislation failures suggest otherwise. Recently, many state drone regulation? bills have been struck down as legislators vie to secure their states as FAA? drone–testing sites. It is estimated that within the next few years domestic? drone use will create over 70,000 jobs and generate $82 billion. One of the? factors considered by the FAA when choosing test sites is the presence of? “drone–restrictive” laws and state legislators have been hesitant to jeopardize? their states’ chances at being selected. After a North Dakota bill that would? have banned police from warrantless use of drones was struck down, a state? senator remarked, “Now that we’ve defeated that bill in the Senate, it sends? a clear message to the FAA that North Dakota’s open for business . . . .”? Attitudes and remarks like this suggest that state and local governments cannot? be counted on to protect privacy interests in the face of competing economic? opportunity. Baseline federal privacy safeguards would sufficiently protect? privacy interests and still allow for technological and economic growth in the? drone industry. CP can’t solve – states don’t have jurisdiction to regulate federal agencies, federal law preempts state law when it comes to aviationJol A. Silversmith, J.D., November 3, 2013, “You Can’t Regulate This: State Regulation? of the Private Use of Unmanned Aircraft,” accessed May 24, 2015, U.S. Constitution provides that federal laws? are the “supreme law of the land.”? In the context of? aviation, the doctrine of field preemption—that state? action is preempted because Congress intended to? occupy the entire regulatory field—has been held? by many courts to generally prohibit state regulation? of aircraft safety and operations.? Underlying? this position is that the U.S. government by statute? “has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United? States.”? As the Supreme Court explained more than? 40 years ago in an opinion invalidating a locally? imposed curfew on aircraft noise, “a uniform and? exclusive system of federal regulation” is required “if? the congressional objectives underlying the Federal? Aviation Act are to be fulfilled.” Thus, in the context? of aviation, federal preemption long has been understood? to sweep with a wide broom.AT: Gendered Language KUAV is the specific term of art adopted by the DoD, alternatives like “unpiloted” have different military meaningI. Colomina and P. Molina, photogrammetry and remote sensing experts, June 2014, “Unmanned aerial systems for photogrammetry and remote sensing: A review,” accessed May 23, 2015, are known under various different names and acronyms, such as “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” (UAV), “aerial robot” or simply “drone,” with “UAV” and “drone” being the most popular terms. The term UAS was adopted by the US Department of Defense (DOD) and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) of the UK. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has introduced the concept of “Remotely-Piloted Aerial System” (RPAS), a particular class of UAS, in the ICAO Circular 328 (ICAO, 2011). This term is basically motivated by the fact that only RPAS will be able to integrate into the international civil aviation system. The aforementioned circular is a key reference in which the reader may find a comprehensive compilation of terms and definitions associated to UAS.Language is fluid – their argument ignores inherent ambiguities in language – their argument ignores the intent of the speaker, which is dehumanizing and totalitarianKelley L. Ross, Ph.D., 2006, “Against the Theory? of "Sexist Language",” accessed May 23, 2015, of all, the theory of "sexist language" seems to say that words cannot have more than one meaning: if "man" and "he" in some usage mean males, then they cannot mean both males and females in other usage (i.e. nouns and pronouns can have both masculine and common gender). Although univocal meanings were once the ideal of philosophical schools like Logical Positivism, this view is absurd enough as a rule for natural languages (where equivocal meanings and ambiguity emerge through usage) that there is usually a more subtle take on it: that the use of "man" or "he" to refer to males and to both males and females means that maleness is more fundamental than femaleness, "subordinating" femaleness to maleness, just as in the Book of Genesis the first woman, Eve, is created from Adam's rib for the purpose of being his companion. Now, the implication of the Biblical story may well be precisely that Adam is more fundamental than Eve, but the Bible did not create the language, Hebrew, in which it is written. If we are going to talk about the linguistic structure of Hebrew as distinct from the social ideology of the Bible, it is one thing to argue that the system of grammatical gender allowed the interpretation of gender embodied in the story of Adam and Eve and something very much different to argue that such an interpretive meaning necessarily underlies the original grammar of Hebrew -- or Akkadian, Arabic, Greek, French, Spanish, English, Swahili, etc. -- or that such a system of grammatical gender requires such an interpretation [note].? What a language with its gender system means is what people use it to mean. It is an evil principle to think that we can tell other people what they mean by what they say, because of some theory we have that makes it mean something in particular to us, even when they obviously mean something else. Nevertheless, there is now a common principle, in feminism and elsewhere (especially flourishing in literary criticism), that meaning is only in the response of the interpreter, not in the mind of the speaker, even if the speaker is to be sued or charged with a crime for the interpreter having the response that they do. There is also on top of this the Marxist theory of "false consciousness," which holds that "true" meaning follows from the underlying economic structure, today usually just called the "power" relationships. Most people are unaware of the power relationships which produce the concepts and language that they use, and so what people think they mean by their own statements and language is an illusion.? The implications of these principles are dehumanizing and totalitarian: what individual people think and want is irrelevant and to be disregarded, even by laws and political authorities forcing them to behave, and speak, in certain ways. But they are principles that make it possible to dismiss the common sense view that few people speaking English who said "man" in statements like "man is a rational animal" were referring exclusively to males, even though this usage was clear to all, from the context, for centuries before feminism decided that people didn't "really" mean that. But even if some speakers really did mean that, it is actually irrelevant to the freedom of individuals to mean whatever they intend to mean through language in the conventionally available forms that they choose. Focus on speech criticism causes policy paralysis – shifts focus from policy discussion and actual reformWendy Brown, Political Science Professor at US Berkeley, 2001, “Politics Out of History,” “Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech. Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive political response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize.EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 AFFIRMATIVEThesisAccording to sources in the intelligence community, Executive Order 12333, originally implemented by President Reagan, is the fundamental document authorizing the expansion of data collection activities towards U.S. citizens. The Order has been used by the National Security Agency as legal authorization for the secret and systematic collection of unencrypted information flowing through the internet, emails, cell phones, and every other means of electronic information transmission. The affirmative has Congress render the Executive Order legally invalid, which Congress is empowered to do. The main 1AC advantage is totalitarianism. Separation of powers is an additional advantage in the file. 1ACObservation One: InherencyExecutive Order 12333 falls outside of FISA jurisdiction and is responsible for the majority of data collectionErica Newland, former Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Democracy & Technology and member of Yale Law Journal editorial staff, April 2015"Executive Orders in Court," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124, (accessed 4/26/2014)The relative scarcity of attention to E.O. 12,333 is all the more surprising because the Order, according to some reports, is the authority behind “most of [the] NSA’s data collection.” Despite text that imposes limitations on surveillance of U.S. persons, press reports have suggested that significant numbers of U.S. persons are caught in the Order’s web. And compared to activities authorized by the Order’s statutory counterparts, E.O. 12,333 programs are less likely to be briefed to the congressional intelligence committees. These programs also fall outside the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).Executive Order 12333 allows collection of content and metadata without limit, requiring no warrant, no report to Congress, no consent of the companies involved and none of Obama’s promised reformsJohn Napier Tye, former section chief for Internet Freedom in State Department, July 18, 2014"Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans," Washington Post, (accessed 4/25/2015)Executive Order 12333 contains nothing to prevent the NSA from collecting and storing all such communications — content as well as metadata — provided that such collection occurs outside the United States in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence investigation. No warrant or court approval is required, and such collection never need be reported to Congress. Obama’s promised reforms don’t address the Executive OrderJohn Napier Tye, former section chief for Internet Freedom in State Department, July 18, 2014"Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans," Washington Post, (accessed 4/25/2015)None of the reforms that Obama announced earlier this year will affect such collection. Without any legal barriers to such collection, U.S. persons must increasingly rely on the affected companies to implement security measures to keep their communications private. The executive order does not require the NSA to notify or obtain consent of a company before collecting its users’ data.1ACThe Order allows the NSA to bypass the limits on surveillance imposed by FISAMarcy Wheeler, national security blogger, December 14, 2014"Section 309: A Band-Aid for a Gaping Wound in Democracy," Emptywheel, (accessed 4/25/2015)But instead of extending FISA (which is already inadequate to the technology of bulk collection), Congress instead moved to impose some retention limits but not use limits on this data. Indeed, the permitted reasons for retention, and Litt’s insistence that this doesn’t change what they’re already doing, suggests they’re already using this data for broad purposes, though the really unlimited use of it would be limited to metadata analysis. At the very least, this means the government is able to engage in metadata analysis of Americans for far more uses than permitted under FISA, and do so without the First Amendment review required under FISA. It means NSA can construct the dossiers based on metadata on Americans so long as they do it with EO 12333 data. The use of EO 12333 also provides a way for the Attorney General to authorize spying on content that will only, with the new provision, receive outside oversight after 5 years.Thus, we advocate the following:The United States Congress should enact legislation declaring that the provisions of Executive Order 12333 that authorize surveillance and data collection on American citizens no longer has legal effect.Observation Two: SolvencyCongress should use legislation to stop the domestic surveillance component of Executive Order 12333Mark Jaycox, legislative analyst at Electronic Frontier Foundation, November 5, 2013"Three Leaks, Three Weeks, and What We've Learned About the US Government's Other Spying Authority: Executive Order 12333," Electronic Frontier Foundation, (accessed 4/26/2015)Congress must scrutinize the use of 12333 more closely. If it's being used to collect, data mine, and/or analyze innocent Americans' information, it must be stopped with legislation by Congress. The stories show how the NSA is using laws, policies, and procedures to completely skirt the Constitution. Congress must step in as the major oversight branch of the US government. It can do this by beginning a full-scale investigation into the NSA's surveillance authorities by a special Congressional committee. More questions than answers continue to be raised by the ongoing leaks. And it's time for Congress to act.1ACCongress can declare that a particular provision of an executive order no longer has legal effectVivian S. Chu and Todd Garvey, Legislative Attorneys at Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2014"Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation," CRS Report 7-5700, (accessed 4/26/2015)To effectuate a repeal, Congress need only enact legislation directing that provisions of the executive order “shall not have legal effect.” For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 explicitly revoked a December 13, 1912, executive order that had created the Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 2. In 1992, Congress similarly revoked an executive order issued by President George H. W. Bush that had directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a human fetal tissue bank for research purposes. The repeal legislation stated that “[t]he provisions of Executive Order 12806 ... shall not have any legal effect.”Their sources are wrong about intelligence being the exclusive realm of the executive: Congress can check presidential authority on surveillanceDavid S. Eggert, Professor of Law at Washington and Lee, 1983"Executive Order 12333: An Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless National Security Searches," Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1983, (accessed 4/25/2015)Congress has broad power to regulate the exercise of any presidential power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance. No explicit constitutional grant unambiguously gives the President such power. Youngstown seems decisive: if the President cannot, in the face of congressional hostility, seize steel mills when he considers the nation's security imperiled, he cannot conduct searches and seizures under similar conditions. It would be anomalous to hold that Congress has greater capacity to protect individual property rights than those personal rights Justice Brandeis aptly described as most valued by civilized men. The president is not a "Lone Ranger" in the field of foreign affairs or in the more specialized area of national security. Indeed, if the President were free to invoke national security to ignore the will of Congress, wide categories of legislation might be rendered nugatory. Powers explicitly granted to the legislative branch by the Constitution would be eroded. Thus, Congress possesses substantial power to regulate executive activity relating to foreign intelligence surveillance; it now becomes necessary to determine the extent to which Congress has exercised this power.1ACEO 12333 is a direct threat to democracy; it should be replaced via legislation just as Section 215 is currently being considered. Privacy of domestic citizens overseas is vitalJohn Napier Tye, former section chief for Internet Freedom in State Department, July 18, 2014"Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans," Washington Post, (accessed 4/25/2015)Consider the possibility that Section 215 collection does not represent the outer limits of collection on U.S. persons but rather is a mechanism to backfill that portion of U.S. person data that cannot be collected overseas under 12333. Proposals for replacing Section 215 collection are currently being debated in Congress. We need a similar debate about Executive Order 12333. The order as used today threatens our democracy. There is no good reason that U.S. citizens should receive weaker privacy and oversight protections simply because their communications are collected outside, not inside, our borders.Advantage One: TotalitarianismSurveillance spurs totalitarianism on the most intimate levels of human activity, outweighing any national security gainsHenry Giroux, Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, February 10, 2014"Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State," Truthout, (accessed 4/26/2015)Intelligence benefits are far outweighed by the illegal use of the Internet, telecommunication companies and stealth malware for data collection and government interventions that erode civil liberties and target individuals and groups that pose no threat whatsoever to national security. New technologies that range from webcams and spycams to biometrics and Internet drilling reinforce not only the fear of being watched, monitored and investigated but also a propensity toward confessing one's intimate thoughts and sharing the most personal of information. What is profoundly disturbing and worth repeating in this case is the new intimacy between digital technologies and cultures of surveillance in which there exists a profound an unseen intimate connection into the most personal and private areas as subjects publish and document their interests, identities, hopes and fears online in massive quantities.1ACSurveillance directed at foreign enemies will inevitably be used to crush domestic dissentFranklin Dmitryev, committee member at News & Letters Collective and activist with Defense Depot of Memphis Tennessee Concerned Citizens Committee, February 6, 2014"Rampant U.S. surveillance slouches toward totalitarianism," News & Letters, (accessed 2/26/2015)It has been the practice of every capitalist state’s repressive apparatus to point the finger abroad to attack the class struggle and other freedom movements at home. “Terrorism” is today’s equivalent of Joe McCarthy and J. Edgar Hoover’s “Communist menace,” which justified disrupting the civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement, and murdering people like Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark.Surveillance culture turns all of civil society into a war zone and renders class- and race-based discrimination invulnerable to dissentHenry Giroux, Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, February 10, 2014"Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State," Truthout, (accessed 4/26/2015)Under such circumstances, historical memory offers no buffer to the proliferation of a kind of mad violence and paranoid culture of media-induced fear that turns every public space into a war zone. Consequently, it is not surprising that the American public barely blinks in the face of a growing surveillance state. Nor is it surprising that intellectuals such as Sean Wilentz can claim that "the lack of fealty to the imperatives of the surveillance community as demonstrated by Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald, and Julian Assange is an assault on the modern liberal state itself." Indeed, what the new apologists for the surveillance state refuse to recognize is a history of abuse and criminal behavior by US intelligence apparatuses that were less concerned with implementing the law, arresting criminals and preventing terrorist acts than they were in suppressing dissent and punishing those groups marginalized by race and class. 1ACWe are on the brink of losing constitutional protections and sliding into totalitarianismPeter Van Buren, investigative journalist on State Department issues and author of "We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People," February 16, 2014"The Erosion of the U.S. Constitution ... and It Starts in the White House," Alternet, (accessed 4/26/2015) At the moment, we are threatened with a return to a pre-Constitutional situation that Americans would once have dismissed out of hand, a society in which the head of state can take a citizen’s life on his own say-so. If it’s the model for the building of post-Constitutional America, we’re in trouble. Indeed the stakes are high, whether we notice or not. The question is: How far will post-Constitutional America stray from the nation so conceived in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights? Because in the twenty-first century, the midnight knock on the door may come not from the King’s men, but from the sky.Surveillance crushes oppositional thought, controls the public, and militarizes societyFranklin Dmitryev, committee member at News & Letters Collective and activist with Defense Depot of Memphis Tennessee Concerned Citizens Committee, February 6, 2014"Rampant U.S. surveillance slouches toward totalitarianism," News & Letters, (accessed 2/26/2015)Surveillance is not an end in itself. It is used to control people, to intimidate, to locate and stifle opposition. Each intelligence agency has close links to the military; the NSA head is always a general or admiral. Some agencies, like the CIA, have their own paramilitary branches, even their own killer drones.F. Totalitarianism causes internal genocide and external warsR.J. Rummell, former professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, 2002"20th Century Democide," Death By Government, (accessed 4/26/2015)A preeminent fact about government is that some murder millions in cold blood. This is where absolute Power reigns. A second fact is that some, usually the same governments, murder tens of thousands more through foreign aggression. Absolute Power again. These two facts alone must be the basis of our reconceptualization and taxonomies. Not, as it is today, only whether states are developed or not, third world or not, militarily powerful or not, or large or not. But also and more important, whether Power is absolute, and whether it has engaged in genocide, politicide, and mass icality: Domestic SurveillanceWe're topical: Domestic surveillance is definitionally included in the text of Executive Order 12333 and means the gathering of nonpublic information on American citizensMatthew L. Small, Presidential Fellow at United States Air Force Academy, 2008"His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis," Text of A Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership: Papers of the 2007-2008 Center Fellows, (accessed 4/26/2015)Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)).Domestic surveillance includes electronic surveillance, eg phone tappingMatthew L. Small, Presidential Fellow at United States Air Force Academy, 2008"His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis," Text of A Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership: Papers of the 2007-2008 Center Fellows, (accessed 4/26/2015)The ability of the US government to tap into phone conversations opened a whole new realm of domestic surveillance. Simultaneously, it struck a fear into American citizens. Now, one could use telephone conversations, which people held to be as private as a one-on-one chat inside one’s own home, to intrude into a person’s private life or convict a person of a crime. Out of this fear arose the need to assert the right to privacy. Domestic needn't be inside the United States; it can mean dealing with the United States, as in U.S. citizens , 2015"Domestic," , (accessed 4/26/2015)Domestic: of or relating to one's own or a particular country as apart from other countries.CurtailCurtailing the power of the executive branch entails cutting off some partMerriam-Webster Dictionary, 2015"Curtail," Merriam-, (accessed 4/27/2014)Curtail: to make less by or as if by cutting off or away some part <curtail the power of the executive branch> <curtail inflation>.Curtail includes to haltBurton's Legal Thesaurus, 2007"Curtail," Legal Dictionary at , (accessed 4/27/2015)Curtail: abate, abbreviate, abridge, clip, coartare, cut, cut down, cut short, decrease, diminish, halt, lessen, lop, make smaller, minuere, pare, pare down, retrench, shorten, subtract, trimSubstantiallySubstantially means mainly or mostOxford Dictionaries, 2015"Substantially," , (accessed 4/27/2014)Substantially: mainly; in most details, even if not completely.Substantially means in the most important wayMacMillan Dictionary, 2015"Substantially," , (accessed 4/27/2015)Substantially: in the most important or basic way.We meet: Executive Order 12333 is the main and most comprehensive foundation for domestic surveillanceAli Watkins, Washington Bureau Reporter for McClatchy Newspapers, November 21, 2013"Most of NSA’s data collection authorized by order Ronald Reagan issued," McClatchy D.C., (accessed 4/27/2015)Approved by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, Executive Order 12333 (referred to as “twelve-triple-three”) still governs most of what the NSA does. It is a sweeping mandate that outlines the duties and foreign intelligence collection for the nation’s 17 intelligence agencies. It is not governed by Congress, and critics say it has little privacy protection and many loopholes. What changes have been made to it have come through guidelines set by the attorney general or other documents. The result is a web of intelligence law so complicated that it stymies even those tasked with interpreting it. As one former executive official said, “It’s complicated stuff.” Confusing though it may be, the order remains the primary authority under which the country’s intelligence agencies conduct the majority of their operations.Solvency: 12333 Should Be OverturnedRecommendation 12 of the Intelligence and Communication Review Group specifically concerns limiting the domestic surveillance power of EO 12333 and could be used as model legislation directly affecting that part of the orderJohn Napier Tye, former section chief for Internet Freedom in State Department, July 18, 2014"Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans," Washington Post, (accessed 4/25/2015)The president’s own Review Group on Intelligence and Communication Technologies, in Recommendation 12 of its public report, addressed the matter. But the review group coded its references in a way that masked the true nature of the problem. At first glance, Recommendation 12 appears to concern Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, which authorizes collection inside the United States against foreign targets outside the United States. Although the recommendation does not explicitly mention Executive Order 12333, it does refer to “any other authority.” A member of the review group confirmed to me that this reference was written deliberately to include Executive Order 12333. Recommendation 12 urges that all data of U.S. persons incidentally collected under such authorities be immediately purged unless it has foreign intelligence value or is necessary to prevent serious harm. The review group further recommended that a U.S. person’s incidentally collected data never be used in criminal proceedings against that person, and that the government refrain from searching communications by U.S. persons unless it obtains a warrant or unless such searching is necessary to prevent serious harm. The White House understood that Recommendation 12 was intended to apply to 12333. That understanding was conveyed to me verbally by several White House staffers, and was confirmed in an unclassified White House document that I saw during my federal employment and that is now in the possession of several congressional committees. In that document, the White House stated that adoption of Recommendation 12 would require “significant changes” to current practice under Executive Order 12333 and indicated that it had no plans to make such plexity is the only barrier to interbranch reevaluation of 12333Ali Watkins, Washington Bureau Reporter for McClatchy Newspapers, November 21, 2013"Most of NSA’s data collection authorized by order Ronald Reagan issued," McClatchy D.C., (accessed 4/27/2015)Executive Order 12333 was intended to bolster a reeling intelligence community and further define its authority to conduct foreign intelligence gathering. The global telecommunications network didn’t exist, and collecting foreign communications posed little risk for Americans’ data to be swept up in the dragnet. But in the three decades since 12333 was written, global communications have changed dramatically. The order, however, has not. “In 1996, when (12333) was 15 years old, we said, ‘Gee, this probably ought to be revised.’ Now we’re more than 15 years after that,” said John Bellinger, a former legal adviser to the National Security Council during the presidency of George W. Bush. Still, the order hasn’t undergone any major change, “in part, because it’s so difficult and complex to change it,” he said.Solvency: Congress Can Overturn Executive OrdersSunset provisions effectively overturn executive ordersVivian S. Chu and Todd Garvey, Legislative Attorneys at Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2014"Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation," CRS Report 7-5700, (accessed 4/26/2015)Congress may also affect executive orders by amending the language to include a sunset provision. If Congress lets the sunset provision lapse, the President would no longer have the authority under the statute to act. For example, Executive Order 11399 established the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO). This executive order was later amended by Executive Order 11688. In 1969, Congress appropriated funds to continue the NCIO for five years at which time it would terminate unless reauthorized by Congress. The NCIO is no longer in existence. Congress can de-fund executive orders or particular sections of themVivian S. Chu and Todd Garvey, Legislative Attorneys at Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2014"Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation," CRS Report 7-5700, (accessed 4/26/2015)Additionally, Congress may also inhibit the implementation of an executive order by preventing funds from being used to implement the order. For example, Congress has used its appropriations authority to limit the effect of executive orders by denying salaries and expenses for an office established in an executive order, or by directly denying funds to implement a particular section of an order.Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of CitizensThe National Security Agency relies on 12333 to collect mass unencrypted information from Google and Yahoo data centersSpencer Ackerman, national security editor for The Guardian, July 2, 2014"NSA reformers dismayed after privacy board vindicates surveillance dragnet," The Guardian, (accessed 4/25/2015)When the board next meets, on July 23, it will consider launching a new inquiry into one of the seminal texts behind US intelligence authorities, an executive order known as 12333. The NSA relies upon that obscure document for, among other things, its surreptitious collection of unencrypted information transiting from Google and Yahoo data centers. After the hearing adjourned Wednesday, Medine, Cook and Wald all indicated their appetite for reviewing 12333.12333 is the foundation for the vast majority of data surreptitiously collected on U.S. citizensJohn Napier Tye, former section chief for Internet Freedom in State Department, July 18, 2014"Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans," Washington Post, (accessed 4/25/2015)Public debate about the bulk collection of U.S. citizens’ data by the NSA has focused largely on Section 215 of the Patriot Act, through which the government obtains court orders to compel American telecommunications companies to turn over phone data. But Section 215 is a small part of the picture and does not include the universe of collection and storage of communications by U.S. persons authorized under Executive Order 12333. From 2011 until April of this year, I worked on global Internet freedom policy as a civil servant at the State Department. In that capacity, I was cleared to receive top-secret and “sensitive compartmented” information. Based in part on classified facts that I am prohibited by law from publishing, I believe that Americans should be even more concerned about the collection and storage of their communications under Executive Order 12333 than under Section 215.12333 is more sweeping than Section 215; it includes audio collection and information on U.S. citizens abroad, all with no congressional oversightJohn Napier Tye, former section chief for Internet Freedom in State Department, July 18, 2014"Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans," Washington Post, (accessed 4/25/2015)For example, Section 215 permits the bulk collection only of U.S. telephone metadata — lists of incoming and outgoing phone numbers — but not audio of the calls. Executive Order 12333 contains no such protections for U.S. persons if the collection occurs outside U.S. borders. Issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 to authorize foreign intelligence investigations, 12333 is not a statute and has never been subject to meaningful oversight from Congress or any court. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that the committee has not been able to “sufficiently” oversee activities conducted under 12333.Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of CitizensThere is less protection/more metadata exploitation under 12333; it makes it easier to spy on AmericansMarcy Wheeler, National Security Blogger, January 27, 2014"Important: Changes to Section 215 Dragnet Will Not Change Treatment of EO 12333 Metadata," Empty Wheel, (accessed 4/27/2015)If the data is accessed via one of the FISC-overseen programs, US persons benefit from the additional subject matter, dissemination, and First Amendment protections of those laws or FISC’s implementation of them (and would benefit from the minor changes Obama has promised to both Section 215 and FAA). But if NSA collected the data via one of its EO 12333 programs, it does not get those protections. To be clear, it does get some dissemination protection and can only be accessed with a foreign intelligence purpose, but that is much less than what the FISC programs get. Which leaves the NSA a fair amount of leeway to spy on US persons, so long as it hasn’t collected the data to do so under the programs overseen by FISC. And when it collects data under EO 12333, it is a lot easier for the NSA to spy on Americans. 12333 is responsible for metadata collection from mobile apps, Facebook and YouTube; despite administration claims, Americans have no protection from this subset of data collectionMarcy Wheeler, National Security Blogger, January 27, 2014"Important: Changes to Section 215 Dragnet Will Not Change Treatment of EO 12333 Metadata," Empty Wheel, (accessed 4/27/2015)The metadata from leaky mobile apps almost certainly comes from EO 12333 collection, not least given the role of GCHQ and CSEC (Canada’s Five Eyes’ partner) to the collection. The Facebook and YouTube data GCHQ collects (just reported by Glenn Greenwald working with NBC) surely counts as EO 12333 collection. NSA’s spokeswoman will say over and over that “everyday” or “ordinary” Americans don’t have to worry about their favorite software being sucked up by NSA. But to the extent that collection happens under EO 12333, they have relatively little protection.Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of Citizens12333 enables mass collection of data from Skype, Facebook messages, emails, and incidental internet data, giving Americans no protection even when they are not specifically targetedCyrus Farivar, Senior Business Editor at Ars Technica, and is also an author of The Internet of Elsewhere, August 27, 2014"The executive order that led to mass spying, as told by NSA alumni," ARS Technica, (accessed 4/25/2015)The document, known in government circles as "twelve triple three," gives incredible leeway to intelligence agencies sweeping up vast quantities of Americans' data. That data ranges from e-mail content to Facebook messages, from Skype chats to practically anything that passes over the Internet on an incidental basis. In other words, EO 12333 protects the tangential collection of Americans' data even when Americans aren't specifically targeted—otherwise it would be forbidden under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.12333 allows the retention of data incidental to any investigationCyrus Farivar, Senior Business Editor at Ars Technica, and is also an author of The Internet of Elsewhere, August 27, 2014"The executive order that led to mass spying, as told by NSA alumni," ARS Technica, (accessed 4/25/2015)Most collection of US domestic communications and data is done under EO 12333, section 2.3 paragraph C in the Upstream program. They claim, near as I can tell, that all domestic collection is incidental. That’s, of course, the vast majority of data.” Specifically, that subsection allows the intelligence community to "collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States persons" if that information is "obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation."'Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of Citizens12333 bypasses FISA limitations and allows the executive to ignore all restrictions on surveillanceErica Newland, former Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Democracy & Technology and member of Yale Law Journal editorial staff, April 2015"Executive Orders in Court," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124, (accessed 4/26/2014)Returning to an example with which this Note opened, statutes like FISA not only empower the government to conduct surveillance activities, but also place restrictions on those activities—restrictions that are, theoretically anyway, legally enforceable. Moreover, such restrictions may not be withdrawn or modified without the public approval of Congress and the President. In contrast, E.O. 12,333, the executive order counterpart to these statutes, appears to have created new surveillance powers for the federal government “with the stroke of the pen.” Meanwhile, judicial decisions have rendered the restrictions that the order publicly purports to place on government activities unenforceable in courts. 12333 trumps FISA lawCyrus Farivar, Senior Business Editor at Ars Technica, and is also an author of The Internet of Elsewhere, August 27, 2014"The executive order that led to mass spying, as told by NSA alumni," ARS Technica, (accessed 4/25/2015)Loomis, Binney, and others were pushing a surveillance program known as ThinThread, which was discontinued weeks before the September 11 attacks. ThinThread supporters claim it had the ability to encrypt US persons' data so that analysts would not know who it was about. Prior to September 11, according to Loomis, the NSA's policy was that the FISA law trumped EO 12333, whereas after, it essentially became the other way around. (This is likely what Snowden was referring to in his internal query regarding the hierarchy of laws.)The Order is responsible for the most controversial and unscrutinized surveillance activitiesErica Newland, former Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Democracy & Technology and member of Yale Law Journal editorial staff, April 2015"Executive Orders in Court," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124, (accessed 4/26/2014)Yet a different law—one that has long served as a linchpin of surveillance programs and that reportedly authorizes many of the NSA’s most controversial activities—has largely escaped public and congressional scrutiny. This law is not a statute but rather an executive order that dates back to 1981. Known as E.O. 12,333 (twelve-triple-three), the surveillance executive order creates a framework for intelligence programs that target “the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents.” Its sweep is extensive, and its first principles are explicit: “All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence available.” Inherency: Won’t Be Overturned and Gives Unlimited PowerNo chance of 12333 being overturned in the status quo Cyrus Farivar, Senior Business Editor at Ars Technica, and is also an author of The Internet of Elsewhere, August 27, 2014"The executive order that led to mass spying, as told by NSA alumni," ARS Technica, (accessed 4/25/2015)Earlier this month, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board said it would re-examine EO 12333 after all the fanfare. But based on history, overturning an executive order simply isn't a common outcome. Unless done by a subsequent executive order, it's extremely difficult and has rarely happened. So for now, American data remains as accessible as it's ever been.Executive orders have no procedural requirements; they give the president unlimited powersErica Newland, former Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Democracy & Technology and member of Yale Law Journal editorial staff, April 2015"Executive Orders in Court," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124, (accessed 4/26/2014)In contrast to legislation or agency regulation, there are almost no legally enforceable procedural requirements that the president must satisfy before issuing (or repealing) an executive order or other presidential directive. That, no doubt, is central to their appeal to presidents. They rid the president of the need to assemble majorities in both houses of Congress, or to wait through administrative processes, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, to initiate policy.Inherency: No OversightThere is no congressional oversight to intelligence gathering activities under 12333; congress doesn’t even know the right questions to askErica Newland, former Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Democracy & Technology and member of Yale Law Journal editorial staff, April 2015"Executive Orders in Court," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124, (accessed 4/26/2014)Executive Order 12,333 again provides a useful illustration. While members of the Senate and House intelligence committees—and the so-called Gang of Eight—have received at least some briefings on the executive branch’s creative interpretations of the surveillance provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act, presidents appear to have kept congressional leadership in the dark about how related provisions in E.O. 12,333 have been interpreted and implemented. In 2013, a senior Senate Intelligence Committee staff member told the Washington Post that the Committee is “far less aware of operations conducted under [Executive Order] 12333” than they are of operations conducted under the USA PATRIOT Act. The NSA “would not routinely report these things, and, in general, [E.O. 12,333 programs] would not fall within the focus of the committee,” the staffer explained. And if congressional leadership were to seek information about E.O. 12,333 programs, they would not even know the right questions to ask. If the President’s greater access to information justifies affording him greater latitude on matters relating to national security, then it should also caution against application of the acquiescence doctrine, or any variant thereof, in the national security context. After all, Congress cannot meaningfully acquiesce to activities that it knows little about.Court order requirement doesn’t check abuse—12333 relies on self-monitoring of executive branch with no real oversightJeramie Scott, National Security Counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, July 23, 2014"Prepared Statement for the Record of Jeramie D. Scott, National Security Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center Public Meeting Before the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board," , (accessed 4/26/2014) Although 12333 requires a court order to target a United States Person, this is of little comfort. Given the global nature of communications, the indiscriminate mass surveillance the NSA conducts overseas captures the information of United States Persons. Furthermore, the government can use and share this information without any order from a judge or oversight from Congress. As a matter of fact, the only check on surveillance under 12333 comes from Executive oversight. This type of self-regulation has proven to be ineffective at best in limiting surveillance overreach. The minimal oversight in place does not even give the appearance of the checks and balances provided by judicial or congressional oversight. Congress has admitted to very little oversight of the activities under 12333. Additionally, Executive Order 12333 does not fall within the purview of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; thus, no neutral arbiter reviews 12333 surveillance for compliance with the Fourth Amendment.Surveillance Totalitarianism Impact ScenariosGovernment surveillance destroys civil society and accountability, discourages political engagement, and punishes dissentHenry Giroux, Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, February 10, 2014"Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State," Truthout, (accessed 4/26/2015)Some of the most dreadful consequences of neoliberal modernity and cultures of surveillance include the elimination of those public spheres capable of educating the public to hold power accountable, and the dissolution of all social bonds that entail a sense of responsibility toward others. In this instance, politics has not only become dysfunctional and corrupt in the face of massive inequalities in wealth and power, it also has been emptied of any substantive meaning. Government not only has fallen into the hands of the elite and right-wing extremists, it has embraced a mode of lawlessness evident in forms of foreign and domestic terrorism that undercuts the obligations of citizenship, justice and morality. As surveillance and fear become a constant condition of American society, there is a growing indifference, if not distaste, for politics among large segments of the population. This distaste is purposely manufactured by the ongoing operations of political repression against intellectuals, artists, nonviolent protesters and journalists on the left and right. Increasingly, as such populations engage in dissent and the free flow of ideas, whether online or offline, they are considered dangerous to the state and become subject to the mechanizations of a massive security apparatuses designed to monitor, control and punish dissenting populations. Surveillance creates a climate of fear, destroying critical thought and collapsing the distinction between friends and enemiesHenry Giroux, Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, February 10, 2014"Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State," Truthout, (accessed 4/26/2015)As the line collapses between authoritarian power and democratic governance, state and corporate repression intensifies and increasingly engulfs the nation in a toxic climate of fear and self-censorship in which free speech, if not critical thought, itself is viewed as too dangerous in which to engage. The NSA, alone, has become what Scott Shane has called an "electronic omnivore of staggering capabilities, eavesdropping and hacking its way around the world to strip governments and other targets of their secrets, all while enforcing the utmost secrecy about its own operations. It spies routinely on friends as well as foes."Surveillance Totalitarianism ExtensionsWe are on the brink of total collapse into surveillance-based totalitarianismHenry Giroux, Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, February 10, 2014"Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State," Truthout, (accessed 4/26/2015)America is not simply in harm's way, it stands at the end of precipice about to fall into what Hannah Arendt once called "dark times." As memory recedes so does political consciousness, particularly the danger that the surveillance state has posed to poor and working-class Americans who have been monitored for years and as Virginia Eubanks points out "already live in the surveillance future."Surveillance technology will be used to track every move and document promulgated by every citizenNaomi Wolf, author of The Beauty Myth and Give Me Liberty and cofounder of , August 15, 2012"The new totalitarianism of surveillance technology," The Guardian, (accessed 4/26/2015)What is very obvious is that this technology will not be applied merely to people under arrest, or to people under surveillance in accordance with the fourth amendment (suspects in possible terrorist plots or other potential crimes, after law enforcement agents have already obtained a warrant from a magistrate). No, the "targets" here are me and you: everyone, all of the time. In the name of "national security", the capacity is being built to identify, track and document any citizen constantly and continuously.Mass surveillance is an unstoppable slippery slope to totalitarianism, creating an unquenchable desire for more power and infiltrating the most private areas of human lifeJohn Suarez, human rights activist and host of Notes from the Cuban Exile Quarter, October 18, 2013"The US Surveillance State and the Totalitarian Tipping Point," Pan Am Post, (accessed 4/26/2015)Unfortunately, there is no plan; there is no conspiracy. This expansion and centralization of power has continued under both Republicans and Democrats in the United States and would most likely continue under a third party. Centralized power has become an end unto itself, and as the late Czech president Vaclav Havel observed: "Once the claims of central power have been placed above law and morality, once the exercise of that power is divested of public control, and once the institutional guarantees of political plurality and civil rights have been made a mockery of, or simply abolished, there is no reason to respect any other limitations. The expansion of central power does not stop at the frontier between the public and the private, but instead, arbitrarily pushes back that border until it is shamelessly intervening in areas that once were private." The United States is reaching a tipping point that leads into a totalitarian abyss and the crackdown on privacy whistleblowers is one of many ominous signs regarding where this centralization of power is heading. Totalitarianism ImpactsTotalitarianism causes genocidesR.J. Rummell, former professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, 2002"20th Century Democide," Death By Government, (accessed 4/26/2015)So Power kills and absolute Power kills absolutely. What then can be said of those alleged causes or factors in war, genocide, and mass murder favored by students of genocide. What about cultural-ethnic differences, outgroup conflict, misperception, frustration-aggression, relative deprivation, ideological imperatives, dehumanization, resource competition, etc.? At one time or another, for one regime or another, one or more of these factors play an important role in democide. Some are essential for understanding some genocides, as of the Jews or Armenians; some politicide, as of "enemies of the people," bourgeoisie, and clergy; some massacres, as of competing religious-ethnic groups; or some atrocities, as of those committed against poor and helpless villagers by victorious soldiers. But then neighbors in the service of Power have killed neighbor, fathers have killed their sons, faceless and unknown people have been killed by quota. One is hard put to find a race, religion, culture, or distinct ethnic group whose regime has not murdered its own or others. These specific causes or factors accelerate the likelihood of war or democide once some trigger event occurs and absolute or near absolute Power is present. That is, Power is a necessary cause for war or democide. When the elite have absolute power, war or democide follows a common process (which I call "the conflict helix").Disproportionate power creates cultures of violence, killing hundreds of millions; the reverse is true—lack of totalitarianism means less violenceR.J. Rummell, former professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, 2002"20th Century Democide," Death By Government, (accessed 4/26/2015)In sum, then, where absolute Power exists, interests become polarized, a culture of violence develops, and war and democide follow. In this century alone, by current count, absolute-totalitarian-Power has murdered near 138,000,000 people (table 1.6). Over 14,000,000 more of its subjects have died from battle in their wars. Where among states Power is limited and accountable, interests are cross-pressured and a culture of nonviolence develops, no wars have occurred and comparatively few citizens have been murdered by the governing elite, and even most of those killed is questionable. About 90 percent of the citizens killed by democracies have been by marginally democratic Spain (during its 1936-1939 Civil War and by Republicans after the war), India, and Peru (during its struggle against the communist Shining Path guerrillas). Totalitarianism ImpactsTotalitarianism results in mass murderBryan Caplan, professor in Department of Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, January 2006"The Totalitarian Threat," George Mason University Economic Faculty Web Page, (accessed 4/26/2015)The connection between totalitarian goals and totalitarian methods is straightforward. People do not want to radically change their behavior. To make them change anyway requires credible threats of harsh punishment – and the main way to make such threats credible is to carry them out on a massive scale. Furthermore, even if people believe your threats, some will resist anyway or seem likely to foment resistance later on. Indeed, some are simply unable to change. An aristocrat cannot choose to have proletarian origins, or a Jew to be an Aryan. To handle these recalcitrant problems requires special prisons to isolate dangerous elements, or mass murder to eliminate them.Totalitarianism creates social disastersBryan Caplan, professor in Department of Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, January 2006"The Totalitarian Threat," George Mason University Economic Faculty Web Page, (accessed 4/26/2015)From the viewpoint of the ruling party, this may be a fair trade: More and worse disasters are the price of social control. From the viewpoint of anyone concerned about global catastrophic risks, however, this means that totalitarianism is worse than it first appears. To the direct cost of totalitarianism we must add the indirect cost of amplifying other risks. Terrorism Disadvantage AnswersMass surveillance fails to stop terror—multiple reports concludeGaurav Laroia, Legislative Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative Office, January 14, 2014"Growing Chorus Agrees Mass Surveillance Just Doesn't Work," American Civil Liberties Union Blog, (accessed 4/25/2015)The New America Foundation (NAF) published a strong critique yesterday of the effectiveness of the NSA's surveillance program. Its conclusion echoes a similar one reached by the president's NSA Review Group - the agency's mass surveillance program simply does not work. The Review Group was unable to find a single example of the NSA's phone metadata program providing crucial intelligence in a terrorism investigation. The New America Foundation Report uses even stronger language, concluding that the administration's claims about the role of warrantless NSA surveillance programs in keeping Americans safe are "overblown and even misleading."The entire premise of mass surveillance fails: big data collection never tells us anythingFrancis Gouillart, president of Experience Co-Creation Partnership, June 10, 2013"Big data NSA spying is not even an effective strategy," Fortune, (accessed 4/25/2015)Unfortunately, as the administration trades privacy for intelligence insights, President Obama is exchanging a cherished American value for an unproved theory. The Obama Administration loves data. It argues that the president was reelected because of its enormous people database and use of polling and social media. And the Affordable Care Act is built in part on a belief that massive troves of electronic health records will pave the way for predictive algorithms that will prevent costly hospital readmissions, or identify medical practices that lead to better patient health. But the evidence for big data is scant at best. To date, large fields of data have generated meaningful insights at times, but not on the scale many have promised. This disappointment has been documented in the Wall Street Journal, Information Week, and Smart Data Collective. Terrorism Disadvantage AnswersRequiring warrants won’t impede intelligence gatheringDavid S. Eggert, Professor of Law at Washington and Lee, 1983"Executive Order 12333: An Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless National Security Searches," Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1983, (accessed 4/25/2015)The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the warrant requirement will not significantly impede the purpose behind foreign intelligence surveillance. Thus, as in Camara and Keith, it is unnecessary to pursue the weighing process demanded by the third branch of the proposed test. Because the purpose is not frustrated, no government interest counterbalances the diminution to individual rights flowing from lack of pre-seizure judicial scrutiny. The scales tip decisively in favor of the warrant requirement. Any inconvenience imposed on the executive by the warrant requirement is substantially outweighed by the protection of privacy expectations. It follows, therefore, that a general national security exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement does not satisfy the guidelines articulated by the Supreme Court in Camara. To the extent Executive Order 12,333, section 2.5, relies on such an exception to avoid securing pre-search warrants for foreign intelligence surveillance searches, the Order is unconstitutional.Mass data collection results in false positives and fake conclusionsNassim N. Taleb, Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University Polytechnic School of Engineering, February 8, 2013"Beware the Big Errors of 'Big Data,'" Wired, (accessed 4/26/2015)But beyond that, big data means anyone can find fake statistical relationships, since the spurious rises to the surface. This is because in large data sets, large deviations are vastly more attributable to variance (or noise) than to information (or signal). It’s a property of sampling: In real life there is no cherry-picking, but on the researcher’s computer, there is. Large deviations are likely to be bogus.Executive Order 12333 Undermines Separation of PowersThe President doesn’t have unlimited authority on foreign relations—constitutional checks existJonathan D. Forgang, Associate Attorney at Goodwin Procter and J.D. from Fordham Law School, 2009"'The Right of the People': The NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans Overseas," Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78 Issue 1, (accessed 4/27/2015)Though cases have often relied on Curtiss-Wright to show the President's ability to conduct foreign affairs, the Court in Curtiss-Wright still warned that "like every other governmental power, [the President's plenary power over foreign relations] must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution."' Thus, the unquestioned executive prerogative for gathering foreign affairs intelligence that some courts have found when holding that there is a foreign intelligence exception is not actually written into the text of the Constitution.The framers intended checks and balances to limit presidential power on foreign affairsJonathan D. Forgang, Associate Attorney at Goodwin Procter and J.D. from Fordham Law School, 2009"'The Right of the People': The NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans Overseas," Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78 Issue 1, (accessed 4/27/2015)In Truong, the Fourth Circuit held that the foreign intelligence needs of the executive are so compelling that a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the President's ability to carry out his foreign affairs. However, the Truong court overlooked the fact that the President's foreign affairs decisions are subject to the same checks and balances as all other powers of the federal government. The Truong court also reasoned that under the separation of powers doctrine, the executive has been entrusted with the safety of the country and foreign intelligence surveillance. The Butenko court stated that foreign intelligence needs often cannot be anticipated and, if courts required a warrant to carry out foreign intelligence, the President might have to act illegally in order to fulfill the constitutional duties of the office. While this is a valid concern, Congress has previously regulated the activities of foreign intelligence agents. Checks and balances help combat the human tendency to abuse power. It does not appear that the Framers wanted to suspend checks and balances when they affect the President's foreign affairs power.Executive Order 12333 Undermines Separation of PowersLeaks are not unique to any particular branch; there ought to be interbranch checks on executive intelligenceJonathan D. Forgang, Associate Attorney at Goodwin Procter and J.D. from Fordham Law School, 2009"'The Right of the People': The NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans Overseas," Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78 Issue 1, (accessed 4/27/2015)Because of the secrecy of many foreign affairs matters, some commentators and courts believe it is improper for parties outside the executive to view many classified documents. Some leaks of secret information could pose a threat to national security and the lives of agents and confidential sources. However, there are countervailing reasons to believe the courts are equally capable of handling sensitive foreign affairs information. First, there is no reason to believe that the executive is less susceptible to leaks than the judiciary. Government secrets are always capable of leaking, no matter which branch of government holds them. Second, leaks from the judiciary are less likely because FISA has solved many of the executive's concerns about security leaks with its strict secrecy requirements.Separation of powers is vital to apply to executive intelligence gatheringJonathan D. Forgang, Associate Attorney at Goodwin Procter and J.D. from Fordham Law School, 2009"'The Right of the People': The NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans Overseas," Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78 Issue 1, (accessed 4/27/2015)It is not enough for a country to state its intention to uphold certain basic rights. The Founders knew that a government must include internal checks and balances to ensure the protection of important constitutional rights. Privacy is a basic right, protected by the laws and Constitution of the United States. While national security is an immensely important interest, the government should not sacrifice all else while trying to protect it. Warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance of Americans overseas is not an evil act. It is the act of a government working hard to keep the country safe. However, a better balance between the competing interests of privacy and national security is necessary to preserve a truly free nation. It will take a vigilant and conscientious government to achieve this balance. Yet by looking to the Constitution for guidance, it is possible for the United States to come closer to this essential equilibrium.Executive Order 12333 Undermines Separation of PowersExcessive executive power over intelligence-gathering violates separation of powersMarcy Wheeler, National Security Blogger, January 24, 2014"The Impasse on Executive Spying," Empty Wheel, (accessed 4/27/2015)When NSA chose to avoid First Amendment review on the 3,000 US persons it had been watch-listing by simply moving them onto a new list, when it refused to tell John Bates how much US person content it collects domestically off telecom switches, when it had GCHQ break into Google’s cables to get content it ought to be able to obtain through FISA 702, when it rolled out an Internet dragnet contact-chaining program overseas in part because it gave access to US person data it couldn’t legally have here, NSA made it clear it will only fulfill its side of the compromise so long as no one dares to limit what it can do. That is, Snowden has made it clear that the “compromise” never was one. It was just a facade to make Congress and the Courts believe they had salvaged some scrap of separation of powers. NSA has made it clear it doesn’t much care what its overseers in Congress or the Court think. It’ll do what it wants, whether it’s in the FISC or at a telecom switch just off the US shore. And thus far, Obama seems to agree with them. Which means we’re going to have to start talking about whether this country believes the Executive Branch should have relatively unfettered ability to spy on Americans. We’re going to have to take a step back and talk about separation of powers again.Involvement of the judiciary is critical to maintaining separation of powers in national security surveillance policyWilliam C. Banks, Professor at Syracuse University College of Law, and M.E. Bowman, Associate General Counsel at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000"Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance," American University Law Review Vol. 50 Issue 1, (accessed 4/27/2015)However, the “broader spirit” of the Fourth Amendment, as expressed in United States v. Katz, and “the convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values” in national security wiretapping cases, made the Court especially wary of possible abuses of the national security power. The Court proceeded to balance “the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression.” Justice Powell found that waiving the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement could lead the executive to “yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.” Justice Powell stated that maintaining separation of powers and protecting individual freedoms requires a judicial role in issuing warrants.Separation of Powers ImpactsSeparation of powers key to preserve democracy—history provesDavid Samuels, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, 2014"Separation of Powers," The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, (accessed 4/26/2015)Perhaps the most fundamental institutional difference across the world’s democracies is whether the executive and legislative powers are fused or separate. Intelligent people have explored the question of the ‘‘best’’ constitutional design since antiquity: Aristotle was perhaps the first comparativist, sending his acolytes-cum-graduate students into the Weld to gather comparative constitutional ‘‘data.’’ Yet it was the nightmare of Weimar Germany’s collapse into Nazi terror that sparked interest in this question for twentieth-century scholars (Hermens 1941). For many scholars, the failure of democracy in many countries during the Cold War (1945–90), particularly in Latin America, provided additional confirmation that the separation of powers can affect democracy’s potential to flourish (e.g. Linz 1990).Democracy ensures peaceJames Lee Ray, professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, 1998"Does Democracy Cause Peace?" American Review of Poliical Science vol. 1, (accessed 4/27/2015)Does democracy cause peace? The empirical evidence in favor of the proposition that democratic states have not initiated and are not likely to initiate interstate wars against each other is substantial, especially when compared with that which could be brought to bear by specialists in the 1970s. Criticism of this evidence has so far met with reasonably persuasive counterarguments by the defenders of the proposition.Separation of Powers ImpactsSeparation of powers is key to prevent tyrannyCharles R. Kesler, senior fellow of The Claremont Institute and editor of the Claremont Review of Books, December 17, 2007"What Separation of Powers Means for Constitutional Government," First Principles Series Report #17 on Political Thought, Heritage Foundation, (accessed 4/27/2015)The argument from liberty holds that separation is needed in order to prevent tyranny. According to Publius's famous definition, "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Tyranny is a danger because man's passions and reason are not perfectly harmonious; his reason may be distorted by desire. Although each man has by nature the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, he cannot secure these rights without joining together with other men to form a civil society, a people. Despite the legal unity of this people, it is composed of individuals whose impassioned opinions and interests divide them into majorities and minorities. As a precaution against injustice, therefore, the powers of government must be so divided that no man or group of men may wield all of them at once. This precaution would not be necessary if reason and passion were utterly harmonious, and if the whole comprising such reason and passion were a priori unitary rather than synthetic. Separation of powers is key to governmental effectivenessCharles R. Kesler, senior fellow of The Claremont Institute and editor of the Claremont Review of Books, December 17, 2007"What Separation of Powers Means for Constitutional Government," First Principles Series Report #17 on Political Thought, Heritage Foundation, (accessed 4/27/2015)For in addition to the negative function of preventing tyranny, the separation of powers actively promotes good government. That is to say, it allows the branches of the federal government to perform their respective functions well or at least better than they otherwise could. In the first argument, "power" is treated as a generic thing, abstracted from any ends for which it might be used, regarded as a dangerous end in itself (hence its "encroaching" nature). But in the second, "power" is divided into "powers," acknowledging that each has a "nature" that aims at the excellent performance of certain definite functions.Answers to Supreme Court CounterplanSupreme Court ruling has settled the issue and establishes a no-standing precedentRyan Gallagher, reporter on surveillance and national security, February 26, 2013"Supreme Court Says Americans Can't Challenge 'Dragnet Surveillance' Law," Slate, (accessed 4/27/2015)Now, the Supreme Court has weighed in to settle the issue, reversing the 2nd Circuit’s judgment on a 5-4 vote and agreeing with the government that the plaintiffs have no standing to challenge the spy law. The Supreme Court said that the plaintiffs’ argument “fails” in part because it “rests on a speculative chain of possibilities that does not establish that their potential injury is certainly impending or is fairly traceable.” The ruling states that “it is highly speculative whether the government will imminently target communications to which respondents are parties,” adding that “they have no actual knowledge of the government’s [FISA] targeting practices.”Court has already ruled that there is no standing to sue to stop surveillanceBill Mears, CNN Supreme Court Producer, November 18, 2013"Supreme Court allows NSA to continue looking at telephone records for now," , (accessed 4/27/2015)The revelations of the NSA program and the inner workings of the Surveillance Court came after a former agency contractor, Edward Snowden, leaked documents to the Guardian newspaper in Britain. Snowden fled to Hong Kong and then Russia to escape U.S. prosecution, and his supporters say they are working on asylum deals with other countries on his behalf. The Justice Department urged the high court to stay out of the current fight, called a "mandamus" review. EPIC's petition "does not meet the stringent requirements for mandamus relief, and this court lacks jurisdiction" to act, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli said in the government's brief, filed last month. "The mandamus petition does not establish that it is more than speculative that the NSA has reviewed, or might in the future review, records pertaining to petitioner's members, particularly given the stringent, (Surveillance Court)-imposed restrictions that limit access to the database to counterterrorism purposes," the Obama administration added. The U.S. Supreme Court does not comment on pending cases. The privacy rights group now has the option of going back to the lower courts and starting the legal process anew. Prior lawsuits against the NSA program have been unsuccessful.Answers to Supreme Court CounterplanSupreme Court precedent is clear in the status quo and accepts the government’s interpretation in totoRyan Gallagher, reporter on surveillance and national security, February 26, 2013"Supreme Court Says Americans Can't Challenge 'Dragnet Surveillance' Law," Slate, (accessed 4/27/2015)It’s also worth noting that the Supreme Court judgement is clear in that it accepts “the government’s interception of a private telephone or e-mail conversation amounts to an injury that is ‘concrete and particularized’.” The reason the plaintiffs’ case failed was that they could not prove that they were subject to surveillance—and they could not do so because the government refuses to comment on its surveillance capabilities or divulge details about whom it is targeting. Indeed, in a bizarre piece of circular reasoning, the NSA told lawmakers last year that it could not even so much as provide a rough estimate of how many Americans it has spied on because it argues that providing this information would itself “violate the privacy of U.S. persons.” This hammers home the point that the problem is not necessarily the surveillance per se, but the secrecy that surrounds the surveillance.Stare decisis is key to court legitimacyAdam N. Steinman, Associate Professor of Law at University of Cincinnati, 2004"A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking," University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 65, (accessed 4/27/2015)A system where courts are free to decide cases knowing that the decision will not bind them in the future could undermine the legitimacy of the court by permitting arbitrary or unprincipled decisionmaking. The essence of principled decisionmaking, arguably, is to base decisions on principles that will hold fast beyond just the immediate case. Thus, allowing broad judicial lawmaking can legitimate the judicial role, because it helps to ensure that decisions are reached in a principled manner.Answers to Supreme Court CounterplanStare decisis is necessary for public perception of principled judiciaryAdam N. Steinman, Associate Professor of Law at University of Cincinnati, 2004"A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking," University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 65, (accessed 4/27/2015)The benefits that judicial lawmaking creates would be lost if future courts were free to modify that law without sufficient justification. In addition, stare decisis impacts the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. If courts may disregard the principles articulated in prior cases without proper justification, the legitimating notion that cases are reached in a principled manner is eroded.Court legitimacy key to prevent terrorismJeremy Shapiro, Associate Director at the Brookings Institute, 2003“French Lessons: The Importance of the Judicial System in Fighting Terrorism,” Brookings Institute, (accessed 4/27/2015)The unique nature of terrorism means that maintaining the appearance of justice and democratic legitimacy will be much more important than in past wars. The terrorist threat is in a perpetual state of mutation and adaptation in response to government efforts to oppose it. The war on terrorism more closely resembles the war on drugs than World War II; it is unlikely to have any discernable endpoint, only irregular periods of calm. The French experience shows that ad-hoc anti-terrorist measures that have little basis in societal values and shallow support in public opinion may wither away during the periods of calm. In the U.S., there is an enormous reservoir of legitimacy, established by over 200 years of history and tradition, in the judiciary. That reservoir represents an important asset that the U.S. government can profit from to maintain long-term vigilance in this type of war. Despite the unusual opportunity for innovation afforded by the crisis of September 11, the U.S. government has not tried to reform American judicial institutions to enable them to meet the threat of terrorism. To prevent the next wave of attacks, however far off they might be, and to avoid re-inventing a slightly different wheel each time will require giving life to institutions that can persist and evolve, even in times of low terrorist activity. Given the numerous differences between the two countries, the U.S. cannot and should not simply import the French system, but it can learn from their mistakes. Their experience suggests a few possible reforms: A specialized U.S. Attorney tasked solely with terrorism cases and entirely responsible for prosecuting such cases in the U.S. Direct and formal links between that U.S. Attorney’s office and the various intelligence agencies, allowing prosecutors to task the intelligences agencies during judicial investigations Special procedures for selecting and protecting juries in terrorism cases and special rules of evidence that allow for increased protection of classified information in terrorist cases Creating a normal, civilian judicial process that can prosecute terrorists and yet retain legitimacy is not merely morally satisfying. It may also help to prevent terrorist attacks in the long run. Not incidentally, it would demonstrate to the world a continuing faith in the ability of democratic societies to manage the threat of terrorism without sacrificing the very values they so desperately desire to protect.General Kritik Answers: Mass Surveillance Undermines Alternative Surveillance stops the fruition of critical ideas, meaning the alternative won’t spreadMargot E. Kaminski, Professor of Law at Ohio State University, and Shane Witnov, California attorney, January 1, 2015"The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech," University of Richmond Law Review, Vol. 49, (accessed 4/27/2015)If the First Amendment serves to foster a marketplace of ideas, surveillance thwarts this purpose by preventing the development of minority ideas. Research indicates that surveillance more strongly affects those who do not yet hold strong views than those who do. If the First Amendment serves to encourage democratic self-governance, surveillance thwarts this purpose as well. Surveillance discourages individuals with unformed ideas from deviating from majority political views. And if the First Amendment is intended to allow the fullest development of the autonomous self, surveillance interferes with autonomy. Surveillance encourages individuals to follow what they think others expect of them and conform to perceived norms instead of engaging in unhampered self-development. Surveillance destroys the ability to change one’s beliefsMargot E. Kaminski, Professor of Law at Ohio State University, and Shane Witnov, California attorney, January 1, 2015"The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech," University of Richmond Law Review, Vol. 49, (accessed 4/27/2015)Further, a person‘s commitment to a minority position is directly related to her ability to resist majority influence, and surveillance is likely to make it harder to become committed to a minority position. In a variation on Asch‘s experiment, researchers had subjects make a commitment to an answer by writing it down, before all of the members of the group announced their answers. The more committed the subject was to the answer before hearing the responses of the group, the greater her ability to resist the group norm. In the White and Zimbardo study on police surveillance, the surveillance had less effect on individuals who had already taken a public position on legalization of marijuana. On the other hand, individuals who were less-decided were most influenced by the conforming effect of the surveillance. Accordingly, the conforming effect caused by surveillance can result in smaller and less confident minorities. These minorities, in turn, will be less successful than they otherwise might have been at challenging the status quo and the majority views. Thus, individuals and the public will miss out on the better, more deliberate, more creative, and more critical thinking that results from minority influences. Surveillance undermines critical speech acts of oppressedPaul Bernal, Lecturer in Media Law at the University of East Anglia Law School, November 19, 2014"Surveillance, power and chill . . . and the Chatham House Rule," Paul Bernal's Blog, (accessed 4/27/2015)So yes, the chill of surveillance is real. And, perhaps most importantly, it’s real for precisely those people that need support in freedom of expression terms. People whose voices are heard the least often – and people who have the most need to be able to take advantage of the opportunities that our modern communications systems offer. The internet can enable a great deal, particularly for people in those kinds of positions – from freedom of expression to freedom of assembly and association and much, much more – but surveillance cannot just jeopardise that but reverse it. If it only enables freedom of speech for those already with power, it exacerbates the power differences, and makes those already quiet even quieter, whilst those with power and voice can get their messages across even more powerfully.MUSLIM SURVEILLANCE AFFIRMATIVEMuslim Surveillance 1ACThesis: The FBI regularly conducts sting operations where informants target vulnerable Muslims with no real interest in terrorism. This is called a “provocation” strategy, whereby informants supply encouragement, arms, money, and other support to radicalize the individual. Once they engage in a botched attempt, they are prosecuted and conviction. The focus on Muslims as inherent terrorists in clearly racist and should be reversed.OBSERVATION ONE: THE STATUS QUOA. Anti-Muslim surveillance is racial and religious profiling. The FBI manipulates religion through informants and agents to literally create terrorists they can catchHuman Rights Watch, Staff Writer, July 2014, “The Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions,” , ACC. 5-22-2015In many of the sting operations we examined, informants and undercover agents carefully laid out an ideological basis for a proposed terrorist attack, and then provided investigative targets with a range of options and the weapons necessary to carry out the attack. Instead of beginning a sting at the point where the target had expressed an interest in engaging in illegal conduct, many terrorism sting operations that we investigated facilitated or invented the target’s willingness to act before presenting the tangible opportunity to do so. In this way, the FBI may have created terrorists out of law-abiding individuals. In these cases, the informants and agents often seemed to choose targets based on their religious or political beliefs. They often chose targets who were particularly vulnerable—whether because of mental disability, or because they were indigent and needed money that the government offered them. In some cases—which have been particularly troubling for American Muslim communities—targets were seeking spiritual guidance, and the government informants or agents guided them towards violence. Relevant aspects of these cases are described below.B. The FBI has virtually unrestrained power to engage in domestic surveillanceBill Chambers, Staff Writer, July 14, 2014, “NSA & FBI Spying on Muslims: Old Story, New Target,” Chicago Monitor, , ACC. 5-22-2015Now with the advanced, mass surveillance technology at the disposal of the NSA, the FBI has almost unlimited ability to target all the communications of specific people or a very large group of people with very little effort. The other Snowden revelations have already shown that the NSA did not require much in the way of legal justifications, evidence of criminality, or court approval to gather large amounts of data on any American. How much legal justification, evidence, or approval would the FBI really have needed to convince the judge in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court?that these five American Muslims were terrorists potentially plotting terrorist acts?1ACC. FBI anti-Muslim sting operations manufacture “terrorists” with no will or capability to engage in lone wolf attacksTrevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, pp. 225-226For the FBI, terrorism sting operations net results, and results confirm to the Bureau that a problem or threat exists, thereby supporting the belief that more terrorism sting operations are needed. While this type of cycle could be created from any kind of crime and with any law enforcement agency, it is hard to imagine that the public would tolerate widespread sting operations and aggressive informants used in anything other than terrorism investigations in Muslim communities. Imagine, for example, if law enforcement sent informants and undercover officers into poor minority communities in South Los Angeles and offered cash for stolen cars—and then used the resulting rash of arrests to prove how well the police were curbing the growing problem of auto theft, a problem the police had created in the first place. Would the public, alerted by African American and Hispanic community leaders to what would appear to be entrapment and racial and ethnic targeting, tolerate such behavior from law enforcement? The answer is no. Yet since 9/11, leaders in Muslim communities nationwide have objected to the FBI tactics used against their people, without any kind of support from the public or the media. I can only believe that the public either does not understand how egregious the FBI's practices are, or believes that keeping the United States safe from would-be terrorists justifies limits to justice and civil rights for a single minority group. To this day, the FBI continues to manufacture terrorism crimes in Muslim communities. By not challenging the FBI and the Justice Department, the public and the media have tacitly condoned sting operations against men with no capacity on their own to commit serious crimes. If the FBI’s top priority is to find and stop lone wolves, and these lone wolves are found only through FBI stings that border on entrapment and target easily influenced men with financial troubles or mental problems, providing the FBI with a deep pool of potential terrorists, then how will the Bureau ever know when terrorism is no longer a threat, and the time has come to shift priorities?D. Local law enforcement follow the FBI’s lead on anti-Muslim surveillanceMadiha Shahabuddin, JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, September 2014, “The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be”: How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment Rights,” Chapman Law Review, Vol. 18:2, 577-610, , ACC. 5-22-2015The government’s use of informants to infiltrate mosques throughout the country is particularly troubling, reminiscent of the days of COINTELPRO and the massive distrust the government sowed throughout the politically dissident community. Agencies like the FBI—and by extension local law enforcement like the NYPD—have aggressively sought to recruit and send informants to mosques to infiltrate Muslim American communities, befriend unwitting mosque attendees, Muslim community leaders, and even Muslim student organization members to record, report, and in many instances, incite violence or discussions of violence to see which Muslims will be caught in the dragnet. Investigative journalist and author Trevor Aaronson dedicated years to studying the terrorism prosecutions that resulted from the use of government informants. According to data he collected in August 2011, almost ten years since 9/11, out of 508 terrorism defendants, “243 had been targeted through an FBI informant, 158 had been caught in an FBI terrorism sting, and 49 had encountered an agent provocateur.” By numbers alone, then, during that time period, nearly forty-eight percent of the defendants prosecuted for terrorism-related crimes had been apprehended by the use of a government-sent informant, tasked with setting up—and often supplying materials for—a terror plot and bringing the targeted individual into the fold of it.1ACE. The paradigm of prevention lowers the bar for FBI investigations and specifically calls for targeting MuslimsArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, pp. 194-195After 9/11, the FBI adopted a preemptive stance on countering terrorism—what John Ashcroft, then attorney general, repeatedly promoted as a new "paradigm of prevention." The belief was that the usual principles of the rule of law—investigating individuals when there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal intent—were insufficient for tackling terrorism. Surveillance had to be broadened to a wider group suspected of radicalization. In line with this, Ashcroft revised the FBI's guidelines so that the threshold for counterterrorism investigations was significantly lowered." Whereas earlier, informants could be used only when there was strong evidence of criminal activity, after 9/11 they could be employed much more widely. Philip Mudd, who in 2006 became associate executive director of the National Security Branch of the FBI, explained the consequences of the new preventive approach: "By definition, if you are preventative, there will be people dragged into those investigations who did not do something wrong." Mudd was recruited to lead the process of transforming the FBI into a spy agency on the model of Britain's MI5, of moving the bureau beyond investigating individual cases to a wide- ranging gathering of information on American Muslim communities in general. He had previously been deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, during the period when it tortured terrorism suspects, and in the run-up to the Iraq war, when he liaised with then secretary of state Colin Powell prior to his notorious speech at the UN, which was based on fabricated intelligence. Mudd introduced a program at the FBI called "domain management" that involved producing electronic maps showing in detail where ethnic groups were clustered, cross-referencing such information with databases of financial transactions, charitable-giving activities, jobs held, and so on. This then became the basis for allocating resources and informant recruitment to specific neighborhoods—effectively, a form of ethnic profiling. The FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, which implements The Attorney General Guidelines, calls on agents to refrain from profiling "solely" on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion. But they permit the collection of information regarding ethnic behaviors "reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community"—which, given the FBI's model of radicalization, would allow for all kinds of Muslim religious practices to be subject to surveillance. Also permitted is the identification of "locations of concentrated ethnic communities [and] the locations of ethnic-oriented businesses and other facilities," which presumably includes mosques.F. Current FBI approaches are designed to pacify Congress through manufacturing “terrorists”. This guarantees we will be unprepared for the next attackTrevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, pp. 233-234These are unanswerable questions. But as I researched terrorism sting operations and talked with current and former FBI agents who complained that in terrorism stings the government was creating bogeymen from buffoons, I've thought a lot about these questions, which remind me of a line that Peter Ahearn, the retired FBI agent who directed the Western New York Joint Terrorism Task Force and oversaw the investigation of the Lackawanna Six, offered when we sat in a coffee shop in the Washington, D.C., suburbs. "If you concentrate more people on a problem," Ahearn told me, "you'll find more problems." The corollary to that, of course, is that if you concentrate fewer people on a problem, you'll find fewer problems. It's conceivable that had the FBI not been chasing terrorists of its own creation, federal agents might have had the resources to prevent the financial crimes that ultimately brought the world economy to the brink of collapse—or stopped the sovereign citizen movement before men like Brandon Paudert were killed. However, since the U.S. Congress continues to mandate that the FBI focus on terrorism, and the FBI in turn churns out Islamic terrorism cases to prove that it is responsive to that mandate, it's conceivable that the Bureau will not notice or arrive too late to address the real crimes and threats of tomorrow.1ACPLAN: The Federal Bureau of Investigation should end its domestic surveillance practices of preemption and provocation directed at Muslim communities.ADVANTAGE ONE: RACISMA. Current anti-Muslim counterterrorism is rooted in racist orientalism thinking that buttresses U.S. imperialismMahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Strategic Culture Foundation?April 6, 2015, “Imagery and Empire: Understanding the Western Fear of Arab and Muslim Terrorists,” Global Research, , ACC. 5-22-2015The notion that the majority of terrorist attacks are committed by Arabs or Muslims not only lacks a historical perspective, but is an unempirical argument that is tied to modern Orientalism that is alive and kicking. Orientalism, itself is heavily tied to US views of exceptionalism. It is an area of thinking where exceptionalist and racist views coincide profoundly. In fact, there is a thin line between all three. In an outdated linear and geo-ethnocentric way of thinking, whatever societies are located east, as well as south, of the US, Canada, and Western Europe — particularly France, Britain, and the Germanic-speaking countries — are viewed as deficient and inferior. In Europe, this means everyone east of Germany is either tacitly or overtly portrayed as culturally backward. This means the Balkans, Slavic peoples, Albanians, Greeks, Turks, Romanians, Orthodox Christianity, and the ex-Soviet republics. Under Orientalist thinking in the US, even lower on the totem pole are non-Europeans. This means the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Like exceptionalist attitudes, Orientalist views are important for supporting Washington’s foreign policy and wars as a noble enterprise. US Orientalist attitudes see the rest of the world, from Mexico to Iraq and Russia, as needing US tutelage and stewardship. This is a reconstruction of what was called the ?white man’s burden? that was used to justify the colonization of people that were perceived as non-whites.B. Post-911 fears have infested the intelligence community with racial bias against Muslim Americans. This systemically makes the system rigged against an entire raceGlenn Greenwald, journalist and constitutional lawyer,?and Murtaza Hussain, Staff Writer, July 8, 2014, “Meet the Muslim-American leaders the FBI and NSA have been spying on,” The Intercept, , ACC. 5-22-2015Whatever the specific reasons and methods used to monitor the five men’s emails, the surveillance against them took place during the chaos and fear that enveloped the national security community in the years after 9/11. The Clinton Administration had avoided investigating potential links between Muslim charities and suspected terrorists, and the FBI was scrambling to catch up and scrutinize dozens of organizations on the orders of the Bush Administration. Those probes led to some prosecutions and convictions, but they also generated a huge backlash of criticism for targeting innocent groups. One former law enforcement official said that, while the FBI was diligent in trying to hew to the law, there may have been “some missteps” along the way. Those missteps have landed heavily on Americans of Muslim heritage. Even when the surveillance process is overseen by officials and judges who don’t share the Islamophobic mindset of John Guandolo, mainstream and constitutionally protected forms of activism by American Muslims have come to be seen by some within the intelligence community as potentially dangerous—a dynamic that raises the potential for abuse, especially when warrants are issued in secret and authorized by a law that gives wide latitude to those seeking them. A?Washington Post?report?earlier this week found that the government used FISA procedures to intercept and retain vast amounts of private data belonging to “ordinary internet users” who had no evident connection to terrorism or espionage and had been “caught in a net the [NSA] had cast for somebody else.”1ACC. The FBI uses human surveillance through false relationships in an effort that criminalizes Muslim identities and thought. We have an obligation to reject the spectacle of Muslim extremism that makes violence by the US empire invisibleArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, pp. 12-14The consequences of making the notion of radicalization central to the domestic war on terror are far-reaching. When the government widened the perceived threat of terrorism from individuals actively inciting, financing, or preparing terrorist attacks to those having an ideology, they brought constitutionally protected activities of large numbers of people under surveillance. Most discussion of state surveillance attends to wiretapping, collection of Internet communications data, closed-circuit television cameras, and other forms of electronic surveillance of our online and offline lives. Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing has made clear the extent to which the US National Security Agency conducts warrantless surveillance of Internet and phone communication globally and domestically. But central to counter-radicalization practice is another form of surveillance that is addressed less often: using personal relationships within targeted communities themselves for intelligence gathering. When community organizations and service providers such as teachers, doctors, and youth workers develop surveillance relationships with law enforcement agencies, when government community engagement exercises mask intelligence gathering, and when informants are recruited from communities, surveillance becomes intertwined with the fabric of human relationships and the threads of trust upon which they are built. The power and danger of these forms of surveillance derive from their entanglement in everyday human interactions at the community level rather than from the external monitoring capabilities of hidden technologies. Moreover, having established such structures of surveillance in relation to Islamist extremism, it becomes easy to widen them to other forms of radicalism—occasionally to cover the far Right, but more often to left-wing protesters and dissidents. Following from the widening of surveillance is the criminalization of ideological activities previously understood to be constitutionally protected. This can happen through the entrapment of individuals by law enforcement agencies or through measures criminalizing the material support of terrorism, the definition of which has been widened to include a broad range of ideological activities. Then, because ideologies circulating among Muslim populations have been identified as precursors to terrorism, the perception grows that Muslims have a special problem with radicalization. In this context, leaders of targeted Muslim communities have become intimidated by the general mood and aligned themselves with the government, offering themselves as allies willing to oppose and expose dissent within the community. Everyone who rejects the game of fake patriotism falls under suspicion, as opposition to extremism becomes the only legitimate discourse. Finally, the spectacle of the Muslim extremist renders invisible the violence of the US empire. Opposition to such violence from within the imperium has fallen silent, as the universal duty of countering extremism precludes any wider D. FBI training materials teach agents to see all Muslims as terrorists to be destroyedGlenn Greenwald, journalist and constitutional lawyer,?and Murtaza Hussain, Staff Writer, July 8, 2014, “Meet the Muslim-American leaders the FBI and NSA have been spying on,” The Intercept, , ACC. 5-22-2015The FBI—which is listed as the “responsible agency” for surveillance on the five men—has a controversial record when it comes to the ethnic profiling of Muslim-Americans. According to FBI training materials?uncovered by Wired?in 2011, the bureau taught agents to treat “mainstream” Muslims as supporters of terrorism, to view charitable donations by Muslims as “a funding mechanism for combat,” and to view Islam itself as a “Death Star” that must be destroyed if terrorism is to be contained.E. Racism is constructed socially through rhetoric and human interaction. We can and must take every opportunity to dismantle the structures of oppression that organize daily lifeDavid Hall, JD, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law School, Summer, 1999, “Giving Birth to a Racially Just Society in the 21st Century,” University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review, 21 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 927, 21+U.+Ark.+Little+Rock+L.+Rev.+927&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=7128c39417584ebb5f524e6401917bdc, ACC. 5-23-2015The history of racism and racial discrimination in this society is a classic example of this cycle of frustration and dashed hopes. As we approach the close of the 20th Century a retrospective analysis would provide numerous examples of what some have come to call the civil rights shuffle-one step forward, two steps backwards, side step, side step. This dance was eloquently and consistently choreographed for the last one hundred years and beyond. This dance does not negate or belittle the important and significant progress which was made during this century, but one could accurately say at the dawning of the 21st Century what W.E.B. DuBois said about the 20th Century-the issue of the century will be the color line. Therefore it is critically important and appropriate to not only learn lessons from the mistakes of this closing century, but to find the spiritual will to bring an end to this dance. Though a seminal symposium on race creates important opportunities to discuss these critical matters, one has to wonder if we are only engaged in a ritualistic exercise that pacifies our insecurities as the world around us gets worse. In the midst of those moments of sobering reflection, one must realize that each opportunity we have in life to touch each other's souls, to challenge each other's minds, and to lift each other's spirits, is a precious gift. The mere possibility that words and human interaction can make a difference in the reality of the world is what should inspire our future efforts and dedication, even when there is very little tangible evidence of progress.OBSERVATION TWO: DO THE RIGHT THINGA. The federal government should stop suspicionless surveillance of Muslim AmericansMadiha Shahabuddin, JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, September 2014, “The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be”: How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment Rights,” Chapman Law Review, Vol. 18:2, 577-610, , ACC. 5-22-2015The government—both federal and local—should stop the practice of widespread, suspicionless surveillance of Muslim Americans in the form of mosque infiltration and informant sting operations. Community and grassroots activists, legal civil rights groups, and Muslim American leaders are all calling for the end of such a practice. Choosing to spy on Muslims simply because they are Muslim and attend a mosque is based upon a faulty and invidious presumption that terrorist threats only come from Muslims, and namely those Muslims who are more “religious.” Such a presumption must be retracted in order for the government’s approach to be narrowly tailored. Moreover, the current surveillance techniques have not proved effective in achieving their stated goals. In 2012, Assistant Chief Thomas Galati of the NYPD himself attested under oath that during the more than six years of its implementation, the surveillance program did not yield a single lead, nor did it spark the need to initiate any terror investigations. There are also limits to how useful a tool surveillance can be for crime prevention.1ACB. Status quo policies undermine counter-terrorism goals. The federal government should adopt an approach that respected Muslim rights in surveillance policiesHuman Rights Watch, Staff Writer, July 2014, “The Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions,” , ACC. 5-22-2015US counterterrorism policies call for building strong relationships with American Muslim communities. Yet many of the practices employed are alienating those communities and diverting resources from other, more effective, ways of responding to the threat of terrorism. The US government should focus its resources on a rights-respecting approach to terrorism prosecutions, one that protects security while strengthening the government’s relationship with communities most affected by abusive counterterrorism policies.C. We have a moral obligation to reverse anti-Muslim counterterrorism. The FBI manipulates young Muslims and turns them into would-be mass murdersMark?S.?Hamm, PhD, Professor of Criminology at Indiana State University, 2015, “Book Review - Arun Kundnani: The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror,” Critical Criminology, 23:1, pp. 141-143After 9/11, FBI agents began hunting the lowly and wretched. Several of the Muslims identified by Kundnani as sting targets suffered from schizophrenia. One kept bottles of his urine at his bedside; another was hallucinating on PCP throughout the investigation. The NYPD’s biggest terrorism get has been a Spanish Harlem heroin addict named Jose Pimentel, a man so mentally disturbed that he circumcised himself.A more appropriate reference for the FBI’s sting program is the “broken windows” approach to urban law enforcement. But instead of emphasizing arrests for “quality of life” and petty drug crimes to maintain order in working-class neighborhoods, FBI agents trawl cyber neighborhoods of the Internet looking for what they call Kramer jihadists (after the bumbling?Seinfeld?character) who espouse violence against the United States. The FBI’s mission is to lure these opinionated but criminally inept young Muslim men into conspiracies where agents can provide them with the tutelage and encouragement necessary to turn relatively harmless people into would-be mass murderers—never once considering how such a costly method of wrecking lives might be converted into soft power approaches to salvage them. That may be the ultimate moral failure of domestic counterterrorism in the twenty first Century and Kundnani is to be applauded for making academic sense of it.Affirmative ExtensionState and local law enforcement follows the FBI leadThe FBI sets the standard for local surveillance of Muslim communitiesDiala Shamas, Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, October 31, 2013, “Where’s the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,” The Nation, , ACC. 5-22-2015Contrary to popular perception, however, the NYPD has not gone rogue. In fact, the NYPD is following in the footsteps of its federal counterparts at the FBI. Both agencies claim their intelligence gathering activities are governed by rules; the difference is that while the NYPD faces some skepticism with regards to the validity—or relevance—of its justifications, the FBI’s own surveillance policies have been accorded far more deference. As an attorney working with New York’s Muslim communities at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, along with student attorneys and colleagues, I have engaged in various efforts to hold the NYPD accountable for its surveillance and tactics. Along with the ACLU and the NYCLU, we represent Muslim individuals and organizations bringing a legal challenge to the NYPD’s surveillance program. But CLEAR clients’ experiences also show us that the NYPD’s tactics are not exceptional. Aggressively intrusive and harmful intelligence gathering on Muslims’ daily lives is a national epidemic—and the chief culprit is the FBI. The task of holding the NYPD accountable must not supersede the equally, if not more important, task of holding the FBI—and the broader law enforcement community—to account for their own misguided post-9/11 policies.SQ does not protect Muslim rights / InherencyDomestic surveillance is engrained in Islamophobia. The Patriot Act allows the federal government unrestrained power of surveillance it uses to racialize an entire group of people. Dalia F. Fahmy, Department of Political Science, Long Island University, March 2015,?“The Green Scare is not McCarthyism 2.0: How Islamophobia is redefining the use of propaganda in foreign and domestic affairs,” Dialectical Anthropology, Volume 39,?Issue 1,?pp 63-67The state utilized various technologies at its disposal and protected by the US Patriot Act (or Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001). The US Patriot Act allows the state to ‘‘enhance’’ domestic security against terrorism, institute its new surveillance procedures, remove obstacles to investigating terrorism, circumvent criminal law statutes, and utilize new forms of surveillance measures, all without the knowledge of the public and under secret authorization. And while the extent of surveillance is only beginning to come to light through the recent revelations of Edward Snowden and Glen Greenwald, the program has reified the Islamophobic discourses by allowing for the targeting of Muslims in the name of security, without yielding real fruit, while alienating and racializing a segment of the nation.FISA and the FISC do not prevent FBI surveillance of American MuslimsBill Chambers, Staff Writer, July 14, 2014, “NSA & FBI Spying on Muslims: Old Story, New Target,” Chicago Monitor, , ACC. 5-22-2015Even FISA and its Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) implemented to stop FBI abuse in investigating dissidents is being used to continue the exact same practice, i.e. gathering intelligence on American citizens who the NSA and FBI has decided are suspected terrorists. Now that group of “dissidents” appears to be Americans Muslims. FBI anti-Muslim stings are used to justify its bloated budgetDeirdre Fulton, Staff Writer, July 21, 2014, “FBI Entrapment Created 'Illusion' of Terrorist Plots: Report,” Common Dreams, , ACC. 5-25-2015Federal officials and law enforcement agents are treating American Muslims like "terrorists-in-waiting," according to a new?report released Monday?by Human Rights Watch and Columbia Law School's Human Rights Institute. The FBI, under pressure to appear effective and worthy of its $8.4-billion budget, has "targeted American Muslims in abusive counterterrorism 'sting operations' based on religious and ethnic identity"; sent informants to mosques to "troll for leads"; and in some cases encouraged or even paid individuals to undertake terrorist acts, the?report?(pdf) reveals.A2: FBI goodFBI anti-Muslim surveillance fosters psychological traumaAlexander J. O’Connor and Farhana Jahan, University of California, Berkeley, 2014, “Under Surveillance and Overwrought: American Muslims’ Emotional and Behavioral Responses to Government Surveillance,” Journal of Muslim Health, Volume 8,?Issue 1,?2014, , ACC. 5-23-2015In early 2012, it was uncovered that the New York Police Department established an extensive program of surveillance and infiltration of Muslim student organizations in universities across the northeast. That this surveillance occurred both within and outside of New York City—in Connecticut and Pennsylvania, for instance—was early evidence of the extent and support of covert surveillance of American Muslims by United States law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Similar instances of widespread surveillance conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were later uncovered in other areas of the country. Such reports of governmental surveillance, profiling, and monitoring—all which we consider in the present study—increased after September 11th, 2001. The USA PATRIOT Act (2001), signed in the months after 9/11, by reducing restrictions in law enforcement agencies' ability to conduct surveillance on anyone suspected of involvement in terrorism, provided the legal legitimacy for much of the subsequent surveillance. Revelations about the National Security Agency’s surveillance program suggest that these methods have since expanded. Such surveillance, however, has targeted many people, Muslims in particular, with no connection to terrorism. Alongside other forms of post-9/11 discrimination experienced by American Muslims, government surveillance is associated with psychological distress—including depression and subclinical forms of paranoia. Little is known, however, about (1) American Muslims’ emotional reaction to being monitored by the government and (2) how they respond to, manage, and regulate these emotions alongside the prospect of continuing or future surveillance. The present work examined these two phenomena.A2: FBI goodThe FBI has a long history of labelling certain groups for surveillance and criminalization of the peopleBill Chambers, Staff Writer, July 14, 2014, “NSA & FBI Spying on Muslims: Old Story, New Target,” Chicago Monitor, , ACC. 5-22-2015So presumably these individual names had to be taken in front of a judge at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court with evidence that they were “not only agents of an international terrorist organization…but also ‘are or may be’ engaged in or abetting espionage, sabotage, or terrorism.” In other words, they were terrorists possibly involved in planning terrorist acts in the U.S. ?There has been no indication or evidence that any of these individuals are terrorists so how was this surveillance ever approved? Anyone who has any knowledge of the FBI’s history will recognize this scenario. A group of people who challenge the government or U.S. foreign policy are assigned a label, criminalized by a law or program, and then put under surveillance with the goal of an indictment or at least a disruption of their activism. The label has ranged from “anarchist”, “socialist”, “communist”, “black nationalist”, to today’s “terrorist”. There have been a series of laws, FBI programs, and Supreme Court decisions attached to these labels that justified the surveillance and criminalization of the group. ?Laws have ranged from the?Espionage Act 1917, Alien and Sedition Act 1918,??Smith Act 1940, McCarran Act 1950, COINTELPRO (Domestic Counterintelligence Program) 1960′s, COMINFIL (Communist Infiltration Program), the Patriot Act 2001, and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010. As the article points out, even the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted in 1978 in response to disclosures that J. Edgar Hoover and a long line of presidents from both parties had used U.S. intelligence agencies to spy on dissidents and political enemies. Intended to allow authorities to covertly investigate suspected spies or terrorists on U.S. soil, the surveillance is often used simply to gather intelligence, not to build a criminal case.Radicalization theories are wrongStudies prove anti-Muslim surveillance inspires anxiety, not angerAlexander J. O’Connor and Farhana Jahan, University of California, Berkeley, 2014, “Under Surveillance and Overwrought: American Muslims’ Emotional and Behavioral Responses to Government Surveillance,” Journal of Muslim Health, Volume 8,?Issue 1,?2014, , ACC. 5-23-2015Work by political scientists finds two dominant emotion responses—anxiety and anger—when people?imagine being monitored by the government. The emotional response of people?personally experiencing?government surveillance is, however, unknown. In the case of American Muslims experiencing government surveillance, anxiety levels are likely particularly pronounced. Consider that American Muslims monitored by the government, even after they are cleared of suspicion, are in a precarious position. Given the covert nature of US government surveillance, those previously monitored can never be certain that monitoring has ceased. Even when believing surveillance has ceased, they may view themselves as likely targets of future surveillance. Anxiety, not anger, is the typical response to such feelings of uncertainty and uncontrollability in response to the prospect of negative events. Furthermore, given evidence of higher levels of anxiety, depression, sub-clinical paranoia, and dis-identification among American Muslims who report more general forms of religious discrimination, those with potentially interminable experiences with government surveillance may be especially prone to higher levels of anxiety.Radicalization theories and fears of domestic Muslim terrorism are unfounded. Most reject extremismHuman Rights Watch, Staff Writer, July 2014, “The Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions,” , ACC. 5-22-2015Fears of homegrown terrorism and radicalization theories have driven federal agencies to treat American Muslim communities as uniquely susceptible to terrorist propaganda and to subject them to greater government scrutiny. Yet this assumption is unsubstantiated. As a 2009 Pew study put it, “[v]iolent jihad is discordant with the values, outlook and attitudes of the vast majority of Muslim Americans, most of whom reject extremism.”FBI counterterrorism efforts are guided by internal guidelines for broad-based surveillance on radicalizationArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 194Since 9/11, this problem has become far worse, as the FBI increasingly sees its counterterrorism role as collecting broad-based intelligence on radicalization that is unconnected to any specific criminal act. Key to this shift have been changes to the FBI's internal rules, known as the Attorney General's Guidelines. These were originally introduced in 1976, following the revelations of abuses in the FBI's Hoover-era countersubversion programs, such as COINTELPRO, which sought to discredit, harass, and criminalize legitimate political movements. The guidelines clarified that the FBI's role was not to conduct open-ended domestic intelligence operations. Intrusive investigative techniques could only be used when there were specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or group is or may be engaged in activities which involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve the violation of federal law. The basis for starting such investigations had to be recorded, so that an audit trail was available if allegations of government abuse were later raised. However, over time, the guidelines were gradually adjusted so that the authority to collect information became less and less dependent on having evidence of completed or impending criminal acts.Pre-emptive prosecutions / provocation bad94.2% of federal terrorism convictions are based on pre-emptive prosecutionsAbdullah Al-Arian, assistant professor of history at Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service in Qatar, July 21, 2014, “The informants: Manufacturing terror,” AlJazeera News, , ACC. 5-22-2015A startling report utilising the Department of Justice's internal statistics recently?stated that in the decade after 9/11, 94.2 percent of federal terrorism convictions were obtained, at least in part, on the basis of preemptive prosecutions. Given how pervasive this practice has been, it is noteworthy that American Muslim civil rights groups have not developed a coordinated response to what has plainly become a widespread use of informants nationwide. In some instances, they have even attempted to downplay the problem of preemptive prosecutions, as in one report by a prominent American Muslim organisation that?states?that "while the numbers clearly show informants are frequently used by federal law enforcement, a majority of these cases do not involve them at all." The use of informants to target communities is one of the most alarming trends to have developed since 9/11, as it threatens to undo the fabric of a free society. That these recent investigative films have laid bare this troubling phenomenon and displayed its consequences for all to see, is a critical first step in confronting its damaging effect not only on the vulnerable American Muslim community but on American society as a whole.The FBI operates under the assumption that all Muslims are terrorists, or can be turned into terrorists. The pre-emptive mandate is a program of provocation to manipulate radicalization and create “terrorists”Arun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 186Moreover, FBI agents believe that just monitoring young people in these radicalization stages is insufficient. They claim surveillance alone is unreliable, because it risks missing crucial developments that, they say, can occur over as little as a few months. Equally, the FBI believes that in other cases it could be years before low-level radicalism moves to involvement in actual terrorist activity, by which time the case may have been dropped because a period of surveillance failed to indicate any criminal activity. Given these perceptions, as well as the demand that the FBI adopt counterterrorism as its top priority and the requirement that it take a preemptive stance on perceived threats, a more aggressive strategy has inevitably followed. That strategy is provocation: the use of agents provocateurs to test if individuals expressing radical views can, in circumstances carefully engineered by the government, be pushed into criminal activity, so that they can then be arrested and prosecuted. As a RAND Corporation study puts it, agents provocateurs need to be used to "lubricate" suspects' decision making.' The assumption is that if an FBI undercover agent or informant can, through elaborate sting operations lasting many months, create circumstances that manipulate radicalized young people into conspiring to commit acts of terror—with the FBI supplying fake weapons then that is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a person was already on a radicalization journey to becoming a terrorist. If the key difficulty of a preventive approach to counterterrorism is knowing whether someone who is not currently a terrorist is going to become one in the future, the FBI's solution is to ask a different question: can someone who is not currently a terrorist be made into one by the FBI?Pre-emptive prosecutions / provocation badFBI provocation programs fail and lead to information overload. This erodes trust, causes fear, and silences political dissent to undermine democracyMark?S.?Hamm, PhD, Professor of Criminology at Indiana State University, 2015, “Book Review - Arun Kundnani: The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror,” Critical Criminology, 23:1, pp. 141-143Another problem is data overload. Kundnani cites a report showing that for a two-year period (2009–2011), FBI agents conducted 42,888 national security assessments involving informants, interviews, and physical surveillance. (All stings originate here.) Vast amounts of information has been collected (see Edward Snowden), much of it unconnected to criminal activity. Kundnani illuminates the tragic irony. “More often than not, when the US government has failed to prevent terrorist acts,” he writes, “it is not because the intelligence was missing but because its significance was not identified amid the huge tracts of surveillance data the national security state collects” (p. 194). Underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Bledsoe and Hasan, and the Boston Marathon bombers—intelligence existed on all of these post-9/11 terrorists prior to their attacks but its meaning became lost in the data overload. Beyond these life-and-death concerns, the FBI’s agent provocateur program has concentrated its resources primarily in Muslim-American communities, thereby eroding community trust, instigating fear, and silencing political dissent necessary for democracy.FBI convictions & the provocation strategy are a sham that constructs a self-fulfilling prophecy and perpetual stereotypingArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 199-200A second consequence of the provocation strategy is the distorting effect on perceptions of the domestic terrorist threat. The FBI has generated a stream of terrorist convictions that are considered genuine by policy makers and analysts. That these cases would not have existed without FBI fabrication is ignored. This means that mainstream analysis of the scale and nature of the terrorist threat is in part a self-fulfilling prophecy, reflecting the FBI's choices of whom to target. If the numbers of people arrested in a particular year go up, it is as likely to be because of a step-up in the number of agent provocateur operations the FBI is carrying out as the result of an independent increase in terrorist plotting. If Muslims constitute the majority of those indicted for terrorism in the US, this is in large part a product of whom the FBI is deciding to target in provocation operations rather than an objective measure of where the threat of terrorism comes from. In the two decades leading up to 2010, 348 people were killed in acts of political violence committed by the American far Right in the United States. Of course, a much larger number of people died in the 9/11 attacks, carried out by Muslims present in the US as foreign visitors. But the number of people killed in acts of political violence carried out by Muslim- American citizens or long-term residents of the US is much smaller: twenty people between 1990 and 2010. Yet because the FBI considers Muslim Americans a special risk, it targets them with agents provocateurs to a far greater degree than it does the far Right. The result is that every two months or so the FBI announces another high-profile arrest of a Muslim terrorist suspect, keeping the US on its war on terror footing and sustaining the multibillion- dollar homeland security industry, while the far Right threat is downplayed. In turn, the stereotype of Muslims as inherently prone to terrorism is perpetuated.Pre-emptive prosecutions / provocation badToday’s anti-terrorism stings are unique and target whole Muslim communities. They are targeted because of their identity, not criminal historyEugenia Lulo, Associate Media Director of the Brown Political Review, December 9, 2014, “Terrorists-In-Waiting: The Problems With FBI Sting Operations,” Brown Political Review, , ACC. 5-25-2015Sting operations are not new to counterterrorism strategy. Rather, they have been a large part of the FBI’s strategy almost as long as the organization has existed. The difference between a traditional sting operation and its current iterations is that traditional sting operations deal with targets that have a history of committing the same type of crime. Today, anti-terrorism sting operations often target people because their communities, opinions and backgrounds are stereotypically associated with terrorism, and criminal history is no longer the distinguishing factor. In the case of the Newburgh Four, Hussain began search for a target by visiting mosques. Targeting mosques and other religious institutions that Muslim-Americans frequent insinuates that Muslims are predisposed to terrorism, and inevitably results in “treating American Muslims as terrorists-in-waiting.”A2: Community partnershipsCommunity partnerships between the FBI and Muslim communities are top-down programs. So-called moderate Muslim leaders are usually government plantsArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 208Whatever the merits of community-oriented policing to tackle drugs and gang-related crime, using it for counterterrorism is a different proposition. Community partnerships are unable to provide any means of accountability or shared decision making, because how the FBI investigates terrorism is decided in Washington, DC, and driven by political forces that Muslim-American organizations have been unable to challenge. Moreover, there is next to no information on terrorism that American Muslims can share with law enforcement agencies, no matter how much trust they have in them, because hardly any have come across terrorist recruitment. In practice, partnerships between the FBI and Muslim communities to tackle terrorism have been part of a top-down strategy to prevent radicalization that goes way beyond knowing about imminent crimes. The moderate Muslims who are recruited to such roles are rarely civil rights advocates with a commitment to government accountability; more often they are, in effect, advocates for the government, conveying its political message to community members rather than the other way around.The FBI treats Muslim communities as unified blocs, where civil rights claims are vilified. They use community relations to gather intelligenceArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 206In the imaginations of FBI agents, immigrant Muslim communities are made up of monolithic blocs headed by patriarchs—like the "tribes" many ex-military FBI agents thought they were confronting in Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan before they joined the bureau. What this ignores is that communities are complex tapestries, not only with different ethnic strands, but with multiple interwoven power relationships of class, gender, and age. Who represents Muslims is not something that can be decided by empirical indicators such as influence or the number of members in a congregation or an organization. Communities do not come ready-made with leaders—to identify one is to make a political choice. And potential leaders who take a civil rights stand are often vilified as conveyors of the extremist ideas that supposedly make people into terrorists. While the Obama administration has rhetorically embraced the idea of forging community partnerships with moderate Muslims in its domestic war on terror, in practice the role communities are allowed to play in preventing terrorism has been reduced to intelligence gathering and the self-policing of radical rmants bad / coercionFBI informants form the largest spy group since J. Edgar Hoover, focused on anti-Muslim surveillanceTrevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, pp. 16-17What became clear from my reporting is that in the decade since 9/11, the FBI has built the largest network of spies ever to exist in the United States—with ten times as many informants on the streets today as there were during the infamous Cointelpro operations under FBI director J. Edgar Hoover with the majority of these spies focused on ferreting out terrorism in Muslim communities. The Mother Jones story revealed for the first time the inner workings of the FBI's informant program and how agents provocateurs were behind most of the scary terrorist plots you've heard about since 9/11. But after that story was published, I couldn't help but think about all of the material I had that didn't make it into the article—the rich history of how the FBI transformed into something of a domestic CIA, the inside stories of dozens of terrorism sting operations, interviews with current and former FBI agents I'd met during my reporting, and the full explanation of how the government has exaggerated the threat of Islamic terrorism in the United States. I believe the FBI's use of terrorism stings is one of the most important national security stories of the last decade, and a desire to tell that story in full, and in as much detail I could, led me to write this book.FBI informants are paid to coerce Muslims into becoming terrorists they can then prosecute. Even those with lawful status are threatened with no-fly statusMadiha Shahabuddin, JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, September 2014, “The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be”: How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment Rights,” Chapman Law Review, Vol. 18:2, 577-610, , ACC. 5-22-2015The informant stories are all quite similar. An FBI informant—usually with a checkered past—is tasked with posing as a Muslim with “contacts” to terrorist organizations and told to approach certain targets who are often antisocial, almost “loner” types with few ties to a community—and sometimes with mental health issues—to conjure a terror plot that will lead to those individuals’ prosecution and conviction. Hefty financial incentives abound for the informants, who can be paid up to $100,000 or more per case, with the added possibility of earning tens of thousands more if their operation results in a conviction. The FBI does not stop there, supplying the informants with thousands of dollars at their disposal to offer as financial inducements to their targets, thereby increasing the likelihood they will get a “prosecutable” case. In addition, the FBI often uses the vulnerable immigration statuses of some Muslims (e.g., an overstayed student visa or undocumented status) to coerce or exert immense pressure upon immigrant Muslims to become informants in exchange for their immigration problems “going away.” Such individuals are faced with the “choice” of either being deported, or, if they refuse, being prosecuted for terrorism crimes themselves. Even Muslim Americans with lawful status are approached by the FBI to become informants and threatened with being placed on the no-fly list and barred from commercial air rmants bad / coercionFBI terrorism informants only care about the moneyDerek Royden, Staff Writer, January 29, 2015, “Manufacturing Terror: How the FBI Invents Some Plots, and Ignores Others, In the War on Freedom,” , , ACC. 5-22-2015Almost all FBI stings have one thing in common: the use of informants who are themselves trying to get out of criminal charges, and are doing the job for cash, or both. The main informant in the Liberty City case, Elie Assad, courted the men who practiced their own religion based on elements of Christianity, Judaism and Islam, and who called themselves “The Seas of David.” The informants’ motivations seem obvious today; in all, Assad and another informant, Abbas al-Saidi, got more than $130,000 for their work helping FBI handlers build a case against the seven men. Another interesting note about the Seas of David: they never actually engaged in anything resembling violence, and even?refused to receive weapons when they were offered them. James J. Wedick, a former agent with the Bureau,?said of the group: “These guys couldn’t find their way down the end of the street. They were homeless types. And, yes, we did show a picture where somebody was taking an oath to Al Qaeda. So what? They didn’t care. They only cared about the money. When we put forth a case like that to suggest to the American public that we’re protecting them, we’re not protecting them.”Successful scuttles of terrorist plots are a misnomer. FBI informants coerce people to take stepsTrevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, p. 55The FBI uses informants and terrorism stings to create a hostile environment for terrorist recruiters and operators—by raising the risk of even the smallest step toward violent action. It's a form of deterrence, an adaptation of the "broken windows" theory used to fight urban crime. Advocates such as Tidwell insist it has been effective, noting that there hasn't been a successful large-scale attack against the United States since 9/11. But what can't be answered—as many former and current FBI agents acknowledge—is how many of the Bureau's targets would have taken the step over the line at all were it not for the pressure and coercion of an informant. Informants target poor and mentally ill Muslims who had no interest in terrorism, but are assumed to be inherent terroristsEugenia Lulo, Associate Media Director of the Brown Political Review, December 9, 2014, “Terrorists-In-Waiting: The Problems With FBI Sting Operations,” Brown Political Review, , ACC. 5-25-2015These biases become even more apparent during trials. As criminal defense lawyer Martin Stolar said to Al Jazeera, “In the post-9/11 era, Muslims accused of terrorism start out with three strikes against them and maybe four strikes,” making the justice system inherently unfair. Furthermore, these operations have historically targeted the young, people with mental or intellectual disabilities, and the economically disadvantaged — all of whom are particularly susceptible to being persuaded by an informant to join a terrorist plot and who probably wouldn’t have the means or the initiative to pull it off otherwise. Most of the suspects have no previous involvement with any terrorist groups when they are initially targeted by an informant.FBI manufactures Muslim “Terrorists”FBI counterterrorism success claims are a fantasy constructed through coercion by informantsTrevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, p. 234The FBI currently spends $3 billion annually to hunt an enemy that is largely of its own creation. Evidence in dozens of terrorism cases—involving plots to blow up synagogues, skyscrapers, military recruiting stations, and bars and nightclubs—suggests that today's terrorists in the United States are nothing more than FBI creations, impressionable men living on the edges of society who become bomb- triggering would-be killers only because of the actions of FBI informants. The FBI and the Justice Department then cite these sting cases as proof that the government is stopping terrorists before they strike. But the evidence available for review in these cases shows that these "terrorists" never had the capability to launch an attack themselves. Most of the targets in these stings were poor, uneducated, and easily manipulated. In many cases, it's likely they wouldn't have come up with the idea at all without prodding by one of the FBI's 15,000 registered informants. In sting after sting, from Miami to Seattle, the FBI and its informants have provided the means for America's would-be terrorists to carry out an attack, creating what a federal judge has called a "fantasy terror operation.""The FBI regularly targets Muslims and coerces them into abusive interrogations to turn them as informantsDiala Shamas, Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, October 31, 2013, “Where’s the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,” The Nation, , ACC. 5-22-2015On a daily basis, our clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most intimate and protected areas of their lives. They are approached at night at their homes, stopped in front of their neighbors or children, solicited outside their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their colleagues and customers. And the interrogations are far from voluntary. FBI agents regularly warn our clients who invoke their right to have an attorney present that “they can do this the easy way or the hard way.” One client was so frightened by the agents’ threats that he agreed to accompany them to FBI headquarters and let them strap him to what they claimed was a polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions, accused him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an informant.FBI manufactures Muslim “Terrorists”The FBI largely manufactures terrorism plots. Anti-Muslim surveillance is an empirically proven farceTrevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, p. 17For more than a decade, the FBI has thrown as much as it can toward an effort to stop the "next" terrorist attack. Every year, the U.S. government allocates $3 billion to the FBI to prevent the next 9/11, more money than the Bureau receives to combat organized crime. But what an analysis of ten years' worth of Justice Department data shows is that Islamic terrorism in the United States is not an immediate and dangerous threat. The FBI's thousands of informants and billions of dollars have not resulted in the capture of dozens of killers ready and able to bomb a crowded building or gun down people in a suburban shopping mall. Instead, the FBI's trawling in Muslim communities has resulted largely in sting operations that target easily susceptible men on the margins of society, men like Michael Curtis Reynolds. Since 9/11, the FBI and the Justice Department have labeled as terrorists a mentally troubled man who worked at Walmart, a video game store clerk whose only valuable possession was a set of stereo speakers, a university student who was about to be evicted from his apartment, and a window washer who had dropped out of college, among others. All of these men were involved in FBI terrorism stings in which an informant came up with the idea and provided the necessary means and opportunity for the terrorist plot. While we have captured a few terrorists since 9/11, we have manufactured many more.Anti-Muslim surveillance happens under the pretext of the FBI stopping future attacks by a “lone wolf”Trevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, pp. 26-27The FBI has a term for Martinez and other alleged terrorists like him: lone wolf. Officials at the Bureau now believe that the next terrorist attack will likely come from a lone wolf, and this belief is at the core of a federal law enforcement policy known variously as preemption, prevention, and disruption. FBI counterterrorism agents want to catch terrorists before they act, and to accomplish this, federal law enforcement officials have in the decade since 9/11 created the largest domestic spying network ever to exist in the United States. In fact, the FBI today has ten times as many informants as it did in the 1960s, when former FBI director. J. Edgar Hoover made the Bureau infamous for inserting spies into organizations as varied as Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s and the Ku Klux Klan. Modern FBI informants aren't burrowing into political groups, however; they are focused on terrorism, on identifying today the terrorist of tomorrow, and U.S. government officials acknowledge that while terrorist threats do exist from domestic organizations, such as white supremacist groups and the sovereign citizen movement, they believe the greatest threat comes from within U.S. Muslim communities due, in large part, to the aftereffects of the shock and awe Al Qaeda delivered on September 11, 2001. The FBI's vast army of spies, located in every community in the United States with enough Muslims to support a mosque, has one primary function: to identify the next lone wolf. According to the Bureau, a lone wolf is likely to be a single male age sixteen to thirty-five. Therefore, informants and their FBI handlers are on the lookout for young Muslims who espouse radical beliefs, are vocal about their disapproval of U.S. foreign policy, or have expressed sympathy for international terrorist groups. If they find anyone who meets the criteria, they move him to the next stage: the sting, in which an FBI informant, posing as a terrorist, offers to help facilitate a terrorist attack for the target. FBI manufactures Muslim “Terrorists”Informants and coercion are used to manufacture “terrorists” for the FBITrevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, pp. 224-225Since 9/11, the FBI has routinely labeled men like Khalifah Al-Akili as terrorists, despite the lack of evidence that these men would commit terrorist acts without the aggressive prodding and assistance of FBI informants. (In AlAkili's case, even the persistence of the informant was insufficient to push him into going along with a terrorist plot.) Part of the reason that the FBI is able to get away with this is because the public and the media don't question whether the individuals the Bureau puts on display are real terrorists or just men on the margins made to look like terrorists. Even when the government is clearly putting on a show, neither the public nor the mainstream media have stopped it. In the prosecution in Houston of a man who worked with a person he believed was an Al Qaeda trainer, for example, the federal government put on the witness stand an informant wearing a black mask, telling the judge that the mask was necessary because showing the informant's face could make him a target for terrorists. No one pointed out that since actual terrorists weren't involved in the investigation, no real terrorists existed who would want to target the informant.Solvency ExtensionProvocation strategies foster a 1st Amendment chill and rights denial that encourages terrorism. The plan is the best way to solveArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 199The use of a provocation strategy to secure terrorism convictions among American Muslims has had a number of far-reaching consequences beyond the impacts on the individuals prosecuted. Given the large numbers of informants operating in Muslim-American communities, mosque congregations and Muslim community organizations understand that there is the possibility of an informant jotting down names and conversations and passing the information to the government. With the prosecutors of the war on terror blurring the distinctions between First Amendment-protected speech and criminal activity, many feel it is safest to avoid discussing certain topics, such as Western foreign policy, except with one's closest friends and family. Relationships of trust within Muslim, communities are thereby eroded, as people consider open discussions risky. Those who hold views critical of the government choose not to express themselves publicly. As fear takes hold, the traditional avenues of political activism, such as taking to the streets to protest, are less likely to occur. According to official theories of radicalization, an atmosphere in which political opposition to US imperialism cannot be freely expressed by Muslims helps prevent terrorism. But in reality, the more those angry at foreign policy see their community paralyzed by fear and reluctant to express itself openly, the more likely it becomes that some will end up supporting terrorism. A strong, active, and confident Muslim community enjoying its civil rights to the full and able to engage with young people on issues they feel strongly about is the best way of preventing violence.Current government surveillance of Muslim Americans is unconstitutional. The government should not prosecute people based on race or religion through dragnets and informants. The plan secures rights without sacrificing anti-terrorismMadiha Shahabuddin, JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, September 2014, “The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be”: How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment Rights,” Chapman Law Review, Vol. 18:2, 577-610, , ACC. 5-22-2015Although the government has proffered the compelling interest of national security as a justification for its widespread network of surveillance and informants for the purpose of essentially monitoring Muslim American daily life, the means it has employed are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny in the face of constitutional First Amendment protections of free association and speech. This has led to a significant “chilling” of religious and political expression, as well as the curtailment of actual religious activities such as mosque attendance, donations for charity, or participation in a Muslim Student Association on college campuses. Through the refining of the government’s scope of surveillance, and the creation of objective, transparent criteria for individuals who do warrant such government scrutiny, Muslim Americans can be secured their fundamental rights, while still allowing law enforcement to accomplish its goal of fighting actual terrorism. Additionally, the government should not prosecute those vulnerable, and easily susceptible individuals who were unsuspectingly caught in the government “dragnet” of informant sting operations. Instead, law enforcement should allow the Muslim American community its own space to address the issue on its own terms, by offering such individuals social programs and mental health services as needed, without fear of government scrutiny or prosecution. This will not only empower Muslim Americans, a community largely marginalized post 9/11, but also allow them to mold their own destinies in this nation. It is not the place of a government based on fundamental constitutional principles of freedom to punish individuals for mere adherence to their faith, no matter how stigmatized they are. Courts must now step in to uphold those fundamental rights that have been pushed aside out of misunderstanding and fear.Solvency ExtensionThe FBI should make broad-based reforms to current domestic surveillance practicesHuman Rights Watch, Staff Writer, July 2014, “The Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions,” , ACC. 5-22-2015To the Federal Bureau of Investigation ? Ensure that decisions to initiate assessments, preliminary investigations or investigations are not made on the basis of religious behavior, political opinion, or other activity protected by the right to freedom of expression under international law. ? Revise the Domestic Investigations Operations Guide (DIOG) to prohibit the recruiting and tasking of informants in assessment and preliminary investigation phases. ? Declassify and make public key portions of the DIOG detailing guidance provided to FBI agents for initiating monitoring of religious and political institutions. ? Report to congressional committees on the deployment of informants into community or religious spaces, including the number of informants and the scope of their activities. ? Ensure that information obtained through community outreach is not used for intelligence purposes, in accordance with existing FBI policy. ? Ensure that law enforcement agents do not use threats, including those involving the “no-fly” list, when recruiting informants.Racism / Whiteness internalsThe FBI uses entrapment and racial profiling against Muslim Americans, setting the precedent for other marginalized groupsDerek Royden, Staff Writer, January 29, 2015, “Manufacturing Terror: How the FBI Invents Some Plots, and Ignores Others, In the War on Freedom,” , , ACC. 5-22-2015In criminal law, a person is?“entrapped”?when s/he is induced or persuaded by law enforcement officers, or their agents, to commit a crime that s/he had no previous intent to commit. Most Americans know there have been some dubious prosecutions in the FBI’s ongoing effort to thwart terror attacks on American soil. Unfortunately, it seems many Americans are too scared to care. The vast majority of these cases have involved Muslim Americans, a group that has never had much power in terms of American politics and less so in the wake of 9/11 and two wars in majority Muslim countries. My purpose isn't to dismiss these cases, but to show the slippery slope they represent: when one group gets targeted successfully, other marginalized groups usually follow.FBI stings rely on racial stereotypes and prey on vulnerable populations. Deterrence does not work for real terrorists and undermines effectivenessEugenia Lulo, Associate Media Director of the Brown Political Review, December 9, 2014, “Terrorists-In-Waiting: The Problems With FBI Sting Operations,” Brown Political Review, , ACC. 5-25-2015There is little doubt that preventing terrorism attacks has been the highest priority for the FBI and other law enforcement agencies since 9/11, but sting operations are not the best way to find terrorists. Not only do these operations blatantly rely on stereotypes and prey on vulnerable targets, but their effectiveness is also questionable at best. While traditional agent provocateur cases are useful in infiltrating a community and acquiring evidence against the leaders of a group, these sting operations target the very bottom of the food chain. True terrorists cannot be deterred by the possibility of prosecution, which makes prevention the primary goal of anti-terrorism strategy. The targets of these operations are more akin to thugs-for-hire than terrorists, a distinction that may not mean much in the judicial system but is extremely important in the developing of an effective counter-terrorism strategy. The value of arresting these so-called terrorists discovered by informants is chronically overestimated and weakens the overall system as a result. Terrorism, as a word, has many serious implications and connotations. By claiming that these sting operations are foiled terrorist plots, the FBI is both corrupting and belittling the concept of terrorism.Anti-terrorism perspectives on Muslims are embedded in whitenessArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 50Race proved at least as strong a factor as religion in shaping the experiences of US Muslins in the period after 9/11. As Dawud Walid, an African-American Muslim activist in Detroit, notes: Arab Americans were right at the door of what's called "whiteness" in America. Whiteness in America doesn't mean skin color. It's a level of assimilation and social fluidity. Even on the census, Arabs are considered white. But now socially they're not white any more-9/11 took away their social white card. So some of these people want to do whatever they can do to be accepted as white. To be accepted in the mainstream. Now, I'm black, and we have a different history in this country. I've never desired to be white, and it's impossible for me to be white. Hence, from us black Americans who are Muslims, you will hear a different type of talk. And sometimes they think that we're more like the angry black people. It's not that. It's just that I want a dignified space for us in America. It's not my goal to be accepted by certain people. And I don't have any fear of being deported. I'm coming from a totally different psychological disposition.Racism / Orientalism internalsThe foundation of anti-Muslim counterterrorism is a depoliticized worldview of Islam as inherently terroristic, savage, and primitive. This sanitizes U.S. imperialismMahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Strategic Culture Foundation?April 6, 2015, “Imagery and Empire: Understanding the Western Fear of Arab and Muslim Terrorists,” Global Research, , ACC. 5-22-2015Illusions are at work in the world. The truth has been turned on its head. The victims are being portrayed as the perpetrators. Whether stated candidly, implied, or unmentioned, the notion of Arabs and Muslims as savages and terrorists plays on the imagery that the so-called Western World embodies equality, freedom, choice, civilization, tolerance, progress, and modernity whereas the so-called Arab-Muslim World underneath its surface represents inequality, restrictions, tyranny, a lack of choices, savagery, intolerance, backwardness, and primitiveness. This imagery actually serves to de-politize the political nature of tensions. It sanitizes the actions of empire, from coercive diplomacy with Iran and support for regime change in Syria to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and US military intervention in Somalia, Yemen, and Libya. As mentioned earlier, in varying degrees, this imagery extends to other places that are seen by US Orientalists as non-Western places or entities, like Russia and China. At its roots, this imagery is really part of a discourse that sustains a system of power that allows power to be practiced by an empire over ?outsiders? and against its own citizens. It is because of US foreign policy and economic interests that Arabs and Muslims are unempirically portrayed as terrorists while real world data that shows that US intervention is creating terrorism is ignored. This is why there is a fixation on the attack on Parliament Hill in Canada, the Martin Place hostage crisis in Sydney, and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, but US, Canadian, Australian, and French governmental support for terrorism that has cost tens of thousands of lives in Syria is ignored.Islam is not a crime! The FBI and NYPD regularly violate 1st Amendment rights of Muslim Americans, which is a failed racist policyDiala Shamas, Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, October 31, 2013, “Where’s the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,” The Nation, , ACC. 5-22-2015In using these tactics, the FBI is operating on the same faulty and dangerous assumptions that guide the NYPD: that the religious practices of millions of ordinary Muslims can be indicators of criminal activity. In 2007, the NYPD laid out its theory of “Muslim radicalization,” ascribing a range of criminal implications to commonplace religious practices. The FBI has propagated the same logic in its training materials for years. Both agencies consider wearing religious attire and growing facial hair to be indicators of a potential terrorist. Both agencies make it their business to intrude on sacred—and First Amendment–protected—spaces. Neither has shown that this is a strategy that makes us any safer. So why is the outrage not equally directed at the federal culprits?Islamophobia internalsThe federal government is engrained in Islamophobia, using 1st Amendment rights as a smokescreen for cultural and ideological assimilationArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, pp. 256-257But Islamophobic campaigning only has the effect it does because its message resonates with the culturalist and reformist Muslim problem narratives that infuse the discourse of US government agencies. The view that there is a deep, internal struggle taking place within Muslim communities, between our values and Islamist extremism, that the wars the US is fighting are a necessary response to a violence-prone Islamist ideology, and that American Muslim political leadership needs to be pressed to demonstrate its loyalty to American values—all this is not confined to a far Right fringe but is official analysis as well, and is supported by liberals in the Obama administration as much as by conservatives. Domestically liberals tend to maintain a rhetorical defense of First Amendment rights and pursue a cultural policy of assimilating moderate Islam into the mainstream of America. Obama's Department of Justice makes some limited efforts to prosecute hate crimes and defend the rights of Muslims to build mosques. But such efforts are ultimately undermined by the deeper structures of official thinking on extremism. Government counterterrorism officials hold there to be a domestic ideological threat of Muslim extremism that is serious enough to warrant the extrajudicial killing of US citizens who advocate extremist ideologies. That threat is, under Obama, usually understood in terms of a reformist narrative that distinguishes between good Muslims and bad Muslims—the former defined by their embrace of American values, the latter by their support for an extremist ideology that causes terrorism. But that still leaves in place the misguided assumptions of a Muslim problem and the militarized identity politics of a war between the West and radical Islam. It is no surprise, then, that a survey of likely voters in May 2012 found that 63 percent believed there was a conflict in the world today between Western civilization and Islamic nations. The basic assumptions of the war on terror have remained largely in place throughout the Obama years.The discourse of Orientalism frames the world in an East-West binary that describes non-Western peoples as savage and backwards. These ideas get translated into policymaking and hierarchal power relationsTurgay Yerlikaya, MA student at Marmara University, School of Communication, June 3, 2014, “From Orientalism to Islamophobia,” Turkey Agenda, , ACC. 5-25-2015Orientalism is a thought style based on ontological and epistemological difference between the “East” and the “West”. Orientalism can be analyzed as a Western paradigm that deals with the East, describes, legitimizes, determines, and dominates it. This paradigm had found liveliness via an essential ontological pre-acceptance during the process of evolving from a discourse used in daily life to a literary and scientific expression. This pre-accepted object is the East itself over which knowledge is produced and speculated about in every area. However, the East which is a speculation object is an imaginary category that is shaped under the influence of collective imaginary opinions rather than complementing an absolute geography and sociology. This imaginary East fantasy established by an orientalist discourse, carries out a function in the service of foresight of a certain authority as unveiled by Said. In other words with the expression of Rana Kabbani, the orientalist literature portrays the East as a land of backwardness and defectiveness and as being the complementary of these defectiveness’s, this literature attributes savior mission to the West and calls it for help. Accordingly, this orientalist discourse is an extension of an essential policy where deeper structural and cultural ties are established as well as micro-macro power and hierarchic relationships, outside of a framework that forms the East mentally and describes it.Islamophobia internalsMuslims are always and already radicalized under the discourse of counterterrorism. The federal government operates through a racialized lens of Islamophobia to sustain state powerDalia F. Fahmy, Department of Political Science, Long Island University, March 2015,?“The Green Scare is not McCarthyism 2.0: How Islamophobia is redefining the use of propaganda in foreign and domestic affairs,” Dialectical Anthropology, Volume 39,?Issue 1,?pp 63-67Islamophobia is defined as an ‘‘unfounded, irrational fear or hostility toward Islam and Muslims that is perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from America’s social, political, and civic life.’’ Essentially, Islamophobia allows for the racialization of Muslims into a subjective group whose experiences can be eliminated and preference be given to the ways with which they are viewed. This leads to the exclusion of Muslims from the perceived nation and from national identity, and primacy given to the lens of Islamophobia. Such exclusion is perpetuated and facilitated through various technologies that have become imbedded in state power. A primary example of this is the culture of surveillance that exists in the USA today. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the discourses of counter terrorism that emerges encourages the practice of racialization of Muslims and of ethnic/religious profiling. This is carried out through the executive branch’s law enforcement apparatus that grew to include the FBI, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Counter Terrorism Council, as well as police departments. Furthermore, the legal apparatus became a tool through which to facilitate the culture of surveillance and ultimately exclusion to serve the War on Terror (140). The rounding up of thousands of South Asian and Arab Muslims in the immediate weeks after 9/11, in which they were questioned by FBI and immigration officials, led to the detention and deportation of over 1,000 Muslims, citizens and non-citizens. The requirement of immigrants from 25 suspect countries to report the immigration officials signaled that not only was citizenship unequal, but some countries, mostly ‘‘Islamic’’ countries, produced suspect citizens who needed to be watched even if they had no ties to any criminal activity. This resulted in a community that was suspect, citizens that were not perceived as belong to the nation, and deportation that could at anytime cleans the nation of ‘‘suspect’’ Muslims.Empirically, Islamophobia leads to exaggerated predictionsArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 256The rising influence of far Right Islamophobia at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century was largely responsible for creating the political atmosphere in which an upsurge in anti- Muslim violence in the US became likely. Islamophobic violence was not a spontaneous reaction to terrorist attacks. It emerged nine years after 9/11 and, while the Fort Hood shooting in late 2009 and the attempted car-bomb attack on Times Square in May the following year had given Islamophobes hooks around which to mobilize, by themselves these attacks could not have generated the worsening climate that followed. The government had for years been telling Americans to expect more terrorism, even suggesting attacks would likely involve weapons of mass destruction. When actual incidents did occur, they were, if anything, less disturbing than what had been predicted.Islamophobia – Orientalism internal linksIslamophobia is the modern extension of OrientalismTurgay Yerlikaya, MA student at Marmara University, School of Communication, June 3, 2014, “From Orientalism to Islamophobia,” Turkey Agenda, , ACC. 5-25-2015The main contradiction of the Orientalist knowledge that is founded on the Western discourse about the East, is that it is based on perceptive ground rather than a factual reality. These Western depictions presented about the East and Islam, finds its meaning through this perceptual ground. The representation generated through variety of Western forms, is generally symbols that are generated/derived from imaginary knowledge. The imaginary error in the Western mentality which is historically continuous, shows its influence in a quiet broad area including politics, media, minority politics, human rights and freedom. Islamophobia which is seen as a major issue of Western socio-politic life style recently, makes up the modern form of a similar imaginary error.?1st Amendment / Freedom internal linksCurrent Muslim surveillance practices are unconstitutional. The plan curbs unwarranted surveillance and increase the government’s ability to fight real terrorismMadiha Shahabuddin, JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, September 2014, “The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be”: How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment Rights,” Chapman Law Review, Vol. 18:2, 577-610, , ACC. 5-22-2015Myers argues that gang injunctions, which literally criminalize associative behaviors such as walking down the street or riding in a car with another individual who is suspected to be a gang member, are unconstitutional for the same reasons that Muslim surveillance is: there are other reasonable alternatives to achieving the government’s goal of fighting gang violence. The criteria that law enforcement use to label someone a gang member has been seen as too subjective, arbitrary, and burdensome of expressive rights, such as the ability to wear a certain colored t-shirt, sport a tattoo, or speak with another person on the street. These are much like the “indicators” law enforcement use to label Muslims as terrorist threats because of their garb, physical appearance, or political ideologies. Thus, Myers’s call for “[t]ighter and more definite standards, like beyond a reasonable doubt” for law enforcement to meet before subjecting an individual to closer scrutiny within the gang injunction context also applies to Muslim surveillance. In the early 1990s, Irving A. Spergel, an expert on gangs, also suggested that gang intervention programs for youth should focus on those who “are already engaged in law-violating behaviors.” The latter idea is key in implementing a successful approach, for then it means the government’s method will truly be narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s national security interest. Such a standard, albeit simple, does not infringe upon free exercise, association, or speech rights, but still does offer a basic minimum standard to follow, creating something closer to a “bright line” rule. Approaches such as the ones suggested for the gang context may equally apply to the Muslim surveillance issue, for the government should operate upon more than an individual’s mere adherence to Islam to target them. This will also be more narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s purpose of protecting against domestic terrorism, because it will attempt to target real criminals, rather than everyday mosque congregants. FBI surveillance of Muslim communities is unconstitutional and criminalizes an entire group of peopleBill Chambers, Staff Writer, July 14, 2014, “NSA & FBI Spying on Muslims: Old Story, New Target,” Chicago Monitor, , ACC. 5-22-2015As we hear more and more from NSA documents released by Edward Snowden, we need to continue to be outraged that our government has a very advanced surveillance program to capture personal data on individual Americans as well as on targeted groups of people like Muslims. But we should not be surprised that this unwarranted surveillance has a long history in this country and all the past outrage?to stop this unconsitutional attack on free speech and privacy has not been effective. Maybe it is time to ask why the FBI and our Justice Department seem to have a continual need to criminalize an entire group.1st Amendment / Freedom internal linksFBI surveillance of Muslim communities violates free speech rights and creates a political chill that actually fosters radicalizationAbdullah Al-Arian, assistant professor of history at Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service in Qatar, July 21, 2014, “The informants: Manufacturing terror,” AlJazeera News, , ACC. 5-22-2015By treating the political opinions of American Muslims as cause for suspicion, government investigators operate on the assumption that free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the US Constitution do not extend to a particular segment of the American people. Over the years, the FBI's actions have had a dramatic chilling effect on the ability of Muslims to express their political views. Motivated by such pressures from the government, many community leaders around the country have since attempted to suppress political expression in mosques and community centres. But absent such healthy community spaces through which to channel passions for humanitarian concerns around the globe, it actually becomes more likely that young Muslims could channel their frustrations through alternative modes of oppositional politics. This type of quietist, disaffected atmosphere sanitised of all political expression is precisely the environment in which agent provocateurs thrive.The FBI’s surveillance of Muslim communities violates international law and human rightsHuman Rights Watch, Staff Writer, July 2014, “The Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions,” , ACC. 5-22-2015The FBI investigation tactics described in this section raise serious human rights concerns, including discriminatory treatment on the basis of the target’s protected political and religious expression and association, and violation of the right to fair trial due to criminal entrapment. Under international law, a government may restrict freedom of association, expression or privacy for national security purposes within strict limitations. However, a government may never do so in a discriminatory manner. The UN Human Rights Committee, the international body of experts that monitors state compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), has repeatedly highlighted that restrictions on freedom of expression and privacy must be necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, and be proportionate to the aim pursued. Pursuing sting operations on the basis of individuals’ religious practice or political beliefs violates the obligation under international law that investigations and prosecutions be impartial, and conducted in a non-discriminatory fashion. Such investigations may also have a chilling effect on others’ exercise of their basic rights.A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (radicalization)Anti-Muslim McCarthyism backfires. The assumption of radicalization actually causes more terrorism and undermines law enforcementTom Risen, technology and business reporter, July 9, 2014, “Racial Profiling Reported in NSA, FBI Surveillance,” U.S. News & World Report, , ACC. 5-22-2015A 2005 FBI memo about surveillance procedures featured in The Intercept story uses a fake name “Mohammed Raghead” for the agency staff exercise. This latest report about email surveillance of successful Muslim-Americans is akin to “McCarthyism” that fed paranoia about communist spies during the Cold War, says Reza Aslan, a professor at the University of California, Riverside. “The notion that these five upstanding American citizens, all of them prominent public individuals, represent a threat to the U.S. for no other reason than their religion is an embarrassment to the FBI and an affront to the constitution,” Aslan says. There is a risk of radicalization among citizens Americans, evidenced by some who have gone to fight jihads in Syria and Somalia, but mass shootings carried out by U.S. citizens of various racial backgrounds?occurs much more often, says Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Since 1982, there have been at least 70 mass shootings across the U.S.?“We have seen very little domestic terrorism in the U.S.,” Felbab-Brown says. This lack of terrorism is due in part to the willingness of the Islamic community to cooperate with law enforcement to identify possible radical threats, out of gratitude that the U.S. is a stable, secure country compared with the Middle East, she says. “That could go sour if law enforcement becomes too aggressive, too extreme,” she says.A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (mistrust)FBI surveillance of Muslim communities employs tactics that only increase fear of law enforcementHuman Rights Watch, Staff Writer, July 2014, “The Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions,” , ACC. 5-22-2015With expanded authorities, and based on radicalization theories, the FBI has conducted surveillance on communities based on their religious and ethnic makeup. It has created demographic profiles to map the racial, ethnic and religious composition of neighborhoods, including the location of mosques and beliefs of congregants. As we describe in section VII, the FBI has also used voluntary interviews and activities presented as “community outreach” to solicit information from American Muslims, which have fed fears of law enforcement and distrust within communities.Targeting everyday Muslims is ineffectiveAnthony M. Destephano, Staff Writer, April 15, 2014, “NYPD stops Muslim surveillance program,” Newsday, , ACC. 5-22-2015A New York state politician who didn't want to be named said Bratton took this action to smooth over relations with the Muslim community, adding that police would carry out some investigative activities through their larger counterterrorism activities. One former high-level NYPD official who also didn't want to be named criticized the notion that collaborative relations would be fruitful in terrorism probes. "Your average Muslim in New York City isn't going to have information on terror plots," the official said.A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (ineffective)FBI efforts are misplaced. There is no evidence of a “lone wolf”Trevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, pp. 30-31The FBI's logic to support the use of terrorism stings goes something like this: By catching a lone wolf before he strikes, federal law enforcement can take him off the streets before he meets a real terrorist who can provide him with weapons and munitions. However, to this day, no example exists of a lone wolf; by himself unable to launch an attack, becoming operational through meeting an actual terrorist in the United States. In addition, in the dozens of terrorism sting operations since 9/11, the would-be terrorists are usually uneducated, unsophisticated, and economically desperate—not the attributes of someone likely to plan and launch a sophisticated, violent attack without significant help.Federal government profiling tactics undermine the goals of building Muslim cohesion and trust and undermine religious freedomHuman Rights Watch, Staff Writer, July 2014, “The Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions,” , ACC. 5-22-2015The cases we examined—and the hundreds of other terrorism prosecutions in the US since the September 11 attacks—have not occurred in a vacuum. At the same time as the government has aggressively sought out terrorism suspects, sometimes before the individual concerned has expressed any intention to use violence, it has sought to build relationships with American Muslim community leaders and groups, believing they are critical sources of information to prevent terrorist attacks. It has also sought to build American Muslim communities’ sense of cohesion and trust in law enforcement, as part of a strategy for what it calls “Countering Violent Extremism.” However, many of the practices described in this report are counter to the goals of these policies: in some communities, they have led to anxiety and a fear of interacting with law enforcement. Some Muslim community members said that fears of government surveillance and informant infiltration had negatively transformed the quality of the mosque from a place of spiritual sanctuary and togetherness to one of vigilance. Now, they said, they must watch what they say, to whom, and how often they attend services.A2: Terrorism is real / threatThe fear of terrorism gets manipulated by political leaders, resulting in disastrous policies that also fail. History is on our side.Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, March 2015, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71(2) 75–87.Human history displays many examples of political leaders who manipulate public fears to gain support for policies that, in the end, produce disastrous outcomes for large numbers of people. Racist fears helped Nazis obtain support for the oppression and ultimate murder of millions of Jews, Slavs, homosexuals, and Roma. Eliminating Nazi predations required a war that cost 50 million lives. Excessive fear of communism built support for a war in Vietnam that resulted in two million lives lost in that country and another two million lost on the killing fields of a destabilized Cambodia. Today, the fear of terrorism brought on by 9/11, coupled with the fear of nuclear weapons, has become the source of policies that threaten the destruction of American democracy because of a lack of perspective in the public discussion of these issues. Exaggerating the threat of terrorism and Islam makes it more likelyEd Kilgore, managing editor for the Democratic Strategist, March 20, 2015, “Exaggerated Perceptions of “Threats” Are Threatening to National Security,” Washington Monthly, thr054718.php, ACC. 5-21-2015Perhaps unfortunately, American politicians cannot talk that way. Yes, we’ve been very lucky in that compared with an awful lot of other countries we’ve suffered relatively low military casualties in our wars (aside, of course, from the Civil War), and extremely limited civilian casualties. But ironically, that has produced a low tolerance for risk that in turn is more “emboldening” to terrorists and other enemies than all the objective weaknesses in the world. It is our exaggerated sense of the threat posed by IS that feeds its ambition and sense of power—and potentially its actual power if it obtains leverage over us or our people. When politicians whip up fears about terrorists, they are actually whipping up vulnerability to terrorists, particularly when they have nothing in the way of any practical strategy for defeating them, beyond insulting their religion and raging at Barack Obama for not making them all disappear.The threat of terrorism is socially constructedKrista McQueeney, Merrimack College, 2014, “Disrupting Islamophobia: Teaching the Social Construction of Terrorism in the Mass Media,” International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, Volume 26, Number 2, 297-309, , ACC. 5-22-2015From a social constructionist perspective, social problems should not be taken for granted as objective conditions that afflict society. Instead, they are analyzed as a process. Social constructionists ask, how and why do people come to perceive that some condition should be viewed as a social problem? From this perspective, terrorism is not a real threat embodied by individuals and groups who can be hunted down and killed. Instead, terrorism is constructed through the interpretation of events, the use of claims made up of language and symbols, and the work of claims-makers to attract the public’s attention and sway public opinion in support of some interests over others. Basic to this process is that claims-makers deploy dominant language and symbols that circulate in the culture to construct social problems. Moreover, the issues that are defined as social problems in the real world are products of ideological power struggles.A2: Lone Wolf Terrorism “Lone wolfs” are only so-called a “threat” when they are MuslimMatthew Harwood, Staff Writer, February 5, 2015, “Lone Wolf Terrorists Are Exceedingly Rare, So Why Does Everyone Keep Talking About Them?,” Mother Jones, , ACC. 5-25-2015By contrast, when the apparent lone wolf isn't a Muslim or other minority, he rarely finds the fear-inducing terrorist label pinned on him by the government, the media, or security experts. Take James von Brunn, a white supremacist who murdered a security guard at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. According to the Department of Homeland Security, the act had?no connection?to terrorism, although it was ideologically motivated, as one FBI official acknowledged.You should be skeptical of terrorism and lone-wolf scenarios. The risks are exceedingly rareMathew Hardwood, Senior Writer/Editor for the ACLU, February 8, 2015, “Terrorism’s new boogeyman: Charles Krauthammer and the toxic myth of the “lone wolf”,” , and_the_toxic_myth_of_the_lone_wolf_partner/, ACC. 5-21-2015Like all violent crime, individual terrorism represents a genuine risk, just an exceedingly rare and minimal one.? It’s not the sort of thing that the government should be able to build whole new, intrusive surveillance programs on or use as an excuse for sending in agents to infiltrate communities. National programs now being set up to combat lone-wolf terrorism have a way of wildly exaggerating its prevalence and dangers — and in the end are only likely to exacerbate the problem. For Americans to concede more of their civil liberties in return for “security” against lone wolves wouldn’t be a trade; it would be fraud. The “literature” on both terrorism and the lone wolf should be approached with a healthy degree of skepticism. To this day, there is?little consensus?on what exactly terrorism is; the same is?true?of the lone-wolf variety.A2: Liberalism GoodThe War on Terrorism is code for a war on Islam. Liberalism constructs Islam as ideological extremismArun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 114In its campaign to transform Islamic identity, liberalism itself underwent a transformation: it became an ideology of total war that led its advocates into what Italian theorist Domenico Losurdo calls "a tragic performative contradiction." War on terror liberals reproduced the weaknesses of the conceptual scaffolding they inherited from the cold war. They located the problem of radical political challenges to Western society in alien ideologies that by their very nature were bound to produce violence. In so doing, they disavowed the structural violence on which liberal society itself depended: the ways in which racialized "others" live in a "state of exception" in which liberal norms are permanently suspended—paradoxically, in the name of defending the liberal way of life." Fighting an extremist enemy constructed as Huntington's "ideal enemy" both "ideologically hostile" and "racially and culturally different" required that liberalism become an identity politics, a call to recharge the batteries of belonging, to take a stand defending a way of life—militarily, intellectually, and culturally—while still claiming the mantle of a universal civilization.SOCIAL JUSTICE AFFIRMATIVEThis affirmative defends curtailing US domestic surveillance. The racism advantage focuses on how domestic surveillance and policing are discriminatory on the basis of race. The impact to that kind of discrimination is psychological trauma or PTSD. The second advantage is poverty and focuses on the “broken window” system of domestic surveillance that disproportionately targets low-income communities. There are additional impacts in the 2AC portion of the file, all of which hinge on disparate enforcement of domestic surveillance policies.Social Justice 1ACInherencyThe government is currently considering surveillance bills in an effort to stifle national security threats but no one is talking about itKeertan Kini, 4-9-2015, “Opinion: The unnoticed expansion of domestic surveillance,” biggest criticisms stem from the bill’s broad definitions and uses of the shared data. Under the bill, the government may retain and use any shared information resulting from cybersecurity threats related to “an imminent threat of death, serious bodily harm, or serious economic harm.” The use of shared data is not limited to any specific agency. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the data would be shared with “all appropriate government agencies,” including the FBI and NSA. The data may be used not only in combating broad threats but also in criminal proceedings. Since all data shared under the act by companies is voluntary, the data would be accessible without a warrant, without a judge to determine relevance. Lastly, given the liability protections extended to companies who share data, consumer privacy protections from corporations are potentially undermined.? We live in a constantly accelerating world of sensors and networks, where the Internet of Things is becoming more real every day. Not knowing what information about you is being shared and analyzed is disconcerting at best and terrifying at worst. Yet instead of engaging with these pressing issues, the news is inundated with predictions of a presidential contest 19 months away.Domestic surveillance is ever-expanding and unchecked violating constitutional rightsPatrick G. Eddington, a policy analyst in homeland security and civil liberties at CATO, 4-13-2015, “Confronting the surveillance state,” was supposed to be a temporary, emergency program became permanent on October 4, 2001. President Bush signed a secret memorandum formally authorizing it. For the first time since the Vietnam era, an American president was initiating warrantless spying on American citizens.? The chronology of this program, codenamed Stellar Wind, is laid out in great detail in the documents Snowden leaked. Since the publication of documents from the Snowden Archive, two things have become clear. Even as the Bush administration was negotiating with Congress for increased surveillance authority in 2001 — first in the authorization of the use of military force, and later in what became known as the Patriot Act — it was not prepared to be constrained by any act of Congress in its quest to gather data on al Qaeda. That included an unprecedented and for several years successful effort to keep as few lawmakers informed as possible informed, and then only in a cursory way, about the scope of Stellar Wind and related programs. And even after domestic surveillance activities were revealed by news organizations, Congress has not passed legislation to slow down, even a little, the most constitutionally questionable of these activities.? Contrast that with the Watergate era. The Congressional investigation into NSA domestic spying programs known as Shamrock and Minaret took place in 1975, and reforms under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) became law in 1978. While Executive Order 12333, signed by President Reagan in 1981, created a possible path around FISA, the public evidence so far suggests that FISA restrained presidents in surveillance until the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.? The same month President Bush authorized the secret Stellar Wind program, Congress began the Patriot Act, an omnibus counterterrorism bill. The 131-page bill was, in the words of an ACLU letter to Congress, the result of a closed door deal that granted "the Attorney General and federal law enforcement unnecessary and permanent new powers to violate civil liberties that go far beyond the stated goal of fighting international terrorism. These new and unchecked powers could be used against American citizens who are not under criminal investigation, immigrants who are here within our borders legally, and also against those whose First Amendment activities are deemed to be threats to national security."Advantage 1: RacismBetween the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, domestic surveillance has lead to a rise in incarceration rates functionally creating a racial caste systemCorinna Mullin, activist and academic currently based in Tunis, and Azadeh Shahshahani, human rights attorney based in Atlanta and President of the National Lawyers Guild, 8-21-2014, “From Gaza to Ferguson: Exposing the Toolbox of Racist Repression,” mass incarceration as a tool of oppression entails less blatant violence than past forms of racial control practiced in the United States, its impact has nevertheless been harmful and extensive. The institutionalized racism inherent in this system has led Alexander to describe U.S. mass incarceration as the “new Jim Crow,” likening it to the “racial caste system” maintained through racist laws and violence after the formal abolition of slavery.? University of London professor Laleh Khalili agrees. In Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies, she examines continuities in carceral strategies from 19th-century colonial rule until today. Khalili shows that while the use of mass incarceration rather than brute force to control “problematic populations” may have developed as one of the “more humane,” “administrative and legal solutions” to social unrest, their aims have often been the same: “to oblige” an oppressed or “occupied people to admit defeat and recognize their own subjugation.”? With the “war on terror,” the practice of mass incarceration has expanded in use and impact, with a dramatic increase in the targeting of Muslim and Arab communities. An Associated Press report in 2011 found that in the United States alone, there had been 2,934 terrorism-related arrests and 2,568 convictions since 9/11—eight times the number of such arrests in the previous decade.? Activists have raised serious concerns regarding the “discriminatory investigations” and “questionable” prosecutorial tactics that have characterized many of these cases. These allegations were detailed in a report by Human Rights Watch and Columbia Law School’s Human Rights Institute, which cited prosecutors’ use of “evidence obtained by coercion, classified evidence that cannot be fairly contested, and inflammatory evidence about terrorism in which defendants played no part” to convict suspects of terrorism.Discussions of domestic surveillance must begin with an analysis of surveillance from a racial standpoint and integrate the centuries of repressionMalkia Amala Cyril, founder and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national network of 175 organizations working to ensure media access, rights, and representation for marginalized communities, 3-30-2015, “Black America's State of Surveillance,” My mother was not the only black person to come under the watchful eye of American law enforcement for perceived and actual dissidence. Nor is dissidence always a requirement for being subject to spying. Files obtained during a break-in at an FBI office in 1971 revealed that African Americans, J. Edger Hoover’s largest target group, didn’t have to be perceived as dissident to warrant surveillance. They just had to be black. As I write this, the same philosophy is driving the increasing adoption and use of surveillance technologies by local law enforcement agencies across the United States. ? Today, media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by Edward Snowden that millions of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother’s visit from the FBI reminds me that, from the slave pass system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow, black people and other people of color have lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy. ? It’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain an impoverished underclass.Domestic surveillance policies grant the government the power to selectively enforce the law depending on who a person isSharda Sekaran, Managing Director of Communications, Drug Policy Alliance, 7-24-2013, “In Order to Address Racism, We Must Confront the Drug War,” and Oscar were from opposite sides of the country and in many ways lived different lives but in the aftermath of their murders, as arguments were put forth for why they could have been seen as suspicious or potentially threatening, a history of involvement with drugs was cited. Drugs remain an enduring part the collection of social and historical biases commonly summoned to put the character of young black men under a microscope. The underlying assumption seems to be it is not so much a matter what you do but who you are.? From caffeine to nicotine to aspirin to alcohol, when was the last time most of us have experienced a truly "drug free" day in our lives? By and large, we regularly consume some sort of substance that alters how we feel or offers pleasure instead of pain. This is why drug prohibition has been such a pernicious tool for perpetuating bias, corruption and bigotry. When the power is granted to selectively criminalize behavior that everyone engages in, unequal applications of law and social judgment are inevitable. This is why civil rights advocate and academic Michelle Alexander calls the drug war "The New Jim Crow."? Frank conversations about race at the national level are long overdue. If any good is come from the Trayvon Martin tragedy, hopefully it will include bringing this dialogue to the forefront. But we absolutely cannot talk about race without talking about the war on drugs. This failed social experiment not only leads to the disproportionate targeting, arrest, conviction and incarceration of people of color, despite equal rates of drug consumption across race, it fuels the underlying thread of judgment, stigma and marginalization that permeates how we value human life and enable acts of violence.The criminal justice system is anything but that—the US strives to incarcerate as many black people as possibleMargaret Kimberley, Freedom Rider columnist, 5-15-2013, “When Cops and Prosecutors are Racist Criminals – Half of Wrongfully Convicted Prisoners in America Are Black,” words may have been spoken by one man, but they represent the thinking of an entire system and its attitudes towards black people. One-half of all wrongfully convicted prisoners are black. Mass incarceration depends on an assembly line of conviction and imprisonment and too few who are charged with caring about justice really do.? It is indisputable that America strives to put as many black people behind bars as possible. Inevitably some white people will be caught up too, but the goal of criminal justice is to make every black person a criminal. No one knows how many Shabaka Shakurs and Derrick Hamiltons there are behind bars in New York and across the country.? Any discussion of ending mass incarceration must address these travesties which take place on a daily basis. The crooked prosecutors and cops must be held accountable. They ought to be charged criminally themselves. There is no incentive for them to obey the law if they are not. The exonerated men and women are expected to quietly accept their misfortune and disappear without expecting any relief. In a sense that is the expectation for all black people. We are known to be innocent but the system doesn’t care.Racism is psychologically debilitating and very closely tied to post-traumatic stress disorderMonnica T Williams, Ph.D., conducts PTSD research and treats PTSD cross-culturally, 5-20-2013, “Can Racism Cause PTSD? Implications for DSM-5,” was a young African American man working at a retail store. Although he enjoyed and valued his job, he struggled with the way he was treated by his boss. He was frequently demeaned, given menial tasks, and even required to track African American customers in the store to make sure they weren’t stealing. He began to suffer from symptoms of depression, generalized anxiety, low self-esteem, and feelings of humiliation. After filing a complaint, he was threatened by his boss and then fired. Allen’s symptoms worsened. He had intrusive thoughts, flashbacks, difficulty concentrating, irritability, and jumpiness – all hallmarks of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Allen later sued his employer for job-related discrimination, and five employees supported his allegations. Allen was found to be suffering from race-based trauma (from Carter & Forsyth, 2009).? Epidemiology of PTSD in Minorities? PTSD is a severe and chronic condition that may occur in response to any traumatic event. The National Survey of American Life (NSAL) found that African Americans show a prevalence rate of 9.1% for PTSD versus 6.8% in non-Hispanic Whites, indicating a notable mental health disparity (Himle et al., 2009). Incresed rates of PTSD have been found in other groups as well, including Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Pacific Islander Americans. and Southeast Asian refugees (Pole et al., 2008). Furthermore, PTSD may be more disabling for minorities; for example, African Americans with PTSD experience significantly more impairment at work and carrying out everyday activities (Himle, et al. 2009).? Racism and PTSD? One major factor in understanding PTSD in ethnoracial minorities is the impact of racism on emotional and psychological well-being. Racism continues to be a daily part of American culture, and racial barriers have an overwhelming impact on the oppressed. Much research has been conducted on the social, economic, and political effects of racism, but little research recognizes the psychological effects of racism on people of color (Carter, 2007).Chou, Asnaani, and Hofmann (2012) found that perceived racial discrimination was associated with increased mental disorders in African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans, suggesting that racism may in itself be a traumatic experience.Advantage 2: Poverty“Broken windows” surveillance policies disproportionately affect impoverished people—particularly homeless—and traps them in a cycle of fines, arrests and povertyMaria Foscarinis, Founder and executive director, National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, 9-2-2014, “Ferguson, New York, and the Criminalization of Poverty,” think it also reflects the growing misuse of the criminal justice system to address deepening poverty and inequality in our country -- both closely related to race. The increasing criminalization of people experiencing homelessness -- an extreme form of poverty that disproportionately affects people of color -- is one example of this trend.? Indeed, homeless people were among the first targets of the broken windows theory, as implemented in the early 1990s by New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Their crimes included sleeping, sitting, and eating in public places -- despite the lack of housing or even shelter.? Often called "quality of life" measures, laws criminalizing such basic acts of human survival are intended to improve the lives of those fortunate enough to have a home by protecting them from having to encounter destitution in their midst. Ironically the quality of the lives of those most directly affected is not included in this term.? Since then, the criminalization of homelessness and poverty has only grown. According to a report released last month by the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, citywide ordinances making it a crime to sleep in public rose by 60 percent since 2011 -- even though there is a severe shortage of affordable housing and shelter.? This misuse of the criminal justice system to address a social problem sends a message that some lives matter less than others. In fact, according to a recent report by the National Coalition for the Homeless, violence against homeless people -- including lethal violence -- is also up.? The images from Ferguson of a militarized police force were frightening but apt reminders of the war being waged against poor, homeless, minority Americans -- who are increasingly shut out of decent living conditions, education, and opportunity. Increasingly, the justice system too works against the poor who, typically without access to legal counsel, are often trapped in a cycle of fines they cannot pay, that turn into warrants for their arrest, that turn into jail time and criminal convictions that further dim their chances of employment and housing.Policing poverty can lead to tragic deaths as in Walter Scott’s caseDanielle C. Belton, associate editor at The Root, 4-10-2015, “Poverty Was the Crime in Walter Scott’s Slaying,” video revealed an ugly truth beyond the fact that Slager killed an unarmed man who was of no threat to him. It revealed that Scott did not die because he was a criminal or had defied an officer’s orders; he died because he was black and poor.? Scott had a warrant out for his arrest—not for robbery or homicide—but for child support, a nonviolent crime that affects families. Neither stopping him for a broken taillight nor killing him for running does anything to provide for his children, raise city revenue or alleviate society’s ills—unless you believe that the very poverty Scott suffered was also his most fatal crime.? There is no explicit law that says people can’t be poor in America, but there are a lot of laws, if broken, that will ensure you stay poor.? The sometimes violent, often punitive enforcement of child support fits right in with other “keep ’em poor” policing tactics that turn traffic violations, homelessness, mental illness and drug addiction into arrest-worthy crimes. If you have money, they’re inconveniences, but if you’re subsisting on a paycheck-to-paycheck existence, they are monumental.? If you are wealthy and can’t or don’t pay child support, you can hire a lawyer and create an elaborate defense. Tickets? You either pay them off or fight them in court. Money allows you to easily hide your recreational-drug use or hire legal counsel when you can’t. No worries about loitering because your home is a house, not the curb. When taillights break on your car, they are replaced. And if you are mentally ill with money, you’re not actually “mentally ill” at all, but among our most protected class: trust-fund babies who suffer from “affluenza.”? If you’re poor, you are one broken taillight from homelessness—or, in Scott’s tragic case, death.Poverty draws generation after generation into the cycle and threatens to destabilize the , research for social and economic development, May 2013, “Causes & Effects of Poverty? On Society, Children & Violence,” vicious cycles of poverty mentioned before mean that lifelong handicaps and troubles that are passed on from one generation to another. To name just a few of these hereditary plagues: no school or education, child labor to help the parents, lack of basic hygiene, transmission of diseases. Unemployment and very low incomes create an environment where kids can't simply go to school. As for those who can actually go to school, they simply don't see how hard work can improve their life as they see their parents fail at the task every day.? Other plagues associated with poverty:? Alcohol & substance abuse, from kids in African slums to adults in the US, this is a very common self-destructing habit often taken as a way to cope with huge amounts of stress and... well, despair;? Crippling accidents due to unsafe working environments (machinery in factories or agriculture) as well as other work hazards such as lead poisoning, pesticide poisoning, bites from wild animals due to lack of proper protection;? Poor housing & living conditions, a classic cause of diseases;? Water and food-related diseases, simply because the poor can't always afford "safe" foods.? Effects of poverty on society as a whole? In the end, poverty is a major cause of social tensions and threatens to divide a nation because of the issue of inequalities, in particular income inequality. This happens when wealth in a country is poorly distributed among its citizens. In other words, when a tiny minority has all the money.? The feature of a rich or developed country for example is the presence of a middle class, but recently we've seen even Western countries gradually losing their middle class, hence the increasing number of riots and clashes. In a society, poverty is a very dangerous factor that can destabilize and entire country. The Arab Spring is another good example, in all of the countries concerned, the revolts started because of the lack of jobs and high poverty levels. This has led to most governments being overthrown).We need to focus on poverty—too many people are falling through the cracks because of the racial and poverty-related problems with the criminal justice systemPeter Edelman, professor at Georgetown University Law Center, 6-22-2012, “The State of Poverty in America,” worse, we have destroyed the safety net for the poorest children in the country. Seven million women and children are among the 20.5 million in deep poverty. One in four children in a household headed by a single mother is in deep poverty. We have to restore the safety net for the poorest of the poor.? Getting serious about investing in our children—from prenatal care and early-childhood assistance on through education at all levels—is also essential if we are to achieve a future without such calamitous levels of poverty. In addition, we must confront the destruction being wrought by the criminal-justice system. These are poverty issues and race issues as well. The schools and the justice system present the civil-rights challenges of this century. ? Combining all of the problems in vicious interaction is the question of place—the issues that arise from having too many poor people concentrated in one area, whether in the inner city, Appalachia, the Mississippi Delta, or on Indian reservations. Such places are home to a minority of the poor, but they include a hugely disproportionate share of intergenerational and persistent poverty. Our most serious policy failing over the past four-plus decades has been our neglect of this concentrated poverty. We have held our own in other respects, but we have lost ground here. ? Finally, we need to be much more forthright about how much all of this has to do with race and gender. It is always important to emphasize that white people make up the largest number of the poor, to counter the stereotype that the face of poverty is one of color. At the same time, though, we must face more squarely that African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans are all poor at almost three times the rate of whites and ask why that continues to be true. We need as a nation to be more honest about who it is that suffers most from terrible schools and the way we lock people up. Poverty most definitely cuts across racial lines, but it doesn’t cut evenly.? There’s a lot to do. Plan: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillanceSolvencyThe politics of fear has justified surveillance and restrictions on civil liberties—this must be a focal pointDavid L. Altheide, Regents’ Professor in the School of Justice and Social Inquiry at? Arizona State University, 2007, “The mass media and terrorism,” Pg. 304-305, politics of fear was joined with this discourse. Citizens became accustomed? to ‘safety rhetoric’ by police officials, which often required them to permit police? searches, condone ‘overaggressive’ police action, as well as join in myriad crime-prevention? efforts, many of which involved more human as well as electronic? surveillance of work places, neighborhoods, stores, and even our ‘bodies,’ in the? form of expansive drug screening. The discourse of fear promotes the politics of? fear, and numerous surveillance practices and rationale to keep us safe (Monahan,? 2006). By the mid-1990s, many high school students had ‘peed in a bottle’ as a? condition of participating in athletics, applying for a job, and in some cases, applying? for student loans and scholarships. Several legal challenges to this scrutiny? were turned down, as the courts (with a few exceptions) began to uphold the? cliché that was echoed by local TV newscasters and others: ‘why worry if you? have nothing to hide?’ In short, US citizens had been socialized into the garrison? state, no longer being offended by surveillance, and indeed, two-thirds of parents? choose to use the rapidly expanding – and inexpensive – technology to monitor? their own children, including testing them for drugs. Safety, caring, and control? are wrapped in the discourse of fear:? ‘It is our responsibility as parents to do everything in our power to protect our children? from the perils of drug abuse, and we believe that fostering greater communication? between parents and their children coupled with utilization of a home drug test are? the keys to preventing drug abuse and addiction,’ said Debbie Moak, co-founder of? notMYkid. (Spratling, 2006, emphasis added)Crime mapping only creates the perception of “high-crime” areas that are typically determined by profiling the inhabitants and creates a positive feedback loop of policing and crime in the designated areaSteven R. Morrison, Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law, 2014 “The System of Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement,” Pg. 357, mapping has obvious strategic advantages in assisting law enforcement? agencies in deploying assets to address and, ideally, lower the crime rate.? Supporting this notion, Frank Zimring, discussing New York City’s dramatic? crime drop, challenged the assumption that crime prevented by police on one? block will simply shift to the next block.109 This means that attention to the geography? of crime has the potential to reduce it, rather than shift it. Detailed? crime mapping should, therefore, be taken seriously as a legitimate tool of effective? law enforcement.? Crime mapping’s effectiveness is, however, also a source of its major criticism.? It brands certain neighborhoods as crime hot spots, resulting in a higher? law enforcement presence and more intensive policing. This in turn results in a? higher absolute and relative crime rate, a continued mapping of that neighborhood? as a crime hot spot, and further deployment of assets in that neighborhood.? 110 This produces a positive feedback loop that provides an explanation? for a number of systemic inefficiencies. At the level of physical geography, it? helps to explain the persistence of racial profiling in segregated communities.? 111 At the level of community groups, it explains why Muslims, wherever? they reside and whatever their income level, are overrepresented as terrorism? suspects.Now is key—domestic surveillance tactics are going to get progressively worsePaulina Phelps, intern at The Seattle Globalist, 6-25-2013, “Arab and Muslim communities react to NSA surveillance leak,” “Suspicionless surveillance does not become okay simply because it’s only victimizing 95 percent of the world instead of 100 percent,” whistleblower Edward Snowden said in an online Q & A hosted by the Guardian last week, referring to assurances that only communications outside the US are being monitored. “Our founders did not write, ‘we hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all US Persons are created equal.’”? Arsalan Bukhari, executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) Washington Chapter, agrees that the system is unconstitutional. But he’s more optimistic about the ultimate outcome of the leak.? “I hope the good that comes out of this are clear guidelines that regulate when and how the government can survey a person.” he said. “For too long we’ve had unconstitutional surveillance. We want to make sure the constitution is the law of the land and is followed — which means you have to get a warrant.”? Egyptian-American Muslim activist Tarek Dawoud compared the government’s actions to that of other countries. “This is what is happening in Egypt… it’s not a good sign you can see this country going down that path and it’s a concern because one of the greatest gifts people have here is to be free and the ability to challenge authority.”? Ultimately all of these voices on the issue, including the person behind the leak, echo feelings of betrayal by the government. And they seem to agree that the existing system is unconstitutional and vulnerable to racial profiling.? Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians have been experiencing government surveillance as a “national security measure” ever since 9/11. So for the entire country to suddenly realize they may be subject to the same thing is almost a relief.? “Often, if you have certain communities targeted for certain things it’s only a matter of time that the entire American population is targeted with the same sort of tactic,” Bukhari said.? “There is a huge discrepancy between what the US citizens think their government is entitled to do and what the government does” said Dawoud. “It’s about time that people became aware of this because its been going on for a while and it’s getting progressively worse.”2AC ExtensionsInherencyChange is not coming now—plan is key to ensure change in how inequality functions unabatedDyanoosh Youssefi, legal studies professor, social justice advocate and writer, 4-14-2015, “Toronto police set to embrace institutionalized racism,” in the 10 months since Blair wrote those promising words in a Star opinion piece, the police have reverted to denial and resistance. Inexplicably, the chief and his bosses on the Police Services Board, including Toronto’s new mayor, participated in a closed mediation. The result: the PSB is now set to vote on a policy that is meek, offensive and insidious. This new policy not only eliminates the requirement to issue receipts, but it takes us back even further than we were a few months ago.? So we’ve gone from refusal, to resistance, to resignation, to recognition of the problem, to partial resolution (the PACER report) and now, to retraction, recalcitrance and regression.? Where is the commitment to a fair and equitable society, to bias-free policing?? When our police force and the Police Services Board were initially faced with the undeniable proof of racial profiling, they could shield themselves with claims of, “We did not know the extent of the bias. We are not racist.” Indeed, in the PACER report, the police drew a valid distinction between bias and racism. And Blair, in his Star piece, declared, “We are not racist but we are all human. The science of bias teaches us that even the best-intentioned, most decent and honourable people can be influenced by the implicit bias we all have.”? But the police can no longer hide behind good intentions and claims of “mere” bias. We know that racial profiling occurs and that it is discriminatory and harmful. While human nature makes us prone to bias, institutional policies can either prevent that bias or promote it. We had taken some steps to rectify the problem. And now we have reverted.National strategies for dealing with criminal justice are ineffectiveSteven R. Morrison, Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law, 2014 “The System of Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement,” Pg. 376-377, , nationalized criminal justice tends to produce law enforcement? approaches that contain a number of inefficiencies.217? First, nationalized criminal justice tends to be politicized.218 Since prohibition,? the media and national political figures have used a perpetual crime? wave219 to justify their existence. Whether the concern was alcohol, communism,? drugs, or terrorists, nationalized crime moves respond not solely to? demands of justice or nuanced policy needs, but also to politicized fears that are? rarely reflective of reality. Relative to the actual danger, inordinate amounts of? resources have been directed at these concerns.220? Second, nationalized criminal justice tends to dehumanize offenders by? viewing them not as people or community members, but merely as criminals.? 221 This approach discounts the value of leniency and dismisses alternative? sentencing as an ineffective attempt at rehabilitation and an elision of retributivist? principles.? Third, nationalized criminal justice tends to be blind to local needs and? concerns. Disgruntled members of the American populace who may tend toward? terrorist conduct probably do not do so for the same reasons, or in the? same ways. The missing Somali teens in Minneapolis in 2009, thought to have? joined Al Shabaab;222 lone wolves who took criminal action, like the Times? Square would-be bomber Faisal Shahzad;223 those who responded to a government? sting and may be mentally ill, like Rezwan Ferdaus;224 and those who? responded to a government sting based on arrogant anger, like Tarik Shah,225? would all probably respond differently to different interventions. Managing the? domestic war on terror from Washington, as has been the case,226 may not produce? the nuanced justice that traditional criminal law demands. It is unclear,? furthermore, that centralized policing ensures public safety more than localized? approaches. It is clear, however, that the positive feedback loop engendered by? massive, centralized policing creates inefficiencies and unjust outcomes.Solvency There are currently no counterbalances on domestic surveillance due to the fear associated with terrorism—the US until recently was willing to sacrifice constitutional rights in favor of “not another 9/11” justifying illegal searches and bad evidence standardsSteven R. Morrison, Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law, 2014 “The System of Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement,” Pg. 366-367, and constitutional rules are supposed to ensure that relevant,? probative, fair evidence is admitted at trial and evidence that would lead either? away from the truth or would result in procedural injustice is excluded. These? rules normally have the external effect of guiding law enforcement agents to? abide by the law and obtain relevant evidence fairly and guiding prosecutors to? use their discretion to prosecute when the evidence is good and forego prosecution? when it appears that the evidence would not be substantially usable.? In the post-9/11 War on Terror, the government often elides these evidentiary? and constitutional stabilizers through the use of conspiracy charges, pretextual? immigration or material witness arrests, reference of defendants to military? tribunals, or indefinite detention as enemy combatants. Secretive FISA? warrants, National Security Letters, and surreptitious collection of big data? (which reflects Justice Alito’s Fourth Amendment concern in United States v.? Jones142) also contribute to this elision. In the best of times, evidentiary and? constitutional standards are not always met. The stakes in the post-9/11 era appear? higher, justifying additional elision of stabilizing standards.143? Public policy and public sentiment in the War on Terror evoke similar policy? and sentiments as those during the Red Scare of the 1950s and the drug? wars of the 1980s and 1990s. In all three periods, public policy and sentiment? were shaped by a persistent fear of a massive, but poorly discernable, entity? that threatened the fabric of the country. Communists were thought to be moving? against every town in America, large and small, from their headquarters? abroad. Inner city drug gangs occupied a land just as foreign, romanticized, and? stereotyped144 as the foreign communist hive and Edward Said’s Orient.145 Just? as the Cold War was real, and narcotics certainly a problem, the 9/11 attacks? provided a genuine basis upon which to build smart counterterrorism law en-forcement policy. The not-another-9/11 imperative, felt by both governmental? actors and private citizens, drove that policy.? The strength of the imperative provides no internal stabilizing force (as indicated? by passage of the PATRIOT Act, its 2005 amendment, and the current? troubling use of its business records provision to obtain massive amounts of? telephone call data), and so it has contributed to the positive feedback loops. In? response to the recent revelations about NSA surveillance, there has been unprecedented? pushback, with members of Congress calling for legislation that? would limit the NSA,146 scale back PATRIOT Act provisions, and throw some? light on secretive FISA court proceedings.147 It remains, however, to be seen? whether government and society will modify their response to the not-another-? 9/11 imperative to promote individual rights and just outcomes while continuing? to protect against future terrorist attacks.Current counter-terrorism efforts fail—we must stop looking at the hard-power approachHamed El-Said, chair and professor at the Manchester Metropolitan University, n adviser to the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UNCTITF), the UN body responsible for implementing the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, 2-24-2015, “In defence of soft power: why a “war” on terror will never win,” all is good within the world of counter terrorism. Despite almost 15 years of “war on terror”, terrorism remains one of the major threats that the world community is facing. The phenomenon has recently assumed a new and mystifying phase of brutality. Decapitations, assassinations, kidnapping, suicide operations, and even burning the “enemy” alive have all become the landmark of a gruesome thought that adopts extreme brutality and violence as a tactic. This abominable thought seems to be spreading globally at a pace unseen before. From Ottawa to Ontario, Boston, Sydney, Brussels, Copenhagen to Paris, terrorism has become truly global, although this was not the case just a few years earlier.? While most victims of terror are Muslims living in Muslim majority states, “the number of terrorist attacks around the world has increased dramatically”, according to a recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace (2014). This raises important questions regarding our counter terrorism strategy, one that remains overwhelmingly kinetic in nature.? There is no military solution to terrorism. As David Miliband, a former British Foreign Minister, stated in 2009, “the war on terror was wrong”, and it brought “more harm than good”. It has also undermined the search for alternative, more successful approaches to countering violent extremism by giving the impression that only a military solution exists to counter violent extremism.? Both the European Union and the UN long recognised the futility of a purely military approach as a solution to violent extremism. Therefore, the 2005 European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy and the 2006 United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy viewed terrorism as a process and tactic, and thus called for a better understanding of the "conditions conducive to radicalisation and extremism that lead to terrorism" as a prerequisite for developing effective counter terrorism policies.? Although the EU and UN’s “soft” approaches, which called for “addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism” in the first place, held great potential, they were watered down by the continued prevalence of hard military approach worldwide. The United States, for instance, has never bought into the “soft” approach and continued to follow a military strategy, despite noticeable change in terminology. As a report by the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group concluded in 2001, the US government has shown little interest in “soft” counter radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies.Institutional engagement keyInstitutional engagement is key—adapting via respectability politics is not enough to ensure safetyUK Progressive, 4-6-2015, “Why “Respectability Politics” Is a Sham,” Washington’s plea of black success in the face of racism was heard again last month here on the East Coast. When cops in Virginia took Martese Johnson into custody during a bloody arrest on the University of Virginia’s campus in March during an incident that was captured on video, the teen shouted, “I go to UVA. I go to UVA. How did this happen, you fucking racists? How does this happen?”? Because he’s black. That’s how. No amount of adapting would have saved Johnson from the white supremacist abuse he endured last month. His injuries required 10 stitches.? As The Root’s Kirsten West Savali explained in a column about the incident, “The greatest trick white supremacy ever pulled was positioning racism as only a belief system and not a power structure. This racist system is designed to make you believe that if you just act right, you’ll reach the safety of rarefied air; then they remind you not to breathe. Now is not the time to be more tolerant about race; rather, it’s time to be more intolerant about racism.”? There is too much data available that proves black people, whether they are on the road or not, are preyed upon by racists with police badges. I believe Chris Rock is often stopped because he is black and I won’t be tricked into believing that adapting to the racism that singles him out will make the comedian any ernment legislation is necessary—key to establishing public trustMary McCarthy, an attorney and former senior director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council, a member of The Constitution Project's Liberty and Security Committee, 9-18-2014, “Finally, a chance to protect Americans from NSA : Column,” that establishes constitutional, common sense rules for domestic surveillance is clearly overdue. Despite the Snowden revelations, not a single law has been passed in the last year to prevent the NSA from suspicion-less domestic surveillance.? Public concern about excessive surveillance hasn't died down. The lead architect of the Patriot Act now believes it's time to take it apart. Wisconsin Republican Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, an original cosponsor of the USA Freedom Act, believes that "[t]he collection and retention of all telephone records coming in and out of the United States is excessive and does not fall within the guidelines of [the Patriot Act]."? He is not alone. A majority of people believe the NSA's data collection program is a violation of Americans' privacy. President Obama's own surveillance review group found that "the current storage of bulk metadata creates potential risks to public trust, personal privacy and civil liberty." Most Americans believe that the NSA has gone too far and that legislation is long overdue.? This legislation will pair greater oversight with the creation of a safety net for U.S. persons who believe their rights have been violated by the bulk collection programs. It would also require the government to report the total number of U.S. persons that were subject to orders authorizing surveillance. Such increases in transparency are key to self-governance and are needed to restore trust between the public and our elected officials. And it will also reform the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to provide more accountability and transparency, including by appointing a panel of privacy and civil liberties advocates to the court.Debate keyYouth engagement and discussing these issues head on is critical to achieving racial equality—Ferguson proves. La June Montgomery Tabron, Detroit Free Press guest writer, president and CEO of the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 4-18-2015, “Recognize the progress and hope after Ferguson,” by young leaders and abetted by social media, active engagement is on the rise. Community voices are driving change again, standing up to sustain our democracy. The positives propelling change are overwhelming. Rallies have been held where marchers of all races have protested police brutality. Civic leaders are calling for an end to police mistreatment of blacks. Would the Justice Department have investigated Ferguson’s police and political structures as thoroughly without such a vibrant public outcry?? Brown’s death was the boiling point for children and young adults in Ferguson. Through their words and tireless actions, the youth demonstrated such frustration, such angst and such desperation. “We are prepared to die because we have nothing to lose,” a young woman from Ferguson said at a meeting I attended with civil and justice rights leaders in Washington last fall. Everyone was stunned. What had happened that could elicit such a distressed plea for help?? Now the world knows. The Justice Department determined that black people in Ferguson routinely had their civil rights violated.? Our young people emerged as the real heroes. They are working to bring positive change to their communities. Their energy and activism should be rekindled wherever people of color are routinely profiled and targeted. Our young people can spur racial healing.Domestic surveillance is due to the destruction of the liberal democratic political order—discourse like the affirmative is keyHenry Giroux, Ph.D., Professor in Communication at McMaster University in Canada, 2004, “War Talk, the Death of the Social, and Disappearing Children: Remembering the Other War,” pg. 206-207 , fear, and a particularly virulent contempt for social needs, as these? quotes suggest, have now become the dominant motifs shaping the domestic? and foreign policies of the United States. This is evident not only in the all-embracing? militarization of public life that is emerging under the combined? power and control of neoliberal zealots, religious fanatics, and far right-wing? conservatives but also in the destruction of a liberal democratic political order? and a growing culture of surveillance, inequality, and cynicism.1We are living? in dangerous times in which a new type of society is emerging unlike anything? we have seen in the past—a society in which symbolic capital and political? power reinforce each other through a public pedagogy produced by a concentrated? media, which has become a cheerleading section for dominant elites and? corporate ruling interests. This is a society increasingly marked by a poverty of? critical public discourse, thus making it more difficult for young people and? adults to appropriate a critical language outside of the market that would allow? them to translate private problems into public concerns or to relate public? issues to private considerations. This is also a social order that seems incapable? of questioning itself, just as it wages war against the poor, youth, women,? people of color, and the elderly.The discourse of war must be the focal point of any analysisHenry Giroux, Ph.D., Professor in Communication at McMaster University in Canada, 2004, “War Talk, the Death of the Social, and Disappearing Children: Remembering the Other War,” pg. 209-210 Ulrich Beck (2002, p. 1) has argued, the language of war has taken a distinctly? different turn in the new millennium. War no longer needs to be ratified? by Congress as it is now waged by various government agencies that escape the? need for official approval. War has become a permanent condition adopted by a? nation-state that is largely defined by its repressive functions in response to its? powerlessness to regulate corporate power, provide social investments for the? populace, and guarantee a measure of social freedom. The concept of war occupies? a strange place in the current lexicon of foreign and domestic policy. It no? longer simply refers to a war waged against a sovereign state such as Iraq, nor is? it merely amoral referent for engaging in acts of national self-defense. The concept? of war has been both expanded and inverted. It has been expanded in that? it has become one of the most powerful concepts for understanding and structuring? political culture, public space, and everyday life. Wars are now waged? against crime, labor unions, drugs, terrorism, and a host of alleged public disorders.? Wars are not declared against foreign enemies but against alleged domestic? threats. The concept of war has also been inverted in that has been removed? from any concept of social justice—a relationship that emerged under President? Lyndon Johnson and was exemplified in the war on poverty. War is now? defined almost exclusively as a punitive and militaristic process. This can be? seen in the ways in which social policies are now criminalized so that the war on? poverty is now a war against the poor, the war on drugs is now a war waged? largely against youth of color, and the war against terrorism is now largely a war? against immigrants, domestic freedoms, and dissent itself. In the Bush, Perle,? Rumsfeld, and Ashcroft view of terrorism, war is individualized, as every citizen? becomes a potential terrorist who has to prove that he or she is not dangerous.? Under the rubric of emergency time, which feeds off government-induced? media panics, war provides the moral imperative to collapse the “boundaries? between innocent and guilty, between suspects and non-suspects” (Beck, 2002,? p. 3). War provides the primary rhetorical tool for articulating a notion of the? social as a community organized around shared fears rather than shared responsibilities? and civic courage. War is now transformed into a slick Hollywood? spectacle designed to both glamorize a notion of hypermasculinity fashioned in? the conservative oil fields of Texas and fill public space with celebrations of ritualizedmilitaristic? posturing touting the virtues of either becoming part of “an? Army of one” or indulging in commodified patriotism by purchasing a new? Hummer. War as spectacle easily combines with the culture of fear to divert? public attention away from domestic problems, define patriotism as consensus,? and further the growth of a police state. The latter takes on dangerous overtones? not only with the passage of the Patriot Act and the suspension of civil liberties but also with the elimination of those laws that traditionally separated? the military from domestic law enforcement and offered individuals a vestige of? civil liberties and freedoms. The political implications of the expanded and? inverted use of war as a metaphor can also be seen in the war against “big government,”? which is really a war against the welfare state and the social contract? itself—this is a war against the notion that everyone should have access to? decent education, health care, employment, and other public services. One of? the most serious issues to be addressed in the debate about Bush’s concept of? permanent war is the effect it is having on one of our most vulnerable? populations, children, and the political opportunity this issue holds for? articulating a language of both opposition and possibility.RacismWe are living in a world of new racism where cultural pluralism is understood as nationally destructive which has made exclusion morally acceptableMaggie Ibrahim, Research Officer with the Climate Change and Development Group, 2005, “The Securitization of Migration:? A Racial Discourse,” Pg. 166-167, order to provide security for their population, nations develop traditions.? Traditions, systems of justice and rights, ensure the security and stability of a? nation. Through the disruption of existing traditions, immigrants, who bring? with them different cultures, imbalance the nation. The principle, or position,? which links immigrants and the demise of the nation, is that cultural differences? threaten the existing way of life. It is thus seen as rational to preserve one?s? culture through the exclusion of other cultural groups. This negative attitude? toward migrants should be understood as racism. As outlined above, the negative? belief and a discriminatory action toward somebody on the basis of his or her? social membership is prejudice. This racial prejudice that migrants face is a? result of reifying race and cultural difference and associating such difference? with threat.? The defining feature of new racism is that cultural pluralism will lead to interethnic? conflict which will dissolve the unity of the state. This logic has been? used for decades as a means of limiting immigration and asylum seekers by? right-wing governments. However, the attempt to preserve the state by rejecting? others is now a measure upheld by liberal governments as well. Divisions? based on cultural difference are? just as intractable and fundamental as the natural hierarchies they have partly? replaced, but they have acquired extra moral credibility and additional political? authority by being closer to respectable and realistic cultural nationalism and? more remote from bio-logic of any kind. As a result, we are informed not only? that the mutually exclusive cultures of indigenes and incomers cannot be? compatible but also that mistaken attempts to mix or even dwell peaceable? together can only bring destruction. From this perspective exposure to otherness? is always going to be risky? (Gilroy, 2004: 157).? As a result of concentrating on cultural difference and the preservation of the? state, new racism ?has modernized racism and made it respectable? (Duffield,? 1996: 175). No longer bound to the concern of the nation-state, cultural difference? and the risk it poses are an international concern.Police = racistPolice routinely breach constitutional rights of individuals, disproportionately African AmericansPhilip Sherwell, reporter for The Sunday Telegraph, former Chief Foreign Correspondent who covered the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo, 3-4-2015, “The shocking racism at the heart of one US police force,” said that police routinely breached residents’ constitutional rights by stopping them without reasonable suspicion, arresting them without probable cause, and using unreasonable force against them.? “Many of these constitutional violations have become routine,” he said. “For instance, even though it’s illegal for police officers to detain a person – even briefly – without reasonable suspicion, it’s become common practice for officers in Ferguson to stop pedestrians and request identification for no reason at all.? “And even in cases where police encounters start off as constitutionally defensible, we found that they frequently and rapidly escalate – and end up blatantly and unnecessarily crossing the line.”? The targets were disproportionately African-Americans, investigators found, and the department of justice has recommended a radical overhaul of both the police and courts. “It is time for Ferguson’s leaders to take immediate, wholesale and structural corrective action,” said Mr Holder.? But he also noted that the issues, however acute in Ferguson, were not limited to one suburb in the American heartlands. The challenges, he reminded the country, were "national in scope".Racialized police violence is institutional and systemicVincent Warren, the executive director of the Center for Constitutional Rights, 11-26-2014, “Structural and Institutional Racism Exists Within Police Forces,” officers are so rarely held accountable for killing even unarmed black and brown people, that no one was really surprised at the outcome this time. People have lost faith in the system, which repeatedly tells them black lives don’t matter.? But even if the grand jury had indicted Darren Wilson for killing Mike Brown, even if the grand jury in Staten Island indicts Daniel Pantaleo for killing Eric Garner, it wouldn’t resolve the structural and institutional racism that underlies police violence against black people. Yes, more officers should be held accountable for killing unarmed young men, but it isn’t a few bad apples, it’s the way that police are trained to see communities of color as war zones and to behave like occupying forces. In his testimony, Wilson called the neighborhood a “hostile environment” and told the grand jury, “it is just not a very well-liked community.”Black children are racially profiled, dehumanized and targeted by law enforcement Margaret Kimberley, Freedom Rider columnist, 5-28-2014, “Racism and Law Enforcement in the U.S.: Police Target Black Children,” “All across the country black children as young as kindergarteners have been hand cuffed and arrested as if they are adults.”? Americans should take a long look in the mirror before criticizing other nations for human rights abuses. The law enforcement system in the United States ranks among the worst in the world in the cruel treatment meted out to its citizens. Even children in this country are not safe if they are black and unlucky enough to interact with the police. Of all the various ethnic and national groups in the United States, only black people have to worry that their child may be pushed through a glass window by officers of the law.? A recent study published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology demonstrated what black people have always known. Black children are dehumanized to such an extent that they aren’t perceived as children at all. They are assumed to be older, less innocent and inherently guilty of some wrong doing. Study co-author Matthew Jackson said, “With the average age overestimation for black boys exceeding four-and-a-half years, in some cases, black children may be viewed as adults when they are just 13 years old.” Two recent cases involving the New York City police department show the truth of these words and the perils black people face even in childhood.Black life is criminalized in the United StatesMatt Peppe, writes about politics, U.S. foreign policy and Latin America, 12-30-2014, “Broken Countries Policing: American Terrorism & Racist Violence,” his Pulitzer-prize-winning book “Slavery By Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans From the Civil War to World War II,” Douglas Blackmon describes how southern states criminalized black life, using the legal system to punish black and then lease them to corporations to work in coal mines, steel furnaces, farms, quarries and factories. This served the dual purposes of marginalizing blacks politically and supplying cheap labor to capitalist commercial interests.? “The original records of county jails indicated thousands of arrests for inconsequential charges or for violations of laws specifically written to intimidate blacks – changing employers without permission, vagrancy, riding freight cars without a ticket, engaging in sexual activity – or loud talk – with white women,” Blackmon writes.? The criminalization of black life has continued since the Reconstruction era, morphing into a new form. Whereas once there was convict leasing, now there is mass incarceration. People are warehoused in prisons at the highest rate in the entire world. Public prisons create jobs for construction workers and corrections officers in rural, mainly white communities, while private prisons turn prisoners into profit centers for corporations and their investors.? One hundred years ago, African Americans were persecuted through the criminal justice system en masse. Today the system is remarkably similar. Besides exploitation for profit, criminalization of African American enables many of same types of discrimination as previously existed under Jim Crow.? Michelle Alexander notes in her book “The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness” that discrimination against African Americans today is arguably even more pernicious than under Jim Crow because it is carried out under a nominally colorblind legal system. However, the mindblowing numbers of imprisoned ethnic minorities who are imprisoned mostly for nonviolent crime make the racial aspect of the system indisputable. The result is eerily similar to post-Civil War discrimination against blacks.NSA = racistNSA surveillance is racially targeted and given the nature of FISA, there need be no justificationNatasha Lennard, staff writer for VICE News, 7-9-2014 “The NSA’s Racist Targeting of Individuals Is as Troubling as Indiscriminate Surveillance,” to documents leaked by Edward Snowden, the NSA has been spying on five distinguished Muslim-Americans under a law — the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) — that is meant to target international terrorists or foreign agents. The inclusion of the email accounts of these five people in a spreadsheet listing the targeted accounts of more than 7,000 others belies the NSA’s claim that it’s in the business of marking only terrorist suspects.? Here are the agency’s suspected “terrorists”: Faisal Gill, who was appointed to (and thoroughly vetted by) the Department of Homeland Security under President George W. Bush; Asim Ghafoor, an attorney who has defended clients suspected of terrorism; Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of public policy and international development at Rutgers University; Agha Saeed, founder and chairman of the American Muslim Alliance and a former political science professor at California State University; and Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations.? This is anti-Muslim discrimination pure and simple. While the NSA’s broad data collection is disturbingly total and unspecific, its targeted spying is evidently racist. Another leaked document punctuates this point with a dull, disgusting thud: a 2005 training document explaining how to “properly format internal memos to justify FISA surveillance” offers a sample memo that uses “Mohammed Raghead” as the name of a fictitious terrorism suspect.? Your NSA at work, ladies and gentlemen!The NSA racially profiles Muslim Americans when conducting domestic surveillanceTom Risen, a technology and business reporter for U.S. News & World Report, 7-9-2014, “Racial Profiling Reported in NSA, FBI Surveillance,” National Security Agency and the FBI have reportedly been overzealous trying to prevent terrorist attacks to the point that anti-Islamic racism in those agencies led to the surveillance of prominent Muslim-Americans, revealing a culture of racial profiling and broad latitude for spying on U.S. citizens.? An NSA document leaked by former agency contractor Edward Snowden to reporter Glenn Greenwald shows 202 Americans targeted among the approximately 7,485 email addresses monitored between 2002 and 2008, Greenwald’s news service The Intercept reports.? To monitor Americans, government agencies must first make the case to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is probable cause that the targets are terrorist agents, foreign spies or “are or may be” abetting sabotage, espionage or terrorism. Despite this filter The Intercept identified five Muslim-Americans with high public profile including civil rights leaders, academics, lawyers and a political candidate.? Racial profiling of Muslims by security officers has been a controversy since the terrorist attacks of 2001 spiked fears about al-Qaida trainees preparing more attacks. The New York Police Department has disbanded its unit that mapped New York’s Muslim communities that designated surveillance of mosques as “terrorism enterprise investigations” after pressure from the Justice Department about aggressive monitoring by police.? A 2005 FBI memo about surveillance procedures featured in The Intercept story uses a fake name “Mohammed Raghead” for the agency staff exercise. This latest report about email surveillance of successful Muslim-Americans is akin to “McCarthyism” that fed paranoia about communist spies during the Cold War, says Reza Aslan, a professor at the University of California, Riverside.? “The notion that these five upstanding American citizens, all of them prominent public individuals, represent a threat to the U.S. for no other reason than their religion is an embarrassment to the FBI and an affront to the constitution,” Aslan says.Predictive Policing bad“Broken windows” policing is racially targeted and ingrained in law enforcement and the public’s perception of crimeMichael Greenberg, the author of Hurry Down ?Sunshine and Beg, Borrow, Steal: A Writer’s Life, 11-6-2014, “‘Broken Windows’ and the New York Police,” stop-and-frisk tactic that was heavily employed during the Bloomberg administration is an example of the logic of the broken windows theory taken to an extreme: beat cops were told to dispense with the pretense of minor infractions to identify suspects; simply being on the street became sufficient cause for a frisk, and then a search, to take place. Eighty-seven percent of those stopped were black or Hispanic.? In 2011, two years before Judge Shira Scheindlin of the US District Court ruled that stop and frisk was a form of “indirect racial profiling” and that it violated the Constitution’s equal protection clause, more than 50,000 New Yorkers were arrested for “displaying” tiny amounts of pot. After the state court complained about the flood of cases, Bloomberg’s police commissioner, Ray Kelly, scaled back the arrests. But in 2013, small pot busts still numbered about 28,000. As of June of this year, with Bill de Blasio as mayor and a federal monitor watching over the NYPD as a result of the stop-and-frisk ruling, small pot busts were on track to be at least as numerous.? The inequity is glaring. With the aim of maintaining order in poor, high-crime neighborhoods, police saddle thousands of young men with criminal records for an offense that the state has largely decriminalized and that white people regularly commit with impunity. Penalties imposed by the courts for possession are usually minimal—dismissal of the case after six months if the person has no further run-in with the law—but the damage can still be considerable, taking the form of rejected job and housing applications or being banned from joining the military and attending certain colleges.? William Bratton, the current police commissioner, continues to endorse the busts, but marijuana possession is not a “feeder crime,” as he has often maintained. In 2012, Human Rights Watch found that only 3 percent of those arrested for low-level possession went on to commit a violent felony.? New York’s legacy of using drug possession to create a criminal class that had not existed before, and that disproportionately singles out blacks and Hispanics, can be traced back to the Rockefeller Drug Laws of 1973. Pushed through the state legislature when Nelson Rockefeller was governor, they were the toughest laws of their kind in the country, mandating, for example, a minimum of fifteen years to life in prison for possessing 113 grams of pot. The mass incarceration that resulted is universally recognized to have been a catastrophic failure, and most of Rockefeller’s mandates have been amended. But the psychology of the practice is still ingrained, both in the criminal justice system and in the public’s way of thinking about crime.“Broken windows” policing alienates cops from their communities and causes situations like Eric Garner’s deathJustin Peters, a writer for Slate, 12-3-2014, “Broken Windows Policing Doesn’t Work,” renewed emphasis on misdemeanor “quality of life” arrests has sparked renewed criticisms from community members who are tired of being hassled. These criticisms spiked after Garner’s death in July. Six members of New York’s congressional delegation sent Attorney General Eric Holder a letter noting that “Mr. Garner’s death has taken place in the context of a broken windows policing strategy that appears to target communities of color for the enforcement of minor violations and low-level offenses.”? Two weeks after Garner’s death, de Blasio held a press conference to address these criticisms and defend broken windows. “Breaking a law is breaking a law, and it has to be addressed,” said de Blasio.? That’s nonsense. The cornerstone of effective policing is discretion. If the cops enforced every single law on the books in every single precinct at all hours of the day, New York City would become a police state. Is that what de Blasio and Bratton want?? For mayors and police commissioners, being “tough on crime” means actively implementing some specific policy. But given that violent crime seems to be declining on its own regardless of what they do, there’s a case to be made that de Blasio and Bratton are only making things worse. Here’s a suggestion for a new policing policy for New York City: First, do no harm.Predictive policing is premised on identifying “quality of life crimes” and racial profiling which results in targeted surveillance of predominantly black communitiesMalkia Amala Cyril, founder and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national network of 175 organizations working to ensure media access, rights, and representation for marginalized communities, 3-30-2015, “Black America's State of Surveillance,” Predictive policing, also known as “Total Information Awareness,” is described as using advanced technological tools and data analysis to “preempt” crime. It utilizes trends, patterns, sequences, and affinities found in data to make determinations about when and where crimes will occur.? This model is deceptive, however, because it presumes data inputs to be neutral. They aren’t. In a racially discriminatory criminal justice system, surveillance technologies reproduce injustice. Instead of reducing discrimination, predictive policing is a face of what author Michelle Alexander calls the “New Jim Crow”—a de facto system of separate and unequal application of laws, police practices, conviction rates, sentencing terms, and conditions of confinement that operate more as a system of social control by racial hierarchy than as crime prevention or punishment. ? In New York City, the predictive policing approach in use is “Broken Windows.” This approach to policing places an undue focus on quality of life crimes—like selling loose cigarettes, the kind of offense for which Eric Garner was choked to death. Without oversight, accountability, transparency, or rights, predictive policing is just high-tech racial profiling—indiscriminate data collection that drives discriminatory policing practices.“Broken windows” policing is perceived as dependent on the racial composition of a community rather than things like boarded up windowsMichael Greenberg, the author of Hurry Down ?Sunshine and Beg, Borrow, Steal: A Writer’s Life, 11-6-2014, “‘Broken Windows’ and the New York Police,” “Broken Windows” was published, in 1982, tax revenues in New York were shrinking at an alarming rate and the city’s ability to maintain itself was in doubt. In 1980, the population had fallen to 7,071,639, a drop of about 800,000 from ten years earlier and around where the city’s population had been in 1930. Crime by blacks—not the collapse of local manufacturing or the flight of middle-class families to the suburbs—was popularly perceived to be the primary cause.? This racial perception is no less prevalent today. The most comprehensive study to date on the roots of crime found that the central factor in how people perceive the safety of a neighborhood is not disorder or even the presence of boarded-up stores and abandoned buildings, but the number of African-Americans (and to a lesser extent Hispanics) who live there. This perception was true for blacks and whites alike.4 The link is ingrained in the American psyche. When we criticize the police for racial prejudice, we are decrying a condition that is bigger than the police, a prejudice that we may share ourselves.? In their original presentation of the theory, Kelling and Wilson worried that in implementing broken windows, “skin color or national origin or harmless mannerisms [would] become the basis for distinguishing the undesirable from the desirable.” They offered “no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question” beyond the vague hope that police would be trained to understand “the outer limit of their discretionary authority.” But this trust in individual discretion was never realistic. Jennifer Eberhardt, a social psychologist at Stanford, has demonstrated the deeply coded visual association that Americans—and especially policemen—make between race and crime. When she flashed images of faces across a screen, Eberhardt found that her subjects were better able to detect weapons when the faces were black.AT: Body camerasIncreasing surveillance will not be effective, we need to focus on the institutional racism prevalent in policing tacticsAgatha Beins, 4-17-2015, “Police body cameras will not change the culture of racism in America,” and police departments have turned toward the body camera to improve relations between police officers and the communities they serve and to lessen violence perpetrated by—and we hope against—police officers. But it will take more than body cameras, police dashboard cameras, and cameras installed in public places to make people feel safer. Increasing surveillance is not enough.? While police body cameras may be useful in processes of legal arbitration, it is not clear if they will actually prevent violence, and those who have studied the effects of these cameras still call for more research. One study shows that complaints against police and the use of force by police dropped during a nine-month period when officers were wearing body cameras.? Yet Eric Garner’s death in New York City in July 2014—among others—offers one example of an incident in which awareness of being filmed did nothing to stop police from assaulting someone, according to legal theorist Justin Hansford: “The officers who forcibly pushed Garner’s body into the ground knew a witness was recording the incident, and at least one of them spoke to the videographer,” he wrote in the Washington Post.? Hansford astutely notes, “It’s lax laws that prevent us from holding police accountable, not a lack of evidence.” His call for justice is spot on; however, his proposal that we use the law and “financial penalties” to change behavior still places the burden on an individual (police officer) rather than a discriminatory system. The many trenchant and eloquent critiques by scholars and activists about systemic racism and the prison industrial complex, however, indicate that the systems themselves must change.R/C TerrorismInstitutionalized racism is the root cause of terrorism—psychological trauma fuels violent radicalizationJohn Fitzgerald Gates, Ph.D., National Diversity Expert; Principal and Chief Strategist of Criticality Management Consulting; Former Associate Dean of Harvard College, 4-24-2015, “Institutionalized Racism: National Security Threat and Mental Health Crisis,” is not only destroying black lives, it is causing some African Americans such psychological trauma that they have developed externalized bias as a coping mechanism -- feeding any sense of paranoia or psychosis they may have to deepen their attraction to violent radicalization. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch said of the ISIS sympathizers that the United States would root out any threat to the homeland. But what if the threat to the United States comes from our own institutionalized racism? How do we root that out?? Here are some suggestions.? 1. Institutionalized racism and externalized bias must be treated as national security threats that are giving rise to a new generation of extremists committed to harming the homeland.? 2. Allocate part of the nation's counter terrorism budget to eradicating institutionalized racism, including: the prison industrial system, biased policing, economic violation of minorities and the poor, homelessness, and mental health disparities.? 3. Create pathways to hope through respect for all people. Start by respecting President Obama and not killing unarmed black men.? 4. Recognize that good people are complicit in nurturing racially stressful environments. Examine honestly any part you may play, and change it.? 5. For business leaders, consider the potential threat that institutionalized racism poses to the security, productivity and profitability of your business. Like cyber attacks, institutionalized racism has a capacity to destroy businesses from the inside out. Dismantle institutionalized racism wherever you find it.? 6. Ensure that all Americans have access to mental health care and that for minorities suffering from mental illness, racial PTSD is regularized as part of diagnostic assessment.? Our nearly singular focus on Islam as the road to extremism blinds us to our national complicity in enabling a racialized environment, actors with motivations and a rallying ideology that gives rise to and nurtures violent radicalization. Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois famously argued that the central issue facing America in the 20th century was the "the problem of the color line." More than one hundred years later, the central problem facing the nation remains the color line.? The color line, as a form of slow terror, is driving some African Americans to their breaking points. Rather than endure the unremitting blows of racism, they have opted for fast terror by joining with ISIS. They are no longer tolerant of American systems of injustice that have left them bereft of hope, faith or opportunity. They have decided to fight their oppressors, albeit their fight is really against oppression. Classic examples of "chickens coming home to roost," they prefer the terror of violent radicalization to the terror of being black in America. It is time for the nation to attack violent radicalization at its sources, one of which is American institutionalized racism.Psychology impactWe have to acknowledge and discuss the psychological implications of racial discriminationVeronica Y. Womack, Social Psychologist and Research Associate at the Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, 3-27-2015, “A Movement Against Racism Should Be a Movement for Mental Health,” ’s important to deconstruct the sources for both systemic and interpersonal racism to pinpoint why these infractions still exist, and the steps that are necessary for change. We can kickstart that first step by implementing the second step: talking. Institutional and employment leaders must engage employees in conversations around inclusion, equality, and difference; this is a key step in the process of addressing mental health disorders among African Americans.? Substantive dialogue is critical, but it’s equally vital to note that simply starting these conversations is a powerful thing. It’s a move that shows both internal and external stakeholders that your organization values the tenets of social justice and reflects an investment in community well-being. Beginning these conversations is also an explicit acknowledgement of the problem, which could help employees affected by racial discrimination build back trust in the institution.? This critical dialogue also can’t just be a one-time thing—it requires consistency and commitment. To be effective, these conversations have to be on-going, inclusive, and employ a technique called active listening. Active listening communicates empathy and builds trust by using signs of attentiveness (i.e. paraphrasing, assumption checking, asking questions) to indicate unconditional acceptance and confirming the other’s experience. This type of listening behavior will ensure that an employer’s responses are not dismissive and authoritative. This form of listening reflects that the individual is respecting the other person’s experiential reality, not just waiting to speak and give a predetermined statement.PovertyGovernment interventions have been effective at addressing povertyPeter Edelman, professor at Georgetown University Law Center, 6-22-2012, “The State of Poverty in America,” dire facts tempt one to believe that there may be some truth to President Ronald Reagan’s often-quoted declaration that “we fought a war against poverty and poverty won.” But that is not the case. Our public policies have been remarkably successful. Starting with the Social Security Act of 1935, continuing with the burst of activity in the 1960s, and on from there, we have made great progress. ? We enacted Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and many health indicators for low-income people improved. We enacted food stamps, and the near-starvation conditions we saw in some parts of the country were ameliorated. We enacted the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit, and the incomes of low-wage workers with children were lifted. We enacted Pell grants, and millions of people could afford college who otherwise couldn’t possibly attend. We enacted Supplemental Security Income and thereby raised the income floor for elderly and disabled people whose earnings from work didn’t provide enough Social Security. There is much more—housing vouchers, Head Start, child-care assistance, and legal services for the poor, to name a few. The Obama administration and Congress added 16 million people to Medicaid in the Affordable Care Act, appropriated billions to improve the education of low-income children, and spent an impressive amount on the least well-off in the Recovery Act.? All in all, our various public policies kept a remarkable 40 million people from falling into poverty in 2010—about half because of Social Security and half due to the other programs just mentioned. To assert that we fought a war against poverty and poverty won because there is still poverty is like saying that the Clean Air and Clean Water acts failed because there is still pollution.Poverty has many problematic implications that have been expanding since the great recession beganMelissa S. Kearney, Director of the Hamilton Project; a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and a Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland, Benjamin H. Harris, the Policy Director of The Hamilton Project; a Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings; and Deputy Director of the Retirement Security Project at Brookings, and Karen L. Anderson, 6-19-2014, “Policies to Address Poverty in America – Introduction,” the aftermath of the Great Recession, some disadvantaged workers struggle to obtain the necessary training for fruitful employment, while others grapple with long-term unemployment at unprecedented rates. Long-term challenges remain with us: too many of our nation’s youth drop out of high school, too many of our children are born into unstable home environments, and too many of our young adults are? out of school and out of work. This threatens our nation with the prospect of a permanent class of individuals who are unable to contribute productively to and benefit from a thriving economy.? Furthermore, research demonstrates that poverty leads to substantial and sustained neurobiological stressors that can inhibit intellectual and emotional development and sound decision making. For children in particular, poverty means living with the stress that comes from insufficient nutritional intake, living in the presence of violence in their community or household, and not having a secure place to sleep at night. These challenges make it harder for children to learn and thrive in school, which, in turn, leads to problems that cumulate over childhood and into adulthood. The concern is that children born into deprivation will live their lives stuck in a perpetual poverty trap.The “broken windows” policy is nonsensical and has not been shown to reduce serious crime ratesMatt Peppe, writes about politics, U.S. foreign policy and Latin America, 12-30-2014, “Broken Countries Policing: American Terrorism & Racist Violence,” “broken windows” theory that you can nip violent crime in the bud by punishing minor “quality of life” violations like smoking and drinking in the street or sleeping on the subway is so transparently nonsensical it is hard to believe anyone could even consider it seriously.? It is equivalent to a diet to prevent obesity that consists of forgoing vegetables and grains because foods with the least calories are a gateway to fatty, fried foods with no nutritional value. Corn seeds are not twinkies, and sleeping on a subway train is not murder.? Basic common sense and years of empirical data demonstrate that broken windows theory has no effect on preventing serious crime. When you understand this, it is easy to see that the broken windows theory put into practice is about something entirely different than its professed aims.? There is a strong correlation between race and socioeconomic status in the U.S. Racial minorities suffer disproportionately lower socioeconomic status compared to whites, creating a racial caste system. With the drastic decline in recent decades of agriculture, manufacturing and other forms of manual labor, populations previously depended on for cheap labor have become disposable in the modern economy.? The state has undertaken a system of social control to prevent any solidarity and political opposition that would recognize and oppose unjust racial castes. Not coincidentally, broken windows policing has been carried out predominantly against African American and Latino citizens.Studies prove that “broken windows” policies are not connected to crime reductionsBernard E. Harcourt, a professor of law at the University of Arizona, 9-11-2001, “The Broken-Windows Myth,” is little, if any, evidence that the crackdown on squeegee men and graffiti scribblers has played much of a role in reducing crime in New York. Since the early 1990's, most major American cities have seen their crime rates drop significantly, in some cases even further than New York's has. Many of these cities did not undertake anything like New York's crackdown on small-time offenses.? A 1999 study of the 17 largest cities compared each city's most recent drop in homicides. New York's rate of decline was the fifth-largest, behind those of San Diego, Washington, St. Louis and Houston.? San Diego, seated along a major drug smuggling corridor close to the Mexican border, is particularly interesting. In the late 1980's, its police department began adopting a very different style — a problem-solving, community-oriented approach. While recording impressive drops in crime between 1993 and 1996, the city also posted a 15 percent drop in arrests and an 8 percent decline in complaints of police misconduct.? Criminologists say a number of other factors have contributed to declining crime rates in New York — among them, the sharp increase in the police force. Former Mayor David Dinkins hired more than 2,000 new police officers, and Mr. Giuliani hired another 4,000. From 1991 to 1998 the force grew by almost a quarter, giving New York the highest ratio of officers per civilian of the nation's large cities.? A fall in the crack cocaine trade, a strong economy, new computerized police tracking systems, more prisoners and an aging population have also contributed to lower crime rates.? The best social-scientific evidence has shown that a neighborhood's graffiti, litter or public drunks do not necessarily point to a serious crime problem. The research suggests that rather than leading to serious crime, disorder — like crime — is caused by conditions like poverty and a lack of trust between neighbors.Add onsDemocracyMilitarization of domestic police forces via surveillance techniques risks undermining democracy by creating a force that is not responsive to popular demandsMichael German, fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program, which seeks to ensure that our government respects human rights and fundamental freedoms in conducting the fight against terrorism, 12-18-2014, “The Militarization of Domestic Surveillance is Everyone’s Problem,” ’s-problemMany Americans were shocked to see the militarized police response to public protests this summer in Ferguson, Missouri. Of course, many working on police reform issues have identified the growing militarization of police tactics and equipment as a problem for over two decades. What is less observable but equally dangerous to American civil liberties is the increasing militarization of domestic law enforcement intelligence operations.? The American tradition of prohibiting military involvement in domestic policing is designed to ensure that we maintain democratic and civilian control over an extraordinarily powerful fighting force. An army designed and equipped to protect Americans should never be turned against Americans except to quell active rebellion. But just as the drug war fuelled increased military participation and militarization in domestic policing, the war on terrorism is driving the militarization of domestic intelligence operations. Unlike the purchases of armored vehicles, military weapons, and SWAT gear, domestic intelligence activities take place mostly in the dark and neither the public nor policymakers really know what is happening.? Military intelligence officials are trained for war against hostile enemies. Their tools, tactics, and attitudes reflect that mission, and are completely inappropriate to a domestic application.ImmigrationDomestic surveillance of immigration status infiltrates all aspects of daily life and requires noncitizens to risk “self-deployment”Anil Kalhan, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, 2014, “Immigration Surveillance,” Pg. 60-61, the other hand, the expansion of both direct and indirect post-entry? enforcement simultaneously draws the migration border inward, self-consciously? constructing virtual, domestic border checkpoints throughout? the country’s interior by identifying “events that are necessary for life in a? modern society” where it may be possible to “exercise control” over? individuals in a manner analogous to the control exercised at the territorial? border.245 The particular approaches of these post-entry enforcement? initiatives vary considerably, and each one involves a distinct set of public? and private actors—including law enforcement and criminal justice? officials, but also welfare agencies, public hospitals and health agencies,? motor vehicle licensing agencies, private employers, private landlords, and? potentially others. Collectively, however, these initiatives establish a kind? of immigration panopticism, which eliminates zones in society where? immigration status is invisible and irrelevant and puts this large array of? public and private actors in the position of identifying individuals and? determining immigration status; collecting, analyzing, and storing personal? information; screening and identifying potential immigration law violators;? and sharing information with federal immigration authorities.246 While? these initiatives increase the likelihood of placing many individuals in? removal proceedings, proponents place even greater emphasis on their? ability to trigger a process they characterize as “self-deportation,” which? disciplines potentially deportable noncitizens into internalizing the? perception that their immigration status is constantly being monitored and,? ultimately, into both revealing their status in a range of day-to-day settings? and conforming to social expectations that they depart the country.247Migration is securitized in an effort to prevent any malfunction in national economic marketsMaggie Ibrahim, Research Officer with the Climate Change and Development Group, 2005, “The Securitization of Migration:? A Racial Discourse,” Pg. 172, our current economic paradigm, which is based on the manipulation of information and providing services, social mobility is labelled as increasingly threatening. This increasing trend of viewing migrants as a threat may be to some extent explained through Hardt and Negri?s assertion that international migration has significant macroeconomic effects ? mainly the increased difficulty to manage national markets, especially national labour markets, individually.Migrants who leave the South for employment in the North contribute to the blurring of the boundaries between the North and the South. Through migration, the North and the South incorporate a part of each other. The North receives southerners, who set up ?shantytown, favela, always again produced and reproduced ? (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 254), while the South receives the North in the ?form of stock exchanges and banks, transnational corporations and icy skyscrapers of money and command? (2000: 254). The economic and political geography between the North and South are being undermined, increasingly becoming more fluid. As a result, ?the entire world market tends to be the only coherent domain for the effective application of capitalist management and command ? (2000: 254). With the incorporation of migrant labour searching for freedom from the periphery, comes a challenge to the existing social and productive relations. International migration can, therefore, be understood as an obstacle to the governance and maintenance of the liberal world system. Thus, the securitization of migration creates an agency for global governance in order to maintain and secure global market systems.ImperialismDomestic surveillance programs are justified by the narrative of terrorist prevention but in reality are a tool of extending US imperialismDanny Haiphong, activist and case manager in the Greater Boston Area, 10-1-2014, “Police State America: US Department of Justice to Train “Community Leaders” to be Snitches for the Empire,” quick time after Obama declared a prolonged war on Iraq and Syria, the Department of Justice partnered with the Department of Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center to launch a new domestic surveillance program. This program seeks to expand the surveillance dragnet by training “community leaders” to monitor their communities for signs of “radicalization.” The imperialists are using manufactured fear of ISIS, the proxy jihadists of America’s own creation, as a means to justify such surveillance. The DOJ’s new program is another reinforcement of Washington’s ”War on (of) Terror,” which has provided the ideological foundation for white supremacist, imperialist warfare since 2001. Under the guise of fighting “terror,” the imperialists have waged an all out war on the poor, working class, and those who stand against Empire. In doing so, the “War on Terror” has made it impossible for the ruling class to hide the national security-state apparatus of US imperialism. The passage of the Patriot Act and National Defense Authorization Act, as well as the maintenance of Guantanamo Bay, has sent a clear message that the imperialists are waging permanent war all over the planet for control and plunder. However, the expansion of the national security state is supported by the racist, deceptive narrative of “terrorist” prevention. In reality, imperialism’s erasure of Constitutional law through mass repression stems from a deep fear of popular rebellion. The purpose of the national security state’s illegal wire-taps, search and seizures, raids, and collections of private information is to neutralize any potential threat to the corporate and military dictatorship of US imperialism. TerrorismCounter-terrorism efforts have led to a militarization of police who then see inner-city environments as warzones Gregory Shank, managing editor of Social Justice, degrees in sociology, criminology and the sociology of education from U.C. Berkeley, 2009, “Overview: Policing Protest and Youth,” Pg. 1-2 issue contains two views on how globalization affects policing practices in? the United States, including the policing of protest and of inner-city youth. Stephen? Hill and Randall Beger argue that “paramilitarization” of U.S. security represents? the convergence of two trends, with the police becoming more militarized (e.g.,? Special Weapons and Tactics units) and the U.S. military increasingly taking on? police functions. The rapidity with which this trend is progressing, Hill and Beger? argue, must be reversed before it reaches a threshold already crossed by the heavily? militarized Israeli National Police. Paramilitary forces have often been historically? synonymous with political repression and are generally undemocratic and unaccountable.? Militarization of policing is a global trend since all states operating in? the globalized neoliberal economy respond to the same pressures. However, U.S.? support for foreign paramilitary police forces and paramilitary police units abroad? has intensified this process. A blurring of traditional distinctions between military/? police, war/law enforcement, and internal/external security, the authors argue, is? a product of globalization. As criminal and social issues such as drug trafficking,? illegal immigration, and organized crime have become increasingly transnational? enterprises, they have been subsumed under the mantle of counterterrorism. Yet? the use of heightened national security threats to justify militarization of policing? first emerged in the late 1970s, when Congress seized upon the War on Drugs to? amend the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which had clearly delineated between police? and soldiers. The more militarized the police become, the more they resemble their? military counterparts in ideology and form. This “military operational model” encourages? street-level officers and law enforcement executives to view the inner-city? environment as a war-zone and the urban underclass as the enemy.The U.S. has used fear tactics regarding terrorism to justify intervention and surveillanceDavid L. Altheide, Regents’ Professor in the School of Justice and Social Inquiry at? Arizona State University, 2007, “The mass media and terrorism,” Pg. 292-293, changes in US foreign and domestic policy essentially went unreported? and unchallenged by the dominant news organizations (Armstrong, 2002). Notwithstanding? the long relationship in the United States between fear and crime,? the role of the mass media in promoting fear has become more pronounced since? the United States ‘discovered’ international terrorism on 11 September 2001.? This discourse was grounded in several decades of the ‘fear of crime,’ but it was? also promoted by political action that sought a reorientation and redefinition of? the role of the United States in world affairs.? This broad story about the Iraq War involved negative terms for the enemy,? but it also included US retaliation, the hunt for Al Qaeda leaders (e.g. Osama bin? Laden), and plans to attack countries and ‘outlaw regimes’ that supported or? harbored terrorists. Implementing these programs involved invading Afghanistan? and expanding the US military presence throughout the world. Other adjustments? were made in foreign policy, military budgets, domestic surveillance and attacks? on civil liberties (Johnson, 2004; Kellner, 2003). But these were all contextualized? by fresh metaphors that justified extraordinary acts against a very vile enemy.? Threats to invade other countries – the ‘axis of evil’ – that included Iraq, were part? of an effort to ‘defend’ the United States from future attacks. Terrorism became? a very broad symbol that encompassed fear, consumption, and international? intervention (Kellner, 2004). The meaning of terrorism expanded from a tactic? to also mean an idea, a lifestyle, and ultimately, a condition of the world. News? reports contributed to this broad definition of terrorism as a condition (Altheide,? 2004). A key source for this news theme was the Project for a New American? Century (PNAC).2AC AnswersT: Domestic SurveillanceSurveillance is defined as watching or observing the behavior of another to prevent a crimeMerriam-Websters Dictionary, no date, : the act of carefully watching someone or something especially in order to prevent or detect a crimeXO CPPresidential powers surrounding the WOT are fascist—there are no checks and balances leading to policies like Abu Ghraib Rebecca Sanders, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Toronto, Assistant Professor at the University of Cincinnati, April 2011, “(Im)plausible legality: the? rationalisation of human rights abuses? in the American ‘Global War on Terror’,” The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol 15, No. 4, pg. 609, popular authors like Naomi Wolf, the post-9/11 world has ‘historical echoes’ of? fascism, contemporary events are ‘mirrored in history’.33 She proceeds to make numerous? comparisons, analogising the rhetoric of the administration to that of the Nazis.34 More? importantly she argues that there is a ‘structural echo’: ‘the way dictators take over democracies? or crush pro-democracy uprisings by invoking emergency decrees to close down civil? liberties; creating military tribunals; and criminalizing dissent’.35 Through the successive? erosion of human rights, the Bush administration set America on a path towards the? fascist tipping point.? There is no doubt that much in the post-9/11 period lends itself to interpretations based? around the concept of exception and decisionistic leadership. As Nixon summed up his? vision of the ‘imperial presidency’ over 30 years ago, ‘When the President does it, that? means it’s not illegal.’36 This tendency has overtly manifested itself in the GWOT with? the invocation of the theory of the ‘unitary executive’. Arguing that Article II of the constitution? gives the president exclusive control of defense, proponents exempt the executive? from congressional oversight or judicial scrutiny. As articulated by John Yoo, in this view? the president has an absolute monopoly to dictate security policy: ‘The Framers. . .created? an executive with its own independent powers to manage foreign affairs and address emergencies? which, almost by definition, cannot be addressed by existing laws.’37? This aggressive assertion of executive power is evident in the huge number of executive? orders and ‘presidential signing statements’ issued by the Bush administration. For? example, the McCain Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill of 2005 attempted? to prohibit CID treatment of prisoners. Upon signing, President Bush essentially declared? the law not binding: ‘The executive branch shall construe. . .the Act, relating to detainees,? in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the? unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief.’38Courts CPDomestic surveillance has been conducted in such a way that the courts won’t have anything to latch onto—everything has occurred with the assumption of plausible denialRebecca Sanders, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Toronto, Assistant Professor at the University of Cincinnati, April 2011, “(Im)plausible legality: the? rationalisation of human rights abuses? in the American ‘Global War on Terror’,” The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol 15, No. 4, pg. 610, post-World War II (WWII) American history, the doctrine of ‘plausible deniability’? was ubiquitous. Yet, it has been a less common frame of reference for analysts? seeking to understand contemporary developments. Most observers perceive that something? important is different after 9/11. Old patterns of conduct have changed. Nonetheless,? there are echoes of this paradigm in the current day that are worth exploring.? Unlike a state of exception, practices conducted under the cover of plausible denial do? not suspend the law or openly transgress norms, but violate them stealthily. The demand for? denial evinces awareness of the distinction between legality and illegality and the risk of? sanction, embarrassment, and blowback that might accompany the latter. While secrecy? to protect ‘sources and methods’, for instance to conceal the identity of an informer, is a? legitimate necessity for clandestine intelligence collection, plausible denial has traditionally? been associated with covert action. Covert action denies agency. As explained in NSC? 1012, covert operations should be ‘so planned and executed that any US Government? responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorised persons and that if uncovered the? US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them’.43 Covert action? ranges from propaganda, to financial aid, to violent intervention. As defined by contemporary? American law, covert action is ‘an activity or activities of the United States Government? to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the? role of the [government] will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly’.44? For much of the Cold War, plausible denial of covert action was the name of the game.? Long time intelligence journalist Thomas Powers captures the ethos: ‘Think of intelligence? organizations as the instrument of a nation’s id – the desire of a government to do certain? things without having to explain, defend, or justify them’, he writes. ‘Fairness, justice,? restraint and respect for the rights of others may be important terms in the public language? of international politics’, but when a state feels threatened it ‘may seek recourse outside the? limits of official remonstrance and international law, and may seek to impose its will in? secret with methods it would never confess in public.’45 As the 1954 Doolittle Report? put it, the threat of an ‘implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination? by whatever means and at whatever cost’ necessitated that ‘hitherto accepted norms of? conduct’ cease, that ‘long-standing American concepts of “fair play”’ be reconsidered,? and that ‘no one should be permitted to stand in the way’ of the ‘fundamentally repugnant? philosophy’ of ruthless covert action.46State Bad KEngaging with state institutions is critical to fixing flawed policies that have material consequences on marginalized groupsThea Shahrokh, a Research Officer at the Institute of Development Studies, a researcher in International Development for over five years, with a particular focus on issues of gender, citizenship, exclusion and violence, and Erika Lopez-Franco, Research Officer at the Institute of Development Studies, conducting research and advocacy for the participation of vulnerable groups in development policies and programmes from a 'rights-based' approach and using power analysis in development, March 2015, “Achieving meaningful accountability for? people living in poverty and marginalization,” normative frameworks and human? rights agreements play a critical role in shaping? legislation at the national and local level. Where? these frameworks have local ownership they are? integral to challenging institutional discrimination? and power imbalances that marginalise different? groups of citizens.? However, for the poorest and most marginalised? people, laws and policies at all levels rarely? translate into the realisation of rights.? ?? This disconnect relates to contextual and? discriminatory social norms that are deeply? embedded in institutions that mediate access? to services and realisation? of rights.? ??Where a person’s rights have? been violated, discrimination,? corruption and high transaction? costs prevent marginalised? groups accessing justice.? ?? In the case of socially? marginalised identities (such? as LGBTQI) legal recognition? through changes in identity? cards does not automatically lead to respect? and inclusion in their lived realities. People may? still experience discrimination and exclusion,? often violently.? Making this gap between legislation and? reality visible is critical. For accountability to? be meaningful, citizens need to be engaged? with policymakers in both the creation,? implementation, and monitoring of laws, policies? and programmes. Organised citizen groups are? taking action to hold government programmes to? account for reaching more marginalised people,? and also acting as a platform for marginalised? people to enter government schemes to claim? their entitlements:? ?? In Bangladesh, community-based? organisations are playing an important role? in ensuring that government development? committees include diverse and inclusive groups? of older people and people with disabilities in? their constitution.? ?? In India, education on rights and entitlements? by NGOs has accompanied group-building? processes for sexual minority persons and the? resulting advocacy has broken down barriers? to access in government social protection? schemes.Fem KPerm do both—only the affirmative grapples with the logic of fear that is foundational to gendered and raced surveillance. The criticism is nothing but detached theoretical assertionsIris Marion Young, was Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and affiliated with the Center for Gender Studies and the Human Rights program there, Autumn 2003, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on theCurrent Security State,” some feminist theorists of peace and security have noticed? the appeal to protection as justification for war making (Stiehm 1982;? Tickner 1992, 2001), they have not elaborated the gendered logic of? protection to the extent that I try to do here. These accounts concentrate? on international relations, moreover, and do less to carry the analysis to? an understanding of the relation of states to citizens internally. My interest? in this essay is in this dual face of security forms, those that wage war? outside a country and conduct surveillance and detention inside. I notice? that democratic values of due process, separation of powers, free assembly,? and holding powerful actors accountable come into danger when leaders? mobilize fear and present themselves as protectors.? Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, I argue, the relation of the? leaders of the United States to its citizens is well illuminated by interpreting? it under the logic of masculinist protection. The Bush administration? has mobilized the language of fear and threat to gain support for? constricting liberty and dissent inside the United States and waging war? outside. This stronger U.S. security state offers a bargain to its citizens:? obey our commands and support our security actions, and we will ensure? your protection. This protection bargain between the state and its citizens? is not unique to the United States in this period but rather often legitimates? authoritarian government. I argue that the bargain is dangerous in? this case, as in most others. The essay concludes with a gendered analysis? of the war against Afghanistan of fall 2001. While the Bush administration? initially justified the war as a defensive action necessary to protect Americans,? its rhetoric quickly supplemented this legitimation with an appeal? to the liberation of Afghan women. I suggest that some of the groundwork? for this appeal may have been laid by feminist campaigns concerning the? Taliban, which the Bush administration chose at that moment to exploit.? I argue that the apparent success of this appeal in justifying the war to? many Americans should trouble feminists and should prompt us to examine? whether American or Western feminists sometimes adopt the stance? of protector in relation to some women of the world whom we construct? as more dependent or subordinate.Cap KOnly looking at economics forecloses an analysis of how race is perceived and interacted with within class strugglesGeorge Yancy, Professor of Philosophy at McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts, works primarily in the areas of critical philosophy of race, critical whiteness studies, and philosophy of the Black experience, and Falguni A. Sheth, associate professor of philosophy and political theory, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy. She works in the areas of continental philosophy, political philosophy and legal theory, critical race theory and philosophy of race, post-colonial, theory, and sub-altern and gender studies, 2-27-2015, “How Liberalism and Racism are Wed,” .: There are some theorists who continue to want to reduce race to class. My sense is that W.E.B. Du Bois was correct regarding his claim that even poor whites possess whiteness. Do you think that such a distinction has any relevance in our contemporary moment in American history?? F.A.S.: In “Black Reconstruction in America” (1935), Du Bois discussed the wages of whiteness paid to white workers by the Southern white bourgeoisie — through the vehicle of racial apartheid — in order to divide and conquer the working class, and get white and black workers to hate and fear each other, despite, as he says, “their practically identical interests.” There is certainly truth in the claim for today, but it also depends on context, geography, historical moment, and situation—and the racial perspectives of those in power.? Poor whites won’t be racially profiled by white police, or store clerks, or white or nonwhite landlords to the same degree as darker men across economic classes will be. Yet, thinking institutionally, because economic policies adversely impact those who are already disadvantaged, poor blacks and poor whites will both suffer that impact. However, those in power and positions of authority will most often blame working-class and poor blacks for various moral character flaws. We have seen it countless times: from Daniel Moynihan’s infamous 1965 report which traces poverty to character flaws of African-Americans to Ronald Reagan’s vilification of poor black women who then came to be referred to as “welfare queens,” to President Obama’s multiple admonitions to black men to be more responsible fathers. This is despite the fact that we have ample evidence illustrating that black men are incarcerated six times as often as white men, and that they suffer from racial profiling and discrimination and unfair laws like “stop and frisk,” which collectively inhibit them from finding employment, housing or economic success.? Presumably, if poor blacks suffer from “character flaws,” then so do poor whites and other populations of color, but we rarely hear the same moral admonitions directed towards them.Perm do both—Neoliberalism, police violence and “broken windows” surveillance are intrinsically tied and must be addressed togetherBrittney Cooper, a contributing writer at Salon, and teaches Women's and Gender Studies and Africana Studies at Rutgers, 4-15-2015, “Blood money, killer cops: How privatization is funding the racist logic of America’s police,” illuminates for us the way that America exists as a place predicated on the refusal of Black breath and the denial of Black people’s right to move freely in the world without losing our lives for having a broken taillight or playing with a toy gun, or for standing on the street chatting with friends.? This refusal of breath is not only anti-Black, but multigenerational, and harder to combat because of the way neoliberalism and acts of privatization have invaded police forces. As Eric Harris’ breath left him, other officers reminded him that “you ran!” Similar charges were levied against Walter Scott by pundits and commentators last week. “Why did he run?”? Neoliberal structures of self-governance demand that we all control ourselves and “do the right thing,” in order to avoid negative consequences. Meanwhile, the conditions that enable us to actually do the right thing continue to slip away. Walter Scott ran because as a poor Black man who was in arrears on his child support, he did not want to be subject to a long prison sentence and fines he could not pay. The sense of precariousness about not being able to enjoy simple pleasures, like going for a ride on the weekend because you might find yourself in prison interminably for bills you can’t pay, is surely not just.? These are not justifications for Walter Scott’s wrongdoing. They are reminders that many of us manage to do the right thing because we live in conditions that allow us to pay bills, adequately support our children, and find sufficient employment. Many, many Americans, a disproportionate number of them Americans of color, do not live in such conditions.? Yelling at them or executing them for making bad choices in a system that offers limited options shows us how often we miss the point. Under this kind of logic, the supposed lack of control of working-class Black and Brown people justifies the stultifying overpolicing of our communities, the stranglehold of our prison system saddling Black people with jail time, fines, probation, parole and a constant sense of threat, and finally, the ultimate refusal of one’s breath by a trigger-happy police officer if you fail to submit in any way to this unjust state of affairs.Post-modernism KThe criticism is doublespeak that disavows the material reality of the body and differences among groups of people—the particularized nature of the affirmative is preferableGeorge Yancy, Professor of Philosophy at McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts, works primarily in the areas of critical philosophy of race, critical whiteness studies, and philosophy of the Black experience, and Linda Martín Alcoff, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center, 2-4-2015, “Philosophy’s Lost Body and Soul,” .: You mentioned how questions of embodiment were not treated in any substantive way in your early philosophical training. Why is it that the profession of philosophy, generally speaking, is still resistant to questions of embodiment and by extension questions of race?? L.M.A.: In my view this is primarily a methodological problem. Philosophers of nearly all persuasions — analytic, continental, pragmatist — aim for general and generalizable theories that can explain human experience of all sorts. And the ultimate aim, of course, is not description but prescription: how can we come to understand ourselves better, to know better, to understand our world better, and to treat each other better? Worthy goals, but they are usually pursued with a decontextualized approach, as if the best answers would work for everyone. To get at that meta-level of generality, some aspects of one’s context need to be set aside, lopped off, cut out of the picture, and this has traditionally meant the concrete materiality of human existence as we actually experience it in embodied human form.? This is just a way of saying that the body had to be ignored except in so far as we could imagine our bodies to be essentially the same. And to achieve that trick of imagination — to imagine all of our wild diversity in embodiment to be irrelevant — required a bad faith that can be seen throughout the canon: racist asides and ridiculous theories about women alongside generic pronouncements about justice and beauty and the route to truth.? I call it bad faith because, on the one hand, nearly all the great philosophers divided human beings into moral and intellectual hierarchies even while, on the other hand, they presumed, from their consciously particularist space, to speak for all. Hence, methodologically, the problem for philosophy is how to speak for all when one does not, in fact, speak to all. And the solution is to enact a doublespeak in which one justifies not speaking to the mass of humanity at the same time that one imagines oneself to be speaking for the human core which exists in all of us. The body, and difference, is simultaneously acknowledged and disavowed.? This is why philosophers such as Bartolomé de Las Casas in the 16th century and W.E.B. DuBois from even his early writings in the 19th century are such powerful figures: They each explore their own specificity and its impact on how they view the world and others, even to how they formulate moral questions. They model a discourse that can become part of a general dialogue in which others can have a voice as well.Schmitt KSchmitt’s theory no longer applies to present-day politics—too much has changed since 9/11Kim Lane Scheppele, John J. O'Brien Professor of Comparative Law and Professor of Sociology, University of? Pennsylvania, May 2004, “Law in a time of emergency: States of exception and the temptations of 9/11,” this Article, I have tried to explain why the logic of Schmitt's? analyses no longer work as a practical matter to justify states of exception,? even when it is clear to the international community that something? fundamental has changed in the world system since 9/11. The? institutional elaboration of a new international system that has occurred? since Schmitt's time make his ideas seem all the more dangerous,? and yet all the more dated. There are simply fewer states in? the world willing to tolerate either Schmitt's conception of politics or? his conception of the defining qualities of sovereignty. Schmitt's philosophy? has, in short, been met with a different sociology. For his? ideas to be either persuasive or effective, they must be more than internally? coherent or even plausible; they must be loosed in a context? in which they can win against other competing ideas. Precisely because? of the horrors of the twentieth century, much of the international? community that has entrenched both democracy and the rule? of law has turned away from these extra-legal justifications for states? of exception. Instead, such states have attempted to embed exceptionality? as an instance of the normal, and not as a repudiation of the? possibility of normality. Only the United States, with its eighteenth-century? constitution and Cold War legacy of exceptionalism, seems to? be soldiering on in this new legal space of conflict unaware that the? defining aspect of the new sovereignty is that even the new sovereign? is bound by rules.Terrorism DANon-unique—Tolerance for surveillance high now. Congress is pushing to maintain the Patriot Act and surveillance techniques used by the NSAAssociated Press, 4-22-2015, “Senate leaders propose extending NSA phone records storage,” before a key surveillance law expires, Senate Republicans have introduced a bill that would allow the National Security Agency to continue collecting the calling records of nearly every American.? The measure by Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and intelligence committee Chairman Richard Burr would bypass Senate committees and reauthorize sections of the Patriot Act, including the provision under which the NSA is requiring phone companies to turn over the "to and from" records of most domestic landline calls.? After the program was disclosed in 2013 by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, President Barrack Obama and many lawmakers called for legislation to end that collection, but a bill to do so failed last year. Proponents had hoped that the expiration of the Patriot Act provisions on June 1 would force consideration of such a measure.? A bipartisan group of House members is set to introduce such legislation later Wednesday, dubbed the USA Freedom Act. But the move by McConnell and Burr shows that there is support in the leadership for maintaining the status quo. Congressional aides, who declined to be quoted speaking about internal deliberations, said the rise of the Islamic State group and the threat of extremists returning to the U.S. after fighting in Syria has shifted the political climate toward more tolerance of surveillance.The idea that information gathering is crucial for counterterrorism operations is fallacious—it only increases the size of the haystack and produces false positives and false negativesSteven R. Morrison, Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law, 2014 “The System of Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement,” Pg. 343-345, is held as truth that more data, if it is well-managed—that is, arranged in? a useful way that reflects its true meaning—and effectively searchable, will inevitably? improve law enforcement’s ability to spot dangerous patterns and discern? criminal intent.8? This Article challenges that assumed truth on two fronts. First, data mining? may not produce its presumed accurate results. Bruce Schneier, for example,? has argued that data mining will produce wasted law enforcement efforts in? chasing false positives, and will also produce false negatives, because all that? data mining does is enlarge the haystack. When what you are looking for is a? rarity—as terrorist plots, or at least attacks, are9—and its rate of occurrence rel-? ative to all environmental conduct is quite low, then enlarging that field will? make detecting the rarity statistically even more unlikely.10? Second, the positive feedback loop resulting from counterterrorism law enforcement? produces increasing systemic inefficiencies that (1) do not reduce? data noise or reveal real criminal patterns; (2) reinforce the preconceived notion? that such law enforcement does reduce noise and reveal patterns; and (3), as a? result of (1) and (2), often lead to inaccurate targeting of suspects (either as? false positives or false negatives). These results are inaccurate and inefficient? law enforcement responses. Because this is a positive, or self-reinforcing, feedback? loop, these three inefficiencies tend to grow over time, resulting in systemic? instability.? These inefficiencies emerge because of the apparent, but unproven, reliability? of the digital age mosaic database that allows the government to link suspects? with each other in social network maps, whether they have an actual relationship? or not.11 The faith that the government gives to these linking efforts? amounts almost to a fetish.12 It is instantiated at trial as prosecutors invoke the? global jihad movement,13 a rhetorical tactic that is not entirely vacuous, accurate,? or new.14 In the 1950s, prosecutors alleged the existence of an “international? Communist movement,”15 similar in form and function to the global jihad? movement. Both were supposed to indicate a worldwide network of people,? closely aligned in ideology and criminal purpose to destroy the United States.? They both worked to enable prosecutors to allege damning conspiracies and introduce? questionably relevant evidence thereof.16 They both also retained cur-? rency as valid evidentiary tropes because observers believed that they signaled? real foreign existential threats to democracy and society itself.17 This expansive? vision produces expansive law enforcement, and thus the feedback loop.The distinction between an act of terrorism and one of domestic crime is incredibly difficult to distinguish which leads to ever-expanding NSA surveillanceRobert M. Bloom, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, and William J. Dunn, J.D., Boston College Law School, spent three years as a civilian intelligence? analyst for the Department of Defense prior to law school, which included a one-year assignment? at the National Military Joint Intelligence Center in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon,? one year as a sensitive source reporting analyst and Central Intelligence Agency liaison for? the Office of Naval Intelligence, and one year as an all-source Middle East analyst, 2007, “The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless NSA? Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential Power and? the Injury to the Fourth Amendment,” there is an imminent terrorist threat, the use of traditional law enforcement? officials and procedures to address terrorism casts doubt on whether a clear distinction? can be made between terrorism and general crime control.416 The purpose of the warrantless? NSA surveillance is to detect and prevent the death and destruction that? comes from attacks on American people and infrastructure.417 It is difficult, if not? impossible, to determine how a car bomb detonated by an Al Qaida operative is distinguishable? from a car bomb detonated by a domestic criminal. In 2002, the United? States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, in In re Sealed Case,? recognized that this distinction is especially difficult when attempting to justify? foreign intelligence collection of a United States person under the FISA definition? of an “agent of a foreign power.”418 The court noted that “the definition of an agent? of a foreign power—if he or she is a U.S. person—is grounded on criminal conduct.”419? The warrantless NSA surveillance includes domestic citizens and places; therefore,? it falls within conduct closely associated with criminal activity.420 Upholding a warrantless? search to effectuate this purpose would constitute an expansion of the Supreme? Court’s narrow “special needs” cases to include searches that employ law enforcement? officials in a manner similar to crime control.421Terrorism scholarship is fundamentally flawed—be skeptical of their researchMichael German, fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program, which seeks to ensure that our government respects human rights and fundamental freedoms in conducting the fight against terrorism, 4-7-2015, “Is Flawed Terrorism Research Driving Flawed Counterterrorism Policies?,” such factor is the cottage industry of government-funded academic programs that propagate flawed terrorist radicalization theories. Terrorism studies programs have come under significant criticism for failing to uphold rigorous standards of empirical social science research. A NATO Security in Science review found that, “of 1535 scholarly papers published on the subject of terrorism between 2000 and 2004, only 121 had the word ‘data’ in their abstracts and a careful review reveals that genuine new data was reported in less than 10% of that subgroup.”? Arun Kundnani, author of The Muslim’s are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror recently explained to me how these flawed academic studies programs have great influence intelligence and law enforcement agencies:? The FBI agents Kundnani interviewed said they preferred a simple explanation of terrorist radicalization over a more complex one, even if it was contradicted by evidence. But there may be more to why the government prefers these theories than mere simplicity.? Dr. Lisa Stampnitzky, of Harvard University, shares Kundnani’s view that terrorism studies often have an unhealthy financial and intellectual dependence on government:? “Terrorism expertise has its origins as an adjunct to the developing counterterrorism apparatus of the state, with the earliest organized efforts at terrorism studies largely sponsored by the state, and often explicitly oriented toward developing practical techniques of control.”? This insight is crucial to understanding the government’s continuing embrace of radicalization theories. Simply put, the government continues to be the primary sponsor of radicalization studies because they justify counterterrorism policies that maximize its policing powers. As Kundnani has written, “[s]cholarship that associates a particular kind of ‘disposition’, be it ‘cultural,’ ‘psychological’…, with terrorist violence enables intelligence gatherers to use that disposition as a proxy for terrorist risk and to structure their surveillance accordingly.”? Treating terrorism as the spread of an ideological infection within a vulnerable community also allows the government to put aside difficult questions about the role U.S. foreign and national security policies play in generating anti-American grievances, which the Defense Department raised in this 2004 report. Studies supporting government radicalization theories rarely mention U.S. military actions in Muslim countries, lethal drone strikes, torture, or the Guantanamo Bay prison as radicalizing influences, though many terrorist reference them in attempting to justify their actions.? The reliance on radicalization theory also provides benefits to those who support the current political, social, and financial status quo, particularly in regard to U.S. foreign policy. The support for these theories comes from a broad array of organizations.AT: “National Security Outweighs”National security is founded on racism and operates on a system of exclusion that targets individuals based on who they are not what they doCorinna Mullin, activist and academic currently based in Tunis, and Azadeh Shahshahani, human rights attorney based in Atlanta and President of the National Lawyers Guild, 8-21-2014, “From Gaza to Ferguson: Exposing the Toolbox of Racist Repression,” the violent policing of American black communities traceable back to the “slave patrols” of the early 18th century, the origins of the U.S. national security state are particularly deep-rooted and brutal. Yet although the context is different, the United States’ history of settler-colonialism and techniques of racial and economic domination yield many similarities with Israel’s methods.? Importantly, both states operate according to a “national security state” logic, in which a host of violent as well as mundane administrative practices result in physical harm and limits to individual and group freedoms.? Linked to the notion of a “state of exception,” a context in which a state claims leeway to violate a host of legal and constitutional norms, the national security state requires a dehumanized “Other” to sustain its politics of fear. Those constructed as “Other” are deemed threatening not on the basis of their actions, but rather on the basis of their identity or perceived ideology. In other words, it is not what they do, but who they are (Blacks, Palestinians, Muslims, Arabs, Islamists, etc.) that matters in determining whether a criminal act has been committed. Inversing the logic of the law, the Other in a “state of exception” is guilty until proven innocent.? The national security state is characterized by a concentration of power in the hands of the executive, violations of due process and other constitutional guarantees, and liberal use of the state secrecy prerogative. It also entails increased restrictions on speech, association, and privacy; the targeting of whistle blowers, lawyers, and civil liberties advocates; the criminalization of entire communities; and an expanded role for the military and intelligence agencies in civil life, including through the militarization of the police and the use of violence against civilian populations.There is a way to maintain national security and protect the privacy rights of American citizens—the government must be transparent about surveillance so the public can hold them accountable.Al Franken, US Senator from Minnesota, 7-23-2013, “We need transparency on domestic surveillance,” government must give proper weight to both keeping America safe from terrorists and protecting Americans' privacy. But when Americans lack the most basic information about our domestic surveillance programs, they have no way of knowing whether we're getting that balance right. This lack of transparency is a big problem.? Since I came to the Senate, I've been working to fix this. I've supported amendments to the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that would have required greater public reporting on the use of surveillance authorities and greater disclosures about the legal opinions and safeguards that support them. When those amendments failed, I voted against renewing both of these laws.? I want to be clear: I didn't vote "no" because I wanted to end these programs or because I thought they were unnecessary. Based on briefings, I believe these programs protect our country and have saved lives and have reasonable safeguards in place to protect Americans' privacy. I voted the way I did because I wanted to send a loud signal to my colleagues that transparency was critical and that there was too little of it in place. National security laws must protect national security. But they must also protect the public trust and preserve the ability of an informed electorate to hold its government to account.? I'm working on legislation that will require the federal government to annually report how it uses key authorities under the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, including the authorities underlying the phone metadata and the PRISM electronic surveillance programs that recently came to light. For each of these authorities, the government must disclose how many Americans' information is being collected and how many Americans' information is being queried and actually seen by federal officers or agents.? My legislation would also allow companies to publicly report on how many Patriot and FISA orders they're getting and how many of their customers these orders affect. There's a way to do this that protects national security. Since 2009, Google has been reporting on the number of national security letters it receives, and that hasn't hurt anyone. I frankly think that after Snowden's disclosures, an even stronger case can be made that we can achieve greater transparency without harming national ernment surveillance tactics are unknown and even when they are discovered individuals don’t know what the harms of surveillance are—it’s important to challenge thisNeil M. Richards, Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, 2013, “The Dangers of Surveillance,” we have laws that protect us against government surveillance,? secret government programs cannot be challenged until they are? discovered. And even when they are, our law of surveillance provides? only minimal protections. Courts frequently dismiss challenges to such? programs for lack of standing, under the theory that mere surveillance? creates no harms. The Supreme Court recently reversed the only major? case to hold to the contrary, in Clapper v. Amnesty International? USA,3 finding that the respondents’ claim that their communications? were likely being monitored was “too speculative.”4? But the important point is that our society lacks an understanding? of why (and when) government surveillance is harmful. Existing attempts? to identify the dangers of surveillance are often unconvincing,? and they generally fail to speak in terms that are likely to influence the? law. In this Article, I try to explain the harms of government surveillance.? Drawing on law, history, literature, and the work of scholars in? the emerging interdisciplinary field of “surveillance studies,” I offer an? account of what those harms are and why they matter. I will move? beyond the vagueness of current theories of surveillance to articulate a? more coherent understanding and a more workable approach.? At the level of theory, I will explain why and when surveillance is? particularly dangerous and when it is not. First, surveillance is harmful? because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With respect? to civil liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are thinking,? reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their? minds about political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance? is especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment? with new, controversial, or deviant ideas. To protect our intellectual? freedom to think without state oversight or interference, we need what? I have elsewhere called “intellectual privacy.”5 A second special harm? that surveillance poses is its effect on the power dynamic between the? watcher and the watched. This disparity creates the risk of a variety? of harms, such as discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selective? enforcement, where critics of the government can be prosecuted? or blackmailed for wrongdoing unrelated to the purpose of the? surveillance.State of emergency exceptions have been drastically out of control and led to compromising international commitments—reject this logicKim Lane Scheppele, John J. O'Brien Professor of Comparative Law and Professor of Sociology, University of? Pennsylvania, May 2004, “Law in a time of emergency: States of exception and the temptations of 9/11,” this background of the exception and its rationales, I next? explore the specific responses of the United States to 9/11 in both? domestic and foreign policy in Part II of this Article. Since 9/11, the? Bush administration has repeatedly invoked its ability to make exceptions? to normal legality to cope with the terrorist threat in domestic? policy through increasing invocation of military rationales for its actions.? The commander-in-chief powers that have been invoked by the? President have had the effect of undermining both separation of? powers and individual rights at home. In foreign policy, the Bush? administration acted as though 9/11 created the basis not only for a? national state of emergency, but also an international state of emergency? that requires other countries to make exceptions to both international? law and their constitutional orders. The United States, as? a result, has urged its allies to compromise their constitutional and? international commitments to meet the new threat.? As I will show, the Bush administration's response to 9/11 in both? domestic and foreign policy is not what one would typically expect of? a true emergency; namely, quick responses that violate the constitutional? order followed by a progressive normalization. Instead, the? American government (including all three branches working together)? responded with much constitutional care right after 9/11,? fully aware that the temptation would be to overreact. The greater? abuses have come as 9/11 recedes and executive policy has turned? toward larger and larger constitutional exceptions, with the active acquiescence? so far of both Congress and the courts. The reaction to? 9/11 was not the declaration of a sudden emergency that has gradually? abated, but instead has involved a measured immediate response? followed by ever-expanding justifications for the assertion of executive? and unilateral power.The blurring of boundaries between the police and intelligence gathering agencies is not an effective means of combatting terrorismAle? Zavr?nik, Faculty of Law at the Institute of Criminology, Ljubljana, 2013, “Blurring the Line between Law Enforcement and? Intelligence: Sharpening the Gaze of? Surveillance?,” from a longer historical perspective, the current relaxation of borders in the control? and security domain is not at all new. The influence of different agencies has varied over? time and so has the kind of work they carry out. A full account of these evolutions is? obviously beyond the scope of the present discussion. The focus here will thus be on how? law enforcement and foreign intelligence work has overlapped, in institutional,? functional, operative, technological and spatial terms, over the last two decades. We? may summarise the resulting blur as follows: institutionally, new hybrid agencies and? organs have been formed to facilitate cooperation and information exchange. In spatial? terms, law enforcement agencies have started focusing on external threats in? ‘peacekeeping and stabilisation operations’ (cf. Last 2010) while intelligence agencies? began turning to domestic threats. In functional and operative terms ‘intelligence-led? policing’ is increasingly the prototype of all police work (cf. Lemieux 2008) and police? forces have been permitted to employ more invasive secret service-type powers? (examples would include digital searches with on-line ‘Trojan horses’ that fall outside the? scope of judicial overview1 and video surveillance enhanced with face-recognition or? registration plate-recognition systems).2? The blurring of these boundaries cannot be assessed simply as a positive or negative? development. It can be interpreted in several contradictory ways: as complementary or? competitive; as a trend providing a security net; or one demolishing the safety net of? human rights. Hermetically sealed dividing lines between police and intelligence lead to? unjustifiable inefficacy and inefficiency on both sides, and agencies should obviously be? allowed to exchange relevant information. But the examples to be outlined in this paper? will show that impulsively blurring the boundaries between these fields is not a solution? to growing fears of terrorism, cross-border crime and irregular migration. Walls torn-down? raise the level of ‘emergency criminal law’ (Vervaele 2005) and lead us towards a? ‘pre-crime society’ (Zedner 2007).Surveillance not effectiveDomestic surveillance tactics are not effective and trades off with more beneficial forms of law enforcementNicole Pasulka, staff writer and reporter, 10-20-2014, “Snowden Says Mass Surveillance Could Make the U.S. More Vulnerable to Attacks,” to Snowden, the problem is not simply that the NSA database is “a violation of our natural rights.” Even if the government were just collecting this data, not searching it without warrants, the information hasn’t served its alleged purpose of detecting criminal activity.? Snowden isn’t the first person to point this out. In January, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an independent group created by Congress after 9/11, released a report that found only one instance in seven years of the NSA telephone metadata surveillance program leading to a legitimate tip on a terrorist suspect. Members had full access to this classified information and were “incentivized to exonerate these programs,” Snowden said.? “We miss attacks. We miss leads, and investigations fail because when the government is doing what it calls a ‘collect it all’ investigation, we’re not seeing anything with specificity. It’s impossible to keep an eye on all your targets when you’re constantly dumping more hay on top of them,” Snowden said.? “We have finite resources, and the question is, should we be spending $10 billion dollars a year on mass surveillance programs at the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means of traditional targeted surveillance?”? That the collection of phone metadata distracts from more effective forms of law enforcement wasn’t the only argument Snowden made against the program. He also disagreed when Lessig asked him about a suggestion, first proposed by CIA whistle-blower William Binney, that the data be collected but encrypted and accessible only with proper authorization from the courts.The FBI tricks law-abiding citizens into committing terrorist attacks in an effort to appear effectiveDeirdre Fulton, staff writer, 7-21-2014, “FBI Entrapment Created 'Illusion' of Terrorist Plots: Report,” FBI, under pressure to appear effective and worthy of its $8.4-billion budget, has "targeted American Muslims in abusive counterterrorism 'sting operations' based on religious and ethnic identity"; sent informants to mosques to "troll for leads"; and in some cases encouraged or even paid individuals to undertake terrorist acts, the report (pdf) reveals.? “Americans have been told that their government is keeping them safe by preventing and prosecuting terrorism inside the US,” said Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington director at Human Rights Watch and one of the authors of the report. “But take a closer look and you realize that many of these people would never have committed a crime if not for law enforcement encouraging, pressuring, and sometimes paying them to commit terrorist acts.”? The study, entitled Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in U.S. Terrorism Prosecutions, examines 27 federal terrorism cases (of more than 500 since September 11, 2001) from initiation of the investigations to sentencing and post-conviction conditions of confinement, finding infractions at every turn.? By preying on vulnerable individuals, utilizing questionable legal tactics, and subjecting citizens to harsh and disproportionate confinement conditions, the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI show disregard for civil rights and "may be creating terrorists out of law-abiding citizens," report co-author Tarek Z. Ismai writes at Just Security.Law enforcement operates with a large degree of confirmation bias which allows for context-inappropriate responses to eventsSteven R. Morrison, Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law, 2014 “The System of Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement,” Pg. 369-370, the collective level, 9/11 can be said to be the United States’ triggering? event. Since the attacks, law enforcement has operated in a sustained survival? mode. It suffers from confirmation bias, and therefore produces “context-? inappropriate” responses to events.169 One such response is the view that Muslims? and others from the Middle East present a threat that justifies targeting? them as a group.170? Confirmation bias also contributes to positive feedback loops because confirmatory? evidence builds confidence in a pre-existing strategy and inhibits the? ability to change. As the commitment to a strategy continues through time, confidence? in that strategy increases, resulting in increased commitment to the? strategy and to the search for even more confirmatory evidence.171 And so,? confirmation bias drives the positive feedback loop, but the feedback loop also? drives the confirmation bias.172? Confirmation bias produces perceived, self-reinforcing law enforcement? successes,173 as it entails conspiracy charges, pseudo-entrapment, and pretextual? charges. The heuristics associated with biased thinking lead to systematic errors,? failure to update belief sets, underestimation of uncertainty, and excessive? crediting of salient evidence.174 It is possible that operation of confirmation biases? increases the rate of false positives and false negatives.175 Confirmation? bias also, however, may produce more true positives because those subject to? the bias are hypersensitive to threats.176 Discovery of these true positives drives? positive feedback loops and immunizes them somewhat from criticism. Given? the not-another-9/11 imperative, people may be more comfortable with a larger? ratio of false positives to true positives than they would be otherwise.177AT: GuidelinesRestrictions on intelligence gathering operations have decreased since 9/11 and the government and law enforcement are not recognizing the distinction between domestic and foreign operationsMichael German, fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program, which seeks to ensure that our government respects human rights and fundamental freedoms in conducting the fight against terrorism, 12-18-2014, “The Militarization of Domestic Surveillance is Everyone’s Problem,” ’s-problemUnfortunately, the federal government has loosened or ignored law enforcement guidelines restricting intelligence gathering in the years since 9/11, removing or weakening the criminal predicates necessary to ensure a proper focus on illegal activity. The results were predictable —increased police spying on minorities and political dissidents and increased efforts to escape judicial and public oversight. Federal law enforcement agencies have adopted policies of “parallel construction” to mask the surveillance methods they use to gather evidence, misleading courts and depriving defendants of their right to challenge their constitutionality. Where evidence of improper FBI surveillance has leaked to the public, the Justice Department invoked “state secrets” to shut down litigation. And at the request of the State Police and FBI, the Virginia legislature exempted its intelligence fusion center from open government laws.? Trained by the military to spy on hostile foreign nations, Dahl cautioned that “you wouldn’t want to hire me to conduct domestic surveillance.” His statement should serve as a warning to those in Congress who authorized the NSA to play a major role in seizing Americans’ electronic communications (and want to give it more authority over U.S. cyber security), and sat silent as the FBI has transitioned into a domestic intelligence agency.? It should also serve as a warning to federal, state and local law enforcement officials. As these agencies have increasingly claimed a role in intelligence collection, they’ve looked to the military and foreign intelligence agencies for tactics, expertise and personnel, without sufficiently recognizing the important distinctions between domestic and foreign intelligence.COURTS COUNTERPLAN RESPONSESPermutation SolvencyEmpirically, Congress and the Supreme Court work together with overlapping responsibilitiesDeanell Reece Tacha, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and Chair of Committee on the Judicial Branch, United States Judicial Conference, 1991Ohio State Law Journal: Volume 52, Issue 1, (accessed 5/21/2015)The historical record of our nation is replete with examples of overlapping responsibilities and close interaction between Congress and the judiciary. Although the possibility of simultaneous responsibility in both branches has been largely foreclosed in the modern era-to the great relief of overworked legislators and judges-the regular, uninhibited interaction between members of both branches as they went about their official duties and their personal lives remains an example for us today.Courts and legislative actions empirically work together to secure constitutional rightsScott Barclay, head of Department of History and Politics at Drexel College, October 3, 2013"Let's Talk: How Congress and the Court Make It Work," Life of the Law, (accessed 5/21/2015)This interplay is not the popular image of how rights are achieved: the edict brought from constitutional powers on high, as the myth of Brown v Board of Education would have us believe. But, in fact, it is the more historically accurate version. Brown was largely implemented through the actions by federal bureaucratic agencies who took their policy lead from congressional actions and ongoing court decisions that determined the look of the policy on-the-ground. Similarly, notwithstanding the US Supreme Court intervention in 2003 in Lawrence v Texas, the elimination of state sodomy prohibitions from the 1962 through 2003 occurred through a dynamic mix of state legislative action and state court decisions, before federal court action finally completed the task.Permutation SolvencySeparate actions can spur dialogue between the branches, resulting in policy improvementDeanell Reece Tacha, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and Chair of Committee on the Judicial Branch, United States Judicial Conference, 1991Ohio State Law Journal: Volume 52, Issue 1, (accessed 5/21/2015)The complexities of the law-making and law interpreting tasks in the third century of this republic cry out for systematic dialogue between those who make and those who interpret legislation. History suggests that dialogue between the legislative and judicial branches of government was anticipated by the framers of the Constitution. Common sense supports the notion that the public good-and the economy-would be served by enhanced communication between these branches. Even with enhanced dialogue, separation of powers would be preserved by each branch's exercise of its primary power, structural constraints established by the Constitution, and the independence of the individual players.Congress and courts acting together remove constraints to social changeGerald N. Rosenberg, Professor of Law and Political Science at University of Chicago, 2008"Ideological Preferences and Hollow Hopes," University of Chicago Press Page, (accessed 5/20/2015)The second problem with this criticism is that it assumes that whenever the Congress reacts to a Court decision, this is a strike against my argument. For example, Devins, in a long discussion of Court, Congress, and executive interaction in civil rights, argues that in the areas of tax breaks for racist schools, diversity preferences for minority broadcasters, and employment discrimination, the other branches responded to Court decisions in ways that furthered civil rights (Devins 1992, 1046–54). I believe Devins is correct but also believe that nothing in The Hollow Hope argues against this. In each of these subject areas there was legislation or executive orders furthering the civil rights goals. The existence of such political action means that each of the constraints were or could be overcome. The first constraint was overcome because governmental actors created a statutory right, the second constraint was overcome because that action signaled to the justices that they were unlikely to suffer consequences for acting, and the third constraint could be overcome if administrative officials, whose acquiescence was required for implementation, were supportive.Coordination serves the orderly development of lawDeanell Reece Tacha, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and Chair of Committee on the Judicial Branch, United States Judicial Conference, 1991Ohio State Law Journal: Volume 52, Issue 1, (accessed 5/21/2015)Even assuming the reluctance of legislators and judges to interact is grounded in an appropriate concern for separation of powers, our history is replete with examples of constructive dialogue between the branches serving the orderly development of our law. Separation was not intended to mean alienation or to create antagonistic positions. The relationship between the judiciary and Congress was not marked by professional distrust and begrudging compromise when the Constitution originally established separate branches with distinct powers. Legitimacy TurnsControversial decisions undermine Supreme Court legitimacyJames L. Gibson, Professor of Political Science at Washington University Saint Louis, and Gregory Caldeira, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, July 4, 2007"Supreme Court Nominations, Legitimacy Theory, and the American Public: A Dynamic Test of the Theory of Positivity Bias," Social Science Research Network, (accessed 5/21/2015)But opinions can indeed change, with at least two types of “exogenous” sources — controversial Supreme Court decisions and politicized confirmation hearings — providing engines for attitude change. Events such as these may awaken attitudes from their hibernation, allowing for the possibility of updating. Two types of change seem possible: Attention to things judicial may be associated with exposure to highly legitimizing symbols of judicial power (e.g., robes), symbols that teach the lesson that the Court is different from ordinary political institutions and therefore is worthy of esteem. Gibson and Caldeira refer to this as “positivity bias.” Alternatively, events may teach that the Court is not different, that its role is largely “political,” and that the “myth of legality” really is a myth. Since so few studies have adopted a dynamic perspective on attitudes toward institutions, we know little about how these processes of attitude change take place.Court legitimacy is key to fighting terrorismJeremy Shapiro, Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe, March 2003"French Lessons: The Importance of the Judicial System in Fighting Terrorism," Brookings Institute, (accessed 5/21/2015)On February 19, 2003 a court in Germany handed down the first guilty verdict related to the September 11 attacks. A panel of judges in Hamburg found Mounir Al-Motassadeq, a Moroccan studying in Germany, guilty of over 3000 counts of accessory to commit murder. The verdict was a signal victory in the war against terrorism. The very fact, however, that the first such conviction occurred abroad is also a reminder of how little success the U.S. government has had since September 11 in involving the U.S. courts in the struggle against terrorism. The Bush administration's judicial inactivity reflects a widely held discomfort in the U.S. with using the courts for dealing with national security threats. The process is considered too slow, too dependent on inflexible rules, too prone to leaks of valuable intelligence, and too unresponsive to the needs of a rapidly evolving and essentially political threat. These concerns are certainly valid, but they must be weighed against the points raised by numerous human rights organizations and legal scholars that indefinite detentions and military tribunals are inconsistent with deeply held American principles of fairness and justice. There is no simple formula for reconciling the war on terrorism's short-term requirement for speed and flexibility with the same war's long-term need for legitimacy. Nonetheless, understanding the importance of judicial procedures and legitimacy requires a long-term view of the problem of terrorism that the United States lacks. The long French experience with terrorism provides some perspective and demonstrates why judicial institutions that can handle terrorist cases are a critical piece of a nation's counterterrorism arsenal.Courts Ineffective in Checking ExecutiveThe Court can't check executive power--only Congress canFrederick M. Kaiser, Specialist in American National Government at Congressional Research Service, 2001"Congressional Oversight," CRS Report for Congress, (accessed 5/21/2015)The authority to oversee derives from these constitutional powers. Congress could not carry them out reasonably or responsibly without knowing what the executive is doing; how programs are being administered, by whom, and at what cost; and whether officials are obeying the law and complying with legislative intent. The Supreme Court has legitimated Congress’s investigative power, subject to constitutional safeguards for civil liberties.Standing prevents legal action against executive authorityElizabeth Price Foley, Professor of Law at Florida International University, February 7, 2014"Why not even Congress can sue the administration over unconstitutional executive actions," Daily Caller, (accessed 5/21/2015)First, courts have limited ability to check a president’s failure to execute. The primary obstacle is “standing,” a doctrine that requires a plaintiff to have a concrete, personal injury in order to sue. Citizens can’t file generic lawsuits to enforce the Constitution; they must prove that the government has harmed them in a personal, palpable way.The Supreme Court has no enforcement--executive can just ignore its decisionsLisa L. Miller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, February 16, 2006"Too little too late: The Supreme Court as a check on Executive power," Mother Jones, (accessed 5/21/2015)The Supreme Court must rely on the other branches of government to enforce its decisions and as an unelected body that must react to cases brought before it, the Court is highly constrained in the issues it can address. A brief look at cases involving executive power reveals few instances in which the court bucked the status quo. The best we can say about Supreme Court rulings in this area is that they have, on occasion, drawn some loose boundaries around presidential authority. However, in the absence of clear congressional opposition to executive action, the Supreme Court has largely affirmed broad discretion, particularly in times of war or other national security crises. This is not surprising since the Constitution provides specific powers to both Congress and the executive in these areas but grants no such direct authority to the Supreme Court.Counterplan Leads to Judicial ActivismSua sponte hearing of politically contentious case spurs judicial activismRosemary Krimbel, Special Deputy for Regulatory Reform for the City of Chicago, January 1989"Rehearing SUA Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Procedure for Judicial Policymaking," Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 65, no. 3, (accessed 5/19/2015)Through the interplay of the Court's discretion to grant writs of certiorari and request rehearing sua sponte, the Court may reach out and pick specific issues as well as cases. This interplay raises the specter of what has been called the "countermajoritarian difficulty," which arises when the politically unaccountable Court intervenes in the political process. The memorandum opinion that requested reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union s brought to the forefront the question of whether the Court's inherent power to administer its docket -the foundation for its ability to rehear cases sua sponte-may be abused by an activist Court. Adding a case to the docket transforms the Court into a player in policymakingRosemary Krimbel, Special Deputy for Regulatory Reform for the City of Chicago, January 1989"Rehearing SUA Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Procedure for Judicial Policymaking," Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 65, no. 3, (accessed 5/19/2015)As a result, the Court can address the policy decisions made by the politically accountable branches-Congress and the Executive-only when presented with legal challenges to those decisions. But the Court has the inherent ability to add an issue to a case already on its docket simply by requesting rehearing sua sponte, as the Court did in the Patterson case over vigorous dissents by four Justices. This Note will examine how the Supreme Court's broad discretion to select cases and issues has changed the Court from a passive institution "with neither force nor will but merely judgment" to the influential arbiter of "whether the political solutions to major national problems devised by the legislative and executive branches [will] be allowed to proceed."Counterplan Leads to Judicial ActivismSmall steps toward judicial lawmaking spread out of control to complete lack of judicial restraintAnthony D'Amato, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, 2010"Judicial Legislation," Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons, Faculty Working Papers No. 107, (accessed 5/22/2015)Lawyers, as well as the public at large, need a sense of certainty that existing law can be counted upon and plans can be made grounded in legal research and thought. The idea of judicial legislation creates a hole in the system, into which is poured the unpredictable lawmaking preferences of whichever judge happens to be sitting in a given case. The hole widens when lawyers, counseling clients, perceive that an issue is sufficiently close for a future judge to make up a new rule governing it. Uncertainty grows, and it spawns more and more litigation. Soon there are gaps everywhere, and judges become lawmakers—unelected, unaccountable, and unrestrained by whatever rules and principles of law the parties relied upon in the first place. When Court addresses issues not settled by legislature or executive, it raises the countermajoritarian difficultyRosemary Krimbel, Special Deputy for Regulatory Reform for the City of Chicago, January 1989"Rehearing SUA Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Procedure for Judicial Policymaking," Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 65, no. 3, (accessed 5/19/2015)By rehearing sua sponte, the Court can accelerate the "sooner or later" timing of an issue's arrival and, thereby, evade the Constitution's jurisdictional constraints. Thus, the Court can address either issues that have not been decided by a politically accountable body or, worse, issues that have been decided by political representatives. The latter set of issues gives the Court the opportunity to invalidate legislative enactments without anyone requesting that they do so. Both actions raise the countermajoritarian difficulty and possibly violate the Constitution's case or controversy limitation.Activism causes inevitable conflict of interest Anthony D'Amato, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, 2010"Judicial Legislation," Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons, Faculty Working Papers No. 107, (accessed 5/22/2015)On the other hand, the attitude that a judge may legislate could shade imperceptibly into some of these conflicts of interest. A judge who owns shares of stock might find that, once he is legislating for the good of society, social policy requires that corporations should tend to prevail in litigation against private persons or the government. A judge who has heavily invested in the stock market and who has a personal fortune that is dependent on good business conditions might well be inclined to favor decisions that are supportive of a good business environment. These kinds of factors may have a powerful effect upon a judge who feels that in close cases he is freed from the burden of finding the law and instead is called upon to make wise new rules for the social good.Legislature is Better than the CourtsCongress is better equipped to deal with surveillance issues than the courtsRaymond Shih Ray Ku, Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Law, Technology & the Arts, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2010"Unlimited Power: Why the President's (Warrantless) Surveillance Program is Unconstitutional," Faculty Publications, Paper 576, (accessed 5/19/2015) In addition to being the proper constitutional body to decide these questions, legislatures are institutionally more competent than courts to make the types of policy decisions associated with authorizing government surveillance. Since they are politically accountable, they are more likely to evaluate the policy implications of certain surveillance technologies, balancing, among other things, the threat to privacy and the potential for abuse. In other words, this is a balancing of the demands of public security from a potentially abusive government against the demands for public safety from groups and individuals who may do us harm. Legislative branch understands technology better than the courts and takes public interest more into accountRaymond Shih Ray Ku, Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Law, Technology & the Arts, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2010"Unlimited Power: Why the President's (Warrantless) Surveillance Program is Unconstitutional," Faculty Publications, Paper 576, (accessed 5/19/2015) The legislative branch is also better able to develop a factual record with respect to the nuances and details of new technologies and their costs and benefits. Moreover, whatever one might think of the legislative process, it is more likely to take the interests of the general public into account in fashioning rules governing surveillance than courts who are asked to make such decisions in cases in which a search revealed evidence of a defendant's guilt, and the only remedy is exclusion of that evidence. Counterplan Links to Politics DisadvantageCongress perceives and reacts to Supreme Court decisionsDanette Brickman, Associate Professor of Political Science at St. Bonaventure University, January 3, 2007"Congressional Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: Understanding the Introduction of Legislation to Override," , (accessed 5/21/2015)The United States Constitution sets forth a government that prescribes specific roles for each of its branches. While, constitutionally, Congress is the policy-making branch, the U.S. Supreme Court enters the policy-making arena through statutory interpretation and judicial review decisions. The preferred policies of these two branches of government do not always coincide, causing conflict between the Court and Congress. At such times this conflict can lead to a battle over control of national policy. This paper explains congressional reaction to Supreme Court decisions by relaxing two of the assumptions of the separation of powers game and incorporating changing congressional preferences and context. U.S. Supreme Court decisions tend to be viewed “not as a mere interpretation of law, but a determinative statement of national policy that is, for all practical purposes, irrevocable” (Paschel 1991:144). While the majority of Supreme Court decisions remain untouched by Congress, a number of statutory interpretation and judicial review decisions have been successfully overridden by the legislative branch, making it apparent that Supreme Court decisions are not necessarily final. In certain circumstances Congress is willing to do battle with the Court to achieve their preferred policy.It’s implausible to separate judicial decisions and politicsBarry Friedman, Professor of Law at New York University, 2005"The Politics of Judicial Review," Texas Law Review, Vol. 84, (accessed 5/21/2015)This Part examines how the necessity of separating law from politics became a central tenet of constitutional theory. By explaining how we have arrived at the present, history opens space for understanding our world differently. What began as a rhetorical response by opponents of particular Supreme Court decisions has become a fixture of theories of judicial review. This instinct is not wrong: There clearly is a longstanding and central societal belief that law and politics are not the same and should not be considered as such. At the same time, however, history suggests that a strict separation of law and politics is - and always has been - implausible. Counterplan Links to Politics DisadvantageWe can’t isolate Supreme Court decisions from the political process—decisions have political repercussionsBarry Friedman, Professor of Law at New York University, 2005"The Politics of Judicial Review," Texas Law Review, Vol. 84, (accessed 5/21/2015)Only recently - sparked, as is typically the case, by a spate of contentious Supreme Court decisions - have many begun to see that constitutional judging cannot be insulated from "ordinary" politics in quite the way theory demands. Recognition of the relationship between law and politics is on the rise. Still, it is apparent that normative scholars remain uncomfortable with the implications of positive scholarship, even as they take notice. Legal theorists indicate their discomfort by moving quickly from positive assertions about the relationship between law and politics to conclusions that positive scholars would suggest simply are implausible. To take a frequent example, some normative scholars look to the political branches to correct errant judges without considering whether there is any reason to think the political branches are likely to do so at present.Supreme Court decisions send political messagesJoseph L. Smith, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Alabama, 2007"Presidents, Justices, and Deference to Administrative Action," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2, (accessed 5/21/2015)This article continues a line of research begun by Linda Cohen and Matt Spitzer in the 1990s. Cohen and Spitzer began with the insight that Supreme Court decisions evaluating agency actions do more than merely uphold or overturn the action being litigated. These decisions also communicate legal doctrine to the lower courts, sending signals regarding the level of deference they should show to agency decisions. Given the small number of administrative law cases the Supreme Court hears each term, they assert that the signal-sending or doctrinal element of these decisions will have a larger impact on policy than the direct effects on the litigants. Cohen and Spitzer argue that Supreme Court Justices can best achieve their policy-related goals if they consider their ideological relationship with the executive branch and then factor this relationship into their decisions evaluating administrative actions. Their model generally suggests that as the median member of the Court gets ideologically closer to the president, the Court should become more deferential to the administrative action.There are myriad historical instances of judicial review sparking political battlesBarry Friedman, Professor of Law at New York University, 2005"The Politics of Judicial Review," Texas Law Review, Vol. 84, (accessed 5/21/2015)Throughout American history, views about judicial review have been shaped more by political responses to judicial decisions in heated controversies than by any jurisprudential theory of what it means to live under a constitution. This was true during the first great clash of will between the courts and the "political" branches following the election of 1800. All the famous partisan skirmishes of that era - the Marbury litigation, the repeal of the Circuit Judges Act, and the impeachment of Samuel Chase - were motivated by the Federalist party's withdrawal to the judiciary and the immediate political challenge this withdrawal posed to Republican policy. Nonetheless, these disputes played out as debates about judicial independence, popular accountability, and the separation of politics and law.Court Stripping TurnEmpirically controversial decisions spark legislative court-stripping initiativesW. David Kubiak, Project Censored Award-winning journalist and a Kyoto Journal contributing editor, March 24, 2005"Introducing the Constitution Restoration Act," The Scoop, (accessed 5/21/2015)Just when you thought the corporatist/Christian Coalition had milked the 9/11 "surprise" for all it was worth in powers, profits and votes, we regret to report that you may have to think again. Just in case you've briefly fallen behind on your rightwing mailing lists, you might have missed the March 3rd filing of Senate bill S. 520 and House version is H.R. 1070, AKA the "Constitution Restoration Act" (CRA). In the worshipful words of the Conservative Caucus, this historic legislation will "RESTORE OUR CONSTITUTION!", mainly by barring ANY federal court or judge from ever again reviewing "any matter to the extent that relief is sought against an entity of Federal, State, or local government, or against an officer or agent of Federal, State, or local government (whether or not acting in official or personal capacity), concerning that entity's, officer's, or agent's acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government."Barriers to court stripping are being lifted and Congress has a propensity to pass court-stripping legislation in response to controversial decisionsHelen L. Norton, Professor of Law at University of Colorado, 2006"Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress's Latest Challenge to Judicial Review," Social Science Research Network, (accessed 5/21/2015)Not only are these efforts increasingly successful, they are likely to reemerge in future proposals to shape subject matter jurisdiction and thus the balance of judicial power. The House's passage of two separate court-stripping bills in the same Congress represents a high-water mark in the court-shaping movement, as does its passage of the Pledge Protection Act in successive Congresses. Indeed, some of the dynamics that helped thwart earlier court-stripping measures appear to have diminished or disappeared altogether.Court stripping allows Congress to pass unconstitutional laws and destroys judicial reviewMax Baucus, former U.S. Senator from Montana, and Kenneth R. Kay, Chief Minority Counsel, United States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, January 1, 1982"The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress," Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, (accessed 5/21/2015)These hypotheticals are the reasonable extension of the strategy being put forward in the court stripping bills, not fanciful ruminations. If one supports removal of Supreme Court jurisdiction over abortion or school prayer, one necessarily supports the possibility of Congress precluding review of any legislation that might run afoul of any constitutional principle, including those held most dear by current proponents of jurisdiction removal. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Congress will use restraint and limit itself to neutral prospective removal of subject matter jurisdiction. A current example of more far reaching legislation is the proposed "human life statute." Answers to Separation of powersInteraction between Congress and the courts doesn’t violate separation of powersDeanell Reece Tacha, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and Chair of Committee on the Judicial Branch, United States Judicial Conference, 1991Ohio State Law Journal: Volume 52, Issue 1, (accessed 5/21/2015)One way to test whether constitutional separation of powers is a valid justification for limiting interaction between Congress and the judiciary is to consider its effect on communications between other branches of government. For example, no one would suggest that the President's communications with either the House or Senate erode the independence of the President's decision to veto a particular piece of legislation. Nor is regular interaction between legislators and the staff of administrative agencies regarded as destroying the independent judgment of either branch. Further, federal agencies often appear as parties or intervenors in cases filed in federal court and, in that capacity, directly address the judiciary. An officer or agent of the federal government may file an amicus brief in federal court without obtaining either the consent or leave of the court. The activities of joint commissions such as the Sentencing Commission, composed of representatives from all three branches, clearly do not violate separation of powers. Although separation of powers allows these intercommunications, many judges and legislators still believe the Constitution is the reason for their inclination not to communicate with the other branch on a regular basis. This perception, however, is not derived from the separation of powers doctrine established in the Constitution.Separation of powers refers to separate responsibilities, not the absence of any interactionDeanell Reece Tacha, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and Chair of Committee on the Judicial Branch, United States Judicial Conference, 1991Ohio State Law Journal: Volume 52, Issue 1, (accessed 5/21/2015)Thus, Madison's writings demonstrate a conviction that separation of power was not meant to be total separation or an unnatural isolation of members of one branch from the others. Rather, separation of powers was established by granting each of the three branches of government primary responsibility for the tasks of enacting, interpreting, or enforcing the law. Additionally, each branch is partially responsible for restraining the other branches through a system of checks and balances expressly established in the Constitution. As long as these structural protections are maintained, according to Madison, the proper degree of separation will not be disturbed by interaction between the branches that would connect and blend them. Moreover, Madison suggested that such interaction is necessary to maintain the proper functioning of a free government.Answers to DeliberationBenefits of deliberation are exaggeratedMichael E. Morrell, professor of political science at University of Connecticut, 2005"Deliberation, Democratic Decisionmaking and Internal Political Efficiency," Political Behavior, Vol. 27 No. 1, (accessed 5/21/2015)The results tend to reinforce previous findings such as those of Gastil (2004), and they go even further by showing that, when tested using the most reliable and valid measure of internal political efficacy, it is likely that deliberative decision-making will not necessarily directly increase citizens' feelings of personal political competence. This is also in line with the empirical evidence Hibbing and Theiss-Morse report on the effects of deliberation in three areas: improving decisions, improving legitimacy and improving people (2002, ch. 8). Although they do not specifically discuss internal political efficacy, the concept most clearly fits into the general category of "improving people." That deliberation did not significantly affect the global measure of internal political efficacy lends support to their claim that deliberation will not achieve what deliberative theorists' expect in regards to making better citizens. Deliberation is sabotaged by manipulationGünther Sch?nleitner, ?Director, International Financial Institutions at Ministry of Finance, Austria, 2004"Can Public Deliberation Democratise State Action?" Politicising Democract: The New Local Politics of Democratisation, (accessed 5/21/2015)Deliberation is a discursive process in which free and equal participants arrive at collective choices through public reasoning, argumentation, and persuasion. For liberal democrats democracy is about aggregating given, unchangeable preferences prior to the political process, while deliberative democrats believe in the transformation of preferences through political interaction. Arrow’s (1963) impossibility theorem has shown the arbitrariness and instability of voting mechanisms. Thus liberal democrats call for ‘minimal democracy’ limited to the selection of rulers rather than policies, while deliberative democrats advocate non-voting mechanisms of democratic will-formation aimed at consensus. Yet deliberation too is subject to the social choice critique. Processes of argumentation and reflection are prone to strategic calculations, deception and manipulation; and deliberative arrangements rely also on voting if consensus is unattainable. Dryzek (2000:49) replaces consensus with the more realistic aim of ‘reasoned agreement’, but this too opens the door to bargaining, strategy, and manipulation. Too many barriers to effective deliberationGünther Sch?nleitner, ?Director, International Financial Institutions at Ministry of Finance, Austria, 2004"Can Public Deliberation Democratise State Action?" Politicising Democract: The New Local Politics of Democratisation, (accessed 5/21/2015)Deliberative participation is embedded in rather than autonomous from local power dynamics, which it is meant to transform. Deliberation depends upon a peculiar power constellation that remains fragile, especially if not bolstered by strong horizontal forms of civic and political organising. Effective deliberation presupposes conditions most likely to be found in already more democratic polities. This suggests a ‘hierarchy’ between representative and deliberative democracy. Conventional means of ‘aggregative’ politics and electoral transformation are logically prior and superior. Only with power-political obstacles removed can public deliberation contribute to deepening democracy. Democratic consolidation can hardly be achieved by prescribing deliberative ‘add-ons’ to the prevailing institutional matrix. Any serious attempt to overcome ‘institutional hybridism’ must address the malfunctions of the country’s core political institutions of representative democracy.EXECUTIVE ORDER COUNTERPLAN RESPONSES2AC Perm – Do BothConcurrent war powers mean the perm is bestJules?Lobel, Professor of Law,?University of Pittsburgh? Law School, 2008, “Conflicts?Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of?War”, of powers? doctrine generally operates on what has been termed a horizontal axis to draw subject matter lines to separate and demarcate the proper boundaries between legislative, executive, and judicial authority. 23 The powers of Congress and the President to control the conduct of a war authorized by Congress is best understood, however, if viewed sequentially, not horizontally. Rather than drawing a boundary between legislative and executive power based on subject matter or some other normative principle, the two branches have concurrent constitutional power over the conduct of authorized warfare. Those powers are divided in practice by timing, not subject matter. The President has the power of initiative, the ability and authority to act quickly in the face of rapidly changing wartime realities in the theater of action. Congress, on the other hand, has a more deliberative, reflective power, allowing it to check and limit presidential initiative both before and after the Executive acts.2AC Perm – Do the CPNormal means is executive action – empiricsJohn E. Owens, Professor of Government at the Centre for the Study of Democracy @University of Westminster, Faculty Fellow in the Centre for Congressional and Presidential Studies at the American University in Washington, DC, 2010, “The Impact of the “War on Terror” on Executive-Legislative Relations in the UK and US: A Comparative Analysis”, some efforts to challenge and check the Obama administration (as during the Bush administration) – notably on military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan, and detainees at Guantánamo - on most “war on terror” issues the Democratic Congress has not challenged the Obama administration to overturn many of the Bush administration’s “war on terror” policies (including extraordinary rendition, military tribunals, and the use of Bagram and other CIA prisons abroad) or insist on the prosecution of CIA officials and others guilty of torture, Cabinet and other executive officers who lied or failed to disclose illegal programmes to the Congress, or manipulated intelligence (see Conyers 2009 for a more or less complete charge sheet). In February 2010 the President signed into law HR 3961 which provides for further time extensions of several terrorist surveillance provisions included in the PATRIOT Act. In sum, congressional non-decision making has continued, and although some legislators (mainly liberal Democrats) have raised issues and the administration has showed a new willingness to conduct conversations with the Congress, congressional legislators have collectively continued to offer deference to the executive in this domain. 2AC Executive RollbackObama or future presidents will roll back the CP – our evidence is topic specificWilliam Bendix, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Keene State College, and Paul J. Quirk, Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the University of British Columbia and former research associate at the Brookings Institution, March 2015, “Secrecy and Negligence: How Congress Lost Control of Domestic Surveillance,” the immediate future, however, Congress appears to have gone out of the business of determining policy for antiterrorism surveillance. In the near term, the best hope for privacy interests is for President Obama to make good on his post-Snowden pledge, repeated in his 2015 State of the Union Address, to reform surveillance programs in order to instill “public confidence…that the privacy of ordinary people is not being violated.” He promised to work with Congress on the issue. If Congress is not capable of acting, the executive branch can impose its own constraints on surveillance practices.57 But the maintenance of self-imposed executive-branch constraints would depend entirely on the strength of the administration’s commitment—and, in two years’ time, on the disposition of the next president. Because of the president’s central responsibility for national security, the presidency is hardly a reliable institutional champion for privacy interests.2AC Legislative RollbackCongress rolls back executive ordersVanessa K. Burrows, Legislative Attorney for Congressional Research Service, 4-25-2010, “Executive Orders: Issuance and Revocation”, , as long as it is not constitutionally based, Congress may repeal a presidential order, or terminate the underlying authority upon which the action is predicated. For example, in 2006, Congress revoked part of an executive order from November 12, 1838, which reserved certain public land for lighthouse purposes.28 Congress has also explicitly revoked executive orders in their entirety, such as in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which revoked a December 13, 1912, executive order that created Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 2.29 Another example of the express nullification of an executive order by Congress involved the revocation of an executive order by President George H. W. Bush to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to establish a human fetal tissue bank for research purposes.30 To effectuate this repeal, Congress simply directed that the “the provisions of Executive Order 12806 shall not have any legal effect.”31 There have been numerous similarly revoked executive orders and proposals to revoke particular executive orders.2AC Agency RollbackAgencies roll back restrictions on their operations – independent of presidential willHarold H. Bruff, Professor of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1-28-2011, “PLACING YOUR FAITH IN THE CONSTITUTION”, cabinet departments and other nonindependent agencies, the limits of presidential direction are generally understood to be as follows. First, since Congress routinely grants authority to administer statutes to these officers, not the President, they must make the formal decisions. The President is free to direct them to make a particular decision and, if they resist for legal or policy reasons, to remove and replace them, 24 but the President may not exercise statutory authority granted to these officers himself. Presidents also issue executive orders that require the agencies to consult with the White House about the costs and benefits of their proposed regulations; Congress has acquiesced in these orders.25 Thus, the power to supervise the executive branch is shared between the President and Congress in ways that are compromised and are based more on history than on grand theory. The advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement are known. To a pluralist, the arrangement is within constitutional limits, its messiness being offset by the benefits of the creative tension that results from involving both political branches in oversight of the executive agencies. Calabresi and Yoo reject the desirability of this power sharing in favor of the benefits of clean and strong lines of political accountability to the President. Here they must envision a world that does not currently exist - their promised land of a new and improved federal government. What they do not do, however, is paint any detailed picture of the altered landscape, of the practical differences they envision if the unitary executive is endorsed by the Supreme Court. Would newly empowered presidents seize the reins of power and bring the unwieldy bureaucracy under control? It is quite unclear that presidents can do much more to control the bureaucracy than they now attempt. The fact that President Obama felt the need to create various “czars,” his own new bureaucracy to control the bureaucracy, reveals the serious practical limits to comprehensive control by the President himself.2AC Judicial RollbackCourts can rule executive orders unconstitutionalPhillip Cooper, Professor of Public Administration at Portland State University, 2002, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action” pg. 77Despite the apparent deference by the judiciary to the president's orders, this chapter has plainly demonstrated any number of instances in which the White House has lost in court. Executive orders, both legal and illegal, can expose officials to liability. It is an old argument, developed long before the battle over the so-called Nuremberg defense, that illegal orders do not insulate a public official from liability for his or her actions. The classic example harks back to Little v. Barreme 13 1 during the Washington administration. Even legal orders can expose the government to liability. Though the federal courts have often upheld dramatic actions taken by the president during difficult periods, they have not been hesitant to support claims against the government later. The many cases that were brought involving the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation after World War I provide examples of just how long such postorder legal cleanup can take and how much it can Cost. 112 Later, in a 1951 case, the Supreme Court subjected government to claims by business for the damages done to their interests during the government's operation of the coal mines during World War II after FDR seized the mines in 1943.133 Thus, the legal issues that may arise are concerned with both the validity of orders and with addressing the consequences of admittedly legitimate decrees. 2AC Perception + Executive RollbackExecutive orders can’t solve credibility or perception advantages – viewed as going through an improper channel – and future presidents can roll it backTara L. Branum, JD from UT Austin, 2002, “PRESIDENT OR KING? THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN MODERN-DAY AMERICA,” (%22President%20or%20King-The%20Use%20and%20Abuse%20of%20Executive%20Orders%20in%20Modern-Day%20America%22)+AND+DATE+IS+2002The increased use of executive orders and other presidential directives is a fundamental problem in modern-day America. The Constitution does not give one individual an "executive pen" enabling that individual to single-handedly write his preferred policy into law. Despite this lack of constitutional authority, presidential directives have been increasingly used--both by Republicans and Democrats n3--to promulgate laws and to support public policy initiatives in a manner that circumvents the proper lawmaking body, the United States Congress. It would be foolhardy to ignore the danger inherent in this situation, simply because one might like the individual currently holding the presidential pen. n4 It would be hypocritical, as well as dangerous, to seek change when a president from the opposing political party is in power, but to ignore the problem once a president from one's own party has been elected. n5 While the current president [*3] may back acceptable policies or refrain from using his executive power in a tyrannical fashion, there is no guarantee that all future presidents will continue to do so as well.2AC Links to PoliticsUnilateral XOs link to politicsMegan Covington, Vanderbilt School of Engineering, 2012, “Executive Legislation and the Expansion of Presidential Power”, because presidents can bypass Congress so efficiently, however, does not mean they always rely on executive legislation. A president who used only executive orders and did not work with Congress at all would certainly earn sharp criticism from both parties and the media. A president’s bill that has been passed by Congress is a much bigger accomplishment and is more permanent than a policy enacted by executive order, meaning presidents will always have some incentive to work with Congress to achieve their goals. Crenson and Ginsberg argue that one of the reasons for this reliance on executive legislation is that presidents have lost traditional avenues of accomplishing their policy goals.61 Before C-SPAN continuously broadcasted Congress, the president had the advantage in using the media to appeal to the people, and with the recent decrease in party strength, the president can no longer rely on fellow party members and party loyalty as he once did. No president can rule entirely by executive legislation and expect the other two branches to stand docile while he makes major policy change; presidents still have to take Congress into account when passing executive legislation.62 For example, President Clinton could have easily passed an executive order repealing the military’s ban on gays serving openly, but he never issued any such directive, largely because he did not want to risk Congress passing legislation making the ban permanent. 63 Congress is not in danger of losing its functionality entirely, but the extent to which modern presidents can unilaterally effect change was certainly unintended and unforeseen by the Founding Fathers.2AC Links to Politics – Links to ElectionsUnpopular executive orders have political consequences – public perceives them and they backlashClay Risen, Managing editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, M.A. from the University of Chicago, 7-16-2004 “The Power of the Pen: The Not-So-Secret Weapon of Congress-wary Presidents” The American Prospect, ]The most effective check on executive orders has proven to be political. When it comes to executive orders, “The president is much more clearly responsible,” says Dellinger, who was heavily involved in crafting orders under Clinton. “Not only is there no involvement from Congress, but the president has to personally sign the order.” Clinton's Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument executive order may have helped him win votes, but it also set off a massive congressional and public backlash. Right-wing Internet sites bristled with comments about “dictatorial powers,” and Republicans warned of an end to civil liberties as we know them. “President Clinton is running roughshod over our Constitution,” said then–House Majority Leader Dick Armey. Indeed, an unpopular executive order can have immediate--and lasting--political consequences. In 2001, for example, Bush proposed raising the acceptable number of parts per billion of arsenic in drinking water. It was a bone he was trying to toss to the mining industry, and it would have overturned Clinton's order lowering the levels. But the overwhelmingly negative public reaction forced Bush to quickly withdraw his proposal--and it painted him indelibly as an anti-environmental president. 2AC Tyranny DAExecutive orders deck judicial independence and separation of powers – set the stage for a tyrannical fascist stateLindsay Harrison, Lecturer in Law, University of Miami Law School, Harvard Law School (J.D. 2003), clerked for United States District Judge Alan S. Gold (Southern District of Florida) from 2003-2004, worked at Jenner & Block in Washington D.C., 11-15-2005, “More on Executive Orders,” courts were to suddenly take executive pronouncements as the rule of law, it would essentially abolish the separation of powers and the independent judiciary. The very definition of tyranny is the placement of all government authority in a single branch -- if courts were always bound to follow executive pronouncements as to what conduct is constitutional and what is unconstitutional, our nation would have all the essential preconditions for the rise of a tyrranical state akin to Nazi Germany. Professor Erwin Chimerinsky (former Northwestern debater) explains: The Framers created separation of powers in the Constitution precisely because they thought that the accumulation of power in the Executive would lead to tyranny. As Dorsen and Shattuck note: " All unlimited power is inherently dangerous, and it is the salutary function of the courts to circumscribe the boundaries of the executive and legislative powers so that neither branch is exalted at the expense of the other." Controlling Presidential power is necessary to safeguard individual liberties, and it is the role of the courts to protect these rights. (Erwin Chimerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 863, 894 (1983)).Executive RollbackFuture presidents will roll back the CP – empiricsVanessa K. Burrows, Legislative Attorney for Congressional Research Service, 4-25-2010, “Executive Orders: Issuance and Revocation”, the fact that executive orders are used to further an administration’s policy goals, there are frequent examples of situations in which a sitting President has revoked or amended orders issued by his predecessor.37 This practice is particularly apparent where Presidents have used these instruments to assert control over and influence the agency rulemaking process. President Ford, for instance, issued Executive Order 11821, requiring agencies to issue inflation impact statements for proposed regulations.38 President Carter altered this practice with Executive Order 12044, requiring agencies to consider the potential economic impact of certain rules and identify potential alternatives.39 Shortly after taking office, President Reagan revoked President Carter’s order, implementing a scheme asserting much more extensive control over the rulemaking process. Executive Order 12291 directed agencies to implement rules only if “the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society,” requiring agencies to prepare a cost-benefit analysis for any proposed rule that could have a significant economic impact.40 This order was criticized by some as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, on the grounds that it imbued the President with the power to essentially control rulemaking authority that had been committed to a particular agency by Congress.41 Despite these concerns, there were no court rulings assessing the validity of President Reagan’s order. In turn, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, modifying the system established during the Reagan Administration.42 While retaining many of the basic features of President Reagan’s order, E.O. 12866 eased cost benefit analysis requirements, and recognized the primary duty of agencies to fulfill the duties committed to them by Congress. President George W. Bush issued two executive orders amending E.O. 12866, E.O. 13258, and E.O. 13422, both of which were revoked by President Obama in E.O. 13497.43 President Bush’s E.O. 13258 concerned regulatory planning and review, and it removed references in E.O. 12866 to the role of the Vice President, replacing several of them with a reference to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or the Chief of Staff to the President.44 E.O. 13422 defined guidance documents and significant guidance documents and applied several parts of E.O. 12866 to guidance documents, as well as required each agency head to designate a presidential appointee to the newly created position of regulatory policy officer.45 E.O. 13422 also made changes to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA’s) duties and authorities, including a requirement that OIRA be given advance notice of significant guidance documents.46 President Obama’s executive order revoking E.O. 13258 and E.O. 13422 also directed the Director of OMB and the heads of executive departments and agencies to rescind orders, rules, guidelines, and policies that implemented those executive orders.Huge leeway for future presidents to roll back executive ordersConor Friedersdorf, staff writer at the Atlantic, 5-28-2013, “Does Obama Really Believe He Can Limit the Next President's Power?” doesn't seem to realize that his legacy won't be shaped by any perspicacious limits he places on the executive branch, if he ever gets around to placing any on it. The next president can just undo those "self-imposed" limits with the same wave of a hand that Obama uses to create them. His influence in the realm of executive power will be to expand it. By 2016 we'll be four terms deep in major policy decisions being driven by secret memos from the Office of Legal Counsel. The White House will have a kill list, and if the next president wants to add names to it using standards twice as lax as Obama's, he or she can do it, in secret, per his precedent.Future presidents can amend executive ordersPhillip Cooper, Professor of Public Administration at Portland State, November 1997, “Power tools for an effective and responsible presidency” Administration and Society, Vol. 29Even if they serve temporary goals, executive orders can produce a significant amount of complexity and conflict and not yield a long-term benefit because the next president may dispose of predecessors’ orders at a whim. It may be easier than moving a statute through Congress and faster than waiting for agencies to use their rule-making processes to accomplish policy ends, but executive orders may ultimately be a much weaker foundation on which to build a policy than the alternatives.Legislative RollbackCongress can check the president – amend or block unilateral actionWilliam G Howell, Associate professor at Harvard University, 2005 Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, published in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35 issue 3 pg. 417Plainly, presidents cannot institute every aspect of their policy agenda by decree. The checks and balances that define our system of governance are alive, though not always well, when presidents contemplate unilateral action. Should the president proceed without statutory or constitutional authority, the courts stand to overturn his actions, just as Congress can amend them, cut funding for their operations, or eliminate them outright. (4) Even in those moments when presidential power reaches its zenith--namely, during times of national crisis--judicial and congressional prerogatives may be asserted (Howell and Pevehouse 2005, forthcoming; Kriner, forthcoming; Lindsay 1995, 2003; and see Fisher's contribution to this volume). In 2004, as the nation braced itself for another domestic terrorist attack and images of car bombings and suicide missions filled the evening news, the courts extended new protections to citizens deemed enemy combatants by the president, (5) as well as noncitizens held in protective custody abroad. (6) And while Congress, as of this writing, continues to authorize as much funding for the Iraq occupation as Bush requests, members have imposed increasing numbers of restrictions on how the money is to be spent.Agency RollbackExecutive agencies will go rogue – uniquely true for domestic surveillance – they empirically ignore restrictionsTrevor W. Morrison, Associate Professor of Law at Cornell Law School, October 2006, “Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch”, , for example, President Bush's authorization of the Na- tional Security Agency (NSA) to engage in the warrantless gathering of "signals intelligence" within the United States, from communications in- volving United States citizens.255 One of the core legal issues in this con- troversy is whether the surveillance complies with the Foreign Intelli- gence Surveillance Act (FISA), which lays out the basic legal structure governing electronic surveillance within the United States.256 As a gen- eral matter, FISA authorizes electronic surveillance within the United States only upon certain specified showings, and only with a court-issued warrant.257 Beyond that, FISA makes it a criminal offense to engage in any electronic surveillance not authorized by statute,258 and another pro- vision in the federal code specifies that FISA and certain other provisions governing wiretaps for criminal investigation are the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . may be conducted."'259 Shortly after news broke that the President had authorized the surveillance in question,260 the Justice Department offered a formal defense of the program in a letter addressed to members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.261 The letter was later supplemented by a much more detailed white paper sent to the Senate majority leader,262 though the basic argument remained the same. It had two essential parts. First, the Department argued that the President has substantial constitutional authority to order warrantless intelligence surveillance even within the United States.263 Second, and more pertinently for pre- sent purposes, the Department asserted that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) of September 18, 2001 "confirms and supplements" the President's inherent constitutional authority in this area. The AUMF empowers the President to "use all necessary and appro- priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons" he deter- mines to be responsible for the September 11 attacks, but says nothing whatever about surveillance within the United States.265 On its face, therefore, the Justice Department's AUMF argument would appear to conflict with FISA's express identification of the statutory provisions setting forth "the exclusive means" for conducting domestic electronic surveillance.The president won’t challenge agencies – he’ll decide that the costs are too highHarold H. Bruff, Professor of Law at University of Colorado, 2010, “PRESIDENTIAL POWER MEETS BUREAUCRATIC EXPERTISE”, e12/issue2/Bruff12U.Pa.J.Const.L.461(2010).pdfThese observations about the politics of removal suggest that within limits, Presidents are more likely to tolerate than to remove balky or ineffective subordinates. Threats of dismissal and vigorous purges are not preferred supervisory tools for any good manager, especially in government. Firing someone you had earlier selected invites criticism of your own judgment. In the executive branch, another position must often be found for a subordinate who is to be eased out (an ambassadorship, perhaps?). And most important, for any principal officer a substitute must be found who can survive confirmation by a possibly aroused Senate. At the least, the replacement process invites unwelcome congressional oversight and criticism of the administration. It is often better to muddle along.The executive branch routinely ignores its own restrictions – drone war provesMuhammad Ahmad, a Glasgow-based sociologist with a specialization in US foreign policy, 7-3-2013, “Obama won't end the drone war, but Pakistan might” Aljazeera, only concrete proposal, a restrictive targeting criteria codified in a Presidential Policy Guidance, which in principle should have ended "signature strikes", was quickly undermined by administration officials who told the press that the attacks would continue regardless. It also nullified Obama's claim that a "high threshold" had been set for lethal action against "potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens". Far from reassuring non-Americans, it should alarm US citizens. ? But there was also a true statement in Obama's speech. "America cannot take strikes wherever we choose," he said. "Our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty." ? The drone war will not end by a presidential epiphany. It will need political pressure and practical obstacles to stop it - mostly outside the US. Few Democrats are willing to criticise Obama, and Republicans rarely shrink from actions that result in dead foreigners; as long as the war's cost are borne by others, it is unlikely that a critical mass of opinion would emerge to force a reconsideration of policy. Links to PoliticsExecutive actions link to politics – causes huge fights Ginger Gibson, writer at Politico, 1-29-2014, Republicans bash Obama for overstepping bounds, dyn.printstory.cfm?uuid=B6D21B66-98C7-4059-B77D-8CFB4009563FIn his State of the Union address Tuesday night, President Barack Obama said if Congress won’t help him get things done, he’ll do it on his own — and congressional Republicans aren’t pleased. Many in the GOP said they don’t intend to sit quietly if Obama starts signing executive orders. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) had sharp criticism for the president’s expanded authority. “I think it’s unfortunate, I think it’s divisive and quite frankly, borderline unconstitutional on many of those issues,” Rubio said. “I understand the [legislative] process takes long and can be frustrating, but I think it truly undermines the republic.” Rep. Tim Huelskamp (R-Kan.) said the president requested more controversial pieces of legislation — like immigration reform — than he did when Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress. “Suddenly he wants things that Republicans won’t give him that he didn’t ask Democrats to do — it seems like a lot of theatrics,” Huelskamp said. Huelskamp said he joked with fellow members that he’s going to file legislation that doesn’t require a presidential signature. The Kansas conservative said there are ways Republicans could push back at Obama’s executive orders but that he doesn’t think the GOP leadership is willing to wage the fight. “There are things we can do — I’m just afraid leadership is not willing to challenge them,” he said. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) argued that Obama employing executive powers could harm the Democrats as a whole. “I think he’s going to create a narrative for himself that’s going to hurt Democrats by acting unilaterally,” Graham said. “I think he’s going to create an impression among the American people that he’s abusing the power of his office and that will hurt Democrats.” Rep. Tom Cole (R-Okla.) took a soft approach to criticizing the president for overstepping his bounds on executive orders. “We’ll wait and see what he does,” Cole said. “The president has certain executive powers, but if he wants to achieve anything, an executive order is not a very good way to do it. Usually legislative achievement is what is enduring achievement. Executive orders are like writing on the beach, it may last a while but when the tide comes in or goes out, it disappears. So I think it’s a poor way to govern.” Sen. Tim Scott (R-S.C.) said acting without congressional authority is problematic. “We continue to erode the whole notion of the rule of law,” Scott said. “To the extent that he continues to move unilaterally without the consent of Congress, I think it doesn’t sit well with a message of unity.”Executive orders are perceived – drain PCTodd Eberly, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at St Mary’s College, 1-21-2013, “The Presidential Power Trap” with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.Relying on executive orders drains PC – Congress backlashesSteven Schier, Dorothy H. and Edward C. Congdon Professor of Political Science at Carleton College, December 2011, “The Contemporary Presidency: The Presidential Authority Problem and the Political Power Trap” published in Presidential Studies QuarterlyThe frustrations of popular and Washington leadership thus encourage presidents to exercise their formal powers to get results. As Sidney Milkis and Jesse Rhodes put it, this leads a president “to impose his will through the bureaucracy in pursuit of politics that substantially outstrip congressional and public support” (2009, 3). Presidential appointments remain a resource for such assertions (see note 1). Recent presidents have employed executive orders as a way around important policy dif?culties. Though the total number of executive orders per year has not increased greatly since the 1940s, the number of important executive orders has risen since 1960 and particularly since 1985 (Howell 2003, 81-82) as has, over the last 20 years, presidential use of signing statements to shape policy (Congressional Research Service 2007; Savage 2009). The frustrations of maintaining authority in order to consolidate their regimes’ control of government and politics encourages presidents to rely on their powers and to employ their political authority in support of their exercise of powers. Nixon attempted this when surrounded by Democrats in Washington, as did Clinton when surrounded by Republicans. Neither attempt ultimately did their parties any good. Nixon’s efforts led to constitutional violations. For both Nixon and Clinton, the use of formal powers when political authority was de?cient led to charges of illegitimacy and impeachment proceedings. So the “presidential authority problem” has several parts. Authority among elites faces limits due to the institutional thickening in national government. Authority among the public and in Congress suffers from the lessening of presidential political capital detailed in this article. Political authority, according to Skowronek, is designated in advance, works through institutions, and has enforceable mandates and perceptions (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 125). The decline in presidential political capital means that nowadays such traits are hard for presidents to come by. Advance designations frequently vanish among American governing elites and the mass public. Institutions are less “workable” for presidents. Mandates and perceptions are now evanescent, much less enforceable. This leads to a “presidential power trap.” Maintaining authority is hard and frustrating work, and in seeking to maintain it, presidents encounter widespread constraints. Yet the modern presidency grants an incumbent many formal powers over executive branch administration, foreign, and national security policy. The power is there, if the authority is not. So why not use the power—via unilateral decisions, signing statements and executive orders—while you have it, if authority is so hard to garner? The risk is that by using such powers, a president effectively destroys his authority.Congress backlashes to unilateral executive orders – costs PCTodd Eberly, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at St Mary’s College, 1-21-2013, “The Presidential Power Trap” looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital.Unpopular executive orders link to politics – massively controversial and decimate the agendaMarybeth Ulrich, Professor of Government in the Departmnet of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College, July 2004, “Presidential Leadership and National Security Policymaking,” published in the U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, pg. 227-228Executive orders have mainly been used in three areas: to combat various forms of discrimination against citizens, to increase White House control over the executive branch, and to maintain secrets.19 When Congress perceives that executive orders are taken to bypass Congress on controversial issues, they may elicit great political controversy and be a source of conflict between the two branches. Even the prospect of an executive order being issued can erupt in major political controversy as was the case with President Clinton’s proposal to lift the ban on gays serving in the military. There was no question that the president had the legitimate authority to issue such an order as Truman had done to integrate the armed forces in 1948, but the political backlash was so strong in 1993 that Clinton abandoned the idea in order to salvage his domestic agenda before Congress.20Unpopular executive orders spark Congressional and public backlash Chris Miles, writer at Policymic, 1-15-2013, “An Obama Gun Control Executive Order Could Sink the President’s Favorability” Obama be wasting valuable political capital by issuing an executive order on gun control? If Obama acts unilaterally on gun control, the event will likely fire-up conservatives and pro-gun advocates, calling out the president for failing to use the legislative process. The conservative Drudge Report compared executive action to dictators Hitler and Stalin. The backlash could be immense and could cost Obama leverage in future political battles, most notably the coming debt ceiling fight next month. Obama has often pulled the "popular mandate" card, saying that his re-election in November proves the American people are behind him ... almost unconditionally. But what do the American people really think about the gun debate. Well, for starters, just 4% of Americans identify guns as the nation's top problem, per Gallup. Based on that alone, Obama may think twice about pushing popcorn policies that will only splash onto headlines and divide Americans. Any executive action could even hurt his favorability rating, and by extension his ability to negotiate in the future.Congressional backlash to executive orders weakens the presidentMichael Posner, Professor Emeritus at the University of Oregon and Adjunct Professor at the Weill Medical College in New York, 1-1-2000, “Blocking the Presidential Power Play” National Journal, legal experts counsel Congress to be careful not to usurp legitimate presidential power. One expert urging caution is Douglas Cox, a lawyer who was deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department during the Bush Administration. "When a President overreaches and uses executive orders to invade or supersede the legislative powers of Congress, Congress may be sufficiently provoked to consider an across-the-board approach to rein in those abuses," he told the House Rules subcommittee. "Although that reaction is understandable, Congress must be careful to understand the extent to which executive orders are a necessary adjunct of the President's constitutional duties," Cox added. "At all times, Congress has ample legislative and political means to respond to abusive or lawless executive orders, and thus Congress should resist the temptation to pursue more sweeping, more draconian, and more questionable responses."Executive orders turn the President into a lightning rod Phillip Cooper, Professor of Public Administration at Portland State, November 1997, “Power tools for an effective and responsible presidency” Administration and Society, Vol. 29Interestingly enough, the effort to avoid opposition from Congress or agencies can have the effect of turning the White House itself into a lightning rod. When an administrative agency takes action under its statutory authority and responsibility, its opponents generally focus their conflicts as limited disputes aimed at the agency involved. Where the White House employs an executive order, for example, to shift critical elements of decision making from the agencies to the executive office of the president, the nature of conflict changes and the focus shifts to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue or at least to the executive office buildings The saga of the OTRA battle with Congress under regulatory review orders and the murky status of the Quayle Commission working in concert with OIRA provides a dramatic case in point. The nature and focus of conflict is in some measure affected by the fact that executive orders take administrative action outside the normal rules of administrative law. And although there are tensions in that field of law, the fact is that it has been carefully developed over time with the intention of accommodating the needs of administration and the demands for accountability by agencies filled with unelected administrators who make important decisions having the force of law in the form of rules and administrative adjudications. On one hand, administrative law requires open, orderly, and participative decision processes, but it also creates significant presumptions in favor of administrative agencies. The courts provide legal support in the form of favorable decisions as well as assisting agencies in enforcement through orders enforcing subpoena and other investigative authority while also ordering compliance with agency decisions once the investigations and decision processes are complete. Administrative law also provides a vehicle for integrating administrative decisions having the force of law with the larger body of law and policy. The use of executive orders to confound or circumvent normal administrative law is counterproductive and ultimately dysfunctional. Tyranny DAExecutive orders wreck democracyMegan Covington, Vanderbilt School of Engineering, 2012, “Executive Legislation and the Expansion of Presidential Power”, of the president becoming some type of dictator are overblown, but the tendency by modern presidents to use executive legislation to expand the scope of their power is especially dangerous considering that neither the Supreme Court nor Congress is very likely to challenge an executive order, rendering the most important check on presidential legislation virtually nonexistent. Using executive orders to work around Congress, undercut federal agencies, or escape accountability violates the principle of checks and balances our Founding Fathers felt was crucial to our democracy and unlawfully increases the power of the president.6 Allowing the president to continue abusing executive orders and other presidential directives sets a dangerous precedent, one that could result in a future president using executive legislation to act outside his given authority, potentially by suspending civil liberties or ignoring the will of Congress. This increased and unchecked use of executive legislation has expanded the power of the president beyond constitutional bounds and poses a serious threat to our democracy. After discussing the types of executive legislation and their use by recent presidents, I will analyze the effectiveness of the checks on presidential power and explore the potential threats posed by the expansion of the presidency.CRIME DISADVANTAGE RESPONSESNo Uniqueness UQ—Will Expire Now Broad reauthorization of section 215 of the Patriot Act will fail—big blow to broad surveillance Nadia Prupis, staff writer for Common Dreams, April 22, 2015, “As GOP Pushes Patriot Act Renewal, Critics Demand End to Mass Surveillance Provision,” Common Dreams, Accessed May 12, 2015, . Patrick Leahy (D-Vt), ranking Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee and an outspoken backer of surveillance reform, criticized McConnell's maneuver. "Republican leaders should be working across the aisle on legislation that protects both our national security and Americans' privacy rights, but instead they are trying to quietly pass a straight reauthorization of the bulk-collection program that has been proven ineffective and unnecessary," Leahy stated on Tuesday. "And more, they are attempting to do so without the committee process that the majority leader has promised for important legislation. This tone-deaf attempt to pave the way for five and a half more years of unchecked surveillance will not succeed."UQ—Will Expire Now Most egregious surveillance power is collapsing now—public pressure will force Congress to let the provisions of the Patriot Act expire that allow bulk surveillance Patrick G. Eddington, Writer for the Washington Examiner, April 13, 2015, “Confronting the surveillance state,” Washington Examiner, Accessed May 11, 2015, year began with both surveillance reformers and their opponents circling one date on their respective calendars: June 1, 2015. On this date, the Patriot Act's Sec. 215 "business records," "lone wolf" and "roving wiretap" provisions will expire unless Congress agrees to extend them. If public opinion on the topic is any indication, mass surveillance supporters have a tough job on their hands. In March 2015, Pew released the results of its latest poll on attitudes on surveillance. Seventy percent of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents said they were "less confident the surveillance efforts are serving the public interest." Over half of Democrats or those leaning Democratic felt the same way. And of the 87 percent of adults who have heard of the surveillance programs, 34 percent had "taken at least one step to hide or shield their information from the government." This is how the true costs of mass surveillance programs should be measured: not just in dollars, but in how they have eviscerated the Constitution's free association, speech and privacy guarantees. The chilling effect of government surveillance is real, and the poll makes clear it is causing this country's citizens to disconnect from one another, alter what they search for online, and even self-censor. Our own government, not al Qaeda or ISIS, is responsible for this fear and subversion of constitutional rights that has produced these ominous changes. A child born on September 12, 2001 has lived his or her entire life under the shadow of this surveillance state. Whether their full constitutional right to be free from warrantless search and seizure of their online communications will be restored remains to be seen. What is clear is that unless their elders force Congress to end the surveillance state, the generation born after Sept. 11, and all those who follow, will live in a country that would shock Madison, and the Founders.UQ—Will Expire NowBipartisan legislation coming now to strike down bulk surveillance—major blow to surveillance power Julian Hattem, Writer for The Hill political news website, April 16, 2015, “Congress closes in on deal to renew Patriot Act provisions,” The Hill, Accessed May 11, 2015, of Congress are starting to coalesce around a bipartisan plan that would scale back government surveillance while renewing portions of the Patriot Act that are set to expire in May. While the legislation, which could be unveiled as soon as this week, could fall short of more expansive proposals for curbing the National Security Agency, sources say it could include the most significant reforms of intelligence practices in years. “I think there’s a good chance that we’ll be able to get something,” said Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.), a senior member of the House Judiciary Committee who is a vocal critic of government spying. “I don’t want to say much more, but I think the agreement may come together fairly soon.” The House and Senate Judiciary committees have jurisdiction over the law, and the negotiations have largely occurred between those panels’ four leaders: Sens. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Reps. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) and John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.). The talks have also included lawmakers who were involved in the issue last year, including Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), the original author of the Patriot Act. According to people involved in the discussions, the plan would largely mirror last year’s failed effort to end the NSA’s bulk collection of millions of Americans’ phone records.No LinkLink Defense—Crime Alt CausesSurveillance doesn’t lower crime in any substantial way—while several factors lower crime, no one thing is the silver bullet Inimai M. Chettiar, Director of the Justice Program at New York University Law School’s Brennan Center, February 11, 2015, “The Many Causes of America’s Decline in Crime,” The Atlantic, Accessed May 11, 2015, is no shortage of candidates. Every year, it seems, a new study advances a novel explanation. Levitt attributes about half the crime drop to the legalization of abortion. Amherst economist Jessica Reyes attributes about half the violent crime drop to the unleading of gasoline after the Clean Air Act. Berkeley law professor Franklin Zimring credits the police as the central cause. All three theories likely played some role. Instead of a single, dominant cause, our research points to a vast web of factors, often complex, often interacting, and some unexpected. Of the theories we examined, we found the following factors had some effect on bringing down crime: a growth in income (5 to 10 percent), changes in alcohol consumption (5 to 10 percent), the aging population (0 to 5 percent), and decreased unemployment (0 to 3 percent). Policing also played a role, with increased numbers of police in the 1990s reducing crime (0 to 10 percent) and the introduction of CompStat having an even larger effect (5 to 15 percent). But none is solely, or even largely, responsible for the crime drop. Unfortunately, we could not fully test a few theories, as the data did not exist at the detailed level we needed for our analysis. For those, we analyzed past research, finding that inflation and consumer confidence (individuals’ belief about the strength of the economy) probably had some effect on crime. The legalization of abortion and unleading of gasoline may also have played some role. In aggregate, the fourteen factors we identified can explain some of the drop in crime in the 1990s. But even adding all of them together fails to explain the majority of the decrease. No one factor brought down crime. Today, incarceration has become the default option in the fight against crime. But more incarceration is not a silver bullet. It has, in fact, ceased to be effective in reducing crime—and the country is slowly awakening to that reality. Incarceration can be reduced while crime continues to decline. The research shows this and many states are watching it unfold.Terrorism Robust studies show bulk data collection doesn’t prevent terrorism Peter Lampert Bergen et al, Print and broadcast journalist, author, documentary producer, and CNN's national security analyst, January 13, 2014, “New America Foundation: Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?,” Council On Foreign Relations, Accessed May 11, 2015, , our review of the government's claims about the role that NSA "bulk" surveillance of phone and email communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from terrorism shows that these claims are overblown and even misleading. An in-depth analysis of 225 individuals recruited by al-Qaeda or a like-minded group or inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of terrorism since 9/11, demonstrates that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from local communities, and targeted intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus for investigations in the majority of cases, while the contribution of NSA's bulk surveillance programs to these cases was minimal. Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of American telephone metadata, which includes the telephone numbers that originate and receive calls, as well as the time and date of those calls but not their content, under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, appears to have played an identifiable role in initiating, at most, 1.8 percent of these cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside of the United States under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act played a role in 4.4 percent of the terrorism cases we examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified authority played a role in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined.Doesn’t Prevent CrimeGovernment surveillance is a guise for control—it doesn’t prevent crime Kit Daniels, Writer for Info Wars, March 30, 2015, “NSA FAILS TO PREVENT CROSSDRESSERS FROM INVADING HEADQUARTERS DESPITE MASS SURVEILLANCE,” Info Wars, Accessed May 11, 2015, men who were dressed as women tried to ram their SUV through a gate at the NSA headquarters in Ft. Meade, Md., on Monday, prompting security to kill one of the men and seriously injure the other. “The FBI said … it was conducting an investigation with NSA police and other law enforcement agencies, and interviewing witnesses on the scene,” CNN reported. Similarly, a former state correctional officer was charged with a string of shootings near the NSA headquarters earlier this month. The NSA’s failure to anticipate these incidents at its own headquarters contradicts previous statements from officials claiming the NSA’s domestic surveillance would help stop such events from occurring. In particular, former NSA Director Keith Alexander claimed the agency’s surveillance program foiled “50 potential terrorist events” and former FBI Director Robert Mueller claimed that if such dragnet surveillance had been in place before 9/11, it may have curtailed the attacks. And the public is expected to believe all that despite the NSA’s failure to stop crossdressers from invading its headquarters. That’s because the government is simply using the guise of “crime prevention” to hide its real intent behind mass surveillance: to control the population.Doesn’t Prevent CrimePolice insiders admit surveillance doesn’t curb crimeSonia Roubini, Paralegal with the ACLU Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, April 9, 2015, “Police Chief: Surveillance Cameras Don’t Help Fight Crime,” ACLU, Accessed May 10, 2015, are two important points to be made regarding this announcement. First, it followed a trend of government officials acknowledging the ineffectiveness of some surveillance tools. These announcements often fly under the radar, but it’s worth noting that even the greatest proponents of mass surveillance occasionally admit to its shortcomings. The second point is that Lincoln’s police department did something that too few authorities do, which is to actually monitor and audit the performance of a surveillance technology. Every agency adopting a new surveillance technology (whether it be a camera, drone, cellphone tracking device, or anything else) should build in a process to evaluate its effectiveness. This will ensure that the agency and the public alike can understand whether they’re getting reasonable returns on both their investment and their privacy sacrifice. People might disagree over how much power we need to give to law enforcement so they can try to stop crime, but if the surveillance that they're doing isn't even effective, then there's no need for debate.Doesn’t Prevent CrimeSurveillance isn’t about catching criminals—it’s a way for elites to increase their power over the population Maria Xynou, Researcher with the Tactical Technology Collective in Berlin, January 8, 2015, “Lies and Revelations: Why mass surveillance is not about catching the “bad guys”,” My Shadow, Accessed May 11, 2015, response to the Snowden revelations, many governments have argued that we need surveillance to safeguard national security – and this is not a new rhetoric. Ever since 9/11, governments across the globe which have, directly or indirectly, aligned with U.S foreign policy have argued that there is a trade-off between civil liberties and security. This implies that it is acceptable for intelligence agencies to spy on our communications so that they can detect criminals and terrorists – otherwise known as the "bad guys". However, if we look a bit closer at the classified documents leaked by Snowden, it is evident that targeted surveillance is largely used to enhance the political and economic advantage of those in power, while mass surveillance is directed at spying on almost everyone – regardless of whether they have engaged in criminal activity or not.No Int. LinkNo Data Analysis The disad conflates intelligence gathering with intelligence sharing—raw information is useless unless we can effectively analyze it David L. Carter, Ph.D. School of Criminal Justice Michigan State University, November 2004, “Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies,” COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services), Accessed May 9, 2015, of information gathered from diverse sources, for example, wiretaps, informants, banking records, or surveillance (see Figure 1-1), are simply raw data which frequently have limited inherent meaning. Intelligence is when a wide array of raw information is assessed for validity and reliability, reviewed for materiality to the issues at question, and given meaning through the application of inductive or deductive logic. Law enforcement intelligence, therefore, is the product of an analytic process that provides an integrated perspective to disparate information about crime, crime trends, crime and security threats, and conditions associated with criminality.”5 The need for carefully analyzed, reliable information is essential because both policy and operational decisions are made using intelligence; therefore, a vigilant process must be in place to ensure that decisions are made on objective, informed criteria, rather than on presumed criteria. Often “information sharing” and “intelligence sharing” are used interchangeably by persons who do not understand the subtleties, yet importance, of the distinction. In the strictest sense, care should be taken to use terms appropriately because, as will be seen in later discussions, there are different regulatory and legal implications for “intelligence” than for “information” (see Figure 1-2). As such, the subtleties of language can become an important factor should the management of a law enforcement agency's intelligence records come under scrutiny. State and local law enforcement have consistently defined law enforcement intelligence as containing the critical element of “analysis” before any information can be characterized as “intelligence.” For example, the Intelligence-Led Policing report funded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services observes that: …intelligence is the combination of credible information with quality analysis–information that has been evaluated and from which conclusions have been drawn.No Information ShortageMore information doesn’t mean less crime—we don’t have an information shortage in crime fighting efforts Andrea Castillo, Program manager of the Technology Policy Program for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, May 07, 2015, “Cybersecurity bill more likely to promote information overload than prevent cyberattacks,” The Hill, May 11, 2015, concerns privacy advocates who point out that such data collection could serve as an alternative surveillance tool for the NSA. Section 5(A) of CISA authorizes federal agencies to “disclose, retain, and use” shared data for many purposes beyond promoting cybersecurity, like investigating terrorism, the sexual exploitation of children, violent felonies, fraud, identity theft, and trade secret violation. In other words, CISA would allow federal agencies to use data obtained under the auspices of “cybersecurity protection” in entirely unrelated criminal investigations?—?potentially indefinitely. Indeed, CISA is currently stalled in the Senate in deference to debate over the NSA’s controversial bulk collection programs. But the Senate cool-down should not let us forget that CISA does not just threaten civil liberties, it could actually undermine cybersecurity. Information security experts point out that existing information sharing measures run by private companies like IBM and Dell SecureWorks rarely prevent attacks like CISA advocates promise. One survey of information security professionals finds that 87 percent of responders did not believe information sharing measures such as CISA will significantly reduce privacy breaches. The federal government already operates at least 20 information sharing offices collaborating on cybersecurity with the private sector, as Eli Dourado and I found in our new analysis through the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. These numerous federal information-sharing initiatives have not stemmed the tidal wave of government cyberattacks. Another Mercatus Center analysis Dourado and I conducted finds that the number of reported federal information security failures has increased by an astounding 1,012 percent—from 5,502 in FY 2006 to 61,214 in FY 2013. Almost 40 percent of these involved the PII of federal employees and civilians. CISA could therefore have the unintended consequence of creating a juicy and unprepared target for one-stop hacking.No Information ShortageWe don’t have an information problem, we have an action problem. We knew who the 9/11 terrorists were and what they were up to Mattathias Schwartz, Writer for the New Yorker, January 26, 2015, “The Whole Haystack,” The New Yorker, Accessed May 8, 2015, Washington, many people blamed 9/11 on a “wall” between intelligence gathering and criminal investigations. In a report on pre-9/11 failures, the Department of Justice criticized the F.B.I.’s San Diego field office for not making counterterrorism a higher priority. Two of the hijackers—Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar—took flying lessons in San Diego and attended a mosque where the imam, Anwar al-Awlaki, had been the target of an F.B.I. investigation. They lived for a time in an apartment that they rented from an F.B.I. informant, and Mihdhar made phone calls to a known Al Qaeda safe house in Yemen. But the F.B.I. wasn’t solely at fault. The C.I.A. knew that Mihdhar had a visa to travel to the U.S., and that Hazmi had arrived in Los Angeles in January, 2000. The agency failed to forward this information to the F.B.I.Link TurnInformation OverloadWide-net surveillance doesn’t make us safer—it create “information overload” that prevents effective police work Ben Schreiner, Author and political commentator for Counter Punch, April 21, 2015, “Police Body Cameras and Police Surveillance,” Counter Punch, Accessed May 8, 2015, a rush by law enforcement to deploy all the latest surveillance technologies on the American people quite predictably leaves the collecting agencies awash in more data than could ever possibly be of use. In fact, such mass surveillance is quite lousy at its purported purpose of predicting and preventing crime or “terrorism.” As Julia Angwin writes in her book Dragnet Nation, “the flood of data can be overwhelming and confounding to those who are charged with sorting through it to find terrorists.” “But,” Angwin goes on to add, “ubiquitous, covert surveillance does appear to be very good at repression.”Information OverloadBig-net surveillance makes police work less efficient—allows more crime to occur and trades off with funding for good police work Asa Jay, Writer for Cop Block, March 13, 2015, “The FBI’s Ever Increasing Role In Domestic Surveillance,” Cop Block, Accessed May 8, 2015, report released in 2013 by the American Civil Liberties Union provides a comprehensive accounting of the bureau’s expanded post-9/11 investigative and intelligence collection authorities, their impact on civil liberties in the United States, and the FBI’s evasion of oversight that enables abuses to continue. “Rather than aiding its terrorism prevention efforts, the FBI’s expanded investigative and intelligence powers have overwhelmed agents with a flood of irrelevant information and false alarms,” said Michael German, senior policy counsel at the ACLU’s Washington Legislative Office. “Instead of funding these ineffective and suspicionless intelligence collection programs, Congress should examine whether American communities could be made safer overall by spending that money to help state and local police solve violent crime.”Information OverloadToo much surveillance drags in too much information—makes effective crime fighting impossible Glyn Moody, Writer for Tech Dirty, December 3, 2014, “The Repeated Failure Of The US And UK Governments' 'Add More Hay' Approach To Surveillance,” Tech Dirt, Accessed May 11, 2015, we wrote about a UK Parliamentary report absolving the UK spy agencies of any responsibility for the failure to stop the killing of a British soldier last year. Significantly, one explanation given for the fact that the UK's MI5 undervalued the threat, despite investigating the men responsible several times, was that it has several thousand suspects under surveillance at any one time, and so it was beyond its capabilities to follow all leads thoroughly. Of course, that is a consequence of the "needle in a haystack" approach that the US and UK agencies have adopted: collect as much information as possible in the hope that somehow it will be possible to sift through all the irrelevant hay to find the needle. But as an important piece by Coleen Rowley in the Guardian points out, this is not the first time that a "failure to connect the dots" from information to hand resulted in missed opportunities to stop attacks: as an FBI whistleblower and witness for several US official inquiries into 9/11 intelligence failures, I fear that terrorists will succeed in carrying out future attacks -- not despite the massive collect-it-all, dragnet approach to intelligence implemented since 9/11, but because of it. This approach has made terrorist activity more difficult to spot and prevent. She reminds us: The common refrain back then was that, pre 9/11, intelligence had been flowing so fast and furiously, it was like a fire hose, "and you can’t get a sip from a fire hose". Intelligence such as the Phoenix memo -- which warned in July 2001 that terrorist suspects had been in flight schools and urgently requested further investigation -- went unread.Impact TurnsFreedom First—Prior Question Freedom is a prior question to security—true security comes from freedom Leonard E. Read, founder of FEE (Foundation for Economic Education), July 4, 2014, “#12 – “I Prefer Security to Freedom”,” Foundation for Economic Education, Accessed May 11, 2015, people wander unwittingly into socialism, gulled by assumptions they have not tested. One popular but misleading assumption is that security and freedom are mutually exclusive alternatives—that to choose one is to forego the other. In the United States during the past century, more people achieved greater material security than their ancestors had ever known in any previous society. Large numbers of people in this country accumulated a comfortable nest egg, so that “come hell or high water”—depressions, old age, sickness, or whatever—they could rely on the saved fruits of their own labor (and/or that of family members, friends, or parishioners) to carry them through any storm or temporary setback. By reason of unprecedented freedom of choice, unparalleled opportunities, provident living, and the right to the fruits of their own labor—private property—they were able to meet the many exigencies that arise in the course of a lifetime. We think of these enviable, personal achievements as security. But this type of security is not an alternative to freedom; rather, it is an outgrowth of freedom. This traditional security stems from freedom as the oak from an acorn. It is not a case of either/or; one without the other is impossible. Freedom sets the stage for all the security available in this uncertain world.Crushes Freedom—Surveillance SpecificSurveillance strips away innate human need for privacy—increased “security” doesn’t justify loss of privacy Nottingham Post, British news organization, April 02, 2015, “Joe Pursehouse: Privacy is more important than security provided by CCTV,” Nottingham Post, Accessed May 11, 2015, , such suggestions raise serious questions regarding the impact that such a proliferation of in-home CCTV cameras might have on our privacy rights. Before we rush out to install an all-seeing-eye into the places we hold most intimate, it is important to consider who might gain access to the footage recorded. It seems there are an infinite number of ways in which such footage can be used and abused – and no suggestions about how the use of such cameras might be regulated. Family members spying on one another and guests who might visit the home is beyond bad taste – it is fundamentally wrong. Even if we trust our nearest and dearest not to do such things, the very fact that we are being monitored in our home can have a chilling effect on us. This is because, despite the fact that we increasingly relinquish vast amounts of information about our private lives on social media, privacy still holds value, particularly in the home. The home gives us a space outside of society where we can be free from the scrutiny of unchosen others. Even if this Orwellian intrusion does not offend your sensibilities, there are serious questions regarding the necessity of such CCTV surveillance in any case. External CCTV, modern forensic techniques, and preventive technologies such as alarms, can offer protection which serve as a much more visible deterrent for burglars in the first instance. Thus, before we welcome and encourage the use of this invasive technology into our homes, it is important we give due consideration to its impact and its worth. Whilst Sir Bernard stresses that such cameras are now cheaply available, he overlooks the costs to our individual privacy.Crushes Freedom—Surveillance SpecificSurveilling the population probing for crime destroys liberty—its antithesis of a free and open society Thomas Mullen, Writer for Communities Digital News, January 18, 2014, “Obama’s NSA speech proves government can’t prevent terrorism in a free society,” Communities Digital News, Accessed May 9, 2015, Ben Franklin was right. Those who trade essential liberty for temporary safety deserve neither. President Obama means well, but his worldview prevents him from understanding the problem. He believes government is a force for good, but that’s un-American. The United States was born out of the idea that it is at best a necessary evil. Government has only one tool in its toolbox: to bring to bear the combined capacity for violence of the whole society. That’s what makes it, in words often attributed to George Washington, “a troublesome servant and a fearful master.” No society can remain free if that irresistible force is allowed to be employed preemptively. Asking the government to prevent crime or terrorism destroys liberty, by definition. Twelve years after 9/11, Americans should know by now that they’re no freer or safer for giving the government more power. It’s time for real solutions. It’s time to take that power back.Crushes DemocracySurveillance undermines the foundations of democracy—respect of legal processes, human rights, and checks and balances Pieter Omtzigt, Reporter on mass surveillance, and Günter Schirmer, Deputy head of the secretariat of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, February 23, 2015, “Mass surveillance: wrong in practice as well as principle,” Open Democracy, Accessed May 10, 2015, threat to human rights and democracy by the seemingly inexorable growth of the ‘surveillance-industrial complex’ should not be underestimated. As shown in the legal committee’s report, the intelligence agencies of several countries have secured huge and fast-growing budgets. All bureaucracies, especially those intertwined with private business, crave budget increases—providing their leadership with added power, the rank-and-file with more posts and promotion prospects, and private contractors and their lobbies with ever-increasing profits. Democratic oversight and the usual ‘checks and balances’ provided by the open discussion of pros and cons of government programmes, including the vetting of budgetary requirements, are made extremely difficult by the secret nature of the agencies’ activities. In addition, the technologies used, their effectiveness and the potential consequences are highly complex and difficult to assess for outsiders and technological laypersons—including the elected political leadership and even, it sometimes seems, the top brass of the spying agencies themselves.Crushes DemocracySurveillance erodes true democracy—the plan is a step to ensure Sputnik News, News and media outlet, February 14, 2015, “Snowden: NSA Surveillance About Control, Fight Against It About Democracy,” Sputnik News, May 10, 2015, , a Threat to Democracy Addressing the libertarian group, Snowden spoke of the need for people to stand up against the government and demand an end to mass surveillance as a way to protect democracy. “When we think about democracy, we think about the way we interact, the way we control our relationship with the government as a civil society,” he said. “We have to have an even playing field and, at the end of the day, not think about what divides us but about what holds us together.” “No matter how you feel about this particular program, about this particular controversy on the Republican side of the fence or the Democratic side of the field, ultimately as long as we can agree that we have basic rights.” Snowden called the government’s surveillance program unconstitutional, noting that federal courts had attached the label. When the NSA previously admitted to collecting telecommunications information and metadata, they defended their acts by saying they did not review all the collected information and most Americans were, therefore, unaffected.Crushes Freedom of SpeechSurveillance makes true freedom of speech and expression impossible Heini J?rvinen, Writer for European Digital Rights, January 14, 2015, “PEN report reveals concerns about the impact of mass surveillance,” European Digital Rights, May 11, 2015, report presents four key findings: Writers in democratic and non-democratic countries are equally worried about levels of government surveillance in their countries. The majority of writers around the world said they were “very” or “somewhat” worried about levels of government surveillance in their countries, including 75% in countries classified as “free”, 84% in countries classified as “partly free”, and 80% in “not free” countries. Writers’ fear and uncertainty regarding surveillance is so widespread that several survey respondents expressed concern over submitting their responses to the survey. Writers around the world are engaging in self-censorship due to fear of surveillance. The respondents were asked whether they had engaged in different types of self-censorship in their written work, personal communications and online activity. Writers living in liberal democratic countries have begun to engage in self-censorship at levels approaching those seen in non-democratic countries, indicating that mass surveillance has undermined writers’ trust on democratic governments respecting their freedom of expression and right to privacy. Because of pervasive surveillance, writers are concerned that expressing certain views even privately or researching certain topics may lead to negative consequences. Self-censorship has a devastating impact on freedom of information: If writers avoid exploring topics for fear of possible retribution, the material, particularly controversial material, available to readers may be greatly impoverished. Mass surveillance programmes by the US government have damaged its reputation as a protector of free speech in the US. The report indicates that particularly in other “free” countries, writers do not believe freedom of expression is better protected in the US than in their countries. Even in countries classified as “partly free”, nearly one third of the writers think freedom of expression enjoys less protection in the US. Mass surveillance by the US government has damaged its reputation as a champion of freedom of expression around the world. Approximately two thirds of the respondents think US credibility “has been significantly damaged for the long term” by its surveillance programs.Surveillance is Racist—Arabs/ MuslimsSurveillance is racist—it disproportionately targets certain groups. Legal reforms like the aff are key to prevent this Natasha Lennard, Writer for Vice, July 9, 2014, “The NSA’s Racist Targeting of Individuals Is as Troubling as Indiscriminate Surveillance,” Vice, Accessed May 10, 2015, This is anti-Muslim discrimination pure and simple. While the NSA’s broad data collection is disturbingly total and unspecific, its targeted spying is evidently racist. Another leaked document punctuates this point with a dull, disgusting thud: a 2005 training document explaining how to “properly format internal memos to justify FISA surveillance” offers a sample memo that uses “Mohammed Raghead” as the name of a fictitious terrorism suspect. Your NSA at work, ladies and gentlemen! As the existence of this document makes clear, legality is a tortured issue at the heart national security misdeeds. NSA agents are trained to ensure that their surveillance practices fall within the letter of the law — and the law here is at fault, shaped not by a spirit of justice but by surveillance-state paranoia. The Intercept report does not skirt around this point: Indeed, the government’s ability to monitor such high-profile Muslim-Americans — with or without warrants — suggests that the most alarming and invasive aspects of the NSA’s surveillance occur not because the agency breaks the law, but because it is able to exploit the law’s permissive contours. “The scandal is what Congress has made legal,” says Jameel Jaffer, an ACLU deputy legal director. “The claim that the intelligence agencies are complying with the laws is just a distraction from more urgent questions relating to the breadth of the laws themselves.”Surveillance is Racist—African AmericansSurveillance has historically and continues to be used as a means of silencing dissent from African Americans. Surveillance represents racial bias that must be rejected Malkia Amala Cyril, Writer for The Progressive, March 30, 2015, “Black America's State of Surveillance,” Progressive, Accessed May 10, 2015, , media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by Edward Snowden that millions of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother’s visit from the FBI reminds me that, from the slave pass system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow, black people and other people of color have lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy. It’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain an impoverished underclass. In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological advance. Liberty Good—Vulnerable PopulationsData mining targets the most vulnerable populations and strip them of their Civil Liberties Brent Skorup, Writer for Reuters, December 12, 2014, “Cops scan social media to help assess your ‘threat rating’,” Reuters, Accessed May 9, 2015, are many troubling aspects to these programs. There are, of course, obvious risks in outsourcing traditional police work — determining who is a threat — to a proprietary algorithm. Deeming someone a public threat is a serious designation, and applications like Beware may encourage shortcuts and snap decisions. It is also disconcerting that police would access and evaluate someone’s online presence. What types of comments online will increase a threat score? Will race be apparent? These questions are impossible to answer because Intrado merely provides the tool — leaving individual police departments to craft specific standards for what information is available and relevant in a threat score. Local departments can fine-tune their own data collection, but then threat thresholds could vary by locale, making oversight nearly impossible. Tradition holds that justice should be blind, to promote fairness in treatment and avoid prejudgment. With such algorithms, however, police can have significant background information about nearly everyone they pull over or visit at home. Police are time-constrained, and vulnerable populations – such as minorities living in troubled neighborhoods and the poor — may receive more scrutiny.Liberty Good—Privacy Surveillance crushes our ability to enjoy basic freedoms and rights such as privacy—it’s more important now than ever before Zack Whittaker, Writer and editor for Zero Day news, January 20, 2015, “As terror threats rise, privacy is now more important than ever,” Zero Day, Accessed May 11, 2015, a similar vein, the Obama administration (among other federal agencies -- no surprise that the FBI and NSA have weighed in, too) has hinted strongly that Apple and Google are helping its criminal users evade justice by giving them in-built device encryption. The irony is that it came partly in response to the government pushing over the past two years to clamp down on cellphone crime by including kill-switches and other security features on devices. Privacy has come to be seen as something people need when they have "something to hide," or used by dissidents and protesters to hide their faces. And with that goes an association and assumption that they are bad people -- the same bad people that want to blow us up in a suicide bombing on a busy street. No wonder privacy is seen as a bad thing when our perception of it has been skewed. The reason we'll lose our right to privacy won't be because surveillance has crept up on us without us noticing. It's because so many didn't even realize they benefited from it when they did.General—Laundry List Bulk surveillance crushes the US economy, cyber security, and liberty Kim Zetter, Writer for Wired, July 29, 2014, “Personal Privacy Is Only One of the Costs of NSA Surveillance,” Wired, Accessed May 10, 2015, IS NO doubt the integrity of our communications and the privacy of our online activities have been the biggest casualty of the NSA’s unfettered surveillance of our digital lives. But the ongoing revelations of government eavesdropping have had a profound impact on the economy, the security of the internet and the credibility of the U.S. government’s leadership when it comes to online governance. These are among the many serious costs and consequences the NSA and those who sanctioned its activities—including the White House, the Justice Department and lawmakers like Sen. Dianne Feinstein—apparently have not considered, or acknowledged, according to a report by the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute. “Too often, we have discussed the National Security Agency’s surveillance programs through the distorting lens of a simplistic ‘security versus privacy’ narrative,” said Danielle Kehl, policy analyst at the Open Technology Institute and primary author of the report. “But if you look closer, the more accurate story is that in the name of security, we’re trading away not only privacy, but also the U.S. tech economy, internet openness, America’s foreign policy interests and cybersecurity.” Over the last year, documents leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, have disclosed numerous NSA spy operations that have gone beyond what many considered acceptable surveillance activity. These included infecting the computers of network administrators working for a Belgian telecom in order to undermine the company’s routers and siphon mobile traffic; working with companies to install backdoors in their products or network infrastructure or to devise ways to undermine encryption; intercepting products that U.S. companies send to customers overseas to install spy equipment in them before they reach customers. The Foundation’s report, released today, outlines some of the collateral damage of NSA surveillance in several areas, including: Economic losses to US businesses due to lost sales and declining customer trust. The deterioration of internet security as a result of the NSA stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities, undermining encryption and installing backdoors in software and hardware products. Undermining the government’s credibility and leadership on “internet freedom” and governance issues such as censorship.Other Aff AnswersYes Abuse—Burden of ProofThe burden of proof is on surveillance advocates to prove sufficient safeguards when privacy is at steakDavid Firestone, Writer for the NY Times Taking Note blog, November 20, 2014, “There’s No Proof of Surveillance Abuse?,” NY Times, Accessed May 10, 2015, of the big points made by the Republican senators who shot down the surveillance bill on Tuesday was that there was no proof the National Security Agency’s program of collecting millions of Americans’ telephone records had ever been abused. The bill would have stopped the existing programs of bulk collection. Opponents of collection, said Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, “cannot cite a single example of this program ever being abused. Not one single example of this specific program being abused by anybody intentionally. Not one. So we are dealing with a theoretical threat.” The world, of course, doesn’t know the full extent of the program or its abuses, because it is secret, revealed only by the leaks of Edward Snowden. But those leaks revealed that on several occasions the N.S.A. spied on innocent Americans because of mistakes in tracing the calls made by foreign suspects. One internal audit by the N.S.A. said the agency had broken privacy laws or violated its legal authority thousands of times a year since 2008, mostly through unauthorized surveillance of Americans. More generally, the leaks showed that the very existence of the program — allowing the government to secretly trace the calls of millions of innocent American citizens with no connection to terrorism — was itself an abuse. It’s useful to turn Mr. Rubio’s argument on its head, because there have also been no examples of the collection program doing any good. The five-person White House review group, which examined these programs in detail, said the N.S.A. claimed bulk collection had contributed to the prevention of possible terrorist attacks. But the group simply didn’t believe the N.S.A.’s claim. “Our review suggests that the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of Section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks,” the group’s report said. (That’s a reference to the legal authority for the collection program.) The same information could have been collected if the N.S.A. had just asked for it from the phone companies, the report said, as the failed surveillance bill would have required. It’s a classic policy standoff. Opponents of the bill say you can’t prove the program is a problem. Supporters say you can’t prove it’s even needed. But when the privacy of millions of people is at stake, those who defend the intelligence agencies should have a much stronger argument than the one they’re presenting.Yes AbuseUS surveillance gathering constitutes gross privacy and human rights violationsVladimir Platov, Researcher for Global Research, January 05, 2015, “US Social Surveillance Abuse Puts Civil Liberties in Jeopardy,” Global Research, Accessed May 11, 2015, intelligence community is also sponsoring the development of the Aladdin program designed for automated analysis and description of video content (Automated Low-Level Analysis and Description of Diverse Intelligence Video – VACE). The main goal of this program is to provide intelligence analysts with automated search capabilities to track videos that could be of interest for them. Videos for analytical processing can come from different sources – television, surveillance cameras, regular pictures, interviews or even footage shot by drones. The footage is systematized by time and place to identify certain individuals and determine the sequence of their actions which may be in certain semantic relations to present-day events. Currently, IARPA implemented a program called Babel, which aims at developing effective speech recognition software in different languages and dialects. Washington and its agencies are literally spending billions of taxpayer dollars annually under the convenient guise of the “war on terror”, which in fact turns out to be a hidden war against its own citizens, now deprived of basic human rights. But what makes it even worse is that it’s pushing its satellite countries to launch an all-out offensive against the civil liberties of Europe and beyond.Yes AbuseMass surveillance abuses the Civil Liberties of every American subject to it Devlin Barrett, Staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal covering security, terrorism, cybercrime, drugs, and corruption, January 26, 2015, “U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers,” Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2015, have publicly said that they track vehicles near the border with Mexico to help fight drug cartels. What hasn’t been previously disclosed is that the DEA has spent years working to expand the database “throughout the United States,’’ according to one email reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Many state and local law-enforcement agencies are accessing the database for a variety of investigations, according to people familiar with the program, putting a wealth of information in the hands of local officials who can track vehicles in real time on major roadways. The database raises new questions about privacy and the scope of government surveillance. The existence of the program and its expansion were described in interviews with current and former government officials, and in documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union through a Freedom of Information Act request and reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. It is unclear if any court oversees or approves the intelligence-gathering. A spokesman for Justice Department, which includes the DEA, said the program complies with federal law. “It is not new that the DEA uses the license-plate reader program to arrest criminals and stop the flow of drugs in areas of high trafficking intensity,’’ the spokesman said. Sen. Patrick Leahy, senior Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee, said the government’s use of license-plate readers “raises significant privacy concerns. The fact that this intrusive technology is potentially being used to expand the reach of the government’s asset-forfeiture efforts is of even greater concern.’’ The senator called for “additional accountability’’ and said Americans shouldn’t have to fear ”their locations and movements are constantly being tracked and stored in a massive government database.’’Parallel Construction Bad—Wrong Parallel construction is wrong—it puts defendants as presumed guilty and erodes their ability to mount a proper defense Hanni Fakhoury, Writer for Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), January 23, 2015, “The Many Problems with the DEA's Bulk Phone Records Collection Program,” ’s because on September 1, 2013, the New York Times reported for the first time the existence of a program known as “Hemisphere” which allows the DEA and local law enforcement to obtain call records from AT&T. As government presentations about the program repeatedly make clear, law enforcement agencies are given instructions on “protecting the program,” and advised to “never refer to Hemisphere in any official document.” Earlier in 2013, Reuters reported about the DEA and IRS’s secret use of investigative tips provided by the NSA and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Like “Hemisphere,” agents are instructed to keep the true source of this information under wraps and to recreate the investigative trail through some other means. The government calls this practice “parallel construction” but it’s really “intelligence laundering,” designed to insulate surveillance programs from the scrutiny of defense attorneys and judges. Given the DEA’s well-documented tendency to be less than truthful when it comes to explaining where it really got investigative information, it’s likely the DEA laundered the results of their bulk phone records database too. That puts criminal defendants at a serious disadvantage in defending their cases and undermines the courts ability to act as an effective check on government surveillance.Parallel Construction Bad—Illegal Parallel construction relies on illegally obtained evidence—even if it secures convictions, it is illegal Shane Trejo, Writer and internet activist, September 30, 2014, “The Perils of Parallel Construction,” Off Now, Accessed May 11, 2015, Snowden revealed that the NSA intercepts huge amounts of electronic data warrantlessly without our permission. However, that is not the only way the surveillance state violates our rights. The NSA uses other underhanded schemes behind-the-scenes to exploit us. One of them is known as 'parallel construction.' Through this shady process, the NSA snoopers supply information to other government agencies. These agencies include other federal bureaucracies, and local and state government entities as well. The information is then rearranged to cover up the exact whereabouts of where it came from, thereby removing any evidence of malpractice for the courts. A more appropriate term to describe this process, coined by the EFF, is 'information laundering.' This insidious process operates primarily through a formerly secret DEA unit known as the Special Operations Division (SOD). As Exposed by Reuters last year, the SOD is involved in information sharing with state and local law enforcement. Almost none of this warrantlessly gathered data has anything to do with foreign intelligence or "terrorism." It primarily involved run of the mill criminal investigations, mostly drug related. The SOD is exempt from any type of oversight from judges or prosecutors. This means the feds get free reign to use illegally-gathered information to fill our exploding prisons at an even faster rate.CYBERWAR DISADVANTAGE RESPONSESCybersecurity Down – SnowdenSnowden’s leaks crushed US cybersecurity alreadyFelicia Schwartz, reporter in the Washington bureau of the Wall Street Journal, 6-17-2014, “Snowden Leaks Cost Nation’s Cyber Security Efforts, Former NSA Official Says,” Wall Street Journal, former deputy National Security Agency director said intelligence secrets leaked by Edward Snowden last June derailed legislative attempts to encourage the public and private sectors to share information about vulnerabilities in cyberspace, and said the government must do more to encourage such collaboration. The Snowden leaks “unfairly, inappropriately, unfortunately” damaged the private sector, said Chris Inglis, the former NSA deputy. Mr. Inglis made his comments Tuesday at The Wall Street Journal’s CFO Network annual meeting in Washington, D.C. Mr. Inglis retired from the NSA in January and will join Securonix’s advisory board, the company announced today. He pointed to Iran’s “denial of service” cyber attacks on the U.S. in 2012 and 2013 as the most frightening cyber security threat to businesses. In working with businesses to prevent future attacks, the government must figure out how to exercise its authority to defend cyberspace. “I think the government is doing what it can, given what understanding there is at this point,” Mr. Inglis said. “There are many challenges in this space.” He also said the Snowden leaks delayed legislation that would have provided companies with legal protections to share data with the government in an effort to improve security measures.US national cybersecurity is low even if private individuals are more secureBenjamin Wittes, senior fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution and codirector of the Harvard Law School–Brookings Project on Law and Security, 2-25-2015, “The Snowden Revelations And Cybersecurity,” The Briefing, trouble is that some of the people best positioned to take advantage of the slew of information Snowden made available are exactly the sort of actors whose empowerment may not serve broader cybersecurity objectives. Is American cybersecurity better off if the People’s Liberation Army and Vladimir Putin know the details of NSA’s programmatic activity? I suspect not. Are companies like Sony less vulnerable if North Korea knows a great deal more about our government’s capabilities and constraints? I doubt it. Are you individually safer online if your and your employer’s cybersecurity practices improve marginally but those of the many criminal gangs after your credit cards and your company’s data improve dramatically? Again, probably not, and those criminal gangs are in fact far better positioned thanks to the Snowden materials to improve their tradecraft than you or your employer are to improve your defenses. In other words, the answer to the question of the effects of the Snowden revelations on cybersecurity depends a great deal on one’s vision of what cybersecurity really is. If, with the great libertarian security theorist Bruce Schneier, you imagine cybersecurity as an Internet resistant to all attackers — including those we call law enforcement and intelligence agencies operating under the rule of law — the effects of Snowden have certainly been positive. If you believe, with the US government, that not all attacks are created equal policywise — that some are hugely damaging criminal and national security threats while others are policy objectives of the highest order and some actually augment larger cybersecurity objectives by enabling the prevention of the damaging intrusions — the landscape is far more complicated. Snowden has clearly had an impact, but it’s an impact that pushes toward a more Schneierian vision of Internet security. And that’s a vision far friendlier to some US objectives than to others.Cybersecurity Down – GenericMost companies have no incentive to protect their assets or disclose breachesLily Hay Newman, staff writer and lead blogger for Slate on National Security, 5-11-2015, “What if a Cybersecurity Attack Shut Down Our Ports?” Slate, ’s easy to forget when you’re on dry land that 90 percent of the world’s goods are shipped on boats. While we worry about the cybersecurity of power grids and nuclear missile silos, most of us have never thought about whether the container ships and ports that bring us our clothes, electronics, food—everything—are secured against digital threats. Spoiler alert: They’re not. The April newsletter from maritime cybersecurity consulting firm CyberKeel contained a scary stat. According to a spot check the group conducted, 37 percent of maritime companies with Windows webservers haven’t been keeping up with installing security patches from Microsoft. As a result, more than one-third of these sites are vulnerable to denial of service attacks and certain types of remote access. We already know that companies are slow to protect their networks. On the first anniversary of the discovery of Heartbleed last month, one study showed that 74 percent of companies on the Forbes Global 2000 list hadn’t comprehensively patched their systems against what was possibly the worst vulnerability ever discovered. Maritime companies, though, are responsible not just for customer data (which is already extremely valuable), but for physical goods. If their systems suffer an outage, companies might not know where their ships are, or ports might not be able to unload cargo. Doesn’t this sound kind of, um, important? Over the last few years, groups around the world have been working to bring maritime cybersecurity to the fore and begin talking about the reality of the threats. When breaches occur, private companies currently have virtually no incentive to disclose them, because it will only generate bad publicity and breed distrust among customers and investors. Incidents have started to come out, and this first step toward transparency is promising.Cybersecurity Down – Tech InvestmentLack of investment in tech development has decimated US cybersecurityCaroline Craig, East Coast site editor for InfoWorld, 5-1-2015, “MIT paints grim picture for future of U.S. tech research,” Info World, security Computer hacking, data theft, and other cyber attacks cost the United States billions of dollars per year, and the number of attacks is increasing rapidly. But "fundamentally more secure systems -- where security is built in, and doesn't depend on programmers never making mistakes or users changing their passwords -- are possible." In addition to redesigning computers to eliminate core security weaknesses in their architecture -- a historical legacy from the late 1970s and early 1980s, when computers were 10,000 times slower, had much smaller memories, and were not networked -- a second fundamental cause of cyber insecurity is the weakness of our access authorization. "Both of these fundamental weaknesses could be overcome, if we decided to do so .... But current investments in these priority areas, especially in non-defense systems, are either non-existent or too small to enable development and testing of a prototype system with demonstrably better security and with performance comparable to commercial systems." Cybersecurity Down – Financial IncentivesCybersecurity is down because cyber-attacks are just too lucrativeRobert Dethlefs, founder of the CISO Coalition, a membership organization for chief information security officers at U.S. corporations and founder and CEO of Evanta, a leadership association of business executives, 5-1-2015, “How cyber attacks became more profitable than the drug trade,” Fortune, security professionals, no matter how big the enterprise they work for, are currently overwhelmingly outgunned by cybercrime. The threat of these criminal enterprises is large and growing and if left unchecked will have a disastrous impact on our economy in the near term. McKinsey & Company estimates that cyber attacks will slow the pace of technology and business innovation over the next few years and cost the economy as much as $3 trillion annually. Data breaches have already taken a heavy toll and costs are on the rise. An IBM-sponsored survey conducted by the Ponemon Institute found that the average cost to the company of a corporate data breach is now $5.9 million. Of this, the cost of lost business from a breach averages $3.2 million. However, this average can be misleading because some of the more widely publicized breaches in recent years have cost the affected companies billions of dollars in revenue and shareholder value. Cyber criminals run highly organized and collaborative enterprises that operate with troubling and destructive efficiency. Juniper Networks conducted a study that found that global cybercrime takes in larger profits than the illegal drug trade. “The cyber black market has evolved from a varied landscape of discrete, ad hoc individuals into a network of highly organized groups, often connected with traditional crime groups (e.g., drug cartels, mafias, terrorist cells) and nation-states,” the report said. And even when the goals of the attackers are not monetary gain, the costs can be enormous. Though not a penny of its cash was stolen, the attack on Sony last December cost the entertainment company billions of dollars through the release of data. Types of data stolen can include financial data, personal health information (PHI) and associated insurance information. What’s more, cyber attackers have adopted the practice of gaining strength in numbers. There is a network of collaboration these criminals easily tap into to help them with their schemes. With these hackers constantly working together to do damage to businesses, it only makes sense for businesses to start working together on a large scale.Link Turn – Surveillance Hurts CybersecuritySurveillance actually harms cybersecurity – it creates backdoors that hackers can exploitDenver Nicks, journalist and writer for TIME on National Security, 7-8-2014, “NSA Spying Hurts Cybersecurity for All of Us Say Privacy Advocates,” TIME, advocates Monday slammed the National Security Agency for conducting surveillance in a way they say undermines cybersecurity for everyone and harms U.S. tech companies. “We have examples of the NSA going in and deliberately weakening security of things that we use so they can eavesdrop on particular targets,” said Bruce Schneier, a prominent cryptography writer and technologist. Schneier referenced a Reuters report that the NSA paid the computer security firm RSA $10 million to use a deliberately flawed encryption standard to facilitate easier eavesdropping, a charge RSA has denied. “This very act of undermining not only undermines our security. It undermines our fundamental trust in the things we use to achieve security. It’s very toxic,” Schneier said. In the year since former NSA contractor Edward Snowden’s first leaks, attention has focused on the Agency’s surveillance itself, fueling debates over whether it is legal and ethical to spy on American citizens or to eavesdrop on the leaders of allied countries. NSA policies that intentionally undermine cybersecurity too often get left out of the debate, said panelists Monday at a New American Foundation event titled “National Insecurity Agency: How the NSA’s Surveillance Programs Undermine Internet Security.” “If the Chinese government had proposed to put in a backdoor into our computers and then paid a company $10 million to make that the standard we would be furious,” said Joe Hall, chief technologist at the Center for Democracy and Technology. “That’s exactly what the NSA has become: the best hacker in the entire world.”Link Turn – Surveillance Hurts CybersecurityNSA spying creates vulnerabilities that hackers can exploit – that crushes cyber securityBrendan Sasso, tech policy correspondent for National Journal, 4-29-2014, “The NSA Isn't Just Spying on Us, It's Also Undermining Internet Security,” National Journal, the nation’s defenses against hackers has been one of the Obama administration’s top goals. Officials have warned for years that a sophisticated cyberattack could cripple critical infrastructure or allow thieves to make off with the financial information of millions of Americans. President Obama pushed Congress to enact cybersecurity legislation, and when it didn’t, he issued his own executive order in 2013. “The cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face,” Obama wrote in a 2012 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal. But critics argue that the National Security Agency has actually undermined cybersecurity and made the United States more vulnerable to hackers. At its core, the problem is the NSA’s dual mission. On one hand, the agency is tasked with securing U.S. networks and information. On the other hand, the agency must gather intelligence on foreign threats to national security. Collecting intelligence often means hacking encrypted communications. That’s nothing new for the NSA; the agency traces its roots back to code-breakers deciphering Nazi messages during World War II. So in many ways, strong Internet security actually makes the NSA’s job harder. “This is an administration that is a vigorous defender of surveillance,” said Christopher Soghoian, the head technologist for the American Civil Liberties Union. “Surveillance at the scale they want requires insecurity.” The leaks from Edward Snowden have revealed a variety of efforts by the NSA to weaken cybersecurity and hack into networks. Critics say those programs, while helping NSA spying, have made U.S. networks less secure. According to the leaked documents, the NSA inserted a so-called back door into at least one encryption standard that was developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The NSA could use that back door to spy on suspected terrorists, but the vulnerability was also available to any other hacker who discovered it.No Link – Private Sector SolvesThe private sector is already boosting cyber security in order to protect from domestic surveillanceTom Risen, technology and business reporter for U.S. News & World Report, 6-5-2014, “Cybersecurity Boosted After Snowden NSA Revelations,” US News and World Report, Valley has come a long way boosting privacy and cybersecurity since reports in June 2013 disclosed that the National Security Agency was collecting data from Internet companies. Tech companies including Google, Twitter and Yahoo commemorated a year of news reports detailing secret government surveillance Thursday by supporting campaigns that both pressure government privacy reform and raise consumer awareness about cybersecurity. Those three companies were among the nine firms that make up the Reform Government Surveillance advocacy group, which called for the Senate to boost privacy protections against mass surveillance with a stronger version of the USA Freedom Act bill. The House passed a version of the bill to end mass phone surveillance that privacy advocates criticized as ineffective on privacy. “Over the last year many of our companies have taken important steps, including strengthening the security of our services and taking action to increase transparency,” the group said in a letter to the Senate. “But the government needs to do more.” The separate Reset the Net advocacy campaign against mass surveillance also gives Internet and mobile cybersecurity tips, while companies including Google pledge to boost their encryption. Google also released a test version of a program to keep Gmail encrypted until it reaches other Gmail users. Reset the Net is the latest step in a “renaissance of Internet security” since former NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked documents to the press about agency surveillance on Internet companies, says Kevin Bankston, policy director of the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute. “Countless organizations and companies have really stepped up their game when it comes to hardening their systems and protecting the security of our communications,” Bankston says. Reports have shown the NSA requested information from Internet companies through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court, which nearly always approved a government query, but has also tapped Yahoo and Google servers, installed back doors onto routers and installed spyware onto computers. The Electronic Frontier Foundation advocacy group made a handy, and lengthy list of all the disclosures that expanded public awareness of government surveillance. “The Snowden leaks have taught tech companies a hard lesson that not only do they have to secure their services against Chinese spies and hackers, but they also need to treat their own government as a security threat,” Bankston says. “In response to that lesson we have seen a substantial improvement around Internet security.” No CyberwarNo chance of cyber catastropheSusan Landau, faculty member in the Worcester Polytechnic Institute Department of Social Science and Policy Studies, where she works on cybersecurity, privacy, and public policy, 3-10-2015, “What We Must Do about Cyber,” Lawfare, the same time that technological capabilities improved, strategic analysis also shifted. We’d been hearing about cyber Pearl Harbors since 2011, and about electronic Pearl Harbors for fifteen years before that. No one says “cyber Pearl Harbor” anymore — and that’s a correct assessment. The entities capable of launching a massive, multi-prong attack on US critical infrastructure through cyber have little strategic interest in doing so. Instead, DNI Clapper suggested that the threat will be, Rather than a “Cyber Armageddon” scenario that debilitates the entire US infrastructure, we envision something different. We foresee an ongoing series of low-to-moderate level cyber attacks from a variety of sources over time, which will impose cumulative costs on US economic competitiveness and national security. These will be disruptive attacks on industry, a la Sony and JPMorgan, and more dangerously, there is the potential of low-level attacks to critical infrastructure. Clapper mentioned this, specifically calling out Russian cyber actors who are developing the ability to access industrial control systems. He is concerned about efforts to degrade quality of information — and thus the ability of systems to work correctly. This new understanding of threats changes in two fundamental ways what our responses must be. The first, as Clapper points out, is that we must increase our focus on information integrity. Technical solutions, including cryptographic hashes to ensure data integrity, will play an increasingly important role here. (Interestingly, you also see information integrity play out in Google’s new initiative to rank webpages based on the accuracy of the facts that they contain rather than on the links to them; thus, for example, webpages claiming a link between the Measles-Mumps-Rubella vaccine and autism would be downranked.) The second important aspect is resilience, the continued ability to function despite degraded performance; this will be increasingly critical. In the last several years, resilience has become part of DoD cyber doctrine; it also appears in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. This capability also needs to become deeply embedded within the private sector. As DNI Clapper observed, “cyber risk must be managed.” The Worldwide Threat Assessment brings a much more sophisticated and nuanced version of the cyber threats the US faces than earlier DoD descriptions did. It behooves not just the US military and political leaders to pay attention, but also US industry leaders. Unlike the previous cyber Armageddons characterizations, this assessment captures the real threats to the US public and private sectors. Such threats will only grow more complex and more severe with time; that argues for beginning the development of responses now. Sony and JPMorgan are undoubtedly paying attention to this; one hopes that a much wider swath of US industrial leaders are as well.No CyberwarNo risk of cyber “Pearl Harbor” – their impact is hypePeter W. Singer, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, 1-22-2014, “What Americans Should Fear in Cyberspace,” its central position in both congressional testimony and Hollywood movies, no person has actually been hurt or killed by an act of cyber terrorism. Indeed, squirrels have taken down power grids, but hackers never have. But that is not to say there's no threat. Indeed, our own creation, the Stuxnet worm, which attacked Iran's nuclear infrastructure, demonstrated that cyber weapons can cause damage. But the fiction of a "cyber Pearl Harbor" gets far more attention than the real, and arguably far greater, impact of the massive campaign of intellectual property theft emanating from China. As with 9/11, the way that we react (or overreact) to an attack, terrorist or otherwise, is what truly determines the impact of it. Understanding the difference between hackers doing something annoying and doing something with the capacity to cause serious harm will better direct our fears and resources. Cyber security has to be seen as a management problem that will never go away. As long as we use the Internet, there will be cyber risks. The key is to move away from a mentality of seeking silver bullets and ever-higher walls and instead to focus on the most important feature of true cyber security: resilience. In both the real and online worlds, we can't stop or deter all bad things, but we can plan for and deal with them.AT: Accidental WarThere is no chance of an accidental nuclear warMichael Quinlan, Consulting Senior Fellow for South Asia International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons,” amazonSimilar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these Instances, it Is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again. critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents Itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magn itude increaw In caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potennal adversay)’. No such launch is known to have occurred In over sixty years. The probability of it is thcrcfore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 6—4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated In this way belongs to science fiction. one special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically in the speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered—at least so far as my own observation went—in the utterances of practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading either what sort of attack it was lwing subjected to, or where the attack came from. One special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically in the speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered—at least so far as my own observation went—in the utterances of practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading either what sort of attack It was being subjected to, or where the attack came from. The postulated misreading of the nature of the attack referred in particular to the hypothesis that if a delivery system—normally a missile—that was known to he capable of carrying either a nuclear or a conventional warhead was launched in a conventional role, the target country might, on detecting the launch through its early. warning systems, misconstrue the mission as an imminent nuclear strike and immediately unleash a nuclear counter-strike of its own. This conecture was voiced, for example, as a criticism of the pro- lls (or giving the US Trident SL11M long associated with nuclear missions, a capability to deliver conventional warheads. Whatever the nwrit of those proposals (it Is not explored here), It is hard to regard this particular apprehension as having any real-life credibility. The flight time of a ballistic missile would not exceed about thirty minutes, and that of a cruise missile a few hours, before arrival on target made its character—conventional or nuclear—unmistakable. No government will need, and no non- lunatic government could wish, to take within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning Information alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack. The speculation tends moreover to be expressed without reference either to any realistic political or conflict-related context thought to render the episode plausible, or to the manifest interest of the launching country, should there be any risk of doubt, in ensuring—by explicit communication if necessary—that there was no misinterpretation of its conventionally armed launch. Governments will act with restraint – they won’t miscalculate in conflictWalter Slocombe, Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 2009, De-Alerting: Diagnoses, Prescriptions, and Side-Effects, , in recent years, both the US and Russia, as well as Britain and China, have modified their procedures so that even if a nuclear-armed missile were launched, it would go not to a “real” target in another country but – at least in the US case - to empty ocean. In addition to the basic advantage of insuring against a nuclear detonation in a populated area, the fact that a missile launched in error would be on flight path that diverged from a plausible attacking trajectory should be detectable by either the US or the Russian warning systems, reducing the possibility of the accident being perceived as a deliberate attack. De-targeting, therefore, provides a significant protection against technical error. These arrangements – PALs and their equivalents coupled with continued observance of the agreement made in the mid-90s on “de-targeting” – do not eliminate the possibility of technical or operator-level failures, but they come very close to providing absolute assurance that such errors cannot lead to a nuclear explosion or be interpreted as the start of a deliberate nuclear attack.6 The advantage of such requirements for external information to activate weapons is of course that the weapons remain available for authorized use but not susceptible of appropriation or mistaken use. The drawback from a deterrence and operational point of view is, of course, that the system for transmitting the information must not be susceptible of interruption – that is, there must be assurance that an authorized decision maker will be able to act and have the decision – and the accompanying authenticated orders and unlock combinations – communicated to and received by the operators of the weapon systems. Accordingly, a system of combination-locked safeties requires a highly survivable network for decision and communication with the operators. Otherwise there would be pressures for early transmission of the codes, with their insertion subject to a later execute order or even more dangerous, pre-delegation of authority to issue the execute orders. In this, as in other aspects of measures to meet the “never” requirement, a highly capable and highly survivable command and control system is essential.AT: China WarInterdependence checks China warJohn J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 4-8-2014, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” the most frequently heard argument that China’s rise can be peaceful is based on the theory of economic interdependence. This perspective has two components. First is the claim that China’s economy is inextricably bound to the economies of its potential rivals, including Japan and the United States. This linkage means not only that China and its trading partners depend on each other to keep prospering but also that prosperity in turn depends on peaceful relations among them. A war involving them would have disastrous economic consequences for all the belligerents. It would be tantamount to mutual assured destruction (MAD) at the economic level. No China war – deterrence checksJoseph S. Nye, University Professor at Harvard University, former US assistant secretary of defense, and former chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, 1-13-2014, “1914 Revisited?” ’s world is different from the world of 1914 in several important ways. One is that nuclear weapons give political leaders the equivalent of a crystal ball that shows what their world would look like after escalation. Perhaps if the Emperor, the Kaiser, and the Czar had had a crystal ball showing their empires destroyed and their thrones lost in 1918, they would have been more prudent in 1914. Certainly, the crystal-ball effect had a strong influence on US and Soviet leaders during the Cuban missile crisis. It would likely have a similar influence on US and Chinese leaders today.AT: Iran WarNo scenario for Iran war – their military is too weakBruce Riedel, Senior Fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and a Professor at Georgetown University, 1-20-2012, , “Iran is not an existential threat,” danger of war is growing again over Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran is rattling its sabers, the Republican presidential candidates and others are rattling theirs. But even if Iran gets the bomb, Israel will have overwhelming military superiority over Iran, a fact that should not be lost in all the heated rhetoric. Former head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, says Iran won't get the bomb until at least 2015. In contrast, Israel has had nuclear weapons since the late 1960s and has jealously guarded its monopoly on them in the region. Israel has used force in the past against developing nuclear threats. Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 were the targets of highly effective Israeli air strikes against developing nuclear weapons programs. Israel has seriously considered conducting such a strike against Iran and may well do so especially now that it has special bunker-busting bombs from the US. Estimates of the size of the Israeli arsenal by international think tanks generally concur that Israel has about 100 nuclear weapons, possibly 200. Even under a crash program, Iran won't achieve an arsenal that size for many years — perhaps decades. Israel also has multiple delivery systems. It has intermediate range ballistic missiles, the Jericho, that are capable of reaching any target in Iran. Its fleet of F15 long-range strike aircraft can also deliver nuclear payloads. Some analysts have suggested that it can also deliver nuclear weapons from its German-made Dolphin submarines using cruise missiles. Israel will also continue to have conventional military superiority over Iran and the rest of the region. The Israel Defense Forces has a demonstrated qualitative edge over all of its potential adversaries in the region, including Iran. The Israeli air force has the capability to penetrate air defense systems with virtual impunity as it demonstrated in 2007 when it destroyed Syria's nascent nuclear capability. The IDF's intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities are vastly superior to its potential rivals. The 2006 Lebanon war and the 2009 Gaza war demonstrated that there are limits to Israel's conventional capabilities but those limits should not obscure the underlying reality of Israel's conventional military superiority over its enemies. Iran, on the other hand, has never fully rebuilt its conventional military from the damage suffered in the Iran-Iraq war. It still relies heavily for air and sea power on equipment purchased by the Shah 40 years ago, much of which is antique today. Moreover, the June 2010 United Nations sanctions, UN Security Council resolution 1929, impose a very stringent arms ban on Iran. Virtually all significant weapons systems — tanks, aircraft, naval vessels, missiles, etc — are banned from sale or transfer to Iran. Training and technical assistance for such systems is also banned. In other words, even if Iran wants to try to improve its conventional military capability in the next few years and has the money to do so, the UN arms ban will make that close to impossible. Iran does not have the capability to produce state-of-the-art weapons on its own, despite its occasional claims of self-sufficiency. It certainly cannot build a modern air force to compete with the IDF on its own. Finally, Israel will continue to enjoy the support of the world's only superpower for the foreseeable future. Assistance from the United States includes roughly $3 billion in aid every year. That is the longest running financial assistance program in American history, dating back to the 1973 war. It is never challenged or cut by Congress and permits Israeli planners to do multi-year planning for defense acquisitions with great certitude about what they can afford to acquire. When Texas Governor Rick Perry suggested cutting aid to Israel to zero in one Republican debate, his poll numbers plummeted. He backtracked fast. US assistance is also far more than just financial aid. The Pentagon and Israel engage in constant exchanges of technical cooperation in virtually all elements of the modern battle field. Missile defense has been at the center of this exchange for over 20 years now. The United States and Israel also have a robust and dynamic intelligence relationship, which helps ensure Israel's qualitative edge. Every American president from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama has been a supporter of maintaining Israel's qualitative edge over its potential foes, including US allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iran, in contrast, has no major power providing it with financial help. Its arms relationships with Russia and China have been severed by Security Council Resolution 1929. Its only military ally is Syria, not exactly a powerhouse. And Syria is now in the midst of a civil war; its army is dissolving. If President Bashar Al-Assad falls, Iran is the biggest loser in the "Arab spring". Hezbollah will be the second largest loser. The deputy secretary general of Hezbollah and one of its founders, Sheikh Naim Qassem, wrote in 2007 that Syria is "the cornerstone" of Hezbollah’s survival in the region. While Syria and Hezbollah have their differences, the relationship is a "necessity" for Hezbollah. So don't let the hot air from Tehran or the Republican debates confuse the reality on the ground. Iran is a dangerous country but it is not an existential threat to either Israel or America.AT: Iran WarIran isn’t a threatAlireza Nader, Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, and James Dobbins, former U.S. assistant Secretary of State and Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND, 1-5-2012, “Iran’s Self-Destructive Gamble”, these circumstances, it is important to realistically judge the nature and extent of the Iranian threat. For all its bluster, the Iranian regime is more vulnerable than at any time in its 32-year history. Internally, Iran is constrained by deep political divisions, civil strife and a woeful economy. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has directly challenged the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while Khamenei has spoken of eliminating the presidency. The life of the ordinary Iranian becomes more precarious every day, with rising unemployment, inflation, state repression, and the country’s growing international isolation. The regime has maintained a superficial sense of stability through repression. Legislative elections are scheduled for early March. Leaders of the reformist Green movement are threatening to boycott the ballot, but there will still be a closely fought contest between the more religious and secularist wings of the regime. Both this election and the presidential vote next year could well become occasions for public demonstrations of the sort that threatened the regime three years ago and have since toppled several Middle East governments. Iran is on the brink of losing its only real ally, Syria, as President Bashir al-Assad looks as if he could be the next Arab dictator to fall. Tightening international sanctions are slowing Iran’s nuclear program while limiting its ability to project power. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s principal regional rival, is leading the other Gulf states in an ever more explicit anti-Iranian coalition. The United States is strengthening its military and political ties with several of these states. Iran’s leaders have watched U.S. forces topple Saddam Hussein and the Taliban with relative ease and NATO help do the same with Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya; Iran’s antiquated conventional forces are no match for the U.S. military. And the Iranian regime believes that the United States remains committed to a policy of regime change, even though Washington might not presently have the appetite for a new military intervention. No LinkIncreasing privacy prevents cyber attacksSusan Landau, faculty member in the Worcester Polytechnic Institute Department of Social Science and Policy Studies, where she works on cybersecurity, privacy, and public policy, 9-29-2014, “Securing Phones – and Securing US,” Lawfare, do you protect US assets? Cryptography is necessary. What do you protect? Every communications and storage device people use: computers, laptops, tablets, iPads, telephones, cell phones, smart phones. And you design the security system so that no unauthorized user can break in. That means no hacker, not a different nation state — and not your own. Is the FBI upset? Of course. For a dozen years, law enforcement has been in a golden age of easily tapped phones that revealed increasingly personal information about users. Despite encryption, some of that information, such as users’ location and connection data, will remain accessible to law enforcement (the phone companies will have it). Such transactional information is remarkably revealing to investigators: it shows who is talking with whom, where the bad guys are, who they are with. Access to such information has enabled the US Marshals Service, which tracks fugitives, to cut the average time to locate the criminals from forty-two days to two. And any information that’s backed up to the cloud — emails, your searches, etc. — will be present at the cloud provider, still obtainable by law enforcement. Yes, the decision to secure the content of iPhones (cryptography without backdoors) and Androids (cryptography on by default) will make investigations of low-level drug dealers and other criminals more complicated for law enforcement, especially for those forces with fewer technical capabilities. There are solutions, including using vulnerabilities (under warrant procedures), to tap phones. State and local law enforcement won’t have the technical expertise to do this, and the FBI will need to share its skills. Terrorists are a different situation, of course. But the smart ones, like the most advanced criminal groups (think Zetas), have been using strong security measures, including cryptography, for years. The NSA has used various skillful means to listen in, and it will continue to do so. The bottom line is the same as in 1996, when the National Academies issued its report. We’re more secure with the wide use of strong cryptography — and that means cryptography without back doors. The moves by Apple and Google are very positive steps for security; arguing otherwise is taking a short-term view for our safety and security — to the peril of all.PRESIDENTIAL POWERS DISADVANTAGE RESPONSESUQNU – Obama Won’t ActObama has zero power – even if he had some, he can’t wield it effectively Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, 9-30-2013, “The Obama Conundrum,” Huffington Post, the curious spectacles of our moment, the strangeness of the Obama presidency hasn't gotten its full due. After decades in which "the imperial presidency" was increasingly in the spotlight, after two terms of George W. Bush in which a literal cult of executive power -- or to use the term of that moment, "the unitary executive" -- took hold in the White House, and without any obvious diminution in the literal powers of the presidency, Barack Obama has managed to look like a bystander at his own funeral. If I had to summarize these years, I would say that he entered the phone booth dressed as Superman and came out as Clark Kent. Today, in "The Mystery of Washington's Waning Global Power," Dilip Hiro points out that, as far as Obama's foreign (and war) policy, it's almost as if, when the American president speaks, no one in the Greater Middle East -- not even our closest allies or client states -- is listening. And true as it may be for that region, it seems, bizarrely enough, no less true in Washington where the president's recent attempts to intervene in the Syrian civil war were rejected both by Congress (though without a final vote on the subject) and by the American people via opinion polls. It should be puzzling just how little power the present executive is actually capable of wielding. He can go to the U.N. or Kansas City and make speeches (that themselves often enough implicitly cast him as a kind of interested observer of his own presidency), but nothing much that he says in Washington seems any longer to be seriously attended to. In the foreign policy arena, he is surrounded by a secretary of defense who ducks for cover, a secretary of state who wanders the world blowing off steam, and a national security advisor and U.N. ambassador who seem like blundering neophytes and whose basic ideological stance (in favor of American -- aka "humanitarian" -- interventions globally) has been rejected in this country by almost any constituency imaginable. Unlike previous presidents, he evidently has no one -- no Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, or even Henry Kissinger -- capable of working the corridors of power skillfully or bringing a policy home. Domestically, who ever heard of a presidency already into its second term that, according to just about all observers, has only one significant achievement -- Obamacare (whatever you think of it) -- and clearly hasn't a hope in hell of getting a second one? Just as he's done in Syria, Obama will now be watching relatively helplessly as Republicans in Congress threaten to shut the government down and not raise the debt ceiling -- and whatever happens, who expects him to be the key player in that onrushing spectacle? America's waning power in the Greater Middle East is more than matched by Obama's waned power in this country. In our lifetime, we've never seen a president -- not even the impeached Clinton -- so drained of power or influence. It's a puzzle wrapped in an enigma swaddled by a pretzel. Go figure.NU – AUMF ThumperObama is reigning in his own powers via the new AUMFPeter Baker, White House correspondent for the NYT, 2-25-2015, “Assessing the Balance of Power in an Era of Widespread Mistrust” NYT, clashes are flaring even as Mr. Obama seeks to enact limits on the president’s war powers in a way that few, if any, of his predecessors have sought to do. He has already been launching airstrikes against the Islamic State for six months, citing existing authorizations of force passed under Mr. Bush, but Mr. Obama agreed with critics that Congress should have a role. The draft measure he sent to Capitol Hill would authorize what he has already been doing in Iraq and Syria while repealing one of those existing authorizations, the one passed in 2002 that paved the way for the invasion of Iraq. But Mr. Obama’s proposal would ostensibly bar him and the next president from launching “enduring offensive ground combat operations” against the Islamic State and would expire in three years, requiring his successor to go back to Congress if he or she determined that operations were still necessary.NU – Syria ThumperSyria outweighs the linkDavid Rothkopf, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy, 8-3-2013, “The Gamble,” articles/2013/08/31/the_gamble?page=fullObama has reversed decades of precedent regarding the nature of presidential war powers -and whether you prefer this change in the balance of power or not, as a matter of quantifiable fact he is transferring greater responsibility for U.S. foreign policy to a Congress that is more divided, more incapable of reasoned debate or action, and more dysfunctional than any in modern American history. Just wait for the Rand Paul filibuster or similar congressional gamesmanship. The president's own action in Libya was undertaken without such approval. So, too, was his expansion of America's drone and cyber programs. Will future offensive actions require Congress to weigh in? How will Congress react if the president tries to pick and choose when this precedent should be applied? At best, the door is open to further acrimony. At worst, the paralysis of the U.S. Congress that has given us the current budget crisis and almost no meaningful recent legislation will soon be coming to a foreign policy decision near you. Consider that John Boehner was instantly more clear about setting the timing for any potential action against Syria with his statement that Congress will not reconvene before its scheduled September 9 return to Washington than anyone in the administration has been thus far. Perhaps more importantly, what will future Congresses expect of future presidents? If Obama abides by this new approach for the next three years, will his successors lack the ability to act quickly and on their own? While past presidents have no doubt abused their War Powers authority to take action and ask for congressional approval within 60 days, we live in a volatile world; sometimes security requires swift action. The president still legally has that right, but Obama's decision may have done more -for better or worse -to dial back the imperial presidency than anything his predecessors or Congress have done for decades. 5. America's international standing will likely suffer. As a consequence of all of the above, even if the president "wins" and persuades Congress to support his extremely limited action in Syria, the perception of America as a nimble, forceful actor on the world stage and that its president is a man whose word carries great weight is likely to be diminished. Again, like the shift or hate it, foreign leaders can do the math. Not only is post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan America less inclined to get involved anywhere, but when it comes to the use of U.S. military force (our one indisputable source of superpower strength) we just became a whole lot less likely to act or, in any event, act quickly. Again, good or bad, that is a stance that is likely to figure into the calculus of those who once feared provoking the United States. A final consequence of this is that it seems ever more certain that Obama's foreign policy will be framed as so anti-interventionist and focused on disengagement from world affairs that it will have major political consequences in 2016. The dialectic has swung from the interventionism of Bush to the leaning away of Obama. Now, the question will be whether a centrist synthesis will emerge that restores the idea that the United States can have a muscular foreign policy that remains prudent, capable of action, and respects international laws and norms. Almost certainly, that is what President Obama would argue he seeks. But I suspect that others, including possibly his former secretary of state may well seek to define a different approach. Indeed, we may well see the divisions within the Democratic Party on national security emerge as key fault lines in the Clinton vs. Biden primary battles of 2016. And just imagine Clinton vs. Rand Paul in the general election.NU – Congressional RestrictionsCongressional backlash is inevitable – weakens the executiveTobias Gibson, Department of Political Science, Westminster College, August 2012, “Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9-11,” pattern failed in the wake of the World War II and the ride of the Cold War. Truman was the first president to send troops abroad, and to claim that Congress did not have the power to stop him from doing so. Presidents from Truman to Nixon led to the rise of what would become known as the “imperial Presidency,” acting nearly unfettered until backlash from Nixon’s Watergate scandal and questionable actions during the Vietnam War led Congress to again rise to the challenge of impeding the centralization and augmentation of presidential power. As Goldsmith notes, these actions, including the War Powers Resolution and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ( among several others), which seemed to work in the short term were then seemingly discarded during military actions in several locations. The popular consensus was that the reforms had failed. Instead, according to Goldsmith, these congressional actions laid the groundwork for a formidable backlash to the presidency in the wake of 9/11 and unilateral actions. Vice President Dick Cheney famously stated that the presidency had been weakened in the decades between the Nixon and Bush (II) presidencies, and Goldsmith readily agrees. Indeed, he argues, when Bush tried to take several actions that previous commanders in chief had taken, including surveillance, detention and interrogation, he was “hemmed in by legal restrictions in the decades before 9/11” (p.37). The reaction by Congress and the courts has continued into the Obama administration, in part because the new president continued several policies implemented under Bush. As but one example of the fettered president, despite a long history of presidents transferring detained enemies around the world, including to the United States mainland, Congress reacted forcefully to prevent the transfer of Gitmo detainees to prisons in the United States (see Johnson, Gibbons and Gibson, 2010). NU – Court RestrictionsCourts have placed huge restrictions on presidential authorityIlya Somin, Law Professor at George Mason University, 7-23-2013, “Supreme Court Shutouts Reveal Reckless Decisions,” a president pursues policies that require such expansive federal power that he can't get a single justice to agree, something is probably amiss. Such overreach, though, has become a part of our political culture. Administrations of both parties are often unwilling to accept constitutional limits on their authority. In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, a decision issued in June, the justices unanimously rejected the Obama administration's argument that raisin farmers did not have the right to go to court to contest the seizure of hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of raisins. The Fifth Amendment states that the government must pay "just compensation" whenever the government takes private property for "public use." But the administration claimed that farmers could not even raise the takings issue in court without first enduring lengthy delays and paying a $483,000 fine. Horne was the administration's third unanimous defeat in a property rights case in 18 months. In Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, it claimed that a couple had no right to go to court to seek compensation after the EPA blocked construction of their "dream house." In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, it unsuccessfully argued that the Fifth Amendment doesn't require compensation when the federal government repeatedly and deliberately floods property owners' land. Even liberal justices normally skeptical of property rights claims, including one of President Obama's appointees, found these arguments too much to swallow. The Obama administration has also suffered unanimous defeats in several other important cases. Last year, the justices rejected the administration's position that the religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment does not apply to churches' decisons to hire and fire employees with religious duties, such as teaching theology. Obama appointee Justice Elena Kagan called the administration's position "amazing." In United States v. Jones, another 2012 case, the justices unanimously rejected the administration's claim that the Fourth Amendment does not restrict the government's authority to attach a GPS tracking device to a car. War on terror Obama isn't the first president to promote dubious theories of federal power. George W. Bush's administration, among others, did so as well. All but one Supreme Court justice rejected its claims of nearly unlimited authority to detain U.S. citizens determined to be "combatants" in the war on terror.LinksNo SpilloverNo spillover to other forms of executive powerCharlie Savage, writer at the New York Times, 9-8-2013, “Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict” G. Bradbury, a head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush administration, said it would be “politically difficult” to order strikes if Congress refused to approve them. But he predicted future presidents would not feel legally constrained to echo Mr. Obama’s request. “Every overseas situation, every set of exigent circumstances, is a little different, so I don’t really buy that it’s going to tie future presidents’ hands very much,” he said. No Link – CongressCongressional regulations don’t restrict presidential commandJennifer Elsea et. al., legislative attorney, 2-19-2013, “Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations, sum, it seems that under the constitutional allocation of powers Congress has the prerogative of placing a legally binding condition on the use of appropriations to regulate or end the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces. Such a prohibition seems directly related to the allocation of resources at the President’s disposal, and would therefore not appear to interfere impermissibly with the President’s ability to exercise command and control over the U.S. Armed Forces. Although not beyond question, such a prohibition would arguably survive challenge as an incident both of Congress’s war power and of its power over appropriations. Link Turn + No Spillover – CongressThe plan locks in presidential power – prevents Congress or the courts from undermining the president Robert Chesney et al, Professor at the University of Texas School of Law, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, and cofounder of Lawfare, (Other authors – Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, former assistant attorney general of the Office of Legal Counsel, Matthew C. Waxman, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, and formerly served in senior positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council, and Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, and editor-in-chief of Lawfare), 2013, “A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats,” , presidential action based on statutory authority has more political and legal legitimacy than action based on Article II alone. Article II actions leave the president without overt political support of Congress, which can later snipe at his decisions, or take actions to undermine them. We saw this happen, for example, in response to many of the Bush administration’s unilateral assertions of authority, and also to some degree in response to President Obama’s unilateral assertion of authority in Libya. This is a problem that grows with reliance on Article II over time. Also, of course, any subsequent judicial review of the president’s use of force is more likely to be upheld if supported by Congress.No spillover – plan reinforces pres power and prevents future reductionsRobert Chesney et al, Professor at the University of Texas School of Law, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, and cofounder of Lawfare, (Other authors – Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, former assistant attorney general of the Office of Legal Counsel, Matthew C. Waxman, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, and formerly served in senior positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council, and Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, and editor-in-chief of Lawfare), 2013, “A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats,” we believe there will be a need for a new AUMF, and while we discuss options for such a new statute in Parts II and III, we first pause to note the general downsides of a new AUMF. As the discussion of inherent presidential power implies, a new statutory framework for presidential uses of force against newly developing terrorist threats might diminish presidential flexibility and discretion at the margins. At the same time, of course, it enhances the legitimacy of presidential action in domestic courts and with domestic public opinion. This constraint-legitimacy tradeoff is commonplace. And to the extent that the constraint achieves legitimacy it promotes sustainable counterterrorism policy, politically and legally, over the long term. A strong statutory basis makes it less likely that Congress or courts will intervene later with constraints that dangerously hamper the president’s agility to respond to threats.Link Turn + No Spillover – CourtsJudicial review actually supports presidential powers – legal clarityRick Pildes, law professor at NYU, 8-5-2013, “Does Judicial Review of National-Security Policies Constrain or Enable the Government?” two very significant benefits to government policy in this area can also result from judicial review. Over the many years since 9/11, I have come to wonder more whether our system calibrates these potential benefits and costs well. First, government actors have a need for legal clarity, particularly in national-security areas where the legal questions are novel and the stakes of guessing wrong particularly high. In the absence of more definitive court guidance, government lawyers and policymakers have spent a staggering number of hours trying to anticipate what courts might conclude is the valid scope of the government’s power to detain, or to use military trials, and similar questions. In many contexts, a significant element in what government actors need is simply legal clarity; knowledge of where the lines lie between the permitted and the forbidden can help government actors figure out how best to reach their legitimate goals. Surely there is something not fully functional about a system that requires a decade’s worth of guesswork, and all the resources involved, about exactly where the legal boundaries lie. Second, judicial decisions do not just call a halt to government action, they also legitimate it. A definitive legal ruling that some controversial program is lawful can diminish (even if not eliminate) some of the power of the charge of illegality Those resistant to judicial review, including the government, can too easily lose sight of this power of courts to legitimate government action. Many of us on Lawfare have argued for years that government needs to embrace more transparency to help explain and legitimate its national-security policies. Judicial review can be seen as part of that transparency effort. By way of contrast, the Supreme Court of Israel has eliminated virtually all procedural obstacles to judicial review, including of national-security issues — to an extent that would be shocking to those familiar only with American judicial practice. But one of the benefits is that the Israeli Court has issued the most important judicial decision in the world on the lawful parameters of targeted killings, and the Israeli government now has clarity about the lawful scope of any such actions. None of these comments is designed to make a starry-eyed, overly idealist case for judicial review. Courts can, indeed, make mistakes. Judicial review must not compromise legitimate national-security needs, such as protecting confidential sources and methods, as well as not compromising necessarily covert programs. And some of the constraints on American judicial review are deeply rooted in constitutional law and history, while others are more matters of prudential limits. But I want to call more attention to that the American practice of narrow, “case and controversy” judicial review is an outlier among courts in many other major democracies. And there are some significant costs — from the perspective of the government itself, not just those who seek to challenge government action in the courts — to a structure of judicial review that still leaves us, more than a decade after 9/11, with so little legal guidance from courts on so many novel, essential, and continuing issues at the center of counter-terrorism law. No Link – PersonalityPresidential authority comes from personal qualities, not formal powersTerry Moe, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and William Howell, graduate student in political science at Stanford University, December 1999, “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory” are the foundations of presidential power? Almost forty years ago, Richard Neustadt (1960) offered an answer that transformed the study of the American presidency. Neustadt observed that presidents have very little formal power, far less than necessary to meet the enormous expectations heaped on them during the modern era. The key to strong presidential leadership, he argued, lies not in formal power, but in the skills, temperament, and experience of the man occupying the office and in his ability to put these personal qualities to use in enhancing his own reputation and prestige. The foundation of presidential power is ultimately personal.MPXAT: Cred – No MPXNo impact – cred isn’t key to anythingNuno Monteiro, assistant professor of political science at Yale University, 12-29-2011, “Why we (keep) fighting,” Foreign Policy, these views are wrong. The war in Afghanistan does not prevent the United States from badly damaging any non-nuclear state that defies it while suffering relatively little itself. And the U.S.'s new enemies are no less rational than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming "we will bury you" Khrushchev and his hundreds of intercontinental nuclear missiles, why is the United States unable to stop North Korea and its handful of rudimentary warheads -- not to mention Iran, which has none? Because threats are not the problem. Backed by the mightiest military in history, U.S. threats are eminently credible. In fact, the absence of another great power capable of deterring Washington gives the U.S. a free hand abroad. As Saddam's foreign minister Tariq Aziz lamented after Iraq's humiliating defeat in the Gulf War, "We don't have a patron anymore. If we still had the Soviets as our patron,none of this would have happened." The problem lies elsewhere. During the Cold War, mutually assured destruction kept the peace. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack, which would ultimately lead to the U.S.'s own destruction, was unthinkable. But now that the Soviet Union is gone, America's enemies feel vulnerable even if they comply with Washington's demands. They know that the United States has the wherewithal to take them down if it so decides, so they are unlikely to accept any U.S. demands (to abandon a nuclear program, for example) that would leave them in a position of even greater weakness. This is what explains U.S. involvement in so many "hot" wars since the Cold War ended. As the world's sole superpower, the United States is often seen as an aggressive behemoth. To make its threats effective, we are told, it must restrain itself through a less aggressive military posture, a commitment to multilateral action, or even a pledge to eschew regime change. But even if it does all this, as long as U.S. power remains unmatched, Washington will continue to face difficulties having its way without resorting to war. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States. Zero impact to cred – best polisci Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College and Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at Dartmouth’s John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, and Jennifer Lind, Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College, 5-6-2013, “Red Lines and Red Herrings” The problem is that there's little evidence that supports the view that countries' record for keeping commitments determines their credibility. Jonathan Mercer, in his book Reputation and International Politics, examined a series of crises leading up to World War I and found that backing down did not cause one's adversaries to discount one's credibility. In another book, Daryl Press examined a series of Cold War crises between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. From 1958 to 1961, Nikita Khrushchev repeatedly threatened to cut off NATO's access to West Berlin. Each time, the deadlines passed and Khrushchev failed to carry out his threats. If backing down damages credibility, Khrushchev's credibility should have been plummeting, but the deliberations of American and British leaders show that his credibility steadily grew throughout this period. And a year after the 1961 Berlin confrontation, when the same American decision-makers confronted Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis, they took his threats very seriously. Senior U.S. leaders were convinced that Khrushchev would respond to any forceful U.S. act against Cuba with an immediate Soviet attack against Berlin. Four years of backing down had not damaged Soviet credibility in the least. Documents from American and British archives reveal that when NATO leaders tried to assess the credibility of Soviet threats, they didn't focus on the past. Instead, they looked at Khrushchev's current threat and the current circumstances and asked themselves two simple questions. Can he do it? And would it serve his interests? In the eyes of the Macmillan, Eisenhower, and Kennedy governments, Soviet credibility was growing -- despite Khrushchev's bluster -- simply because Soviet power was expanding. Power and interests in the here-and-now determine credibility, not what one did in different circumstances in the past. Even the canonical case for reputational arguments -- Hitler's dismissal of French and British threats in 1939 -- shows that credibility stems from power and interests. When Hitler told his generals why the British and French would not oppose him when he invaded Poland, he listed seven reasons, every one of which was about the balance of power. The "worms" quote was a throwaway line after a detailed analysis of the balance of military power and Poland's indefensibility.Cred doesn’t exist – issues are compartmentalized which means the aff doesn’t spill over to all credibilityGanesh Sitaraman, Assistant Professor of Law at the Vanderbilt Law School, January 2014, “Credibility and War Powers,” the context of military threats and the use of force, credibility arguments suffer from some important limitations. First, because both past actions and reputation are based on audience interpretations, a country can have multiple reputations and a single action can create different reputations among different audiences.17 To some, following through on a threat demonstrates resolve; to others, foolishness. Second, action in one context might not migrate into reputation in another.18 If the United States sets a “red line” on a fishing issue for Micronesia and then backs down, it is unlikely to send a signal to Iran that all American “red lines” are bluffs. The Iranians may ignore the Micronesian case because it is fundamentally different from their own. AT: Cred – AT: Heg – No MPXNo impact to hegChristopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, former Professor of History at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, 8-3-2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.US power is sustainable – no challengersNoah Berlatsky, writer at the Atlantic, 6-17-2014, “The Moral Argument for American Restraint – in Iraq and Beyond,” Posen, a professor of political science at MIT and a foreign-policy realist, advocates a different approach. The title of his new book, Restraint, succinctly expresses his policy recommendation. The U.S., he argues, needs to stop trying to do more and more. Instead, it needs to do less. Or, as he puts it, "Efforts to defend everything leave one defending not much of anything." Posen rests his discussion on two basic arguments. The first is that the United States is, by any reasonable metric, an incredibly secure nation. It is geographically isolated from other great powers—a position that makes invading or even attacking the U.S. mainland prohibitively difficult. U.S. conventional forces are by far the most powerful in the world. Posen notes that the U.S. "accounted for a little more than a third of all the military spending in the world during the 1990s," and has increased the percentage to about 41 percent of all military spending in the world today. On top of that, the U.S. has a massive nuclear deterrent. It is simply not credible to argue that Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Pakistan, or even Russia or China have the combination of dangerous capabilities and malign intentions to pose a serious existential threat to the United States in anything but the most paranoid neocon fantasies.AT: Cred – AT: Arctic War – No MPXNo Arctic war – economic interest trumpsInternational Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 11-28-2012, “Russia in the Arctic: Economic Interests Trump Military Ambitions” the signs of heightened military activity in the region, the greatest stabilising factor in the region is mutual economic interest, and the points of friction around border delimitation and military activity are unlikely to override this. Russia, in particular, is eager to open up the Northern Sea Route for trade purposes, as it perceives great potential for commerce along its otherwise remote northern coast and the possibility of imposing transit fees for shipping through the route. Russia's relations with NATO and the US will have a major impact on levels of cooperation or mistrust in the Arctic. Rebuilding its decaying infrastructure and managing the Northern Sea Route that can connect Europe and Asia will advance Russia's strategic goals in the region more effectively than an unnecessary military build-up.No Arctic war – regional disputes won’t escalate – their authors are sensationalists David Axe, American military correspondent, 1-11-2011, “How the U.S. Wins the Coming Arctic War” besides, an Arctic war is highly unlikely, at best. “Militarized conflict over the Arctic is unlikely, and regional disputes are unlikely to cause an overall deterioration in relations between or among polar nations,” the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded in a 2009 conference. “Security issues should not be sensationalized in order to attract attention towards the Arctic.”AT: Cred – Sequester ThumpsSequester decimates warfighting capabilities and credGordon Lubold, national security reporter at Foreign Policy, 1-16-2014, “America's Emaciated Army,” U.S. Army, already reeling from the beginning of a round of cuts that will drop from its peak of 570,000 to about 490,000, was just told that those cuts don't begin to cut it. Now the Army has begun planning to plan to shrink even more: to a force of about 420,000. The writing was on the wall. With Iraq now a distant memory and Afghanistan winding down by the end of the year, the Army had expected to drop in size. But to some, this means "cutting into bone," as one officer observed, and that raises a question about what a smaller Army can do -- and what it can't. The Army leadership have framed almost any cuts to end strength as draconian. Speaking before a December budget deal that softens some of the blow, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno attempted to make the case that a smaller Army couldn't do what it was supposed to do. "If Congress does not act to mitigate the magnitude, method and speed of the reductions under the Budget Control Act with sequestration, the Army will be forced to make significant reductions in force structure and end strength, adding: "Such reductions will not allow us to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and will make it very difficult to conduct even one sustained major combat operation."AT: Cred – Shutdown ThumpsUS credibility is terminally shot – shutdownJoel Brinkley, the Hearst professional in residence at Stanford University and a Pulitzer Prize-winning former correspondent, 10-11-2013, “Shutdown eroding U.S. credibility, status abroad,” shutdown is damaging America's foreign policy in ways that might not be recoverable. The effects are not as immediately apparent today as, say, the closure of the Lincoln Memorial or the Head Start program hiatus. But how is the United States going to remain an important player in the world as foreigners observe that we can't even manage our own country? Just one important example: For years now, this country has been trying to ramp up the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an exclusive trading group that partners Asian economies with the United States. China is deliberately excluded. Many states find the idea appealing. While I was in Taiwan in August, President Ma Ying-jeou told me and others that his country was working hard to build up its economy specifically so Taiwan could qualify for the partnership. China started its own exclusive trade group that deliberately excludes the United States: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Well, President Obama had planned to use last week's trip to a couple of Asian summit meetings to persuade undecided Asian countries to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. But he canceled the trip because of the government shutdown. That brought immediate repercussions. As K. Shanmugam, Singapore's foreign minister, put it in a local TV interview: If the shutdown prevents Obama from coming to Asia, "then, of course, the U.S. leadership in the rest of the world, including Asia, will be questioned," adding that "the longer-term consequences" of the shutdown "for the rest of the world can be pretty serious as well." Or, as Secretary of State John Kerry put it while subbing for Obama in Asia, Americans should worry about "the message that we send to the world when we can't get our own act together." While Obama remained in Washington trying to resolve the budget deadlock with right-wing Republicans, China's president, Xi Jinping, was gallivanting through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Bali and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting in Brunei, slapping backs, giving speeches - striving to recruit members for China's trade group. How effective Xi's efforts will be in the long term cannot be predicted. But this was the third time Obama skipped planned meetings in Asia because of problems at home, lapses that certainly have not gone unnoticed in that part of the world. "How can the United States be a reliable partner when President Obama can't get his own house in order?" Richard Heydarian, a foreign-policy adviser to the Philippine congress, told the New York Times. "It makes people wonder: Is the United States really in a position to come to our aid in the event of a military conflict?" The Asian controversies are not just about competing trade pacts, though their importance cannot be understated. After all, Asian economies account for nearly half of the world's gross domestic product. At the same time, though, China's assertion that it controls virtually all of the South and East China seas is causing extreme tensions that seem to be leaving the region perpetually on the brink of war. That festering conflict has been one impetus behind Obama's purported "pivot" to Asia. But now, many Asian nations see that as more rhetoric than anything else.AT: Econ – No MPXEcon decline doesn’t cause warDaniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.19 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. A fundamental conclusion from a recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis—as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.21The global economy is resilient – institutions increase coordination to prevent collapseDaniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” is equally possible, however, that a renewed crisis would trigger a renewed surge in policy coordination. As scholar G. John Ikenberry has observed, “the complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates some expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system.”75 The post-2008 economic order has remained open, entrenching these interests even more across the globe. Despite uncertain times, the open economic system that has been in operation since 1945 does not appear to be closing anytime soon.AT: Terror – No MPXNo WMD terrorismRachel Oswald, writer at Global Security Newswire, 4-17-2013, “Despite WMD Fears, Terrorists Still Focused on Conventional Attacks” group plots against the U.S. homeland since Sept. 11, 2001 have all involved conventional means of attack. Beyond that have been a handful of instances in which individuals used the postal system to deliver disease materials -- notably this week’s ricin letters to President Obama and at least one senator and the 2001 anthrax mailings. Terrorism experts offer a range of reasons for why al-Qaida or other violent militants have never met their goal of carrying out a biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological attack on the United States or another nation. These include: -- substantive efforts by the United States and partner nations to secure the most lethal WMD materials; -- improved border security and visa checks that deny entry to possible foreign-born terrorists; -- a lack of imagination and drive on the part of would-be terrorists to pursue the kind of novel but technically difficult attacks that could lead to widespread dispersal of unconventional materials; -- a general haplessness on the part of the native-born U.S. extremists who have pursued WMD attacks, specifically involving weaponized pathogens; -- elimination of most of al-Qaida’s original leadership, notably those members with the most experience orchestrating large-scale attacks abroad; and -- the Arab Spring uprisings have likely drawn down the pool of terrorists with the proper training and focus to organize WMD attacks abroad as they have opted instead to join movements to overthrow governments in places such as Syria and Yemen. “We killed a lot of people. That was one thing,” said Randall Larsen, founding director of the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, referring to the deaths in recent years of al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden and any number of his direct or philosophical adherents.Reject faulty reasoning that justifies using war powers to fight terrorism – no threatRosa Brooks, Law Professor at Georgetown University, Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, former counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary for policy, and former senior advisor at the U.S. State Department, 3-14-2013, “Mission Creep in the War on Terror,” this begs the essential question: Why exactly is the United States chasing after every two-bit Islamic terrorist on the planet? With the sole exception of 2001, terrorist groups worldwide have never managed to kill more than a handful of Americans citizens in any given year. According to the State Department, 17 American citizens were killed by terrorists in 2011, for instance. The terrorist death toll was 15 in 2010, and nine in 2009. These deaths are tragedies -- but keep the numbers in perspective. On average, about 55 Americans are killed by lightning strikes each year, and ordinary criminal homicide claims about 16,000 U.S. victims each year. No one, however, believes we need to give the executive branch extraordinary legal authorities to keep Americans from venturing out in storms, or to use armed drones to kill homicide suspects.No MPX + MPX Turn – Unilaterial WarsNo impact to presidential powers – an unrestrained executive creates wars to justify powerGene Healy, vice president at the Cato Institute and author of the Cult of the Presidency, 6-2011, “Book Review: Hail to the Tyrant,” enough in the abstract — but Posner and Vermuele fail to provide a single compelling example that might lead you to lament our allegedly atavistic “tyrannophobia.” And they seem oblivious to the fact that those same irrational biases drive the perceived need for emergency government at least as much as they do hostility towards it. Highly visible public events like the 9/11 attacks also instill dread and a perceived loss of control, even if all the available evidence shows that such incidents are vanishingly rare. The most recent year for which the U.S. State Department has data, 2009, saw just 25 U.S. noncombatants worldwide die from terrorist strikes. I know of no evidence suggesting that unchecked executive power is what stood between us and a much larger death toll. Posner and Vermuele argue that only the executive unbound can address modernity’s myriad crises. But they spend little time exploring whether unconstrained power generates the very emergencies that the executive branch uses to justify its lack of constraint. Discussing George H.W. Bush’s difficulties convincing Congress and the public that the 1991 Gulf War’s risks were worth it, they comment, “in retrospect it might seem that he was clearly right.” Had that war been avoided, though, there would have been no mass presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil — “Osama bin Laden’s principal recruiting device,” according to Paul Wolfowitz — and perhaps no 9/11. Posner and Vermuele are slightly more perceptive when it comes to the home front, letting drop as an aside the observation that because of the easy-money policy that helped inflate the housing bubble, “the Fed is at least partly responsible for both the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and for its resolution.” Oh, well — I guess we’re even, then. Sometimes, the authors are so enamored with the elegant economic models they construct that they can’t be bothered to check their work against observable reality. At one point, attempting to show that separation of powers is inefficient, they analogize the Madisonian scheme to “a market in which two firms must act in order to supply a good,” concluding that “the extra transaction costs of cooperation” make “the consumer (taxpayer) no better off and probably worse off than she would be under the unitary system.” But the government-as-firm metaphor is daffy. In the Madisonian vision, inefficiency isn’t a bug, it’s a feature — a check on “the facility and excess of law-making … the diseases to which our governments are most liable,” per Federalist No. 62. If the “firm” in question also generates public “bads” like unnecessary federal programs and destructive foreign wars — and if the “consumer (taxpayer)” has no choice about whether to “consume” them — he might well favor constraints on production. From Franklin Roosevelt onward, we’ve had something close to vertical integration under presidential command. Whatever benefits that system has brought, it’s imposed considerable costs — not least over 100,000 U.S. combat deaths in the resulting presidential wars. That system has also encouraged hubristic occupants of the Oval Office to burnish their legacies by engaging in “humanitarian war” — an “oxymoron,” according to Posner. In a sharply argued 2006 Washington Post op-ed, he noted that the Iraq War had killed tens of thousands of innocents and observed archly, “polls do not reveal the opinions of dead Iraqis.”MPX Turn – Unilateral WarsFlexibility causes misguided warsMartin Indyk, vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program, 6-20-2013, “The Road to War: Presidential Commitments and Congressional Responsibility” Brookings, since WWII, Kalb said that “history has led us into conflicts that we don’t understand” because presidents do not seek approval from Congress for declarations of war. The country has reached a point now where “presidential power is so great, words out of his mouth become policy for the United States.” Kalb used the Syrian civil war and President Obama’s “red line” policy as an example of how a president’s words become strategy for the United States. Kalb argued that this presidential “flexibility” in foreign policy decision-making has repeatedly led the country into one misguided war to the next such as the Vietnam and Iraq wars. To nullify these poor decisions, Kalb believes that formal congressional declarations of war will help “trigger the appreciation for the gravity of war” and assist in “unifying the nation” behind a strategic military intervention, resulting in more positive outcomes for the United States. TERRORISM DISADVANTAGE RESPONSESNo Link – Surveillance Not KeySurveillance irrelevant – US lacks intelligence capabilities to understand information.Peter Bergen, director of the National Security Program at the New America Foundation, David Sterman, research assistant, Emily Schneider, research assistants and Bailey Cahall, research associate, January 2014, “Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?” (accessed 4/24/15)Finally, the overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they need vaster amounts of information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t sufficiently understand or widely share the information they already possess that was derived from conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques. This was true for two of the 9/11 hijackers who were known to be in the United States before the attacks on New York and Washington, as well as with the case of Chicago resident David Coleman Headley, who helped plan the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, and it is the unfortunate pattern we have also seen in several other significant terrorism cases.We already have too much data – surveillance is irrelevant.Mattathias Schwartz, staff writer, January 26, 2015, The New Yorker, (accessed 4/26/2015)Almost every major terrorist attack on Western soil in the past fifteen years has been committed by people who were already known to law enforcement. One of the gunmen in the attack on Charlie Hebdo, in Paris, had been sent to prison for recruiting jihadist fighters. The other had reportedly studied in Yemen with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber, who was arrested and interrogated by the F.B.I. in 2009. The leader of the 7/7 London suicide bombings, in 2005, had been observed by British intelligence meeting with a suspected terrorist, though MI5 later said that the bombers were “not on our radar.” The men who planned the Mumbai attacks, in 2008, were under electronic surveillance by the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, and one had been an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration. One of the brothers accused of bombing the Boston Marathon was the subject of an F.B.I. threat assessment and a warning from Russian intelligence. In each of these cases, the authorities were not wanting for data. What they failed to do was appreciate the significance of the data they already had. Nevertheless, since 9/11, the National Security Agency has sought to acquire every possible scrap of digital information—what General Keith Alexander, the agency’s former head, has called “the whole haystack.” The size of the haystack was revealed in June, 2013, by Edward Snowden. The N.S.A. vacuums up Internet searches, social-media content, and, most controversially, the records (known as metadata) of United States phone calls—who called whom, for how long, and from where. The agency stores the metadata for five years, possibly longer.Current programs fail – internal NSA assessments prove.Ken Dilanian, Associated Press, March 31, 2015, Forensic Magazine, (accessed 4/26/2015)The National Security Agency considered abandoning its secret program to collect and store American calling records in the months before leaker Edward Snowden revealed the practice, current and former intelligence officials say, because some officials believed the costs outweighed the meager counterterrorism benefits. After the leak and the collective surprise around the world, NSA leaders strongly defended the phone records program to Congress and the public, but without disclosing the internal debate. The proposal to kill the program was circulating among top managers but had not yet reached the desk of Gen. Keith Alexander, then the NSA director, according to current and former intelligence officials who would not be quoted because the details are sensitive. Two former senior NSA officials say they doubt Alexander would have approved it. Still, the behind-the-scenes NSA concerns, which have not been reported previously, could be relevant as Congress decides whether to renew or modify the phone records collection when the law authorizing it expires in June. The internal critics pointed out that the already high costs of vacuuming up and storing the "to and from" information from nearly every domestic landline call were rising, the system was not capturing most cellphone calls, and the program was not central to unraveling terrorist plots, the officials said. They worried about public outrage if the program ever was revealed.No Link – Alternatives SolveAlternative approaches solve – community intelligence gathering proves.Mattathias Schwartz, staff writer, January 26, 2015, The New Yorker, (accessed 4/26/2015)One alternative to data-driven counterterrorism is already being used by the F.B.I. and other agencies. Known as “countering violent extremism,” this approach bears some resemblance to the community-policing programs of the nineteen-nineties, in which law enforcement builds a listening relationship with local leaders. “The kinds of people you want to look for, someone in the community might have seen them first,” Mudd said. After the Moalin arrests, the U.S. Attorney’s office in San Diego began hosting a bimonthly “Somali roundtable” with representatives from the F.B.I., the Department of Homeland Security, the sheriff’s office, local police, and many Somali organizations. “They’ve done a lot of work to reach out and explain what they’re about,” Abdi Mohamoud, the Somali nonprofit director, who has attended the meetings, said.Bulk surveillance not key – alternatives more effective.Peter Bergen, director of the National Security Program at the New America Foundation, David Sterman, research assistant, Emily Schneider, research assistants and Bailey Cahall, research associate, January 2014, “Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?” (accessed 4/24/15)However, our review of the government’s claims about the role that NSA “bulk” surveillance of phone and email communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from terrorism shows that these claims are overblown and even misleading.* An in-depth analysis of 225 individuals recruited by al-Qaeda or a like-minded group or inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of terrorism since 9/11, demonstrates that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from local communities, and targeted intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus for investigations in the majority of cases, while the contribution of NSA’s bulk surveillance programs to these cases was minimal. Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of American telephone metadata, which includes the telephone numbers that originate and receive calls, as well as the time and date of those calls but not their content, under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, appears to have played an identifiable role in, at most, 1.8 percent of these cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside of the United States under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act played a role in 4.4 percent of the terrorism cases we examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified authority played a role in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined. Regular FISA warrants not issued in connection with Section 215 or Section 702, which are the traditional means for investigating foreign persons, were used in at least 48 (21 percent) of the cases we looked at, although it’s unclear whether these warrants played an initiating role or were used at a later point in the investigation. (Click on the link to go to a database of all 225 individuals, complete with additional details about them and the government’s investigations of these cases: ).Conventional investigation less likely to lead to false positives.Ryan Cooper, national correspondent, April 5, 2015, The Week, (accessed 4/26/15)Indeed, it's arguable that an obsessive focus on dragnet surveillance is actually a distraction from more effective investigative techniques, because even moderately competent terrorists will avoid electronic communication altogether. Bin Laden was suspicious of even encrypted email years before the Snowden leaks, but especially today, one would have to be grossly misinformed to express sympathy for terrorism online. This might explain why the FBI has spent so much time of late baiting utterly hapless chumps or the mentally ill into taking fake weapons and explosives they never would have been able to get on their own. At any rate, as I've argued before, simple bureaucratic competence and bog-standard detective work are vastly underrated compared to piling up gigantic quantities of irrelevant data. But the false positive problem ought to be the final nail in the dragnet coffin. Unless terrorism becomes thousands of times more common than it is today, such broad techniques will be utterly useless against real terrorism. *Out of every million people, 1 will be a terrorist, and 1000 (0.1 percent of 1 million) will be false positives. Therefore, Jeff's probability is 1/(1000+1) = 0.001, or 0.1 percent.Link Turn – Electronic Surveillance Trades Off with IntelligenceElectronic surveillance trades off with human intelligence – more effective at fighting terrorism.Sebastian Rotella, Pulitzer Price nominee and staff writer at ProPublica, June 19, 2013, “How the NSA’s High-Tech Surveillance Helped Europeans Catch Terrorists,” ProPublica, (accessed 4/24/15)At the same time, some European experts see the furor as a sign that the strengths of the American giant intertwine with its weaknesses. U.S. agencies devote huge resources to sophisticated technology to the detriment of analysis and human spying, they say. As a result, they say, U.S. agencies sometimes appear overwhelmed by the sheer volume of information. “The problem is not collecting information, it’s understanding it,” said Alain Bauer, a well-connected French criminologist who has served as a presidential adviser. “What is the sense of such programs? They are too big. They will not work. We are a former colonial empire. We know the value of human intelligence. It is more efficient and less expensive than technological fetishism. Fortunately, we do not have enough money to do it the other way.” Spy agencies such as France’s DCRI and Britain’s MI5 have long experience cultivating human sources. In early 2008, Spain’s Civil Guard broke up a plot to bomb the Barcelona subway thanks to a French informant. He was a Pakistani who infiltrated the network in the training camps and traveled with the would-be bombers to Spain. He sounded the alarm when the attack seemed imminent.Surveillance programs make it impossible to identify real targets – trades off with effective intelligence gathering.Mattathias Schwartz, staff writer, January 26, 2015, The New Yorker, (accessed 4/26/2015)By flooding the system with false positives, big-data approaches to counterterrorism might actually make it harder to identify real terrorists before they act. Two years before the Boston Marathon bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of the two brothers alleged to have committed the attack, was assessed by the city’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. They determined that he was not a threat. This was one of about a thousand assessments that the Boston J.T.T.F. conducted that year, a number that had nearly doubled in the previous two years, according to the Boston F.B.I. As of 2013, the Justice Department has trained nearly three hundred thousand law-enforcement officers in how to file “suspicious-activity reports.” In 2010, a central database held about three thousand of these reports; by 2012 it had grown to almost twenty-eight thousand. “The bigger haystack makes it harder to find the needle,” Sensenbrenner told me. Thomas Drake, a former N.S.A. executive and whistle-blower who has become one of the agency’s most vocal critics, told me, “If you target everything, there’s no target.” Drake favors what he calls “a traditional law-enforcement” approach to terrorism, gathering more intelligence on a smaller set of targets. Decisions about which targets matter, he said, should be driven by human expertise, not by a database.Domestic surveillance leads to false leads – wastes resources crucial to catching real suspects.Hina Shamsi, director of the ACLU's National Security Project, and Matthew Harwood, the ACLU's senior writer/editor, November 6, 2014, Mother Jones, (accessed 4/26/15)Law enforcement officials, including the Los Angeles Police Department's top counterterrorism officer, have themselves exhibited skepticism about suspicious activity reporting (out of concern with the possibility of overloading the system). In 2012, George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute surveyed counterterrorism personnel working in fusion centers and in a report generally accepting of SARs noted that the program had "flooded fusion centers, law enforcement, and other security outfits with white noise," complicating "the intelligence process" and distorting "resource allocation and deployment decisions." In other words, it was wasting time and sending personnel off on wild goose chases. A few months later, a scathing report from the Senate subcommittee on homeland security described similar intelligence problems in state-based fusion centers. It found that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel assigned to the centers "forwarded 'intelligence' of uneven quality—oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens' civil liberties and Privacy Act protections... and more often than not unrelated to terrorism."Link Turn – Surveillance Enables CyberterrorismDomestic surveillance enables cyberterrorism – enemies can tap into systems to target the US.Steven M. Bellovin et al, professor of computer science at Columbia University, 2007, IEEE Security & Privacy, (accessed 4/24/2015)Implicit in the FISA update was the need to protect the US against non-state actors, who have indeed shown themselves to be adept at using the Internet to communicate. Some of the tools provided for by the Protect America Act could in fact aid in the disruption of various nefarious plots. But building surveillance technology into a communications infrastructure creates risk of penetration by trusted insiders, foreign powers, and non-state actors (with trusted insiders being the greatest threat). Disrupting attacks by non-state actors could be a short-term gain, but surveillance architectures rarely go away. The dangers created by the Protect America Act present a longterm risk. (This is exemplified by the exploit in the Greek wiretapping case, which relied on an earlier software version that included wiretapping capabilities but not the auditing system.) The Protect America Act, a law enacted in haste, holds the possibility of a vast increase in the number of Americans whose communications and communication patterns will be studied. The surveillance provides access to US communications, a target of great value. The US could build for its opponents something that would be too expensive for them to build for themselves: a system that lets them see the US’s intelligence interests, a system that could tell them how to thwart those interests, and a system that might be turned to intercept the communications of American citizens and institutions. It is critical that the new surveillance system neither enable exploitation of US communications by unauthorized parties nor permit abuse by authorized ones.No Impact – Cyber SecurityCyber security threats overblown.Jerry Brito, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and Tate Watkins, Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2011, Harvard National Security Journal, (accessed 4/26/15)Security risks to private and government networks from criminals and malicious state actors are no doubt real and pressing. However, the rhetoric of "cyber doom" employed by proponents of increased federal intervention in cybersecurity implies an almost existential threat that requires instant and immense action. Yet these proponents lack clear evidence of such doomsday threats that can be verified by the public. As a result, the United States may be witnessing a bout of threat inflation similar to that seen in the run-up to the Iraq War. Additionally, a cyber-industrial complex is emerging, much like the military-industrial complex of the Cold War. This complex may serve not only to supply cybersecurity solutions to the federal government, but to drum up demand for those solutions as well.No terminal impact to cyber threats – economy and society are resilient.Jerry Brito, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and Tate Watkins, Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2011, Harvard National Security Journal, (accessed 4/26/15)Finally, it should be pointed out that even if one were to determine that cybersecurity is under-provided by the private sector, one would then have to proceed to the next questions in an economic analysis: consider different alternatives to regulation, as well as alternative forms of regulation, and determine whether the benefits of the chosen alternative outweigh its costs. Indeed, although cyber-doom scenarios are often presented as existential threats to our fragile interconnected society, the evidence from history from WWII to 9/11 to Katrina-is that people and institutions are incredibly resilient and would likely bounce back from any probable cyber attack. As Aaron Wildavsky puts it when addressing how best to respond to dangers that cannot be understood in advance: "[m]y vote goes to the resilience that comes from passing many trials and learning from errors so that the defects of society's limited imagination are made up by larger amounts of global resources that can be converted into meeting the dangers that its members never thought would arise." Terrorists will never have the capability to launch devastating cyber attacksJoshua Green, Editor of the Washington Monthly, November 2002, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism,” (Accessed 4/25/2015)There's just one problem: There is no such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there compelling evidence that al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted to computers for any sort of serious destructive activity. What's more, outside of a Tom Clancy novel, computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale, and many scoff at the notion that terrorists would bother trying. "I don't lie awake at night worrying about cyberattacks ruining my life," says Dorothy Denning, a computer science professor at Georgetown University and one of the country's foremost cybersecurity experts. "Not only does [cyberterrorism] not rank alongside chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, but it is not anywhere near as serious as other potential physical threats like car bombs or suicide bombers." No Impact – TerrorismIncredibly low risk of terrorism attacks – the numbers don’t lie.Ronald Bailey, Science Correspondent, September 6, 2011, Reason Magazine, (accessed 4/26/2015)Taking these figures into account, a rough calculation suggests that in the last five years, your chances of being killed by a terrorist are about one in 20 million. This compares annual risk of dying in a car accident of 1 in 19,000; drowning in a bathtub at 1 in 800,000; dying in a building fire at 1 in 99,000; or being struck by lightning at 1 in 5,500,000. In other words, in the last five years you were four times more likely to be struck by lightning than killed by a terrorist. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has just published, Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later [PDF]. The report notes, excluding the 9/11 atrocities, that fewer than 500 people died in the U.S. from terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2010. The report adds, “From 1991-2000, the United States averaged 41.3 terrorist attacks per year. After 2001, the average number of U.S. attacks decreased to 16 per year from 2002-2010.” Of course, the police and politicians will cite the lack of deaths from terrorism as evidence that their protective measures are working. Earlier this year, the conservative Heritage Foundation compiled a list of 39 terror plots that had been foiled since September 2001. Going through the list, about 23 of the plots might plausibly have resulted in terror attacks of one sort or another. Several were aimed at subways, military bases, and shopping malls. To get a feel for the number of people that might be killed in typical terrorist attacks, consider that four subway bombs killed 52 people in London in 2005; the deadliest attack on a military base killed 13; and blowing up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killed 187 people in 1995. Making the huge assumption that all 23 plausible plots would have succeeded in killing an average of 100 Americans each, that means that 2,300 would have died in the last 10 years, or about 230 per year. (This implies a rate that is 10 times higher than the rate between 1970 and 2010, excluding the 9/11 attacks, by the way.) Even at this higher rate, your chances of dying in a terrorist attack would be about 1 in 1.7 million.Catastrophic terrorists attacks are unlikely – their impact is all media hypeChristopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, March 2010, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” , accessed (4/23/2015)Even terrorists equipped with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would be incapable of causing damage so cataclysmic that it would prove fatal to modern states. Though the prospect of terrorists obtaining and using such weapons is one of the most consistently terrifying scenarios of the new era, it is also highly unlikely and not nearly as dangerous as sometimes portrayed. As the well-funded, well-staffed Aum Shinrikyo cult found out in the 1990s, workable forms of weapons of mass destruction are hard to purchase, harder still to synthesise without state help, and challenging to use effectively. The Japanese group managed to kill a dozen people on the Tokyo subway system at rush hour. While tragic, the attack was hardly the stuff of apocalyptic nightmares. Super-weapons are simply not easy for even the most sophisticated non-state actors to use.Even if an attack occurs the impact will be containedChristopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, March 2010, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” , accessed (4/23/2015)If terrorists were able to overcome the substantial obstacles and use the most destructive weapons in a densely populated area, the outcome would of course be terrible for those unfortunate enough to be nearby. But we should not operate under the illusion that doomsday would arrive. Modern industrialised countries can cope with disasters, both natural and man-made. As unpleasant as such events would be, they do not represent existential threats. The American public can be forgiven for being afraid of nuclear-, biological- or chemical-armed terrorists, since the messages they have been receiving from US leaders have been uniformly apocalyptic, informed by worst-case thinking. The responsibility for this pathological fear lies with those who ought to know better – who know, for instance, that plastic sheeting and duct tape are not realistic protections against anything, but who recommend their stockpiling anyway. Terrorists can kill people and scare many more, but the localised damage they can cause is by itself incapable of changing the character of Western civilisation. Only the people of the West, largely through their own overreaction, can accomplish that. No Impact - Nuke TerrorZero risk of nuclear terrorism – no motive, tech, expertise, or money John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, November 2013, “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters,” (Accessed 4/27/2015)In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. No nuclear terror threat – no motive or technical capability Leonard Weiss, Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, 2015, “On fear and nuclear terrorism”, (Accessed 4/20/2015)While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008: Nuclear terrorism ...turns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies, nightmares, urban legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings, mysterious substances, terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies, allegations of coverups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory. Only the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008: 26) To illustrate in more detail how fear has distorted the threat of nuclear terrorism, consider the three possibilities for terrorists to obtain a nuclear weapon: steal one; be given one created by a nuclear weapon state; manufacture one. None of these possibilities has a high probability of occurring. Too many obstacles for a successful nuclear attack John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, January 2014 “America Unhinged,” article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show (Accessed 4/21/2015)What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. No Impact - Bio TerrorTechnical barriers to a successful attack are overwhelmingRebecca Keller, Analyst at Stratfor, March 2013, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential (Accessed 4/22/2014)There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.Bioterror threat is non-existentMason Ryan Davenport, Professor of Security Studies at American, August 2014, “The Lingering Specter of Bioterrorism: Assessing Al-Qaeda’s Intent and Capability to Use Biological Weapons against the U.S.”, digitalcommons.apus.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=theses (Accessed 4/23/2015)Al-Qaeda’s failure to either acquire or cultivate lethal biological agents over the last decade should bear more weight on D.C.’s incessant terrorism-cum-bioweapons debate. As ‘imminent’ bioterror threats continually fail to pan out, it stands to reason that al-Qaeda’s attempts at bioterrorism are more wishful thinking than serious dedicationNo risk of bioterrorChris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire, January 2009, “Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism,” (Accessed 4/27/2015)Bioterrorism has killed five U.S. citizens in the 21st century -- the victims of the 2001 anthrax attacks, he said. Meanwhile, at least 400,000 deaths are linked each year to obesity in this country. The United States has authorized $57 billion in spending since the anthrax mailings for biological prevention and defense activities, Leitenberg said. Much of the money would have been better used to prepare for pandemic flu, he argued. "Mistaken threat assessments make mistaken policy and make mistaken allocation of financial resources," Leitenberg said. The number of states with offensive biological weapons programs appears to have stabilized at six beginning in the mid-1970s, despite subsequent intelligence estimates that once indicated an increasing number of efforts, Leitenberg said. Caveats in present analyses of those states make it near-impossible to determine the extent to which their activities remain offensive in nature, he added. There has been minimal proliferation of biological expertise or technology to nations of concern in recent decades.No Impact – Cross Border TerrorTerrorists won’t be able to get operatives into the USScott Stewart, VP of Tactical Analysis at Stratfor, July 2014, “Examining the Terrorist Threat from America's Southern Border,” weekly/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border#axzz39S7rDCvL (Accessed 4/22/2015)Another factor to consider is the changes in the way militant groups have operated against the United States since 9/11. Because of increased counterterrorism operations and changes in immigration policies intended to help combat terrorist travel, it has become increasingly difficult for terrorist groups to get trained operatives into the United States. Even jihadist groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have been forced to undertake remote operations involving bombs placed aboard aircraft overseas rather than placing operatives in the country. This indicates that the group does not have the ability or the network to support such operatives. Terrorists aren’t entering via the Mexican borderJoshua Keating, Staff writer at Slate focusing on international affairs, August 2014, “’El Qaida’: The Persistent, Baseless Claim That Terrorists Will Swarm the U.S. From Mexico,” (Accessed 4/21/2015)The Mexican government is expressing some irritation with Texas Gov. Rick Perry, who suggested last week that there’s a “very real possibility” that members of ISIS or other terrorist groups are entering the U.S. illegally via Mexico. As Perry acknowledged in his own remarks—and as the Pentagon confirmed—there’s “no clear evidence” that this is happening. But as is generally the case when fears of “El Qaida” periodically emerge, a lack of evidence is no barrier to bold sweeping claims. Intelligence officials have warned for some time that there’s a possibility of terrorists entering the U.S. from Mexico, and there is indeed some evidence of groups like Hezbollah operating in South America. It would be foolish, then, to completely rule out the possibility that terrorists have crossed into the United States from down Mexico way. But the frequent claims that this is already a major problem are, well, ridiculous. Expert consensus – no risk and counterterror increasingTom Barry, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy, January 2013, “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” (Accessed 4/24/2015)One likely reason the Border Patrol does not address its counterterrorism in any detail is that the agency’s border security buildup on the southwestern border has not resulted in the apprehension of members of foreign terrorist organizations, as identified by the State Department. Experts in counterterrorism agree there is little risk that foreign terrorist organizations would rely on illegal border crossings – particularly across the U.S.-Mexico border – for entry into the United States. While the fear that foreign terrorists would illegally cross U.S. land borders drove much of the early build-up in border security programs under the newly created homeland security department, counterterrorism seems to have dropped off the actual and rhetorical focus of today’s border security operations.No Impact - ISISISIS has no military power and no allies – they’re not a threatPatrick J. Buchanan, Senior advisor to three Presidents, August 2014, “To Defeat the Islamic State,” (Accessed 4/26/2015)Undeniably, these are bloodthirsty religious fanatics who revel in beheadings and crucifixions and have exhibited battlefield bravery and skill. But are 17,000 jihadi fighters in landlocked regions of Iraq and Syria really an imminent and mortal threat to an America with thousands of nuclear weapons and tens of thousands of missiles and bombs and the means to deliver them? How grave is this crisis? Consider the correlation of forces. Who are the vocal and visible friends and fighting allies of ISIS? They are nonexistent. The Turks, Saudis, Qataris and Kuwaitis who, stupidly, have been aiding ISIS in bringing down Bashar Assad and blowing a hole in the "Shia Crescent" of Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus and Hezbollah, have lately awakened to their idiocy and are cutting off aid to ISIS. Moderate Sunnis detest ISIS for its barbarism and desecration of shrines. The Christians and Yazidis fear and loathe them. The Kurds, both the Syrian YPG and PKK, which broke open the exit route for the Yazidis from Mount Sinjar, and the peshmerga despise ISIS. Lebanon's army, Syria's army, Hezbollah and Iran have been fighting ISIS with Russian assistance. Vladimir Putin himself warned us of the absurdity of our attacking Assad last year, arguing that we would be allying ourselves with the same terrorists who brought down the twin towers. Was Putin not right? Even al-Qaida and Hamas have repudiated ISIS. Territorial control does not determine the strength of ISISPaul R. Pillar, Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University, August 2014, “ISIS in Perspective,” (Accessed 4/19/2015)The control by a group of a piece of territory, even if it is mostly just sand or mountains, is what most often is taken mistakenly as a measure of the threat a group poses, and this phenomenon is occurring in spades with ISIS. Probably seizure of land is interpreted this way because following this aspect of the progress of a group is as simple as looking at color-coded maps in the newspaper. The history of terrorist operations, including highly salient operations such as 9/11, demonstrates that occupying some real estate is not one of the more important factors that determine whether a terrorist operation against the United States or another western country can be mounted. To the extent ISIS devotes itself to seizing, retaining, and administering pieces of real estate in the Levant or Mesopotamia—and imposing its version of a remaking of society in those pieces—this represents a turn away from, not toward, terrorism in the West. Significant friction between ISIS (then under a different name) and al-Qaeda first arose when the former group's concentration on whacking Iraqi Shias was an unhelpful, in the view of the al-Qaeda leadership, digression from the larger global jihad and the role that the far enemy, the United States, played in it.ISIS can’t get WMDsMatthew Cottee, Research analyst with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2014, “The very small Islamic State WMD threat,” (Accessed 4/24/2015)In short, ISIS does seem interested in acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, but ambitions do not necessarily equate with reality. The complexities of such weapons, combined with the difficulties involved in obtaining and handling the necessary material, make the likelihood of its use remote. Let’s not exaggerate the threat. No Impact - Al-QaedaNo risk of Al Qaeda attackScott Stewart, Strategic Analyst at Stratfor, January 2011, “Why Al Qaeda is Unlikely to Execute Another 9/11,” (Accessed 4/23/2015)Since we published our 2011 forecast, bin Laden has been killed as well as senior al Qaeda leader Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who reportedly died in a strike by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle Aug. 22 in Pakistan's North Waziristan region. We continue to believe that the al Qaeda core group is off balance and concerned for its security -- especially in light of the intelligence gathered in the raid on bin Laden's hideout. The core group simply does not enjoy the operational freedom it did prior to September 2001. We also believe the group no longer has the same operational capability in terms of international travel and the ability to transfer money that it had prior to 9/11. Some people believe there is a greater chance of an attack on this year's 9/11 anniversary because of the killing of bin Laden, while others note that al-Zawahiri may feel pressure to conduct an attack in order to prove his credibility as al Qaeda's new leader. Our belief, as noted above, is that al Qaeda has been doing its utmost to attack the United States and has not pulled any punches. Because of this, we do not believe it possesses the ability to increase this effort beyond where it was prior to bin Laden's death. As to the pressure on al-Zawahiri, we noted in December 2007 that the al Qaeda core had been under considerable pressure to prove itself relevant for several years and that, despite this pressure, had yet to deliver. Because of this, we do not believe that the pressure to conduct a successful attack is any heavier on al-Zawahiri today than it was prior to bin Laden's death. Finally, we believe that if al Qaeda possessed the capability to conduct a spectacular attack it would launch the attack as soon as it was operationally ready, rather than wait for some specific date. The risk of discovery is simply too great.New data shows Al Qaeda irreparably damagedRick Maze, Staff Writer at Military Times, January 2012, “Intel chief: Bin Laden death crippled al-Qaida,” (Accessed 4/25/2015)The al-Qaida terrorist network has not and maybe never will recover from the death of Osama bin Laden, the top U.S. intelligence official said Tuesday. Testifying in a rare open session to discuss global threats, James Clapper, the retired Air Force lieutenant general who is director of national intelligence, said bin Laden’s successor as head of the terrorist network has a “leadership style less compelling than bin Laden’s image as a holy man and warrior.” The new al-Qaida leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, will not receive the same “deference” as bin Laden, Clapper said, adding that the loss of other leaders through death or capture is “so substantial, and [the group’s] operating environment so restricted, that a new group of leaders, even if they could be found, would have difficulty integrating into the organization and compensating for mounting losses.” Still, al-Qaida isn’t finished, Clapper said. Even with degraded capabilities, the terrorist network “will seek to execute smaller, simpler plots to demonstrate relevance to the global jihad” while aspiring to attack larger targets, including the U.S. homeland, he said. Al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan increasingly rely on militant factions there to conduct attacks, Clapper said. Pakistan’s military has had only “limited success” against this threat. Regional affiliates of al-Qaida, such as the Northern Africa affiliate Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghred or AQIM, receive communications from network leaders but have limited ability to conduct out-of-area attacks. “We will never again have a hearing where someone asks where is Osama bin Laden,” noted Sen. Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, the intelligence panel’s ranking Republican.BIOPOWER KRITIK RESPONSESBiopower goodSurveillance is not wholly bad—the particular problems the aff identifies are contingent and able to be remedied, surveillance as a whole is not bad but usefulDavid Lyon, directs the Surveillance Studies Centre, is a Professor of Sociology, holds a Queen’s Research Chair and is cross-appointed as a Professor in the Faculty of Law at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, 2002, “Everyday Surveillance: Personal data and social classifications,” me make this clear. I am not suggesting that classification and surveillance? are socially negative processes. They are necessary aspects of all social situations? and serve social purposes, from the vital to the vicious. The point is that as? powerful means of governance, of social ordering, they are also increasingly? invisible and easily taken-for granted. The risk management (and other) classifications of surveillance societies involve categories that are inherently political, that? call for ethical inspection. I am not suggesting either that such classifications are? each powerful in the same way. Surveillance as understood here exists on a long? continuum along which data is collected and processed for a range of purposes? from policing and security to consumption and entertainment. It produces? categorical suspicion at one end (such as ethnic profiling at airport security checks)? and categorical seduction (such as targeting of potential car rental customers from? lists of airline loyalty club members) at the other. Cities are increasingly splintered? into socio-economically divided consumption and security enclaves by these? practices (Graham and Marvin 2001). But either way, the categories have ethics;? the codes have politics.? This, then, is why surveillance matters. It does indeed provoke privacy? concerns from time to time. But, as expressed, these personal concerns are? frequently temporary and contingent ones, often relating to mistakes and errors? in databases or telecommunications systems, or to loss of access to the tokens of? trust such as credit cards or driver’s licenses. They are not high on any political? agenda. And when, for example, surveyed Internet users claim to care about? online privacy, it turns out, paradoxically, that the very same persons key-in PINs? and credit card numbers online! (Washington Post 2000) They want the benefits? of e-commerce even if they also want assurances that their personal details are? secure and not being used for purposes beyond the immediate transaction. When? it comes to legal restrictions on surveillance, whether construed as data protection? or as privacy laws, it is usually the data-subject who has to make an appeal. The? law only acts as a guarantee of some right to self-protection. This is why legal? limits, though not insignificant, scarcely scratch the surface of the social issues? raised by rapidly rising surveillance levels in everyday life.Biopower is good—it is founded on love and care in an effort to maximize quality of life for a populationMika Ojakangas, Faculty member of Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at University of Jyv?skyl?, 2005, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault,” vivid discussion around Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life can be seen as a sign that the book is little by little gaining the status of a “post‐modern political classic”. As is well known, its point of departure is Michel Foucault’s concept of bio‐political power or bio‐power that he elaborates in the end of The History of Sexuality. For Foucault, bio‐power is an essentially modern form of power and its purpose is to exert a positive influence on life, to optimise and multiply life, by subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. In contrast to this power Foucault opposes the classical sovereign power that was exercised mainly as a means of deduction – the seizing of things, time, bodies, and ultimately the? seizing of life itself. Although Agamben admits that our societies are bio‐political ones, he nevertheless sees the Foucauldian opposition between bio‐power and sovereign power as superfluous. According to him, in fact, these models of power essentially intersect, although in a previously concealed manner. Agamben calls “bare life” – the life of homo sacer that is exposed to an unconditional threat of death – the hidden point of intersection between the sovereign and bio‐political models of power. As fine as Agamben’s analysis is, however, it is precisely this argument that is most dubious in Homo Sacer. Not bare life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but the care of “all living” is the foundation of bio‐power.Biopower is concerned with protecting law abiding citizens, it’s main goal is not to destroy livesDominic Corva, Faculty member in the politics department at Sarah Lawrence College, BS, Economics, University of Houston. BA, Creative Writing, University of Arizona. MA and PhD, Geography, University of Washington, 2009, “Biopower and the Militarization of the? Police Function,” police/military distinction in the age of modernity relied upon and? reproduced the sovereignty of the liberal nation-state. The military function acted? upon disorderly subjects outside of, and the police functioned to engage disorderly? subjects within, the borders of the nation-state. The main difference between the? two had to do with the use of coercive state power against subjects who were? considered part of a social contract with the state, defined through regimes of? national citizenship, and those who were not.? The liberal regime of biopower, with respect to policing, is concerned above? all with making and protecting law-abiding subjects rather than destroying the lives? of lawbreakers. In the historical context of the U.S. and U.K. welfare states, this? meant an emphasis on rehabilitation and retribution (in the sense of restorative? sanctions, not vengeance) as well as an expansion of the rights of the accused (see? Beckett, 1997, and Garland, 2000). The liberal police function should be? understood as concerned with the rights and responsibilities of the liberal subject as? s/he is part of society, rather than its enemy. The enemies against which society is? to be defended are deviant, scientifically correctable behaviors, rather than? incorrigible subjects. Hence the medicalization of the criminal as a subject exposed? to “root causes” such as poverty, and in need of restorative care more than harshly? punitive sanctions.Biopower is key to ensure freedomAli Muhammad Rizvi, Ph.D., Lecturer, Critical Thinking and Philosophy? Universiti Brunei Darussalam, 2012, “Freedom, power and capitalism: From disciplines to biopower,” is a theme running throughout Foucault’s analyses of? governmentality, biopower, the changing nature of state and its? relation to society, and neo-liberalism. The theme is particularly? clear in the contrasts he makes between governmentality and the? arts of government in previous centuries (the reason of state and? the theory of police, etc.), biopower versus disciplinary power,? and the modern state versus the early modern state (and medieval? state). The theme is that of freedom: the nature of freedom, and its? relation to other notions such as power, rationality, etc. Foucault? wants to reject a certain notion of freedom. Let us call it a negative? notion of freedom, expressed in terms of the absence of something? else, something it is not: A way out.1 Specifically, negative freedom? is seen as absence of repression and domination, notions that are? in turn associated with power. Hence, negative freedom becomes? absence of power, and the way to freedom is a way out of power? relations. In this view, power is domination. The assumption is? that where there is power there is no freedom, and where there is? freedom there is no power. Let’s call this the ‘exclusory’? hypothesis;2 power and freedom, according to this hypothesis,? are mutually exclusive. But this, Foucault argues, is to? misunderstand the nature of modern freedom and power, and the? way they operate in modern societies. Such notions of freedom? and power might have some relevance to early modern and? medieval societies, but they are quite inadequate in understanding? our contemporary societies.3? One of the insights of the analysis is that freedom is a? great managing power (and not just a liberating force), and power? is not necessarily something bad (it can lead to either domination? or freedom). Freedom, and a particular positive notion of freedom,? is the paradigm of the new techniques of government, the new art? of government. Freedom is meant here not as an ideology? (although that is important as well, even though much less? important than is normally thought), but simultaneously as the? principle (mechanism) through which the system works. Freedom? in this sense is not to be understood primarily as the property of? will (in the tradition of human rights and legal discourses), but as? the freedom of movement and freedom of circulation – freedom to? develop, grow, enhance – and is applied to both people and? things (that is both to physical and human capital). The new art? of government is not primarily based on prohibitions and? exclusions, but is “carried out through and by reliance on freedom? of each” (Foucault 2007, p. 49).Biopower inevitableBiopower is an inevitable part of the human condition—it’s impossible to solve entirely but the affirmative is a productive point of ruptureMathew Coleman, Ph.D., Associate Professor in the Department of Geography at Ohio State University, and Kevin Grove, professor at Ohio State University 2009, “Biopolitics, biopower, and the return of sovereignty,” , and finally, is there a way in which we can account for both Agamben's and? Hardt and Negri's departure from Foucault on what counts as biopolitics? Foucault's? approach to the term sees the life that is the object of power—which is typically? referred to as `population', but, as we saw above, is more accurately about a range of? forms of individual and collective life implicated by the discipline ^ biopolitics ^ racism? triplet—as an effect of power/knowledge. As we argued in the first section of the? paper, this does not mean that regimes of power are fragile, here-today-gone-tomorrow? `speech acts'. However, it does mean that biopolitics—as well as other modes of? power/knowledge—can have no strong metaphysical foundation. Rather, as a mode? of power/knowledge, biopolitics describes rationalities and programs of government? which are contingent upon certain conditions of possibility. This is where both? Agamben and Hardt and Negri part company with Foucault, as signaled by their? shared insistence that Foucault does not properly get at the `real dynamics' of? biopolitical society, whether in terms of his forgetting of death (Agamben) or his? refusal to explore the ontological substance of social production (Hardt and Negri).? Agamben, for example, in asserting that the sovereign ban is the original and ongoing? political relation, and that the production of bare life is the original and ongoing core? of sovereign power, posits biopolitics (the sovereign ban and bare life, together) as a? necessary condition of human existence as we know it. Hardt and Negri, despite their? obvious differences with Agamben, pursue a similarly metaphysical definition of bio-? politics. For them, biopolitics-as-biopotenza describes the innate ability of humans to? produce social life at the edge of time. Moreover, the productivity of labor (biopotenza)? is, for Hardt and Negri, literally what gives shape and substance to history—including? the many forms of biopotere launched against the multitude. For both Agamben and? Hardt and Negri, then, we contend that biopolitics works as a sort of ontological? and metaphysical anchor, a transcendentalizing condition of possibility for the human? ernance is not a static, overarching institution, reject their generalizing claims—freedom means individual participation like the affirmativeDouglas Brown, an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Education, University of Regina, Canada, 2014, “Liberalism, Advanced Liberalism, and the Governmental Policy Challenge in Education,” governance moves past fixed understandings concerning hierarchical power (state and civil society), subject freedom becomes participant in forms of organization and regulation. The freedom of the individual then stands in contradiction to the frequently proffered position that pinpoints the state as a unified player, a dispenser of cohesion and authority (diplomaticly and militarily). Foucault argues that the state possesses none of this fixity or functionality (Foucault, 2007).? A theorist or citizen, then, should be less concerned with overarching theories of power than with “actions upon actions,” or the exercising of power within a given social context (Foucault, 1982, p.220). Simplistic a priori narratives engaging domination and oppression are exchanged for inquiries into the practices of governance. Governance becomes more a methodology, a practice or rational way of doing things. Governmentality references multiple forms of conduct amongst many players. This may include the government of oneself, the government of souls, the government of the household, or the governance of one’s children (Foucault, 1991). The formation of governing mechanisms implies connections between the individual and governance forms. Here we have the blending of the “microphysical with the macropolitical” (Burchell, 1996, p. 20), or the linking of the individual practices of the self with forms of external domination. Foucault (as cited in Burchell, 1996) writes:? I think that if one wants to analyse the genealogy of the subject in Western societies, one has to take into account not only techniques of domination, but also techniques of self. Let’s say one has to take into account the interaction of these two types of techniques. (p. 20)? The involvement, or exchange, hinging on this analytics of power as government, is set through the interplay of actors and agencies. Governance must be understood as the way in which power is exercised in reciprocal correspondence between self and other, as a means in which our conduct/regulation is bound to institutional and/or state processes.State inevitableThe state is inevitable—even during a period of organized anarchy, the strong will coalesce and have incentive to create a government Randall G. Holcombe, DeVoe Moore Professor of Economics at Florida State University, 2004, “Government: Unnecessary? but Inevitable,” the foregoing arguments, I have maintained that although government may not be? desirable, it is inevitable because if no government exists, predators have an incentive? to establish one. From a theoretical standpoint, Nozick’s argument—that competing? protection firms will evolve into a monopoly that then becomes the state—represents? one form of the general argument that government is inevitable. Because of the? prominence of Nozick’s work, I offer no further theoretical defense of it here. More? significant, however, as de Jasay notes, “Anarchy, if historical precedent is to be taken? as conclusive, does not survive” (1989, 217). Every place in the world is ruled by government.? The evidence shows that anarchy, no matter how desirable in theory, does? not constitute a realistic alternative in practice, and it suggests that if government ever? were to be eliminated anywhere, predators would move in to establish themselves as? one by force.18 One can debate the merits of anarchy in theory, but the real-world libertarian? issue is not whether it would more be desirable to establish a limited government? or to eliminate government altogether. Economist Bruce Benson notes, “When? a community is at a comparative disadvantage in the use of violence it may not be able? to prevent subjugation by a protection racket such as the state” (1999, 153). Libertarian? philosopher Jan Narveson writes, “Why does government remain in power?? Why, in fact, are there still governments? The short answer is that governments command? powers to which the ordinary citizen is utterly unequal” (2002, 199–200).? Government is inevitable, and people with no government—or even with a weak? government—will find themselves taken over and ruled by predatory gangs who will? establish a government over them.19 As de Jasay observes, “An anarchistic society may? not be well equipped to resist military conquest by a command-directed one” (1997,? 200). People may not need or want government, but inevitably they will find themselves? under government’s jurisdiction.20No Link—negative state actionDomestic surveillance is the pinnacle of biopower—the affirmative is a good moveJohn Hayward, columnist for Breitbart, 5-8-2015, “France Approves Domestic Spying with ‘Almost no Judicial Oversight’,” new measures in France include cellphone and email metadata harvesting, along the lines of the National Security Agency’s controversial programs in the United States.? But there’s much more. “The provisions, as currently outlined, would allow the intelligence services to tap cellphones, read emails and force Internet companies to comply with requests to allow the government to sift through virtually all of their subscribers’ communications,” reports The New York Times, adding:? The intelligence services could also request the right to put hidden microphones in a room or on objects such as cars or in computers, or to place antennas to capture telephone conversations or mechanisms that capture text messages. Both French citizens and foreigners could be tapped.? As in the United States, civil liberties activists are uneasy with these sweeping surveillance powers. The head of the Paris bar association flatly dismissed the government’s arguments for the new measures and its promises of accountability as “a state lie,” accusing proponents of using terrorism scares to increase government spying on law-abiding citizens.? Even the editor of Charlie Hebdo thought the new laws were “opportunistic” and excessive, telling The New York Times editorial board that existing provisions should be adequate to combat domestic terrorism, if used properly.? Prominent terrorism Judge Marc Trevidic called the new law “dangerous” because it would substitute a National Commission to Control Intelligence Techniques for routine judicial review, and the Prime Minister would have the power to override recommendations from the ernment surveillance is one of the most prominent and potent examples of biopower—it’s executive overreach without any checksPatrick G. Eddington, a policy analyst in homeland security and civil liberties at CATO, 4-13-2015, “Confronting the surveillance state,” creation of what many refer to as the "American Surveillance State" began in secret, just days after the Sept. 11 attacks. As the wreckage of the Twin Towers smoldered, President Bush and his top national security and intelligence advisers were making decisions that would trigger a constitutional crisis over surveillance programs that the public was told was essential to combating terrorism. The first act in this post-Sept.11 drama began on Capitol Hill.? On Sep. 12, 2001, just as the Senate was about to vote on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against al Qaeda, Majority Leader Tom Daschle received urgent messages from senior White House officials. Even though there was a bipartisan agreement on the resolution, the Bush administration was seeking a radical change in the language. As Daschle revealed in a Dec. 2005 Washington Post op-ed, "Literally minutes before the Senate cast its vote, the administration sought to add the words 'in the United States and' after 'appropriate force.' This last-minute change would have given the president broad authority to exercise expansive powers not just overseas — where we all understood he wanted authority to act — but right here in the United States, potentially against American citizens. I could see no justification for Congress to accede to this extraordinary request for additional authority. I refused."? But Bush administration officials wouldn't take "no" for an answer.? Just two days after the confrontation with Daschle, then-NSA Director General Michael Hayden green-lighted more data collection of global communications system surveillance, including from people inside the United States. And while the country would only learn of this warrantless surveillance program from the New York Times story, many of the specifics about Hayden's action only came to light much later, through a previously top secret NSA Inspector General report Snowden provided to the Guardian newspaper in June 2013.PermutationThe affirmative is a productive way of strategically engaging biopolitics—recognition of contingency is necessaryAnne Bloom, Professor of Law, the University of the Pacific/McGeorge School of Law, 2012, “Speaking ‘Truth’ to Biopower,” “Speaking ?Truth? to Biopower” is a pragmatic strategy for legal activism that incorporates postmodern insights regarding the nature of both “truth” and “power.” “Truth” is in quotes to emphasize its contingency – the impossibility of understanding what truth means outside of a particular political and social context. “Biopower” replaces “Power” to highlight the ways in which the body is a key site of contestation in contemporary political struggles.3 While these insights are postmodern,4 the strategy I propose is not. Instead of rejecting legal arguments that rely upon foundational beliefs or “truths” (as would be characteristic of a postmodern approach),5 I argue it is more useful to strategically deploy legal “truths” in? ways that acknowledge their political and social contingency. In short, “Speaking ?Truth? to Biopower” is a strategy that recognizes both the political utility and the limitations of legal arguments that rest on foundational claims.? “Speaking ?Truth? to Biopower” is also a strategy that champions the political utility of rights. While rights-based tactics have many limitations,6 I argue that they can be useful when they are employed in ways that take into account the surrounding political and material conditions. Moreover, because tort litigation tends to be more focused on material conditions than other areas of the law,7 I argue that rights-based strategies may be particularly useful when they are deployed in tort litigation. Thus, “Speaking ?Truth? to Biopower” encourages activists to view tort litigation as a potentially important site of political struggle where rights can be strategically asserted to address injustices in material conditions.The opposite of biopolitics is the private becoming political, not the destruction of the state—the permutation is necessary to solve the impactsBogdana Koljevi?, an associate of the Institute for Political? Studies and is on the editorial staff of the “New Serbian Political? Thought” magazine, 2008, “Biopower and government? techniques,” numerous concrete examples the answer is quite simple? and plausible - it is a politics opposing the idea of an all out? “chipization“, a policy against biometric measures and identification? systems, and at that level the idea comes across fairly? clearly. Far less clear however is whether the policy of freedom? today should or could at all be defined only as negative? freedom, “freedom from”, i.e. as an eminently neoliberal or? even libertarian concept of liberty? In the same vein, is the? idea of a minimal state at the background of this “policy of? freedom“. The limitation of the negative freedom theory is, in? a sense, structural. That is also the reason why one of the? leading issues of modern debates is how to attain positive? freedom, thus not only (negative) freedom of individuals, but? the freedom of society as a whole. This is the case of theories? formulated in a wide theoretical span from Habermas’ idea? about the key role of the informal public sphere to radical? theories of Antonio Negri’s total systemic change.? That is because the opposite of biopolitics are not human? or civil rights, the right and liberty of an individual - the? opposite of biopolitics is politics as public activity, activity? within the polis, i.e. community. Crucial for biopolitics is the? fact that oikos (the private sphere) enters the polis (the public? realm). The process where life is politicized and politics? depoliticized in its retreat before life and in the name of life is? what Foucault calls biopolitics. It is also what Foucault? implied by referring to the progressive animalization of man? through the most sophisticated techniques.Reform is necessary and inevitable—millennials don’t want surveillance which is a large component of biopowerAnthony D. Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, 4-20-2015, “With millennials gaining influence, surveillance reform is inevitable,” surveillance reform may confront resistance in the near term, millennials have made it clear that they don't want government agencies tracking them online or collecting data about their phone calls. In the United States, millennials will surpass the baby boomer generation this year, and by 2020, they will represent 1 out of 3 adults. As they grow in influence, so too will the demand to rein in the surveillance state.? Conventional wisdom says that the young and idealistic grow up and shed their naive ideals as they confront the real world. By that logic, as millennials age, they will recognize the need for the surveillance state to keep us safe from terrorism. But given the lack of evidence that mass surveillance works — President Obama's own review group concluded that the National Security Agency's call-records program never played a pivotal role in any investigation — it is unlikely this generation of digital natives will shed a fundamental commitment to the free exchange of information.? Their ethos — that the Internet should be a place where people are free to share knowledge and ideas without government interference — is already reflected in tech culture. Technology companies, compelled by profit and principle, recognize how governments continue to violate their citizens' trust with secretive surveillance practices, and some have responded by providing encryption measures for their customers to circumvent it. Last month, the Reform Government Surveillance coalition, which includes Google, Apple, AOL, Facebook, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter and Yahoo, sent a letter to U.S. lawmakers calling for the government to end the bulk collection of data.? It's important to remember how fast even the most entrenched beliefs can change. Not so long ago, the majority of Americans opposed same-sex marriage. In 2003, the Pew Research Center found that 59% of the U.S. population opposed same-sex marriage. But that same year, 51% of millennials supported it. Since then, support for it has increased every year, in every age group. Federal legalization of same-sex marriage now appears inevitable.? It took about a decade for U.S. policies and laws to catch up to millennials on same-sex marriage. But Congress will have an opportunity to tackle the surveillance issue much faster. In June, key provisions of the Patriot Act are set to expire, including Section 215, which the NSA claims as the legal backing for its bulk collection of Americans' phone call records. Congress should let these provisions expire.? When millennials translate their political ideals into public policy, the future will be more in the spirit of 1776 than 1984, and Snowden will assume his place in American history as whistleblower and patriot. The establishment might not like him now, but one day, it will erect a monument honoring him.The permutation creates the space for institutional reform in which society and individuals are able to reflect on how they are complicit in systems of biopolitical control which is necessary to any solvencyPeyi Soyinka-Airewele Ph.D? Professor of International Relations,? & Comparative Studies, Carnegie Fellow at the Department of? Political Science and International Relations,? Covenant University, Canaan Land, Ota, March 2015, “The end of politics?: Reclaiming humanity in an age of biopower and necropolitics,” what would emerge in its place? Still politics, but hopefully? a reformed politics that can travel into the future. The word ?reform‘? sounds tame besides our preferred terms of revolution and? transformation but I use it advisedly in the context of Foucault‘s caution? against constructing utopias that degenerate into biopower. The? dilemma with necropolitics is that even as we protest its putrid? formations, we often lose sight of how much it has entwined itself? around our lives, swamped and overwhelmed our vision, language,? relationships, communities and lives. We ignore how deeply we are? invested in and complicit with its norms and enticements. So perhaps? seeking reform or transformation is a first step to recognizing, unlike? the local party bosses of China, our own complicity in corruption and in? systems of power and fear.? Although the medical field utilizes surgical debridement to save? lives threatened by necrotic trauma, the only assured mode the human? species has of defeating death is ensuring that life is constantly birthed.? So at various levels of the polity, we must continue to mobilize, debate? and seek to elect ethical, visionary and responsive leaders; demand a? national political structure rooted in true federalism; and hold leaders in? all societal sectors accountable for their discourses and actions or lack? thereof.Feminism affThe feminist analysis of the aff offers space for alliances—power is disrupted by shifting, interconnected sites of resistance—the perm solves best Catriona Macleod, Ph.D., Harvard University? Edmund J. and Louise W. Kahn Term Professor in the Humanities, Professor of German, and Kevin Durrheim, PhD, social psychologist, ? Professor of Psychology? University of KwaZulu-Natal, March 2002, “Foucauldian Feminism: the Implications of Governmentality,” Foucauldian terms resistance takes the form of reverse or subjugated discourses and practices subverting hegemonic discourses and practices. These subjugated knowledges include those of the psychiatric patient, the hysteric, the midwife, the housewife, the teenage mother etc. Foucault does not see resistance as radical rupture or overt revolution. There is “no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt” (Foucault 1978, p. 96) but rather shifting points of resistance that “inflame certain parts of the body, certain moments in life” (Foucault, 1978, p. 96). What governmentality adds to this is the possibility of identifying and resisting concentrations of power. This does not mean a reversal to a “single locus of great Refusal”, but rather that alliances of shifting points of resistance around concentrations of power become a possibility.? The implication of this in terms of feminist political practice is that such practice becomes a matter of alliances rather than one of unity around a universally shared interest (Allen & Baber, 1992). We would more rightly talk of the practice of feminisms. Within this politics, the aim is not to overcome differences in order to achieve political unity. Rather it is to use difference as a resource around which to establish multiple points of resistance to the myriad of micro- and macro-level gendered relations of inequality and domination. The commonality around gendered relations remains, but one strategy of resistance is not privileged over another. Feminist-informed governmental analyses may provide the intellectual grounds for holding diversity within commonality (i.e. making the links between micro-level practices and strategies of resistance and macro-level concentrations of power, e.g. patriarchy). This means that the practice of feminisms need not collapse into something in which anything goes. On the basis of specific theoretical analyses of particular struggles generalisations can be made, and patterns in power relations and the effectiveness of various strategies identified.Policing affDomestic policing has expanded the power of the sovereign, we must look at the intersections between policing and biopower—only the permutation solvesDominic Corva, Faculty member in the politics department at Sarah Lawrence College, BS, Economics, University of Houston. BA, Creative Writing, University of Arizona. MA and PhD, Geography, University of Washington, 2009, “Biopower and the Militarization of the? Police Function,” who focus on the intersection of poverty and penality often assert,? though rarely explore, the claim that the war on drugs has become a primary? justification for the militarization of the police function within the U.S. (see? Wacquant, 2003, for example). By “militarization” I refer to the expansion of the? criminal justice apparatus to intensify unprecedentedly harsh punitive sanctions and? coercive practices, with attendant collateral damage, especially in urban centers and? against socioeconomically excluded populations. This has been the expansionary? sector of the federal budget during a time when welfare expenditures have been? restructured along neoliberal lines (Peck 2001), especially since 1986 when the? first omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed. Gilmore (2002) calls it the? warfare-welfare state, Peck (2003) calls it the penal state, Wacquant (2001) calls it? the carceral state/prison society, and Andreas (1998) calls it the crimefare state.? Whatever one calls it, this form of state restructuring has expanded police power? (and firepower), prosecutorial discretion, mass incarceration, welfare? conditionalities, employment qualification, and the erosion of civil liberties while? downsizing citizenship rights and universal participation in public space. The war? on drugs fundamentally alters the rights and responsibilities of the most vulnerable? sectors of the U.S. population by normalizing what it means to be an economically? productive body in society. This biopolitical discourse, in turn, has underwritten? the highly repressive practices of the national penal state.ImpactsAT: Bare lifeBare life is not a necessary condition of biopower—the sovereign must have a condition of life that is in line with its goals and thus strives for the multiplicity of life, increasing quality of life for the majorityMika Ojakangas, Faculty member of Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at University of Jyv?skyl?, 2005, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault,” , life as the object and the subject of bio‐power – given that life is everywhere, it becomes everywhere – is in no way bare, but is as the synthetic notion of life implies, the multiplicity of the forms of life, from the nutritive life to the intellectual life, from the biological levels of life to the political existence of man.43 Instead of bare life, the life of bio‐power is a? plenitude of life, as Foucault puts it.44 Agamben is certainly right in saying that the production of bare life is, and has been since Aristotle, a main strategy of the sovereign power to establish itself – to the same degree that sovereignty has been the main fiction of juridico‐institutional thinking from Jean Bodin to Carl Schmitt. The sovereign power is, indeed, based on bare life because it is capable of confronting life merely when stripped off and isolated from all forms of life, when the entire existence of a man is reduced to a bare life and exposed to an unconditional threat of death. Life is undoubtedly sacred for the sovereign power in the sense that Agamben defines it. It can be taken away without a homicide being committed. In the case of bio‐power, however, this does not hold true. In order to function properly, bio‐power cannot reduce life to the level of bare life, because bare life is life that can only be taken away or allowed to persist – which also makes understandable the vast critique of sovereignty in the era of bio‐power. Bio‐power needs a notion of life that corresponds to its aims. What then is the aim of bio‐power? Its aim is not to produce bare life but, as Foucault emphasizes, to “multiply life”,45 to produce “extra‐life.”46 Bio‐power needs, in other words, a notion of life which enables it to accomplish this task. The modern synthetic notion of life endows it with such a notion. It enables bio‐power to “invest life through and through”, to “optimize forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern.”47AlternativeThe alternative leads to other groups like NGOs filling in and being more violent than the governmentLaurence McFalls, Professor in the department of political science at Université de Montréal, 2010, “Benevolent Dictatorship:? The Formal Logic of Humanitarian Government,” NGO’s negative form of definition clearly signals the shift in rationality away from the legal-rational instrumentalism of the modern state. Just as the explosive economic growth of modern capitalism depended on a shift from a rationality of ends (i.e. wealth) to a rationality of means (productivity), the unprecedented development of the bureaucratic, sovereign state resulted from the western European political dynamic of the pursuit of power as an end in itself, i.e., from the subjection of politics to a purely instrumental rationality. The internal, circular logic of the preservation and aggrandizement of state capacities obscured, as Agamben shows, the inclusive exclusion of political value rationality, which manifested itself in the growing bio-politicization of modern state power. The emergence, since the 1970s, of the NGO has simply completed the backdoor-return of political value rationality. Performing social functions previously associated with the state and doing so largely with funding of state origin, NGOs short-circuit the self-sustaining circular logic of the bureaucratic state’s formal, impersonal rationality. More than a neo-liberal privatisation of an allegedly bloated, inefficient and self-serving (but procedurally legitimate) state bureaucracy, NGOs confer the means of? legitimate violence to particular, personal, and passing substantive value rationalities. Feigning a non-political, humanitarian vocation, NGOs, whose missions and methods can change with the prevailing wind, in fact embody a politics of arbitrary life force imposing its values and visions.Abolishing the risk of negative governance means abolishing the opportunity of freedom—only the permutation solves.Ali Muhammad Rizvi, Ph.D., Lecturer, Critical Thinking and Philosophy? Universiti Brunei Darussalam, 2012, “Freedom, power and capitalism: From disciplines to biopower,” a sense, this encapsulates the whole problem of? governance in the age of capitalism, which in a way is still with? us. The example of a town here is important for several reasons.? Capitalism as a movement emerges in free towns, away from the? shackles of early modern (feudal) sovereign territorial states.? Foucault at one point says that “the town was par excellence the? free town” (ibid., p. 64), and that “the town was always an? expansion within an essentially territorial system of power? founded and developed on the basis of a territorial domination? defined by feudalism” (ibid.). For a feudal, territorial state the? problem is entirely negative, that is, of “fixing and demarcating? the territory”; the problem of the newly emerging, positive art of? government on the other hand is: “(A)llowing circulations to take? place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring? that things are always in movement, constantly moving around,? continuously going from one point to another, but in such a way? that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out”? (ibid., p. 65). In governing open, fluid multiplicities without? hindering the fluidity – in other words, managing the space of? governance in such a way as to maximise opportunity and minimise? dangers (possible disruptions to the positive task) – fluidity,? openness, and inherent ungovernability are seen not just as? dangers (conceptually speaking), but as opportunities. The task? of the newly evolving arts of government (which of course would? draw upon all the present and past available resources) is to? evolve techniques, strategies, policies in order to do just that: “It? is simply a matter of maximising the positive elements, for which? one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimising? what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while? knowing that they will never be completely suppressed” (ibid., p.? 19). This last point is very important. Whence comes this? realisation that ‘risk’ can only be ‘managed’ but never ‘completely? suppressed’? I submit that this is (at least in part) due to the? realisation of the role of freedom in the whole game. If the purpose? is to maximise ‘opportunity’, ‘utility’, or ‘positivity’ (whatever? you want to call it) then freedom is essential to the system as a? whole; and, if freedom is essential, risk and uncertainty are also? essential, as they are part and parcel of freedom. Risk cannot be? abolished without abolishing freedom, and hence the system itself.? It also follows from this that such a strategy of governance is? primarily positive (as it is based on positivity par excellence –? freedom20) and only secondarily negative (aimed at reducing risk).Solvency—Engagement keySurveillance is conducted and depends on information infrastructure—without engaging that infrastructure, the alternative failsDavid Lyon, directs the Surveillance Studies Centre, is a Professor of Sociology, holds a Queen’s Research Chair and is cross-appointed as a Professor in the Faculty of Law at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, 2002, “Everyday Surveillance: Personal data and social classifications,” depends, then, on information infrastructures, invisible frameworks? that order the data according to certain criteria, purposes and interests.? In the later twentieth century, information infrastructures were decisively? computerized, which simultaneously made them even less visible and even more? powerful, and also produced some specific kinds of coding (Lessig 1999). The? kinds of interests behind social classifications expanded to include not only? government departments and policing or security services, but also a multitude? of commercial organizations as well (Gandy 1993; Lyon 1994). Beyond this,? particular kinds of agencies have become prominent – above all insurance? companies – and their interests often transcend those of either governmental or? commercial domains. They have become, albeit as an unintended consequence of? their activities, very powerful social actors on the contemporary landscape? (Strange 1996).Decentered, localized resistance fails—must engage the federal government if we want to create real changeDominic Corva, Faculty member in the politics department at Sarah Lawrence College, BS, Economics, University of Houston. BA, Creative Writing, University of Arizona. MA and PhD, Geography, University of Washington, 2009, “Biopower and the Militarization of the? Police Function,” as a regime of biopower not only has an uneven geography, it is? reproduced as a liberal strategy through the militarization of the state’s police? function. The uneven geography of state power has, in turn, facilitated the? transnationalization of the militarized police function, to places where its? biopolitical liberalism has been, and continues to be, widely contested. The? biopower of the drug war rests on two principles. First, that “drugs” are a global? security threat to normal, healthy bodies and economies. Second, that this threat is? so massive that narcotics-related police functions should more closely resemble? warfare: against enemies, not citizens, and transnational in scope. These principles? can be contested, in turn, many different ways by many different actors. But the? necessary nexus for the consolidation of these principles has been, and continues to? be, the U.S. state at the federal level—not a decentered, hegemonic network of? biopower.? As Foucault states, “[p]ower as a pure limit set on freedom is, at least in our? society, the general form of its acceptability” (Foucault, 1978, 86). Where this? acceptability is located, however, has mattered a great deal for the? transnationalization and militarization of the police function. The widespread? cultural stigmatization of “drugs” in the U.S. has catalyzed to a significant degree? the thickening of the police function, particularly throughout the U.S. and Latin? America. As long as “drugs” are embedded in the U.S. biopolitical economy of? transnational fear, the U.S. narco-industrial complex will augment the? militarization of liberal democratic state-society relationships through the police? function throughout the world (albeit in an uneven and contingent fashion).? The normalization of repressive sovereign power within a regime of? biopower is facilitated when the latter produces credible ways of understanding? threats to the social body as emanating from individuals that can be treated as? enemies, rather than social transformations. Drug war discourses produce locally? acceptable truths connecting real social disorder to fetishized, illicit commodities? rather than to local and global political and economic inequalities. This? normalization has legitimated the expansion of the coercive capacity of states and? illicit economic actors. Many of the trends in state militarization that are now used? in the war on terror were developed in the spaces of the war on drugs. Dyncorp and? other military contractors were active in the privatization of the military function11? in the Andes long before they were in Iraq (see Azzelini and Kanzleiter, 2005; and? Borger and Hodgeson, 2001). The discursive association of illicit immigration with? dangerous individuals, justifying the militarization of border police, was? predominantly drug-related before 9/11 (see Andreas and Nadelman, 2006, 165-8).? And the practice of detaining suspects without due process, with years before trial,? was happening in Cochabamba, Bolivia, long before Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (see? Farthing, 1997, 259).State engagement is key otherwise the sovereign will be able to strategically define resistance movements to shut down any hope for changeAihwa Ong, a professor of sociocultural anthropology? and Asian studies at the University? of California, Berkeley, 2012, “Powers of sovereignty: State, people, wealth, life,” analytic of interacting powers (state and? people) recognizes the situated mix of resistance,? accommodation, and manipulation, and? uncertain outcomes. The state goal is to manipulate? any political situation in order to achieve? an implicit state-people bargain that trades acceptance? of political authoritarianism for sustained? improvements in economic and social? well-being. Each event crystallizes conditions of? struggle in which the state seeks to thwart or? use the will of the people. But we need to grasp? the convergence of events and opportunities at? different moments in time, and how the interactions? crystallize heterogeneous possibilities? and outcomes, not predetermined victory for? the people or for state authoritarianism. That is,? the authoritarian state, in its multifaceted embroilment? with global capital, cannot be frozen? in a posture of opposition to the masses, but? must strategically intervene in unstable conditions,? one moment acting as a draconian oppressor? of workers, the next as a protector of? labor against the depredations of global capital.? Besides its dynamic and heterogeneous sites of? struggle, the distinctive circumstances of? China’s rise also make it hard to imagine Chinese? masses would politically identify with a? borderless global multitude.State engagement is key—obtaining and maintaining freedom necessitates a substantial amount of intervention on the part of the governmentAli Muhammad Rizvi, Ph.D., Lecturer, Critical Thinking and Philosophy? Universiti Brunei Darussalam, 2012, “Freedom, power and capitalism: From disciplines to biopower,” are various instruments and preconditions of? power relations, viz. freedom, knowledge, charisma, and charm,9? to mention a few. Let us suppose I want to control your life; the? question can arise only if you are free and only to the extent that? you are free; if you are not free (e.g. if you are chained, or are? enslaved),10 I do not need to control your activities. In this specific? sense, freedom is the general condition of any power relation,? and it is also a general condition of governance. Similarly,? knowledge of the object/person one wants to govern also seems? to be a general condition of power relations as well as governance.? However, the active, positive role of freedom, as well as? knowledge, beyond this minimal sense changes depending on? the nature of power involved, the specific object of governance,? etc. Now, if you are free, and if I need to control your activities? (and control may or may not involve repression), I need to have? some sort of power over you. I need to have a certain strategy in? place to govern, restrict, and streamline (depending on the? context) your (possible) actions. Various factors can influence? such strategies. If, for example, my purpose is just that you do? not become too powerful relative to me, then my purpose is? entirely negative. I have no positive interest in managing your? life (or at least, only to the point that it is necessary for the? negative purpose of stopping you from usurping my privileges).? My interest in positively governing you (restricting, managing? your actions or conduct) exists only to the extent that it is related? to the negative task of limiting your power over me. On the other? hand, if my interest in governing you is positive, it will require? much more elaborate techniques, and the nature of? governance will vary according to the purpose,? objectives, and level of techniques available.? All things being equal, negative governance involves much less? work than positive governance.11 If you are more knowledgeable,? physically robust, and resourceful, it is more difficult to govern? you. Generally speaking, the freer she is, the harder it is to govern? her, which paradoxically may mean that freedom potentially? requires much more intervention on the part of the governor,? and not less. Finally, if I want you to live in certain ways (that is,? govern you positively), it is much more convenient (if possible)? to persuade you of the worth of living in that way, rather than? threaten you, bribe you, and then constantly monitor you to see? if you comply or not. Self-discipline, self-subjection, and self-governance? are thus more efficient ways of governing people.? Generally speaking, the strategy of governance, especially when? it involves freedom as a technique of governance, is much more? efficient when it relies on strategies of self-governance.Solvency—History KeyWithout the specific analysis of the history of domestic surveillance the alternative fails—prefer the affWilliam O. Saas, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication Arts and Sciences, where he specializes in rhetorics of war and peace, 2012, “Critique of Charismatic Violence,” symploke, V.20, No. 1-2, absent in Dawes’ highly useful analysis, however, is a sense of? modern bureaucracy’s contingent historical character. By focusing on fictive? portrayals of both submission and resistance to the depersonalized rule of? bureaucratic domination, Dawes foregoes historicization of the bureaucratic? organizational form as such. Also absent, then, is an account of the rhetorical? forces that conspired to fix the shape and scope of the modern military? bureaucracy. As Walter Benjamin wrote, “The critique of violence is a philosophy? of its history” (1978, 299). And as Max Weber demonstrated, the state? bureaucracy is particular to Western history, an Enlightenment innovation? radically divergent from and eminently more resilient than traditional structures? of power (Breiner 1996, 134-135). Further, as Priest and Arkin have? shown, the national security bureaucracy of today takes on an elaborately? different form than that of even four years ago, owing to the Obama administration’s? continued rhetorical development of the Bush administration’s most? covert and violent counter-terrorism policies (which were themselves radical? declensions from the policies of previous administrations). To Dawes’ call? for recognizing organizational forms as the nexus of the modern language-violence? relationship, then, I will add that understanding the relationship? between language and violence today demands understanding the historical? conditions that precipitated the development of bureaucracy, as well as? an understanding of those exceptional rhetorical situations, whereby the? entrenched state bureaucracy can be adapted to novel conditions and oriented? toward new ends. Only with a grasp of the national security bureaucracy’s? evolutionary history—its material, contingent, and rhetorical origins—can? one begin to imagine subverting or reshaping these actually existing bureaucratic? forms. Such is the task of the following section.Solvency—No public supportThe alternative can’t garner the public support it needs—too many people are supportive of executive overreach, the affirmative is the only feasible solutionWilliam O. Saas, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication Arts and Sciences, where he specializes in rhetorics of war and peace, 2012, “Critique of Charismatic Violence,” symploke, V.20, No. 1-2, primarily among critics of U.S. foreign policy, the Obama? administration’s expansive interpretations and extensions of executive? power and concomitant expansion of the national security bureaucracy are? not sources of substantive lay-public outcry. Priest’s and Arkin’s July, 2010? exposé of the vast post-9/11 expansion of the national security bureaucracy,? which became the subject of a PBS Frontline episode in late 2011, did not? reach far beyond a relatively small (if also strident) readership. Neither has? increasingly widespread news of the use of drone attacks—and the significant? number of civilian deaths they have caused—spurred much popular debate.? A February, 2012 poll in the Washington Post showed that a vast majority? of the American electorate supports the Obama administration’s “counterterrorism”? policies (Wilson and Cohen 2012), with “83 percent of Americans”? and “fully 77 percent of liberal Democrats” endorsing the use of drone strikes? for assassinations, leading the pollsters to conclude that “Obama is unlikely? to suffer any political consequences as a result of his policy in this election? year.” What was divisive along party-lines under the second Bush administration? has now become a site of unusually strong bi-partisan consensus: the? Post poll also found that “53 percent of self-identified liberal Democrats—? and 67 percent of moderate or conservative Democrats—support keeping? Guantanamo Bay open.” Where candidate Obama campaigned on a promise? to reverse these policies, President Obama may be re-elected in part because? he has in fact enhanced them.FrameworkIt is important to discuss policy implementation and practice the specific nature of institutional engagement if we want to be effective members of government—this is especially true in the context of biopowerDouglas Brown, an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Education, University of Regina, Canada, 2014, “Liberalism, Advanced Liberalism, and the Governmental Policy Challenge in Education,” in governance results in alternative formations of conduct (e.g., subject formation, care of the self, and social technologies). Governance within a liberal democracy (liberalism or advanced liberalism) is a "reasoned" activity. Anchored in day-to-day methodologies and practices, liberal governance empowers individuals and agencies to act in relatively predictable ways. Social or institutional function and change occurs in recognition of this process. With advanced liberalism, social mechanisms of government, control, and paternalism give way to a new prudentialism. Subjects affect greater responsibility (freedom) for living choices, or the assurance of survival and happiness (e.g., education, health, and superannuation). Future consequences (e.g., calculable dangers and acceptable risks) are calculations affecting things like diet, home security, and education through individualised governance of conduct. Citizens embrace specific truth regimes, as played out upon participant bodies, and subject positions in educated and knowledgeable relation to self-care. Importantly, while the individual is answerable to and artificer of bureaucratic practices, we should not see these practices as structures, in that they do not predetermine a given reality. Change is possible, in fact probable. However, it is incorrect to assume that schooling, as a community project, is simply political. The processes of schooling are mired in the routines of the everyday (e.g., values, beliefs, habits, and policies). What makes these routines governable is that they become practice; they are mechanisms influencing conduct and, in turn, regulation.? In recent years, the phenomenon of neoliberalism (both as an ethos and as a series of practices) has drawn significant criticism in countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. Specific to education, critics have maligned policy-driven changes, identifying them as draconian, as less than subtle attempts to de-professionalize or proletarianize the field (e.g., de-professionalization of teaching, shrinking budgets, and the centralized control of curricula). Recent adaptations include, open jurisdictional boundaries (in both staffing and recruiting), the call for greater school choice (e.g., charter schools, private schools, and alternative schools), the standardization of curricula and assessment, and merit pay. Within the debate forces have become highly polarized, pitting Left against the Right, politicians against acting professionals, and professional associations against think tanks, taxpayer associations, and media. Unfortunately, the act of political contestation can blur or mask substantive issues and complexities as inherent in the act of policy choice. For strong public censure can result in open debate and admonition with groups partitioned, issues reified, and allegiances blurred.UtilitarianismIn the context of security, utilitarian calculations are important. Biopower allows for individual desires to be evaluated and for a collective desire to be actualizedAli Muhammad Rizvi, Ph.D., Lecturer, Critical Thinking and Philosophy? Universiti Brunei Darussalam, 2012, “Freedom, power and capitalism: From disciplines to biopower,” model of security, on the other hand, manages desires? on the macro level, providing space for desires to flourish and? bloom (even spurring them on). People will be incited to discourse? about their desires (sexual discourses for example) (Foucault? 1981, pp. 44-49); on the other hand, those desires are managed? from a distance of anonymity – it is not this or that desire which? is important, not your or my desire, but the general mechanism? and the logic of desire. Knowledge of individual desire allows? management of desire from a distance, culminating in the interests? of the population. It is realised that “this desire is such that if? one give it ‘free play’, it will lead to the general interest of the? population” (Foucault 2007, p. 73). The technique of government? no longer concerns itself with the desire of each and every? individual, but with what is desirable for the population as a? whole. Policy initiatives concentrate on making sure that these? interests are served and maximised, and if they have to intervene? in the individual life (which will be not infrequently of course),? that it will be in the name of safeguarding the interests of the? population based on discourses and expertise developed in the? area, and not in the name of guiding the individual in her private? life. Managing desires from the distance of interest provides a? better model of desirability, efficiency, and feasibility. This should? all ideally lead to a reformulation of disciplinary techniques? according to the new model of population and security? discourses.AT: Rights badHuman rights based strategies are necessary—the law is predicated on rights based language and it is the most effective starting pointAnne Bloom, Professor of Law, the University of the Pacific/McGeorge School of Law, 2012, “Speaking ‘Truth’ to Biopower,” contemporary critics of rights take a similar approach.20 The leading critic of rights, for example, argues that rights “in the abstract” have? no meaning and, as a result, it only makes sense to speak of rights in terms of how they operate in particular social settings.21 Contemporary legal scholars also detail the limitations of placing too much emphasis on rights-based claims, including the tendency of right-based legal tactics to fragment political movements and to deemphasize or obscure a movement?s desire for more fundamental reform.22 Despite these critiques, however, many Critical Race and Feminist Scholars argue for the continuing utility of rights if only because there appears to be no other useful strategy.23? My argument here begins at a similar place. Whatever the limitations of rights, I do not believe it is possible to do resistance work today without engaging the language of rights. The language of rights and equality currently structures our thinking so much that it is all but impossible to get outside of these discourses, particularly in legal settings.24 Even if it were possible, however, I would be more than a little afraid to abandon rights rhetoric all together. While critics are correct to point out how rights-based strategies can be damaging to political movements,25 strategies without respect for rights also pose problems.26 As Patricia Williams has noted, the United States? “worst historical moments have not been attributable to rights assertion but to a failure of rights commitment.”27 Certainly, rights-based work can be confining.28 But, like Williams,29 I am more afraid of what might happen in the absence of rights.? To say that someone has rights is to show respect for her as an individual and acknowledge that she is part of a shared humanity.30 The conferral of rights makes the person a recognized member of society to whom, at least in theory, some respect and “collective responsibility” is owed.31 These expressions of respect and collective responsibility are? extremely important in a political system – such as ours – that is largely inaccessible to certain classes and groups of people.32 For these otherwise excluded individuals and groups, rights-based claims provide an important opening and an opportunity to be heard in ways that are otherwise not available.33 The fact that the system frequently fails to respond to rights-based claims does not diminish their significance.34 The mere making of a demand for inclusion and respect can be empowering, even when the demand goes unrealized.35AT: SubjectivityOnly if we recognize the dignity of other individuals, as with the affirmative, can we create a community that is for the good of the whole rather than a select fewPeyi Soyinka-Airewele Ph.D? Professor of International Relations,? & Comparative Studies, Carnegie Fellow at the Department of? Political Science and International Relations,? Covenant University, Canaan Land, Ota, March 2015, “The end of politics?: Reclaiming humanity in an age of biopower and necropolitics,” their examination of Fukuyama‘s essay, twenty-five years after its? original publication, Stanley and Lee declare that away from the? excitement of the late 1980s: the imminent collapse of the Berlin Wall? and the Soviet Union, and the ―orgy of free-market excitement,‖ ―today,? it‘s hard to imagine Fukuyama being more wrong. History isn‘t over? and neither liberalism nor democracy is ascendant‖ (Stanley & Lee,? 2014). Thus, they offer us a modified conceptualization of a liberalism? that might be relevant for the future, made perhaps more powerful by its? very simplicity, ―liberalism is defined by a commitment to liberty … a? concept grounded in the individual. It is the freedom to be all that one? is, to actualize the fullness of one‘s potential as a human being endowed? with the capacity for creativity and the ability to make autonomous? value judgments for ourselves.‖ Stanley and Lee also expose two? compelling realities that could frame a resurrected politics of life and? human dignity:? The first is that we all share the same degree of dignity: No one? has any less potential than any other, and no one‘s humanity is? any less pronounced than anyone else‘s. The second is that our? humanity imposes upon us the same basic needs. By virtue of our? nature, we all require food, shelter, clothing, security, and a range? of other basic goods necessary for sufficiency and survival.? Though deceptively simple, these implications have profound? meaning when we consider how individual liberty is to be? translated into a social and political construct … the principles of? equity and the common good must be embedded in the structure? of society (Stanley and Lee, 2014).? No wonder several liberation scholars and theologians, including? Gustavo Gutierrez for instance, insist that the social and economic? rights of the poor can only be achieved by acknowledging that ―the poor? are a by-product of the system in which we live and for which we are? responsible … hence the poverty of the poor is not a call to generous? relief action, but a demand that we go and build a different social order‖? (cited in Farmer, 2004). Stanley and Lee caution that it is only if? everyone recognizes the dignity of the human person that they will? recognize, and strive to defend and preserve not only their own liberty,? but also that of all others in their society using law. If we lose our? commitment as a polity to seek and defend human dignity, ―society? becomes a jungle in which it is everyone for himself; self-interest? dominates, law becomes partial, and tyranny supplants liberty‖ (2014).AT: Disability ModuleSurveillance techniques that include disability can be empowering and provide tools to address the ableist systemNatasha Saltes, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology, Queen's University, Canada, 2013, “‘Abnormal’ Bodies on the Borders of Inclusion:? Biopolitics and the paradox of Disability Surveillance,” Surveillance & Society 11(1/2): 55-73.? , in order to improve accessibility, remove disabling barriers and develop adequate programs,? services, and accommodation it is necessary to measure and count the prevalence and impact of? impairment. When conducted for this purpose, disability surveillance operates according to the principles? and goals of the disability rights movement and is conducted according to a definition of disability that? does not reduce disability to the body, but instead recognizes the ways in which social constructions and? processes contribute to disability. This presents a paradox whereby the techniques of disability? surveillance become a venue for both exclusion and empowerment. Disability surveillance reinforces? ableist norms, but also provides the tools to change them. This paper problematizes normalization and? definitions of disability grounded in medical discourse for its legitimization of the perception of abnormal? that is used to rationalize exclusionary biopolitical agendas. I conclude with a theoretical argument that? aims to resolve the paradox of preventing ‘risk’ and promoting rights by applying Ojakangas’ (2005)? notion of an affirmative biopolitics of care.AT: Charismatic LeaderNo link: Surveillance is not the product of a charismatic leader—the affirmative is a response to “therapeutic domination” by the government. Laurence McFalls, Professor in the department of political science at Université de Montréal, 2010, “Benevolent Dictatorship:? The Formal Logic of Humanitarian Government,” have elsewhere associated this fourth form with scientific authority, under which the impersonal procedure of scientific method challenges existing orders of knowledge in a revolutionary process of scientific advancement,? 9 but by metonymic analogy to medical knowledge we can also call this fourth pure form of authority therapeutic domination. Under this form, as in the doctor-patient relationship of command, the ruler claims obedience by virtue of the application of a scientifically valid, impersonal procedure—a treatment protocol—in the extraordinary context of crisis. As Vanessa Pupavac has argued, humanitarian interventions have in empirical practice taken on the quite literally medicalized form of what she calls “therapeutic governance,” i.e., the application of social and clinical psychological treatments to traumatized or otherwise stressed target? populations.10? While it encompasses substantive practices of therapeutic governance in Pupavac’s sense, the concept of therapeutic domination abstractly describes any relationship of command justified by an appeal to an impersonal rule or procedure in rupture with a previous enduring order. Nonetheless, the formal structure of figuratively therapeutic domination logically suggests that the substantive contents of its normative claims will be literally therapeutic. As with legal-rational claims to authority, therapeutic domination’s appeal to impersonal procedure applies to no-body in particular and hence to every-body in general. Paradoxically, and in contrast to legal-rational authority, the apparently disembodied norms of therapeutic authority focus precisely on the human body itself because of this mode of domination’s extra-ordinary temporal quality.? Intervening in rupture with established practices, therapeutic domination not only depersonalizes but decontextualizes social relationships. Without any reference to culture or history, therapeutic domination reduces social agents to human bodies. Thus, unlike charismatic, traditional or even legal-rational authority, no particular conception of the good life, but only the minimal but absolute value of life itself, can inform therapeutic domination.PRIVACY KRITIK RESPONSESPermutationsPermutation solvencyTheir critique inevitably relies on legal solutions. This proves the permutation solvesTracy E. Higgins, Law Professor at Fordham Law School, 2000, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 75Chi.-Kent L. Rev.847 (1999-2000), , ACC. 4-17-2015A second reason why feminists should consider working within the public/private dichotomy and perhaps reshaping it is that a distinction between public and private is implicit within the theoretical critique itself. Specifically, the first critique-that the public/private dichotomy inappropriately restricts state but not private action-is almost always an argument for the greater regulation of the private action viewed as harmful. Similarly, the second critique-that the public/private dichotomy emphasizes action and ignores inaction-is almost always an argument for the exercise of public power (or location of a constitutional obligation to act) as a check on private power. This argument is advanced only so far by collapsing public and private power and regarding them as equally threatening to individual liberty. Indeed, a much more powerful argument can be made that, given the differences between public and private power, there are good reasons to prefer the exercise of public power over the default allocation of private power in the face of competing liberty or privacy concerns. Law is the endpoint of their alternativeClaire Pomeroy, Bryn Mawr College December, 2004, “Redefining Public and Private in the Framework of a Gendered Equality,” Knowing the Body:?Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Sex and Gender, cpomeroy.html, ACC. 4-21-2015The regulation of things within the private realm is precarious, because "by its very terminology – privacy – the doctrine suggests at its core that it is plausible to divide the world into two spheres: the public and the private. The presupposition is that privacy should be protected because private acts do not affect public life." On the contrary, the public and private are deeply interconnected spheres and do affect one another greatly. Some privacy must be forfeited to gain protection from potential harm that may occur in the private sphere. There must be laws intact to deal with the consequences of harm that take place in private.Even the biggest feminist critics still support legal reforms for privacyTracy E. Higgins, Law Professor at Fordham Law School, 2000, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 75Chi.-Kent L. Rev.847 (1999-2000), , ACC. 4-17-2015Part I of this Essay addresses critiques of the public/private line that defines a zone of decisional or spatial privacy. First, Part I briefly describes the most important of these critiques. It then suggests that, notwithstanding assertions regarding the personal as political, most feminists, including the strongest critics of the public/private line, find much that is worth preserving in the right of privacy. Part II addresses critiques of the public/private line in the second sense, as a limit on the scope of constitutional rights. Here again, after briefly describing two important types of critiques, Part II argues that neither of the critiques supports an elimination of the line altogether. Acknowledging that the issue is reform and not elimination of the distinction, Part III explores the utility of the public/private line, particularly the differential constitutional treatment of public and private power; suggests ways of refocusing and refining the critique; and lays out an agenda for further exploration.Permutation solvencyDefending the public/private dichotomy as an analytical distinction does not mean one matters to the exclusion of the other. This proves the permutation of acting on an individual and policy level solves Tracy E. Higgins, Law Professor at Fordham Law School, 2000, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 75Chi.-Kent L. Rev.847 (1999-2000), , ACC. 4-17-2015This defense of the public/private line requires some immediate qualifications. First, the difference I describe does not track perfectly the contours of public and private action. Certain forms of private violence such as that based on racial or religious hatred can have a collective, political impact comparable to state-sponsored violence. To the extent that it does, it ought to be viewed as implicating the allocation of political power in a way that affects the public sphere. Second, private violence that is pervasive and without legal remedy contributes to political oppression in a way that is increasingly and appropriately regarded as implicating the state. Finally, acknowledging the existence of a qualitative difference between private and state-sponsored violence does not lead to the conclusion that one matters while the other does not. The feminist deconstruction of the distinction between public and private violence responds to the tendency to ignore or downplay the private. However, one need not collapse the categories analytically to argue that both should be taken seriously. Indeed, maintaining the distinction may prove useful for the purposes of understanding the nature of the harm and developing appropriate responses both on the individual and the policy level. Link Answers / TurnsNo link – Legal reforms / StatismLegal reforms can solve. The 1AC protects civil liberties and disrupts the power imbalance between the people and the StateNeil M. Richards, Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis,?May 20, 2013, “The Dangers of Surveillance,” Harvard Law Review, , ACC. 4-19-2015The challenge to our law posed by the Age of Surveillance is immense. The justifications for surveillance by public and private actors are significant, but so too are the costs that the rising tide of unfettered surveillance is creating. Surveillance can sometimes be necessary, even helpful. But unconstrained surveillance, especially of our intellectual activities, threatens a cognitive revolution that cuts at the core of the freedom of the mind that our political institutions presuppose. Therefore, surveillance must be constrained by legal and social rules. The technological, economic, and geopolitical changes of the past twenty years have whittled away at those rules, both formally on their substance (for example, the Patriot Act and the expansion of National Security Letter jurisdiction) and in practice (for example, the pressure that the technological social practices of the Internet have exerted on privacy). By thus recognizing the harms of surveillance and crafting our laws accordingly, we can obtain many of its benefits without sacrificing our vital civil liberties or upending the power balance between individuals on the one hand and companies and governments on the other. No link – Intellectual privacyIntellectual privacy transcends the public/private dichotomy. Reforming law is at least a good first stepNeil M. Richards, Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis,?May 20, 2013, “The Dangers of Surveillance,” Harvard Law Review, , ACC. 4-19-2015But we must also remember that in modern societies, surveillance fails to respect the line between public and private actors. Intellectual privacy should be preserved against private actors as well as against the state. Federal prosecutions based on purely intellectual surveillance are thankfully rare, but the coercive effects of monitoring by our friends and acquaintances are much more common. We are constrained in our actions by peer pressure at least as much as by the state. Moreover, records collected by private parties can be sold to or subpoenaed by the government, which (as noted above) has shown a voracious interest in all kinds of personal information, particularly records related to the operation of the mind and political beliefs. Put simply, the problem of intellectual privacy transcends the public/private divide, and justifies additional legal protections on intellectual privacy and the right to read freely. Constitutional law and standing doctrine alone will not solve the threat of surveillance to intellectual freedom and privacy, but they are a good place to start.Protecting intellectual privacy is justified because surveillance here affects our very thinkingNeil M. Richards, Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis,?May 20, 2013, “The Dangers of Surveillance,” Harvard Law Review, , ACC. 4-19-2015At the level of theory, I will explain why and when surveillance is particularly dangerous and when it is not. First, surveillance is harmful because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With respect to civil liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are thinking, reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their minds about political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance is especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment with new, controversial, or deviant ideas. To protect our intellectual freedom to think without state oversight or interference, we need what I have elsewhere called “intellectual privacy.” A second special harm that surveillance poses is its effect on the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched. This disparity creates the risk of a variety of harms, such as discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selective enforcement, where critics of the government can be prosecuted or blackmailed for wrongdoing unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance.Link /Internal link answersNo internal link—Utilizing the distinction does not mean we choose sidesTracy E. Higgins, Law Professor at Fordham Law School, 2000, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 75Chi.-Kent L. Rev.847 (1999-2000), , ACC. 4-17-2015This is not to say that, categorically, state action should be regarded as legitimate and private action suspect. It would be a mistake for feminists to underestimate the very real threat posed by tyranny of the majority by focusing our attention only on the consequences of private power and the virtues of public power. Feminists need no reminder that women's equality has been and continues to be threatened by the exercise of public power. Yet, maintaining the distinction does not require choosing sides in a categorical way. The point is not simply to favor one form of power over the other but to recognize their differences and to theorize more carefully about the kind of threats each may pose.Deconstructing the public/private divide erodes the benefits of protecting the private sphere as a space for feminine experienceClaire Pomeroy, Bryn Mawr College December, 2004, “Redefining Public and Private in the Framework of a Gendered Equality,” Knowing the Body:?Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Sex and Gender, cpomeroy.html, ACC. 4-21-2015The deconstruction of the public/private divide is not only causing the loss of the individuality and uniqueness of the female experience, but it is also threatening the sanctity of the private space. The private space is being destroyed because of its intrinsic association with the oppression of females, but as it is being destroyed, the benefits of private space are also being ruined. Both the public and private realms have morally associated characteristics with them. The public moral evaluation – duty, justice, right, equality, liberty, legitimacy, resistance – is counterbalanced by the private moral sentiment and emotion – affection, responsibility, love, mercy, compassion, decency, kindness. Associated with the private sphere is intimacy; with the public sphere is detachment and coldness. The private sphere is a place that a person can escape from the impersonal public sphere. Privacy "allows us to do things we would not do in public, to experiment, to engage in self-reflection; it protects us from majoritarian pressures; it allows us to control who we will have access to ourselves and to information about ourselves, and to make decisions that critically affect our lives." It is not intended to secure separation from social pressure, but to assist social involvements and intimacy.Link Turn / Aff is a pre-requisiteThe Aff is a pre-requisite to the alternative. Only working with the plan can we reconstruct privacy through a gendered lensLinda C. McClain, Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law, March, 1999, “Reconstructive tasks for a liberal feminist conception of privacy,” William & Mary Law Review, , ACC. 4-22-2015All of this probably sounds familiar, perhaps even too familiar. Reconstructing privacy requires moving beyond restating such rebuttals to feminist critiques of privacy. If they have not already done so, liberals should readily grant that an adequate conception of privacy in its various dimensions must clearly reject privacy's legacy of confinement and subordination, as well as the immunity of private aggression from the law's reach. The reconstructive task for an adequate liberal-and liberal feminist-model of privacy requires a normative argument as to why society should honor some form of public/private distinction and some limiting principles that admit of an appropriate role for governmental regulation of "private" life, "private" places, and "private" relationships.Link turns / Permutation solvencyLaws over privacy can be central to women’s freedom. The alternative’s assumption of a universal feminist vision of privacy is false and implicitly fosters fractures within feminism, which internal link turns the kritik and is a net-benefit to the permutationTracy E. Higgins, Law Professor at Fordham Law School, 2000, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 75Chi.-Kent L. Rev.847 (1999-2000), , ACC. 4-17-2015The persistence of these critiques-often under the banner "the personal is the political" - suggests that feminists have very little use for the notion that the private sphere is worthy of protection from government regulation or government scrutiny. This turns out not to be the case. Indeed, some feminists have defended a liberal conception all along. For example, both Anita Allen and Linda McClain, among others, have consistently argued that a modified liberal conception of privacy is central to women's liberty interests. While taking feminist critiques of liberal privacy seriously, McClain has challenged feminists to clarify and refine their arguments with respect to the core concerns of privacy. She has made a compelling case that decisional privacy is central to women's freedom and need not unduly limit affirmative efforts by the state to secure women's equality. Anita Allen has advocated a liberal conception of privacy that would simultaneously preserve those values served by a right of privacy and respond to feminist critiques of traditional definitions of both spatial and decisional privacy. Like McClain, Allen's theory of privacy would not preclude state intervention in the private realm where necessary to secure women's equality and security. Greater access to public power means women can theorize and take advantage of the public/private distinctionTracy E. Higgins, Law Professor at Fordham Law School, 2000, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 75Chi.-Kent L. Rev.847 (1999-2000), , ACC. 4-17-2015Finally, there are practical reasons for maintaining the public/private distinction in feminist theorizing. Michelman articulates the view of a "confirmed optimist" about the democratic process. I suggest that his view of public power might also be appealing to the confirmed feminist, not only for theoretical but also for instrumental reasons. I suggest as much simply because there are good reasons to believe that women may have greater access to public power than to private power. Because women are a majority of the population, in a well-functioning democracy one would expect that women's interests would be well reflected in the legislative process. Yet, owing to the exclusion of women from the political realm, both de jure and de facto, women have never exercised as much political power as is their due. Nevertheless, even before women were entitled to vote, they were often successful at influencing legislative bodies. For example, married women gained property rights through legislative change before women could vote. Later, women achieved income support for widows and workplace protections through legislative means. More recently, women have won changes in rape statutes, child support standards, and child support enforcement. During the last decade, Congress has passed two important pieces of legislation protecting women's rights: the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Violence Against Women Act.Link turn / Permutation solvency - IntersectionalityThe intersectional method of the 1AC can be combined with the alternative, which solves better. The alternative alone ignores collectives denied powerYasmeen Abu-Laban, University of Alberta, 2015, “Gendering Surveillance Studies: The Empirical and Normative Promise of Feminist Methodology,” Surveillance & Society, , ACC. 4-21-2015The insights emerging from these recent works are suggestive of how complex forms of identity may be at work in the surveillant gaze, and this is connected to power. In fact, it has been noted that the surveillant gaze frequently fixates on specific collectivities lacking power and construed as flawed such as poor women of colour, welfare recipients, immigrants or those perceived as “illegal” immigrants, prisoners, homeless people or enemy combatants. Gendering Surveillance Studies, and pushing the boundaries of empirical understanding, may be further enhanced by much more explicitly and systematically embracing intersectionality as part of the methodological understanding informing how research proceeds and is analyzed. This may also serve to illuminate extant concepts in the field in ways that are attuned to complexity and possible differentiation at local, national and global levels, as well as over time. In this sense “the surveillant gaze” may take multiple and intersecting forms as concerns for example masculinity, imperialism, whiteness, adulthood, and so on.Link turns – Surveillance is patriarchalSurveillance targeted at the poor and welfare recipients disproportionately hurts women, especially racialized womenYasmeen Abu-Laban, University of Alberta, 2015, “Gendering Surveillance Studies: The Empirical and Normative Promise of Feminist Methodology,” Surveillance & Society, , ACC. 4-21-2015The work on gender and surveillance also reflects on how state surveillance may take gendered forms. One sphere in which women are especially prone to encountering state surveillance is in the area of social welfare. As a contemporary example, Monahan notes how electronic benefit transfer systems for American welfare and food stamp recipients serve to surveil poor and often racialized women. Introduced in the U.S. as part of the 1996 reform of welfare, ostensibly to prevent fraud, these systems track purchases made with electronic cards, with consequences for individual budgeting strategies and choices. What is equally noteworthy is that as early as World War One, Britain’s embryonic welfare state pension programme designed for war widows involved gendered bureaucratic surveillance. In this way, the state effectively replaced the deceased husband as both the financial and moral guardian of war widows. These findings suggest the deeply embedded forms of gendered bureaucratic surveillance contained in the welfare state, a finding echoed about the judicial branch of the state by criminologists addressing gender and crime. Such work has much to say about how surveillance practices relate to gender and other social divisions, how new forms of surveillance and surveillance technologies may reinforce existing social divides along new lines, and also how a variety of state institutions may be mobilized. On the latter, for instance Flavin draws attention to how the courts, laws and law enforcement agencies, and social welfare/child welfare agencies, work in tandem to effectively “police” women’s reproduction in the United States in relation to conception, abortion, pregnancy and child-rearing.Surveillance is a tool of patriarchyRohini Lakshané, GenderIT, June 11, 2014, “Feminist Principles of the Internet,” WELDD, , ACC. 4-21-2015Surveillance by default is the tool of patriarchy to control and restrict rights both online and offline. The right to privacy?and to exercise full control over our own data is a critical principle for a safer, open internet for all. Equal attention needs to be paid to surveillance practices by individuals against each other, as well as the private sector and non-state actors, in addition to the state.Alternative AnswersFeminist criticism failsFeminist criticism of the public/private dichotomy lacks unity and overstates the threat to agency and equalityTracy E. Higgins, Law Professor at Fordham Law School, 2000, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 75Chi.-Kent L. Rev.847 (1999-2000), , ACC. 4-17-2015The line between public and private has at least two distinct meanings within feminist theorizing. Feminists sometimes use the concept to refer to the demarcation of a zone of personal privacy protected from state regulation. This usage, in turn, has at least two variations, sometimes referring to "decisional privacy," a concept related to personal autonomy, and at other times referring to spatial privacy, related to the sanctity of home and family, both of which enjoy a degree of constitutional protection. In other contexts, feminists use the concept of the public/private line to denote the limits of the application of constitutional constraints. In this sense of the term, actions falling on the public side of the line implicate the constitution and those on the private side do not. Clearly the uses are related; however, just as clearly they are not the same. The first demarcates a constitutional limit on the reach of state action. The second demarcates a state action limit on the reach of the constitution. In this Essay, I argue that feminist critiques of both uses of the public/private distinction tend to overstate the threat the concepts pose to women's liberty and equality and to understate or ignore altogether the potential value of the distinction for feminist theorizing. With respect to the first definition, the private as the personal, this "meta-critique" is not particularly new. Liberal feminists have always defended the value of privacy, and, increasingly, other feminists are beginning to rethink its value in a number of contexts. With respect to the second definition of the public/private distinction, focusing on state action, feminists remain remarkably unified in the deconstructive project. In this Essay, I hope to raise a challenge to this unity and provoke a reexamination of the public/private line, moving the critique from the category of "foregone conclusion" to "unfinished business."Legal reforms are keyThe alternative fails. Changing the courts is essential to redefining the public-private dichotomyTamara?Dinev, PhD, ?Professor, Chair, Dept. of Information Technology & Operations Management, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, 2014, “Why would we care about privacy?,” European Journal of Information Systems?(2014)?23,?97–102, , ACC. 4-18-2015Historically, the need for definition and conceptualization of privacy originated in the law and the needs of courts to define the boundaries between public and private. When it was only concerning physical privacy, the approach was relatively easy: the boundaries of the physical space such as room, house, private property, satisfied the quest for that definition. The landscape changed when the courts and states found the need to include information and data gathering in the definition of privacy and with this to rigorously redefine public–private boundaries. It is important to remember that it will be the courts and states again who will need the definitions and conceptualization that the scientists will flesh out from their research on privacy. And this is where the largest societal impact of MIS privacy research lies.Impact Answers / TurnsAgency/ Value to lifePrivacy does not foreclose agency, but is essential to maintaining spaces for subjectivity and value to lifeJulie E.?Cohen, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, May,?2013, “What privacy is for,” Harvard Law Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, , ACC. 4-21-2015But here we must come back to privacy, for the development of critical subjectivity is a realistic goal only to the extent that privacy comes into play. Subjectivity is a function of the interplay between emergent selfhood and social shaping; privacy, which inheres in the interstices of social shaping, is what permits that interplay to occur. Privacy is not a fixed condition that can be distilled to an essential core, but rather “an interest in breathing room to engage in socially situated processes of boundary management.” It enables situated subjects to navigate within preexisting cultural and social matrices, creating spaces for the play and the work of self-making. And once this point is established, privacy’s dynamism becomes clear. Lack of privacy means reduced scope for self-making — along the lines of the liberal ideal, or along other lines. Privacy does not negate social shaping. “In a world with effective boundary management, however, there is play in the joints, and that is better than the alternative. . . . Privacy’s goal, simply put, is to ensure that the development of subjectivity and the development of communal values do not proceed in lockstep.” Privacy will not always produce expressions of subjectivity that have social value, and here I mean expressly to leave open the question whether there might be particular types of privacy claims that do not merit protection or even respect. Even so, privacy is one of the resources that situated subjects require to flourish. The pursuit of happiness is dependent on privacy protections HYPERLINK "" \o "View other papers by this author" \t "_blank" Adam D. Thierer, George Mason University - Mercatus Center, March 2013, “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, , ACC. 4-21-2015This framework provides a useful way of thinking about privacy. Even if we cannot agree whether we have a right to privacy, or what the scope of any particular privacy right should be, the right to pursue it should be as uncontroversial as the right to pursue happiness. In fact, pursing privacy is probably an important element of achieving happiness for most citizens. Almost everyone needs some time and space to be free with their own thoughts or to control personal information or secrets that they value. But that does not make it any easier to define the nature of privacy as a formal legal right, or any easier to enforce it, even if a satisfactory conception of privacy could be crafted to suit every context.??Privacy is an inherent human right that is essential to dignityBruce Schneier, CTO of Counterpane Internet Security, May 2006, “The Eternal Value of Privacy,” Wired, , ACC. 4-23-2015The most common retort against privacy advocates -- by those in favor of ID checks, cameras, databases, data mining and other wholesale surveillance measures -- is this line: "If you aren't doing anything wrong, what do you have to hide?" Some clever answers: "If I'm not doing anything wrong, then you have no cause to watch me." "Because the government gets to define what's wrong, and they keep changing the definition." "Because you might do something wrong with my information." My problem with quips like these -- as right as they are -- is that they accept the premise that privacy is about hiding a wrong. It's not. Privacy is an inherent human right, and a requirement for maintaining the human condition with dignity and respect.Anti-surveillance/Privacy policies are goodTotalistic surveillance should be rejected. At the very least we must problematize surveillance efforts at every turn to prevent escalating violations of civil libertiesNeil M. Richards, Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis,?May 20, 2013, “The Dangers of Surveillance,” Harvard Law Review, , ACC. 4-19-2015At a practical level, I propose a set of four principles that should guide the future development of surveillance law, allowing for a more appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of government surveillance. First, we must recognize that surveillance transcends the public/private divide. Public and private surveillance are simply related parts of the same problem, rather than wholly discrete. Even if we are ultimately more concerned with government surveillance, any solution must grapple with the complex relationships between government and corporate watchers. Second, we must recognize that secret surveillance is illegitimate and prohibit the creation of any domestic-surveillance programs whose existence is secret. Third, we should recognize that total surveillance is illegitimate and reject the idea that it is acceptable for the government to record all Internet activity without authorization. Government surveillance of the Internet is a power with the potential for massive abuse. Like its precursor of telephone wiretapping, it must be subjected to meaningful judicial process before it is authorized. We should carefully scrutinize any surveillance that threatens our intellectual privacy. Fourth, we must recognize that surveillance is harmful. Surveillance menaces intellectual privacy and increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrimination; accordingly, we must recognize surveillance as a harm in constitutional standing doctrine. Explaining the harms of surveillance in a doctrinally sensitive way is essential if we want to avoid sacrificing our vital civil liberties.New technologies of surveillance demand that we actively protect privacyJulie E.?Cohen, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, May,?2013, “What privacy is for,” Harvard Law Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, , ACC. 4-21-2015What is certain is that privacy is important and urgently in need of preservation, and that current regulatory strategies seem unlikely to prove up to the task. Imbuing our networked information technologies with a different politics will require both the vision to appreciate privacy’s dynamism and the will to think creatively about preserving it.Surveillance is built on the idea of systemic exclusion and mass discriminationKirstie Ball, Business School, Open University, Birmingham, UK, Et al. 2009, “Editorial: Surveillance Studies Needs Gender and Sexuality,” Surveillance & Society 6(4): 352-355. Surveillance theory holds that surveillance processes are routine, systemic, purposeful and focused. They are woven into everyday life. They aggregate individuals into populations, in part by creating robust, replicable analytical categories. This is done with the strategic objective of institutional management of those populations and the everyday life of the individuals that comprise them. Marginalisation, exclusion and mass discrimination are necessary byproducts of this manageable order.Anti-surveillance/Privacy policies are goodWe must confront the problems underlying surveillance to take advantage of the benefits of surveillance and avoid privacy intrusionsThomas B. Kearns, JD, Attorney, 1999, “Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, wmborj/vol7/iss3/10, ACC. 4-17-2015Technological advances are changing the face of American society dramatically. New technology affects individuals in countless ways, including the manner in which they interact with each other, with businesses, and with the government. While technology makes it possible to accomplish many tasks more efficiently, and even to accomplish tasks previously not possible, these accomplishments do not come without costs. Even though they provide solutions to current problems, many technological developments often create new, sometimes unforeseen, problems. As society incorporates these developments into its structure, the problems that the developments create must be confronted so that the benefits of technology outweigh its burdens. One area in which new technology currently is creating such problems is the right to privacy. Surveillance technology invokes privacy concerns perhaps more directly than any other type of technology because surveillance equipment, by its very nature, is designed to enable a surveillant to observe that which the subject does not intend to be observed. Although surveillance is a useful and necessary aspect of criminal investigation, new developments in surveillance technology equipment, such as magnetic gradient measuring, passive millimeter wave imaging, back-scattered x-ray imaging, and radar-skin scanning, give rise to privacy issues that previously did not exist. Furthermore, although privacy concerns stemming from surveillance activity traditionally involve government intrusion, private actors increasingly have access to surveillance equipment and the ability to invade individuals' privacy.The public/private dichotomy is goodThe public/private distinction is inevitable and can be good in some instancesRichard J. Arneson, Prof. in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, Summer, 2000, “Egalitarian Justive Versus the Right to Privacy,” Social Philosophy and Policy 17, No. 2, , ACC. 4-17-2015Broad, diffuse, and contentless, the right to privacy construed as the right to be let alone does not capture all that one might have in mind in invoking a public/private distinction in political argument. The distinction can be made between behavior that is considered appropriate in private places such as within private homes and behavior that is deemed appropriate in public spaces such as streets, parks, and businesses open to the public. A society might have different codes of behavior for public and private spaces without endorsing the idea that individual discretion should reign in the private spaces. Individual conduct might be strictly regulated in both spheres, but differently in each. Rules that specify appropriate behavior in public and private might take the form of conferring rights on persons that others behave in public and private in these approved ways. In this way when a couple romantically inclined makes love in a public park, this is an invasion of the privacy of those who wish to use the park without being distracted by this sight, or rather, an invasion of the public sphere by what ought to be conduct done in private. An example of intrusion of public behavior into the private sphere would be my launching into a sermon, as though to my Sunday congregation, at a private dinner party.The public/private dichotomy is good in certain circumstances and justifies state actionTracy E. Higgins, Law Professor at Fordham Law School, 2000, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 75Chi.-Kent L. Rev.847 (1999-2000), , ACC. 4-17-2015The first and simplest reason for maintaining the public/private distinction for certain purposes is that it may actually capture a difference that is meaningful to women's experiences. For example, consider the critique of the emphasis on state action in the context of international human rights. Although it is certainly correct that a human rights regime that focuses exclusively on harms directly perpetrated by the state fails to address important threats to women's lives and liberty, it may also be correct that state sponsored violence is qualitatively different from private violence. This view is consistent with the reports of victims of human rights abuses. Acts of private violence indisputably have an impact on the lives of individual victims that may include profound and long-lasting physical and psychological consequences. When rape and torture are perpetrated by soldiers or police, however, those physical and psychological consequences are compounded by political powerlessness and vulnerability that often extend beyond the individual to the broader community. This distinction may justify different approaches to regulating the harm, including different theories of state responsibility. Democracy Turn – 2ACPrivacy is the bedrock of freedom and democracyThomas B. Kearns, JD, Attorney, 1999, “Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, wmborj/vol7/iss3/10, ACC. 4-17-2015Privacy is an essential element of a free society. Many commentators agree that without privacy, freedom is not possible.' Without the ability to interact with one another in private, individuals cannot exchange ideas freely. This "marketplace of ideas" is essential for a democracy to function properly and give rise to a free society." Although no "universally accepted definition of the right to privacy" exists, court opinions that address privacy issues often encompass three areas of privacy interests: autonomy, intrusion, and information privacy.This culminates in extinctionLarry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, December 1995, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives.” A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, [, ACC. 2-22-2015This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. Democracy ExtensionTheir anti-liberal democracy criticism absconds real policymaking efforts and ignores legal reflexivity. The alternative to democracy undermines agencyRichard Youngs, Dir. of FRIDE and Assoc. Prof. at the U of Warwick, January2011, “Misunderstanding the maladies of liberal democracy promotion, No. 106, FRIDE, , ACC. 4-22-2015There are different levels of critique, which risk elision. One thing is to argue that Western powers should support core liberal democratic principles, then from this base work to build into their policies a concern with social equality, participation, deliberation and religious identity. It would be entirely convincing to argue that, while democracy promoters have advanced, they could and should be doing more in this direction. But it is quite another thing to suggest that such aims should be supported against or instead of core liberal norms. In practice, what many critics appear to advocate is not a cumulative combination, but a dilution of the liberal component in favour of other forms. They betray a core inconsistency: they dislike democracy promotion for being overly intrusive, but then advocate modifications that would make it more, not less, intrusive. This is because most suggested ‘alternative forms of democracy’ breach the line between process and substantive policy outputs – they advocate particular ends, not just a type of policy-making means. The concrete examples of European policies demonstrate that it is hardly credible to ‘accuse’ Brussels of being an unthinking citadel of blinkered liberalism. Indeed, in this author’s experience, conversations with policy-makers reveal this to be akin to an almost unmentionable L-word. When so much doubt and ambivalence now suffuses democracy support strategies, it is unconvincing to admonish the latter for being uniformly, heavily prescriptive. Donors’ tendency to see democracy through the prism of their own political systems still often surfaces. Privacy incursions undermine the entire liberal democratic systemJulie E.?Cohen, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, May,?2013, “What privacy is for,” Harvard Law Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, , ACC. 4-21-2015So described, privacy is anything but old-fashioned, and trading it away creates two kinds of large systemic risk, which Parts III and IV describe. Privacy incursions can be episodic or systematic, but systematic deprivations of privacy also facilitate episodic privacy incursions. In this Article, therefore, I focus on the interplay between privacy and systems of surveillance. Part III argues that freedom from surveillance, whether public or private, is foundational to the practice of informed and reflective citizenship. Privacy therefore is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic political systems. Freedom from surveillance also is foundational to the capacity for innovation; therefore, as Part IV explains, the perception of privacy as anti-innovation is a non sequitur. Innovation occurs in commercial and social contexts and is infused with particular commercial and social values. A commercial culture that sees privacy as threatening its own valued practices of knowledge production will register privacy regulation as a threat. But a society that values innovation ignores privacy at its peril, for privacy also shelters the processes of play and experimentation from which innovation emerges. In short, privacy incursions harm individuals, but not only individuals. Privacy incursions in the name of progress, innovation, and ordered liberty jeopardize the continuing vitality of the political and intellectual culture that we say we value. ................
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