European Relations with Russia - RAND Corporation

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European Relations with Russia

Threat Perceptions, Responses, and Strategies in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis

Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, Thomas S. Szayna, F. Stephen Larrabee

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9637-1

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Preface

This is the second in a series of reports on the impact and implications of the Ukraine crisis on European security; it was produced under a project titled, "Security in Europe in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis: Implications for the U.S. Army." This report examines how European states perceive Russia's behavior in eastern and northern Europe in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. It focuses on three key analytical questions:

? Do European states see Russia as a major security threat, and, if so, what is it that Russia might threaten?

? How have European states responded to date--either individually, through the European Union, or through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

? How might these policies change if Russia takes even more aggressive steps in the future?

Human Subject Protections protocols have been used in this research in accordance with the appropriate statutes and U.S. Department of Defense regulations governing Human Subject Protections. The views of sources rendered anonymous by Human Subject Protections protocols are solely their own and do not represent the official policy of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Other reports in the series examine European vulnerabilities to Russian pressures, Russian capabilities, Russian operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and implications for the U.S. Army. This report should be of interest to those concerned with the impact on European

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iv European Relations with Russia: Threat Perceptions, Responses, and Strategies

security of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the future of the relationship between European countries and Russia. Research for this project was conducted from May to October 2015.

This research was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army and conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.

The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD146843.

Contents

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Organization of This Report.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CHAPTER TWO

Perceptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Threat Perceptions of a Russian Conventional Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Threat Perceptions of a Russian Hybrid Warfare Scenario.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Perceptions of NATO and the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CHAPTER THREE

Responses.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 European States Agree on a Firm Response to Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Maintaining Dialogue with Russia and Avoiding Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

CHAPTER FOUR

Intentions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 What Is Next for Europe-Russia Relations?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Sustaining Existing Measures and Planning for New Ones. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

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