Being a Physicalist: How and (More Importantly) Why

Being a Physicalist: How and (More Importantly) Why Author(s): Andrew Melnyk Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 74, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 221-241 Published by: Springer Stable URL: . Accessed: 26/03/2011 14:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . . JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . . . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@.

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ANDREW MELNYK

BEING A PHYSICALIST:

HOW AND (MORE IMPORTANTLY) WHY

(Received16 April1993)

A standardobjectionto anyversionof physicalism,an objectionwhich may be encounteredboth in conversationand in the literature,is that there is just no reason to be a physicalist;even if there are no good argumentsagainstphysicalism,there are none for it either.1My main aim in this paper is to defeat this objection by supplyinga trio of positivereasonsfor adoptinga particularbrandof physicalismw, hichI call realisationphysicalism.2

The argumentsI shall give for realisationphysicalismare not intended to persuade the supporters of other, and rival, brands of physicalism that realisation physicalism is the best formulation of physicalistintuitions,thoughI shallvery brieflyindicatewhy I believe this to be so; rather,my argumentsare addressedto the comprehensive anti-physicalist- the objectorwho wishesnot to accept any brandof physicalismat all - and theirgeneralthrustis thatit is muchharderto be a comprehensiveanti-physicalistthan might at first appear.The reasonis thatthe comprehensiveanti-physicalisot wes us a longerand betterstorythana meredenialof each and everyphysicalistthesis,and when such a story is provided, it turns out that the aspirantantiphysicalistfaces powerfultheoreticalpressuresto acceptsome form of physicalismO. rso, atleast,I shallargue.

Although it might seem Quixotic to spend time arguingagainst comprehensiveanti-physicalismm, y adversaryis far from imaginary. Comprehensiveanti-physicalismhas such distinguishedchampionsas Hilary Putnamand Nelson Goodman.3Its influence among philosophersingeneralis, I suspect,increasing.

In Section Two I will sketch the doctrine I call realisationphysicalism,and thenin SectionsThreeand Four I will presentthe firsttwo argumentsthat I take to supportit. Section Five will contain a third considerationwhichtells in favorof realisationphysicalismt,houghin a

PhilosophicalStudies74:221-241, 1994. ? 1994 KluwerAcademicPublishersP. rintedin theNetherlands.

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ratherlooser way.But first,in SectionOne, I mustindicatewhatI hold to be the problematicwithinwhich the issue concerningthe truthof physicalismarises;this will be usefulin revealinghow I understandthe generalcharacterof the varietiesof physicalismand of anti-physicalism, and, most importantly,in indicatingthe main theoreticalobligation whicheverydoctrineof physicalismoranti-physicalismmustdischarge.

I. THE PROBLEM OF THE MANY SCIENCES

Gilbert Ryle somewhere remarked that there is no such thing as science.His point, of course,was not to deny the obviousexistenceof science, but ratherto emphasisethe pluralityof the sciences.Philosophers have sometimesmade it seem as if therewere only one science, namely physics. But even a casual perusal of a university course directoryrevealsthat there are plenty of others,such as meteorology, geology,zoology,biochemistryn, europhysiologyp, sychology,sociology, ecology,molecularbiology,andso on.So therearemanysciences.

Alongside this profusion of sciences, however, which is manifestly observable,there is a vaguer,more philosophical,and more intuitive thought,the thoughtthat somehow it must be possible for the many sciencesto fit togetherso as to constitutewhatis in some sense a single and unifiedaccountof the world;and possible also for the respective domainsof the manysciences - the entitiesand propertiesthey seem to be about - to fit togetherso as to constitutea single and unified world.

Consequently,a pair of questionsnaturallyarises:how, exactly,are the manysciences relatedto one another?And how, exactly,are their domainsrelatedto one another?Let us call the problemexpressedby these two questionsthe problemof the manysciences.And if we follow WilfridSellarsin thinkingthat"Theaim of philosophy... is to understandhow thingsin the broadestsense of the termhangtogetherin the broadestpossible sense of the term",4then the problemof the many sciences must rate as the very model of a philosophicalproblem. Moreover,it must rate as the very model of a modernphilosophical problem,since,althoughtherehave been manysciencesfor a verylong time,especiallyif our commonsenseview of the worldis countedas an honorary science, it is only within, say, the last hundred years that

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sciencessuch as psychology,biology,andeconomicshavedevelopedto thepointwheretheycannotpossiblybe ignored.

The problemof the manysciences,as I havecharacterisedit, is large, general, and abstract.But it has smaller, more specific, and more concretemanifestationsO. ne, of course,(thoughonly one) is the mindbody problem,whetherit concernsthe relationsbetweencommonsense mental talk - folk psychology - and neurophysiology, or between both of these and cognitive psychology.5Another manifestationis the problem of Eddington'stwo tables.6A third is the controversyover whetheranythingdiscoveredby physicsor psychologyoughtto lead us to deny that external objects, such as emeralds and tomatoes, are colored.7Andof coursethereareothers.

Now my contention is that the varietiesof physicalismand antiphysicalismcan and should be seen as competingresponsesto the problem of the many sciences. Doctrines of physicalism and antiphysicalismoffer systematicaccountsof the relationsamongthe many sciences,and amongtheirmanydomains.But doctrinesof physicalism, of course,do so in a distinctiveway,since theiraccountof the relations amongthe manysciences and their domainshas the effect of in some way ptivilegingphysics and its domain, of in some way assigningto physicsandthe physicala certaindescriptiveandmetaphysicapl rimacy. And it is this privilegingof physics,this assignmentto it of a certain primacy,whichis what makesa responseto the problemof the many sciences a physicalistone.8There is, however,no single way in which physicalismmust do this, and the varietiesof physicalismdifferinasmuchas this way varies.9Doctrinesof anti-physicalismh,owever,must also address the problem of the many sciences, even if the account given is thin or deflationary.This last point will assumegreatimportancein thenextsectionbutone.

Let me now makea coupleof observationsF. irst,the problemof the many sciences, and hence the varietiesof physicalismand anti-physicalism, are not peculiarly concerned with the mental, or with psychology. The problem - or rather one aspect of it - does arise in the contextof the mindandpsychology,as I have alreadynoted,butit does not only arise there, and would arise even for a universe devoid of mentalor psychologicalproperties.For sucha universeit wouldstillbe interestingto know whatis the relationbetweennon-biologicalmacro-

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level sciences, such as geology or meteorology, and a micro-level sciencesuchas particlephysics.

Secondly,I haveunderestimatedthe problemof the manysciencesin one importantway,by neglectingthe factthata "single"science,suchas physics,itself has partswhose interrelationsstand,primafacie, in need of elucidation.But of coursethis has no tendencyto show thatthereis no problemof the many sciences.That there is a problemaccounting for the relationshipbetween microphysicsand cell biology is not compromisedby acknowledgingthe existenceof a problemconcerning the relationbetween,say, quantummechanicsand relativitytheory.If anythings,urely,theproblemis aggravated.

II. REALISATION PHYSICALISM

Since I am going to argue that a certain brand of physicalism realisationphysicalism- is true,I mustfirststatewhatit claims.Let us note, to begin with,four thingswhich realisationphysicalismdoes not claim. First, realisationphysicalismdoes not claim that non-physical properties,i.e. propertiesmentionedin sciencesotherthanphysics,fail to exist.On the contrary,it insiststhatsuchpropertiesas thatof beinga neurotransmitteor,r beingan introverto, r beinga glacierreallydo exist - which makes it a form of retentive (as opposed to eliminative) physicalism.10Secondly, realisationphysicalismdoes not claim that non-physical properties can be identified,i.e. type-identified,with physical properties;the multiple realisability,not to mention actual multiplerealisation,of non-physicalpropertiessurelyrules out all, or virtuallyall, such identifications.Thirdly,realisationphysicalismdoes not even claim, more weakly, that non-physicalevents (instancesof non-physicalproperties)canbe identifiedwithphysicalevents(instances of physicalproperties).So the conceptof eventidentity,whichis crucial to token physicalism,plays no part whatsoeverin the formulationof realisationphysicalism.IIFinally,unlike several currentlyfashionable versionsof physicalism,the formulationof realisationphysicalismdoes not rely on the concept of supervenience.12 (Claims of supervenience may follow from realisationphysicalism,but they are not, strictly speakingp, artof itsformulation.)

The readermaywellbe wonderingnow how a versionof physicalism

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