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Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase the development of Operationally Responsive Space.
Note
I have my partner just read the deterrence advantage and then the Colon card in the aerospace advantage when we don’t have the time. We’ve only done the 1AC once, so hopefully we can shorten it down, but here are the cards that are essential:
- Wortzel
- MacDonald
- Burke
- Rendleman (the one about terrorist proxies)
- Donahue
- Putman
- Sejba
- Colon
- Smith (for stealth, if you have the time)
- Tellis (it’s its own advantage)
Deterrence Advantage
Advantage One - Deterrence
Current vulnerabilities in US space assets are the Achilles heel of deterrence – multiple adversaries with different military doctrines invite attack
Rendleman, 10 - Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (James, Astropolitics, 8:220–255, 2010, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Ebsco Political Science)
The 11 January 2007 test of a Chinese ground-based, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) kinetic-kill interceptor against one of their own defunct weather satellites generated considerable angst across the United States space community. The 2007 test demonstrated that the importance of space capabilities is also their Achilles heel, that is, their deadly weakness in spite of overall strength; it is far too easy to neutralize space systems and their power. In the broad strategic context, space capabilities have their own set of unique, inherent vulnerabilities, which are largely the result of orbital mechanics. This invites destruction, damage, and even just mischief delivered by even the least significant adversary. However, other nations may seek to deny U.S. advantages in space through a variety of negation and prevention actions. Negation Threats Satellite systems consist not only of spacecraft, each with their own payload and bus, but also a supporting infrastructure—ground control stations, tracking and control links, commonly referred to as the tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) links, data links, launch facilities, and an industrial base. Each of these components is at risk to threats of physical and cyber attack, and sabotage, and can be negated, simultaneously or each in detail. The satellite payload, bus, links, and infrastructure can be negated by using a variety of permanent or reversible means to achieve one of the five possible effects, known as the ‘‘five Ds’’—deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction.5 Space-based threats proliferate as a result of the ever-growing global availability of technology and access to the space domain. There are huge incentives for states to invest in and use space, and the spread of space technologies has occurred. States with sufficient resources can now reach out to space and ‘‘touch’’ satellites through a variety of means, and achieve one and even more of the five Ds. Spacecraft are vulnerable to direct ascent weapons as demonstrated by the Chinese ASAT test, and to a variety of other groundbased, airborne, and space-based ASAT technologies. Direct-ascent launched, or orbit-based nuclear devices, can be detonated, generating radiation and other lethal effects to destroy unshielded electronics over a wide lethal range. Co-orbital ASATs could be employed, comparable to the old Soviet system that was tested extensively in the 1970s and early 80s. In a less likely scenario, space-borne mines can also be deployed in close proximity to spacecraft, or exploded to generate debris clouds that destructively engage whole classes of satellites in the same orbital plane or in crossing orbits. Ground, space-based, or airborne lasers could be used by adversaries to wreak havoc. Blinding operations could be executed and inflict effects ranging from temporary ‘‘dazzling’’ to permanent burnout of optical or other sensors with intense energy bursts. Ground systems, supporting communications, and their nodes, are vulnerable to diverse land, sea, or air kinetic attacks, including sabotage. Unprotected systems are also susceptible to electronic attack through jamming and electromagnetic deception techniques. Jammers emit signals that mask or prevent reception of desired signals; these methods can disrupt uplinks, downlinks, and even cross-links. By disabling the means of command and control, and data communications, jammers render satellites inoperable or unavailable. Electromagnetic deception techniques can be employed to confuse systems; this could include sending false, but deceptively plausible, commands that cause spacecraft to perform damaging or wasteful maneuvers, modify databases or execute configuration changes, or otherwise destroy it. Similarly, supporting terrestrial ground stations, computer networks, and links are vulnerable to information operation and cyber attacks. These attacks could involve directing global denial of service tasks, injecting fake commands, malicious software and viruses into the space system, performing unauthorized monitoring and disclosure of sensitive information (data interception), and causing unauthorized modification or deliberate corruption of network information, services, and databases. In sum, there is a wide span of kinetic and other types of attacks an adversary could consider and employ. There is potential that even non-state actors can access some of these technologies and space systems, and achieve several of the five Ds; however, it is unlikely they can obtain and then employ a full-spectrum of these means and achieve all of these effects. Conducting an attack within the space domain involves a rather substantial investment to develop, acquire, operate, and sustain needed shooter, sensor, and command and control systems. Given the scope and commitment needed to affect such a move, an on-orbit attack would probably be made only in the context of a larger strategic struggle, perhaps as a prelude to or part of early combat operations. On the other hand, inexpensive jamming technology is available to even the poorest potential adversaries. As such, jamming poses the most used and growing threat to space systems. Some argue that jamming also carries with it implicit political and legal sanctions since no major space power has moved to ban or make even temporary and reversible jamming illegal. This may change now that a number of nations have banned together to object to recent Iranian satellite jamming.6 Cyber adversaries and criminals are also beginning to hone their craft. They present an evolving threat to space systems; and like jamming, cyber threats can be developed and deployed for only modest investments. Prevention Threats Prevention actions generally involve economic, political, informational, and diplomatic instruments of national power. For example, an extremely large creditor nation could employ its considerable economic clout and leverage in an attempt to compel or blackmail the United States to not license or permit imaging of its territory, preventing its use, and reducing its exposure to such observation. The creditor nation could seek to accomplish its objective by destabilizing the world market place. It could refuse to purchase treasury offerings that underpin the burgeoning U.S. fiscal and trade deficits, perhaps arguing that remote sensing, especially commercial remote sensing, of its territory infringes on its territorial and sovereign rights, or that it constitutes ‘‘unlawful’’ industrial espionage, and is thus, an unfair trade practice.7 Commercial remote sensing systems are nowan important resource for the United States Government and its national security needs. U.S. Government orders help sustain and stabilize the remote sensing industry,8 and any limitations on activities, whether for U.S. Government customers or commercial ones, imposed in response to external economic threats could evolve to cause problems. In an alternative scenario, a state, acting through political allies and proxies, could exert considerable influence and dominance to affect a change in U.S. law. This change could restrict licensing of commercial remote sensing imagery, restricting the market place and impacting business models for producers.9 As a diplomatic prevention example, adversaries could attempt to use international forums and treaties to deny frequency rights needed by U.S. military or intelligence satellites by making spurious ‘‘paper satellite’’ filings with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). ‘‘Paper satellites’’ involve ITU applications for satellite orbital slots, many for ‘‘speculative’’ systems that will never leave Earth. These filings can block access to scarce spectrum and orbital resources.10 The ability to place communications and other satellites in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) positions could be held at risk. Some characterize some of these types of actions as a form of ‘‘lawfare.’’ ‘‘The term lawfare describes the growing use of international law claims, usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool of war. The goal is to gain a moral advantage over your enemy in the court of world opinion, and potentially a legal advantage in national and international tribunals.’’11 Prevention actions taken to hobble U.S. space systems are not armed attacks. As is discussed later, the use of force is only authorized under the United Nations (UN) Charter in response to an armed attack, or upon authorization of the UN Security Council. As such, using armed force to deter and defeat prevention actions involving political or diplomatic subterfuge or intrigue may be unlawful under international law. Creative alternative solutions must therefore be found to assure access to space when facing these types of threats. Implications for U.S. Space Strategy The wide span of threats poses profound implications for U.S. space strategy and its execution. First, unlike the Cold War era, the United States now confronts a wide array of global actors, all operating with different motivations and incentives, some of which could become potential adversaries who can attack or threaten space capabilities. These state and non-state adversaries exhibit a wide array of political, economic, technical, and social differences. Having many potential adversaries makes each of them harder to understand. This complicates efforts to understand motivations and to influence perceptions for deterrence purposes. These differences, in turn, increase the likelihood of misperception, undercutting strategies to protect access to space capabilities. When one’s attention is divided, deterrent measures that are appropriate for one target may not be useful, or even counterproductive, for another. This requires tailored intelligence efforts, information operations, and transparency efforts in order to avoid or minimize disputes and prevent problems. Second, the broad array of adversaries exhibit widely varying risk-taking behaviors. Risk-taking behavior can strongly influence an adversary’s perception of a situation. Understanding this phenomenon can lead to better ways of influencing those perceptions. Unfortunately, potential adversaries may not care that space systems offer tremendous value and capabilities to all nations, or care whether conflict in space could create space debris that could cost all nations access to the domain. A strategy to assure continuing access to space assets must therefore be sufficiently flexible to address both risk-averse and risk-taking adversaries. Indeed, potential adversaries may shift from risk-taking to risk-adverse over a relatively short period of time. China may fit in this category. Within a decade or two, it will have its own extensive space-based communications, navigation, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellite constellations, all of which will be integrated into its military operations. No doubt, China will embrace that evolution and become very reliant on space capabilities; this will shift it from an asymmetric competitor to one similar to the United States or Russia. Third, with the demise of the Soviet Union, some political commentators and critics described the United States as a ‘‘hyperpower’’ not just a ‘‘superpower.’’ 12 Though buffeted by recent events involving Iraq, Afghanistan, the Global War on Terror, and the 2008 global financial meltdown, U.S. military supremacy continues. But, that supremacy does not make or guarantee a successful space strategy. Adversaries may believe they have a higher stake than the United States in the outcome of a particular crisis or conflict. Alternatively, the United States stake in the crisis may not be commensurate with the possible cost of involvement by the United States military and the rest of its national security apparatus. The first alternative may encourage mischief by adversaries; the second discourages U.S. action. As a result, adversaries may find threats of U.S. action in response to hostile acts affecting U.S. access to space systems to be non-credible. Fourth, while the United States has produced superlative space capabilities, it has not produced enough systems ready to survive the new kinetic, exotic, jamming, and cyber threat environment. The vulnerability exists because the spacecraft developed and deployed today are in many ways the same as those originally fielded during the Cold War. During that epic struggle, there was a tacit and then explicit understanding that each superpower would not attack and overwhelm the other’s space systems, except in the direst of circumstances, perhaps during the throes of a nuclear conflagration. Indeed, a number of agreements between the superpowers adopted the understanding and ruled out interference with national technical means, including space assets. This belief in the superiority of space systems and power blinds the United States to the inherent strategic weaknesses and vulnerabilities in these systems. This, predictably, can now be exploited by potential adversaries, such as China, who, with their recent ASAT test, appear more willing to fully explore the technologies needed to expand the limits of conventional war to include the space domain. Consequently, by historically and diplomatically reducing the threat, engineering of some satellite threat detection, attack avoidance, and other defense subsystems have not matured enough so that they are sophisticated, nimble, and robust enough to counter new 21st Century adversary attack capabilities.
These risks are compounding globally – 40 countries have ASAT technology
Donahue, 10 – USAF Major (Jack, “CATASTROPHE ON THE HORIZON: A SCENARIO-BASED FUTURE EFFECT OF ORBITAL SPACE DEBRIS,” )
Currently, the configuration of global space technologies and assets is highly desirable from a US perspective.67 The US has begun to rely heavily on space assets for a myriad of capabilities in recent years. Some have voiced worries that the United States will lose its lead as the global innovator in technology or that an enemy could make technological leaps that would give it significant advantages.68 That is possible, but by no means a foregone conclusion.69 However one thing is clear, “technology will proliferate.”70 Space technology has become increasingly available to any country or multinational corporation with the ability to fund the research or acquire the technology and place it in orbit.71 The increasing proliferation of launch and satellite capabilities, as well as the development of anti-satellite capabilities has begun to level the playing field.72 Adversary technological advances in kinetic-energy weapons causing structural damage by impacting the target with one or more high-speed masses, directed-energy weapons that are either ground- or air-based systems never getting close to their target, and nuclear weapons that detonate at an empty point in space could put our space assets at risk in the near future.73 Kinetic-energy weapons such as China‘s 11 January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, kinetic-kill anti-satellite (ASAT) vehicle destroying an inactive Chinese weather satellite generating thousands of pieces of space debris that threatened many operational spacecraft is of growing concern.74 Another kinetic energy weapon that is of concern is microsatellites (microsats). Currently, at least 40 countries have demonstrated some ability to design, build, launch, and operate microsats.75 Microsats can maneuver in such a way to observe and disrupt operations of orbiting assets. These microsats may soon be capable of harassing or destroying larger satellites at virtually any altitude.76 Because these satellites are so small, they may not be easily detectable as part of a payload or when maneuvering in space. Directed-energy weapons are laser, radio frequency, and particle beam weapons. Lasers operate by delivering energy onto the surface of the target and gradual or rapid absorption of this energy leads to several forms of thermal damage.77 Radio frequency (RF) weapons such as the high-power microwave (HPM) have either ground-and space-based RF emitters that fire an intense burst of radio energy at a satellite, disabling electronic components.78 Nuclear weapons are perhaps the technology of most concern to US space assets. Some argue though that adversaries would desist from using nuclear weapons in space out of fear of retaliation.79 While others say “what better way to use nuclear weapons than to destroy a key military capability of an enemy country without killing any of its population.”80 Regardless of the arguments, one thing is clear; a nuclear detonation would have three huge environmental effects in space: electromagnetic pulse (EMP), transient nuclear radiation, and thermal radiation.81 EMP from a nuclear detonation will induce potentially damaging voltages and currents in unprotected electronic circuits and components virtually rendering space assets inoperative.82 Increased radiation from such a detonation would also have profound effects on the space environment. This would severely damage nearby orbiting satellites reducing the lifetime of satellites in LEO from years to months or less and make satellite operations futile for many months.83 The risk of this potential threat is significant. To execute this mission, all that is needed is a rocket and a simple nuclear device.84 Countries such as Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and Pakistan possess such missiles that could carry warheads to the necessary altitudes to perform such missions.85 Technological advances in adversary weaponry are certainly hard to predict even in the near term. However, if this weaponry matures enough and is successfully used it will create additional space debris from the orbiting satellites being rendered inoperative (space junk) and becoming potential hazards to other satellites.
Space is the new strategic high ground – 2.5 thousand years of history proves nations will compete because of terrestrial ties
Smith, Colonel and PhD in IR, 11 (M.V., Colonel, PhD in Politics and IR @ University of Reading, Citing Colin Gray, “Chapter 17: Security and Spacepower, Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, , EMM)
It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one belligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others. And the greater the importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture, or destroy it. In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the future because the use of space in war has become vital. . . . Regardless of public sentimental or environmentally shaped attitudes towards space as the pristine final frontier, space warfare is coming.20 The strategic value of space to states is not in question. Advanced spacefaring states are already reliant—and moving toward dependence—on space-derived services for activities across every sector of their societies. Spacepower is becoming critical to their styles of warfighting. Likewise, the injury that can be caused to such states by menacing their space systems can be considerable. Given these incentives, the beast of war will either break its chains all at once or stretch them slowly over time.21
Multiple adversaries will use space as an asymmetric means to destroy US hegemony – deterrence by punishment will fail because the US lacks defenses and states could act through terrorist proxies
Rendleman, 10 - Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (James, Astropolitics, 8:220–255, 2010, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Ebsco Political Science)
The strategy to deter nuclear attack worked throughout the Cold War; the Soviet Union was powerful, but it was also a rational adversary. For this reason, the United States worked hard to understand the culture, goals, incentives, and ideals of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was also open to, and reciprocated, U.S. diplomatic engagement overtures. The United States has gained great advantage through development and integration of space capabilities. This has forced potential adversaries to evolve techniques to neutralize this superiority. Attacks on U.S. space systems can be performed through terrorist proxies, third parties, or covert acts that offer perpetrators plausible deniability for damage inflicted. The United States now confronts a diverse set of adversaries, and their rogue leaders are arguably much more risk prone, or perhaps, just oxymoronic, acting deliberately reckless. These adversaries know full well the importance of space capabilities to U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic success. They see that attacking and disrupting space capabilities presents a significant opportunity to deny U.S. national objectives, to retain or expand their own relative power, and to compensate for their own lack of conventional strength. Deterrence has failed throughout history ‘‘because the object of deterring measures fails to notice them, does not find the measures credible, or is pursuing an agenda sufficiently important enough to its interests that it is prepared to ignore the deterrence attempt.’’30 Given this, the United States cannot depend solely on deterrence to secure itself. It must prepare for the possibility that its measures could fail. Therefore, defenses should also be deployed; though the extent of these should be measured and balanced against their utility, and measured by projected costs, lost opportunity costs, likely effectiveness, and effects obtained in the end. Deterrence and defense tasks are inexorably linked to each other. As noted by Robert Butterworth, ‘‘Defenses offer protection, while deterrence threatens punishment. Defenses can succeed whether the enemy believes in them or not.’’31 There are a number of active and passive defensive capabilities that can be developed and deployed to protect space systems, particularly against kinetic-kill ASATs and jammers.
Chinese doctrine, spending, and actions all portend an attack on US space assets - it will likely escalate
Wortzel, 8 - Colonel, United States Army (Retired) (Larry, Astropolitics, 6:112–137, “THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
AND SPACE WARFARE,” Ebsco Political Science)
The PLA is exploring in theoretical research, basic research, and applied research a variety of forms of space weapons.77 These include:
. satellite jamming technology;
. collisions between space bodies;
. kinetic energy weapons;
. space-to-ground attack weapons;
. space planes that can transit and fight ‘‘up or down’’ in the upper atmosphere or space;
. high-power laser weapons;
. high-power microwave weapon systems;
. particle-beam weapons; and
. electromagnetic pulse.78
PLA authors credit the U.S. with having the most advanced capabilities in the areas of kinetic energy weapons, particle beam weapons, and directed energy. The PLA does have various forms of jamming capability, and has done a lot of work on the concept of colliding space bodies. The dilemma here for the military theorists or planner in the U.S., is that this is really space science and rocket science. Although Chinese military theory, basic research, and applied research into these areas are transparent, the successes or weapons systems that may become formal programs are not transparent. Regardless of whether the algorithms are correct or not, it is clear that the PLA is serious about space warfare. The destruction of their own weather satellite and the blinding of a U.S. satellite mean they are achieving some success. PLA theorists think that internal lines of communication are most favorable for successful military operations, whether the offense, defense, or maintaining a logistics chain.79 They see internal lines as superior to the conduct of military operations on external lines.80 The Chinese see their regional position in Asia as superior to that of the U.S. because the U.S. has to fight, communicate, and re-supply along extended exterior lines, while China enjoys interior lines of communication within the range of its aircraft, missiles, and submarine fleet. This means that in a conflict, they would probably use their jamming and antisatellite systems to disrupt American lines of communication, command and control, situational awareness, and efforts at coordination at the extended ranges of military conflict for the U.S.81 One of the most disruptive things the PLA could do, therefore, would be to neutralize the U.S. ability to use tracking and data relay satellites, which provide the global, real time sensor and communications capabilities for network centric operations. The PLA believes that the U.S. is heavily dependent on its satellite systems, more dependent than the PLA. That is changing, however. As the PLA modernizes its own Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4SIR) systems, it is becoming as dependent on space and information systems as the U.S. Therefore, its policies of space control and space deterrence for military purposes are no longer forms of asymmetric warfare. Rather, the contest will be over which force can most effectively disrupt the other’s military operations. Space warfare will likely become an integral part of traditional conflict. The Implications of Attacks on Reconnaissance Satellites One problem that begs an answer is whether the PLA is considering the implications of exercising the capabilities it is developing. That is, when researchers consider a form of space warfare, or develop capabilities to be applied in space weapons, are there also PLA officers in the policy or war planning sphere thinking through the implications of employing that capability? If not, an incident could quickly escalate and get out of control, leading to an exchange of weapons or a deeper crisis. For example, four officers from the PLA’s Second Artillery Command College, in Wuhan, have published an analysis of how to jam or destroy the space-based ballistic missile advanced warning systems of the U.S.82 In their article, the officers note, ‘‘a space borne missile early warning system will play a pivotal role in future space wars.’’83 They set out the capabilities and parameters of the U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning satellites, including the geosynchronous orbits of the satellite sets, their axis of look, the infrared bands they cover, and their shortcomings. The authors discuss how to destroy the U.S. DSP satellites with other satellites, ground-based lasers, or direct ascent weapons.84 They also have a discussion of how to jam the satellites, their satellite-to-ground transmissions, or to camouflage the infrared radiation emitted by a missile to make it more difficult for the warning satellite to detect an attack.85 In their conclusion, the authors find that maintaining a strategic ballistic missile capability is a powerful deterrent to prevent the U.S. from launching a large scale military attack or intervention aimed at China’s own military operations on its southeast coast, i.e., to intervene in Chinese military operations against Taiwan.86 Their view is that ‘‘destroying and jamming space borne missile early warning systems not only can paralyze such anti-missile systems, but also will help us [the PRC] win the war in space.’’87 The PLA is also aware of the most advanced U.S. synthetic aperture radar imaging systems and are thinking through how to neutralize or jam them.88 The problem in this reasoning is that there is no consideration given to a likely American reaction to the disruption of its missile early warning systems. One possible reaction by the U.S. is that it might well think it is coming under immediate attack and launch its own strike against China’s strategic missile forces. Another reasonable reaction by U.S. forces might be to strike the source of the Chinese attack, particularly if it came from a ground based laser or direct ascent launch. Even if such a reaction by the U.S. used conventional weapons, the PLA may find it has created a deeper crisis that led to an American strike on Chinese soil. These four PLA authors do not seem to have considered the ramifications of their own research. Space Deterrence Space power theorists, like Cai, advocate the ability to control parts of space for limited periods. Huang Zhicheng, in reaction to U.S. Air Force Space Command manual AFM 2–2.1, Space Warfare and Countermeasures, develops the concept further, advocating a regime of ‘‘space deterrence’’ to counter American space superiority. 89 For Huang, this shift toward space deterrence mirrors a trend in U.S. space theory.90 Huang defines this as ‘‘the use of strong aerospace power to create or demonstrate a threat to an opponent’s space power to deter that opponent in a practical way.’’91 The goal of this concept of deterrence is to increase the PLA’s power in weapons systems, information gathering, and command and control to improve national warning systems in China, create fear in an adversary, and degrade the adversary’s power.92 The key to achieving this level of deterrence, according to Huang, is to concentrate one’s own economic, military, and science and technology power to ‘‘ruin an opponent’s economy and ability to function in space.’’93 The intention behind the December 2006 blinding of a U.S. satellite by a Chinese laser and the 11 January 2007 destruction of a Chinese weather satellite by the PLA’s own direct ascent kill vehicle is clear when interpreted through this concept of demonstrating space deterrence.94 As Huang concedes, for a deterrent to be credible, one must demonstrate the capability. A deterrent must be demonstrated. It is also important to note that effective space deterrence, as conceived by this writer, includes crippling attacks on information networks and C4SIR systems. In the future, there could be other examples of space deterrence to let the U.S. and other countries know that they do not have free reign in space or over China. The PLA could demonstrate various forms of jamming. In doing so, the PLA would conduct operational tests of the work being done on jamming synthetic aperture radar satellites. Chinese journals do discuss maneuvering space bodies to intersect in orbit. This type of maneuvering lends itself to accidental collisions between space bodies. China could deny the hostile intent of such accidents, but they still would demonstrate a space deterrent capability. Conclusions There are a number of important findings to this research effort. First, in the event of conflict with the PLA, military operations carried out across all the domains of war, ground, sea, air, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum, or information- and cyber-warfare, are likely. Any military operations in space will be part of a more coordinated cyber or information attack on an enemy’s knowledge and command systems. Second, there will probably be strategic warning, even if there is operational or tactical surprise, in any future conflict between China and the U.S. Prior to direct conflict, the PLA and the Central Military Commission will likely justify any of its actions by conducting what it calls legal warfare.95 Third, the concept of legal warfare will be applied by the PRC Foreign Ministry, the security services, Chinese Communist Party liaison Department, and the PLA to exploit political divisions in the U.S. over nuclear testing and space-based weapon systems. Fourth, the PLA will seek to exercise space control in a limited area of conflict. The PLA will probably observe the internationally accepted definitions of commons in space, over 100,000 m, in peacetime. If direct conflict breaks out, altitude limits on space control are off, and any systems carrying adversary military traffic or signals are probably fair game for the PLA. U.S. Navy Secretary Donald Winter, on a visit to Australia in August 2007, said that the U.S. still wants to understand what the Chinese intention is in its military modernization.96 This concern over how China will engage in military operations in space is really about intentions. There are a number of China’s activities and policy positions coming from Beijing that make it hard to interpret Chinese intent. Among these are: China’s expansive territorial claims, combined with periodic incidents of the use of armed force to reinforce these claims;97 the justification for extending the territorial claims of China into the reaches of outer space outlined in this paper; and the shaping of the ‘‘space battlefield’’ with legal arguments that would justify China’s actions to prevent space observation over its territory. The U.S. has taken a course with China that is far different from the isolationist and confrontational approach with the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. Both states are heavily involved in trade, economic, and political engagements with each other. Nonetheless, both states are wary of the potential for conflict with the other, and there exist some deep fundamental differences of national interest. Whether one is a proponent of arms control agreements or not, the dialogue between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over arms control and treaties produced a body of mutual understanding that holds up today. The U.S. and the Soviet Union seemed to realize that it is potentially destabilizing to define the upper limits of sovereignty. Thus, neither country interfered with the other’s free passage in space. Also, they agreed that the ability to conduct strategic verification from space stabilized the nuclear balance. No such dialogue has taken place with China. The PLA has either ignored or rebuffed American efforts at such a dialogue. Often, senior military or Chinese Communist Party leaders have told Americans that to engage in such a dialogue is an example of a cold war mentality.98 Yet discussions on these issues are important to clarify the rationales for America’s positions on space and serve as threat reduction measures. Although China’s intentions are not fully known, they can be inferred from Chinese actions, like the attack on a U.S. satellite with a laser and the destruction of its own weather satellite as a demonstration of capability. PRC intentions can also be inferred from judicious reviews of its military literature. By observing the military capabilities China is acquiring and reading its military literature, it is clear that China’s leaders are preparing as though they may have to fight the U.S. To this end, the PLA is busily preparing the space battlefield in advance with legal arguments, as called for in its doctrine. As a result, there are very sound reasons to prepare to defend American interests in space, to engage in mutual threat reduction measures, and to pursue programs that will ensure that the U.S. military will have access to space in any future conflict.
The risk of crisis instability and miscalculation in space is high – the PLA is likely to initiate an attack in a crisis
MacDonald, 11 - Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program, U.S. Institute of Peace (Bruce, CQ Congressional Testimony, “MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAMS IN CHINA”, 5/11, lexis)
One characteristic of too many wars in the last century is that they are the result of miscalculation that ignites the tinder of fundamental geopolitical tensions. Averting major power conflict requires skillful management of tensions by senior leaders of the major powers. China has become much more internationally sophisticated, though with important exceptions, in its dealings with the rest of the world than has been true in the past, and this is reflected in its civilian leadership. Unfortunately, the PLA's senior officer corps trails its civilian counterparts in this respect. They have much less interaction with foreign official and travel abroad much less frequently than their U.S. counterparts. This means that the PLA overall views world events from a less knowledgeable and sophisticated perspective, a danger in this increasingly complex world, and could explain, for example, the political "tonedeafness" of the PLA in the manner they conducted their 2007 ASAT test. This PLA problem becomes more serious when one realizes that the PLA is organizationally separate from the rest of the Chinese government, and reports only to the Central Military Commission, currently chaired by President Hu Jintao. President Hu, and his likely successors, have no significant military background, and the majority of the CMC's members are top PLA officers, suggesting that civilian oversight of major military decisions and consideration of their larger implications are not as carefully reviewed as in the U.S. government. Normally this would not be too great a concern, but in a crisis this could be dangerous. Add to this the fact that China has no equivalent of our National Security Council, a critically important body for coordinating our security decisionmaking, and one comes away concerned about the relative insularity of the PLA in the Chinese power structure. In a crisis, the PLA probably cannot be counted on to show as sophisticated a sense of judgment as one would hope any country's military leaders, even an enemy's, to show. All these problems and many more pose potential threats to internal political stability and Communist Party control, providing ample opportunity for crisis and conflict in the years ahead. Overview of The Strategic Landscape of Space Space assets, and the communications and cyber links that enable them to function, are the means by which essential national security information is either generated, transmitted, or both. This information is the lifeblood of U.S. conventional military superiority and plays a key role in U.S. strategic nuclear posture as well. As such, these space related assets represent extraordinarily appealing targets in any future conflict, and their relative vulnerability can provide dangerously attractive incentives in a crisis to preempt, escalating to war. Resisting this temptation to attack may be morally virtuous but could be strategically unwise: going first in a space conflict with a nearpeer space adversary appears to offer many advantages, while absorbing such a strike, with all its attendant destruction of military capabilities, and then responding to the attack against an opponent fully expecting such a response, appears to be militarily and strategically quite undesirable. As technology advances, the ways of interfering with, disrupting, or destroying information streams in space or supporting space systems will likely increase, as will U.S. and others' dependence upon such systems. Providing defensive options for U.S. space assets should be pursued where appropriate, but most space observers believe that offense has the advantage in space over defense, as General Cartwright observed last May. Cartwright also noted that the challenging issues that space poses has made the Space Posture Review "the most difficult of all the defense reviews" the Obama Administration has undertaken. The overall U.S. goal in space should be to shape the space domain to the advantage of the United States and its allies, and to do so in ways that are stabilizing and enhance U.S. and allied security. The United States has an overriding interest in maintaining the safety, survival, and function of its space assets so that the profound military, civilian, and commercial benefits they enable can continue to be available to the United States and its allies. This need not mean that China and others must perforce be disadvantaged by such an arrangement - there should be ample opportunity for many countries to benefit and prosper from a properly crafted system of space management. There is an inherent risk of strategic instability when relatively modest defense efforts create disproportionate danger to an adversary, as with space offense. And there is a serious risk of crisis instability in space when "going first" pays off - destroying an adversary's satellites before he destroys yours. We don't know what would happen in a crisis, but the potential for space instability seems high and likely to grow.
That risks miscalc and nuclear escalation
Burke, 6 – Lt Col, USAF, command space professional with operational experience in missile operations, space surveillance, space control, missile warning, and command and control (Alan, “SPACE THREAT WARNING: FOUNDATION FOR SPACE SUPERIORITY, AVOIDING A SPACE PEARL HARBOR,” )
The erosion of the US ability to execute the space threat warning mission has serious implications for US national security to include: the loss of a key early warning indicator of an attack on the US homeland; the loss of space capabilities which would degrade US warfighting effectiveness; the preventable loss of critical high-value satellites, facilities or services; the increased possibility that adversaries could develop new weapons or covertly conduct probing attacks on US space systems; and the lack of a credible means to execute stated US policy in response to an attack against space assets. One of the most serious impacts of the failure to develop or execute a reliable space threat warning and attack verification system is the loss of a key early warning indicator of an attack on the US homeland or an attack that is part of a major regional action by a near-peer adversary such as an attack on Taiwan by the Chinese mainland. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, whose goal was the destruction of the Pacific Fleet, was not done as an isolated act, but as part of the start of a larger campaign to establish a Japanese Pacific sphere of influence which included the forceful acquisition of US territories. At this time, the Pacific Fleet was viewed as a US center of gravity whose destruction would enable Japan to achieve regional domination and discourage future US intervention. Today, our space-based assets may represent the equivalent of the WWII Pacific Fleet. Further, other nations have stated they view the US reliance on space as a potential Achilles ’ heel and a center of gravity whose destruction or disruption is critical to future military success against the US.44 Although a major attack on the US is not likely, the loss of US space-based early warning capability and ground-based missile warning radars could undermine nuclear deterrence strategy resulting in a devastating miscalculation that the US was vulnerable to a nuclear first strike. The perception that US space capabilities are vulnerable to a surprise attack also weakens conventional deterrence. In the case of a US-China conflict over Taiwan, the Chinese might seek to disrupt or destroy regional space capabilities as part of a delaying strategy to deny US forces access to the region until their military operations were well underway, making the Chinese takeover of Taiwan a fait accompli.45 A successful Pearl Harbor-type attack on US space assets would degrade US fighting effectiveness. Today, space represents the ultimate high ground and it is unlikely that a nation, whose military ambitions might provoke US involvement, will willingly cede that high ground. The level of battlespace awareness space-based platforms provide makes any attack using large massed forces difficult to accomplish. The ability to neutralize these platforms would improve the circumstances required to gain a strategic advantage over US and allied forces. As General Lord stated in his Congressional testimony: “A resourceful enemy will look at our centers of gravity and try to attack them. Our adversaries understand our global dependence on space capabilities, and we must be ready to handle any threat to our space infrastructure.”46 With the increased US reliance on space assets for communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and command and control of our deployed forces; a successful space attack could significantly delay US response to regional aggression. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), over 60% of theater communications traveled via satellites.47 The Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) provided 90% of all protected communications and 70% of all military satellite communications into theater.48 These capabilities significantly enhanced command and control of US and allied forces. Further, the employment of the satellite-based Blue Force Tracker system resulted in an unprecedented level of situational awareness which decreased fratricide and facilitating search and rescue operations and reinforcement operations.49 The United States also maximized the use of the space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) to enable precision weapons delivery, allowing the use of fewer and smaller weapons to achieve effects; to enhance navigation in featureless terrain; and to aid in the location of both friendly and hostile forces.50 General Lord testified to Congress: “Space capabilities are no longer nice to have, but are now indispensable to how we fight and win our nation’s wars.”51 The failure to develop a credible space threat warning system increases the likelihood that a foreign nation would attack US space assets. The inability to detect and provide timely warning of a space attack could result in the preventable loss of critical high-value satellites, facilities or services. There are a number of scenarios where the timely detection of a threat would allow space operators to intervene, thwarting the attack. In many instances, the ability to find, fix, target and destroy the threat is currently a viable way to counter the attack. However, this is not always possible. In the case of a co-orbital ASAT attack, which involves the launch and maneuver of a satellite into a closing orbit of another satellite to destroy or disrupt it, the countermeasure require a pre-intercept maneuver of the target satellite. The support countermeasures for an attack on space ground facilities include increased physical and information security. Countermeasures for electronic warfare attacks or jamming of the space link segment exist but there is often a significant bandwidth cost when these measures are in effect.52 Degradations to space assets could also occur as a result of unintentional sources such as radio frequency interference or from scientific research such as laser research. In these situations, it is important to locate the source and terminate the activity to prevent loss of the space asset or service. The loss of these capabilities during critical operations could result in operational failure, loss of equipment, resources, and lives. The inability to rapidly neutralize sources of satellite communication (SATCOM) interference also has national security implications. In the area of airpower employment, successful SATCOM jamming could disrupt the US ability to command and control air assets in theater from geographically separated air operations centers. A delay of even one to two days might jeopardize US ability to support deployed forces. Satellite communication links to worldwide deployed forces are critical capabilities in protecting US security, sovereignty, and military combat capability. The inability to detect and assess space threats might allow adversaries to develop new weapon systems or conduct probing attacks on US space systems without our knowledge. Although US surveillance technology and systems are more sophisticated today, the US should not assume it will always be able to detect the development of a new weapon. Our experience in post-WW II with the Germans is one example. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the US and Russia engaged in a race to uncover Germany’s scientific secrets. Major General Hugh-Knerr, deputy commander of the US Air Forces in Europe wrote: “The occupation of German scientific and industrial establishments has revealed the fact that we have been alarmingly backward in many fields of research.”53 Supersonic rockets, nerve gas, jet aircraft, guided missiles, stealth technology and hardened armor were just some of the technologies developed in WWII German laboratories.54 The Soviet Sputnik launches and the deployment of the FOB system are modern examples of technological surprise.55 Today, other nations are working to develop new weapons to counter US dominance and to take the lead in what is termed Fourth Generation Warfare—information war. The current coverage gaps in our space surveillance network, a fragmented intelligence network, a lack of discipline in anomaly reporting, the current inability to rapidly detect an attack on on-orbit systems, and overall erosion over the last decade of the space defense mindset makes it more likely an adversary could develop anti-satellite weapons without our knowledge. Finally, without a credible space threat warning capability the US will not have the ability to execute stated US policy to counter an attack against US space assets. In 1999, President Clinton signed into law DoD Directive 3100.10, US Space Policy, which specifically declared an attack on US space systems, to include commercial space systems, an attack on US sovereignty.56 One purposes of this policy is to deter an attack on US space assets. However, the lack of a credible space threat warning system undermines this policy. A senior officer in US Strategic Command recently stated that a nation or group could likely interfere with US satellites without fear of retribution.57
Independently, perceived US vulnerability to a Chinese ASAT attack will cause a preemptive first strike – escalates to nuclear war
Tellis, 7 (Ashley, Senior Associate @ Carnegie, Survival, Autumn, “China’s Military Space Strategy”, ingenta)
Finally, the growing Chinese capability for space warfare implies that a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait would entail serious deterrence and crisis instabilities. If such a clash were to compel Beijing to attack US space systems at the beginning of a war, the very prospect of such a ‘space Pearl Harbor’94 could, in turn, provoke the United States to contemplate pre-emptive attacks or horizontal escalation on the Chinese mainland. Such outcomes would be particularly likely in a conflict in the next decade, before Washington has the opportunity to invest fully in redundant space capabilities. Already, US Strategic Command officials have publicly signalled that conventionally armed Trident submarine- launched ballistic missiles would be appropriate weapons for executing the prompt strikes that might become necessary in such a contingency.95 Such attacks, even if employing only conventional warheads, on space launch sites, sensor nodes and command and control installations on the Chinese mainland could well be perceived as a precursor to an all-out war. It would be difficult for all sides to limit the intensification of such a conflict, even without the added complications of accidents and further misperception.96
Loss of space assets will annihilate US hegemony
Marshall, 8 - NASA Ames Research Center (Will, Astropolitics, 6:154–199, “REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF SPACE ASSETS: A MULTITIERED MICROSATELLITE CONSTELLATION ARCHITECTURE,” Ebsco Political Science)
Space assets are one of the most critical ‘‘Achilles’ heels’’ of the current military capability of the United States (U.S.). This is for two reasons: (1) the U.S. military space systems—in particular reconnaissance, navigation, signals intelligence, early warning, and communications systems—are critical to modern military warfare and intelligence; and (2) space systems are inherently vulnerable to attack. This combination is understood at the highest levels and was espoused in the ‘‘Rumsfeld Space Commission’’ with talk of a ‘‘Space Pearl Harbor.’’1 Whether one agrees with the tone, this is a genuine security problem for the U.S. in need of a near-term solution. While there have been numerous papers, and much media and academic attention, in the space security discussion focused on promoting or criticizing space-based weapons,2 there have been far fewer papers and studies offering constructive ways forward that deal with these genuine security concerns in a broader sense.3 The central motivation for this paper is to put forward one key element—the satellite architecture—in an effort to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. space assets. It is hoped that this idea, together with others like it, should stimulate and contribute to a debate on more constructive ways forward for how to achieve space security in the post-Cold war world. Importance of Space Assets For better or worse, it is clear that the U.S. military is to some significant extent dependent on its key satellites, which number about 86–105 operational satellites at present. These satellites constitute a significant part of the eyes, ears, and central nervous system of the modern military.4 A practical example that helps to illustrate this is the case of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. First, the decision to go was based in part on satellite imagery and signals intelligence from satellites; whether or not it was interpreted or used correctly is a separate issue. Second, the planning and operation were facilitated by satellite imagery. Third, many planes, ships, tanks, and units’ positions were known through Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, and even most munitions were guided by GPS. Fourth, the operation was commanded from the U.S. in large part through the use of communications satellites. Perhaps more importantly than any of the functions in the Iraq example, early warning (EW) satellites are the U.S.’s and Russia’s first warning of nuclear missile attack. As Gray classified, space assets have moved from being ‘‘useful and important’’ to an ‘‘indispensable adjunct’’ in the military over the last decade.5 Space assets are definitely used a great deal by the U.S. military, but that does not mean necessarily as strong a dependence as Gray implies. The loss of U.S. space assets could range in its effect anywhere from a loss to the U.S. military in practical operations, to being catastrophic to U.S. security. The former would entail a reduction in operational effectiveness or speed, but fundamentally supposes that back-up systems and/or redundancy allow a near continuation of military capability. The latter scenario would entail an effective disablement of the U.S. military capability from normal operations. In reality, the significance lies between these boundaries, but this is a topic that could benefit from further research.
This could result in global nuclear conflicts in every region of the world
Kagan, 7[Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, 7/19, web)
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world ’s powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China’s foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is pass é; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. The Chinese do not share the view that power is passé; hence their now twodecades- long military buildup. Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power — with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending — now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea ’s nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan’s own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or “little brother” to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other ’s rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a “greater China” and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe ’s past than its present. But it also looks like Asia’s past. Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the eu and nato, would not insist on predominant influence over its “near abroad,” and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia ’s international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from nato and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia’s complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia ’s relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India ’s regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its “century of humiliation.” Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on. Israel has become its living symbol. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
A firm commitment to ORS is vital to credible deterrence by denial – it will prevent attacks against US space assets
Sejba, 10 - USAF Congressional Budget Liaison Officer Budget and Appropriations Liaison Directorate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget Secretary of the Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC (Timothy, “ Deterrence for Space: Is Operationally Responsive Space Part of the Solution?”, High Frontier, May, )
The space domain, often referred to as “The High Frontier,” no longer is a sanctuary outside the reach of foreign intervention. The threat to space systems and their capabilities is broad, ranging from reversible effects such as jamming or blinding, to more destructive means such as anti-satellite weapons. It is now time to take actions for the sake of space, and assure its continued contributions across the full spectrum of military operations. Given the criticality of space to not only our military power, but also our economic power, it is time we develop policies and field capabilities to deter future adversaries from attempting to degrade, deny, or destroy space capabilities and services. The asymmetric advantages enabled by space can no longer be assumed and as a result, a new National Security Strategy for space must be forged, one that combines deterrence with basic protection capabilities never before afforded our space systems. Yet, space deterrence is not an “all in” strategy, nor can it reduce the risk of attack to zero.1 Should aspects of deterrence fail, we must take steps to defend and protect our space systems and the critical global services they provide. Operationally responsive space (ORS) by definition is “assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of joint force commanders’ needs.”2 Dissected further, one key word stands out: assured … being sufficiently robust, timely, agile, adaptive, and resilient, to achieve desired outcomes with a high degree of certainty.3 So while ORS intends to provide operational and tactical support to the joint warfighter, its true value will be the assurance it provides as a credible strategic deterrent against space attacks. As a deterrent, ORS provides access to existing capabilities, or rapid deployment and employment of new capabilities, denying the benefits our adversaries may seek by attacking our space capabilities. Through timely and accurate intelligence, we can work to understand our adversaries’ intent and armed with this knowledge, we gain the opportunity to influence their decision-making calculus. Understanding intent, coupled with credible and timely ORS capabilities, can effectively deny or greatly reduce the benefits they seek by attacking the asymmetric advantages enabled by space. ORS provides a responsiveness that will allow the commander, US Strategic Command (CDR USSTRATCOM), to respond and support our combatant commands real-time and near-term requirements. To support these requirements, ORS consists of three tiers of capabilities: Tier 1, the employment of existing capabilities within minutes to hours; Tier 2, the rapid call-up, launch and deployment of tailored, ready to field capabilities within days to weeks; and finally, Tier 3, the rapid development of a new capability to meet a combatant commander’s joint urgent operational need within months to a year. The Unified Command Plan assigns CDR USSTRATCOM the responsibility for all military space. The space systems under his authority and control provide our warfighters increased speed, precision, and lethality in military operations. In 2007, during an Air Force Association speech in Los Angeles, California, General C. Robert Kehler, commander, Air Force Space Command and former deputy commander, USSTRATCOM, stated that the biggest difference between 25 years ago and today, was that “space today is embedded in combat operations.”4 ORS’ strategic deterrent value has the potential to be just as important to future combat operations. Nuclear and Traditional Deterrence Theory – Misapplication When Applied to Space For years, deterrence theory centered solely on nuclear deterrence strategies, which relied heavily on threats of punishment and unacceptable losses or mutually assured destruction. These strategies effectively deterred the use of nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War to present day. However, strategies of threatening devastating nuclear retaliation do not apply to space. In fact, a deterrence strategy that includes the threat of punishment (i.e., impose cost) should be just one, if not a limited aspect of deterrence for space. For almost half a century, nuclear deterrence strategies formed the foundation for the Cold War waged between the US and the former Soviet Union. Both superpowers relied on the threat of nuclear weapons to deter even conventional military actions, for fear of rapid escalation. In its most unlimited form, mutual assured destruction was a key deterrence strategy; a doctrine of military strategy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two opposing sides would effectively result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender.5 While nuclear weapons continue to be a strategic deterrent, the same destructive thought process and strategy is not directly applicable to space.6 Today, some theorists focus and apply more punishing or destructive deterrence practices and thinking to the space domain. They view credible deterrence in space as relying upon the threat of punishment against an aggressor; going so far as to suggest that an attack against us could be countered with an attack in kind. One specific definition limits deterrence to an “attempt to persuade an adversary by threat of force (and other measures) not to pursue an undesirable course of action.”7 Another theorist states, “Deterrence can only succeed if the enemy finds the threat of punishment to be believable.”8 These approaches are less likely to deter for space, especially given our dependence upon the domain. For example, destroying an adversary’s satellite, especially one in an operational orbit, would create a large debris field, potentially hampering or denying our own ability to access space. Instead, deterrence for space can only succeed if our enemies believe we have credible means of denying the benefits they seek to gain. Space deterrence theory should focus on credible ways and means to deny an enemy the benefits they seek; impose costs on our adversaries (against their most prized assets);9 and encourage their restraint. A New Focus of Deterrence What does deterrence look like in the 21st century? The US has not yet figured that out, said Marine Corps General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “You need something that deters a conflict, and you need more choices than just nuclear. ~ Sandra I. Erwin, Future of War—How the Game is Changing … Our deterrence strategy no longer rests primarily on the grim premise of inflicting devastating consequences on potential foes.… ~ US National Security Strategy, 2006 In fact, the US does have new and plausible thoughts on 21st century deterrence. Authored under the leadership of General Cartwright, then commander of USSTRATCOM, and signed out in December 2006, the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO-JOC) is the Department of Defense’s (DoD) latest view on deterrence. This approach extends beyond traditional nuclear deterrence theory, which dates back to the heralded days of Strategic Air Command. The DO-JOC states that the purpose or objective of deterrence operations is to “convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-making.”10 In order to influence our adversaries’ decision-making calculus, it focuses on and integrates three key elements: Deny the benefits the adversary seeks; impose costs the adversary fears; and encourage adversary restraint (by convincing them that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome).11 Of these three elements, denying the benefit should be our focus when fielding new ORS capabilities. Deterrence today can only succeed if our adversaries find ORS credible enough to enable military operations even in a contested environment. Deny the Benefits—ORS Tier 1 and Tier 2 Examples People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) view of space: Space shifting from enabler to key battleground. Space characterized as important because it contributes to information dominance; space now described as important in its own right….many in the PLA see space as a likely future arena for conflict. ~ Space and PRC National Security,’ Dean Cheng, China specialist, The Heritage Foundation, 8 October 2008.12 The purpose to benefit denial is to convince an adversary that their intent will not be achieved, or have little to no value. Today, our ability to field ORS capabilities is minimal at best, and unconvincing as a credible deterrent. Instead, our adversaries likely perceive great benefit in attempting to deny the US’ space capabilities. These benefits, also referred to as “vulnerabilities gaps,”13 are reasons why we must pursue ORS with an increased sense of urgency. However, for benefit denial to be viewed as a credible deterrent, the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Study states “our adversaries (must) perceive that the US will retain superior warfighting capability even after an attack.”14 The space and cyberspace domains are increasingly important to how current and future wars will be fought and won. As recently as 4 November 2009, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) top Air Force Commander, Xu Qiliang, called the militarization of space an “historical inevitability.”15 This statement came on the heels of an historic visit to USSTRATCOM by General Xu Chihou, one of two vice chairmen of the PRC’s Central Military Commission. During this visit, General Kevin P. Chilton encouraged increased cooperation and comprehensive bilateral relationships between the two space-faring nations.16 Statements from Qiliang and actions such as the 2007 anti-satellite test highlight a growing disconnect between the PRC’s actions and stated policies, increasing concern amongst US leaders and lending credence to the need for new deterrence practices. Moving forward, to be a true deterrent, ORS must also win the race to space in both the speed and cost of fielding capability versus our adversaries’ attempts to counter, destroy, or deny them. Two examples highlight how ORS could play a credible role in deterring adverse actions against our space capabilities: (1) International cooperation and partnerships through shared space capabilities (Tier 1) and (2) the ability to rapidly augment or replace some aspect of existing on-orbit ISR assets in low Earth orbit (Tier 2). Tier 1 and Two ORS capabilities can be deployed and employed rapidly, within hours to days. The cost for Tier 1 includes implementing new concept of operations for deployed on-orbit systems, or the rapid, low cost launch and deployment of systems intended to augment existing systems for Tier 2.
Expanding ORS will deter attacks against US space assets
Putman, 9 – USAF Major, operations officer, 328th Weapons Squadron, United States Air Force Weapons School, former chief,
DSCS III Operations duties at the 3rd Space Operations Squadron (Christopher, “Countering the Chinese Threat to Low Earth Orbit Satellites: Building a Defensive Space Strategy”, ) HANE = High Altitude Nuclear Event
The United States has taken some initial steps to improve its defensive capabilities. The DoD stood up the joint Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office on May 21,2007 at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The ORS effort seeks to meet emerging warfighter needs with new space capabilities. Ron Sega, DoD executive agent for space, stated that efforts will focus on the "ability to launch, activate and employ low-cost military-useful satellites, provide, search capability, reconstitute and augment existing capability, while providing timely availabilities of tailor-made, unique capabilities. ,,39 Further, the DoD's Plan for Operationally Responsive Space highlighted the need to increase "situational awareness and adaptability to the threat, as well as an ability to evolve the total suite of space capabilities to address emerging threats in new ways.,,40 The Commander of United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) detailed three efforts vital to execute the plan: rapidly develop technological and operational innovations, rapidly modify or supplement existing systems to increase capabilities, and rapidly reconstitute space systems when necessary to maintain capability.41 Initial focus on capabilities will be on ISR and communication satellites, improvement of space situational awareness, rapid launch capabilities, and command and control. 42 The ORS effort will use a three tier capability approach to meet warfighter needs. Tier-1 implements activities immediately-to-days using existing or on-orbit systems. Tier-2 utilizes field-ready systems in days-to-weeks to provide rapid exploitation, augmentation or reconstitution of space capabilities. Finally, Tier-3 solutions take months-to-one year to satisfy needs while capabilities are modified or developed and then deployed.43 The ORS implementation timeline envisions eight tactical satellite demonstrators through fiscal year 2013. As of January 2009, two demonstrators have been launched with the third delayed from a scheduled spring 2009 launch due to technical issues. The program timeline also includes tests of operational employment and integration, command and control, and launch vehicles. The ORS program office recently purchased the first three launch vehicle specifically procured for ORS with launches scheduled for 2010 and 2011. Finally, the DoD expects the "Chiliworks" facility at Kirtland Air Force Base, which will focus onTier-2 satellite fielding, to be fully operational by 2015.44 While there are other ongoing efforts within the Intelligence Community and the DoD45 , ORS provides a good starting point for implementation of recommendations within this paper. The ORS plan identifies the need for both anticipatory and reactive elements. ORS planners should focus on the Chinese threat to build capabilities to fit within the Tier-1 and Tier-2 categories. The conflict with China would have to extend past a year to make use ofTier-3 capabilities. The United States must anticipate Chinese actions and have field-ready systems ready for either preemptive or immediate reactive use. Field-ready systems would provide a credible defensive deterrent against existing and likely Chinese offensive anti-satellite actions. PROPOSED DEFENSIVE ACTIONS The United States can choose from a wide variety of options to develop a defensive strategy to counter the Chinese threat to LEO satellites. The comprehensive approach should address space situational awareness (SSA), preplanned satellite actions, launch capability, small satellites, decreased dependence on space systems, nuclear explosion protection, institutional changes, transparency, and engagement. Space Situational Awareness Improving SSA is essential to the success of this strategy. The United States must have a comprehensive knowledge of all objects in orbit. Although the United States maintains a significant Space Surveillance Network (SSN) network, it lacks coverage in key areas and the capability to comprehensively predict the orbits of all objects in space; the February 10, 2009 collision between an Iridium commercial satellite and a Russian military satellite caught the SSN by surprise.46 The United States could build more fixed ground sites, but this would be limited by host country permissions and fiscal constraints. As a near term improvement to coverage, the United States should leverage the US Navy's AEGIS cruiser and destroyer-based radars into its SSN. The AEGIS radar highlighted its space surveillance capability when it tracked a decaying US satellite, enabling its destruction by a US anti-satellite weapon in 2008.47 While the Navy assets need to train and execute their primary mission, they could be given alternate tasking to search and track objects in LEO. This would entail development of procedures between services. Further, integration of land and space-based missile warning sensors into the SSN would yield benefits in the event of an anti-satellite launch. Finally, the United States should continue to pursue satellite as a sensor technology, where the satellite has the ability to self-identify and report on attacks. Improved SSA also allows the United States to characterize the resultant debris field of an anti-satellite attack and thus support reactive measures that may be required by other satellites. Intelligence Directly related to improved SSA is a robust intelligence effort that focuses on Chinese anti-satellite activity. Indications and warning may include increased communication at tracking stations, deployment of mobile tracking stations, and fueling and dispersal of launch vehicles. Identification and reporting of Chinese anti-satellite preparations would enable execution of preemptive defensive actions by the United States. Preplanned Satellite Actions Establishing preplanned actions is key to deterring and reacting to an anti-satellite attack. While the time from launch to impact for the SC-19 is on the order of minutes, intelligence of an impending launch can lengthen the timeline for taking preemptive defensive actions. While limited on-board fuel prevents large orbital maneuvers, a one-time small change to a satellite's orbit is possible. These orbital maneuvers must be executed before the launch of the anti-satellite weapon. Changes in orbit will produce a discrepancy between the anticipated satellite location and the final satellite tracking just prior to launch. The inconsistency may cause the Chinese to doubt the quality of their data and delay the launch as they develop new orbital tracking data, thus opening a window for additional US actions to prevent a launch. However, if the Chinese did decide to launch without updating their data, the slight change in orbit may cause the antisatellite weapon to miss. These same procedures would also be effective against ground-based anti-satellite weapons; a maneuver could lead to a laser missing the target. Having preplanned actions ready to execute provides United States planners another option. If a conflict looks to be inevitable, they could decide to rapidly execute minor maneuvers across satellite constellations. While not only complicating the Chinese targeting process, this could serve as non-destructive shot across the bow. If the conflict escalates into a conventional war, the single maneuver may buy the United States enough time to execute a kinetic strike that would dismantle the Chinese anti-satellite program. The importance of these strikes would move the priority high on the targeting list. Here again, intelligence is a key enabler. Targets must be accurately located, vetted, and updated to enable quick strikes on the anti-satellite targets. Variable and Rapid Launch Capability The current United States Department of Defense launch complex does not have the capability to rapidly replenish satellites in the event of destruction. Launch preparation and execution can take weeks to months. The United States must adopt rapid and flexible commercial launch technologies. Of at least equal importance to having a rapid launch capability is a launch system that deploys satellites from varying locations. When launched from the traditional space ports of Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force Base, China can easily monitor the launch and quickly determine the initial orbit and possibly satellite type. Having a capability that can unpredictably launch from unmonitored locations will delay China's ability to track and identify United States satellites, greatly inhibiting their ability to target satellites. This capability could be sea-based, where monitoring by an adversary is more difficult. The capability could also be airborne, like the Pegasus program which has successfully launched satellites using an L-I0ll aircraft from California, Virginia, Florida, the Canary Islands, and the Marshall Islands. 48 Small Satellites The United States must also make a move towards smaller satellites that use a common bus and architecture. A single launch vehicle could then deploy multiple small satellites, allowing the rapid establishment of a new constellation at the beginning of a conflict or replenishment of an old one. China would then face a dilemma as to which satellites they would attack. If China does decide to attack, the impact would be proportionately smaller because they would take out a lesser percentage of the constellation. The Iridium collision demonstrated the ability of a large constellation to absorb the loss of single satellite with minimal degradation. 49 Having numerous small satellites ready to launch can also lesson the need to perform defensive orbital maneuvers, as they can be quickly replenished. Finally, small satellites are inherently harder to track whether by radar or optical telescopes. While a requirement for large satellites remains; small satellites will help protect and complement the large satellites. Key to developing small satellites is a common command and control (C2) network regardless of function, rather than today's stovepiped C2 that are unique for each satellite type. A common bus and C2 system can also support small satellites by relying on a cross-linked network to control satellites and download mission data from a central location rather than on ground stations distributed around the globe. Decreased Dependence on Space Systems The United States must decrease its dependence on space systems, making attack on satellites a less appealing target. United States military forces should have weapons and procedures that can function with or without satellite support. For example, high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles can and should complement, and potentially replace, the LEO satellite ISR mission. Countering High-altitude Nuclear Explosions Although the possibility of a HANE may be remote, defense against the long term radiation effects must focus on hardening all future satellites against nuclear explosions. Without hardening, depending on the size of the constellation, satellite replenishment could take months and quickly exhaust satellite spares even with rapid reaction launch capabilities. Building satellites to withstand the nuclear weapon radiation effects beyond that required against the natural environment would add only 2 to 3 percent to total satellite cost.50 Consideration may be given to forgoing hardening for satellites designed for a short (days to weeks) lifetime; one should consider the radiation from a nuclear explosion may remain for up to two years, precluding the launch of non-hardened satellites into the affected orbital regime. 51 While some government low-earth orbit satellites are already hardened, the United States should harden all future satellites. Institutional Changes Changes must be properly incorporated into the DoD infrastructure to be effective. All aspects of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities must be examined. Additionally, the changes must work across many organizations within the DoD and throughout the United States government. For example, STRATCOM should run comprehensive anti-satellite exercises that incorporate all applicable services and agencies, from the satellite operator to the end user. Transparency The above actions may deter China from further pursuing its anti-satellite programs, but only if executed in a transparent manner. Systems must be fully trained and tested; the United States must overtly demonstrate its capability to rapidly deploy satellites. China must be made fully aware of US capabilities to effectively counter its anti-satellite weapons. China may then realize that its actions will have minimal effect on US military capabilities. Engagement Beyond using a military response to protect government satellites, the United States should consider a holistic approach to China's anti-satellite capabilities by using the other elements of national power: diplomatic, information, and economic. China's current reliance on space is minimal when compared to the United States. China can therefore afford to use antisatellite weapons against the United States. Increased Chinese reliance on space would provide significant deterrents to Chinese use ofcertain weapons such as direct ascent, co-orbital, and nuclear, since collateral damage from these weapons would affect China. First, the United States should engage on Chinese proposed treaties limiting space weapons. Next, the United States should work to build Chinese economic dependence on space systems, while taking appropriate measures to limit technology transfer. With a gap between the Space Shuttle and Ares launch vehicles, an opportunity exists to bring China in as a partner on the International Space Station by providing equipment launch services. Working with China to build its reliance on and participation in space activities will help build deterrence to the use of anti-satellite weapons; the collateral effects would harm its own interests. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS While this paper focuses on LEO satellites, the same rigor must also be applied to medium Earth orbit (MEO), highly elliptical orbit (REO), and geosynchronous (GEO) orbit satellites. Although current direct ascent anti-satellite capability can only reach LEO, China's ballistic· missile and space launch vehicles could reach higher orbits. Additionally, China has orbited GEO satellites which could already be carrying co-orbital anti-satellite weapons. China has expressed interest in combating the MEO GPS system through both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks.52 China is also actively developing jamming capabilities to combat United States military communications satellites found predominately in GEO. Additionally, the proposed defensive measures will do more than support deterrence against China. Numerous nations will seek to emulate Chinese actions with kinetic and nonkinetic options. In response to the recent anti-satellite activity of China and the United States, Russia announced the resumption of its anti-satellite weapons program.53 Ground-based actions such as jamming are within the realm of many nations and individuals. One only need look at the hijacking of the HBO satellite signal by "Capt Midnight" as an example of a single individual being able to steal a satellite transponder, in effect jamming the intended signal. 54 Further, proliferation of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile technology make the use of a HANE attractive to a rogue nation or terrorist nation that has little reliance on space capabilities. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency suggests this scenario as a possible last act of defiance by North Korean forces facing defeat,55 Lastly, these measures can be used to combat natural phenomena, such as a meteor shower or solar storms that can damage satellite systems. “A strategy that ensures access to and use of space is useful in times of peace just as in times of war, since space systems that provide critical services may fail or become inoperative in the absence of hostile action.”56 Finally, the United States must not stop at applying these recommendations merely to military satellites. While government satellites are critical in a conflict, commercial satellites in all orbital regimes have become an integral part of military operations to include weather, imaging, and communications. Although tightly tied to the world economy, China could decide to expand its anti-satellite program to attack the economic interests of the United States. While commercial satellites companies typically incorporate protective measures against natural threats, the United States government should share best practices and provide incentives to commercial entities to protect themselves against human threats. The government could do this through requirements to obtain licensing or guaranteed govemment contracts to companies that comply. CONCLUSION The fundamental U.S. security interest in the wake of China's 2007 anti-satellite test should be deterring China and others from attacking U.S. assets in space, using both a combination of declaratory policy, military programs, and diplomacy, and promoting a more stable and secure space environment.57 Council on Foreign Relations The United States government requires a comprehensive plan to counter the threat to its LEO systems posed by Chinese anti-satellite weapons. Failing to protect these key satellites would severely degrade US military capabilities in a conflict with China. The United States should rely on a defensive space strategy to deter Chinese anti-satellite actions. The strategy must include robust space situational awareness, preplanned actions, small satellites, rapid and variable launch capability, decreased dependence on space systems and institutional changes. In total, these actions would complicate the ability for Chinese anti-satellite weapons to easily strike US assets while providing the means to operate through an attack and then reconstitute lost capability. The DoD's ORS effort can be used as springboard, but must be accelerated to meet the rapidly emerging threat. Finally, its growth as a space faring nation may eventually be the best deterrence against a Chinese attack on United States satellites. However, the actions outlined in this paper can also be used to counter threats from other nations or natural phenomena. A rapid comprehensive defensive deterrence approach most effectively counters the Chinese threat and meets Presidential guidance to establish “contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets and accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack.”58
Swarms of small satellites create redundancy that makes successful attacks against US assets impossible
Smith, 11 – USAF Colonel, Director of the Air Force Space and Cyber Center at Air University. He served in the Pentagon’s National Security Space Office as the Chief of the Future Concepts shop (M.V., Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
Although offense is the dominant form of war in space today, this will not always be the case. Defense is possible. Three principles will likely guide the development of future space defenses.
First, if you can't see it, you can't hit it. Satellites are already getting smaller—too small for most space surveillance networks to detect and track. This trend will likely continue not only as a matter of cost savings, but also as a matter of stealthy defense. Avoiding detection includes maneuvering satellites to undisclosed wartime orbits.
Second, all warfare is based on deception.34 Potential adversaries collect intelligence on each other's space systems and make their estimates based on their intelligence assessments. Action must be taken to deceive potential adversaries into underestimating the value of critical systems and overestimating the value of inconsequential systems. In addition, the use of wartime-only modes of operation, frequencies, and other unanticipated behaviors will further complicate an adversary's problems.
Third, there is strength in numbers. The age of the capital satellites is over. Employing only one or two large, very expensive satellites to fulfill a critical mission area, such as reconnaissance, is foolish. Future space systems must be large constellations of smaller, cheaper, and, in many cases, lower-fidelity systems swarming in various orbits that exploit ground processing to derive high-fidelity solutions. In addition, swarms improve global access and presence.
A stable, predictable funding stream is vital to ORS technology development
Dinerman, 6 – DOD space consultant, and senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch (Taylor, The Space Review, “Tactical IR satellites: operationally responsive spacecraft?,” 8/7,
The troops on the ground need information they can use in a timely and easily understood format. Simply to provide them, or division or brigade intelligence staffs that support them, with raw satellite data is probably worse than useless. The next generations of US Army and Marine Corps units are going to require information that can be integrated into their “network-centric” information systems. Imagery from space-based infrared sensors that are specifically designed for tactical utility should be part of these networks. This is a mission for a future constellation of small “operationally responsive” satellites. Part of the constellation should be kept in orbits that take them over places such as south Lebanon or the Afghan-Pakistani border where we can assume that there will be trouble for a long time to come. These should be carefully calibrated on a constant basis, so that their positioning information is ultra-precise. Other satellites can be kept on the ground ready to be launched at relatively short notice to supplement the ones on orbit over the world’s trouble spots, or they could be launched to cover unexpected outbreaks of fighting. A model for the way such a program could be run is GPS, which, over almost three decades, has gone from prototypes to sets of more and more sophisticated and capable satellites. These spacecraft have, on the whole, been both cost effective and free of the kinds of nasty and expensive surprises that have plagued SBIRS and other Air Force satellite programs. An operationally responsive tactical IR satellite system would have to be both affordable and based on proven and reliable technology. The first generation of such satellites may not have all the desired features, but if properly designed—with the right filters and the right level of multi- or hyper-spectral sensitivity—such craft would give the ground forces a valuable early operational capability. To make the program affordable it would have to be designed to use already existing bus and power supply systems and probably also an in-service communications architecture. It would have to be light enough to be launched on a Delta 2 or on a future operationally responsive spacelift vehicle. Most important of all, the funding stream—no matter how much or how little—would have to be predictable so that the contractors would have the incentive to plan for the long term. This would be the most difficult part of the program since it would mean asking Congress to give up part of its power over the annual budget cycle. Another way to keep the program affordable would be to keep the early requirements to a minimum. The first versions should be strictly for ground force use only, with perhaps some applications for Marine Corps amphibious warfare requirements. Only after the system has proven itself should the program be allowed to move on to develop air-to-ground sensor-to-shooter loops. Ultimately a constellation of a dozen or so spacecraft in orbit, backed up by a similar number on the ground, would be ideal for the early versions of the full system. The ground segments will have to be as simple and as inexpensive as possible since it will need to be deployed with more than fifty Army and Marine brigade-sized units as well as with higher headquarters. If the idea of operationally responsive space means anything, it means that the military space forces, particularly Air Force Space Command, are ready to give priority to supporting the troops on the front lines worldwide. Enhancing the combat effectiveness of the Army and the Marines and helping to save American lives should be the highest goal. As Clausewitz put it, “The object of fighting is the destruction or defeat of the enemy.” The more that military space contributes directly to that objective, the better for the troops on the ground and for America as a whole.
Aerospace Advantage
Advantage Two – Aerospace Industry
High launch costs inhibit commercial space development
Coppersmith, 10 – historian of technology at Texas A&M University (Jonathan, The Space Review, “Obama in space: bold but not bold enough,” 4/12,
Lost in the attention given to ending shuttle flights this year, as intended by President Bush, and the cancellation of the overcost and overweight Constellation program, are the promising initiatives to develop and deploy new generations of technology. At the core of the president’s proposed revamping of NASA is the focus on new technologies to reduce the cost and complexity of operating in space. NASA will restart its Institute for Advanced Concepts, eliminated in 2007 to help pay for Constellation cost overruns. Chief technologist Robert D. Braun will head the new Space Technology Program, which will offer research grants to encourage innovative ideas. These steps will revitalize the private, academic, and NASA technology base. The chief flaw of the president’s proposals is they do not address the key constraint limiting human and robotic exploration and exploitation of space, the high cost of reaching orbit. When I fly domestically, I pay about $2 per pound of me for a ticket. To launch a satellite into orbit costs roughly $10,000 a pound. Until that cost dramatically drops, the promise of the final frontier will remain only a promise. These high launch costs restrict access to space to those governments and corporations that can afford tens of millions of dollars to launch a satellite. Consequently, the annual total of all payloads is only a few hundred tons, the equivalent of two 747 freighter flights. The great expense to reach orbit has not only hindered past exploration, but will also restrict the future if unchanged. Imagine how many more businesses would experiment and develop applications in space if the cost of launching a satellite was only in the hundreds of thousands instead of tens of millions of dollars. Making access to space affordable will create vast economic as well as scientific opportunities.
Government demand for reconstitution of small satellite constellations is vital to capitalizing the entire aerospace and commercial industrial base
Rendleman, 10 - Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (James, Astropolitics, 8:220–255, 2010, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Ebsco Political Science)
Given the importance of a responsive space infrastructure to space assurance, arguments in favor of such capabilities must be improved and refocused to show they also satisfy strategic and long-term needs, and serve as good economic investment. Cost-effective access can best be achieved by deploying resilient, more populous, and less-complex satellite constellations. Leveraging such architecture, individual spacecraft components could be designed and developed to be less capable, and reliable, than systems dependent on a single or small number of satellites. Reliability would be gained through redundancy. Mission and cost savings advantages could be gained through shortened development cycles that allow for spirally-developed block versions of each platform, its payload(s) and other parts of the system. Increasing the numbers of satellites on-orbit would give the economies of scale needed to support spacelift innovation and encourage investment by the commercial sector. Architectures developed for responsive small satellite systems should be able to effectively use rapidly evolving technology and process innovations. Miniaturization of components in small satellites now offers sophisticated capabilities useful for a wide variety of operational and science and technology missions, and can give the needed flexibility for designing large constellation mission architectures. LEO, multi-plane Walker constellations, insertion of multiple satellites on each launch, selection of mature technology readiness level (TRL) sensor or communication payloads and buses, block acquisition approaches, simplified platforms and busses, and common mission control and ground systems can all be employed. Constellations of simple multi-mission, combined communication-sensor satellites can be developed and deployed to achieve cost-efficient acquisition goals. Commercial and international communities are already deploying smaller, shorter-life, yet capable satellites with streamlined mission control architectures; these approaches are already cost-effectively satisfying mission needs. Acquirers must seize upon the best approaches. National security missions are amenable to LEO and small satellite systems—communications, reconnaissance, missile warning and defense, and weather. As we have seen with GPS, OrbComm, and Iridium systems, large constellations of small satellites can be effectively managed and perform vital missions; they employ well-designed Walker Constellations to provide ubiquitous 24/7 coverage of much of the globe. By operating under a concept of employment that envisions regular, not infrequent or as-needed, replenishment of space systems, decisions makers would potentially have sufficient numbers of systems on hand, or in storage, to sustain rapid reconstitution or augmentation of capabilities in response to an attempted space ‘‘Pearl Harbor’’ or other national emergency. LEO could be selected, so that on mission completion systems are de-orbited in a relatively short period of time compared to present systems in higher orbits, reducing space debris problems. Other secondary benefits could be secured with such a sustainment strategy—the U.S. aerospace industrial base, which has been suffering lately, could be re-energized with acquisition strategies that require continuous engineering improvements and innovations to large constellation space systems. This could ensure that the United States Government, and industrial and commercial base, is adequately capitalized and led, to be able to ‘‘develop and accelerate programs for rapid launch of satellites, to reconstitute lost systems, or bolster constellations in times of crisis.’’88 Costs for responsive space will be difficult to contain, while the underlying industrial base struggles to sustain, re-define, and improve itself.89 Employing large constellation acquisition, operations, and sustainment approach could provide the cost imperatives, effectiveness, resiliency, and opportunity to reconstitute that base. Thus, a responsive infrastructure would also serve as a vital part of a space assurance strategy.
This stimulates commercial launch markets and substantially lowers launch costs – in addition to creating credible deterrence by denial
Colón, 10 - Lt Col, USAF, former Director of Operations to the 45th Operations Support Squadron at Cape Canaveral AFS, served as the deputy commander 595th Space Group responsible for the operational testing of space and missile weapon systems until leaving for his present assignment at the Air War College (Miguel, “ DETERRENCE 2035 –THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY AND DIVERSITY IN A WORLD OF NANOSATS,” )
A New Approach to Space Deterrence The book entitled Complex Deterrence states that deterrence works best among major great-powers and is therefore ineffective against rogue groups or terrorists.35 Thus, deterrence must evolve beyond the threat of potential costs imposed by a punishment strategy. Expressed mathematically, deterrence is comprised of gains (G) sought by the adversary and the cost imposed by punishment (C). Thus, if G > C the actor attacks and if C > G he does not. Usually deterrence concentrates on making the cost or punishment so great that the potential aggressor will not attack. This approach will not work for space because an attack is extraordinarily difficult to attribute to any adversary. For example, in 1998, PANAMSAT’s Galaxy IV satellite experienced a battery anomaly leading to a satellite failure that left nearly 40 million customers without paging services.36 What if this incident was not caused by the battery anomaly? Who then attacked the satellite and how? For deterrence to work, one must gather convincing evidence that attributes the attack to someone specific. Lack of attribution will convince the adversary to attack. First, the probability of a nation-state counterattacking, without demonstrable evidence, is low. Second, the inability to rapidly identify the responsible party reduces the probability of retribution thereby increasing the potential gains to an aggressor. As technology miniaturizes satellites, the potential target becomes smaller, cheaper and can effectively hide in the clutter of space debris. For this reason, the approach to space deterrence must concentrate on significantly reducing the perceived gain (G) or success to be won by an adversary. The conditions must be such that it becomes manifestly clear; attacking another asset in space is pointless and counterproductive. Space deterrence must revolve around two concepts: transparency and diversity. Transparency, or the ability to see without obstruction the events that occur in space, creates a peaceful environment which promotes understanding and accountability. Theoretically, when information is released, under the auspices of transparency, it produces an informed and engaged public, one that will hold a culprit accountable. 37 The ability to monitor and understand the rapidly changing conditions in space is critical to the preservation of security in space. While the US developed its current satellite capabilities in compliance with international rules and treaties it also deemed it prudent to develop a space surveillance network to monitor all near space activity and ensure a secure environment for all space faring nations. This network, of ground and space based sensors, provides radar and optical data used to characterize the mission of any satellite, identify the class and type or to simply aid in anomaly resolution.38 Currently, ground systems can track objects with a resolution of 12cm or greater39 making it challenging to track nanosats. Air Force Space Command’s 2030 vision is enabled by technological improvement. It includes upgrades to existing sensors and an increase in the number of space-based optical sensors in an attempt to provide persistent and complete coverage of the near space domain. The resolution of near-term upgrades will improve to 1cm increasing the ability to track nanosatellites.40 In order to ensure safe space operations and uphold its commitment to cooperation with other nations and the peaceful use of space, the US consistently provides the orbit positional data41 via a public website accessible by anyone. The principles and goals stated in the national space policy highlight the nation’s vision of leading the way in space surveillance in order to promote and provide a safe operating environment for machines and people.42 In the end, for transparency to work, space situational awareness must allow analysts to identify deliberate actions by a spacecraft and its owners and ultimately predict, detect, and attribute an attack43. The second concept in space deterrence is diversity. It provides a tailored approach, focusing on minimizing the impact of an attack, also known as graceful degradation, consequently driving the perceived gains (G) for the adversary as close to zero as possible. Diversity can be achieved through large networked constellations of space-based assets complimenting the existing ground based sensors, with a distributed architecture so that destruction of one or even several satellites does not take down the entire system. In the past, the US employed the costly approach of maintaining on-orbit spares, hardening on-board components, enhancing uplink and downlink encryption to increase satellite and signal survivability.44 In the future, nanotechnology will facilitate redundancy and rapid reconstitution. Presently, several companies, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, are currently demonstrating the technology. By 2035, on-orbit repair along with the robotic on-orbit refueling of satellites will become standard. Spacecraft will use autonomous navigation and conduct housekeeping tasks independent of a ground station. This is especially useful in the event of a communication failure or loss of the ground segment. Moreover, rapid reaction maneuvering capability will allow spacecraft to evade kinetic kill vehicles. The cornerstone of resilience is agile, capable, and functional technology able to diminish an adversary’s gain while increasing the cost of an attack – success in both enables deterrence. Above all, the space industrial base must grow to deliver the technical transformation required to employ this new approach to deterrence. Recommendations The US was shocked by a technological surprise on 4 October 1957 when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, a 184 pound satellite, into orbit on top of a rocket weighing nearly 4 tons. In contrast, the Vanguard satellite the US developed and had yet to launch weighed only 3.5 pounds.45 Sputnik completely collapsed the technological comfort zone the US. It heated up the Cold War as peoples’ fear grew over what the Soviets might do next; the strategic deterrence calculus was fundamentally altered. Today the US has the opportunity to shape the future and set conditions for effective space deterrence. Reconstituting and energizing the space industrial base is critical to future deterrence. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2 states, “Operators and planners must know as quickly as possible the origin of any anomaly and be able to identify and geolocate the threat in a timely manner.”46 In order to meet the intent of AFDD 2-2 the US must embrace the goals identified in the National Space Policy, most importantly to “enable a robust science and technology base supporting national security.”47 Without industrial base growth, the international community’s influence will grow and undermine the nation’s future space security. The US cannot allow its own space industry to abrogate its role in national security nor can it continue to set conditions through ITAR and national policies which leave industry with little choice but to divest itself of its space tools. The US government must focus on the following areas: improving space situational awareness, miniaturizing spacecraft and launch vehicles, promoting innovation and risk taking in technology development, and improving export control policies and procedures. First, the key enabler for transparency is space situational awareness. Today’s space surveillance network is composed of diverse sensors to include tracking radars, optical telescopes and space-based visible sensors. To prepare for tomorrow’s smaller target upgrades are required. The W-band upgrade to the Haystack sensor in Massachusetts increases the ground-based sensor’s collection bandwidth from 1GHz to 8 GHz thereby improving its resolution from 25 cm to 1cm and facilitating the tracking of nanosatellites.48 Although the upgrade is significant for the ground-based sensor network, it must be complimented with additional space based capabilities. In this instance, miniaturization becomes a force multiplier as it allows the next generation of space-based space surveillance to be configured with full motion video. Ground-based sensors can tip-off the space-based sensor to track a specific target. The video’s dynamic feedback can in turn provide greater insight into the intent of the adversary as it observes the target. CubeSat has already demonstrated the ability of one nanosat to take a picture of another (figure 3). Consequently, a successful deterrence strategy is dependent on the surveillance network’s ability to identify threats, characterize the potential damage, determine an aggressor’s intent and ultimately attribute the action to the adversary. Second, CubeSat redefined the approach to building satellites through the development of standard building modules and taking advantage of the latest breakthroughs in nanotechnology. This approach makes CubeSat the model for “smaller, cheaper, and faster”. The US government must adopt a similar approach. While tradeoffs are necessary, government interest and investment in the many facets of the space should allow for good decisions about when a technology is “good enough” to satisfy mission and national security requirements. The approach facilitates decreasing the size of satellites, increasing spacecraft redundancy and allowing a higher number of satellites per constellation thereby complicating the targeting equation for the adversary. Its centerpiece focused on driving down the adversary’s perceived gain (G) closer to zero. This approach will increase diversity and future space deterrence effectiveness within a dynamic security environment. Third, advanced miniaturization is creating a growing market for a very small, capable launch vehicle. As CubeSat gains momentum, it creates a strong market dynamic for a very 17 small and highly responsive launch vehicle. Currently, most CubeSats are launched on decommissioned Russian rockets as secondary payloads49. Up to this point, companies like Eurokot and Kosmotras have kept the launch cost to no more than $40K per CubeSat. As demand rises and slots for secondary payloads become scarce, the cost of each CubeSat will inexorably rise. Sensing a growing need for CubeSats, launch companies are developing a two-stage liquid propellant, launch vehicle capable of delivering 10 kg to a 250 kilometer polar orbit. If successful, such a capability will increase launch market share for the US space industry, enhance growth in other areas and lower launch costs.50 Affordable launch enables satellite replenishment. Even if the adversary destroys a satellite, the spacecraft can be quickly replaced minimizing the impact of the attack. Fourth, changes to US export control laws are required. The primary agencies governing export control are the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Commerce (DOC). The DOS is responsible for maintaining the US’ munitions list which is used to identify which products or services are subject to export controls. Currently, satellites and all related space technologies are under DOS jurisdiction.51 However, DOS is not the most knowledgeable agency with regard to spacecraft or the associated technology and it uses ITAR to implement requirements established in the arms Export Control Act. According to the Defense Industrial Base Assessment on the US space industry, “US manufacturers have not introduced a new satellite bus since the Boeing 702 was developed in 1999. In contrast, European manufacturers have introduced 3 new busses in the last 5 years and are currently developing a 4th.”52 Players within the space industry argue that the US market share dipped from approximately 70% in 1995 to 25% in 2005. Compliance with export control cost US companies an average of $49M per year from 2003-2006.53 This cost was not applicable to foreign 18 competitors. Clearly, export controls provide foreign competitors an advantage in marketing to non-US customers because they limit what can be bought and who can buy it. It can also control the actions of the authorized buyers and users in terms of what they can use the technology for and whom they can share the technology with. Such restrictions adversely affect a US company’s ability to compete in foreign space markets consequently opening up opportunities for foreign space ventures whose governments are not as particular about how technology is used or who buys it.54 In the end, international competition is critical in order to reduce costs, preserve US dominance, forge closer relationships in order to globalize and thereby protect the use of space for all benevolent users. It enables an advanced form of deterrence denying the adversary the option of attacking. In short, space technology must move off the munitions list and into its own category which protects the technology that needs protecting while allowing the US space industrial base to sell non-critical space technology internationally. Conclusion Current developments in the field of nanotechnology are highlighting pathways for spacecraft to become smaller and ultimately affordable. As nanotechnology helps solve the problems of spacecraft mass, volume, and power consumption, national leaders must not lose sight of the fact that it is also opening access to space to virtually anyone. Adversaries understand the US’ increasing space reliance and will challenge the medium especially if it provides an audience and even worldwide recognition for their cause. As future adversaries benefit from smaller, lighter, and affordable satellites, the US must invest in an approach that 19 relies on transparency and diversity as the backbone of a strong deterrence posture to meet the threat in 2035. This new approach to space deterrence concentrates on significantly reducing the perceived gain (G) or success to be won by an adversary instead of solely focusing on the traditional approach of punishment. In order to lower the adversary’s perceived gain, the US’ future ability to deter an attack rests on a space surveillance network that allows for the identification and persistent tracking of miniaturized spacecrafts thereby highlighting intent and ultimately attributing an action to a specific actor. Equally important, the US must embrace nanotechnology as the cornerstone to materials magnifying ways for spacecraft to become smaller, lighter, and affordable while further developing the space industry base. Furthermore, nanotechnology will enable diversity or added redundancy in the more autonomous spacecraft and increase survivability in space while lessening dependency on ground stations making the perceived gains (G) of attacking the ground infrastructure close to zero. Lastly, export control reform will allow nanotechnology to power the industrial base engine and minimize the potential for a nation-state, group or individual actor to create a strategic shock to the space sector. After Sputnik’s voyage, public opinion blamed the government for not doing enough and ultimately risking US’ national security. The response was a significant increase in funding for military and civil space. In a post-9/11 world, the US cannot allow another technological surprise to occur, especially one perpetrated by non-state actors availing themselves of readily available and inexpensive space capabilities that can be used in ways to fundamentally alter the deterrence calculus. Once again, a significant commitment is required to strengthen the space industry and set the conditions needed for success in 2035. The natural deterrent created by high launch costs is disappearing and the ability to monitor and understand the rapidly changing 20 conditions in space continues to be critical to the preservation of national security. In short, the nation’s best technological approach for future space deterrence lies in becoming the world leader in the application of nanotechnology. It will increase the industrial base, lower launch costs, improve transparency and diversity ultimately setting the conditions for the deterrence calculus to tip in favor of the United States. Only then will the adversary’s gain/loss assessment dictate not to attack; effectively deterring him.
The perception of a firm governmental commitment to ORS is vital to stimulating the commercial launch market
Felt, 10 - USAF Commander, Space Test Operations Squadron Space Development and Test Wing Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (Eric, “Responsive Space Funding Challenges and Solutions: Avoiding a Tragedy of the Commons,” High Frontier, May, )
Industry watching for decisive government leadership, especially in the budget. Unlike those of most exquisite space programs, the ORS business model is not based upon awarding one contract spanning many years to a single contractor. The responsive space business model calls for a significantly higher transaction rate, which establishes the “carrot” of capturing future business as the primary motivation to perform well on existing contracts. Most companies seem to recognize the benefits that a more competitive US government space marketplace would provide. Other aspects of the ORS business model may be less appealing to industry, however. In-sourcing of final assembly and test, lower contract values in general, a return to linking fee/profit to risk on cost-plus contracts, interfaces based on open rather than proprietary standards, and open source flight software are concepts that some contractors perceive as threats to their short-term corporate profitability. Others realize that these concepts are necessary to maintain the overall health of the space enterprise over the long run and grow the overall space budget, benefitting many companies and shareholders.
Government acquisition decisions must be based on what is good for the taxpayer and the country, not only on maximizing the prime contractor’s near-term corporate profits. The government is the entity likely to benefit most from the ORS business model, and should be eager to experiment with elements of the new model and evaluate risks and benefits. Since the barriers to entry are lower and the US government is not their only customer, the small space industry base is much more vibrant, competitive, and innovative than might be expected from looking only at the US government small space budget. For example, ORS business solicitations have elicited hundreds of excellent proposals from hungry industry partners, including many small businesses. Nevertheless, industry’s luke-warm embrace of ORS has influenced decision makers within the government to move more slowly toward responsive space than they otherwise might have. Unfortunately, the government moving slowly on responsive space induces a “wait and see” response from the established space contractors, perpetuating the cycle of moving slowly on responsive space. The bottom line is that industry will follow the money and embrace responsive space fully when, and only when, the government shifts enough budget resources to actually field significant operational capability.
A healthy aerospace industry is key to power projection and technological innovation
Walker et al 2 – Chairman of the USAI (Robert Walker, et cal, Chair of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, 2002, “Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners,” )
Defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal govern-ment.2 This translates into two broad missions—Defend America and Project Power—when and where needed. In order to defend America and project power, the nation needs the ability to move manpower, materiel, intelligence information and precision weaponry swiftly to any point around the globe, when needed. This has been, and will continue to be, a mainstay of our national security strategy. The events of September 11, 2001 dramatically demonstrated the extent of our national reliance on aerospace capabilities and related military contribu-tions to homeland security. Combat air patrols swept the skies; satellites supported real-time communica-tions for emergency responders, imagery for recov- ery, and intelligence on terrorist activities; and the security and protection of key government officials was enabled by timely air transport. As recent events in Afghanistan and Kosovo show, the power generated by our nation’s aerospace capa-bilities is an—and perhaps the—essential ingredient in force projection and expeditionary operations. In both places, at the outset of the crisis, satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, some unmanned, provided critical strategic and tactical intelligence to our national leadership. Space-borne intelligence, com-mand, control and communications assets permitted the rapid targeting of key enemy positions and facilities. Airlifters and tankers brought personnel, materiel, and aircraft to critical locations. And aerial bombardment, with precision weapons and cruise missiles, often aided by the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Predator unmanned vehicle, destroyed enemy forces. Aircraft carriers and their aircraft also played key roles in both conflicts. Today’s military aerospace capabilities are indeed robust, but at significant risk. They rely on platforms and an industrial base—measured in both human capital and physical facilities—that are aging and increasingly inadequate. Consider just a few of the issues: • Much of our capability to defend America and project power depends on satellites. Assured reli-able access to space is a critical enabler of this capa-bility. As recently as 1998, the key to near- and mid-term space access was the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), a development project of Boeing, Lockheed Martin and the U. S. Air Force. EELV drew primarily on commercial demand to close the business case for two new launchers, with the U.S. government essentially buying launches at the margin. In this model, each company partner made significant investments of corporate funds in vehicle development and infrastructure, reducing the overall need for government investment. Today, however, worldwide demand for commer-cial satellite launch has dropped essentially to nothing—and is not expected to rise for a decade or more—while the number of available launch platforms worldwide has proliferated. Today, therefore, the business case for EELV simply does not close, and reliance on the economics of a com-mercially-driven market is unsustainable. A new strategy for assured access to space must be found. • The U.S. needs unrestricted access to space for civil, commercial, and military applications. Our satellite systems will become increasingly impor- tant to military operations as today’s information revolution, the so-called “revolution in military affairs,” continues, while at the same time satellites will become increasingly vulnerable to attack as the century proceeds. To preserve critical satellite net-works, the nation will almost certainly need the capability to launch replacement satellites quickly after an attack. One of the key enablers for “launch on demand” is reusable space launch, and yet within the last year all work has been stopped on the X-33 and X-34 reusable launch programs • The challenge for the defense industrial base is to have the capability to build the base force struc-ture, support contingency-related surges, provide production capacity that can increase faster than any new emerging global threat can build up its capacity, and provide an “appropriate” return to shareholders. But the motivation of government and industry are different. This is a prime detrac-tion for wanting to form government-industry partnerships. Industry prioritizes investments toward near-term, high-return, and high-dollar programs that make for a sound business case for them. Government, on the other hand, wants to prioritize investment to ensure a continuing capa-bility to meet any new threat to the nation. This need is cyclical and difficult for businesses to sus-tain during periods of government inactiv-ity. Based on the cyclic nature of demand, the increasing cost/complexity of new systems, and the slow pace of defense modernization, aerospace companies are losing market advantages and the sector is contracting. Twenty-two years ago, today’s “Big 5” in aerospace were 75 separate companies, as depicted by the historical chart of industry con-solidation shown in Chapter 7. • Tactical combat aircraft have been a key compo-nent of America’s air forces. Today, three tactical aircraft programs continue: the F/A-18E/F (in production), the F/A-22 (in a late stage of test and evaluation), and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (just moving into system design and development). Because of the recentness of these programs, there are robust design teams in existence. But all of the initial design work on all three programs will be completed by 2008. If the nation were to con- clude, as it very well may, that a new manned tac- tical aircraft needs to be fielded in the middle of this century, where will we find the experienced design teams required to design and build it, if the design process is in fact gapped for 20 years or more? • More than half of the aerospace workforce is over the age of 404, and the average age of aerospace defense workers is over 50.5Inside the Department of Defense (DoD), a large percent of all scientists and engineers will be retirement eligible by 2005. Given these demographics, there will be an exodus of “corporate knowledge” in the next decade that will be difficult and costly to rebuild once it is lost. There will be a critical need for new engineers, but little new work to mature their practical skill over the next several decades. Further, enrollment in aerospace engineering programs has dropped by 47 percent in the past nine years6, and the interest and national skills in mathematics and science are down. Defense spending on cutting-edge work is at best stable, and commercial aircraft programs are struggling and laying workers off. As the DoD’s recent Space Research and Development (R&D) Industrial Base Study7 concluded, “[s]ustaining a talented workforce of sufficient size and experience remains a long-term issue and is likely to get worse.” In short, the nation needs a plan to attract, train and maintain a skilled, world-class aerospace workforce, but none currently exists. • The current U.S. research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure has a legacy dating back to either World War II or the expan- sion during the Space Age in the 1960s. It is now suffering significantly from a lack of resources required for modernization. In some cases, our nation’s capabilities have atrophied and we have lost the lead, as with our outdated wind tunnels, where European facilities are now more modern and efficient. In the current climate, there is inad- equate funding to modernize aging government infrastructure or build facilities that would support the development of new transformational capabil- ities, such as wind tunnels needed to design and test new hypersonic vehicles. The aerospace indus-try must have access to appropriate, modern facil- ities to develop, test and evaluate new systems. Throughout this dynamic and challenging environ-ment, one message remains clear: a healthy U.S. aerospace industry is more than a hedge against an uncertain future. It is one of the primary national instruments through which DoD will develop and obtain the superior technologies and capabilities essential to the on-going transformation of the armed forces, thus maintaining our position as the world’s preeminent military power.
Creating an RLV is the linchpin of US economic growth – it will prevent a global depression and the collapse of US leadership
Hsu and Cox, 9 - *Senior fellow, Aerospace Technology Working Group, AND **Founder & Director of the Aerospace Technology Working Group (Feng and Ken, “Sustainable Space Exploration and Space Development - A Unified Strategic Vision,” 2/20, )
(4) The U.S. space exploration goal should focus primarily on exploring unknown and new destinations by use of robotic exploration as much as is practical. However, the new vision (or VSE) must be more of an interplanetary-exploring nature, with a manned mission to NEO or staging at, and returning from the sun-Earth L2 libration point, as preparation for a precursor mission to Mars' moon Phobos, followed by manned missions to land on Mars. To achieve these goals, the U.S. should develop a Deep Space Habitat (deep space experiment module or station beyond low Earth orbit), complete with artificially produced gravity, for use in flying to destinations or to reside at various libration points (such as the moon-Earth L1 or sun-Earth L2 staging points), or to orbit various NEO destinations. This experiment module or habitat could be used as part of the "fly-by" and orbit program mentioned above. (5) With the success of a manned NEO or L2 staging mission, a manned mission to Phobos can be carried out prior to a manned mission to Mars. Also, a one-way manned mission to Mars can be considered, with sufficient Mars crew Hub capacity and in situ resource utilization (ISRU) capabilities delivered prior to the arrival of the first manned Mars mission. We also recommend an R&D effort and demonstration projects on space-based solar power (SBSP, which offers a great potential for electric propulsion and power resources that can be utilized for deep space exploration missions. But more importantly, its key technology components can be shared or used by many other space applications, including future supply of baseload power from space for terrestrial electrical energy demands. (6) The above exploration goals (lead by NASA and the international community) can not be achieved unless a cost-effective HLV (heavy launch vehicle) or affordable LEO transportation infrastructure is developed first, or developed concurrently by DOS and its global collaborators. Such as low-cost crew LV (launch vehicle) and cargo HLV system development should be the task of highest U.S. short-term priority in space development, as they are not only crucial for supporting all strategic space exploration goals but also imperative for space-based economic and commercial development, such as development and demonstration of SBSP and space tourist infrastructure system capabilities. 6. Propel Humanity's Outward Expansion into Space-based Economic Frontiers As discussed in the previous sections, a space agency without reforms, as it still exists today, born out of the cold war era half a century ago, worked well for the space race, but is unlikely to deliver space-development achievements that benefit our national economy. It is also more likely to resist international participation, or even likely to exacerbate external threats and provoke an unnecessary or detrimental space race. What the U.S. and the international community urgently need in the 21 century, under a globalized world economy, for confronting the global climate change, energy and economic challenges is, however, opening the new frontier of economic and commercial development in space, especially industrialization in the Earth-moon LEO system. The recent history of the profound leap-forward of human economic development, triggered by the opening of commercial air transportation capability, must shed light on how we should embark on the next giant leap of humanity's economic and commercial expansion into low earth orbit. Technology innovations have always lifted human society out of the economic gridlocks, and have led mankind from many of the worst economic crises to vast industrialization and enduring prosperity and growth. The history of human civilization has shown that technology innovations and human ingenuity are our best hope to power humanity out of any crisis, and especially a U.S.-lead human economic development into low earth orbit that will not only lift us out of the current acute global depression, but will most certainly bring about the next economic and industrial revolution beyond the confinement of Earth gravity. Commercial aircraft transportation and operations in the past 100 years since the Wright Brothers' first successful test flight have advanced significantly in all areas, and have contributed tremendously to the world economy and modern civilization. Nonetheless, space access capability and associated LEO infrastructure has generally not advanced in nearly half a century. Particularly, as elaborated in the previous sections, given the current plans under the Bush VSE for the next generation of human space transportation being pursued by NASA, there exists little hope of making any substantial improvements in safety, affordability, or commercial operations of any LEO transportation infrastructure for another generation. With the impact of the upcoming termination of Space Shuttle operations, as guided by the Bush VSE, it is very clear that the U.S. needs substantially improved crew and cargo space access capabilities, and such improved space access capabilities are largely represented by a two-stage, fully reusable launch vehicle (RLV) system (in the short- to mid-term). An evolutionary infrastructure buildup of such a RLV system that is largely based on existing heritage or capabilities should be a key element of a reliable and low-cost cargo/crew space transportation development. Indeed, development and government investment in such an affordable space transportation infrastructure in the Earth-Moon system is of paramount importance; it's all about the crossroads the U.S. is at with the current economic crisis and how Space could be a key part of the answer. A key component of a sound strategic space vision that was missed almost entirely by the Bush VSE is the vision for space development (VSD), or a space-based economic and commercial expansion into low earth orbit. Such a vision should be to place the highest priority on embarking on a national and international strategic space development goal that will ensure the technological, and with it, the economical leadership of America for the 21 century and the next few hundred years ahead. Otherwise, we risk continuing on the course of the Bush VSE, allowing it to drift into the back waters of history. Investing in space infrastructure development--such as low-cost RLV systems or fully reusable, two-stage (or ultimately single-stage) space access system developed as an extension of safe and reliable airplane operations or investing in SBSP (space based solar power) and space tourism infrastructures as a significant part of the national space economy and energy programs--is the choice of a strategic space goal that certainly will re-ignite the American spirit and jump-start its high-tech manufacturing sector. It will send a profound message to the world: that America is still a nation where great bold endeavors are the order of the day. , Or else, it will be a message that we will allow the nation to continue its drift into obscurity and signal that America's greatest days are in the past.
Economic collapse invites multiple scenarios for nuclear war and aggression
Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8
[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, ]
Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
1ac – plan
The United States federal government should substantially increase the development of Operationally Responsive Space.
1ac - Deterrence
Contention 1 - Deterrence
Current vulnerabilities in US space assets are the Achilles heel of deterrence – multiple adversaries with different military doctrines invite attack
Rendleman, 10 - Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (James, Astropolitics, 8:220–255, 2010, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Ebsco Political Science)
The 11 January 2007 test of a Chinese ground-based, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) kinetic-kill interceptor against one of their own defunct weather satellites generated considerable angst across the United States space community. The 2007 test demonstrated that the importance of space capabilities is also their Achilles heel, that is, their deadly weakness in spite of overall strength; it is far too easy to neutralize space systems and their power. In the broad strategic context, space capabilities have their own set of unique, inherent vulnerabilities, which are largely the result of orbital mechanics. This invites destruction, damage, and even just mischief delivered by even the least significant adversary. However, other nations may seek to deny U.S. advantages in space through a variety of negation and prevention actions.
Negation Threats
Satellite systems consist not only of spacecraft, each with their own payload and bus, but also a supporting infrastructure—ground control stations, tracking and control links, commonly referred to as the tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) links, data links, launch facilities, and an industrial base. Each of these components is at risk to threats of physical and cyber attack, and sabotage, and can be negated, simultaneously or each in detail. The satellite payload, bus, links, and infrastructure can be negated by using a variety of permanent or reversible means to achieve one of the five possible effects, known as the ‘‘five Ds’’—deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction.5
Space-based threats proliferate as a result of the ever-growing global availability of technology and access to the space domain. There are huge incentives for states to invest in and use space, and the spread of space technologies has occurred. States with sufficient resources can now reach out to space and ‘‘touch’’ satellites through a variety of means, and achieve one and even more of the five Ds. Spacecraft are vulnerable to direct ascent weapons as demonstrated by the Chinese ASAT test, and to a variety of other groundbased, airborne, and space-based ASAT technologies. Direct-ascent launched, or orbit-based nuclear devices, can be detonated, generating radiation and other lethal effects to destroy unshielded electronics over a wide lethal range. Co-orbital ASATs could be employed, comparable to the old Soviet system that was tested extensively in the 1970s and early 80s. In a less likely scenario, space-borne mines can also be deployed in close proximity to spacecraft, or exploded to generate debris clouds that destructively engage whole classes of satellites in the same orbital plane or in crossing orbits. Ground, space-based, or airborne lasers could be used by adversaries to wreak havoc. Blinding operations could be executed and inflict effects ranging from temporary ‘‘dazzling’’ to permanent burnout of optical or other sensors with intense energy bursts.
Ground systems, supporting communications, and their nodes, are vulnerable to diverse land, sea, or air kinetic attacks, including sabotage. Unprotected systems are also susceptible to electronic attack through jamming and electromagnetic deception techniques. Jammers emit signals that mask or prevent reception of desired signals; these methods can disrupt uplinks, downlinks, and even cross-links. By disabling the means of command and control, and data communications, jammers render satellites inoperable or unavailable. Electromagnetic deception techniques can be employed to confuse systems; this could include sending false, but deceptively plausible, commands that cause spacecraft to perform damaging or wasteful maneuvers, modify databases or execute configuration changes, or otherwise destroy it.
Similarly, supporting terrestrial ground stations, computer networks, and links are vulnerable to information operation and cyber attacks. These attacks could involve directing global denial of service tasks, injecting fake commands, malicious software and viruses into the space system, performing unauthorized monitoring and disclosure of sensitive information (data interception), and causing unauthorized modification or deliberate corruption of network information, services, and databases.
In sum, there is a wide span of kinetic and other types of attacks an adversary could consider and employ. There is potential that even non-state actors can access some of these technologies and space systems, and achieve several of the five Ds; however, it is unlikely they can obtain and then employ a full-spectrum of these means and achieve all of these effects. Conducting an attack within the space domain involves a rather substantial investment to develop, acquire, operate, and sustain needed shooter, sensor, and command and control systems. Given the scope and commitment needed to affect such a move, an on-orbit attack would probably be made only in the context of a larger strategic struggle, perhaps as a prelude to or part of early combat operations. On the other hand, inexpensive jamming technology is available to even the poorest potential adversaries. As such, jamming poses the most used and growing threat to space systems. Some argue that jamming also carries with it implicit political and legal sanctions since no major space power has moved to ban or make even temporary and reversible jamming illegal. This may change now that a number of nations have banned together to object to recent Iranian satellite jamming.6 Cyber adversaries and criminals are also beginning to hone their craft. They present an evolving threat to space systems; and like jamming, cyber threats can be developed and deployed for only modest investments.
Prevention Threats
Prevention actions generally involve economic, political, informational, and diplomatic instruments of national power. For example, an extremely large creditor nation could employ its considerable economic clout and leverage in an attempt to compel or blackmail the United States to not license or permit imaging of its territory, preventing its use, and reducing its exposure to such observation. The creditor nation could seek to accomplish its objective by destabilizing the world market place. It could refuse to purchase treasury offerings that underpin the burgeoning U.S. fiscal and trade deficits, perhaps arguing that remote sensing, especially commercial remote sensing, of its territory infringes on its territorial and sovereign rights, or that it constitutes ‘‘unlawful’’ industrial espionage, and is thus, an unfair trade practice.7 Commercial remote sensing systems are nowan important resource for the United States Government and its national security needs. U.S. Government orders help sustain and stabilize the remote sensing industry,8 and any limitations on activities, whether for U.S. Government customers or commercial ones, imposed in response to external economic threats could evolve to cause problems. In an alternative scenario, a state, acting through political allies and proxies, could exert considerable influence and dominance to affect a change in U.S. law. This change could restrict licensing of commercial remote sensing imagery, restricting the market place and impacting business models for producers.9
As a diplomatic prevention example, adversaries could attempt to use international forums and treaties to deny frequency rights needed by U.S. military or intelligence satellites by making spurious ‘‘paper satellite’’ filings with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). ‘‘Paper satellites’’ involve ITU applications for satellite orbital slots, many for ‘‘speculative’’ systems that will never leave Earth. These filings can block access to scarce spectrum and orbital resources.10 The ability to place communications and other satellites in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) positions could be held at risk. Some characterize some of these types of actions as a form of ‘‘lawfare.’’ ‘‘The term lawfare describes the growing use of international law claims, usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool of war. The goal is to gain a moral advantage over your enemy in the court of world opinion, and potentially a legal advantage in national and international tribunals.’’11
Prevention actions taken to hobble U.S. space systems are not armed attacks. As is discussed later, the use of force is only authorized under the United Nations (UN) Charter in response to an armed attack, or upon authorization of the UN Security Council. As such, using armed force to deter and defeat prevention actions involving political or diplomatic subterfuge or intrigue may be unlawful under international law. Creative alternative solutions must therefore be found to assure access to space when facing these types of threats.
Implications for U.S. Space Strategy
The wide span of threats poses profound implications for U.S. space strategy and its execution. First, unlike the Cold War era, the United States now confronts a wide array of global actors, all operating with different motivations and incentives, some of which could become potential adversaries who can attack or threaten space capabilities. These state and non-state adversaries exhibit a wide array of political, economic, technical, and social differences. Having many potential adversaries makes each of them harder to understand. This complicates efforts to understand motivations and to influence perceptions for deterrence purposes. These differences, in turn, increase the likelihood of misperception, undercutting strategies to protect access to space capabilities. When one’s attention is divided, deterrent measures that are appropriate for one target may not be useful, or even counterproductive, for another. This requires tailored intelligence efforts, information operations, and transparency efforts in order to avoid or minimize disputes and prevent problems.
Second, the broad array of adversaries exhibit widely varying risk-taking behaviors. Risk-taking behavior can strongly influence an adversary’s perception of a situation. Understanding this phenomenon can lead to better ways of influencing those perceptions. Unfortunately, potential adversaries may not care that space systems offer tremendous value and capabilities to all nations, or care whether conflict in space could create space debris that could cost all nations access to the domain. A strategy to assure continuing access to space assets must therefore be sufficiently flexible to address both risk-averse and risk-taking adversaries. Indeed, potential adversaries may shift from risk-taking to risk-adverse over a relatively short period of time. China may fit in this category. Within a decade or two, it will have its own extensive space-based communications, navigation, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellite constellations, all of which will be integrated into its military operations. No doubt, China will embrace that evolution and become very reliant on space capabilities; this will shift it from an asymmetric competitor to one similar to the United States or Russia. Third, with the demise of the Soviet Union, some political commentators and critics described the United States as a ‘‘hyperpower’’ not just a ‘‘superpower.’’ 12 Though buffeted by recent events involving Iraq, Afghanistan, the Global War on Terror, and the 2008 global financial meltdown, U.S. military supremacy continues. But, that supremacy does not make or guarantee a successful space strategy. Adversaries may believe they have a higher stake than the United States in the outcome of a particular crisis or conflict. Alternatively, the United States stake in the crisis may not be commensurate with the possible cost of involvement by the United States military and the rest of its national security apparatus. The first alternative may encourage mischief by adversaries; the second discourages U.S. action. As a result, adversaries may find threats of U.S. action in response to hostile acts affecting U.S. access to space systems to be non-credible.
Fourth, while the United States has produced superlative space capabilities, it has not produced enough systems ready to survive the new kinetic, exotic, jamming, and cyber threat environment. The vulnerability exists because the spacecraft developed and deployed today are in many ways the same as those originally fielded during the Cold War. During that epic struggle, there was a tacit and then explicit understanding that each superpower would not attack and overwhelm the other’s space systems, except in the direst of circumstances, perhaps during the throes of a nuclear conflagration. Indeed, a number of agreements between the superpowers adopted the understanding and ruled out interference with national technical means, including space assets. This belief in the superiority of space systems and power blinds the United States to the inherent strategic weaknesses and vulnerabilities in these systems. This, predictably, can now be exploited by potential adversaries, such as China, who, with their recent ASAT test, appear more willing to fully explore the technologies needed to expand the limits of conventional war to include the space domain. Consequently, by historically and diplomatically reducing the threat, engineering of some satellite threat detection, attack avoidance, and other defense subsystems have not matured enough so that they are sophisticated, nimble, and robust enough to counter new 21st Century adversary attack capabilities.
Conflict over space is inevitable - reliance on space for terrestrial warfare guarantees it - 2.5 thousand years of history prove
Smith, Colonel and PhD in IR, 11 (M.V., Colonel, PhD in Politics and IR @ University of Reading, Citing Colin Gray, “Chapter 17: Security and Spacepower, Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, , EMM)
It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one belligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others. And the greater the importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture, or destroy it. In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the future because the use of space in war has become vital. . . . Regardless of public sentimental or environmentally shaped attitudes towards space as the pristine final frontier, space warfare is coming.20 The strategic value of space to states is not in question. Advanced spacefaring states are already reliant—and moving toward dependence—on space-derived services for activities across every sector of their societies. Spacepower is becoming critical to their styles of warfighting. Likewise, the injury that can be caused to such states by menacing their space systems can be considerable. Given these incentives, the beast of war will either break its chains all at once or stretch them slowly over time.21
Multiple adversaries will use space as an asymmetric means to destroy US hegemony – deterrence by punishment will fail because the US lacks defenses and states could act through terrorist proxies
Rendleman, 10 - Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (James, Astropolitics, 8:220–255, 2010, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Ebsco Political Science)
The strategy to deter nuclear attack worked throughout the Cold War; the Soviet Union was powerful, but it was also a rational adversary. For this reason, the United States worked hard to understand the culture, goals, incentives, and ideals of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was also open to, and reciprocated, U.S. diplomatic engagement overtures. The United States has gained great advantage through development and integration of space capabilities. This has forced potential adversaries to evolve techniques to neutralize this superiority. Attacks on U.S. space systems can be performed through terrorist proxies, third parties, or covert acts that offer perpetrators plausible deniability for damage inflicted. The United States now confronts a diverse set of adversaries, and their rogue leaders are arguably much more risk prone, or perhaps, just oxymoronic, acting deliberately reckless. These adversaries know full well the importance of space capabilities to U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic success. They see that attacking and disrupting space capabilities presents a significant opportunity to deny U.S. national objectives, to retain or expand their own relative power, and to compensate for their own lack of conventional strength.
Deterrence has failed throughout history ‘‘because the object of deterring measures fails to notice them, does not find the measures credible, or is pursuing an agenda sufficiently important enough to its interests that it is prepared to ignore the deterrence attempt.’’30 Given this, the United States cannot depend solely on deterrence to secure itself. It must prepare for the possibility that its measures could fail. Therefore, defenses should also be deployed; though the extent of these should be measured and balanced against their utility, and measured by projected costs, lost opportunity costs, likely effectiveness, and effects obtained in the end.
Deterrence and defense tasks are inexorably linked to each other. As noted by Robert Butterworth, ‘‘Defenses offer protection, while deterrence threatens punishment. Defenses can succeed whether the enemy believes in them or not.’’31 There are a number of active and passive defensive capabilities that can be developed and deployed to protect space systems, particularly against kinetic-kill ASATs and jammers.
Chinese doctrine, spending, and actions all portend an attack on US space assets - it will likely escalate
Wortzel, 8 - Colonel, United States Army (Retired) (Larry, Astropolitics, 6:112–137, “THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
AND SPACE WARFARE,” Ebsco Political Science)
The PLA is exploring in theoretical research, basic research, and applied research a variety of forms of space weapons.77 These include:
. satellite jamming technology;
. collisions between space bodies;
. kinetic energy weapons;
. space-to-ground attack weapons;
. space planes that can transit and fight ‘‘up or down’’ in the upper atmosphere or space;
. high-power laser weapons;
. high-power microwave weapon systems;
. particle-beam weapons; and
. electromagnetic pulse.78
PLA authors credit the U.S. with having the most advanced capabilities in the areas of kinetic energy weapons, particle beam weapons, and directed energy. The PLA does have various forms of jamming capability, and has done a lot of work on the concept of colliding space bodies. The dilemma here for the military theorists or planner in the U.S., is that this is really space science and rocket science. Although Chinese military theory, basic research, and applied research into these areas are transparent, the successes or weapons systems that may become formal programs are not transparent. Regardless of whether the algorithms are correct or not, it is clear that the PLA is serious about space warfare. The destruction of their own weather satellite and the blinding of a U.S. satellite mean they are achieving some success.
PLA theorists think that internal lines of communication are most favorable for successful military operations, whether the offense, defense, or maintaining a logistics chain.79 They see internal lines as superior to the conduct of military operations on external lines.80 The Chinese see their regional position in Asia as superior to that of the U.S. because the U.S. has to fight, communicate, and re-supply along extended exterior lines, while China enjoys interior lines of communication within the range of its aircraft, missiles, and submarine fleet. This means that in a conflict, they would probably use their jamming and antisatellite systems to disrupt American lines of communication, command and control, situational awareness, and efforts at coordination at the extended ranges of military conflict for the U.S.81
One of the most disruptive things the PLA could do, therefore, would be to neutralize the U.S. ability to use tracking and data relay satellites, which provide the global, real time sensor and communications capabilities for network centric operations. The PLA believes that the U.S. is heavily dependent on its satellite systems, more dependent than the PLA. That is changing, however. As the PLA modernizes its own Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4SIR) systems, it is becoming as dependent on space and information systems as the U.S. Therefore, its policies of space control and space deterrence for military purposes are no longer forms of asymmetric warfare. Rather, the contest will be over which force can most effectively disrupt the other’s military operations. Space warfare will likely become an integral part of traditional conflict.
The Implications of Attacks on Reconnaissance Satellites
One problem that begs an answer is whether the PLA is considering the implications of exercising the capabilities it is developing. That is, when researchers consider a form of space warfare, or develop capabilities to be applied in space weapons, are there also PLA officers in the policy or war planning sphere thinking through the implications of employing that capability? If not, an incident could quickly escalate and get out of control, leading to an exchange of weapons or a deeper crisis.
For example, four officers from the PLA’s Second Artillery Command College, in Wuhan, have published an analysis of how to jam or destroy the space-based ballistic missile advanced warning systems of the U.S.82 In their article, the officers note, ‘‘a space borne missile early warning system will play a pivotal role in future space wars.’’83 They set out the capabilities and parameters of the U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning satellites, including the geosynchronous orbits of the satellite sets, their axis of look, the infrared bands they cover, and their shortcomings. The authors discuss how to destroy the U.S. DSP satellites with other satellites, ground-based lasers, or direct ascent weapons.84 They also have a discussion of how to jam the satellites, their satellite-to-ground transmissions, or to camouflage the infrared radiation emitted by a missile to make it more difficult for the warning satellite to detect an attack.85
In their conclusion, the authors find that maintaining a strategic ballistic missile capability is a powerful deterrent to prevent the U.S. from launching a large scale military attack or intervention aimed at China’s own military operations on its southeast coast, i.e., to intervene in Chinese military operations against Taiwan.86 Their view is that ‘‘destroying and jamming space borne missile early warning systems not only can paralyze such anti-missile systems, but also will help us [the PRC] win the war in space.’’87 The PLA is also aware of the most advanced U.S. synthetic aperture radar imaging systems and are thinking through how to neutralize or jam them.88
The problem in this reasoning is that there is no consideration given to a likely American reaction to the disruption of its missile early warning systems. One possible reaction by the U.S. is that it might well think it is coming under immediate attack and launch its own strike against China’s strategic missile forces. Another reasonable reaction by U.S. forces might be to strike the source of the Chinese attack, particularly if it came from a ground based laser or direct ascent launch. Even if such a reaction by the U.S. used conventional weapons, the PLA may find it has created a deeper crisis that led to an American strike on Chinese soil. These four PLA authors do not seem to have considered the ramifications of their own research.
Space Deterrence
Space power theorists, like Cai, advocate the ability to control parts of space for limited periods. Huang Zhicheng, in reaction to U.S. Air Force Space Command manual AFM 2–2.1, Space Warfare and Countermeasures, develops the concept further, advocating a regime of ‘‘space deterrence’’ to counter American space superiority. 89 For Huang, this shift toward space deterrence mirrors a trend in U.S. space theory.90 Huang defines this as ‘‘the use of strong aerospace power to create or demonstrate a threat to an opponent’s space power to deter that opponent in a practical way.’’91 The goal of this concept of deterrence is to increase the PLA’s power in weapons systems, information gathering, and command and control to improve national warning systems in China, create fear in an adversary, and degrade the adversary’s power.92 The key to achieving this level of deterrence, according to Huang, is to concentrate one’s own economic, military, and science and technology power to ‘‘ruin an opponent’s economy and ability to function in space.’’93 The intention behind the December 2006 blinding of a U.S. satellite by a Chinese laser and the 11 January 2007 destruction of a Chinese weather satellite by the PLA’s own direct ascent kill vehicle is clear when interpreted through this concept of demonstrating space deterrence.94 As Huang concedes, for a deterrent to be credible, one must demonstrate the capability. A deterrent must be demonstrated. It is also important to note that effective space deterrence, as conceived by this writer, includes crippling attacks on information networks and C4SIR systems.
In the future, there could be other examples of space deterrence to let the U.S. and other countries know that they do not have free reign in space or over China. The PLA could demonstrate various forms of jamming. In doing so, the PLA would conduct operational tests of the work being done on jamming synthetic aperture radar satellites. Chinese journals do discuss maneuvering space bodies to intersect in orbit. This type of maneuvering lends itself to accidental collisions between space bodies. China could deny the hostile intent of such accidents, but they still would demonstrate a space deterrent capability.
Conclusions
There are a number of important findings to this research effort. First, in the event of conflict with the PLA, military operations carried out across all the domains of war, ground, sea, air, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum, or information- and cyber-warfare, are likely. Any military operations in space will be part of a more coordinated cyber or information attack on an enemy’s knowledge and command systems. Second, there will probably be strategic warning, even if there is operational or tactical surprise, in any future conflict between China and the U.S. Prior to direct conflict, the PLA and the Central Military Commission will likely justify any of its actions by conducting what it calls legal warfare.95 Third, the concept of legal warfare will be applied by the PRC Foreign Ministry, the security services, Chinese Communist Party liaison Department, and the PLA to exploit political divisions in the U.S. over nuclear testing and space-based weapon systems. Fourth, the PLA will seek to exercise space control in a limited area of conflict. The PLA will probably observe the internationally accepted definitions of commons in space, over 100,000 m, in peacetime. If direct conflict breaks out, altitude limits on space control are off, and any systems carrying adversary military traffic or signals are probably fair game for the PLA.
U.S. Navy Secretary Donald Winter, on a visit to Australia in August 2007, said that the U.S. still wants to understand what the Chinese intention is in its military modernization.96 This concern over how China will engage in military operations in space is really about intentions. There are a number of China’s activities and policy positions coming from Beijing that make it hard to interpret Chinese intent. Among these are: China’s expansive territorial claims, combined with periodic incidents of the use of armed force to reinforce these claims;97 the justification for extending the territorial claims of China into the reaches of outer space outlined in this paper; and the shaping of the ‘‘space battlefield’’ with legal arguments that would justify China’s actions to prevent space observation over its territory.
The U.S. has taken a course with China that is far different from the isolationist and confrontational approach with the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. Both states are heavily involved in trade, economic, and political engagements with each other. Nonetheless, both states are wary of the potential for conflict with the other, and there exist some deep fundamental differences of national interest. Whether one is a proponent of arms control agreements or not, the dialogue between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over arms control and treaties produced a body of mutual understanding that holds up today. The U.S. and the Soviet Union seemed to realize that it is potentially destabilizing to define the upper limits of sovereignty. Thus, neither country interfered with the other’s free passage in space. Also, they agreed that the ability to conduct strategic verification from space stabilized the nuclear balance. No such dialogue has taken place with China. The PLA has either ignored or rebuffed American efforts at such a dialogue. Often, senior military or Chinese Communist Party leaders have told Americans that to engage in such a dialogue is an example of a cold war mentality.98 Yet discussions on these issues are important to clarify the rationales for America’s positions on space and serve as threat reduction measures.
Although China’s intentions are not fully known, they can be inferred from Chinese actions, like the attack on a U.S. satellite with a laser and the destruction of its own weather satellite as a demonstration of capability. PRC intentions can also be inferred from judicious reviews of its military literature. By observing the military capabilities China is acquiring and reading its military literature, it is clear that China’s leaders are preparing as though they may have to fight the U.S. To this end, the PLA is busily preparing the space battlefield in advance with legal arguments, as called for in its doctrine. As a result, there are very sound reasons to prepare to defend American interests in space, to engage in mutual threat reduction measures, and to pursue programs that will ensure that the U.S. military will have access to space in any future conflict.
The risk of crisis instability and miscalculation in space is high – the PLA is likely to initiate an attack in a crisis
MacDonald, 11 - Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program, U.S. Institute of Peace (Bruce, CQ Congressional Testimony, “MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAMS IN CHINA”, 5/11, lexis)
One characteristic of too many wars in the last century is that they are the result of miscalculation that ignites the tinder of fundamental geopolitical tensions. Averting major power conflict requires skillful management of tensions by senior leaders of the major powers. China has become much more internationally sophisticated, though with important exceptions, in its dealings with the rest of the world than has been true in the past, and this is reflected in its civilian leadership. Unfortunately, the PLA's senior officer corps trails its civilian counterparts in this respect. They have much less interaction with foreign official and travel abroad much less frequently than their U.S. counterparts. This means that the PLA overall views world events from a less knowledgeable and sophisticated perspective, a danger in this increasingly complex world, and could explain, for example, the political "tonedeafness" of the PLA in the manner they conducted their 2007 ASAT test.
This PLA problem becomes more serious when one realizes that the PLA is organizationally separate from the rest of the Chinese government, and reports only to the Central Military Commission, currently chaired by President Hu Jintao. President Hu, and his likely successors, have no significant military background, and the majority of the CMC's members are top PLA officers, suggesting that civilian oversight of major military decisions and consideration of their larger implications are not as carefully reviewed as in the U.S. government. Normally this would not be too great a concern, but in a crisis this could be dangerous. Add to this the fact that China has no equivalent of our National Security Council, a critically important body for coordinating our security decisionmaking, and one comes away concerned about the relative insularity of the PLA in the Chinese power structure.
In a crisis, the PLA probably cannot be counted on to show as sophisticated a sense of judgment as one would hope any country's military leaders, even an enemy's, to show. All these problems and many more pose potential threats to internal political stability and Communist Party control, providing ample opportunity for crisis and conflict in the years ahead.
Overview of The Strategic Landscape of Space
Space assets, and the communications and cyber links that enable them to function, are the means by which essential national security information is either generated, transmitted, or both. This information is the lifeblood of U.S. conventional military superiority and plays a key role in U.S. strategic nuclear posture as well. As such, these space related assets represent extraordinarily appealing targets in any future conflict, and their relative vulnerability can provide dangerously attractive incentives in a crisis to preempt, escalating to war. Resisting this temptation to attack may be morally virtuous but could be strategically unwise: going first in a space conflict with a nearpeer space adversary appears to offer many advantages, while absorbing such a strike, with all its attendant destruction of military capabilities, and then responding to the attack against an opponent fully expecting such a response, appears to be militarily and strategically quite undesirable.
As technology advances, the ways of interfering with, disrupting, or destroying information streams in space or supporting space systems will likely increase, as will U.S. and others' dependence upon such systems. Providing defensive options for U.S. space assets should be pursued where appropriate, but most space observers believe that offense has the advantage in space over defense, as General Cartwright observed last May. Cartwright also noted that the challenging issues that space poses has made the Space Posture Review "the most difficult of all the defense reviews" the Obama Administration has undertaken.
The overall U.S. goal in space should be to shape the space domain to the advantage of the United States and its allies, and to do so in ways that are stabilizing and enhance U.S. and allied security. The United States has an overriding interest in maintaining the safety, survival, and function of its space assets so that the profound military, civilian, and commercial benefits they enable can continue to be available to the United States and its allies. This need not mean that China and others must perforce be disadvantaged by such an arrangement - there should be ample opportunity for many countries to benefit and prosper from a properly crafted system of space management.
There is an inherent risk of strategic instability when relatively modest defense efforts create disproportionate danger to an adversary, as with space offense. And there is a serious risk of crisis instability in space when "going first" pays off - destroying an adversary's satellites before he destroys yours. We don't know what would happen in a crisis, but the potential for space instability seems high and likely to grow.
That risks miscalc and nuclear escalation
Burke, 6 – Lt Col, USAF, command space professional with operational experience in missile operations, space surveillance, space control, missile warning, and command and control (Alan, “SPACE THREAT WARNING: FOUNDATION FOR SPACE SUPERIORITY, AVOIDING A SPACE PEARL HARBOR,” )
The erosion of the US ability to execute the space threat warning mission has serious implications for US national security to include: the loss of a key early warning indicator of an attack on the US homeland; the loss of space capabilities which would degrade US warfighting effectiveness; the preventable loss of critical high-value satellites, facilities or services; the increased possibility that adversaries could develop new weapons or covertly conduct probing attacks on US space systems; and the lack of a credible means to execute stated US policy in response to an attack against space assets.
One of the most serious impacts of the failure to develop or execute a reliable space threat warning and attack verification system is the loss of a key early warning indicator of an attack on the US homeland or an attack that is part of a major regional action by a near-peer adversary such as an attack on Taiwan by the Chinese mainland. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, whose goal was the destruction of the Pacific Fleet, was not done as an isolated act, but as part of the start of a larger campaign to establish a Japanese Pacific sphere of influence which included the forceful acquisition of US territories. At this time, the Pacific Fleet was viewed as a US center of gravity whose destruction would enable Japan to achieve regional domination and discourage future US intervention. Today, our space-based assets may represent the equivalent of the WWII Pacific Fleet. Further, other nations have stated they view the US reliance on space as a potential Achilles ’ heel and a center of gravity whose destruction or disruption is critical to future military success against the US.44
Although a major attack on the US is not likely, the loss of US space-based early warning capability and ground-based missile warning radars could undermine nuclear deterrence strategy resulting in a devastating miscalculation that the US was vulnerable to a nuclear first strike. The perception that US space capabilities are vulnerable to a surprise attack also weakens conventional deterrence. In the case of a US-China conflict over Taiwan, the Chinese might seek to disrupt or destroy regional space capabilities as part of a delaying strategy to deny US forces access to the region until their military operations were well underway, making the Chinese takeover of Taiwan a fait accompli.45
A successful Pearl Harbor-type attack on US space assets would degrade US fighting effectiveness. Today, space represents the ultimate high ground and it is unlikely that a nation, whose military ambitions might provoke US involvement, will willingly cede that high ground. The level of battlespace awareness space-based platforms provide makes any attack using large massed forces difficult to accomplish. The ability to neutralize these platforms would improve the circumstances required to gain a strategic advantage over US and allied forces. As General Lord stated in his Congressional testimony: “A resourceful enemy will look at our centers of gravity and try to attack them. Our adversaries understand our global dependence on space capabilities, and we must be ready to handle any threat to our space infrastructure.”46 With the increased US reliance on space assets for communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and command and control of our deployed forces; a successful space attack could significantly delay US response to regional aggression. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), over 60% of theater communications traveled via satellites.47 The Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) provided 90% of all protected communications and 70% of all military satellite communications into theater.48 These capabilities significantly enhanced command and control of US and allied forces. Further, the employment of the satellite-based Blue Force Tracker system resulted in an unprecedented level of situational awareness which decreased fratricide and facilitating search and rescue operations and reinforcement operations.49
The United States also maximized the use of the space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) to enable precision weapons delivery, allowing the use of fewer and smaller weapons to achieve effects; to enhance navigation in featureless terrain; and to aid in the location of both friendly and hostile forces.50 General Lord testified to Congress: “Space capabilities are no longer nice to have, but are now indispensable to how we fight and win our nation’s wars.”51 The failure to develop a credible space threat warning system increases the likelihood that a foreign nation would attack US space assets.
The inability to detect and provide timely warning of a space attack could result in the preventable loss of critical high-value satellites, facilities or services. There are a number of scenarios where the timely detection of a threat would allow space operators to intervene, thwarting the attack. In many instances, the ability to find, fix, target and destroy the threat is currently a viable way to counter the attack. However, this is not always possible. In the case of a co-orbital ASAT attack, which involves the launch and maneuver of a satellite into a closing orbit of another satellite to destroy or disrupt it, the countermeasure require a pre-intercept maneuver of the target satellite. The support countermeasures for an attack on space ground facilities include increased physical and information security. Countermeasures for electronic warfare attacks or jamming of the space link segment exist but there is often a significant bandwidth cost when these measures are in effect.52
Degradations to space assets could also occur as a result of unintentional sources such as radio frequency interference or from scientific research such as laser research. In these situations, it is important to locate the source and terminate the activity to prevent loss of the space asset or service. The loss of these capabilities during critical operations could result in operational failure, loss of equipment, resources, and lives.
The inability to rapidly neutralize sources of satellite communication (SATCOM) interference also has national security implications. In the area of airpower employment, successful SATCOM jamming could disrupt the US ability to command and control air assets in theater from geographically separated air operations centers. A delay of even one to two days might jeopardize US ability to support deployed forces. Satellite communication links to worldwide deployed forces are critical capabilities in protecting US security, sovereignty, and military combat capability.
The inability to detect and assess space threats might allow adversaries to develop new weapon systems or conduct probing attacks on US space systems without our knowledge. Although US surveillance technology and systems are more sophisticated today, the US should not assume it will always be able to detect the development of a new weapon. Our experience in post-WW II with the Germans is one example. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the US and Russia engaged in a race to uncover Germany’s scientific secrets. Major General Hugh-Knerr, deputy commander of the US Air Forces in Europe wrote: “The occupation of German scientific and industrial establishments has revealed the fact that we have been alarmingly backward in many fields of research.”53 Supersonic rockets, nerve gas, jet aircraft, guided missiles, stealth technology and hardened armor were just some of the technologies developed in WWII German laboratories.54 The Soviet Sputnik launches and the deployment of the FOB system are modern examples of technological surprise.55
Today, other nations are working to develop new weapons to counter US dominance and to take the lead in what is termed Fourth Generation Warfare—information war. The current coverage gaps in our space surveillance network, a fragmented intelligence network, a lack of discipline in anomaly reporting, the current inability to rapidly detect an attack on on-orbit systems, and overall erosion over the last decade of the space defense mindset makes it more likely an adversary could develop anti-satellite weapons without our knowledge.
Finally, without a credible space threat warning capability the US will not have the ability to execute stated US policy to counter an attack against US space assets. In 1999, President Clinton signed into law DoD Directive 3100.10, US Space Policy, which specifically declared an attack on US space systems, to include commercial space systems, an attack on US sovereignty.56 One purposes of this policy is to deter an attack on US space assets. However, the lack of a credible space threat warning system undermines this policy. A senior officer in US Strategic Command recently stated that a nation or group could likely interfere with US satellites without fear of retribution.57
These risks are compounding globally – 40 countries have ASAT technology
Donahue, 10 – USAF Major (Jack, “CATASTROPHE ON THE HORIZON: A SCENARIO-BASED FUTURE EFFECT OF ORBITAL SPACE DEBRIS,” )
Currently, the configuration of global space technologies and assets is highly desirable from a US perspective.67 The US has begun to rely heavily on space assets for a myriad of capabilities in recent years. Some have voiced worries that the United States will lose its lead as the global innovator in technology or that an enemy could make technological leaps that would give it significant advantages.68 That is possible, but by no means a foregone conclusion.69 However one thing is clear, “technology will proliferate.”70 Space technology has become increasingly available to any country or multinational corporation with the ability to fund the research or acquire the technology and place it in orbit.71 The increasing proliferation of launch and satellite capabilities, as well as the development of anti-satellite capabilities has begun to level the playing field.72 Adversary technological advances in kinetic-energy weapons causing structural damage by impacting the target with one or more high-speed masses, directed-energy weapons that are either ground- or air-based systems never getting close to their target, and nuclear weapons that detonate at an empty point in space could put our space assets at risk in the near future.73 Kinetic-energy weapons such as China‘s 11 January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, kinetic-kill anti-satellite (ASAT) vehicle destroying an inactive Chinese weather satellite generating thousands of pieces of space debris that threatened many operational spacecraft is of growing concern.74 Another kinetic energy weapon that is of concern is microsatellites (microsats). Currently, at least 40 countries have demonstrated some ability to design, build, launch, and operate microsats.75 Microsats can maneuver in such a way to observe and disrupt operations of orbiting assets. These microsats may soon be capable of harassing or destroying larger satellites at virtually any altitude.76 Because these satellites are so small, they may not be easily detectable as part of a payload or when maneuvering in space. Directed-energy weapons are laser, radio frequency, and particle beam weapons. Lasers operate by delivering energy onto the surface of the target and gradual or rapid absorption of this energy leads to several forms of thermal damage.77 Radio frequency (RF) weapons such as the high-power microwave (HPM) have either ground-and space-based RF emitters that fire an intense burst of radio energy at a satellite, disabling electronic components.78 Nuclear weapons are perhaps the technology of most concern to US space assets. Some argue though that adversaries would desist from using nuclear weapons in space out of fear of retaliation.79 While others say “what better way to use nuclear weapons than to destroy a key military capability of an enemy country without killing any of its population.”80 Regardless of the arguments, one thing is clear; a nuclear detonation would have three huge environmental effects in space: electromagnetic pulse (EMP), transient nuclear radiation, and thermal radiation.81 EMP from a nuclear detonation will induce potentially damaging voltages and currents in unprotected electronic circuits and components virtually rendering space assets inoperative.82 Increased radiation from such a detonation would also have profound effects on the space environment. This would severely damage nearby orbiting satellites reducing the lifetime of satellites in LEO from years to months or less and make satellite operations futile for many months.83 The risk of this potential threat is significant. To execute this mission, all that is needed is a rocket and a simple nuclear device.84 Countries such as Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and Pakistan possess such missiles that could carry warheads to the necessary altitudes to perform such missions.85 Technological advances in adversary weaponry are certainly hard to predict even in the near term. However, if this weaponry matures enough and is successfully used it will create additional space debris from the orbiting satellites being rendered inoperative (space junk) and becoming potential hazards to other satellites.
US space reliance undermines first strike stability and makes preemption likely
Morgan, 10 - defense policy researcher working in RAND Corporation's Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force (Forrest, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space,”
Given the great extent to which the United States depends on space systems for its national security and economic prosperity, U.S. policymakers and military leaders are becoming increasingly concerned that future adversaries might attack those systems. U.S. military forces operate in distant theaters and employ ever more sophisticated equipment and doctrines that rely on advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and timing data, most of which is produced or relayed by satellites. The ground infrastructure that supports these assets has long been vulnerable to attack, and a growing number of states now possess or are developing means of attacking satellites and the communication links that connect them to users and control stations. Due to the dramatic warfighting advantage that space support provides to U.S. forces, security analysts are nearly unanimous in their judgment that future enemies will likely attempt to “level the playing field” by attacking U.S. space systems in efforts to degrade or eliminate that support. All of this suggests that first-strike stability in space may be eroding.
First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.1 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as “a measure of the countries’ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,” 2 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, firststrike stability focuses on each side’s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur.3
Space stability issues differ from the Kent-Thaler conception of first-strike stability in that nuclear forces are not directly involved, so the risk of prompt catastrophic damage in the event of a deterrence failure is not nearly as great. However, several other strong parallels exist between first-strike stability in space and in the nuclear realm. First, space support substantially enhances operational warfighting capabilities in the terrestrial domain that are threatening to potential enemies. At the same time, satellites are difficult to defend against adversaries with capabilities to attack them. As a result, space, like the nuclear realm, is an offense-dominant environment with substantial incentives for striking first should war appear probable. Second, deterrence failures in space, though not as immediately catastrophic as nuclear deterrence failures, could, nonetheless, be very costly given the resources invested in orbital infrastructure and the many security and economic functions that benefit from space support. And, like nuclear deterrence failures, the costs of warfare in space would likely be shared by third parties due to global economic interdependence and multinational ownership of many space systems—all the more so if kinetic attacks on satellites litter important orbits with debris. Finally, there is a parallel between nuclear and space deterrence in that significant thresholds are perceived in both realms, the crossing of which could lead to reprisals, follow-on attacks, and rapid escalation.4
Even conflicts not involving the US could wipe the skies of satellites
Smith, 11 – USAF Colonel, Director of the Air Force Space and Cyber Center at Air University. He served in the Pentagon’s National Security Space Office as the Chief of the Future Concepts shop (M.V., Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
Spacefaring prowess is a common attribute of the dominant powers in the world today. Special attention must be paid to so-called rogue states that have access to space-related technology and may even be spacefaring but do not have the conventional forces to achieve their policy aims. Those aims tend to be very intense, and these players may seek space weapons as an asymmetric hedge against spacefaring adversaries who may try to coerce them.
The dominant military powers in the world, some of whom are potential adversaries, also tend to be the dominant spacefaring states. Because of the economic benefits and exponential enhancements that spacepower delivers to terrestrial warfighting, those states are under increasing pressure to defend their space systems and to counter those of their potential adversaries. This may lead to a space weapons race and an immediate escalation of hostilities to "wipe the skies" of enemy satellites should war break out between two or more dominant military space powers.29
When assessing the interplay between the spectrum of conflict and the spectrum of belligerents, it may be the case that war between two weak actors will not likely extend into space. However, if the power is perceived to be disparate, a weak actor is far more likely to use space weapons against a powerful state as an asymmetric defensive move.30 A powerful state may counter the space systems in use by a weaker adversary, but it is likely to do so by placing diplomatic pressure on commercial vendors, or executing attacks on their ground stations, or launching highly selective covert attacks on the satellites they use by employing temporary and reversible means.
Should two dominant spacefaring powers go directly to war with each other with intense motives, both will find it critical to preserve their space systems and will consider it a dangerous liability to allow their enemy to exploit theirs. Given the ability of spacepower to cut the fog and friction of war while connecting military forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, it is likely that space systems will be primary targets that will be negated in the opening moves of war. The fight for space is likely to be intense and brief. Temporary means of negation will likely switch to permanent methods of destruction to remove doubt in the minds of commanders.
Loss of space assets will annihilate US hegemony
Marshall, 8 - NASA Ames Research Center (Will, Astropolitics, 6:154–199, “REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF SPACE ASSETS: A MULTITIERED MICROSATELLITE CONSTELLATION ARCHITECTURE,” Ebsco Political Science)
Space assets are one of the most critical ‘‘Achilles’ heels’’ of the current military capability of the United States (U.S.). This is for two reasons: (1) the U.S. military space systems—in particular reconnaissance, navigation, signals intelligence, early warning, and communications systems—are critical to modern military warfare and intelligence; and (2) space systems are inherently vulnerable to attack. This combination is understood at the highest levels and was espoused in the ‘‘Rumsfeld Space Commission’’ with talk of a ‘‘Space Pearl Harbor.’’1 Whether one agrees with the tone, this is a genuine security problem for the U.S. in need of a near-term solution. While there have been numerous papers, and much media and academic attention, in the space security discussion focused on promoting or criticizing space-based weapons,2 there have been far fewer papers and studies offering constructive ways forward that deal with these genuine security concerns in a broader sense.3
The central motivation for this paper is to put forward one key element—the satellite architecture—in an effort to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. space assets. It is hoped that this idea, together with others like it, should stimulate and contribute to a debate on more constructive ways forward for how to achieve space security in the post-Cold war world.
Importance of Space Assets
For better or worse, it is clear that the U.S. military is to some significant extent dependent on its key satellites, which number about 86–105 operational satellites at present. These satellites constitute a significant part of the eyes, ears, and central nervous system of the modern military.4 A practical example that helps to illustrate this is the case of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. First, the decision to go was based in part on satellite imagery and signals intelligence from satellites; whether or not it was interpreted or used correctly is a separate issue. Second, the planning and operation were facilitated by satellite imagery. Third, many planes, ships, tanks, and units’ positions were known through Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, and even most munitions were guided by GPS. Fourth, the operation was commanded from the U.S. in large part through the use of communications satellites. Perhaps more importantly than any of the functions in the Iraq example, early warning (EW) satellites are the U.S.’s and Russia’s first warning of nuclear missile attack. As Gray classified, space assets have moved from being ‘‘useful and important’’ to an ‘‘indispensable adjunct’’ in the military over the last decade.5
Space assets are definitely used a great deal by the U.S. military, but that does not mean necessarily as strong a dependence as Gray implies. The loss of U.S. space assets could range in its effect anywhere from a loss to the U.S. military in practical operations, to being catastrophic to U.S. security. The former would entail a reduction in operational effectiveness or speed, but fundamentally supposes that back-up systems and/or redundancy allow a near continuation of military capability. The latter scenario would entail an effective disablement of the U.S. military capability from normal operations. In reality, the significance lies between these boundaries, but this is a topic that could benefit from further research.
This could result in global nuclear conflicts in every region of the world
Kagan, 7 - senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, 7/19, )
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world's powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington.
The return of great powers and great games
If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China's foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is passé; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power -- with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending -- now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea 's nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan's own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or "little brother" to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other 's rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a "greater China" and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe's past than its present. But it also looks like Asia's past. Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, would not insist on predominant influence over its "near abroad," and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from NATO and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia's complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia 's relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India 's regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its "century of humiliation." Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.
It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant
naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more
genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.
Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.
People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.
The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world's great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.
Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.
In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.
It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.
The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.
The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
A firm commitment to ORS is vital to credible deterrence by denial – it will prevent attacks against US space assets
Sejba, 10 - USAF Congressional Budget Liaison Officer Budget and Appropriations Liaison Directorate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget Secretary of the Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC (Timothy, “ Deterrence for Space: Is Operationally Responsive Space Part of the Solution?”, High Frontier, May, )
The space domain, often referred to as “The High Frontier,” no longer is a sanctuary outside the reach of foreign intervention. The threat to space systems and their capabilities is broad, ranging from reversible effects such as jamming or blinding, to more destructive means such as anti-satellite weapons. It is now time to take actions for the sake of space, and assure its continued contributions across the full spectrum of military operations. Given the criticality of space to not only our military power, but also our economic power, it is time we develop policies and field capabilities to deter future adversaries from attempting to degrade, deny, or destroy space capabilities and services. The asymmetric advantages enabled by space can no longer be assumed and as a result, a new National Security Strategy for space must be forged, one that combines deterrence with basic protection capabilities never before afforded our space systems. Yet, space deterrence is not an “all in” strategy, nor can it reduce the risk of attack to zero.1 Should aspects of deterrence fail, we must take steps to defend and protect our space systems and the critical global services they provide.
Operationally responsive space (ORS) by definition is “assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of joint force commanders’ needs.”2 Dissected further, one key word stands out: assured … being sufficiently robust, timely, agile, adaptive, and resilient, to achieve desired outcomes with a high degree of certainty.3 So while ORS intends to provide operational and tactical support to the joint warfighter, its true value will be the assurance it provides as a credible strategic deterrent against space attacks.
As a deterrent, ORS provides access to existing capabilities, or rapid deployment and employment of new capabilities, denying the benefits our adversaries may seek by attacking our space capabilities. Through timely and accurate intelligence, we can work to understand our adversaries’ intent and armed with this knowledge, we gain the opportunity to influence their decision-making calculus. Understanding intent, coupled with credible and timely ORS capabilities, can effectively deny or greatly reduce the benefits they seek by attacking the asymmetric advantages enabled by space.
ORS provides a responsiveness that will allow the commander, US Strategic Command (CDR USSTRATCOM), to respond and support our combatant commands real-time and near-term requirements. To support these requirements, ORS consists of three tiers of capabilities: Tier 1, the employment of existing capabilities within minutes to hours; Tier 2, the rapid call-up, launch and deployment of tailored, ready to field capabilities within days to weeks; and finally, Tier 3, the rapid development of a new capability to meet a combatant commander’s joint urgent operational need within months to a year.
The Unified Command Plan assigns CDR USSTRATCOM the responsibility for all military space. The space systems under his authority and control provide our warfighters increased speed, precision, and lethality in military operations. In 2007, during an Air Force Association speech in Los Angeles, California, General C. Robert Kehler, commander, Air Force Space Command and former deputy commander, USSTRATCOM, stated that the biggest difference between 25 years ago and today, was that “space today is embedded in combat operations.”4 ORS’ strategic deterrent value has the potential to be just as important to future combat operations.
Nuclear and Traditional Deterrence Theory – Misapplication When Applied to Space
For years, deterrence theory centered solely on nuclear deterrence strategies, which relied heavily on threats of punishment and unacceptable losses or mutually assured destruction. These strategies effectively deterred the use of nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War to present day. However, strategies of threatening devastating nuclear retaliation do not apply to space. In fact, a deterrence strategy that includes the threat of punishment (i.e., impose cost) should be just one, if not a limited aspect of deterrence for space.
For almost half a century, nuclear deterrence strategies formed the foundation for the Cold War waged between the US and the former Soviet Union. Both superpowers relied on the threat of nuclear weapons to deter even conventional military actions, for fear of rapid escalation. In its most unlimited form, mutual assured destruction was a key deterrence strategy; a doctrine of military strategy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two opposing sides would effectively result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender.5 While nuclear weapons continue to be a strategic deterrent, the same destructive thought process and strategy is not directly applicable to space.6
Today, some theorists focus and apply more punishing or destructive deterrence practices and thinking to the space domain. They view credible deterrence in space as relying upon the threat of punishment against an aggressor; going so far as to suggest that an attack against us could be countered with an attack in kind. One specific definition limits deterrence to an “attempt to persuade an adversary by threat of force (and other measures) not to pursue an undesirable course of action.”7 Another theorist states, “Deterrence can only succeed if the enemy finds the threat of punishment to be believable.”8 These approaches are less likely to deter for space, especially given our dependence upon the domain. For example, destroying an adversary’s satellite, especially one in an operational orbit, would create a large debris field, potentially hampering or denying our own ability to access space.
Instead, deterrence for space can only succeed if our enemies believe we have credible means of denying the benefits they seek to gain. Space deterrence theory should focus on credible ways and means to deny an enemy the benefits they seek; impose costs on our adversaries (against their most prized assets);9 and encourage their restraint.
A New Focus of Deterrence
What does deterrence look like in the 21st century? The US has not yet figured that out, said Marine Corps General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “You need something that deters a conflict, and you need more choices than just nuclear.
~ Sandra I. Erwin, Future of War—How the Game is Changing
… Our deterrence strategy no longer rests primarily on the grim premise of inflicting devastating consequences on potential foes.… ~ US National Security Strategy, 2006
In fact, the US does have new and plausible thoughts on 21st century deterrence. Authored under the leadership of General Cartwright, then commander of USSTRATCOM, and signed out in December 2006, the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO-JOC) is the Department of Defense’s (DoD) latest view on deterrence. This approach extends beyond traditional nuclear deterrence theory, which dates back to the heralded days of Strategic Air Command.
The DO-JOC states that the purpose or objective of deterrence operations is to “convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-making.”10 In order to influence our adversaries’ decision-making calculus, it focuses on and integrates three key elements: Deny the benefits the adversary seeks; impose costs the adversary fears; and encourage adversary restraint (by convincing them that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome).11 Of these three elements, denying the benefit should be our focus when fielding new ORS capabilities. Deterrence today can only succeed if our adversaries find ORS credible enough to enable military operations even in a contested environment.
Deny the Benefits—ORS Tier 1 and Tier 2 Examples
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) view of space: Space shifting from enabler to key battleground. Space characterized as important because it contributes to information dominance; space now described as important in its own right….many in the PLA see space as a likely future arena for conflict.
~ Space and PRC National Security,’ Dean Cheng, China specialist, The Heritage Foundation, 8 October 2008.12
The purpose to benefit denial is to convince an adversary that their intent will not be achieved, or have little to no value. Today, our ability to field ORS capabilities is minimal at best, and unconvincing as a credible deterrent. Instead, our adversaries likely perceive great benefit in attempting to deny the US’ space capabilities. These benefits, also referred to as “vulnerabilities gaps,”13 are reasons why we must pursue ORS with an increased sense of urgency. However, for benefit denial to be viewed as a credible deterrent, the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Study states “our adversaries (must) perceive that the US will retain superior warfighting capability even after an attack.”14
The space and cyberspace domains are increasingly important to how current and future wars will be fought and won. As recently as 4 November 2009, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) top Air Force Commander, Xu Qiliang, called the militarization of space an “historical inevitability.”15 This statement came on the heels of an historic visit to USSTRATCOM by General Xu Chihou, one of two vice chairmen of the PRC’s Central Military Commission. During this visit, General Kevin P. Chilton encouraged increased cooperation and comprehensive bilateral relationships between the two space-faring nations.16 Statements from Qiliang and actions such as the 2007 anti-satellite test highlight a growing disconnect between the PRC’s actions and stated policies, increasing concern amongst US leaders and lending credence to the need for new deterrence practices.
Moving forward, to be a true deterrent, ORS must also win the race to space in both the speed and cost of fielding capability versus our adversaries’ attempts to counter, destroy, or deny them. Two examples highlight how ORS could play a credible role in deterring adverse actions against our space capabilities: (1) International cooperation and partnerships through shared space capabilities (Tier 1) and (2) the ability to rapidly augment or replace some aspect of existing on-orbit ISR assets in low Earth orbit (Tier 2). Tier 1 and Two ORS capabilities can be deployed and employed rapidly, within hours to days. The cost for Tier 1 includes implementing new concept of operations for deployed on-orbit systems, or the rapid, low cost launch and deployment of systems intended to augment existing systems for Tier 2.
Developing small satellites and reconstitution capabilities gives the US the ability to prevail in a space conflict
Rendleman, 10 - Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (James, Astropolitics, 8:220–255, 2010, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Ebsco Political Science)
RESPONSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE
A robust and responsive space infrastructure enables a spacefaring nation to present agile responses to man-made threats, debris, and changes in the space environment. A responsive space infrastructure augments the other pillars of space assurance and provides a needed back-up in event of their failure. According to Lawrence Cooper:
Responsive space is the ability to put a satellite payload into orbit shortly after making the decision to launch. It includes the ability to replace failed satellites quickly, to re-attempt a launch after an aborted try, and to respond to operational requirements to satisfy national security interests. Responsive space provides the means for assured access to space. An objective goal for responsive space could be operating the satellite in hours to days from the decision to launch vice the current paradigm of months to years. Responsive space creates the possibility of adding an additional dimension to the United States’ space power by increasing the robustness of military and commercial satellite systems. By pursuing a strategy of responsive space, space systems become less vulnerable, not from harder systems or active countermeasures, but through ubiquity. Such a strategy pushes satellites to become less expensive and lighter; launch services more versatile and responsive; and satellite operations become faster and more flexible. If industry makes it simpler and quicker to place satellites in orbit, the satellites also become less vulnerable because any damage or shortfalls can be replaced on short notice; and operations become more flexible because supplementary capability is always available.77
Much of the early emphasis for responsive space was on implementing transformational process changes in the way space systems are acquired and operated. While the term ‘‘transformational’’ no longer holds the e´lan it once held in the early 2000s, when the then Office of Force Transformation championed funding and concept development for responsive space, proponents place great value on how these proposed systems have the potential to provide tremendous flexibility and options to decision makers and commanders.
This responsiveness theme has understandably been picked up in the DOD Plan for Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). Its formulation focuses on assuring availability of timely and needed space capabilities for joint force commanders, delivering these warfighting needs through a three-tier construct—from hours-to-days, weeks-to-months, and then to no more than one year. The DOD approach also acknowledges needs to reconstitute, augment, or surge space capabilities in event of conflict.
However, as structured, the current ORS program stops short of pushing credible long-term acquisition approaches needed for a space strategy. As stated in Joint Publication 3–14, Space Operations, ‘‘Strategic or long-term needs are not a primary focus of ORS.’’78 The rationale also suffers because its construct is based, in part, on false premises. First, the descriptive term ‘‘responsive space’’ implies that the space community has not been responsive to warfighter needs. This has not been the case, and senior U.S. military space leaders have argued indignantly against this conclusion in various conferences and forums. They contend that the space community has been responsive in satisfying warfighter needs, as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere have borne out. Second, the rationale implies warfighters need the space community to develop and sustain the capability to deliver new, just-in-time technologies, or solutions to satisfy battlefield and battlespace needs. The practical business and budgeting realities of indulging the second purported need have not been comprehensively explored.
No doubt, military and national space systems are needed to survive a space ‘‘Pearl Harbor,’’ to reconstitute those systems to ensure they are available to support the warfighter. ‘‘Reconstitution refers to plans and operations for replenishing lost or diminished space capabilities. This includes repositioning, reconfiguring unaffected and surviving assets, augmenting capabilities with civil and commercial capabilities, and replacing lost assets.’’79 If such capabilities can be developed, they would allow the United States to respond to an adversary attack by rapidly replacing or reconfiguring systems destroyed or degraded by enemy action. This would also ensure that during periods of increased tension or conflict, the United States would be able to launch and deploy new or replacement space assets and capabilities, and also augment the systems already on orbit.
Instead of using a pure reconstitution approach, the United States could choose instead to change its satellite designs to small single-purpose vehicles deployed in large distributed constellations to obtain continuous Earth coverage. This would effect a profound acquisition strategy change for the DOD and its civil counterparts, as heretofore they have focused on acquiring much larger flagship-class satellites, each dubbed a ‘‘Battlestar Galactica.’’ The DOD has experimented with small satellites, but usually only to demonstrate new technologies.
As noted in this paper’s discussion of space protection and defenses, large constellation architectures can offer a good measure of redundancy. This, in turn, could deny an adversary an opportunity to target only a few critical on-orbit satellites. Creating and sustaining large constellations will require responsive and more affordable launch capabilities, technology, infrastructure, and organizations. The operations must be fully integrated to ensure system survivability. Responsive spacelift must include launch capabilities with improved mobility attributes, and must also be able to provide the proliferation needed to reduce adversary opportunities to target systems, while they are in a launch preparation phase. Finally, to assure continued access, satellite operations must be conducted to sustain on-orbit capabilities, and, as needed, activate on-orbit spares.
Expanding ORS will deter attacks against US space assets
Putman, 9 – USAF Major, operations officer, 328th Weapons Squadron, United States Air Force Weapons School, former chief,
DSCS III Operations duties at the 3rd Space Operations Squadron (Christopher, “Countering the Chinese Threat to Low Earth Orbit Satellites: Building a Defensive Space Strategy”, ) HANE = High Altitude Nuclear Event
The United States has taken some initial steps to improve its defensive capabilities. The DoD stood up the joint Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office on May 21,2007 at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The ORS effort seeks to meet emerging warfighter needs with new space capabilities. Ron Sega, DoD executive agent for space, stated that efforts will focus on the "ability to launch, activate and employ low-cost military-useful satellites, provide, search capability, reconstitute and augment existing capability, while providing timely availabilities of tailor-made, unique capabilities. ,,39 Further, the DoD's Plan for Operationally Responsive Space highlighted the need to increase "situational awareness and adaptability to the threat, as well as an ability to evolve the total suite of space capabilities to address emerging threats in new ways.,,40 The Commander of United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) detailed three efforts vital to execute the plan: rapidly develop technological and operational innovations, rapidly modify or supplement existing systems to increase capabilities, and rapidly reconstitute space systems when necessary to maintain capability.41 Initial focus on capabilities will be on ISR and communication satellites, improvement of space situational awareness, rapid launch capabilities, and command and control. 42
The ORS effort will use a three tier capability approach to meet warfighter needs. Tier-1 implements activities immediately-to-days using existing or on-orbit systems. Tier-2 utilizes field-ready systems in days-to-weeks to provide rapid exploitation, augmentation or reconstitution of space capabilities. Finally, Tier-3 solutions take months-to-one year to satisfy needs while capabilities are modified or developed and then deployed.43
The ORS implementation timeline envisions eight tactical satellite demonstrators through fiscal year 2013. As of January 2009, two demonstrators have been launched with the third delayed from a scheduled spring 2009 launch due to technical issues. The program timeline also includes tests of operational employment and integration, command and control, and launch vehicles. The ORS program office recently purchased the first three launch vehicle specifically procured for ORS with launches scheduled for 2010 and 2011. Finally, the DoD expects the "Chiliworks" facility at Kirtland Air Force Base, which will focus onTier-2 satellite fielding, to be fully operational by 2015.44
While there are other ongoing efforts within the Intelligence Community and the DoD45 , ORS provides a good starting point for implementation of recommendations within this paper. The ORS plan identifies the need for both anticipatory and reactive elements. ORS planners should focus on the Chinese threat to build capabilities to fit within the Tier-1 and Tier-2 categories. The conflict with China would have to extend past a year to make use ofTier-3 capabilities. The United States must anticipate Chinese actions and have field-ready systems ready for either preemptive or immediate reactive use. Field-ready systems would provide a credible defensive deterrent against existing and likely Chinese offensive anti-satellite actions.
PROPOSED DEFENSIVE ACTIONS
The United States can choose from a wide variety of options to develop a defensive strategy to counter the Chinese threat to LEO satellites. The comprehensive approach should address space situational awareness (SSA), preplanned satellite actions, launch capability, small satellites, decreased dependence on space systems, nuclear explosion protection, institutional changes, transparency, and engagement.
Space Situational Awareness
Improving SSA is essential to the success of this strategy. The United States must have a comprehensive knowledge of all objects in orbit. Although the United States maintains a significant Space Surveillance Network (SSN) network, it lacks coverage in key areas and the capability to comprehensively predict the orbits of all objects in space; the February 10, 2009 collision between an Iridium commercial satellite and a Russian military satellite caught the SSN by surprise.46 The United States could build more fixed ground sites, but this would be limited by host country permissions and fiscal constraints. As a near term improvement to coverage, the United States should leverage the US Navy's AEGIS cruiser and destroyer-based radars into its SSN. The AEGIS radar highlighted its space surveillance capability when it tracked a decaying US satellite, enabling its destruction by a US anti-satellite weapon in 2008.47 While the Navy assets need to train and execute their primary mission, they could be given alternate tasking to search and track objects in LEO. This would entail development of procedures between services. Further, integration of land and space-based missile warning sensors into the SSN would yield benefits in the event of an anti-satellite launch. Finally, the United States should continue to pursue satellite as a sensor technology, where the satellite has the ability to self-identify and report on attacks. Improved SSA also allows the United States to characterize the resultant debris field of an anti-satellite attack and thus support reactive measures that may be required by other satellites.
Intelligence
Directly related to improved SSA is a robust intelligence effort that focuses on Chinese anti-satellite activity. Indications and warning may include increased communication at tracking stations, deployment of mobile tracking stations, and fueling and dispersal of launch vehicles. Identification and reporting of Chinese anti-satellite preparations would enable execution of preemptive defensive actions by the United States.
Preplanned Satellite Actions
Establishing preplanned actions is key to deterring and reacting to an anti-satellite attack. While the time from launch to impact for the SC-19 is on the order of minutes, intelligence of an impending launch can lengthen the timeline for taking preemptive defensive actions. While limited on-board fuel prevents large orbital maneuvers, a one-time small change to a satellite's orbit is possible. These orbital maneuvers must be executed before the launch of the anti-satellite weapon. Changes in orbit will produce a discrepancy between the anticipated satellite location and the final satellite tracking just prior to launch. The inconsistency may cause the Chinese to doubt the quality of their data and delay the launch as they develop new orbital tracking data, thus opening a window for additional US actions to prevent a launch. However, if the Chinese did decide to launch without updating their data, the slight change in orbit may cause the antisatellite weapon to miss. These same procedures would also be effective against ground-based anti-satellite weapons; a maneuver could lead to a laser missing the target.
Having preplanned actions ready to execute provides United States planners another option. If a conflict looks to be inevitable, they could decide to rapidly execute minor maneuvers across satellite constellations. While not only complicating the Chinese targeting process, this could serve as non-destructive shot across the bow. If the conflict escalates into a conventional war, the single maneuver may buy the United States enough time to execute a kinetic strike that would dismantle the Chinese anti-satellite program. The importance of these strikes would move the priority high on the targeting list. Here again, intelligence is a key enabler. Targets must be accurately located, vetted, and updated to enable quick strikes on the anti-satellite targets.
Variable and Rapid Launch Capability
The current United States Department of Defense launch complex does not have the capability to rapidly replenish satellites in the event of destruction. Launch preparation and execution can take weeks to months. The United States must adopt rapid and flexible commercial launch technologies.
Of at least equal importance to having a rapid launch capability is a launch system that deploys satellites from varying locations. When launched from the traditional space ports of Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force Base, China can easily monitor the launch and quickly determine the initial orbit and possibly satellite type. Having a capability that can unpredictably launch from unmonitored locations will delay China's ability to track and identify United States satellites, greatly inhibiting their ability to target satellites. This capability could be sea-based, where monitoring by an adversary is more difficult. The capability could also be airborne, like the Pegasus program which has successfully launched satellites using an L-I0ll aircraft from California, Virginia, Florida, the Canary Islands, and the Marshall Islands. 48
Small Satellites
The United States must also make a move towards smaller satellites that use a common bus and architecture. A single launch vehicle could then deploy multiple small satellites, allowing the rapid establishment of a new constellation at the beginning of a conflict or replenishment of an old one. China would then face a dilemma as to which satellites they would attack. If China does decide to attack, the impact would be proportionately smaller because they would take out a lesser percentage of the constellation. The Iridium collision demonstrated the ability of a large constellation to absorb the loss of single satellite with minimal degradation. 49 Having numerous small satellites ready to launch can also lesson the need to perform defensive orbital maneuvers, as they can be quickly replenished. Finally, small satellites are inherently harder to track whether by radar or optical telescopes. While a requirement for large satellites remains; small satellites will help protect and complement the large satellites.
Key to developing small satellites is a common command and control (C2) network regardless of function, rather than today's stovepiped C2 that are unique for each satellite type. A common bus and C2 system can also support small satellites by relying on a cross-linked network to control satellites and download mission data from a central location rather than on ground stations distributed around the globe.
Decreased Dependence on Space Systems
The United States must decrease its dependence on space systems, making attack on satellites a less appealing target. United States military forces should have weapons and procedures that can function with or without satellite support. For example, high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles can and should complement, and potentially replace, the LEO satellite ISR mission.
Countering High-altitude Nuclear Explosions
Although the possibility of a HANE may be remote, defense against the long term radiation effects must focus on hardening all future satellites against nuclear explosions. Without hardening, depending on the size of the constellation, satellite replenishment could take months and quickly exhaust satellite spares even with rapid reaction launch capabilities. Building satellites to withstand the nuclear weapon radiation effects beyond that required against the natural environment would add only 2 to 3 percent to total satellite cost.50 Consideration may be given to forgoing hardening for satellites designed for a short (days to weeks) lifetime; one should consider the radiation from a nuclear explosion may remain for up to two years, precluding the launch of non-hardened satellites into the affected orbital regime. 51 While some government low-earth orbit satellites are already hardened, the United States should harden all future satellites.
Institutional Changes
Changes must be properly incorporated into the DoD infrastructure to be effective. All aspects of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities must be examined. Additionally, the changes must work across many organizations within the DoD and throughout the United States government. For example, STRATCOM should run comprehensive anti-satellite exercises that incorporate all applicable services and agencies, from the satellite operator to the end user.
Transparency
The above actions may deter China from further pursuing its anti-satellite programs, but only if executed in a transparent manner. Systems must be fully trained and tested; the United States must overtly demonstrate its capability to rapidly deploy satellites. China must be made fully aware of US capabilities to effectively counter its anti-satellite weapons. China may then realize that its actions will have minimal effect on US military capabilities.
Engagement
Beyond using a military response to protect government satellites, the United States should consider a holistic approach to China's anti-satellite capabilities by using the other elements of national power: diplomatic, information, and economic. China's current reliance on space is minimal when compared to the United States. China can therefore afford to use antisatellite weapons against the United States. Increased Chinese reliance on space would provide significant deterrents to Chinese use ofcertain weapons such as direct ascent, co-orbital, and nuclear, since collateral damage from these weapons would affect China. First, the United States should engage on Chinese proposed treaties limiting space weapons. Next, the United States should work to build Chinese economic dependence on space systems, while taking appropriate measures to limit technology transfer. With a gap between the Space Shuttle and Ares launch vehicles, an opportunity exists to bring China in as a partner on the International Space Station by providing equipment launch services. Working with China to build its reliance on and participation in space activities will help build deterrence to the use of anti-satellite weapons; the collateral effects would harm its own interests.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
While this paper focuses on LEO satellites, the same rigor must also be applied to medium Earth orbit (MEO), highly elliptical orbit (REO), and geosynchronous (GEO) orbit satellites. Although current direct ascent anti-satellite capability can only reach LEO, China's ballistic· missile and space launch vehicles could reach higher orbits. Additionally, China has orbited GEO satellites which could already be carrying co-orbital anti-satellite weapons. China has expressed interest in combating the MEO GPS system through both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks.52 China is also actively developing jamming capabilities to combat United States military communications satellites found predominately in GEO.
Additionally, the proposed defensive measures will do more than support deterrence against China. Numerous nations will seek to emulate Chinese actions with kinetic and nonkinetic options. In response to the recent anti-satellite activity of China and the United States, Russia announced the resumption of its anti-satellite weapons program.53 Ground-based actions such as jamming are within the realm of many nations and individuals. One only need look at the hijacking of the HBO satellite signal by "Capt Midnight" as an example of a single individual being able to steal a satellite transponder, in effect jamming the intended signal. 54 Further, proliferation of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile technology make the use of a HANE attractive to a rogue nation or terrorist nation that has little reliance on space capabilities. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency suggests this scenario as a possible last act of defiance by North Korean forces facing defeat,55 Lastly, these measures can be used to combat natural phenomena, such as a meteor shower or solar storms that can damage satellite systems. “A strategy that ensures access to and use of space is useful in times of peace just as in times of war, since space systems that provide critical services may fail or become inoperative in the absence of hostile action.”56
Finally, the United States must not stop at applying these recommendations merely to military satellites. While government satellites are critical in a conflict, commercial satellites in all orbital regimes have become an integral part of military operations to include weather, imaging, and communications. Although tightly tied to the world economy, China could decide to expand its anti-satellite program to attack the economic interests of the United States. While commercial satellites companies typically incorporate protective measures against natural threats, the United States government should share best practices and provide incentives to commercial entities to protect themselves against human threats. The government could do this through requirements to obtain licensing or guaranteed govemment contracts to companies that comply.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental U.S. security interest in the wake of China's 2007 anti-satellite test should be deterring China and others from attacking U.S. assets in space, using both a combination of declaratory policy, military programs, and diplomacy, and promoting a more stable and secure space environment.57
Council on Foreign Relations
The United States government requires a comprehensive plan to counter the threat to its LEO systems posed by Chinese anti-satellite weapons. Failing to protect these key satellites would severely degrade US military capabilities in a conflict with China. The United States should rely on a defensive space strategy to deter Chinese anti-satellite actions. The strategy must include robust space situational awareness, preplanned actions, small satellites, rapid and variable launch capability, decreased dependence on space systems and institutional changes. In total, these actions would complicate the ability for Chinese anti-satellite weapons to easily strike US assets while providing the means to operate through an attack and then reconstitute lost capability. The DoD's ORS effort can be used as springboard, but must be accelerated to meet the rapidly emerging threat. Finally, its growth as a space faring nation may eventually be the best deterrence against a Chinese attack on United States satellites. However, the actions outlined in this paper can also be used to counter threats from other nations or natural phenomena. A rapid comprehensive defensive deterrence approach most effectively counters the Chinese threat and meets Presidential guidance to establish “contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets and accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack.”58
Rapid reconstitution capabilities will deter attacks against the US completely
Butterworth, 8 - President, Aries Analytics, Inc. Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute (Robert, “Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs,”
Responses
Satellites can be defended against some kinds of direct kinetic attacks. They can be moved out of range of the attacker’s terminal engagement sensors, if there is enough warning and accurate track of the interceptor and enough understanding of the kill mechanism, and if the satellite has been designed to withstand the loads created by the movement. There may be ways to confuse or defeat the sensors used to detect and track the target satellite, either in initial acquisition or in terminal engagement. The target might also be protected by active defenses, although with intercept occurring only about ten minutes after launch, the defenses will probably need to be directed energy rather than kinetic weapons. Either case would require precise situational awareness—exact information about the technology and operation of the attack—together with major advances in command and control for the defenses.
Even without enemy action, satellites in orbit might provide less space support than needed. Satellites might be lost to collisions with debris or other objects; or essential components might fail. Or it may be that prewar planning proved inaccurate, that more support is needed to meet unforeseen needs, or that demand for space support at the outbreak of crisis proves much greater than had been anticipated.
These problems are not remedied by defenses; instead, they call for a supplemental capability, to augment capacity to meet surging needs and to replace lost or failed sensors. Some of this supplemental capability might be found already in orbit: the communications and intelligence satellites of commercial entities and allied governments. While not all of the products of these systems will be militarily useful to the U.S.—and probably none will possess the capability of analogous U.S. government systems—the diversity of information they could provide and the speed with which it could be available would surely prove advantageous.
More capable systems, fully compatible with U.S. forces and fully under U.S. control, could in principle be stored in orbit; the engineering requirements for long-term storage and return to full operation seem well understood. At the same time, these systems might themselves suffer on-orbit misadventures, might potentially be targeted, and might prove useless in the face of unforeseen needs. Still, this approach offers the fastest, and probably the most expensive, path to the most capable supplementary systems.
Supplements might be provided more cheaply and more reliably if they were stored on the ground, ready to be launched in response to the developing needs of joint force commanders. If these supplemental systems could be launched and brought into operation quickly enough, the time required for adversaries to detect, track, and assess them might deter antisatellite attacks completely. If launched before hostilities began, these supplements would confront adversaries with the need to prepare revised and more complicated plans for attacks in space, perhaps with less confidence that all important systems were in the crosshairs.
If launched as replacements for satellites initially lost to enemy action, the supplements would shrink the advantage that was sought in attacking the original satellites. If the U.S. coupled its supplemental replacements with vigorous offensive counterspace actions of its own, an enemy’s initial attacks would leave the U.S. with a diminished yet effective set of space assets and the enemy with none. All in all, being able to supplement or restore needed capability in orbit would likely prove a stabilizing and deterring influence; not being destructive weapons themselves, the supplements could scarcely be considered escalatory.
Swarms of small satellites create redundancy that make successful attacks against US assets impossible
Smith, 11 – USAF Colonel, Director of the Air Force Space and Cyber Center at Air University. He served in the Pentagon’s National Security Space Office as the Chief of the Future Concepts shop (M.V., Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
Although offense is the dominant form of war in space today, this will not always be the case. Defense is possible. Three principles will likely guide the development of future space defenses.
First, if you can't see it, you can't hit it. Satellites are already getting smaller—too small for most space surveillance networks to detect and track. This trend will likely continue not only as a matter of cost savings, but also as a matter of stealthy defense. Avoiding detection includes maneuvering satellites to undisclosed wartime orbits.
Second, all warfare is based on deception.34 Potential adversaries collect intelligence on each other's space systems and make their estimates based on their intelligence assessments. Action must be taken to deceive potential adversaries into underestimating the value of critical systems and overestimating the value of inconsequential systems. In addition, the use of wartime-only modes of operation, frequencies, and other unanticipated behaviors will further complicate an adversary's problems.
Third, there is strength in numbers. The age of the capital satellites is over. Employing only one or two large, very expensive satellites to fulfill a critical mission area, such as reconnaissance, is foolish. Future space systems must be large constellations of smaller, cheaper, and, in many cases, lower-fidelity systems swarming in various orbits that exploit ground processing to derive high-fidelity solutions. In addition, swarms improve global access and presence.
Effective space deterrence contributes to general deterrence of conflict
Morgan, 10 - defense policy researcher working in RAND Corporation's Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force (Forrest, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space,”
Space Deterrence and General Deterrence
Although this assessment focuses specifically on deterrence and firststrike stability in space, it is important to appreciate the interdependencies between these factors and general deterrence and stability writ large. Given the extent to which space support enhances U.S. conventional military capabilities, an adversary weighing the risks and potential benefits of war with the United States might be encouraged toward aggression by the belief that attacking space systems would degrade U.S. warfighting capabilities enough to enable the attainment of objectives at acceptable costs. As a result, weaknesses in space deterrence can undermine general deterrence. Conversely, if a prospective adversary concludes that the probable cost-benefit outcome of attacking U.S. space systems is unacceptable, it is forced to weigh the risks and benefits of aggressive designs in the terrestrial domain against the prospects of facing fully capable, space-enhanced U.S. military forces. In sum, effective space deterrence fortifies general deterrence and stability.
A stable, predictable funding stream is vital to ORS technology development
Dinerman, 6 – DOD space consultant, and senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch (Taylor, The Space Review, “Tactical IR satellites: operationally responsive spacecraft?,” 8/7,
The troops on the ground need information they can use in a timely and easily understood format. Simply to provide them, or division or brigade intelligence staffs that support them, with raw satellite data is probably worse than useless. The next generations of US Army and Marine Corps units are going to require information that can be integrated into their “network-centric” information systems. Imagery from space-based infrared sensors that are specifically designed for tactical utility should be part of these networks.
This is a mission for a future constellation of small “operationally responsive” satellites. Part of the constellation should be kept in orbits that take them over places such as south Lebanon or the Afghan-Pakistani border where we can assume that there will be trouble for a long time to come. These should be carefully calibrated on a constant basis, so that their positioning information is ultra-precise. Other satellites can be kept on the ground ready to be launched at relatively short notice to supplement the ones on orbit over the world’s trouble spots, or they could be launched to cover unexpected outbreaks of fighting.
A model for the way such a program could be run is GPS, which, over almost three decades, has gone from prototypes to sets of more and more sophisticated and capable satellites. These spacecraft have, on the whole, been both cost effective and free of the kinds of nasty and expensive surprises that have plagued SBIRS and other Air Force satellite programs.
An operationally responsive tactical IR satellite system would have to be both affordable and based on proven and reliable technology. The first generation of such satellites may not have all the desired features, but if properly designed—with the right filters and the right level of multi- or hyper-spectral sensitivity—such craft would give the ground forces a valuable early operational capability.
To make the program affordable it would have to be designed to use already existing bus and power supply systems and probably also an in-service communications architecture. It would have to be light enough to be launched on a Delta 2 or on a future operationally responsive spacelift vehicle. Most important of all, the funding stream—no matter how much or how little—would have to be predictable so that the contractors would have the incentive to plan for the long term. This would be the most difficult part of the program since it would mean asking Congress to give up part of its power over the annual budget cycle.
Another way to keep the program affordable would be to keep the early requirements to a minimum. The first versions should be strictly for ground force use only, with perhaps some applications for Marine Corps amphibious warfare requirements. Only after the system has proven itself should the program be allowed to move on to develop air-to-ground sensor-to-shooter loops.
Ultimately a constellation of a dozen or so spacecraft in orbit, backed up by a similar number on the ground, would be ideal for the early versions of the full system. The ground segments will have to be as simple and as inexpensive as possible since it will need to be deployed with more than fifty Army and Marine brigade-sized units as well as with higher headquarters.
If the idea of operationally responsive space means anything, it means that the military space forces, particularly Air Force Space Command, are ready to give priority to supporting the troops on the front lines worldwide. Enhancing the combat effectiveness of the Army and the Marines and helping to save American lives should be the highest goal. As Clausewitz put it, “The object of fighting is the destruction or defeat of the enemy.” The more that military space contributes directly to that objective, the better for the troops on the ground and for America as a whole.
1ac – Development
Contention 2 – Development
High launch costs inhibit commercial space development
Coppersmith, 10 – historian of technology at Texas A&M University (Jonathan, The Space Review, “Obama in space: bold but not bold enough,” 4/12,
Lost in the attention given to ending shuttle flights this year, as intended by President Bush, and the cancellation of the overcost and overweight Constellation program, are the promising initiatives to develop and deploy new generations of technology. At the core of the president’s proposed revamping of NASA is the focus on new technologies to reduce the cost and complexity of operating in space. NASA will restart its Institute for Advanced Concepts, eliminated in 2007 to help pay for Constellation cost overruns. Chief technologist Robert D. Braun will head the new Space Technology Program, which will offer research grants to encourage innovative ideas. These steps will revitalize the private, academic, and NASA technology base.
The chief flaw of the president’s proposals is they do not address the key constraint limiting human and robotic exploration and exploitation of space, the high cost of reaching orbit. When I fly domestically, I pay about $2 per pound of me for a ticket. To launch a satellite into orbit costs roughly $10,000 a pound. Until that cost dramatically drops, the promise of the final frontier will remain only a promise.
These high launch costs restrict access to space to those governments and corporations that can afford tens of millions of dollars to launch a satellite. Consequently, the annual total of all payloads is only a few hundred tons, the equivalent of two 747 freighter flights.
The great expense to reach orbit has not only hindered past exploration, but will also restrict the future if unchanged. Imagine how many more businesses would experiment and develop applications in space if the cost of launching a satellite was only in the hundreds of thousands instead of tens of millions of dollars. Making access to space affordable will create vast economic as well as scientific opportunities.
Commercial space development is vital to preventing terrestrial environmental collapse
Collins and Autino, 10 - * Life & Environmental Science, Azabu University AND ** Andromeda Inc., Italy (Patrick and Adriano, “What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace,” Acta Astronautica 66 (2010) 1553–1562, science direct)
Economic development in space based on low launch costs could contribute greatly, even definitively, to solving world environmental problems. As a first step, substantially reducing the cost of space travel will reduce the cost of environment-monitoring satellites, thereby improving climate research and environmental policy-making.
4.1. Space-based solar power supply
A second possibility, which has been researched for several decades but has not yet received funding to enable testing in orbit, is the delivery of continuous solargenerated power from space to Earth. Researchers believe that such space-based solar power (SSP) could supply clean, low-cost energy on a large scale, which is a prerequisite for economic development of poorer countries, while avoiding damaging pollution. However, realisation of SSP requires much lower launch costs, which apparently only the development of a passenger space travel industry could achieve. Hence the development of orbital tourism could provide the key to realising SSP economically [14].
4.2. Carbon-neutral space travel
Clean energy produced by SSP could eliminate the environmental impact of space travel, and even make it ‘‘carbon neutral’’ if this is considered desirable [25]. Moreover, SSP has a much shorter energy pay-back time than terrestrial solar energy, due to the almost continuous supply of power which it can generate, rather than only in day-time during clear weather. Some critics claim that space travel will become a significant environmental burden [26]. However, while superficially correct in the short term, this is the opposite of the truth over the longer term. It would be a dangerous error to prevent the growth of space tourism in order to avoid its initial, minor environmental impact, since this would prevent a range of major benefits in the future, including the supply of lowcost, carbon-neutral SSP, and other space-based industry.
4.3. Space-based industry
If orbital travel grows to a scale of millions of passengers/year—as it could by the 2030s, with vigorous investment—it will stimulate the spontaneous growth of numerous businesses in space. These will grow progressively from simple activities such as maintenance of orbiting hotels, to in-space manufacturing using asteroidal minerals. For example, the development of SSP would enable a range of industrial processes using the advantages of space, including high vacuum, weightlessness, low-cost electricity and sources of both minerals and volatile chemicals in shallow gravitational wells.
If SSP grows to supply a significant share of the terrestrial energy market, more and more industry would operate outside the Earth’s ecological system. While most industries cause growing damage to the Earth’s environment as they grow in scale, industrial activities which are outside the Earth’s ecosystem need not cause any such damage. Hence the growth of space-based industry to large scale offers the longer-term possibility of decoupling economic growth from the limits of the terrestrial environment. Indeed, it has been convincingly argued that only the use of space resources, including especially SSP, offers the possibility of protecting the Earth’s environment while enabling sufficient economic growth to preserve civilised society [22,27].
Resource wars are inevitable and risk extinction. Creating a viable commercial space sector changes the political calculation to go to war
Collins and Autino, 10 - * Life & Environmental Science, Azabu University AND ** Andromeda Inc., Italy (Patrick and Adriano, “What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace,” Acta Astronautica 66 (2010) 1553–1562, science direct)
The major source of social friction, including international friction, has surely always been unequal access to resources. People fight to control the valuable resources on and under the land, and in and under the sea. The natural resources of Earth are limited in quantity, and economically accessible resources even more so. As the population grows, and demand grows for a higher material standard of living, industrial activity grows exponentially. The threat of resources becoming scarce has led to the concept of ‘‘Resource Wars’’. Having begun long ago with wars to control the gold and diamonds of Africa and South America, and oil in the Middle East, the current phase is at centre stage of world events today [37]. A particular danger of ‘‘resource wars’’ is that, if the general public can be persuaded to support them, they may become impossible to stop as resources become increasingly scarce. Many commentators have noted the similarity of the language of US and UK government advocates of ‘‘war on terror’’ to the language of the novel ‘‘1984’’ which describes a dystopian future of endless, fraudulent war in which citizens are reduced to slaves.
7.1. Expansion into near-Earth space is the only alternative to endless ‘‘resource wars’’
As an alternative to the ‘‘resource wars’’ already devastating many countries today, opening access to the unlimited resources of near-Earth space could clearly facilitate world peace and security. The US National Security Space Office, at the start of its report on the potential of space-based solar power (SSP) published in early 2007, stated: ‘‘Expanding human populations and declining natural resources are potential sources of local and strategic conflict in the 21st Century, and many see energy as the foremost threat to national security’’ [38]. The report ended by encouraging urgent research on the feasibility of SSP: ‘‘Considering the timescales that are involved, and the exponential growth of population and resource pressures within that same strategic period, it is imperative that this work for ‘‘drilling up’’ vs. drilling down for energy security begins immediately’’ [38].
Although the use of extra-terrestrial resources on a substantial scale may still be some decades away, it is important to recognise that simply acknowledging its feasibility using known technology is the surest way of ending the threat of resource wars. That is, if it is assumed that the resources available for human use are limited to those on Earth, then it can be argued that resource wars are inescapable [22,37]. If, by contrast, it is assumed that the resources of space are economically accessible, this not only eliminates the need for resource wars, it can also preserve the benefits of civilisation which are being eroded today by ‘‘resource war-mongers’’, most notably the governments of the ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ countries and their ‘‘neo-con’’ advisers. It is also worth noting that the $1 trillion that these have already committed to wars in the Middle-East in the 21st century is orders of magnitude more than the public investment needed to aid companies sufficiently to start the commercial use of space resources.
Industrial and financial groups which profit from monopolistic control of terrestrial supplies of various natural resources, like those which profit from wars, have an economic interest in protecting their profitable situation. However, these groups’ continuing profits are justified neither by capitalism nor by democracy: they could be preserved only by maintaining the pretence that use of space resources is not feasible, and by preventing the development of low-cost space travel. Once the feasibility of low-cost space travel is understood, ‘‘resource wars’’ are clearly foolish as well as tragic. A visiting extra-terrestrial would be pityingly amused at the foolish antics of homo sapiens using longrange rockets to fight each other over dwindling terrestrial resources—rather than using the same rockets to travel in space and have the use of all the resources they need!
7.2. High return in safety from extra-terrestrial settlement
Investment in low-cost orbital access and other space infrastructure will facilitate the establishment of settlements on the Moon, Mars, asteroids and in man-made space structures. In the first phase, development of new regulatory infrastructure in various Earth orbits, including property/usufruct rights, real estate, mortgage financing and insurance, traffic management, pilotage, policing and other services will enable the population living in Earth orbits to grow very large. Such activities aimed at making near-Earth space habitable are the logical extension of humans’ historical spread over the surface of the Earth. As trade spreads through near-Earth space, settlements are likely to follow, of which the inhabitants will add to the wealth of different cultures which humans have created in the many different environments in which they live.
Success of such extra-terrestrial settlements will have the additional benefit of reducing the danger of human extinction due to planet-wide or cosmic accidents [27]. These horrors include both man-made disasters such as nuclear war, plagues or growing pollution, and natural disasters such as super-volcanoes or asteroid impact. It is hard to think of any objective that is more important than preserving peace. Weapons developed in recent decades are so destructive, and have such horrific, long-term side-effects that their use should be discouraged as strongly as possible by the international community. Hence, reducing the incentive to use these weapons by rapidly developing the ability to use space-based resources on a large scale is surely equally important [11,16]. The achievement of this depends on low space travel costs which, at the present time, appear to be achievable only through the development of a vigorous space tourism industry.
8. Summary
As discussed above, if space travel services had started during the 1950s, the space industry would be enormously more developed than it is today. Hence the failure to develop passenger space travel has seriously distorted the path taken by humans’ technological and economic development since WW2, away from the path which would have been followed if capitalism and democracy operated as intended. Technological know-how which could have been used to supply services which are known to be very popular with a large proportion of the population has not been used for that purpose, while waste and suffering due to the unemployment and environmental damage caused by the resulting lack of new industrial opportunities have increased.
In response, policies should be implemented urgently to correct this error, and to catch up with the possibilities for industrial and economic growth that have been ignored for so long. This policy renewal is urgent because of the growing dangers of unemployment, economic stagnation, environmental pollution, educational and cultural decline, resource wars and loss of civil liberties which face civilisation today. In order to achieve the necessary progress there is a particular need for collaboration between those working in the two fields of civil aviation and civil space. Although the word ‘‘aerospace’’ is widely used, it is largely a misnomer since these two fields are in practice quite separate. True ‘‘aerospace’’ collaboration to realise passenger space travel will develop the wonderful profusion of possibilities outlined above.
8.1. Heaven or hell on Earth?
As discussed above, the claim that the Earth’s resources are running out is used to justify wars which may never end: present-day rhetoric about ‘‘the long war’’ or ‘‘100 years war’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan are current examples. If political leaders do not change their viewpoint, the recent aggression by the rich ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ countries, and their cutting back of traditional civil liberties, are ominous for the future. However, this ‘‘hellish’’ vision of endless war is based on an assumption about a single number—the future cost of travel to orbit—about which a different assumption leads to a ‘‘heavenly’’ vision of peace and ever-rising living standards for everyone. If this cost stays above 10,000 Euros/kg, where it has been unchanged for nearly 50 years, the prospects for humanity are bleak. But if humans make the necessary effort, and use the tiny amount of resources needed to develop vehicles for passenger space travel, then this cost will fall to 100 Euros/kg, the use of extra-terrestrial resources will become economic, and arguments for resource wars will evaporate entirely. The main reason why this has not yet happened seems to be lack of understanding of the myriad opportunities by investors and policy-makers. Now that the potential to catch up half a century of delay in the growth of space travel is becoming understood, continuing to spend 20 billion Euro-equivalents/year on government space activities, while continuing to invest nothing in developing passenger space travel, would be a gross failure of economic policy, and strongly contrary to the economic and social interests of the public. Correcting this error, even after such a costly delay, will ameliorate many problems in the world today.
As this policy error is corrected, and investment in profitable space projects grows rapidly in coming years, we can look forward to a growing world-wide boom. Viewed as a whole, humans’ industrial activities have been seriously underperforming for decades, due to the failure to exploit these immensely promising fields of activity. The tens of thousands of unemployed space engineers in Russia, America and Europe alone are a huge waste. The potential manpower in rapidly developing India and China is clearly vast. The hundreds of millions of disappointed young people who have been taught that they cannot travel in space are another enormous wasted resource.
We do not know for certain when the above scenario will be realised. However, it could have such enormous value that considerable expenditure is justified in order to study its feasibility in detail [5]. At the very least, vigorous investment by both private and public sectors in a range of different sub-orbital passenger vehicle projects and related businesses is highly desirable. Fortunately, the ambitious and rapid investment by the Indian and Chinese governments in growing space capabilities may finally jolt the space industries of Russia, America, Europe and Japan out of their long economic stagnation, and induce them to apply their accumulated know-how to economically valuable activities—notably supplying widely popular travel services to the general public.
Government demand for reconstitution of small satellite constellations is vital to capitalizing the entire aerospace and commercial industrial base
Rendleman, 10 - Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (James, Astropolitics, 8:220–255, 2010, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Ebsco Political Science)
Given the importance of a responsive space infrastructure to space assurance, arguments in favor of such capabilities must be improved and refocused to show they also satisfy strategic and long-term needs, and serve as good economic investment. Cost-effective access can best be achieved by deploying resilient, more populous, and less-complex satellite constellations. Leveraging such architecture, individual spacecraft components could be designed and developed to be less capable, and reliable, than systems dependent on a single or small number of satellites. Reliability would be gained through redundancy. Mission and cost savings advantages could be gained through shortened development cycles that allow for spirally-developed block versions of each platform, its payload(s) and other parts of the system. Increasing the numbers of satellites on-orbit would give the economies of scale needed to support spacelift innovation and encourage investment by the commercial sector.
Architectures developed for responsive small satellite systems should be able to effectively use rapidly evolving technology and process innovations. Miniaturization of components in small satellites now offers sophisticated capabilities useful for a wide variety of operational and science and technology missions, and can give the needed flexibility for designing large constellation mission architectures. LEO, multi-plane Walker constellations, insertion of multiple satellites on each launch, selection of mature technology readiness level (TRL) sensor or communication payloads and buses, block acquisition approaches, simplified platforms and busses, and common mission control and ground systems can all be employed. Constellations of simple multi-mission, combined communication-sensor satellites can be developed and deployed to achieve cost-efficient acquisition goals. Commercial and international communities are already deploying smaller, shorter-life, yet capable satellites with streamlined mission control architectures; these approaches are already cost-effectively satisfying mission needs. Acquirers must seize upon the best approaches. National security missions are amenable to LEO and small satellite systems—communications, reconnaissance, missile warning and defense, and weather. As we have seen with GPS, OrbComm, and Iridium systems, large constellations of small satellites can be effectively managed and perform vital missions; they employ well-designed Walker Constellations to provide ubiquitous 24/7 coverage of much of the globe. By operating under a concept of employment that envisions regular, not infrequent or as-needed, replenishment of space systems, decisions makers would potentially have sufficient numbers of systems on hand, or in storage, to sustain rapid reconstitution or augmentation of capabilities in response to an attempted space ‘‘Pearl Harbor’’ or other national emergency. LEO could be selected, so that on mission completion systems are de-orbited in a relatively short period of time compared to present systems in higher orbits, reducing space debris problems.
Other secondary benefits could be secured with such a sustainment strategy—the U.S. aerospace industrial base, which has been suffering lately, could be re-energized with acquisition strategies that require continuous engineering improvements and innovations to large constellation space systems. This could ensure that the United States Government, and industrial and commercial base, is adequately capitalized and led, to be able to ‘‘develop and accelerate programs for rapid launch of satellites, to reconstitute lost systems, or bolster constellations in times of crisis.’’88 Costs for responsive space will be difficult to contain, while the underlying industrial base struggles to sustain, re-define, and improve itself.89 Employing large constellation acquisition, operations, and sustainment approach could provide the cost imperatives, effectiveness, resiliency, and opportunity to reconstitute that base. Thus, a responsive infrastructure would also serve as a vital part of a space assurance strategy.
This stimulates commercial launch markets and substantially lowers launch costs – in addition to creating credible deterrence by denial
Colón, 10 - Lt Col, USAF, former Director of Operations to the 45th Operations Support Squadron at Cape Canaveral AFS, served as the deputy commander 595th Space Group responsible for the operational testing of space and missile weapon systems until leaving for his present assignment at the Air War College (Miguel, “ DETERRENCE 2035 –THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY AND DIVERSITY IN A WORLD OF NANOSATS,” )
A New Approach to Space Deterrence
The book entitled Complex Deterrence states that deterrence works best among major great-powers and is therefore ineffective against rogue groups or terrorists.35 Thus, deterrence must evolve beyond the threat of potential costs imposed by a punishment strategy. Expressed mathematically, deterrence is comprised of gains (G) sought by the adversary and the cost imposed by punishment (C). Thus, if G > C the actor attacks and if C > G he does not. Usually deterrence concentrates on making the cost or punishment so great that the potential aggressor will not attack. This approach will not work for space because an attack is extraordinarily difficult to attribute to any adversary. For example, in 1998, PANAMSAT’s Galaxy IV satellite experienced a battery anomaly leading to a satellite failure that left nearly 40 million customers without paging services.36 What if this incident was not caused by the battery anomaly? Who then attacked the satellite and how? For deterrence to work, one must gather convincing evidence that attributes the attack to someone specific.
Lack of attribution will convince the adversary to attack. First, the probability of a nation-state counterattacking, without demonstrable evidence, is low. Second, the inability to rapidly identify the responsible party reduces the probability of retribution thereby increasing the potential gains to an aggressor. As technology miniaturizes satellites, the potential target becomes smaller, cheaper and can effectively hide in the clutter of space debris. For this reason, the approach to space deterrence must concentrate on significantly reducing the perceived gain (G) or success to be won by an adversary. The conditions must be such that it becomes manifestly clear; attacking another asset in space is pointless and counterproductive. Space deterrence must revolve around two concepts: transparency and diversity.
Transparency, or the ability to see without obstruction the events that occur in space, creates a peaceful environment which promotes understanding and accountability. Theoretically, when information is released, under the auspices of transparency, it produces an informed and engaged public, one that will hold a culprit accountable. 37 The ability to monitor and understand the rapidly changing conditions in space is critical to the preservation of security in space. While the US developed its current satellite capabilities in compliance with international rules and treaties it also deemed it prudent to develop a space surveillance network to monitor all near space activity and ensure a secure environment for all space faring nations. This network, of ground and space based sensors, provides radar and optical data used to characterize the mission of any satellite, identify the class and type or to simply aid in anomaly resolution.38 Currently, ground systems can track objects with a resolution of 12cm or greater39 making it challenging to track nanosats.
Air Force Space Command’s 2030 vision is enabled by technological improvement. It includes upgrades to existing sensors and an increase in the number of space-based optical sensors in an attempt to provide persistent and complete coverage of the near space domain. The resolution of near-term upgrades will improve to 1cm increasing the ability to track nanosatellites.40 In order to ensure safe space operations and uphold its commitment to cooperation with other nations and the peaceful use of space, the US consistently provides the orbit positional data41 via a public website accessible by anyone. The principles and goals stated in the national space policy highlight the nation’s vision of leading the way in space surveillance in order to promote and provide a safe operating environment for machines and people.42 In the end, for transparency to work, space situational awareness must allow analysts to identify deliberate actions by a spacecraft and its owners and ultimately predict, detect, and attribute an attack43.
The second concept in space deterrence is diversity. It provides a tailored approach, focusing on minimizing the impact of an attack, also known as graceful degradation, consequently driving the perceived gains (G) for the adversary as close to zero as possible. Diversity can be achieved through large networked constellations of space-based assets complimenting the existing ground based sensors, with a distributed architecture so that destruction of one or even several satellites does not take down the entire system. In the past, the US employed the costly approach of maintaining on-orbit spares, hardening on-board components, enhancing uplink and downlink encryption to increase satellite and signal survivability.44
In the future, nanotechnology will facilitate redundancy and rapid reconstitution. Presently, several companies, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, are currently demonstrating the technology. By 2035, on-orbit repair along with the robotic on-orbit refueling of satellites will become standard. Spacecraft will use autonomous navigation and conduct housekeeping tasks independent of a ground station. This is especially useful in the event of a communication failure or loss of the ground segment. Moreover, rapid reaction maneuvering capability will allow spacecraft to evade kinetic kill vehicles. The cornerstone of resilience is agile, capable, and functional technology able to diminish an adversary’s gain while increasing the cost of an attack – success in both enables deterrence. Above all, the space industrial base must grow to deliver the technical transformation required to employ this new approach to deterrence.
Recommendations
The US was shocked by a technological surprise on 4 October 1957 when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, a 184 pound satellite, into orbit on top of a rocket weighing nearly 4 tons. In contrast, the Vanguard satellite the US developed and had yet to launch weighed only 3.5 pounds.45 Sputnik completely collapsed the technological comfort zone the US. It heated up the Cold War as peoples’ fear grew over what the Soviets might do next; the strategic deterrence calculus was fundamentally altered. Today the US has the opportunity to shape the future and set conditions for effective space deterrence.
Reconstituting and energizing the space industrial base is critical to future deterrence. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2 states, “Operators and planners must know as quickly as possible the origin of any anomaly and be able to identify and geolocate the threat in a timely manner.”46 In order to meet the intent of AFDD 2-2 the US must embrace the goals identified in the National Space Policy, most importantly to “enable a robust science and technology base supporting national security.”47 Without industrial base growth, the international community’s influence will grow and undermine the nation’s future space security. The US cannot allow its own space industry to abrogate its role in national security nor can it continue to set conditions through ITAR and national policies which leave industry with little choice but to divest itself of its space tools. The US government must focus on the following areas: improving space situational awareness, miniaturizing spacecraft and launch vehicles, promoting innovation and risk taking in technology development, and improving export control policies and procedures.
First, the key enabler for transparency is space situational awareness. Today’s space surveillance network is composed of diverse sensors to include tracking radars, optical telescopes and space-based visible sensors. To prepare for tomorrow’s smaller target upgrades are required. The W-band upgrade to the Haystack sensor in Massachusetts increases the ground-based sensor’s collection bandwidth from 1GHz to 8 GHz thereby improving its resolution from 25 cm to 1cm and facilitating the tracking of nanosatellites.48 Although the upgrade is significant for the ground-based sensor network, it must be complimented with additional space based capabilities. In this instance, miniaturization becomes a force multiplier as it allows the next generation of space-based space surveillance to be configured with full motion video. Ground-based sensors can tip-off the space-based sensor to track a specific target. The video’s dynamic feedback can in turn provide greater insight into the intent of the adversary as it observes the target. CubeSat has already demonstrated the ability of one nanosat to take a picture of another (figure 3). Consequently, a successful deterrence strategy is dependent on the surveillance network’s ability to identify threats, characterize the potential damage, determine an aggressor’s intent and ultimately attribute the action to the adversary.
Second, CubeSat redefined the approach to building satellites through the development of standard building modules and taking advantage of the latest breakthroughs in nanotechnology. This approach makes CubeSat the model for “smaller, cheaper, and faster”. The US government must adopt a similar approach. While tradeoffs are necessary, government interest and investment in the many facets of the space should allow for good decisions about when a technology is “good enough” to satisfy mission and national security requirements. The approach facilitates decreasing the size of satellites, increasing spacecraft redundancy and allowing a higher number of satellites per constellation thereby complicating the targeting equation for the adversary. Its centerpiece focused on driving down the adversary’s perceived gain (G) closer to zero. This approach will increase diversity and future space deterrence effectiveness within a dynamic security environment.
Third, advanced miniaturization is creating a growing market for a very small, capable launch vehicle. As CubeSat gains momentum, it creates a strong market dynamic for a very 17 small and highly responsive launch vehicle. Currently, most CubeSats are launched on decommissioned Russian rockets as secondary payloads49. Up to this point, companies like Eurokot and Kosmotras have kept the launch cost to no more than $40K per CubeSat. As demand rises and slots for secondary payloads become scarce, the cost of each CubeSat will inexorably rise. Sensing a growing need for CubeSats, launch companies are developing a two-stage liquid propellant, launch vehicle capable of delivering 10 kg to a 250 kilometer polar orbit. If successful, such a capability will increase launch market share for the US space industry, enhance growth in other areas and lower launch costs.50 Affordable launch enables satellite replenishment. Even if the adversary destroys a satellite, the spacecraft can be quickly replaced minimizing the impact of the attack.
Fourth, changes to US export control laws are required. The primary agencies governing export control are the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Commerce (DOC). The DOS is responsible for maintaining the US’ munitions list which is used to identify which products or services are subject to export controls. Currently, satellites and all related space technologies are under DOS jurisdiction.51 However, DOS is not the most knowledgeable agency with regard to spacecraft or the associated technology and it uses ITAR to implement requirements established in the arms Export Control Act. According to the Defense Industrial Base Assessment on the US space industry, “US manufacturers have not introduced a new satellite bus since the Boeing 702 was developed in 1999. In contrast, European manufacturers have introduced 3 new busses in the last 5 years and are currently developing a 4th.”52
Players within the space industry argue that the US market share dipped from approximately 70% in 1995 to 25% in 2005. Compliance with export control cost US companies an average of $49M per year from 2003-2006.53 This cost was not applicable to foreign 18
competitors. Clearly, export controls provide foreign competitors an advantage in marketing to non-US customers because they limit what can be bought and who can buy it. It can also control the actions of the authorized buyers and users in terms of what they can use the technology for and whom they can share the technology with. Such restrictions adversely affect a US company’s ability to compete in foreign space markets consequently opening up opportunities for foreign space ventures whose governments are not as particular about how technology is used or who buys it.54
In the end, international competition is critical in order to reduce costs, preserve US dominance, forge closer relationships in order to globalize and thereby protect the use of space for all benevolent users. It enables an advanced form of deterrence denying the adversary the option of attacking. In short, space technology must move off the munitions list and into its own category which protects the technology that needs protecting while allowing the US space industrial base to sell non-critical space technology internationally.
Conclusion
Current developments in the field of nanotechnology are highlighting pathways for spacecraft to become smaller and ultimately affordable. As nanotechnology helps solve the problems of spacecraft mass, volume, and power consumption, national leaders must not lose sight of the fact that it is also opening access to space to virtually anyone. Adversaries understand the US’ increasing space reliance and will challenge the medium especially if it provides an audience and even worldwide recognition for their cause. As future adversaries benefit from smaller, lighter, and affordable satellites, the US must invest in an approach that 19 relies on transparency and diversity as the backbone of a strong deterrence posture to meet the threat in 2035.
This new approach to space deterrence concentrates on significantly reducing the perceived gain (G) or success to be won by an adversary instead of solely focusing on the traditional approach of punishment. In order to lower the adversary’s perceived gain, the US’ future ability to deter an attack rests on a space surveillance network that allows for the identification and persistent tracking of miniaturized spacecrafts thereby highlighting intent and ultimately attributing an action to a specific actor. Equally important, the US must embrace nanotechnology as the cornerstone to materials magnifying ways for spacecraft to become smaller, lighter, and affordable while further developing the space industry base. Furthermore, nanotechnology will enable diversity or added redundancy in the more autonomous spacecraft and increase survivability in space while lessening dependency on ground stations making the perceived gains (G) of attacking the ground infrastructure close to zero. Lastly, export control reform will allow nanotechnology to power the industrial base engine and minimize the potential for a nation-state, group or individual actor to create a strategic shock to the space sector.
After Sputnik’s voyage, public opinion blamed the government for not doing enough and ultimately risking US’ national security. The response was a significant increase in funding for military and civil space. In a post-9/11 world, the US cannot allow another technological surprise to occur, especially one perpetrated by non-state actors availing themselves of readily available and inexpensive space capabilities that can be used in ways to fundamentally alter the deterrence calculus. Once again, a significant commitment is required to strengthen the space industry and set the conditions needed for success in 2035. The natural deterrent created by high launch costs is disappearing and the ability to monitor and understand the rapidly changing 20 conditions in space continues to be critical to the preservation of national security. In short, the nation’s best technological approach for future space deterrence lies in becoming the world leader in the application of nanotechnology. It will increase the industrial base, lower launch costs, improve transparency and diversity ultimately setting the conditions for the deterrence calculus to tip in favor of the United States. Only then will the adversary’s gain/loss assessment dictate not to attack; effectively deterring him.
The perception of a firm governmental commitment to ORS is vital to stimulating the commercial launch market
Felt, 10 - USAF Commander, Space Test Operations Squadron Space Development and Test Wing Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (Eric, “Responsive Space Funding Challenges and Solutions: Avoiding a Tragedy of the Commons,” High Frontier, May, )
Industry watching for decisive government leadership, especially in the budget. Unlike those of most exquisite space programs, the ORS business model is not based upon awarding one contract spanning many years to a single contractor. The responsive space business model calls for a significantly higher transaction rate, which establishes the “carrot” of capturing future business as the primary motivation to perform well on existing contracts. Most companies seem to recognize the benefits that a more competitive US government space marketplace would provide. Other aspects of the ORS business model may be less appealing to industry, however. In-sourcing of final assembly and test, lower contract values in general, a return to linking fee/profit to risk on cost-plus contracts, interfaces based on open rather than proprietary standards, and open source flight software are concepts that some contractors perceive as threats to their short-term corporate profitability. Others realize that these concepts are necessary to maintain the overall health of the space enterprise over the long run and grow the overall space budget, benefitting many companies and shareholders.
Government acquisition decisions must be based on what is good for the taxpayer and the country, not only on maximizing the prime contractor’s near-term corporate profits. The government is the entity likely to benefit most from the ORS business model, and should be eager to experiment with elements of the new model and evaluate risks and benefits. Since the barriers to entry are lower and the US government is not their only customer, the small space industry base is much more vibrant, competitive, and innovative than might be expected from looking only at the US government small space budget. For example, ORS business solicitations have elicited hundreds of excellent proposals from hungry industry partners, including many small businesses. Nevertheless, industry’s luke-warm embrace of ORS has influenced decision makers within the government to move more slowly toward responsive space than they otherwise might have. Unfortunately, the government moving slowly on responsive space induces a “wait and see” response from the established space contractors, perpetuating the cycle of moving slowly on responsive space. The bottom line is that industry will follow the money and embrace responsive space fully when, and only when, the government shifts enough budget resources to actually field significant operational capability.
***INHERENCY
Military launch capability low
US military launch capabilities are weak, unresponsive and dependent on the commercial sector
Freeman, 9 – Lt. Col, Launch Test Squadron, SMC/SDTW (Thomas, “Operationally Responsive Space Launch for Space Situational Awareness Missions,” )
The United States Space Situational Awareness capability continues to be a key element in obtaining and maintaining the high ground in space. Space Situational Awareness satellites are critical enablers for integrated air, ground and sea operations, and play an essential role in fighting and winning conflicts. The United States leads the world space community in spacecraft payload systems from the component level into spacecraft, and in the development of constellations of spacecraft. The United States’ position is founded upon continued government investment in research and development in space technology [1], which is clearly reflected in the Space Situational Awareness capabilities and the longevity of these missions.
In the area of launch systems that support Space Situational Awareness, despite the recent development of small launch vehicles, the United States launch capability is dominated by an old, unresponsive and relatively expensive set of launchers [1] in the Expandable, Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) platforms; Delta IV and Atlas V. The EELV systems require an average of six to eight months from positioning on the launch table until liftoff [3]. Access to space requires maintaining a robust space transportation capability, founded on a rigorous industrial and technology base. The downturn of commercial space launch service use has undermined, for the time being, the ability of industry to recoup its significant investment in current launch systems. This has effectively precluded industry from sustaining a balanced robust industrial and technology base to sufficiently meet all United States Government spacelift needs [2]. The reduction of resources to the Department of Defense and the Air Force, coupled by the long launch preparation periods have further resulted in less operationally responsive spacelift capability from new launch systems.
AT: Launch capabilities now
Redundant capabilities to get to space are vital to space access
Kent, 10 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “National Security Space Access and the Space Elevator,” High Frontier, May, ) SE = Space Elevator
Transition Periods and Guaranteed Access to Space
Spacelift is one of the operational functions of air and space power as assigned to the US Air Force.15 “The Air Force is the DoD service responsible for operating US launch facilities”16 to provide assured access to space. “Assured access to space is a key element of US national space policy and a foundation upon which US national security, civil, and commercial space activities depend.”17
Does the US require redundant paths to access space? The example of the development of the Air Forces’ EELV show a path the US has taken in developing and maintaining the means to access space. In the case of EELV, two entirely different families of launch vehicles were developed and then maintained— ensuring the US had redundant launch capabilities should a failure shut one of the systems down for an extended period of time. The US has learned some hard lessons about relying on a single means to access space. The Challenger accident in 1986 shut down shuttle flights for two years, grounding both manned missions and NSS payloads—effectively eliminating “the ability to place the nation’s highest priority satellites into orbit.”18 With NSS assets in orbit playing critical roles in everyday life and for every military operation, reliable access to space is essential. Plans to shift NSS payloads to the shuttle were scrapped, planned shuttle operations from Vandenberg AFB, California were scuttled and the unmanned expendable rockets returned to center stage as the US Air Force’s means of providing assured access to space. Instead of the shuttle, NSS payloads would rely on legacy launch systems—Titan and Atlas—to get into orbit. The heavy lift Titan IV and medium lift Atlas II were derived from intercontinental ballistic missile designs and were very costly. The EELV program was conceived to build a new family of launch vehicles to replace the legacy systems and provide the same launch services at reduced cost.
EELV was envisioned to cut costs by streamlining production, simplifying processing for launch and by volume purchases as it provided services to both government and commercial customers. In the end, the commercial side of the business model never developed and the Air Force decided to maintain both the Atlas V and Delta IV vehicle families to ensure reliable, redundant means to access space. Boeing’s Delta IV and Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V rockets both offer NSS payloads reliable access to space with very few single points of failure between them – ensuring an anomaly with one family will most likely not shut down the other.19 In the case of EELV, the US has maintained redundant, reliable launch capabilities to ensure NSS payloads have assured access to space.
Inherency - Inflexibility
Status quo launch programs prevent ORS – too inflexible
Steele, 09 – USAF Lieutenant Colonel, Command Lead for the EELV program and at United States Strategic Command (2/12/09, Thomas M., Air War College, Air University “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Eelv) For Operationally Responsive Space,”)RK
In order to meet the ORS responsive launch requirements, a launch vehicle would have to be physically available at the launch base for crisis response call-up. Currently, the EELV program office purchases boosters based on an approved planning document called the National Launch Forecast (NLF).27 Based on the NLF, the contractor is notified or awarded a mission nearly two years in advance and the booster is called-up (ordered) one year prior to the required launch date. At that time, the launch vehicle is assigned to support a particular space mission. Air Force, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Reconnaissance Office/Office of Space Launch (NRO/OSL) all assign mission assurance teams to track “their” booster from production, to the launch base, and through launch operations. They also monitor the changes needed for the booster to accommodate a specific spacecraft. In the current system, a booster is not available for use by anyone else, including ORS, other than the specific customer; that is, a booster and a spacecraft become a “matched pair.”
Inherency – Launch On Demand
We currently lack the ability to rapidly replace space assets
Steele, 09 – USAF Lieutenant Colonel, Command Lead for the EELV program and at United States Strategic Command (2/12/09, Thomas M., Air War College, Air University “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Eelv) For Operationally Responsive Space,”)RK
The “crisis launch” need for launch-on-demand (LOD) has long been associated with the ORS concept. In fact, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics yearly Responsive Space conference featured eight separate LOD presentations and papers in the last four years.32 However, the ORS implementation plan does not mention LOD as either an initiative or requirement for the ORS program. Instead the plan, requires “ORS to improve responsiveness of existing space capabilities and to develop complementary, more affordable, small satellite/launch vehicle combinations and associated ground systems that can be deployed in operationally relevant timeframes.”33 It is unclear what caused the omission of LOD concept from the ORS implementation plan, but perhaps LOD advocates are attempting to avoid many of the same questions and stigmas that led to the demise of the original Operationally Responsive Spacelift concept. The ORS implementation plan does include some less controversial wording implying LOD, but instead emphasizes the imprecise phrase “operationally relevant timeframes.”
Launch-on-Demand is a launch concept which envisions space capabilities being deployed within hours or a few days of call-up. Current launch vehicles, including EELVs are not capable of meeting these call-up requirements. To acquire this capability the USG would have to pursue new launch vehicles, infrastructure, and command and control capabilities. “The key requirement is that the launch vehicle be essentially a commodity, built to inventory, and ready to go whenever needed, much like cruise missiles or rental cars” Some in the industry are looking to the future and beginning to develop capable new systems that may eventually meet LOD requirements. New promising systems include: FALCON, Minotaur, Scorpus, Air Launch and a handful of others. However, some in the spacelift industry question the military utility of launch-on-demand systems and whether the threat environment actually exists to support development efforts. Lou Amorosi, vice president of Orbital Sciences Corporation questions the importance of ORS’s responsive launch (that is, LOD) requirements. He points out that the Pegasus and Taurus launch vehicles are both capable of high launch rates, with surge rates of one per week, yet no one has used this responsive option in the 18 years the capability has been available.35 Given its current direction, the ORS program is working to a 2015 initial capability date for small launch vehicles that can meet the aforementioned “operationally relevant timeframes.”
As described above, EELVs cannot meet LOD timeframes for launch. However, the concept offered in the previous chapter, where EELVs and ESPA are used to deploy a set of capabilities to the combatant commanders, has essential elements that are shared with some LOD ideas and potential CONOPs. “The key to configuring a practical LOD system is defining a small set of “core” bus vehicles that can “mix and match” with a number of payload “kits” to satisfy the specific needs of the mission.”
Given that the ideas are similar, the only departure between the EELV CONOP offered in the previous chapter and the LOD concepts are the actual timeframes from launch call-up to launch. This takes the argument back to “operationally responsive timeframes,” the threat environment to the nation, and the combatant commanders’ needs.
Launch costs prevent military access
High launch costs are undermining military access to space
Conaton, 11 - Under Secretary of the Air Force (Erin, “Air Force Implementation of the National Space Policy: Space Situational Awareness and Launch,” High Frontier, February, )
Because launch is so critical to our space enterprise, the Air Force is making significant investments in launch capability and undertaking major efforts to improve launch acquisition. The reliability of the evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) program to date has been outstanding. The Delta IV and Atlas V launch vehicles that comprise the EELV program have a 100 percent launch success rate—37 of 37. Unfortunately, at the same time, the costs of launch services are surging, putting pressure on the enterprise.
As a recent senior level review of the nation’s launch capabilities noted, recent launch success is not assured. Instead, the operational measure of assured access is space-based capabilities on-orbit, on-time, and with the required performance. More than a decade ago, the Air Force and the NRO faced a fundamental challenge to assured access to space—launch reliability. There were significant reliability challenges with the legacy Titan IV, and even Atlas and Delta, with a string of launch successes, experienced eight major anomalies over 1997 to 1999.
Furthermore, the Atlas 141 was on Pad 3E at Vandenberg AFB, California for more than two years due to spacecraft and upper stage issues. Since then, however, the Air Force has implemented a series of steps to improve launch capability with positive results, and the NRO has also implemented proven mission assurance processes.
As the Air Force and its partners survey the launch enterprise
today, several important factors emerge:
• The EELV system is still maturing and will require continued focus on mission assurance process and resources.
• The primary cost driver for capability on orbit remains the cost of the payload.
• The impacts from the loss of a payload are so dominant that continued commitment to mission assurance is mandatory.
In addition, for many critically important payloads there is no backup system, and the leading cause of delayed capability in space continues to be late delivery of space vehicles. So while our focus on mission assurance is producing the desired results, there are elements of fragility behind our launch successes that require additional work.
At the same time, our current acquisition strategy for launch services is not adequately containing costs, and is straining the industrial base with small buys and short-term demand forecasts. Air Force senior leaders understand that purchasing launch hardware one launch at a time will not sustain the capability over the long term—and perhaps not even over the short term. Consequently, we are examining options that could provide a steady baseline transportation capability, such as utilizing block-buys with quantities tied to expected demand for launch services. The government would of course assume some risk with a block buy approach, but working in partnership with NASA and NRO, such risk should be mitigated over time to a manageable level. And these changes in our approach to the acquisition of launch capability and services must be made in concert with a more economical launch business case.
The mandate to sustain our focus on mission assurance, then, is matched by our determination to do better. The new NSP makes clear that Air Force contributions to national security via our space programs are enormous—not least in the area of space launch and assured access. But to be good stewards of the space mission in the emerging budget environment, we have to make our programs more competitive. Consequently, the Air Force is working to ensure the reliability of EELV is matched by a contract structure that enables more efficient production and that provides more affordable launch vehicles for our space enterprise. As part of this effort, and in tandem with our industry partners, the Air Force is pressing to make our space acquisition contracts more transparent, to provide greater visibility into the way our resources are applied. Without such visibility, we are unable to demonstrate with the value of our investment with the granularity required by the DoD and Congress. The new NSP’s emphasis on assured access and the dependence of all other space activities on launch underscore the urgency of our efforts.
***Hegemony ADV
Weaponization inevitable
Brink now- US, China, Iran, and Ethiopia weaponizing in the status quo.
United Press International 2/8 (“U.S. wary of China space weapons”, ) NYan
* Schulte is a US Deputy Secretary of Defense for Space Policy
WASHINGTON, Feb. 8 (UPI) -- Senior Pentagon officials are sounding concern over China's development of weapons designed to shoot down satellites or jam communication signals.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory Schulte said China's project was becoming a "matter of concern" for the United States.
Space, he told defense and intelligence officials while unveiling a 10-year strategy for security in space, "is no longer the preserves of the United States and the Soviet Union, at the time in which we could operate with impunity."
"There are more competitors, more countries that are launching satellites ... and we increasingly have to worry about countries developing counter-space capabilities that can be used against the peaceful use of space."
In 2007, China shot an obsolete weather satellite with a ground missile, creating so much space junk that crew members on the International Space Station had to change orbit to avert a collision last year.
Schulte said in his remarks that U.S. concerns had prompted U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to seek to include space in stability talks being pursued with the Chinese.
The official said China's capabilities were going beyond shooting at spacecraft.
Beijing's counter-space activities include jamming satellite signals. It is also in the process of developing directed energy weapons that emit a disabling burst of energy toward a target rather than firing a projectile at it.
Other countries believed to be developing counter-space technology include Iran and Ethiopia.
Diplomatic cables distributed by WikiLeaks and published by the British Daily Telegraph newspaper said that the United States and China had engaged in a show of military strength in space by testing anti-satellite weapons on their own satellites on separate occasions.
The memos feature more than 500 leaked cables that detail the fears of the countries as they race to gain supremacy in space.
The documents revealed that following China's destruction of the weather satellite in 2007, the United States responded a year later by blowing up a defunct satellite in a test strike.
U.S. officials at the time, rebuffed reports that the move was part of a military test, saying it was necessary to destroy the American spy satellite to avert a health and environmental fallout as it re-entered the Earth's atmosphere laden with toxic fuel.
Under the 10-year space strategy being formulated by the Pentagon, Schulte said the United States was bent on proposing ways to protect U.S. space assets. Among the considerations: setting up international partnerships along the lines of NATO, under which an attack on one member would constitute an attack on all and thus jointly retaliate.
Schulte said the United States also retained the option to "respond in self-defense to attacks in space."
Demonstration of space weapons in the status quo- ASAT tests and ambiguous technologies.
Hsu 10 (5/5, Jeremy, , “Is a New Space Weapon Race Heating Up?”, ) NYan
A U.S. Air Force space plane and a failed hypersonic glider tested by the Pentagon represent the latest space missions to raise concerns about weapons in space. But while their exact purpose remains murky, they join a host of new space technology tests that could eventually bring the battlefield into space.
Some space technology demonstrations are more obviously space weapons, such as the anti-satellite missile capabilities tested by the U.S. and China in recent years. India has also begun developing its own anti-satellite program which would combine lasers and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, as announced at the beginning of 2010.
The U.S. military and others have also long developed and deployed more neutral space assets such as rockets and satellites for military purposes. In that sense, both the Air Force's X-37B robotic space plane and the HTV-2 hypersonic glider prototype of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) could represent similarly ambiguous technologies which may or may not lead to weapons.
Missile defense viable now- tracking components and interceptors have overcome problems.
Clark 2/15 (Stephen, , Missile Defense Demo Satellites Ready for Testing, ) NYan
* Young is vice president of missile defense and warning programs at Northrop Grumman
The Missile Defense Agency says it is merging its $1.7 billion STSS tracking satellite mission with ground- and sea-based interceptor tests, a campaign officials hope will enable the military to launch kill vehicles against missiles before they fly in range of conventional radars.
If proven, the ability to detect and track missiles from space will give commanders another tool to go along with sensors based on land, at sea and in the air. The addition of a space-based detection network, which STSS is designed to demonstrate, could give strategic, regional and theater defense systems more warning of an enemy missile and permit the launch of interceptors against the threat earlier than ever before.
Existing radars and tracking systems, including the mobile sea-based X-band radar platform, can only see missiles and warheads in a limited area, usually in the launch or re-entry phases of flight. The STSS mission is supposed to show officials if satellites can provide a global perspective on missile flights.
"STSS brings unique capabilities to missile defense," said Doug Young, vice president of missile defense and warning programs at Northrop Grumman Corp., which built the satellites. "It's the only system capable of tracking ballistic missiles through all phases of flight, starting with boost extending through midcourse and terminal phases."
Not only can STSS track missiles, it can map a missile's trajectory and pass the data to sea- or land-based interceptors to destroy the threat. [STSS Mission Illustrations from Spaceflight Now]
The United Launch Alliance Delta II rocket with Space Tracking and Surveillance System - Demonstrator, or STSS-Demo, spacecraft aboard races into the sky leaving a trail of fire and smoke after liftoff from Launch Pad 17-B at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.
After overcoming technical problems in the months after their September 2009 launch, the MDA's two Space Tracking and Surveillance System satellites detected and tracked a half-dozen U.S. missile tests last year.
ASAT threats are growing – China, India, Iran, Israel and others have all stated interests in space weapon capabilities
Larrimore, 07 – Lt Col, USAF (April, Scott C., Air Force Fellows Air University, “Operationally Responsive Space: A New Paradigm or Another False Start?”
)RK
Environment Operational
By the end of the 1980s, the last time a tactical satellite program was proposed, eight countries had established the ability to launch spacecraft to orbit independently.49 Since then, no other country has successfully developed an indigenous launch capability. That may change in the near future as South Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Brazil, and North Korea are all developing either space launch or related intermediate ballistic missile technologies. Spacecraft use, however, has expanded remarkably.
The number of satellites operating in space has proliferated with time. At least 44 countries and many international organizations now operate spacecraft,50 many of which support the country’s national security needs. According to a review of space industry press, nine countries currently operate national military or dual-use imaging satellites with at resolution of a meter or less in the visible spectrum, or just a couple meters in the case of a synthetic aperture radar satellite.51 A couple other countries have domestic space imaging capabilities but with lower resolution of a few meters. Back in the 1980s, only three countries, Russian, China, and the United States had such systems. With this proliferation and integration of space information into countries’ national security structures, so increases the desire of potential adversaries to deny those same capabilities with ASAT weapons.
China successfully tested it first direct ascent ASAT on January 11, 2007. Despite international criticism of the test, other nations embattled in regional military conflicts are considering developing ASAT capabilities of their own. India’s Air Force chief Shashi Tyagi said India in planning to develop an aerospace defense command to shield itself against possible attacks from outer space.52 Referring to Iran’s space developments, Israel’s defense minister and Air Force chief warned that emerging reconnaissance and anti-satellite capabilities in the hands of regional adversaries would require Israel to deploy its own defenses against ASAT threats.53 The number of countries that could threaten United States space systems is growing from several different directions. One country of particular concern is China.
Political
While the United States and its allies generally enjoy strategic peace, there is increasing apprehension over China’s rise as a near-peer military competitor. China’s defense budget grew 17.8 percent in 2007 and 14.7 percent in 2006. In response to China’s ASAT test and continued military build-up, Vice President Cheney stated these actions “are less constructive and are not consistent with China’s stated goal of a peaceful rise.”54 While China may be a strategic rival in the long term, the United States immediate attention is on regional powers.
Regional conflicts, particularly the Middle East, will likely embroil the United States for years to come. Concern is increasing, however, that some regional actors such as Iran or North Korea might develop ASAT weapons to ride atop their proven intermediate ballistic missiles. Concern over United States’ satellite vulnerability is one reason Congress decided to fund robustly the ORS initiative in 2006 and 2007.
China’s ASAT tests have spurred India and Israel; numerous countries also have the capabilities and motivation now.
Ball 7 - Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University (Desmond, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, “Assessing China's ASAT program”, ) NYan
The militarisation of space
China's ASAT test of 11 January involved a fairly primitive system, limited to high-inclination LEO satellites. It is the sort of capability available to any country with a store of MRBMs/IRBMs or satellite launch vehicles, and a long-range radar system, such as Japan, India, Pakistan, Iran and even North Korea. However, its LEO coverage does include some extremely valuable satellites, including imaging and ELINT satellites, and the test is likely to generate reactions in several countries.
Many countries now use space satellites for military and intelligence purposes. In addition to the US and Russia, for example, several European countries, Israel, India and Japan also maintain reconnaissance satellites in LEOs vulnerable to China's KT-1 and KT-2 direct-ascent ASAT missiles.
China's ASAT test has been widely viewed as a direct challenge to US space superiority. The US maintains by far the largest fleet of military and intelligence satellite systems in the world, and the mission of the US Space Command is to maintain control of space. The transformation of the US military for Network-centric Warfare and Information Operations is increasing its reliance on space-based assets. American satellites are lucrative targets in the Chinese strategy of asymmetric warfare. As one Chinese defence analyst has noted: 'For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the US space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice'. [24] Even a limited ASAT capability would be extremely useful to the PLA in contingencies involving the Taiwan Strait. China's test will strengthen the arguments in the US for an enlivened ASAT program, as well as prompt the further development of counter-measures.
China's ASAT test is also likely to prompt India to develop ASAT capabilities. Both the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Indian Air Force have proposed various ASAT systems, but these have so far been resisted by the Indian government. Israel has also raised concerns about transfers of ASAT technology from China to countries in the Middle East, and especially Iran.
China has been a prominent advocate of the 'prevention of an arms race in outer space' (PAROS). In one move, albeit fairly primitive, it has provided a major stimulus to such a race. The PLA can only have calculated that the inevitable reactions were worth risking for a demonstrable capability to threaten a relatively few valuable LEO imaging and ELINT satellites in some critical contingency.
Russia developing ASATs in response to US and China- not limited by costs.
Associated Press 9 (3/5, “Russia building anti-satellite weapons”, ns/world_news-europe/t/russia-building-anti-satellite-weapons/) NYan
Russia is working on anti-satellite weapons to match technologies developed by other nations and will speed up modernization of its nuclear forces, a deputy defense minister was quoted as saying Thursday.
The statement by Gen. Valentin Popovkin signaled the government's intention to pursue its ambitious plans to strengthen the military despite the money crunch caused by a worsening financial crisis. He said the military will procure enough new missiles to deploy near Poland if the U.S. goes ahead with its European missile defense plans.
Popovkin said Russia continues to oppose a space arms race but will respond to moves made by other countries, according to Russian news reports.
"We can't sit back and quietly watch others doing that; such work is being conducted in Russia," Popovkin was quoted as saying.
Russia already has some "basic, key elements" of such weapons, he said without elaboration.
Popovkin, who previously was the chief of Russian military Space Forces, reportedly made the statement at a news conference in response to a question about U.S. and Chinese tests of anti-satellite weapons.
US/China space conflict coming
China is developing ASATs, energy weapons, and counterspace capabilities
Schulte 11-- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (February 4, 2011, “DOD News Briefing with Deputy Secretary Lynn and Deputy Assistant Secretary Schulte from the Pentagon on the National Security Space Strategy”, , FS)
Q: Ambassador Schulte, can you address China's growing capabilities, in particular in light, for instance, of its January 2007 destruction of an aging weather satellite? Was that a seminal event? And does that explain much of what you're talking about when you talk about competition in space with potential adversaries?
MR. SCHULTE: You know, in my last job, I was the -- I was the ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency and also to the United Nations in Vienna. So I was in Vienna when the Chinese shot their weather satellite. And I tell you it was certainly a seminal event in terms of world attention, probably a lot more seminal than the Chinese wanted.
And I think what it did is it did two things. First off -- in addition to embarrassing the Chinese -- first off, it showed that there were countries like China developing counterspace capabilities. So while the Chinese like to talk -- Chinese diplomats like to talk about not weaponizing space, it would appear that their military was going in a slightly different direction.
And it also showed the risk of congestion. When you look at the chart in here that shows the amount of debris, a good -- you will see after the Chinese ASAT test, look how it went up. A good amount of the debris up in space is actually from the weather satellite that they struck. And there have been any number of times when we've had to maneuver, for example, the International Space Station to avoid debris from this weather satellite.
So I think -- so I think the Chinese test did a couple of things. I mean, first off, it just made people focus that much more on the concerns about debris and how do we mitigate that, how do we avoid the risks that are posed to our spacecraft and operations.
Secondly, it focused concerns on Chinese capabilities. If you read the annual report to Congress on Chinese military capabilities, you will see that China is developing a lot more counter-space capability than just that direct ascent, anti-satellite missile that we saw demonstrated back then. And the investment that China is putting into counter-space capabilities is a matter of concern for us. It's part of the reason why the secretary of Defense wants to talk about space as part of the stability dialogue with the Chinese. And we think China has a common interest with us in protecting the space domain. And so, you know, this is also part of our effort to make them partners in promoting the responsible use of space.
Q: And is this what is behind comments that we heard from Deputy Secretary Lynn just now about coming up with systems designed to reduce U.S. reliance on space systems to the extent that they're vulnerable to anti-satellite weapons?
MR. SCHULTE: I mean, there are a lot of reasons why we have to sort of have a more resilient space structure and why we need to think about cross-domain solutions. But one of the major reasons is a concern about the type of counter-space capabilities that are being developed, and China is at the forefront of the development of those capabilities. I mean, it's not only the direct ascent ASAT we saw. As the report to Congress says, they're also working on jamming capabilities, directed energy weapons, a whole variety of counter-space capabilities. But it's not just China, I mean, we see other countries doing it, and we actually have seen some countries that might surprise you employing counter-space activities.
For example, are you ready for this? Iran has used counterspace capabilities and Ethiopia has.
Now, it's not ASAT, but they've actually jammed satellites. They've jammed satellites -- commercial satellites that have been used to carry, you know, BBC and Voice of America and so forth.
If -- you know, if Ethiopia can jam a commercial satellite, I mean, you have to worry about what others could do against -- you know, now, our military satellites tend to be -- tend to be anti-jam, but you still -- you still need to worry about that. And, again, there was a time 10 or 15 years ago when we didn't have to worry about that. And now we have to think differently and we have to think about how do we make sure that the critical functions that are performed from space we can continue to conduct them from space or, if they're degraded, that we also have alternative solutions.
China is planning destruction of foreign space assets in a surprise attack—PLA report proves
DOD Annual Report to Congress ‘10 (2010, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf , FS)
Accordingly, the PLA is acquiring technologies to improve China’s space capabilities. A PLA analysis of U.S. and Coalition military operations reinforced the importance of operations in space to enable informatized warfare, claiming that “space is the commanding point for the information battlefield. Battlefield monitor and control, information communications, navigation and position, and precision guidance all rely on satellites and other sensors.”
Concurrently, China is developing the ability to attack an adversary’s space assets, accelerating the militarization of space. PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance ... and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among initial targets of attack to “blind and deafen the enemy.” The same PLA analysis of U.S. and Coalition military operations also states that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors … will deprive the opponents of initiatives on the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.”
New space craft test proves Chinese intentions to go to war over space
Sheridan and Lamb 1-16-2011 (Michael and Christina are staff writers for The Sunday Times, a London-based newspaper “US frets as China launches space war; Beijing's secret military space plane and talk of ousting America from Asia are raising tensions” Lexis) BW
CHINA has staged a successful test flight of a military spacecraft to rival the US air force's secret unmanned space plane, the X-37B, according to a report on state-controlled television.
The report came as tensions over China's growing military ambitions threatened to overshadow a summit this week between presidents Hu Jintao and Barack Obama. Some in Beijing dream of expelling the Americans from Asia and urge an all-out effort to beat them at high-tech warfare, with space as a prospective battlefield.
The Chinese spacecraft closely resembles its US counterpart in video images shot at an aviation plant in Xian, the centre of China's aerospace industry, which were broadcast on a local network on January 7. Pictures showed it slung underneath a bomber, in contrast to the US craft, which is launched atop an Atlas 5 rocket. Both projects are shrouded in secrecy but aviation experts speculate that the craft are meant for long-duration, low-orbit missions including reconnaissance, attacking satellites and launching precision ground strikes.
The American X-37B landed at Vandenberg air force base in California last month after a seven-month test flight, an achievement that may have prompted the Chinese broadcast a few weeks later.
The television report was the most authoritative confirmation yet of China's vaulting ambition to compete with the United States in space warfare.
It showed Zhao Zhengyong, acting governor of the province of which Xian is the capital, inspecting the craft and complimenting its engineers. However, Chinese censors have deleted all subsequent references to the report from the internet and there has been no further coverage in the state-run media. This may be China's cautious reaction to hostile comments in America last week about the unusual public display of a Chinese stealth fighter, codenamed J-20, near the city of Chengdu.
The J-20's test flight took place as Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, visited Beijing.
The Americans were quick to embarrass Hu by telling reporters he had not known of the flight when Gates asked him about it, suggesting the president may not be wholly in command of his military.
The test prompted a wave of Chinese patriotic sentiment, reminding Washington in a torrent of internet and media comment that China believes it is on the rise as a great power.
Even mainstream Chinese academics say Chinese strategy aims to detach America from allies such as Japan and South Korea. Ultra-patriots on military websites discuss tactics for a war to reunify China with Taiwan. Some argue that China could shatter US prestige for good by sinking its aircraft carriers in such a fight. The Americans worry that China has built an anti-ship missile to do just that. Others talk of war against India as inevitable.
All agree America is trying to "encircle" China. A few claim China will one day push it back across the Pacific to restore the 18th-century grandeur of the Chinese empire.
In an effort to lower the temperature, the Obama administration is laying on the full redcarpet treatment for this week's visit by the Chinese president with a black-tie dinner and a 21-gun salute.
Hu's two-day trip - one day in Washington and one in Obama's adopted home town of Chicago - is being billed by US officials as the most important state visit in 30 years.
Obama has often said he believes the US-China relationship will shape the 21st century. But the talks between the world's two biggest economies will be clouded by suspicion.
China's military build-up, its plans to conquer space and the cyberworld and its challenge to America's control of the seas have added to a list of grievances. Both sides need to re-establish trust after clashing over trade, currency, copyright piracy, internet freedom, human rights, Tibet, Taiwan, North Korea and Iran.
The situation has led Victor Cha, director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council under President George W Bush, to conclude Team Obama has got China badly wrong.
"They thought if they worked closely with China and didn't step on issues which have traditionally been minefields - arms sales to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama - then they could get co-operation on other issues such as the economy, climate change and nonproliferation.
But that didn't pan out," he said.
A Chinese challenge to American military might, recalling the Soviet threat of the 1950s, could make relations more toxic. Admiral Mike Mullen, America's top commander, said last week: "China is investing in very high end, high-tech capabilities and the question that is always out there is to try to understand exactly why."
China challenging US for dominance now.
Ross and Watt 2/2 (The Telegraph, “WikiLeaks: US vs China in battle of the anti-satellite space weapons”, ) NYan
It was a conference call from the Air Force General, Kevin Chilton, the head of US Strategic Command, and Marine General James Cartwright, the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They told him the conditions were “ripe” to launch what can now be disclosed was a secret test of America’s anti-satellite weapons, Washington’s first such strike in space for 23 years. That night, the US navy’s Ticonderoga-class cruiser, USS Lake Erie, scored a direct hit on an American spy satellite, known as USA 193. The missile used, a highly sophisticated SM-3, took about three minutes to climb 150 miles above the Earth, where it flew past the satellite before turning back and destroying the target at an impact speed of 22,000mph.
The strike came about a year after the Chinese government had launched its own satellithe attack, which started a secret “space war”, The Daily Telegraph can disclose. For months the two super powers had been engaged in a private and increasingly acrimonious row over China’s use of weapons in space – an international taboo since President Ronald Reagan abandoned the “star wars” programme in the 1980s.
The clash began on Jan 11, 2007, when Beijing shocked the world – including George W Bush’s White House – by destroying a Chinese weather satellite with a ballistic missile.
The strike, 530 miles above the Earth, dramatically demonstrated China’s new ability to destroy the satellites of enemy nations. The threat was obvious. Without navigation or spy satellites, much of America’s military would be vulnerable.
China is increasing its ability to destroy US space assets
MacDonald, 11 - Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program, U.S. Institute of Peace (Bruce, CQ Congressional Testimony, “MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAMS IN CHINA”, 5/11, lexis)
This hearing is timely, and one of rising urgency. In the more than four years since China destroyed an aging weather satellite, demonstrating not only an antisatellite (ASAT) capability but the potential for strategic ballistic missile defense capability as well, it has proceeded to deploy more, and more advanced, military space capabilities as well. We should not be surprised by this, nor should we be stricken with fear. We would, however, be unwise to ignore both these developments, which are public knowledge, and other developments that are of a classified nature.
The Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) appears to recognize what most thoughtful observers of national security also recognize, that U.S. space assets, coupled with our advances in brilliant weaponry, have provided the United States with unprecedented and unequaled global conventional military capabilities. Both China and the United States are fortunate that neither country is the enemy of the other. However, China's growing economic and military power, coupled with friction points in the relationship, most notably over Taiwan, suggest that a future U.S.China conflict, though unlikely, cannot be ruled out.
The PLA and U.S. armed forces both would be derelict in their duties if they did not have contingency plans for such a conflict. As the current inferior military power, the PLA has every incentive to develop options for offensive operations against weak points in U.S. military posture, just as our military establishment should develop options against weak points in Chinese defenses.
PLA officers have noted the great U.S. dependence upon space assets and capabilities and the way they multiply U.S. force effectiveness. Just recently, they saw how U.S. special forces, and the military and civilian leadership that commanded them, heavily depended upon satellite photographs, spacederived weather and electronic intelligence, GPS, other spaceenabled information, and satellite communications in executing the strike against Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan. This brilliantly successful operation was built on a firm foundation of information in which space played a vital role in creating.. Is it any wonder that the PLA would want the capability to interrupt these rivers of information and services that our space assets provide? This information allows our military decisionmaking, our weapons, and especially our warfighters to be far more effective than in the past, vital advantages across the spectrum of potential conflict.
These "spaceenabled information services" lie at the heart of U.S. military superiority. The PLA certainly wants to be able to greatly weaken U.S. military power in wartime, and I believe the PLA could do so within a decade using its kinetic kill and other ASAT weapons if it chose to deploy them in large numbers, and thus pose a serious threat to U.S. space assets. China is also pursuing other programs that have important ASAT implications, and other nations are interested in ASAT as well, such as India and Russia.
This strategic space situation is troubling. Though absolute U.S. advantages in space should increase over time, the margin of U.S. advantage seems likely to diminish as China increases its space capabilities and space exploitation, and the PLA will reap both the military advantages and vulnerabilities of greater space capabilities. These PLA efforts are funded by a vigorous, quickly growing economy and supported by a government with full appreciation for the roles that spaceenabled information and information warfare play in modern conflict. U.S. and Chinese strategic interests in East Asia are not foreordained to lead to conflict; each has much to lose if this happens, and each appreciates the other's military capabilities.
China's demonstration of an antisatellite (ASAT) capability through the downing of an old Chinese satellite in 2007, demonstrated at least basic hittokill (HTK) technology capability. They further demonstrated their HTK prowess in January 2010 when they performed a successful ballistic missile intercept test. This shows growing mastery of HTK technology, as hitting a longer range ballistic missile or warhead is a more challenging HTK task than hitting an orbiting satellite. This successful missile defense test has important strategic implications for U.S. security interests that have to date been largely ignored. One Chinese source me that Chinese scientists had been actively pursuing HTK technology development ever since the United States first demonstrated HTK technology in the homing overlay experiment (HOE) in 1984. This source said that Chinese scientists saw at that time the strategic significance of HTK technology and the importance of China mastering it - which they now appear to have done.
Besides the kinetic ASAT the PLA tested in 2007, China reportedly has other offensive space programs under development, including lasers, microwaveand cyberweapons. We also face the twin realities that defending space assets is more difficult than attacking them; and while advancing technology will help both defense and offense, the offense is likely to benefit more. Senior Chinese military and political leadership also appears to appreciate the national security significance of space. 18 months ago, the PLA Air Force chief of staff, Gen. Xu Qiliang, spoke of the inevitability of space conflict, followed one week later by Hu Jintao's statement about the PLAAF "requirement of [developing] both offensive and defensive space capabilities." Writings in authoritative Chinese military journals also show a clear awareness of the growing military role that space assets play in advanced conventional military capabilities. A recent article in China reporting on the launch of the latest Chinese Beidou (GPStype) satellite cited one Chinese military expert as noting that 90% of advanced weapons currently depend upon GPS for their operation. China's 2008 Defense white paper also notes the major role of "informationized warfare" in future conflicts and devotes an entire section to "promoting the informationization of China's national defense and armed forces in the paper. China seeks to have a significant capability in this area by 2020 and to be able to prevail in such warfare by 2050, according to their white paper.
China's most recent defense white paper, released two months ago, acknowledges once again that space plays a prominent role in its security thinking. The paper notes, among other national defense taskings, to maintain China's "security interests in space, electromagnetic space and cyber space." The website of the daily newspaper of the Central Military Commission recently criticized Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Greg Schulte's citing of China's "antispace weaponry." I am particularly struck by the fact that the CMC newspaper, though it countered that some countries are worried about U.S. "antispace" capabilities, did not deny the accuracy of Ambassador Schulte's statement, as China usually does. This is quite a change, one I believe is noteworthy given its origin.
The PLA views last year's revised U.S. space policy as "seeking space hegemony" as a "core U.S. objective," and claims that "developing and deploying spacebased weapons is America's established strategy," according to published accounts. These and other distorted PLA views must be called out and refuted, lest more junior PLA officers, and others who read PLA publications accept them uncritically.
The key questions are what Chinese intentions are for these capabilities, and what the implications are for the United States.
Chinese Military Space Intentions
A fundamental problem we face is that China says little at an official level about its military space policy and doctrine. Chinese counterspace capabilities may be intended purely for deterrence purposes, to be used in warfare at a time of their choosing, or some combination of the two. PLA leaders have informally told U.S. officials and others that it is in the interest of an inferior power to keep secret information about its weaknesses and strengths, and they appear to be following this advice quite strictly. Time and again the U.S. has been rebuffed in seeking greater openness and transparency in Chinese space and larger defense strategy. That said, the PLA publishes an increasing number of papers on these issues that have not received enough attention, the problem, I am told, being a resource constraint.
There is a sizable PLA literature on space conflict, but it is unclear how well this reflects Chinese government thinking, any more than U.S. military journals reflect official U.S. policy. However, China's ASAT and missile defense tests and this literature demonstrate a PLA awareness of the importance of offensive counterspace (OCS) capabilities and strongly suggest that such capabilities are part of China's larger plans for the future - and perhaps missile defense capabilities as well. It is also unclear whether this reflects PLA interest in OCS for warfighting or just for deterrence, though I suspect it is likely a mixture of both.
Should China choose to deploy its demonstrated ASAT system, or more advanced versions of it, U.S. space assets and the military and economic infrastructures they support would be put at risk. One thing is certain - more clarity on PLA and Chinese government thinking on space deterrence, doctrine, space stability, and related issues - and Russian thinking, too are urgently needed and are important to U.S. security. If there is any aspect of space security that needs more resources, space intelligence and analysis is it.
Wikileaks proves a race to space has begun – threats of retaliation make war inevitable
Skosyrev 2-4-2011 (Vladimir is the Observer of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" of Moscow and an Indophile having served as a correspondent of ‘Izvestia’ in India from 1969-74. “China and U.S. Battle in Outer Space” ) BW
The battle for the control of outer space, which had calmed down after the Cold War, has resumed. Its main participants are Beijing and Washington. Disregarding the agreements that say outer space should not be used to military ends, they are knocking down their own satellites. In the opinion of a Nezavisimaya expert, Russia is not a part of this race.
The website WikiLeaks revealed this new sensation. From U.S. diplomatic archives it is clear that they clandestinely tested their anti-satellite weapons. On Feb. 20, 2008, the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS Lake Erie launched a missile that struck the spy satellite USA 193. The SM-3 rocket flew up to 150 miles above the ground and hit its target. This test occurred a year after China hit its own satellite.
So has begun a new secret war in outer space, proclaimed the British newspaper The Telegraph, to which WikiLeaks gave a selection of documents that were saved in the American government’s electronic archives.
An exchange of harsh declarations along diplomatic channels between Washington and Beijing preceded U.S. military operations in outer space.
Recall that on Jan.11, 2007, a Chinese ballistic missile destroyed a satellite that was being used to gather data about the weather. The satellite flew at a height of 530 miles above Earth. Through that the People’s Republic of China demonstrated its ability to disrupt satellite communication, without which the majority of American armed forces would end up in a vulnerable position.
Washington was furious. The American ambassador in Beijing filed a protest against the Chinese government in the strongest of terms. Although American public opinion was comparatively reserved, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice informed Beijing that America can also employ military force to protect its space systems.
“Any purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be interpreted by the U.S. as an infringement of its rights and considered an escalation in a crisis or conflict,” stated Rice. In this regard, а threat to respond with various measures, including military measures, rang out. The secretary of state also pointed out that America had not tested space weapons since 1985.
But one month later, the U.S. had changed its course. Then-U.S. President George Bush decided that diplomacy alone was insufficient. At that point the American spy satellite was knocked down. Officially, Washington promoted the story that it was done in order to prevent its fuel tank — with toxic matter — from falling to Earth.
In fact, the American government sanctioned the testing of space weaponry. In a file marked “secret,” it is noted that the rocket launch was executed by the U.S. command as a test of anti-satellite equipment.
The weapons race in outer space continues to gain momentum. In January 2010 American intelligence spotted a new Chinese experiment. This time Beijing destroyed one of its own rockets at a height of 150 miles above Earth.
The United States called this a test of anti-satellite weaponry. Current Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also lodged a protest against Beijing and demanded an answer to the question: In what direction is the Chinese missile defense program developing?
Beijing did not wait long to respond and accused the U.S. of building offensive laser weapons that can destroy Chinese missiles over PRC territory.
In an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, independent expert Lieutenant-General (ret.) Gennady Evstafiev said, “The WikiLeaks information that the Americans ran an anti-satellite weapons test may be credible. It was an answer to China. Nevertheless they accomplished their goal. The world gasped, having seen the kind of capability China has.”
“This event didn’t cause us to react sharply. Maybe because we’ve been through this already. In 1972 the Soviet Union and the United States agreed not to send weapons into outer space. This was a part of the anti-ballistic missile agreement. But under Bush, America withdrew from this agreement. The agreement not to send weapons into space remains but is constantly eroding. Americans say that they will act in accordance with their national security interests.”
PLA statements prove weaponization is inevitable
Clark 9 (Clark, November 4, 2009, “China Declares Space War Inevitable”, DoD Buzz, , DMintz)
The Obama adminstration must react responsibly to China’s declaration that military operations in space are inevitable, a top China expert says.
“How will the US react to Chinese diplomatic efforts in light of the PLA’s blunt statements on space warfare? This is something the Obama administration has to take into account,” said Dean Cheng, China specialist at Washington’s Heritage Foundation. “Are we going to see outrage, any meaningful reactions to the Chinese statements or again that it was someone speaking out of school and we just aren’t sure.”
Cheng was referring to what appears to mark a major shift in Chinese military and arms control strategy. The head of the PRC’s air force has said in an official interview that military operations in space are an “historical inevitability.”
“As far as the revolution in military affairs is concerned, the competition between military forces is moving towards outer space… this is a historical inevitability and a development that cannot be turned back,” said air force commander Xu Qiliang in an interview with the official People’s Liberation Army Daily.
“Only power can protect peace,” the commander said in an interview celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC’s air force.
For years, Chinese diplomats and military leaders have hewn to the line that the PRC pursued only peaceful uses of outer space. Chinese diplomats, working with Russia, pushed their own version of peaceful agreements on the uses of space, submitting a draft treaty in 2008 at the UN Conference on Disarmament that would have prohibited space-based missile defenses, among other things.
Joan Johnson Freese, professor at the Naval War College and one of the top experts on Chinese miltiary space policy and capabilities, bemoaned the general’s comments, saying they sound “eerily like documents and statements from USAF Space Command.” Freese said the only difference between the two sides is that “the Chinese are still calling for superiority rather than dominance.”
The Bush administration’s National Space Policy, released in October 2006, rejected new space arms control agreements if they would “limit” U.S. options in space. Some analysts believe China was reacting to this policy when it performed its January 11, 2007 anti-satellite test.
However, Cheng of the Heritage Foundation said he does not think the general’s statement “is really much of a departure from what the PLA has been thinking for some time.… What you have is the PLA making that statement publicly.”
Cheng thinks the most significant fact about the general’s declaration is that it came from an Air Force official. Unlike the United States, where the Air Force is inextricably linked to space policy and operations, “until three or four years ago the [Chinese] Air Force did not have an overt role in space issues. What does this suggest about who actually runs China’s space policy and military issues?” he wondered.
Cheng said the policy declaration did not necessarily indicate that the PLA was making new policy. After all, there have been clear indications that the PLA was leaning this way. After the Chinese anti-satellite test, Senior Colonel Yao Yunzhu of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences said that “outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime” and that “if there is a space superpower, it’s not going to be alone, and China is not going to be the only one.”
But Cheng said, “the PLA has never said they would not do military space operations. They just haven’t been quoted at all. Now the silence has ended,” he said.
As an example of how the PLA sometimes makes policy — something the Foreign Ministry can rarely do since it does not have direct access to the PRC president, as does the military — without public declarations having been made, he pointed to the anti-satellite test. While China’s Foreign Ministry hemmed and hawed about just why China performed the test, some of the people who designed the missile’s seeker later received awards.
China is militarizing space—PLA doctrine proves
Zhang 11—PhD in political science at UT Austin (March/April 2011, Baohui, Asian Survey, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, Vol.51, No.2, p.311-332, JSTOR, FS)
This perception of the American lead in space militarization and attempts for its weaponization is a major motive for the Chinese military to develop similar projects and thus avoid U.S. domination in future wars. The PLA believes that control of the commanding heights will decide the outcome of future wars, and China cannot afford to cede that control to the U.S. As a result, space war is a key component of the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) new doctrines. In 2006 the PLAAF released a comprehensive study called Military Doctrines for Air Force, which makes the following statement: In future wars, merely possessing air superiority will no longer be sufficient for seizing the initiative of battles. In significant ways, only obtaining space superiority could ensure controlling the initiative of war. The contest in outer space has become the contest for the new commanding heights. Seizing control of space will mean control of the global commanding heights, which will in turn enable dominance in air, land, and sea battles. Thus, it is impossible to achieve national security without obtaining space security.23
China is developing counter space programs—PLA officials say it’s inevitable
Zhang 11—PhD in political science at UT Austin (March/April 2011, Baohui, Asian Survey, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, Vol.51, No.2, p.311-332, JSTOR, FS)
China’s military space program and its strategies for space warfare have caused rising concerns in the United States. In fact, China’s military intentions in outer space have emerged as one of the central security issues between the two countries. In November 2009, after the commander of the Chinese Air Force called the militarization of space “a historical inevitability,” General Kevin Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, urged China to explain the objectives of its rapidly advancing military space program.1
Indeed, in the wake of China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have attempted to identify China’s motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of a forthcoming revolution in military affairs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future warfare. The comment by the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA.2 In addition, China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional U.S. military advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United States.”3 Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue, China’s military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conventional forces.”4 This perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superiority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms race, whether implicitly or explicitly.
China is developing counterspace capabilities—recent tests and launches prove
DOD Annual Report to Congress ‘10 (2010, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf , FS)
Space and Counterspace Capabilities. China is expanding its space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communications satellite constellations. In parallel, China is developing a multidimensional program to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict. China’s commercial space program has utility for non-military research, but it also demonstrates space launch and control capabilities that have direct military application.
Beijing launched a navigation satellite on April 15, 2009, and plans to have a full network to provide global positioning for military and civilian users by 2015-2020.
China launched Yaogan-6 on February 22, 2009, the 6th in a series of new reconnaissance satellites orbited since 2006.
Russia launched a commercial communications satellite (COMSAT), Asiasat-5, for China on September 11, 2009. Beijing launched a commercial COMSAT, Palapa-D, for Indonesia on August 31, 2009.
China continues development and testing of the Long March V rocket. Intended to lift heavy payloads into space, it will more than double the size of the Low Earth Orbit and Geosynchronous Orbit payloads that China can currently place into orbit. To support these new rockets, China began construction of a launch facility near Wenchang on Hainan Island in 2008.
China is accelerating space weaponization—that leaves the US vulnerable
Morgan 10—PhD in policy studies and senior defense analyst at RAND (2010, Forrest E., RAND Project Air Force, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment” , FS)
This dangerous combination of continued vulnerability, growing dependence, and limited SSA indicate that first-strike stability in space has diminished, and further indications suggest that the rate of erosion is accelerating. While the difficulty of attacking orbital assets remains a stabilizing factor, that factor is shrinking as an increasing number of states acquire capabilities to interrupt space services. Several states are now attempting to develop directed-energy weapons. One of them, Russia, also retains the co-orbital ASAT capability that the Soviet Union developed during the Cold War and has since sold GPS jammers to anyone with the funds to purchase them. As has been the case since the dawn of the space age, any state with ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons has the basic components to field a crude but highly destructive ASAT weapon.16 The proliferation of such threats is troubling, and anxieties have become more acute now that China has begun experimenting with directed-energy weapons and has demonstrated a capability to destroy satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) with a direct-ascent kinetic ASAT weapon.17 Unfortunately, the infrastructure, policies, and attitudes that both enable and constrain U.S. space operations in the current environment are, in many ways, unchanged from when they were developed during the MAD-induced stability of the Cold War. This leaves the United States exposed to the risk of a surprise attack in space unless a deterrence regime can be developed to restore first-strike stability in that domain.18
China is focusing on space militarization—PLA generals confirm
DOD Annual Report to Congress ‘10 (2010, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf , FS)
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) celebrated its 60th Anniversary on November 11, 2009. During the anniversary ceremony, CMC Vice Chairman General Guo Boxiong urged the PLAAF to accelerate the development of new weapons systems, improve the PLAAF’s logistics systems, and improve joint operations training. In an interview on the occasion of the anniversary, PLAAF Commander General Xu Qiliang said that the trend of military competition extending to space is “inevitable” and emphasized the transformation of the PLAAF from a homeland defense focus to one that “integrates air and space,” and that possesses both “offensive and defensive” capabilities.
AT: China just responding to US NSP
China was developing ASATs before the NSP was released
Listner 4-25-2011 (Michael is a legal and policy analyst with a focus on issues relating to space law and policy. Michael has numerous writings on the topic published in legal and online journals and also writes a regular column on space law and policy at . Michael received his JD in 2001 from Regent University of School of Law in Virginia Beach, “An exercise in the Art of War: China’s National Defense white paper, outer space, and the PPWT” ) BW
Congress inquired whether the National Space Policy could have been the impetus to the PRC’s ASAT test, to which the State Department’s April 23, 2007, report concluded that:
Even before issuance of the U.S. space policy, China conducted three previous tests of this direct-ascent ASAT weapon and, by September 2006, China had used a ground-based laser to illuminate a U.S. satellite in several tests of a system to “blind” satellites.
Before and after this latest ASAT test, PRC military and civilian analysts have voiced concerns about China’s perceived vulnerability against U.S. dominance in military and space power. After the test, a Senior Colonel of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences said that “outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime” and that “if there is a space superpower, it’s not going to be alone, and China is not going to be the only one.”
This counters that the proposition that the PRC’s motivation to perform the test was in response to the National Space Policy, and that the PRC had other rationales for performing it.
China is rapidly militarizing space—PLA generals say it’s urgent because of many rival space programs
Zhang 11—PhD in political science at UT Austin (March/April 2011, Baohui, Asian Survey, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, Vol.51, No.2, p.311-332, JSTOR, FS)
Another driver of the PLA’s efforts to counter U.S. dominance in space is the time factor. There is a genuine sense of urgency about controlling the commanding heights in space. The U.S. is seen as already possessing a decisive lead in the race toward space hegemony. As observed by Lieutenant General Ge Dongsheng, vice president of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences: Establishing space capability is not only important but also urgent. This is due to the fact that the U.S. and Russia have already taken the steps and now enjoy a vast lead over us. Even India, Japan, and European countries have ambitious plans to develop their own space capabilities. Under this situation, if we do not hasten implementing our own plan, there will be the possibility of having to face a generational gap in space capabilities.24
AT: Can’t know Chinese intent
The space race has started- empirical actions and Chinese statements.
Chang 9 - author of The Coming Collapse of China (11/6, Gordon, “The Space Arms Race Begins”, ) NYan
But do we really need to talk to the Chinese to figure out their intentions? In August 2006, the Chinese lasered at least one American satellite with the apparent intention of blinding it, a direct attack on the United States. In the following January, the People's Liberation Army destroyed one of its old weather satellites with a ground-launched missile, sending more than 35,000 fragments into low-earth orbit.
The Chinese want to dominate space. General Xu did the United States a favor by removing any doubt about where his country stands. Whether we like it or not, there is now a brutal competition between the United States and China to control the high ground of space.
AT: China space cooperation
Cooperation with China on space activities is impossible, China will continue to cheat and conceal weapons programs
Pollpeter 08 - China Project Manager for DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, specializes in China national security issues with a focus on China’s space program, he also served in research positions at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the RAND Corporation, B.A. degree in China Studies from Grinnell College and a M.A. degree in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies [NOTE: DGI=Defense Group Inc. a private consultation company for defense initiatives that works in conjunction with numerous US defense agencies including the DOD, DHS, DOE and DOJ] (Kevin, March 2008, “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOG DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE”, )JCP
Moreover, using cooperative activities to increase transparency and trust is likely to be very difficult. China’s ASAT test in January 2007, and its refusal to admit the test until well after the event, demonstrated China’s intransigence and lack of transparency involving space matters even when provided with incontrovertible evidence.
Increasing trust in regards to space activities appears to be difficult when space operations, in particular counterspace operations, may figure prominently in Chinese efforts to strike asymmetrically at the United States in the event of an armed conflict.100 In the past, cooperative efforts with China’s military have been difficult. The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), designed to reduce the risk of accidents and miscommunication in the air and on the sea, has been bogged down since the collision of a Chinese fighter with a U.S. reconnaissance plane due to Chinese insistence on using the venue to claim sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone. Even when the United States transferred military technology to China during the 1980s, the Chinese were reluctant to provide the United States with the basic motivations for certain technologies.101 Secrecy surrounding the Chinese space program is similarly tight, and Chinese space experts appear to be under strict guidelines and normally only divulge information that has already come out in the Chinese press. China’s space experts also appear to function as a conduit for disinformation. One prominent Chinese space expert concludes in an English language publication that “It is obvious that assertions judging China’s manned spacecraft program as a military threat are baseless.”102 Yet, in an internal military publication the same author argues that human spaceflight technology “can carry a large amount of effective military payload” and can be used for information support missions as well as function as a weapon or as a weapons platform.103
AT: US too far ahead of China
China’s space program will inevitably catch up with the US and hurt American space leadership
Pollpeter 08 - China Project Manager for DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, specializes in China national security issues with a focus on China’s space program, he also served in research positions at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the RAND Corporation, B.A. degree in China Studies from Grinnell College and a M.A. degree in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies [NOTE: DGI=Defense Group Inc. a private consultation company for defense initiatives that works in conjunction with numerous US defense agencies including the DOD, DHS, DOE and DOJ] (Kevin, March 2008, “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOG DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE”, )JCP
Nevertheless, China’s progress in the space arena cannot be discounted. China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race. It neither has a sufficient foundation nor the resources to conduct one. Yet, China’s rise as a space power will most likely have a net negative-sum effect for the United States over the long term. It has clearly laid a foundation to become a peer. Moreover, while Chinese technology and operations tempo may not equal those of the major space powers, as China’s space technology improves and becomes more reliable, whether China’s space technology matches the major space powers may become irrelevant. At some point, its technology may simply be good enough to support modern war and be competitive in the marketplace. Taking satellite imagery as an example, one-meter resolution satellite imagery, now widely available commercially, is considered the threshold for widespread military utility. China does not need to develop technologies with capabilities on a par with U.S. satellite capabilities to achieve desired effects.
Because of this, it is doubtful that merely staying one generation ahead of the competition, as advocated by the Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, will be enough to maintain effective leadership in this area. Even if U.S. space power does not decline in absolute terms, China’s advance in space technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space.
Indian ASATs now
India just tested an ASAT
Listner, 11 (Michael, The Space Review, “India’s ABM test: a validated ASAT capability or a paper tiger?,” 3/28,
The March 7 edition of The Hindu reported that India performed a test of the interceptor missile portion of its ballistic missile defense system on March 6, 2011. The test, the sixth of the series, was reportedly a success and a validation of the technology to be integrated into India’s defense system.1
The target missile, a modified Prithvi, was launched at 9:32 a.m. from Launch Complex III of the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, Orissa. The modified Prithvi mimicked the trajectory of a ballistic missile with a 600-kilometer (324-nautical-mile) range. Radars at different locations tracked the modified Prithvi, determined its trajectory, and passed the information in real time to Mission Control Centre (MCC) to launch the interceptor. The interceptor used a directional warhead to maneuver the interceptor to the modified Prithvi before exploding. As part the announcement, V.K. Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Director-General, stated this latest success demonstrated India’s capability to effectively neutralize satellites belonging to an adversary.2
While not the primary purpose of the test of India’s ABM program, Sarawat’s statement reflects India’s interest in anti-satellite (ASAT) technology, and it has reportedly put together the necessary components to acquire such a capacity (see “India’s missile defense/anti-satellite nexus”, The Space Review, May 10, 2010). The question remains that, even with the necessary technology to acquire an ASAT capacity, does India now have a proven capability?
ABMs and ASATs
The history of India’s quest for an ASAT capability dovetails with the development of its ABM program. Unlike the ABM capability sought by India, its endeavor towards an ASAT capability is fairly new. India’s indigenously built ABM system has been in development for several decades and only began to bear fruit in November 2006 when an intercept was performed outside the atmosphere. India followed up this success with others in an effort to deploy an operational ABM capability sometime in 2012.
According to Sarawat, there are two phases in India’s ABM program. Phase 1, which the March 6, 2011 test was a part, will develop a capability to intercept missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,080 nautical miles) coming from an altitude of 150 kilometers (81 nautical miles). The next test planned later this year is supposed to validate this capability3. Phase 2 of the program is intended to develop a capability to intercept missiles with a range up to 5,000 kilometers (2,700 nautical miles), which theoretically would give India the capability to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
Chinese ASAT test and seeds of India’s ASAT interest
The Chinese government surprised the international community with the intentional destruction of its weather satellite Fengyun 1C on January 11, 2007, using its SC-19 ballistic missile to carry a kinetic kill vehicle4. The test was the first successful test of China’s ASAT, and it was performed without warning to the international community and likely constituted a technical violation of China’s obligations under the Outer Space Treaty5. Aside from international criticism, China suffered no sanctions for the test and the resulting debris cloud.
The United States took particular notice that the test represented the demonstration of a potential threat against its robust outer space systems, which it has become increasingly reliant upon. What didn’t garner immediate attention was India’s concern that China’s ASAT test represented a similar threat to its growing investment in outer space systems. It wasn’t until 2009 that India started making public gestures that it was interested in finding a way to secure it space assets.
If there were any doubts about India’s intentions they were cleared when Saraswat publically acknowledged that India was developing and bringing together the basic technologies to create a system that could be used against satellites belonging to an adversary. Saraswat made a similar statement after the March 6 test6. The decision to adapt India’s existing ABM technologies to the ASAT role was doubtless encouraged by the ancillary capability demonstrated by the United States when it adapted its ABM system to deorbit USA 193 in 2008.
Dedicated weapon or capability?
It is unclear whether India’s purported ASAT capacity is intended to be a dedicated weapons program or a simply a capability ancillary to missile defense. To illustrate, the test against Fengyun 1C in 2007 not only that demonstrated that China had the capability to deorbit a satellite, but that it also had a weapons program dedicated towards the creation of that capability.
When the United States planned to de-orbit the crippled USA 193, critics argued that the United States was planning on testing an ASAT7. The United States did not have a specific program dedicated to develop and deploy an ASAT; however, it did demonstrate that it had an ancillary capability to its ABM program that could be used in the ASAT role.
The distinction between China’s ASAT test and the de-orbit of USA 193 is important because China’s test was the result of an active effort to develop and deploy a dedicated weapon system, which was designed to deny an adversary the use of its space assets. Conversely, the United States demonstrated it had an ASAT capability ancillary to missile defense that was used to de-orbit a crippled satellite before it could cause harm.
India’s public statements about its purported ASAT capability seem to fit neither an active program to develop an ASAT or an ancillary capability to ballistic missile defense. On one hand, public statements made by India’s officials indicate that their goal is to protect its space assets and deny the use of space to an adversary.
In the same vein India’s officials claim their ASAT ambitions are strictly a deterrent and not meant to be used and that “India’s policy is that it will not weaponise space, and we are committed to the peaceful uses of outer space.”8 The conflicting statements give the impression that India intends to deploy dedicated ASAT capability along with the deployment of its ABM system, but at the same time considers the ASAT role an ancillary capability that it does not intend to use.
It is perhaps this ambiguity and uncertainty where India’s ABM program ends and its ASAT ambitions begin that India is relying upon to make China wary of interfering with its outer space assets.
Proven capability or semantics?
Whether India’s ASAT is “proven” as postured by India’s officials is a matter of semantics and given the geopolitical realities that India exists within it may be all that it can rely upon.
On March 9, 2011, the Secure World Foundation held a panel discussion concerning the militarization of India’s space program. Victoria Samson, the Director of the Washington office of the Secure World Foundation noted, “A missile defense program can very easily be used as a technology demonstrator program for an ASAT capability.”9
As noted above, the United States demonstrated this when it modified components of its ABM system to intercept and de-orbit the crippled USA 193. The effort was successful on its first attempt, but the plan for the intercept did allow for multiple attempts if necessary.
India has publically acknowledged that it brought together the basic technologies needed to create an ASAT capability; however, integrating the necessary technologies may give India an ASAT capacity, but does not necessarily give India a proven ASAT capability. The only way for India to demonstrate that it has a proven ASAT capability is to perform a test on a target satellite.
Addressing the audience at the Secure World Foundation panel discussion, Bharath Gopalaswamy stated that the scientific and military community of India was open to a test, if it is performed with careful consideration of where and how it was performed and that such a test might occur within the next 5 to 10 years.10
A prospect such as the one presented with USA 193 may not manifest itself for India to test its ASAT, unless it intentionally places a satellite in orbit in order to manufacture a situation similar to the one that the United States faced with USA 193. Otherwise, India would have to utilize one of its own existing satellites already in stable orbit. When questioned about which satellite India would likely choose for a test, Gopalaswamy identified India’s RITSAT-2, which orbits at an altitude of 551 kilometers (298 nautical miles), as a likely candidate.11
Even if India fulfills its obligations under the Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, it is questionable whether such a test would be looked upon favorably. The altitude of the satellite is such that its destruction could produce a debris field, which could linger in orbit for a considerable time and represent a hazard to other spacecraft.12 Furthermore, the test of an ASAT could be considered an aggressive military action and would be inconsistent with India’s stance that it aligns itself with the Outer Space Treaty’s precept of the peaceful use of outer space.13
An attempt to perform such a test unilaterally without consulting the international community could result in serious international repercussions and could even affect its burgeoning relations with the United States in terms of space cooperation.14Although China avoided serious international repercussions from its ASAT test in 2007, it is unlikely that India would enjoy similar immunity and could find itself at the center of a serious political and diplomatic tempest, a fact that India’s officials are likely aware of.15
India would also have to consider what a unilateral test could do to its credibility in the international circle with relation to orbital debris mitigation. India is a member of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), and it contributed significantly to crafting that organizations mitigation guidelines. A successful test of an ASAT by India and the resulting debris field could seriously erode it credibility in that arena.
There is also a possibility that an ASAT test could inadvertently spark an international crisis with China. The resulting debris from an ASAT test could contaminate a large orbital area and potentially create a hazard to Chinese satellites. Regardless of the debris produced by an ASAT test, China might consider such a test as a provocative action.
India also has to consider the possibility that a test could fail, and such a failure might not go unnoticed. Even though India may have the technology to produce an ASAT capacity it does not guarantee that it will work the first time out. The deorbit of USA 193 performed by the United States was planned with multiple attempts to take down the satellite to ensure the satellite was safely deorbited. The stakes of an ASAT test for India are far greater.
The uncertainty of India’s ASAT capability works to its benefit, and that uncertainty can be a powerful tool for deterrence. India could effectively squander that uncertainty if it decides to perform a test of its ASAT and it does not perform as touted first time out. A failure would not only be a blow to the technical and scientific community of India, but it could also affect India’s national security as it would provide China a level of certainty that India does not have an effective ASAT capability.
It is uncertainty surrounding India’s ASAT ambitions that may be its best weapon to protect its space assets, and it may be what India is ultimately seeking. The combined statements of Saraswat after the March 6th test concerning India’s “proven” ASAT capability and the statements made by Bharath Gopalaswamy at the Secure World Foundation panel discussion touting a test of India’s ASAT capacity in five to ten years may be orchestrated posturing from within India’s government designed to stoke the flames of uncertainty with China as the intended audience.
Conclusion
The question of whether India has a proven ASAT will not be answered until India performs a full-up test. Technical realities, international politics, and geographical concerns make such a test chancy.
Unless a situation arises where India feels that it needs to employ its ASAT, India’s best weapon of choice is uncertainty, and if uncertainty is India’s strategy then its ASAT capability will likely remain a paper tiger for the arms control community and the intelligence community to ponder and for its neighbor China to consider.
India weaponizing now- galvanized by Chinese ASAT tests.
Ramachandran 8 (6/18, Sudha, Asia Times, “India goes to war in space”, ) NYan
While the idea of an aerospace command was mooted by the Indian Air Force in the late 1990s, it does seem that the growing display of Chinese military might in space prompted India to act towards taking the first steps to dealing with the looming threat. Antony's reference to the threat posed by "military space systems in the neighborhood" to India's space assets indicates that the China factor was an important consideration in Delhi setting up the Integrated Space Cell.
While the China factor might have hastened the decision, there are broader reasons behind its setting up. "With the army, the air force and the navy relying on space-based communication satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance or operations and the Indian armed forces adopting a joint doctrine that enhances greater lateral integration between the three services, an Integrated Space Cell has become a necessity," Prabhakar said. Besides, "Such a cell is an organizational initiative, essential to the operational requirements of space-based assets for dual civilian-military operations and applications."
Iranian ASATs now
Iran developing dual use rockets now- could lead to EMP use.
Mazol 9 - Research Associate, George C. Marshall Institut (February, James, Marshall Policy Outlook, “Persia in Space: Implications for U.S. National Security”, ) NYan
The state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported that Iran successfully launched a Safir-2 rocket carrying an Omid research and telecommunications satellite into orbit on February 2. 1 The Omid satellite’s capabilities are not as troubling as the advanced rocket system used to deliver the Iranian Sputnik into space. Indeed, the former head of Israel’s space program, Isaac Ben-Israel described the Omid as “quite primitive” and “not so much a satellite as a box that can collect data.” 2 The Safir rocket that propelled the Omid through the atmosphere is a much more serious concern for U.S. national security. Iran has now joined the elite ranks of space-faring nations. The launch’s timing, of course, coincided with the 30th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution’s triumph in Tehran and just days before the U.N.’s Security Council members plus Germany met in Frankfurt to discuss Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Iran first orbited a satellite in 2005, but aboard a Russian rocket. 3 This indigenous launch shows Iran’s growing technical capacity and mastery of ballistic missiles. The Iranian government said “promoting the national space industry” 4 remains the main objective of its indigenous space program. Iranian President Ahmadinejad told state television, “We need [space-related] science for friendship, brotherhood, and justice.” 5 America should be skeptical: Iran can and probably is using space-related science to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying nuclear payloads. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) expressed similar concerns after confirming Iran’s claims. A spokesman said: “The mere fact that this launch involves dual-purpose capabilities is what causes concern to us in this government. The technology that’s used to…propel this satellite into space is one that could also be used to propel long-range ballistic missiles.” 6 A newly space-faring Iran only provides further impetus for constructing the comprehensive, multi-layered missile defense system America has begun building in Europe and at home. The Safir-2 is a two- (or possibly three-) staged liquid-propulsion rocket. Israeli experts stated the Safir-2 is “a product of nearly 20 years of ballistic missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea, whose No-Dong served as the baseline for Tehran’s Shihab [or Shahab] series.” 7 February 2’s launch represents a significant advance for Iran’s space program; an earlier attempt to test the Safir-2’s suborbital capabilities failed in August 2008. The Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) probably powers the Safir’s initial boost before an additional propulsion system takes over. Iran’s successful Shahab-3 test in July 2008 was confirmed by western intelligence services, despite Tehran’s awkward choice to manipulate official photographs of the test. 8 The Safir-2 vehicle significantly increases the Shahab-3’s 1200 kilometer (km) range. If the Iranians can reach low earth orbit (LEO), they are on track to build an ICBM. Last November, Iran improved its effective targeting range by demonstrating the two-stage Sajjil intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). In contrast to the liquid-fueled Shahab, the solid-fueled Sajjil is more mobile and less susceptible to preemptive strikes. 9 Iran could utilize its space-launch capability in other ways besides building long-range ballistic missiles to threaten the U.S. and its friends and allies. Tehran might mimic the Chinese and develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. The ASAT presents a challenge to the American military’s “Achilles heel: its space based assets and their related ground installations.” 10 On January 11, 2007, the Chinese military destroyed an aging weather satellite in LEO using an MRBM. The ballistic missile’s “kill vehicle” collided with the satellite at an altitude of 864 kilometers. The Chinese realize both the importance and vulnerability of American military space assets. One People’s Liberation Army (PLA) analyst concluded U.S. military space assets constitute its “soft ribs” and “for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice.” 11 Iran may take the necessary steps, including developing a kinetic kill vehicle, to build up an ASAT program (perhaps, with Chinese assistance). Also, Iran could punch America’s soft ribs by launching an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack in space. In 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission warned that the United States could face a “space Pearl Harbor.” 12 The consequences of a space Pearl Harbor would be particularly harmful to the United States given our dependence on space. As space defense analyst Robert Butterworth notes: “Far more than any other country, the U.S. depends on space for national and tactical intelligence, military operations, and civil and commercial benefits. A ‘scorched space’ attack…would hurt the U.S. most of all.” 13 This option is particularly salient in light of Iranian reluctance to suspend its nuclear program. Iran could elect to detonate a nuclear weapon (or multiple weapons) in space, causing an EMP. In this worst-case-scenario, the mere ability to wreak havoc on U.S. satellites in orbit affords the Iranians significant leverage. The Claremont Institute’s Brian Kennedy reminds us, “Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP.” 14
Nonstate actors ASATs now
Nonstate actors also have incentives to attack US space assets
Redifer, 11 - LtCol, USMC, Master of Science in Applied Physics and Master of Science in Space Systems Operations, Naval Postgraduate School (Stephen, “TAKING THE INITIATIVE – PROTECTING US INTERESTS IN SPACE,” )
Since the 2007 test of a kinetic kill anti-satellite system by the Chinese military, the threat in space posed by the People’s Republic of China has been of growing concern to the United States. China continues to build its national power through rapid economic growth and advances in science and technology, and recent developments in the People’s Liberation Army demonstrate a corresponding desire to extend Chinese influence beyond mainland China. Not surprisingly, Chinese military leaders have expressed both their interest in space and their understanding of the US dependence on space-based assets; in fact, “China is developing a multi-dimensional program to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by potential adversaries.”11
Additionally, the Russian Federation continues to express concern over US space and missile defense initiatives; political-strategic uncertainty in US-Russian relations will likely always be present, and it is often unclear how US actions will be perceived by Russia. In late summer of 2009, General Alexander Zelin, Commander of the Russian Air Force, stated that “Russia's armed forces it must be ready to deter potential aggressors at regional and global levels in peaceful times and to rebuff an armed aggression” and asserted that Russia was developing a new surface-to-air rocket for the purpose of air and space defense12. In 2003, the Russians provided Iraq with GPS jammers, which proved moderately successful against some precision strike weapons 13 and, regardless of success, demanded attention from military planners. Despite numerous changes and upheaval since the end of the Cold War, Russia cannot be ignored: “[s]ince 1999, the United States’ share of global GDP has declined, while that of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) has increased. By 2014, the International Monetary Fund predicts that BRIC countries will represent more than 27 percent of global GDP, and the United States and the EU will represent less than 20 percent each.”14
Finally, non-state actors as well as “rogue” states have expressed an interest and a capability to interfere with or deny the use of space systems. Indonesia has jammed a Chinese communications satellite, Iran and Turkey have jammed satellite broadcasts within their countries, and Iran jammed Voice of America broadcasts in 2003.15 Perhaps more significantly, Iran launched a 600-pound satellite into orbit in February 2009, an accomplishment that took years of preparation and indicates that Iran has developed a multi-stage rocket. Given the current US advantage and commensurate dependence on space power, a rogue state or non-state actor would have little to lose but much to gain by attacking US space systems and space infrastructure; such a state or non-state actor would also not suffer as directly as the US should it take an action that polluted the space environment.
AT: Going second provides political cover
Going second can’t solve- political cover doesn’t apply to the US.
Oberg 7 – formerly worked at NASA mission control for 22 years (3/12, James, The Space Review, “The dozen space weapons myths”, ) NYan
12. Other nations are justified in building “space weapons” because the US has done so, or is about to do so.
This argument never seems to work both ways. It always justifies any other country’s space weapons, laying the blame on something the US has done, may do, is thinking about doing, or is merely accused of doing in the mass media. But it never seems to justify any US hardware-development response to actual space weapons deployed by other countries, from the cannon mounted on a Soviet manned space station, to its operational killer satellites and orbital nuclear weapon launchers, to the recent Chinese anti-satellite missile test. The US did not respond in kind to those weapons because they made no military sense—there was no mindless reflex, but instead a rational assessment of security requirements. Those assessments usually can be made regardless of the actions of other parties, especially regarding the level of required space weapons.
Weaponization risks accidental nuclear war
Space weaponization risks accidental nuclear war, undermines arms control, and makes space unusable
Hoey, 6 – research associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (2/27/06, Matthew, The Space Review, “Military space systems: the road ahead,” )RK
Many people believe that a deployed anti-satellite capability and an ability to attack targets on or near the Earth’s surface from space would create a global climate of insecurity both by enhancing current risks and by creating new problems. These new and increased risks would be the byproducts not only of systems to be deployed by the United States but also of the subsequent arms race in space which could be expected to result thanks to responses by China, Russia, the European Union, and perhaps Japan. Perhaps the most consequential impact would be increasing the probability of accidental nuclear war. Space-based weapons could shorten the road to armed conflict, whether nuclear or conventional. In the event that a space asset of one nation was attacked by another (on purpose or by accident), an immediate military response would be triggered, shortening the diplomatic process while escalating the armed conflict. Once employed regularly, anti-satellite systems and space weapons would litter LEO with debris, which in turn would permanently compromise our collective ability to explore the heavens and use space for constructive commercial purposes. The weaponization of space and the deployment of ASAT systems would undermine existing international arms control treaties that are already under stress. In addition, they would fly in the face of the collective will of the international community, which has demanded a ban on weapons in space for two decades and repeatedly been blocked by the United States. For those who share these concerns, one thing is certain: the time for international negotiations on a treaty to ban weapons in space is long overdue. Within a very few years, this potential development could become a reality.
ORS solves space Pearl Harbor
ORS reconstitution capabilities solve the impact to a space pearl harbor
Felt, 10 - USAF Commander, Space Test Operations Squadron Space Development and Test Wing Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (Eric, “Responsive Space Funding Challenges and Solutions: Avoiding a Tragedy of the Commons,” High Frontier, May, )
The reasons for pursuing responsive space, defined for the purposes of this paper as small satellites that can be rapidly acquired and launched “on demand,” remain at least as valid today as when the ORS program was founded in 2007. These reasons/ trends will continue to drive our nation’s space enterprise toward more responsive space solutions. The four primary reasons for pursuing responsive space remain:
1. Increasing vulnerability of space capabilities. While our nation is becoming increasingly dependent on space capabilities, those capabilities are also becoming increasingly vulnerable. As a nation we must “pull our heads from the sand” and avoid a potential space “Pearl Harbor” by addressing this growing vulnerability.1 The risk can be mitigated by either reducing our dependence on space capabilities or by making our space capabilities more robust. By providing a more dispersed architecture and rapid reconstitution capabilities, responsive space makes our nation’s space capabilities more robust against all potential threats, from anti-satellite weapons, to space debris, to launch failure, and even to acquisition failure.2
ORS key to military
Dramatic steps towards an operationally responsive spacelift program need to be taken or our military effectiveness will collapse in the event of an ASAT attack even if our satellites are not attacked natural phenomena and mechanical failure will ensure collapse in military readiness
Stanley 2 - Major, U.S. Air Force (Robert W., February 2002, “SPACELIFT – THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF AMERICAN SPACE POWER” )JCP
America’s reliance on space-based assets continues to grow dramatically following the surprisingly successful integration of these capabilities with our conventional military during the Gulf War of 1990-91. Our regional CINCs now count on space-based platforms to enable such capabilities as navigation, communications, meteorological support and ISR. Unfortunately, these capabilities are vulnerable not just to enemy attack, but also to natural phenomena and simple mechanical or software failure.2 These vulnerabilities mean the ability to quickly replace a neutralized satellite may decide the next conflict.
Our nation’s capacity to replace damaged satellites and ensure fully operational constellations is dependent on our fragile spacelift program. To provide the type of support the warfighting CINCs must have, three major areas of this program must be enhanced. First, current spacelift is unresponsive. Months, and even years may pass before a space asset is in place after a CINC identifies the need for support. Secondly, the U.S. government needs to ensure domestic spacelift contractors are allowed to operate efficiently on government-owned launch ranges. Competition from dynamic foreign launch agencies continues to weaken the domestic industry upon which our warfighting CINCs depend. National security and the health of this critical industry are inextricably linked. Finally, America’s launch infrastructure, its key components as well as many of its functions are too fragile, and lack redundancy. Astonishingly, warfighting CINCs are largely unaware of the tenuous nature of the space support they now take for granted.
ORS key to deterrence by denial
Improving space defenses creates deterrence by denial
Rendleman, 10 - Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (James, Astropolitics, 8:220–255, 2010, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Ebsco Political Science)
Deterrence by Denying Benefits
Deterrence by denying benefits can be achieved by deploying systems that can disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, or otherwise negate the adversary’s weapon systems or effects they are trying to achieve. Denying benefits can be achieved through defensive and offensive weapon systems. For example, space defenses that can successfully destroy, defeat, or marginalize a kinetic-kill ASAT interceptor are an example of a capability that can provide deterrence by denying benefits. So, would be the development of the capability to perform anticipatory defensive measures to destroy ASAT launchers, or engage adversary sensor and targeting systems before an attack takes place. Another example is employing a responsive space capability to sustain, and then continue effective space operations, even in the midst or wake of major adversary attacks. Having the ability to launch satellites on need, or in anticipation of attack, could reduce the prospect that an adversary could cripple U.S. ability to execute needed space operations when wanted. Hardened systems could be employed to survive harsh environments; similarly, tactics, techniques, and procedures could be used to enable a satellite system to operate through dazzling or jamming attacks. Finally, one could consider use of non-space systems to provide redundancy and achieve the function objectives of the space system an adversary may choose to target. For example, this tactic could involve the use of fiber-optic cable or relay systems bouncing data off of high-altitude airships, or manned and unmanned aircraft to provide the needed ‘‘high-ground’’ and space-like communications access.
Expanding responsive spacelift is the best near-term strategy for deterrence by denial
Morgan, 10 - defense policy researcher working in RAND Corporation's Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force (Forrest, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space,”
Finally, the United States needs to continue efforts to make its space lift system, as well as its satellite manufacturing capabilities, more responsive in order to demonstrate U.S. capabilities for rapid replenishment. Faster replacement of lost satellites means a smaller tactical benefit for an opponent that attacks them. Because other means of deterrence by denial require technological advances and costly changes or augmentation to the existing orbital infrastructure, rapid replenishment and terrestrial backup are probably the best near-term avenues for denying the benefits of an attack on U.S. space assets.
Concealing weaknesses in current satellites and upgrading defenses on future satellites contributes to deterrence by denial
Morgan, 10 - defense policy researcher working in RAND Corporation's Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force (Forrest, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space,”
Enhancing Space Deterrence by Denying Adversaries the Benefits of Attack
Even a multifaceted, punishment-based deterrence strategy may not be sufficiently potent or credible to discourage an adversary facing the prospect of war with the United States. Therefore, a comprehensive U.S. space deterrence strategy should also focus efforts on persuading potential adversaries that the probability of obtaining sufficient benefit from attacking space assets would not be high enough to make it worth suffering the inevitable costs of U.S. retribution. Part of such a strategy would entail perception management: The United States should, to the greatest extent possible, conceal vulnerabilities of its space systems and demonstrate the ability to operate effectively without space support. However, perception management can only go so far in the face of observable weaknesses. Therefore, the strategy should also pursue multiple avenues to make vulnerable U.S. space systems more resilient and defendable, thereby demonstrating tangible capabilities to deny potential adversaries the benefits of attacking in space. An added benefit to the United States of incorporating such denial approaches in the national space deterrence regime is that they would make the services that space systems provide more robust against loss should deterrence fail.
Although satellites are inherently difficult to defend, those who design, procure, and operate space systems should, to the extent feasible and affordable, invest in capabilities to do so. Passive defenses— such as shuttered optics, shields and filters against EMP and RF attack, onboard subsystem redundancy, antijam technologies, and so on—should be installed on all future high-priority military and intelligence satellites, and the Department of Defense and Air Force should explore the possibilities of subsidizing some of these capabilities on commercial systems supporting national security missions. Efforts should be made to develop the necessary enhancements to propulsion systems and propellant capacities to improve satellite maneuverability, along with the ability to detect, assess, and respond to threats quickly enough to evade them. Research should continue in efforts to develop onboard active defenses, and novel approaches, such as microsatellite escorts, should be fully explored. Because passive defenses and many active defense systems are not readily observable, they contribute nothing to deterrence unless would-be attackers believe or, at least, suspect that they are in place. Consequently, as stated earlier, perception management will continue to be an important dimension in the tacit communication between U.S. authorities and prospective attackers. Specific vulnerabilities of U.S. space systems must never be divulged, and the resilience of the orbital infrastructure and its defenses should be emphasized wherever plausible. Nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge the fiscal and technical constraints on space defense, at least for the foreseeable future, and remember that potential adversaries are generally aware of those limitations as well.
Therefore, in addition to the foregoing efforts, the United States should strive to reduce the potential benefits of attacking its space systems by dispersing the capabilities they provide across a larger number of platforms and by placing redundant capabilities on orbit. Today, many national security space missions are hosted on platforms that support multiple payloads and users. Similarly, some missions, such as imagery collection, require satellites that are large, expensive, and easily detected and tracked. Both conditions have evolved for sound, practi cal reasons: The first is the result of efforts to manage the high costs of space lift with maximum economic efficiency, and the second is driven by mission requirements. Nevertheless, they both concentrate capabilities into nodes that are lucrative targets of attack, offering substantial payoffs to potential adversaries. A strategy to reduce the benefits of such attacks would be, to the extent feasible and affordable, to disperse missions onto separate platforms and place redundant capabilities on orbit. Ideally, new systems would be designed around distributed, multisatellite technologies, such as those used by GPS.11
Military launch key to hardpower
Loss of space capabilities cripples our military
Burton, 7 - Lt Col. USAF [“GLOBALIZED SPACELIFT: A THREAT TO ASSURED ACCESS”, , liam]
In Operations ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM, 60 percent of military communications bandwidth was delivered by commercial satellite providers. During IRAQI FREEDOM that number rose to 80 percent and is expected to rise in future conflicts.118 This commercial communication capability is critical to the warfighter’s ability to command and control air and ground forces, disseminate warning and intelligence data and pilot unmanned aerial vehicles, to name a few.
Equally important to the warfighter is the data provided by commercial remote sensing and imaging satellites. These systems contribute to the development of flight publications, aeronautical and nautical charts, digital terrain elevation data and escape and evasion charts,119 all of which are critical in executing combat operations. Commercial systems are becoming more widely used as the intelligence community looks for more cost effective ways to deliver capability.120 In fact, in 2005, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency let contracts worth $500 million for commercial high-resolution imagery through 2010 and awarded Digital Globe and OrbImage $500 million each to ensure they could launch replacement satellites later in the decade.121
Clearly the U.S. military is becoming more reliant on commercial capabilities to conduct operations. Curtailment or denial of these capabilities by an adversary would result in considerably reduced operational tempo, greater friction on the battlefield, and ultimately a significant reduction in combat effectiveness. These are avoidable risks the military should not be forced to assume.
Increasing commitment to ORS is vital to eliminating US vulnerability in space
Peel 8- Lt Col, USAF (Scott D., October 30, “Fixing the Nation’s Space Launch Woes: Operationally Responsive Space for Tomorrow’s Joint Force Commander—Panacea or Pipedream”, Naval War College, , Mintz)
Introduction
The successful launch and orbit of the United States’ first satellite, Explorer-1, from Cape Canaveral on 31 January 1958 marked the nation’s first step in its “space race” with its Cold War competitor the Soviet Union. More importantly, it was a watershed event that ushered in a new military operating media that offered rapid, around-the-clock access to any location in the world. The intervening fifty years have seen the nation grow from fledging space explorer to the most dominant space power in the world, to include operating more national and military space systems than the rest of the world combined.
History has demonstrated on multiple occasions that a superior force or capability is worthless if it is not at the right location, at the right time, and integrated effectively to ensure unity of effort. Sadly, the nation’s space providers have been forced to rely on a strategy of forward-deployed forces due to protracted satellite preparation, launch, and deployment timelines—a long recognized Achilles heel and potential critical vulnerability. In order to meet emergent space needs of combatant commanders on timelines predicated on operational need, the Department of Defense (DOD) recently unveiled a new construct called Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). While ORS is a positive step toward addressing space power’s most significant operational issues, additional actions are still necessary to enhance requisite integrated planning and coordination. This paper will provide a brief background of the issue, analyze current ORS activities, and identify areas requiring further activity, as well as recommending some possible solutions to aid in timely campaign planning and operational execution. While briefly addressed, the focus of this paper is not on the technical capabilities of proposed satellites and launch vehicles.
Space assets key to hegemony
Current space vulnerabilities incentivize attacks on US space assets – it could destroy the entire US military
Sejba, 10 - USAF Congressional Budget Liaison Officer Budget and Appropriations Liaison Directorate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget Secretary of the Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC (Timothy, “ Deterrence for Space: Is Operationally Responsive Space Part of the Solution?”, High Frontier, May, )
Deny the Benefits—“To Protect and Continue Service”
Now about a week ago I was sitting with our new chief (General Norton A. Schwartz), and I told him I get the same question over and over. I get this question when I testify, I get this question when I get out in public audiences like this, and the question always goes, actually there are two questions. First question is, are we too reliant on space? And the second question is, what happens if we lose space capabilities? And to the first, I say no we’re not too reliant on space, much like our reliance on airpower, it shapes the way America fights. Space shapes the way America fights. And we must continue to have that kind of capability to continue to fight the way we do, which is really the answer to the second question—what happens if we lose it? Well I believe it creates a time warp in the opposite direction, you don’t go forward in time, you go backwards in time. We get slower, our actions are less precise. ~ General C. Robert Kehler21
Offices such as the Space Protection Program, a joint program between the National Reconnaissance Office and AFSPC, are important to current and future space systems.22 Yet some argue that protection will be too expensive or will likely fail. From 1957 through 2007 the US invested nearly one and a half trillion dollars in space.23 In 2008 alone, the US spent nearly $43 billion across the National Aeronautic Space Administration (NASA), the DoD and other government organizations.24 These significant investments in space highlight how much the US stands to lose. To put this in perspective, according to newspaper reports in 2008, Pentagon officials estimated the cost to shoot down the failed US spy satellite ranged anywhere from $30 million and $60 million dollars, with the missile alone costing approximately $10 million.25, 26 Compare this to a single reconnaissance satellite in low Earth orbit that likely tops $1 billion. This example alone highlights the need to protect space. We must take immediate and prudent steps to protect our space systems to assure basic spacebased services to users worldwide.
It is hard to imagine military operations without the position and timing information provided by the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System. Or, the intelligence and situational awareness provided by nearly 50 UAS combat air patrols, remotely controlled through communications satellites from Creech AFB, Nevada. As stated by General Kehler during his 2008 AFA speech, without space, we are slower and less precise in our military operations. 27 In fact, roll back the calendar ten, fifteen, even twenty years, and previous tactics, techniques, and procedures used by military forces in those timeframes may not even be possible today. Integrating space has changed how we execute military operations, from the delivery of munitions, to communications with deployed troops, to basic navigation. This lends more credence as to why protected space capabilities, basic mission assurance for key warfighting functions, and minimizing or eliminating vulnerabilities are long overdue and an absolute necessity moving forward.
History does lend examples of how vulnerabilities can be viewed as an instigator to action. In his 1954 RAND study, “Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases,” Albert Wohlstetter concluded that our overseas, nuclear-capable bomber deterrent was extremely susceptible to attack. In fact, instead of being a deterrent to war, because of their proximity to the enemy, it became a magnet for a potential first-strike. At the time, a first-strike had the potential of eliminating much of America’s deterrent force, leaving the former Soviet Union with a capable second-strike option and a nuclear victory. As a result, based on Wohlstetter’s recommendation, we dispersed and hardened our nuclear capabilities and invested heavily in early warning capabilities to increase the survivability of our force. Bomber forces were dispersed by pulling them back to nearly 30 US-based hardened locations with increased defenses for early warning and protection.28 This scenario is especially relevant to today’s space capabilities. Our dependence upon space across the range of military operations is similar to our forward deployed bomber force of the 1950s. The vulnerabilities of both invite an enemy strategic planner to exploit these weaknesses. Increased hardening, protection, and dispersal should play a similar role in minimizing vulnerabilities in space.
Space stability is eroding – it will destroy US hegemony
Morgan, 10 - defense policy researcher working in RAND Corporation's Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force (Forrest, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space,”
Space stability is a fundamental U.S. national security interest. Unfortunately, that stability may be eroding. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have repeatedly demonstrated their dominance in conventional warfare, and future enemies will be well aware that the dramatic warfighting advantage that U.S. forces possess is largely the result of support from space. With a growing number of states acquiring the ability to degrade or destroy U.S. space capabilities, the probability that space systems will come under attack in a future crisis or conflict is ever increasing. Deterring adversaries from attacking some U.S. space systems may be difficult due to these systems’ inherent vulnerability and the disproportionate degree to which the United States depends on the services they provide. Nevertheless, the United States can fashion a regime to raise the thresholds of deterrence failure in terms of destructive attacks on its space systems and thus achieve a measure of first-strike stability in space during crises and at some levels of limited war. (See pp. 7–16.)
Estimated Thresholds of Space Deterrence Failure
While the factors above suggest that stability in space is eroding, it would be overly simplistic to assume that the thresholds of deterrence failure are the same for all space systems or at all levels of confrontation. In any given crisis or conflict, an adversary would have to weigh a range of factors in contemplating attacks on U.S. space capabilities. The risks incurred or benefits expected in a space attack would vary greatly in the context of any specific scenario. Consequently, it is less a question of whether would-be aggressors can be deterred from attacking U.S. space systems than of what kinds of attacks against which capabilities could be deterred under what circumstances. (See pp. 16–21.) As Figure S.1 illustrates, an adversary’s assessment of the costs and benefits of attacking a U.S. space system would likely vary from one prospective target set to another at each level of conflict, and the threshold of deterrence failure would be different for nondestructive attacks (i.e., “reversible-effects” attacks) than for destructive attacks (those that cause damage). (See pp. 16–21.)
Some of these thresholds are quite low today. An opponent in a confrontation with the United States that has not yet engaged in conventional terrestrial hostilities might consider reversible-effects attacks on U.S. space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and communication assets to be a promising means of degrading the United States’ ability to respond to the crisis, with relatively low risk of serious retribution compared to that of a destructive attack on one or more U.S. satellites. Fearing the onset of U.S. air strikes, the adversary might also begin jamming Global Positioning System (GPS) signals in areas around command-and-control nodes and other important facilities to degrade the accuracy of U.S. precision-guided weapons. Even after fighting has begun, a savvy adversary might continue to abstain from destroying U.S. satellites in a limited war for fear of escalating the conflict, particularly if the reversible-effects attacks continued to yield comparable levels of benefit. However, should the terrestrial conflict escalate, it would become increasingly difficult to deter an enemy with the appropriate capabilities from carrying out destructive attacks in space. At some point, the conflict would likely reach a threshold at which the growing benefits of transitioning to destructive attacks on certain space systems would overtake the dwindling costs of doing so. In fact, satellites used for reconnaissance and ocean surveillance—being high-value, low-density assets—might become targets even at relatively low levels of conflict, and the adversary might attempt to damage dedicated U.S. military satellite communication (MILSATCOM) assets as well. (See pp. 16–21.)
An assured space support capability is vital to ground forces – ORS is vital to the reliability of ground-based warfighting
Campbell, 10 - USASMDC/ARSTRAT Commander Joint Functional Component Command Integrated Missile Defense (Kevin, High Frontier, May, “The Warfighter's Perspective on Space Support,”
Eight plus years of persistent conflict has taught us important lessons. Chief among these is the fact that for the foreseeable future, our soldiers will consistently be involved in full spectrum operations. We anticipate our Army forces deploying into austere environments where space must play a foundational role. This is especially true in early entry operations. Here, space support is vital. Space enables our ground units to pierce the “fog of war.” Space-provided products and services assist our troops in maintaining situational awareness of their position, the position of friendly forces, current terrain information, current and projected weather conditions, and enemy locations and capabilities—all critical requirements when operating in the heart of enemy strongholds.
Freedom of action on today’s battlefield is tied to space-based capabilities. Over the course of the last decade, we have made significant advances in providing space-based products and services to our brigades and battalions. Commanders at this level have space support that far exceeds anything available to their peers during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Our soldiers tell us; however, that products and services (current satellite imagery and communications) delivered from space-based platforms do not consistently reach our lower echelon units—those closest to the fight. Additionally, many of our adversaries understand our dependencies on space and could take action to disrupt our ability to deliver products and services to those engaged in the fight.
If our strategic space systems cannot meet the immediate, realtime needs of our forces in contact, and if potential adversaries are focusing on disrupting our space-delivered services and products, then we must find more effective means of delivering products and services to our front-line units. “Big space” may not be the capability of choice. We may be entering an era where a mix of systems and capabilities is necessary to meet the needs of the warfighter, a time when we must find new ways to ensure information flows to our lower echelon units.
This article discusses why space is important to the soldier, and the capabilities and attributes they need most from space systems. We also describe what US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/ Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) is doing to explore other means of providing the capabilities and attributes the warfighter needs in order to sustain freedom of action across the battlefield.
When the US Army thinks about space, we tend to think about it from the perspective of our operating concept. Army Field Manual 3-0 describes a doctrine wherein commanders execute offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously throughout the depth of the operational area. We cannot achieve the versatility, agility, lethality, or interoperability required to carry out our doctrine without space capabilities. Space-based systems allow us to operate across larger areas with fewer boots on the ground. Compared to cold war deployment schemes of some 100-square miles, today’s brigade combat teams operate within sectors the size of the state of New Jersey. This would not be possible without space support. In today’s environment, our small units must operate independently and semi-autonomously. On today’s battlefield, it is at the squad, company, and battalion level where wars are won. Here, timely information enables optimal employment of our small units and enables adequate force protection. At the small unit level, our space-based services and products do not consistently reach the end user—the commander in contact with the enemy.
Our requirements—our warfighter’s requirements—are demanding when you consider the need for assuredness, persistence, and responsiveness. We are putting our troops in remote locations on terrain where mountains and valleys separate members of the same combat unit. Under these conditions, terrestrial line-of-sight systems may not give the small unit leaders the situational awareness to operate with relative freedom of action. Any disruption in service exposes our units to greater force protection risks. If we could bring in the ground commanders, those fighting the fight, and talk about their needs in combat, we doubt if they would be concerned with whether a small or a conventional satellite is used to meet their requirements. We also doubt they would know if a low Earth orbit or a geosynchronous orbit satellite best meets their needs. We do think they would say; they need persistent coverage— they need to talk to small teams deployed in complex terrain, they need information in real time—they need lower resolution data in 30 minutes more than they need higher resolution data in three hours. And, they would also tell us their greatest needs are in the forms of communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
So what are the attributes we need in our space systems? Our troops in combat need assuredness, persistence, and responsiveness. Assuredness: confidence we will get the products and services we need. Persistence: there when needed for as long as needed. Responsiveness: the ability to task an asset in real-time for rapid delivery of information to the troops in contact. These attributes would seem inherent in our space systems. However, our architectures, concepts, and perhaps culture interfere with the delivery of products and services from our space-based platforms to the lower echelons.
There are many reasons why products and services may not be delivered to the small unit in a timely manner. We recognize that our space assets are strategic in nature. They were designed and fielded to meet the strategic needs of the nation. We are, in effect, attempting to fulfill tactical needs with systems designed to meet strategic requirements. We carefully guard the capabilities and sometimes even the existence of our strategic satellites. Products produced by them are normally classified at a level that may place them out of reach of the commanders at the small unit level. We are not advocating a focus on lower echelons at the expense of other users. Our national space assets have been put in place to meet the strategic needs of our nation. We think it is absolutely critical that we continue to field and operate these very capable space systems. But, we know we cannot do it all with large spacecraft, and we know that “big space” is challenged meeting all of our national and strategic requirements.1 We need augmenting systems to meet our warfighting requirements.
Space is vital to US military dominance
Sterner, 10 - fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. He was a senior professional staff member on the House Armed Services and Science Committees and served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as NASA's associate deputy administrator of policy and planning (Eric, World Politics Review, “Tending the Forge of American Space Power,” 6/15,
The story is even more dramatic in U.S. national security. Over the last 20 years, the United States military has undergone a military technical revolution. Today, the military relies on space as a global infrastructure at the heart of its ability to move information around the world at the speed of light in support of military operations. Just as space systems have been integrated into the economy, they have been integrated into U.S. military capabilities. They enable U.S. command authorities to exercise command and control at global distances and provide key communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions. For example, few may realize it, but the soldiers "piloting" the United States' lethal UAV drone campaign against al-Qaida targets in South Asia are physically located in the continental United States, sending their flight commands over satellite. These are unique advantages that the United States military enjoys over its adversaries.
As terrestrial forces integrate more information technology into their systems, space has become even more critical in fully exploiting their potential. Growth in the demand for communications bandwidth has been stunning. One study noted that during Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990-1991, 500,000 troops communicated at 100 megabytes per second (Mbps). By 2003, the demand for communications for 250,000 troops had risen to 2,400 Mbps. A different review projected that global U.S. military demand for satellite communications will rise from 13.6 Gigabytes per second (Gbps) in 2006 to 160 Gbps in 2015.
Imagery and GPS have also enabled much of the change that lies at the heart of the precise application of firepower in the 21st century, allowing the U.S. military to do more with less. According to former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne, "In World War II, it took 1,500 B-17s dropping 9,000 bombs to destroy a given target. Today, a B-2 can strike and destroy 80 different targets on a single mission using weapons guided by space-based USAF global positioning system signals." As a result, the United States can use less force to achieve its goals, reducing the risk to American service personnel and the collateral damage inherent in military operations.
However, though clearly the planet's dominant space power, the United States is not alone in enjoying the benefits of space, either for its economy or for military purposes. Globalization has affected the aerospace industry as much as it has impacted information technologies. Whereas during the Cold War there were two dominant space powers, today, dozens of countries have a modicum of power in space. One space expert attributed launches to 10 different countries in 2009, and even more than that if the members of the European Space Agency are counted individually. These were: China, European Space Agency, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. (The North and South Korean launches failed to achieve orbit.)
In the same vein, a number of countries now develop, own, or operate satellites. A non-comprehensive list includes all of the countries with space launch capabilities, plus states such as Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Venezuela and Vietnam. For those that do not have their own systems, the global market in commercial space goods and services enables them to utilize space for their own purposes. In short, virtually any country now has access to some amount of space power, either through indigenous development, outright purchase or lease, or the simple use of space applications.
China, in particular, is rapidly emerging as a strong space power. Chinese strategists have identified space as a key domain in warfare and are integrating it into their military capabilities (.pdf). China has deployed systems for communications, remote sensing, navigation, and timing, and is building an advanced human spaceflight program, becoming only the third country to place people in orbit. Beijing clearly understands the natural security applications of these technologies. Similarly, India has formed a tri-service space cell to work with the Indian Space Research Organization (India's civil space agency) to explore the national security aspects of space technology. Likewise, the European Union and Japan have taken steps to begin assessing the role that space can play in their national security postures.
Most potential adversaries recognize the United States' dependence on space and view it as an asymmetric opportunity to offset significant U.S. space-derived conventional military advantages. In 2008, then-Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell noted several threats (.pdf) to the United States, including "The growing foreign interest in counter-space programs that could threaten critical U.S. military and intelligence capabilities." In recent years, a number of countries have done just that, primarily by damaging or disrupting communications links: Iran and Turkey have both jammed satellite signals from dissidents; Iran jammed Voice of America signals, and Iraq jammed Global Positioning System signals; Iran and Cuba reportedly collaborated to jam Telstar 12 signals; and Brazilian hackers have reportedly hijacked transponders on a U.S. Navy satellite. Thus, China's successful 2007 test of an effective kinetic anti-satellite weapon only highlighted a disturbing trend (.pdf).
Space assets are critical to hegemony – leaving them undefended creates extreme asset vulnerability
Baltazar, 11 – Major at the Portuguese Air Force and Proffesor at the Institute of High Military Studies (Spring 2011, Ana, e-journal of International Relations, “Europe’s Fight For Space – A New Challenge,” )RK
“Europe’s Fight for Space – A New Challenge “invites reflection because it is a fact that, nowadays, contemporary societies depend on space resources and on their applications. Increasingly, more countries have satellites built and launched by third parties. In general, those satellites have civil and military multiple functions, ranging from facilitating communications and weather forecasting, to obtaining concrete information for navigation purposes. This awareness of dependence on resources required major powers, in particular, to think about space security. During the last conflicts, space resources have had a major influence on military operations. This influence is basically felt at the level of decision-making time and military response, making everything – decisions/actions – quicker.
During conflicts, available space resources are typically plentiful and quite varied, of which the following stand out: weather forecast systems: military communication systems; surveillance systems; weapon positioning and missile launching satellites; and positioning systems, among others. For the Armed Forces, satellites are power multipliers and essential tools serving the “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance” (C4ISR).
As this article illustrates, having capacity brings on power, and to have power brings on capacities to influence decisions on the international stage. However, having the resources and lacking the capacity to defend them may translate into extreme vulnerability. Accordingly, space resources gain strategic importance as they may both offer essential and unique information and put national security at risk.
Space capabilities are absolutely vital to land-based military effectiveness
Stanley 2 - Major, U.S. Air Force (Robert W., February 2002, “SPACELIFT – THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF AMERICAN SPACE POWER” )JCP
For today’s warfighter, the presence of a GPS signal is as routine as expecting the lights to come on in your kitchen when you flip on the wall switch. As stated by a former Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command, (USCINCSPACE), “As a measure of merit, GPS is so well integrated into air, land, and sea operations that it is in many ways taken for granted. Like the telephone dial tone, everyone just expects it to be there.”4 If a regional CINC's forces were engaged in combat, even a few weeks without space support could be devastating. Following a U.S. Army war game in which friendly satellites were disabled by a nuclear weapon detonation in low earth orbit, one participant commented, “They took out most of our space-based capabilities. Our military forces just ground to a halt.” 5
Space reliance creates asymmetric vulnerabilities that can undermine US military power
Butterworth, 8 - President, Aries Analytics, Inc. Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute (Robert, “Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs,”
Today’s situation is quite different. Space systems are deeply embedded in U.S. war plans, as they have become integral components of U.S. weapons networks and tactical operations. Without them, force movements would be slower and less coordinated, weapons systems would be less responsive and less accurate, and tactical operations in general more costly. There would also be a strategic penalty in the form of less timely global reconnaissance, for which there are no substitutes.
These developments have naturally made space systems the target of enemy action. To prevail against the U.S., a local adversary might hope to avoid an all-out war by achieving his local objectives quickly and then suing for peace, leaving the U.S. with no attractive military or diplomatic options. To do so, he would have to thwart the ability of the U.S. to project power promptly, and that, in turn, would require sufficiently inhibiting or degrading the space support on which fast-moving American tactical operations depend so heavily for navigation and timing, intelligence, weather, force tracking, and communications.
Space is vital to every component of the military
Kehler, 10 - Commander, Air Force Space Command (Robert, “Introduction”, High Frontier, May,
Joint force commanders rely on space and cyberspace capabilities to help create the effects they need across the spectrum of conflict. The asymmetrical threats and challenges we face require that we constantly explore new and more effective ways to meet the needs our joint commanders demand. As space systems have grown to provide more detailed and diverse services more quickly and more frequently, they have been integrated ever more tightly with real-time military planning and operations. Today, space capabilities are embedded in a host of systems serving forces and commanders at every level. Space is no longer just the high ground; it is an integral part of joint operations. Operational plans and advanced weapons depend on space as never before, and military plans must take into account potential loss of capability by space assets due to mischance or hostile action. Military forces demand space systems to provide timely and continuing support to joint force commanders in peace, crisis, and war. Our forces demand space systems for use in training and exercises, and whose products and services can also be extended to our allies and coalition partners. US forces increasingly need a space architecture responsive to military purposes that can support operational plans. They demand capabilities that are configured to optimally serve tactical needs and that can continue to contribute to the joint fight, even when under duress.
Space control key to war prevention
Space control is vital to war prevention – boosts transparency and international collaboration
Smith, 11 – USAF Colonel, Director of the Air Force Space and Cyber Center at Air University. He served in the Pentagon’s National Security Space Office as the Chief of the Future Concepts shop (M.V., Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
Spacepower is ideally suited for war prevention—securing the peace—as a matter of day-to-day statecraft. To put this in clearer terms, "the primary value of spacepower is not support to warfighters, rather it is that space capabilities are the primary means of war prevention."1 Spacepower can provide both indirect and direct methods to achieve war prevention. Indirect methods involve cooperative interstate behavior to reduce security concerns without the use or threat of force. Direct methods involve the use of force or threats of force. For now, spacepower lends itself more toward indirect methods such as providing global and cislunar transparency and expanding broad international partnerships. Direct methods are more hard-power–centric and include those capabilities that deliver assurance, dissuasive, and deterrent effects, matched with careful diplomacy, in a cost/benefit calculus. As space weapons proliferate, spacepower will offer effective direct methods of preventing war. Each indirect and direct method is discussed below.
Indirect Methods
Transparency. Space-based reconnaissance and surveillance platforms, because of their global nature, contribute directly to reducing security concerns by providing insight into observable human activities around the globe and in the cislunar region. Insight into human activity in space, manned or unmanned, is every bit as important as observations of terrestrial activities. When considered together, such insights can alleviate unfounded fears and prevent miscalculations, as well as deliver warnings and indications of activities of genuine concern. This was obvious right from the start of the space age during the Cold War when the first successful American reconnaissance satellite, called Corona XIV, returned more imagery of Soviet nuclear forces from deep inside the Soviet Union than did all of the prior U–2 missions combined.2 This new satellite-derived information caused a sharp downward revision in the estimate of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile launchers from 140–200 to between 10 and 25.3 Later, only six of the sites were determined to be operational.4 This application of spacepower helped reduce the American security concern and allowed the Eisenhower and subsequent administrations to right-size their nuclear deterrent force against a much smaller threat than suggested by estimates formulated without satellite data. Space was no longer merely a science project, but a real instrument of policy. True spacepower had arrived.
As the example above illustrates, spacepower provides transparency that reduces the fog during peacetime, increases the certainty of information, and allows contemplation of matters with a better approximation of the facts.5 While this is entirely beneficial to the actor who possesses such information, the value of transparency has its limits. Some states feel increased security concerns if satellite-derived information about their observable affairs is distributed widely. China voiced this complaint shortly after the release of Google Earth, but accommodations were made to degrade the quality of images of areas sensitive to the Chinese government.6 Such concerns must be addressed and dealt with directly, but accommodations can be made. Many states undoubtedly will change their conduct of military and other affairs to ways that are not observable by satellites. India, for example, avoided detection of its efforts to develop and test a nuclear device in 1998 by conducting activities when U.S. imagery satellites were not passing overhead and during times when sandstorms and intense heat could disrupt surveillance sensors.7 Such nefarious workarounds can be eliminated by fielding a large constellation of several dozen reconnaissance and surveillance satellites owned and operated by suprastate or trans-state actors using multispectral technology. The point is that every inch of the Earth could be imaged several times a day using various techniques that can counter various many concealment efforts. Global transparency efforts are large and expensive and by their very nature will require a high degree of international partnering.
Partnering. Another opportunity that spacepower provides for managing security concerns is capitalizing on collaborative international security space arrangements to provide global transparency, space situational awareness, and space traffic management, to name just a few. Such partnerships need not be limited to security-related functions, but must cross into civil and commercial endeavors as well, such as space-based solar power, human missions to the Moon and Mars, space stations, space-based astronomy, and so forth. The goal is not only to accomplish something meaningful in space, but also to build mutual understanding and rapport among the participating states.
The American and Soviet joint venture on the Apollo-Soyuz mission in the mid-1970s is one such example. Although the tangible scientific benefits of the exercise are debatable, it demonstrated to both parties and to the international community that cooperation on a very challenging task is possible, even between the two Cold War antagonists with their widely divergent strategic cultures. This civil spacepower effort became a point of departure for other confidence-building gestures between the two and certainly eased tensions in the homelands and among the rest of the world as well, thereby reducing security concerns.
Partnering on spacefaring projects brings together more brilliant minds and resources to solve problems and to advance the art. It not only heightens the likelihood of success of those programs, but over time it also reduces the friction during peacetime between states, decreases the potential for cultural misunderstandings, increases the opportunities for alliance, integrates aspects of each state's economic and industrial base, and fosters working relationships between governments.8
Hegemony prevents extinction
Hegemony prevents extinction, the US military has been the greatest source of peace and the strongest correlate to global well-being
Barnett, 11 - chief analyst at Wikistrat, former visiting scholar at the University of Tennessee’s Howard Baker Center for Public Policy and a visiting strategist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies (Thomas, World Politics Review, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” 3/7,
It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II.
Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation.
But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.
That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure.
With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head.
The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war.
We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.
Space key to economy
Space assets are vital to the economy
Sterner, 10 - fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. He was a senior professional staff member on the House Armed Services and Science Committees and served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as NASA's associate deputy administrator of policy and planning (Eric, World Politics Review, “Tending the Forge of American Space Power,” 6/15,
Ironically, even as space has moved away from the center of American culture, it has become ever more integrated with the international system. Global space spending in 2009 reached approximately $262 billion, or 7 percent more than in 2008, despite the global recession. The largest share of that spending, at nearly $91 billion, was for commercial satellite services (communications, remote sensing, satellite positioning), followed by commercial infrastructure (at $84 billion), and spending by the United States government (at $64 billion).
Direct spending, however, does not tell the whole story. Space systems lie at the heart of the global infrastructure for moving information, whether that data is collected from remote-sensing systems (such as weather satellites) and high-resolution remote-sensing systems (think Google Earth), or transmitted over communications satellites. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites transmit precise timing signals, which are used to locate one's position on Earth, aid navigation, and time global financial transactions. A range of spacecraft are studying the planet and its functions, peering into deep space at the origins of the universe, and visiting other planets. Space systems and their applications contribute to efforts and advances in agriculture, development, resource allocation, disaster relief, education, and medicine. Even cable television programming is distributed by satellite.
Increasingly, if one digs deeply enough into any economic activity in the 21st century, a space element will be involved. And as the world's most developed space power, the United States has led the way in integrating space into its economic foundations.
ORS boosts space leadership
ORS Hardening leads to soft power, international cooperation, and deters hostile rivals
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
The Space Constabulary International agreements and partnering will be an essential element of any strategy to deter adversaries in 2035. The United States should establish a space policy to enforce rule of law, preserve peace, increase prosperity, reduce fear (of criminal activity), and provide a safe environment for space operations -- establishing, in effect, a Space Constabulary with partnered and allied nations.46 Interconnecting and involving as many international partners with a common dependence on space capabilities as possible will help create conditions for a stable, favorable political environment for space protection. It will also complicate planning and potentially deter hostile actions by nations, groups, and individuals who might consider attacks against stakeholders in the international system. The 100-satellite constellation solution for Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) is a current conceptual option for pursuit of an international partnering strategy in space.47 International partnerships with like-minded nations reinforce shared values for progress, scientific and economic pursuits, and collective defense.
What Joseph Nye and others refer to as soft power, or, “the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them,‖48 has a role to play in international relations, and, therefore, in gaining and maintaining international partnerships, alliances, and agreements that promote United States national interests. Brown states that soft power is not to be considered ―...a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. 49 Furthermore, waning United States soft power cedes influence to potential global competitors or adversaries.50
US space leadership maximizes international cooperation for the defense of outer space – allows debris mitigation, space situational awareness and technological leadership on a global scale
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
Recommendations Space capabilities are vital to United States’ national power, commerce, science, and prestige. These capabilities will grow even more vital to the United States’ and the global economy by 2035. In the world of 2035, space capabilities will become distributed and collaborative across the global commons, fully integrating a global network of utilities and services and creating an environment for a tremendous increase in economic value -- the Space Cloud. Trends across several technical fronts portend a complex, crowded, hazardous space operations environment in the future. Pursue Transparency and Trusted Immunity. To deter adversary and criminal threats, National Security Space leaders should pursue a strategy of transparency and trusted immunity as elements of a larger, national strategy to deter threats. These will serve to reinforce the liberalized international system and values of peace, rule of law, liberty, and prosperity which the United States has promulgated and sought to institutionalize. A space deterrence strategy should include a combination of policy efforts to promote international cooperation, partnership, enforcement, and appreciation of United States leadership and engagement. 66 Promote the Space Constabulary. In a future world of greater complexity, globalized economies, and interdependent relationships, America’s international image and soft power cache will become more powerful and valuable. Stated and demonstrated benevolent intent will than United States’ various current dubious references to and pronouncements of ―space dominance.‖ Transparency and perceived intentions matter. The Space Constabulary concept would allow the United States to leverage the international community to establish normative, 31 responsible behaviors and provide a legitimate international avenue for enforcement. The United States would be very well served by a track record of responsible stewardship in the space operating environment through careful actions that strengthen international confidence and trust. Safeguarding the high frontier from the vantage of the moral high ground will give the United States an advantage in the future international arena. A Space Constabulary will provide credible, internationally legitimate, and likely enforceable threats for potential aggressors and criminals to consider. Develop technologies for active debris mitigation. It will be important for the United States to pursue concepts that afford opportunities to develop and test a wide range of operational options and to show peaceful, responsible stewardship of the space environment. Pursuit of active orbital debris mitigation methods – such as the use of directed energy ablation – offers advanced technology development opportunities under the rubric of environmental clean-up. These efforts will send the message of peaceful intent to allies, partners, and friends, while communicating to potential aggressors or criminals the credibility and capability to respond to hostile actions. Perfect technologies for space situational awareness. The fundamental nature and critical value of detection, characterization, and attribution in the space operating environment cannot be overstated. Technologies for advanced SSA capabilities will rapidly advance, reinforce transparency, and facilitate informed leadership decisions in a dynamic international security environment. Expanded, layered, multi-phenomenological SSA architecture – powered by technologies such as the Los Alamos Lab’s Raptor program – could potentially deny adversaries the current-day sanctuaries of anonymity and non-attribution. Casting the light of day on an aggressor’s actions will be tremendously valuable tools for deterrence. 32 Set conditions for responsiveness and innovation. Ultimately, the United States must design, build, deploy, and posture space forces for a space operating environment that will be far more dynamic and unforgiving. The Air Force should make force structure changes and operational improvements conducive to physical and technical agility by pursuing multi-layered architectures and constellation designs offering increased opportunities for technology insertion. Today’s acquisition, bureaucratic, and operational constructs and processes are a significant self-imposed constraint on the United States’ ability to adapt and insert new technologies into operational systems. As ungainly as these are in 2010, they will be more so in 2035, and will likely cost the United States its leadership role in most areas of space science, technology, and operations. America can credibly maintain its space advantages in the 2035 era of rapid technological change by investing in centers such as the National Labs, Air Force Research Labs, the Space Innovation and Development Center, the Air Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities, and the nascent Operationally Responsive Space Office. A technological ―moving target‖ will serve to complicate an adversary’s strategy in 2035, an era in which technology development and deployment may very well become a part of the OODA Loop. The future portends great uncertainty, yet offers great promise. AS Victor Hugo said, ―The future is what you bring, when tomorrow comes.‖ Indeed, America can and should begin building its future today.
ORS key to ISR
ORS is vital to protecting ISR assets
Sejba, 10 - USAF Congressional Budget Liaison Officer Budget and Appropriations Liaison Directorate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget Secretary of the Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC (Timothy, “ Deterrence for Space: Is Operationally Responsive Space Part of the Solution?”, High Frontier, May, )
Rapid Augmentation of On-Orbit Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ORS Tier 2):
The US’ need for information and situational awareness continues to increase through all phases of military operations, as witnessed in the current conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, over the past several years, the Air Force surged unmanned aerial system (UAS) coverage within Iraq and Afghanistan, increasing overhead air persistence and providing near-continuous situational awareness to troops on the ground. Counter to this, overhead reconnaissance provided by space has not been this responsive. The high cost to access space, both in launch vehicles and the exquisite nature of the systems have been contributing factors. This is not to say that satellite reconnaissance has not played a vital role in these conflicts. Nor should it suggest that we abandon these systems for less exquisite, less capable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Exquisite systems and their capabilities play a key role in our national security, enabling the strategic decision-making of our senior government and military leadership. However, due to their low-density nature yet high-demand information services, they provide an attractive target for a future adversary.
Space-based collection systems deliver key strategic indications and warning of denied areas. Future adversaries will likely seek to deny the US access and visibility of their movement, even with the limited persistence provided by our low-density, highdemand space systems. Early indications and warning, especially of sites known to possess space negation capabilities, will be critical during Phase 0 of joint operations, the shaping phase, as we attempt to prevent or prepare for a conflict.17 The actual denial of space capabilities may serve as the transition trigger to Phase 1 of joint operations, as we struggle to gather information and gain the necessary situational awareness required to define the crisis. The time frame for Phase 1 may be limited, likely occurring over just a few short weeks. Our ability to observe, orient, decide, and act on the situation could be greatly hampered if early indications and warning is denied during these critical early days of a potential conflict. This end-state provides great benefit to a potential adversary.
Denial of our ISR may occur through several means: Either purposeful, reversible interference such as blinding or a more catastrophic, direct-kinetic attack against an on-orbit system. Regardless of the means, one of the adversary’s goals would be to deny the US full-spectrum electromagnetic “visibility” to denied areas. Yet, a credible Tier 2 ORS capability to rapidly access, augment or replace some aspects of ISR would deny this benefit. This sort of rapid capability, especially in a small satellite system, will not provide all the exquisite capabilities afforded by our national systems. However, if credible, it should provide military planners the responsiveness necessary for situational awareness and intelligence to define the crisis, effectively denying the adversary the benefits they desire in the early stages of a conflict. Further, by reducing the cost of Tier 2 launch and space systems to just tens of millions of dollars, we have the potential to launch numerous ISR systems in a very short period. In this case we quickly move from high-demand, low-density overhead space reconnaissances to a relatively large ISR constellation with high revisit coverage and increased space-based persistence. In short, ORS would provide surge or swarming global coverage, with increased access and revisit to regions of interest. While the adversary seeks to limit or deny our access, their actions would instead result in ORS denying these benefits through increased persistence that did not previously exist. If proven credible, both in our ability to rapidly launch and access space, and to provide decision makers useful intelligence of the situation, ORS Tier 2 augmentation of ISR provides a key deterrent against attacks.
Tier 1 SSA cooperation and Tier 2 ISR augmentation are just two examples of how ORS could act as a deterrent. Yet, deterrence for space can and should extend beyond the space domain … high altitude, long duration systems, UAS’s, and new aircraft capabilities could be used to augment, or replace on a limited basis, capabilities provided by space. These cross-domain capabilities likely will not enable the same speed, precision, and lethality to military operations afforded by their space-based equivalents. Yet they would provide a degree of mission assurance, enabling the US to “fight through” a denied period until full space capabilities could be restored. In fact, if our adversaries are convinced that the US can “fight through” disruptions in space, deterrence will be enhanced.18 Ultimately, survivability of space systems to deliver the enabling capabilities currently through space operations is critical to credibly denying benefits to the adversary. Deterrence is not the sole answer to preventing attacks. Yet, some believe the DoD seeks only to deter, not protect space assets. One such article claims, “Pentagon planners are looking toward deterrence instead of protection to safeguard critical services provided by space assets in times of peace, crisis, and war.”19 AFSPC and the National Reconnaissance Office have taken initial steps to protect future space systems, with active and passive defenses offering deterrence value as well.20
ISR key to air power
ISR is vital to US air power
Lambeth, 11 – senior staff member at RAND, where he also directed the International Security and Defense Policy Program in 1989–1990 (Benjamin, Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
Thus far in this discussion, the space medium and its associated mission areas have not been examined in any detail. Yet both have figured prominently and indispensably in the steady maturation of American air-power that has occurred since Vietnam. If there is a single fundamental and distinctive advantage that mature American airpower has conferred upon theater commanders in recent years, it has been an increasingly pronounced degree of freedom from attack and freedom to attack for all force elements, both in the air and on the ground, in major combat operations. The contributions of the Nation's space systems with respect to both ISR and precision attack have figured prominently in making those two force-employment virtues possible. Although still in its adolescence compared to our more mature air warfare posture, the Nation's ever-improving space capability has nonetheless become the enabler that has made possible the new strategy of precision engagement.
Despite that and other contributions from the multitude of military assets now on orbit, however, the Nation's air warfare repertoire still has a way to go before its post-Vietnam maturation can be considered complete. Advances in space-based capabilities on the ISR front will lie at the heart of the full and final transformation of American airpower. It is now almost a cliché to say that airpower can kill essentially anything it can see, identify, and engage. To note one of the few persistent and unrectified shortfalls in airpower's leverage, however, it can kill only what it can see, identify, and engage. Airpower and actionable real-time target intelligence are thus opposite sides of the same coin. If the latter is unavailing in circumstances in which having it is essential for mission success, the former will likely be unavailing also. For that reason, accurate, timely, and comprehensive information about an enemy and his military assets is not only a crucial enabler for airpower to produce pivotal results in joint warfare, it also is an indispensable precondition for ensuring such results. In this regard, it will be in substantial measure through near-term improvements in space-based capabilities that the Air Force's longsought ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess any target of interest on the face of the Earth will become an established reality rather than merely a catchy vision statement with great promise.4
AT: UAVs solve
UAVs depend on COMSATs
Watts, 11 - Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments (Barry, CQ Congressional Testimony, “MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAMS IN CHINA; COMMITTEE: SENATE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION,” 5/11, lexis)
An advantage of UAVs over LEO satellites is that they can dwell over a target area and provide staring surveillance rather than periodic looks. The UAVs, however, are critically dependent on communications satellites (COMSATs). Currently, a single Predator orbit requires data rates of up to 6.4 million bits/second (Mbps); and the electrooptical, infrared and synthetic aperture radar feeds from a single Global Hawk can potentially consume as much as 274 Mbps. These bandwidth requirements have been met by military and commercial COMSATs in geostationary orbits. In addition, the UAVs themselves depend on GPS for precise geolocation of whatever their sensors are "seeing."
Thus, the targeting and battlemanagement networks integral to current U.S. strike operations contain vulnerabilities to attacks ranging from jamming C2 links to the covert insertion of false data into U.S. networks. During the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in MarchApril 2003, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Saudi Arabia used 31 military and commercial COMSAT terminals with a capacity of nearly 210 Mbps. 11 Overall, the total information flow in and out of theater during OIF's major combat phase is estimated to have peaked around three billion bits per second while some 84 percent of all military communications in and out of the theater went through commercial COMSATs. 12 As for the dependence of precision strike operations on space, nearly 44 percent of the guided munitions expended in the OIF air campaign used inertial/GPSaided guidance to home in on their aim points.
Small satellites allow adaptable image gathering and can supplement UAVs
London, 10 – John R. London III, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, with Brent Marley and David J Weeks, SETA Contractors (September 2010, “ARMY NANOSATELLITE TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THE TACTICAL LAND WARFIGHTER,” )RK
3. SMALL MICROSATELLITES FOR ELECTRO-OPTICAL IMAGERY
The unmanned aerial vehicle revolution is putting ondemand imagery into the hands of tactical land warfighters. Warfighter-tasked electro-optical imagery from orbiting small microsatellites could complement unmanned aerial vehicles and even substitute for them in denied areas. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is developing the 14-kilogram Kestrel Eye electro-optical imagery satellite as a technology demonstration to show how the tactical land warfighter can task a dedicated small microsatellite to take and download multiple 1.5 meter resolution images within the single-digit-minute time span of a single overhead pass. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is also developing the NanoEye imagery microsatellite, which will have a propulsion system enabling it to lower its orbit to enhance image resolution and then ―fly‖ back up to its normal orbital altitude. Another Army microsatellite effort is the Small Agile Tactical Satellite study, which is investigating the possibility of framebased video from space.
3.1. Kestrel Eye
The USASMDC/ARSTRAT is developing the Kestrel Eye technology demonstration as an electro-optical nearnanosatelliteclass imagery satellite that will be tasked by the tactical ground component warfighter. Weighing only about 14 kilograms and capable of producing 1.5meter resolution imagery, Kestrel Eye’s data will be downlinked directly to the same warfighter via a data relay network that is also accessible by other warfighters in theater without any continental United States (CONUS) relay or data filtering. At the low cost of only about $1M per spacecraft in a production mode, the intent is to demonstrate a tactical space-based imagery small microsatellite that could be proliferated in large numbers to provide a persistent capability to ground forces. Each satellite would have an operational life of greater than one year in low earth orbit.
The primary objective of the demonstration will be to task the satellite to take a picture of a designated ground object of interest and have that image relayed back to the ground Warfighter during the same satellite pass (i.e., within an approximately 10-minute tasking-to-product cycle). This tactical responsiveness, coupled with the potential persistence enabled by large numbers of these low cost satellites in orbit, make up the key advantages Kestrel Eye would have over existing orbital imagery assets today.
The Kestrel Eye program will extend the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) paradigm into space: a dramatically lower unit cost and proliferated numbers of satellites enabling the system to be dedicated to and operated by Warfighters who today receive only parceled-out service from more powerful, expensive and far less numerous orbital assets. The eventual goal is persistent coverage available to every Soldier on a handheld device – as GPS is today. The CONOPS for this experiment involves very small satellites, laptops and S-Band receiver antennae.
Kestrel Eye advantages include:
Higher altitude than UAVs: coverage above denied areas and invulnerable to surface-to-air missile threats
Smaller size and greater number: affordable, persistent presence, lower probability of detection, less vulnerable to anti-satellite weapons
Graceful degradation: no single shot, launch failure or anomaly causes complete loss of service
Kestrel Eye could provide in-theater tactical land warfighters with the ability to directly task an orbital asset and receive tactically relevant imagery within minutes. It could complement unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery or even substitute for UAV imagery if necessary. The Kestrel Eye technology demonstration could prove out the utility of on-orbit imagery assets dedicated for use by Soldiers in the field.
3.2. NanoEye
USASMDC/ARSTRAT is developing another small, low cost imagery microsatellite called NanoEye. Under development through the DoD’s Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, NanoEye cost estimates at $1.4M or less per satellite are 100 to 1000 times lower than would be the case in a traditional NASA or DoD program. The program’s development timeline is close to an order of magnitude shorter as well. Several factors make these cost and schedule reductions possible. One is a new, dramatically lightweight, lower cost telescope. Another is that NanoEye’s unibody spacecraft structural design developed by Microcosm allows the possibility of an integrated spacecraft/payload. The use of CubeSat components developed by many universities and small companies also contributes to lower cost and rapid development. Finally, SBIR contracting can eliminate many of the typical roadblocks to getting things done rapidly and at low cost.
ORS satellites are superior to traditional satellites and UAVs
Wertz, 8 - president of Microcosm, a space technology small business in Los Angeles, and the general chairman for the first five Responsive Space Conferences (James, “It’s time to get our ORS in gear,” The Space Review, 1/7, )
Are ORS-sats better than traditional satellites or UAVs?
No, they’re just different. It’s like asking, if we have airplanes, why would we want to invent better or cheaper cars? Air travel is faster and safer than highway travel, but it just isn’t the right answer for going to the corner store for milk.
ORS-Sats offer a whole new set of capabilities that complement, but don’t replace, traditional systems. Almost by definition, they are more responsive to a changing world. What’s wrong with a traditional system that takes 10–15 years to build and lasts 15 years on orbit? The problem is that you’re using 25- to 30-year-old technology to address military needs defined in the 1970s when Osama bin Laden was in high school and our main adversary was the Soviet Union.
Traditional satellites have other problems as well. They are clearly vulnerable to ASATs and to other failures, such as orbital debris or sensor failures. If the Chinese choose to take out one or more major US assets in LEO, we can yell and scream, we can hold our breath and turn blue, or we can go to war with China. What we can’t do is to replace those assets in a time frame that matters. Certainly the best safeguard for our large satellites is to be able to launch a replacement (not as capable, but focused on a specific area of interest) tomorrow or, better, this afternoon.
We don’t know where future problems will occur. Therefore, traditional systems are necessarily global, and, consequently, are mostly in near-polar, Sun synchronous orbits. This means that a single satellite sees a given location on the Earth once a day or, depending on how far off track it can look, once every several days. By tuning the orbit to the area of interest, one satellite can see a specific mid-latitude location every 90 minutes from four to six times per day. Three satellites can see that location every 90 minutes, 24 hours a day. (If the problem happens to be near the equator or the poles, we can see it every 90 minutes, 24 hours a day with one satellite.)
“Disposability” is part of what can make ORS so much cheaper than traditional systems. The Hubble Space Telescope, with an aperture of 2.4 meters, initially cost about $2.5 billion in today’s dollars. The ground resolution that Hubble can achieve from 900 kilometers is the same as what can be achieved with a 0.6-meter aperture at 225 kilometers, but the latter system can be bought for a few million dollars, rather than a few billion. Even with lots of stationkeeping propellant and some strategic altitude raising, a system at 225 kilometers won’t last very long. But replacing it with newer technology after a few years may not be a bad thing.
UAVs also have limitations that can be overcome by ORS. Flying UAVs over hostile territory could be considered an act of war and may not be in our best interest. It also means potentially getting the UAV and a ground crew to near the desired location, which takes time and may put American lives at risk.
We’re not arguing that ORS should replace either UAVs or traditional satellites. However, ORS can replace these systems in some roles and can do some tasks that simply aren’t practical with other systems. A broad mix of space assets, just like a mix of aircraft or ships, is what is needed to remain in control of the sea, air, and space.
AT: Ground station attacks
ASAT attacks are the most likely form of future attacks – ground station attacks and jamming fail
Butterworth, 8 - President, Aries Analytics, Inc. Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute (Robert, “Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs,”
Threats
Consideration might turn first to attacks on ground stations, the terrestrial nodes of American space power, but for military campaigns these facilities are less attractive targets than might at first appear. Redundant communications pathways, mobile facilities for command and control, and direct downlink systems make it difficult to predict the battlefield consequences of damage to a particular ground station. Moreover, critical ground stations are located within the United States; attacks on them could prove difficult and highly escalatory.
Interfering with data streams would be far less provocative; indeed, targeted jamming of satellite communications in peacetime, at least, apparently has occasioned nothing stronger than diplomatic demarches. Here again, the military appeal of these attacks might be quite limited. Certainly jamming can corrupt or overwhelm some data streams, and very high power jammers might interfere with GPS signals in limited areas. But it is hard to be confident about the battlefield effects of such efforts unless the communications network of the U.S. forces, and their responsive options, are fully understood. Precision-guided weapons, for example, might be equipped with supplemental advanced inertial navigation or other targeting systems, and denying GPS then might not significantly degrade warhead lethality. In addition, the wartime effectiveness of jamming on data streams is difficult to demonstrate conclusively in peacetime testing.
Quicker and more certain results would come from physically destroying the satellites. With current technology, the preferred option would probably be direct ascent boosters to deliver kinetic or explosive weapons. This approach would principally threaten satellites in low earth orbits; the longer flight times required for high altitude targets (or for coorbital intercept) would give the U.S. more time to detect and defeat the attack. More technologically advanced threats—directed energy weapons and high orbit space mines— do not seem likely to become operational weapons within the next decade or so.
***Coercion ADV
Economic coercion 1ac module
US dependence on foreign launch services threatens US space access and eviscerates US economic leadership – it will also collapse the industrial base
Burton, 7 - Lt Col. USAF [“GLOBALIZED SPACELIFT: A THREAT TO ASSURED ACCESS”, , liam]
Control of the space launch market has been attempted in the past and may be attempted in the future. The high degree of U.S. dependence on foreign launch services and components, coupled with declining demand for U.S. commercial launchers and declining U.S. attractiveness around the globe, presents the United States with a critical vulnerability to assured space access. This vulnerability is heightened by the availability of both diplomatic and economic tools to exert leverage, an increasing likelihood that foreign powers will oppose U.S. policies, and clear evidence that these foreign powers intend to increase their military and commercial space capabilities. Should potential adversaries choose to exploit this vulnerability the impact to U.S. national and economic security could be severe.
Scenarios
The following scenarios are illustrative of how an adversary might exploit U.S. vulnerability by exerting economic leverage. Consider Russian control of the RD-180 rocket engine and a potential future conflict with the United States. As tensions begin to rise, Russia learns that the U.S. intends to augment its military satellite communication capability by lofting a payload using the Atlas V. They refuse to export the required engines. In another scenario, the world's major powers receive intelligence that the United States intends to launch weapons into space using the Delta IV. The European Union and Japan form a soft balancing coalition, delay delivery of the required upper stage fuel tanks and use the United Nations to entangle the U.S. in diplomatic efforts to prevent space weaponization. In a third scenario, suppose European and U.S. satellite manufacturers are racing to place a revolutionary space-based commercial capability on orbit, each launching on an Ariane V. The first one to orbit will seize a substantial share of the market. The European manufacturer may leverage their close relationship with Arianespace to delay U.S. access to launch facilities and thus reach orbit first. Finally, consider a situation where a combination of market consolidation and launch failures have left only two viable launch service providers. These providers conspire to significantly increase fees for launch services.
Impact
Each of these scenarios is plausible and, if exercised, would have a significant impact on U.S. national and economic security. To begin, national prestige and influence would decline and U.S. freedom of action would be curtailed. Space launch capability remains a symbol of national prestige around the world.111 Becoming a victim of coercive economic leverage with the denial or delay of launch capability would be an embarrassment and sign of weakness on the world stage. This, in turn, would likely result in a decline in U.S. soft power and a decline in America's ability to persuade others.112 Equally important, as in the case of the space weaponization example, U.S. freedom of action in space is severely limited by our dependence on foreign providers and components. Any U.S. objective in space can be frustrated by foreign governments, foreign corporations and potential adversaries. As Roger Handberg notes "permanent loss of national space launch capacity leaves the state subject to the political whims or policies of others, whose interests differ regarding future space activities."113 Finally, the emergence of a soft balancing coalition would likely further erode support for future military operations and could shift the balance of economic power away from the United States.114
That economic impact could be severe. Indeed the United States has already experienced significant losses by its inability to compete in the commercial space launch arena. As noted in chapter 2, its share of $1.4 billion commercial launch income in 2006 was a mere $140 million. Should the supply of RD-180 rocket engines be halted for any reason, the Atlas V would vanish from the commercial launch market, losing its projected 2007 income of approximately $140 million115 and any potential to secure an additional share of the annual $1.4 billion market. Additionally, should Boeing for any reason leave the Sea Launch partnership, they stand to lose approximately $140 million per year based on Sea Launch's estimated 2006 income and Boeing's forty percent ownership.
Should economic leverage be used to gain market share, the economic impact to the U.S. could be serious. Based on the latest data available from the Federal Aviation Administration, in 2004 the direct impact of satellite services, remote sensing and distribution industries to the U.S. economy was over $10 billion. Indirect and induced impact accounted for another $51 billion injected into the economy. Including launch vehicle, satellite and ground equipment manufacturing, the total impact to the U.S. economy amounted to over $98 billion.116 This is a lucrative market and a prime target for economic coercion.
Finally, declining U.S. investment in technology, including liquid rocket propulsion, has already had significant impact on the U.S. economy and space launch infrastructure. Coupled with reliance on foreign launch service providers and components, this lack of investment has resulted in significant losses in personnel with critical technical skills, a declining industrial base, and loss of the research infrastructure for space launch.117 Should anyone leverage the United States in such a way as to further reduce the U.S. launch market share, we can expect further losses of skilled personnel and continued erosion of the industrial base which ultimately will degrade U.S. capabilities to provide government launch services as well.
The most significant result of economic leverage would be a severe degradation of military capability and freedom of action. As noted in the space weaponization scenario, foreign entities and potential adversaries have a direct method of impacting U.S. ability to place capabilities on orbit. This vulnerability holds for both deployment of new capabilities and augmenting existing capabilities during a crisis or in response to an on-orbit failure. Further, should the economic leverage be employed to gain market share or delay commercial satellite launches, the U.S. military's ability to use commercial communications, imagery or other services would be significantly limited.
Military launch dependence now
US launch capabilities are dependent upon foreign suppliers
Burton, 7 - Lt Col. USAF [“GLOBALIZED SPACELIFT: A THREAT TO ASSURED ACCESS”, , liam]
The national security of the United States is critically dependent on military and commercial space capabilities and this dependence is expected to grow.2 Indeed, a key element of U.S. national power is its strong and persistent space presence. This presence requires a robust space transportation capability to deliver government, military and commercial payloads to orbit and to augment or replace capabilities on orbit in the case of system failure or hostile action against U.S. space assets.3
However, both the U.S. commercial and defense space sectors are increasingly dependent on foreign entities to gain access to space. Commercial space access is heavily dependent on launch services provided by international partnerships and both variants of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) rely on components, including a main engine, manufactured off-shore. Further, we have begun to see foreign entities, especially the European Union, challenge the U.S. both economically and diplomatically. It is not too hard to imagine a foreign-dominated corporation influencing the launch schedule to gain market share for a “more favorable” partner or leveraging the U.S. government for “consideration” in a matter of international policy. This paper examines the national security and economic implications to the United States of those scenarios and others.
Current US reliance on EELVs threatens US access to space
Burton, 7 - Lt Col. USAF [“GLOBALIZED SPACELIFT: A THREAT TO ASSURED ACCESS”, , liam]
United States policy requires U.S. government payloads to be launched, unless properly waived, on vehicles which are manufactured in the United States4 and tasks the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program to provide those launch capabilities for medium and heavy payloads.5 To assure unrestricted access to space, the policy also requires the Secretary of Defense to fund both the Atlas V and Delta IV EELV variants until he can certify to the President that a reliable, assured capability can be maintained without both vehicles.6 Maintaining two variants ensures that launch delays can be minimized if one of the vehicles is grounded7 and costs the government approximately $1 billion each year. With the planned phase out of the Delta II and space shuttle over the next seven years, the EELV program will become the government's only medium to heavy capability for accessing space.8
Phasing out launch platforms reduces government expenditures but also limits U.S. capability to access space. The intent of maintaining two EELV vehicles is to reduce that risk. However, globalization of the space economy actually increases the risk to assured access due to outsourcing of flight hardware to foreign manufacturers. The U.S. Space Transportation Policy permits the use of foreign components and the participation of foreign companies in U.S. space transportation systems provided it does not jeopardize critical national security or civil space launches due to "delays or disruptions in receipt of foreign-produced systems, components, technology, or expertise."9 This is certainly not the case with the Atlas V.
The Atlas V relies on the RD-180 main booster engine manufactured in Russia by RDAMROSS, a joint venture between Pratt & Whitney and NPO Energomash. The five-meter payload fairing is manufactured in Switzerland by Contraves. Composite structures are manufactured in Spain by CASA and the payload separation systems are supplied by Saab of Sweden.10 The RD-180 engine is the predominant issue with the Atlas V.
The Department of Defense accepted the RD-180 when an agreement was reached to produce the engines in the United States within five years.11 However, to date, co-production has neither been started nor funded. Although the potential exists for United States production of the RD-180, it would require several years of engineering development12 and an investment of $500 to $800 million.13 Additionally, should co-production be attempted, RAND's National Security Space Launch Report assesses that "it might be difficult to replicate the engine in U.S. production facilities." The report offers several alternatives to co-production including stockpiling inventory to mitigate supply interruptions, co-producing only the most critical components and developing a U.S.-built substitute.14 However, there remains no suitable replacement for the RD-180.15 The United States' ability to put government payloads in orbit using the Atlas V is vulnerable to the desires of a former adversary.
The situation with the Delta IV does not appear as risky but it too relies on foreign manufactured components. Most significantly, the upper stage tank is manufactured by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of Japan who also provides two valve assemblies used on the RS-68 main engine. The payload clamp bands used on some missions are manufactured by Saab in Sweden. Finally, an RL-10 second stage nozzle component is manufactured by Snecma of France.16 Although relations are currently strong with Japan, Sweden and France, it will be shown in Chapter 3 that these countries have the ability to influence U.S. capability to achieve orbit with the Delta IV.
Commercial launch dependence now
The US commercial launch sector will be overtaken by foreign competitors
Burton, 7 - Lt Col. USAF [“GLOBALIZED SPACELIFT: A THREAT TO ASSURED ACCESS”, , liam]
There has been a near steady decline in U.S. commercial launch missions over the past decade with a dramatic drop over the last two years.19 The Atlas V and Delta IV are unable to compete with many foreign providers on a cost basis due to substantial subsidies by parent governments and access to skilled labor at costs well below those in the United States.20 Indeed, Boeing took the Delta IV out of competition in the commercial market because they were wary of its competitiveness,21 leaving only the Lockheed-Martin Atlas V to represent the United States in the marketplace. However, the Atlas V continues to struggle.
Of the five FAA-licensed orbital launches in 2005, only one was a U.S.-built vehicle: an Atlas V 431, marketed by International Launch Services (ILS), which deployed the Inmarsat-4 F1 communications satellite. The remaining four satellites (XM 3, Spaceway 1, Intelsat Americas 8, and Inmarsat-4 F2) were each launched by Sea Launch on the Ukrainian-built Zenit 3SL.22 Of 13 other commercial launches in 2005, ten were medium to heavy class. Four flew on Proton (Russia), five on Ariane V (France) and one on Soyuz (Russia), leaving the U.S. with a mere 6% market share in the medium to heavy market which it once dominated.
This trend continued in 2006 and is expected to continue. Of 16 medium-to-heavy class commercial payloads flown in 2006, only one was launched by the United States, that being the Astra 1KR on the Atlas V.24 Only 2 of 24 geosynchronous orbit commercial payloads forecast for launch in 2007 are projected to fly on the Atlas V.25 This decline in U.S. performance is also reflected in observed income.
Worldwide direct income from the 18 commercial launches in 2005 was estimated at $1.2 billion with the U.S. garnering a mere $70 million. In comparison, European companies took in approximately $490 million, Russian companies received nearly $350 million, and Sea Launch earned approximately $280 million.26 2006 produced similar results. 21 commercial launches produced $1.4 billion in direct income. European companies again led the way with $560 million, followed by Russia with $374 million and Sea Launch with $350 million. The U.S. took in $140 million.27 U.S. income of $70 million in 2005 and $140 million in 2006 is a significant decline from an average of $315 million per year from 2002 to 2004 while revenues for all other providers showed significant increases.28 None of these trends are expected to change. With an average annual demand of only 20 medium to heavy commercial vehicles projected through 2015, competition on the commercial launch market will continue to be intense.29
This does not bode well for the United States. The lack of EELV competitiveness on the commercial market makes it unlikely that they will secure more than a few commercial launches in the future.30 As Marco Caceres notes "the U.S. appears to be losing its capability to provide access to space using its own hardware."31 This leaves U.S. satellite manufacturers heavily reliant on foreign entities to gain access to space. Further, with the Atlas V being the only current U.S. entrant in the market, even organic U.S. commercial access to space is vulnerable to the desire of a former adversary due to outsourcing of flight critical hardware.
Within a span of ten years, the U.S. forfeited its dominant position in the space launch industry to settle for less than a 20 percent market share.32 How then do American companies maintain a stake in the commercial launch industry? A fundamental goal of U.S. space policy has been to "encourage international cooperation with foreign nations and/or consortia on space activities."33 This cooperation is clearly evident by U.S. participation in various international partnerships to provide launch services.
Commercial Access and International Partnerships
Sea Launch and the Launch Services Alliance are two major international partnerships that exist to market and provide commercial launch services. The trend is for commercial satellites to be flown on the most cost effective and reliable vehicle available regardless of the payload's origin.34 The partnerships allow the companies to gain access to previously denied foreign markets while pooling their resources to engage in business opportunities that would otherwise be too risky or costly for the individual company to pursue.35
Sea Launch LLC is a launch services consortium providing heavy lift capability for commercial customers.36 With forty percent Boeing ownership the company is headquartered in Long Beach, California. RSC-Energia of Moscow owns a twenty-five percent share of the company and provides the Sea Launch vehicle upper stage, as well as support for mission integration and operations. The Ukrainian company SDO Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash provides the first two stages of the Zenit rocket, vehicle integration and mission operations with a fifteen percent ownership stake. Aker ASA of Norway owns the remaining twenty percent of the company and operates the launch platform and command ship.37 Sea Launch has also subcontracted with Space International Services of Moscow to provide lift capability from existing facilities at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Known as Land Launch, Space International Services will provide all launch system components (based on a modified Sea Launch Zenit booster), integration and mission operations and begin service in 2007.38
Formed in July 2003 by Arianespace, Boeing and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the Launch Services Alliance (LSA) markets the Ariane V, H-2 and the Sea Launch vehicle to customers worldwide. Their unique partnership, with each holding an equal stake, allows customers the flexibility to switch between the three vehicles to meet their scheduling needs while also allowing the LSA principals to market their vehicles independent of the other partners.39 The financial benefits of this arrangement are, to this point, unclear. However, it is clear that LSA members are benefiting from positive customer feedback on their ability to provide back-up schedule options for their customers.40
International Launch Services (ILS), perhaps the first international partnership for spacelift, was until recently a partnership between Lockheed-Khrunichev-Energia (LKEI) and Lockheed-Martin to market the Proton and Atlas vehicles.41 However, Lockheed-Martin sold
their shares in both ILS and LKEI to Space Transport Incorporated in October 2006. Space Transport will continue to use the ILS name to market the Russian Proton and Angara launch vehicles. Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services will continue to offer Atlas launch vehicles to worldwide commercial customers.42
These international partnerships exist in an environment of political uncertainty, cultural differences, and conflicting priorities43 and will last only as long as there is mutual benefit to each partner.44 With Lockheed Martin's exit from ILS, none of the remaining international partnerships uses American launch hardware or facilities. U.S. commercial space access remains vulnerable to the actions and desires of other countries and international corporations.
Launch dependence risks economic coercion
US launch dependence renders it vulnerable to economic coercion
Burton, 7 - Lt Col. USAF [“GLOBALIZED SPACELIFT: A THREAT TO ASSURED ACCESS”, , liam]
In addition to reduced influence on corporate behavior, globalization of space markets has resulted in diminishment of the state's power to control commerce as undue restrictions on trade and exports limit the nation's corporations from competing globally.57 As discussed earlier in the paper, strict export controls were a contributing factor to the rise of foreign launch providers and the subsequent decline in U.S. competitiveness in that market. Reduced control over market forces due to economic interdependence may also affect the development of U.S. foreign policy as economic concerns may hinder a states ability to react to threats.58 While most liberal views of economic interdependence believe economic ties contribute to peace, based on historical case studies, Paul Papayoanou asserts that "dangerous security consequences arise if economic ties become extensive with potential adversaries," particularly those with nondemocratic governments where economic interests may have little influence on political decisions. Papayoanou identifies two potential problems in these cases: in opposition to liberal views of interdependence, there is no guarantee that economic ties will result in peaceful relations and should the potential adversary begin to act aggressively, the economic relationships may constrain U.S. response to the aggression.
Increasing economic interdependence results in increased vulnerability and potential restrictions on U.S. freedom of action in response to a crisis. That vulnerability may be further increased by the attempts or ability of governments and corporations to deliberately gain advantage from the interdependencies by using economic leverage for coercive purposes.60
Tools
Economic leverage derived from interdependence can be used for coercion, extracting profit from market control and directly impacting another state's economic security or military capability. While most of the research in this area relates to the behavior of states, globalization and the increased power of international corporations lend themselves to application of the theories as well.
The purpose of coercion is to influence the intentions or behavior of another actor by threatening them with or implementing some form of punishment. The ability to effect economic coercion is founded in economic interdependence and increases as one actor becomes more and more dependent on the other for something of value. A state or corporation may deny or threaten denial of the supply of the valued commodity to force the targeted state or corporation to modify a policy or meet some other demand. A strategy of coercion, or blackmail, may be successful when (1) the aggressor has the ability to act, (2) the United States cannot easily prevent the act, (3) the demands are not too large and (4) the United States believes compliance will prevent the threatened action from occurring. Successful blackmail is rare and a high-risk strategy as the United States may elect to fight rather than comply. Stephen Walt argues that blackmail might be easier for an ally since they can threaten to take an action without worrying too much about provoking a war.
Regardless of the perpetrator, the ability to blackmail or coerce a target is dependent on a high degree of control over supply of a valued commodity. Yet Klaus Knorr admits that a high degree of control is rare because there are "virtually always" additional suppliers.65 However, this is not the case with the RD-180 engine for the Atlas V. The United States is extremely vulnerable to coercion with respect to the RD-180. Should Russia deny export of the engine it would severely impact U.S. capability to place government payloads on orbit and virtually eliminate U.S. presence on the commercial launch market once on-hand engine inventories were exhausted. Coercion might also be used to gain advantage or compliance by denying U.S. satellite manufacturers access to foreign launch facilities. Both situations also lend themselves to the extraction of monopolistic profits.
Extracting monopolistic profit is another use of economic leverage when there is a high degree of market control. In this case, the state or company with control is not attempting to influence other actors, they are merely attempting to make economic gains by forcing high prices on a valued commodity.66 As U.S. companies rely more and more on foreign owned launch vehicles and as commercial launch capabilities become concentrated in only a few international partnerships, the potential exists to be forced to pay higher and higher costs to reach orbit. Again, Russia's total control of the RD-180 supply gives them an opportunity to extract higher prices from the U.S. once existing inventories run out. A rise in the price to access orbit or obtain components will result in diminished economic performance for U.S. space corporations which in turn will hurt the overall U.S. economy and ultimately effect national security.
This leads to a third use of economic leverage--directly impacting another state's economic security or military capabilities. In this case, the aggressor is not attempting to compel the target to comply, a commodity or service is withheld to weaken the target. For example the aggressor might ban exports of certain goods that are expected to enhance the target's military capability.67 Similarly, a commodity or service may be withheld to gain market share over a competitor or military advantage over an adversary. Again, reliance on off-shore spacelift system components and foreign launch facilities also makes the United States vulnerable to this type of economic leverage. However, economic leverage is only one tool, with many possible forms, which can be used to influence the United States. Other forms of statecraft can also be used to gain advantage.
Soft balancing is one such form of statecraft and consists of "actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies."68 Soft balancing relies on non-military means but aims to impact the military options of a more powerful state. Soft balancing might include denial of territory, entangling diplomacy using international or regional institutions, signaling resolve to form or participate in a balancing coalition, and, key to the issue at hand, economic strengthening.69 Economic strengthening shifts relative economic power in favor of the weaker country or coalition. One way to achieve this is through formation of regional trading blocs that favor trade and prosperity for member states while at the same time denying or minimizing benefits for the United States.70 This behavior, or other soft balancing techniques, are likely to occur when the superior power's position and military behavior cause concern but not a serious challenge to any state's sovereignty; the superior state is a major source of trade and security that cannot easily be replaced; and the more powerful state cannot easily retaliate militarily.71 Robert Pape argues that many powers have already engaged in soft balancing activities against the United States and that those activities are likely to increase "if the United States continues to pursue an aggressively unilateralist national security policy."72
The discussion of soft balancing has generated considerable debate in the last few years and has yet to be fully explored theoretically.73 Opponents of the theory believe it is flawed because it is difficult to distinguish soft balancing from routine diplomatic friction74 or because proponents of the theory failed to consider alternative explanations for states' behavior. Brooks and Wohlforth offer four alternative explanations for state opposition to the United States:
economic interest, regional security concerns, policy disputes and their domestic political situation.75 They argue that "states may undertake actions that hamper the conduct of U.S. foreign policy" to achieve economic gain, because they disagree with specific U.S. policies, or because opposing the United States wins favor among the domestic constituency.76
Regardless of whether the actions taken in opposition to the United States are best described as soft balancing or routine diplomatic friction, the value of the soft balancing discussion to the issue of assured access is to demonstrate a recent propensity of various countries to oppose U.S. policies. While soft balancing and economic leverage tools are available policy options, they alone do not account for the risk facing the United States. A true measure of risk requires not only an assessment of vulnerability but also an assessment of the intent of potential adversaries to oppose the United States.
Intent
Other than the outward hostility that exemplifies North Korean and Iranian attitudes toward U.S. policy, state opposition to the U.S. takes two forms: some states may oppose a subset of U.S. policies while seeking to maintain an overall healthy relationship with the United States while other states may resist U.S. power because they are genuinely concerned with the implications of U.S. predominance.77 Opposition is not limited to America’s adversaries, close allies are increasingly showing concern with the legitimacy, morality and wisdom of U.S. actions and have taken steps to minimize its consequences and advance their own interests independent of U.S. desires.78 Nor is opposition limited to major powers. With the tools outlined above, even relatively weak states or coalitions maintain a significant degree of freedom of action to oppose U.S. power.79
While few countries are willing to directly confront the United States, many are showing an increased willingness to oppose U.S. predominance by less direct means.80 This development will further frustrate U.S. policy makers as they face an uncertain future. It is unclear how reforms in Russia and some former Soviet republics will conclude. The U.S. faces the prospect of strengthening relations between Russia and China. As the European Union grows stronger and economic and political differences create friction, the U.S. will face the potential erosion of NATO and transatlantic relationships.81
The European Union is taking action to increase its reach and power as well as standing up to oppose American predominance. The unilateral U.S. decisions to back away from the Kyoto Protocols and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, without regard for European concerns, angered many in the EU82 and united them in their desire to obtain more power and influence relative to the U.S.83 Europeans are pursuing a common defense policy and acquiring the military capabilities to conduct independent operations.84 They are developing capabilities such as airlift, satellite reconnaissance, satellite navigation and precision munitions that they once relied on the United States to provide.85 The United States' heavy dependence on space assets is driving the Europeans to pursue their own capabilities. They believe the U.S will share those capabilities and technologies only on a limited basis and only in exchange for Europe's compliance with U.S. economic, political and operational priorities.86 Developing the capability and capacity to secure their region and act independently will decrease U.S. influence and provide the EU a greater ability to influence the U.S. on a broad range of policy issues.87
In addition to acquiring the capability to act independently, Europeans have recently demonstrated a greater propensity to expand their sphere of influence and frustrate U.S. policy. The EU has increased resources for public diplomacy and foreign aid, "becoming the world's largest provider of development assistance."88 They have made contact with Russia and China to discuss potential collaboration on the Galileo satellite navigation system.89 France has promoted a multi-polar system where Europe acts as one pole to balance the U.S. They have used the soft balancing tool of "entangling diplomacy" in the UN Security Council, NATO and the EU to constrain U.S. power.90
When the invasion of Iraq appeared imminent, European and other countries used soft balancing tools in an attempt to constrain U.S. military power. In an effort to delay the war, France, Sweden and other European states attempted to entangle the U.S. with UN rules and procedures.91 France and Germany soft balanced the U.S. in NATO by blocking their attempts to get NATO involved in the Iraq campaign and President Chirac used the European Union as his stage to form an antiwar coalition.92 While their attempts did not succeed in blocking the U.S. invasion, they contributed to reducing the legitimacy of U.S. actions in the eyes of the world and made it difficult to obtain peacekeeping forces because that action would now require UN approval.93
More recently, a European tendency to act independently can be seen in efforts to address Iran's nuclear program. Britain, France and Germany, attempted to engage Iran with diplomacy and economic statecraft to limit its nuclear goals. This action was taken independent of the United States and in direct conflict with its policies. As Robert Pape stated, "such widespread opposition is virtually unprecedented in U.S. history."94
Europe, however, is not the only potential challenger of U.S. supremacy. Russia, China and India are emerging as major players on the world stage. They are eager to profit from the global economy but are reluctant to accept the security structure shaped by the United States. As their economies and resultant power grow, they will gain greater influence in their regions with a parallel decline in U.S. influence.95 Russia has demonstrated their intent to compete on the world stage. During the Kosovo crisis, Russia attempted to use soft balancing diplomacy in the UN and European institutions to thwart U.S. efforts to gain UN approval for the intervention.96 They are also pursuing an aggressive space modernization plan. Their federal space agency recently outlined a ten year, $10.6 billion plan to acquire communications, navigation and earth monitoring satellite systems as well as continuing development of the new Angara launch vehicle.97 Further, in 2001, they signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation with China that calls for unified action to offset American power.98
China too is moving to gain power and influence on the world stage. China is beginning to rival American soft power in Asia with a campaign to market its values and culture in the region while espousing support for a multipolar world system.99 China has also used soft balancing techniques to frustrate American policy by using the UN to oppose the NATO intervention in Kosovo, threatening to veto any authorization of the use of force.100 More recently, China has taken a more active role in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, making it harder for the U.S. to contemplate the use of force.101
Because of the Taiwan's dependence on the United States, China perceives the U.S. as a security threat. Therefore, their military modernization program is aimed at improving their performance against the United States.102 They are expanding their space programs in both military and commercial sectors. Their estimated space budget rose nearly 50% between 2003 and 2005.103 They are also attempting to re-enter the commercial launch market but their current commercial launch program is constrained by U.S. export restrictions on satellites and satellite components.104 In fact, China has not launched a commercial space mission since 1999 but they retain their expertise and capability through government launches.105 One key to China's ability to reemerge on the commercial launch market is the successful development of the Long March 5-500 heavy lift vehicle. Comparable to the Ariane 5, its first launch is anticipated in the 20082010 timeframe.106 This capability, as well as competing capabilities in India, will challenge Arianespace, Sea Launch, and the revised ILS for market share.107
From the discussion above it is clear that states have the desire, intent and capability to gain power, strengthen themselves militarily and gain market share. Further, the current level of economic interdependence in the spacelift industry makes the U.S. vulnerable to economic leverage and the desires of these states.
Lest anyone believe that no one would actively seek to control the space launch market, consider United States actions in the '60s and '70s. The U.S. monopolized western space launch capability in the mid-60s, giving them incredible leverage to control other states' actions in space, particularly those that challenged U.S. economic interests. From this position, the U.S. established a policy of not launching commercial satellite systems unless they were compatible with and comparable to Intelsat.108 In fact, in the early 70's they attempted to stop a Canadian effort to launch a communications satellite because it was incompatible with Intelsat. The U.S. also initially denied the launch of a German-French communications satellite because it could compete economically with Intelsat.109 In the end, the United States provided military satellite communications for the allies but controlled access. This experience reinforced the desire of European states to achieve independent space capabilities to preclude U.S. interference in their space activities.110
The US needs t0 create its own launch capabilities and stop relying on foreign access in order to solve for soft power and coercion
Burton, 7 - Lt Col. USAF [“GLOBALIZED SPACELIFT: A THREAT TO ASSURED ACCESS”, , liam]
The United States must address the vulnerabilities to assured space access brought on by reliance on foreign service providers and components, a declining U.S. commercial launch market share, and declining soft power. Outsourcing of flight critical hardware is a critical vulnerability which must be resolved. As both Wood and RAND recommend122, the RD-180 issue must be immediately resolved. While stockpiling inventory is an option, should component quality come into question, the United States will be left with no alternate engine source. The U.S. must fund co-production or an American-built replacement for the RD-180. Co-production would minimize reliance on the Russian supply line and maintain critical U.S. industrial capabilities123 while developing a replacement on-shore would resurrect defunct U.S. liquid oxygen and kerosene technology, expertise and industrial capabilities.124
The outsourcing of critical components is likely an issue for more than space launch vehicles. As Anthony Cordesman has pointed out, there has been little analysis of the negative impacts of globalization. The U.S. military should reanalyze its dependence on foreign components and services, its interdependencies and subsequent vulnerabilities.125 As a minimum, a comprehensive review of all national security space systems should be undertaken. Additionally, future acquisition of space and launch systems should refrain from using foreign components as much as possible.
The United States must also address the lack of competitiveness of U.S. commercial launch vehicles in the market. For government launches the U.S. Space Transportation Policy instructs the government to "provide sufficient and stable funding for acquisition of U.S. space transportation capabilities in order to create a climate in which a robust space transportation industrial and technology base can flourish."126 However, it is unlikely that the space transportation industrial base will flourish by simply relying on government payloads. The United States must consider, as other countries do, providing economic support to U.S. commercial space launch providers in order to enhance their competitiveness on the international market and make their services attractive for U.S.-built satellites. This alone will mitigate a significant amount of risk to both launch providers and satellite manufacturers.
The United States must also embark on a significant strategic communications campaign to enhance worldwide perceptions of America. The decline of American soft power reduces our ability to influence both our allies and our adversaries and makes it more likely that both will oppose U.S. policies and actions in the future. While this issue impacts significantly more areas than space launch, improving America's image will reduce the likelihood that others will oppose our commercial and military aspirations in space.
Finally, the proliferation of international partnerships raises national security concerns which require further study. Specifically, how are influence and power exercised in an international partnership? How can weaker partners influence business outcomes in these partnerships? When is an international partner likely to abandon their national roots in search of profit? The answers to these and other questions are critical to the way national defense systems are procured in an era of increased globalization.
The U.S. cannot afford to ignore the vulnerabilities inherent in relying on foreign providers for launch services and system components. Failure to act will place the U.S. at the mercy of hostile nations or aggressive corporations and ultimately jeopardize U.S. dominance of the high ground.
***Industrial base ADV
ORS key to industrial base
ORS demand will spur commercial space innovation and keep small firms alive
Szajnfarber et al, 8 - Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems Division at MIT (Zoe, “Implications of DoD Acquisition Policy for Innovation: The Case of Operationally Responsive Space,” )
Operationally Responsive Space has been defined broadly by the Department of Defense as “assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of Joint Force Commanders' needs...while also maintaining the ability to address other users' needs for improving the responsiveness of space capabilities to meet national security requirements."5 The purpose of ORS is to reduce the time constants associated with space system acquisition, design, and operation to allow the national space architecture to keep pace with changing missions, environments, and technologies. The fundamental idea is to trade off the reliability and performance achieved by existing spacecraft for the speed, responsiveness, and customization which may be achieved by architectures that incorporate elements such as small, modular spacecraft and low-cost, commercial launch vehicles.6 In terms of the structure described in Fig. 3, ORS is typically grouped into the category of technology development; however its functions really span both the roles of technology development and spacecraft acquisition. This has two key implications with respect to issue 1a (i.e., that the monopsony-oligopoly market structure enforces a top-down acquisition process).
Firstly, by leveraging COTS parts and commercial launch services, it creates a potential market for unarticulated products. In other words, acquisition agents would be able to use “on-the-market” features to help define their need, in the same way that traditional customers are accustomed to doing. This is in stark contrast to the existing paradigm where acquisition agents define their needs in advance of the product being designed. The key difference is that the monopsonist buyer may now buy things for which they didn’t specifically ask. This may generate more bottom-up initiative from the space industrial base and provide avenues for small, innovative companies to enter the DoD market.6 This process will be encouraged through a model of seed-funding rather than development contracts. Where the historical lab structure, to a first order approximation, specifies a need and pays for the development required to meet it, the seed-funding model would allocate funding to firms in the early stages of a promising development. Conceptually, the difference between these two approaches is significant; the latter has the potential to reach non-traditional space firms and leverage bottom-up initiative, where the former perpetuates the traditional pull-push-pull. It remains to be seen whether the practical difference will be significant.
Secondly, the emphasis on rapid development cycles might create a more continuous innovation environment. One of the problems with the discrete nature of a monopsony market, as discussed above, is that it limits the opportunities for new capabilities to be “needed,” while at the same time placing a high premium on major intergenerational improvements. Both of these factors serve to limit the incentives for bottom-up initiative. What the ORS paradigm may change (from the point of view of generating real push) is to create a more frequent market for incremental improvements. If there is a clear opportunity to capture the value of taking the functionality of a spacecraft beyond the specification, contractors may be more inclined to take the initiative.
Small satellites key to industrial base
Small satellites reduce costs and ensure that the aerospace industry will retain capabilities necessary for military satellites
Doggrell, 6 – senior project engineer with the Aerospace Corporation (6/1/06, Les, Air and Space Power Journal, “Operationally Responsive Space A Vision for the Future of Military Space,” )RK
More, smaller spacecraft launched on shorter mission timelines may have additional benefits. The small number of spacecraft and launch vehicles currently produced by the United States complicates the maintenance of an industrial base and increases the unit cost of each craft and vehicle. Convincing the military space industry, which drives the manufacture of high‑reliability, radiation-tolerant parts, to continue this production at any price for only a few units per year poses a considerable challenge. Producing relatively few units means that the costs of each are dominated by the “standing army” or the fixed expense of maintaining a capability. For example, the price of owning infrastructure such as a launchpad or a vacuum test chamber remains largely independent of the frequency of use. The expense of maintaining specialized expertise becomes fixed as well when production rates stay low. Thus, larger numbers of spacecraft and launch vehicles, even smaller ones, might result in economic production quantities and cost—reduction benefits, which in turn would allow exploration of new missions or new approaches to existing missions.14
Small sats decrease launch costs
Small satellites reduce launch costs which make it possible for militarily responsive satellite swarms
Sweeting 09-PhD in Electronic Engineering, has participated in the construction of 29 nano, micro and mini-satellites with numerous organization including University of Surrey, Algeria, China, Nigeria, the UK and the Galileo program for the ESA, ge was knighted by Queen Elisabeth in 1995 and established as an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, he is a member of the ESA Advisory Committee on Human Spaceflight and a Distinguished Professor at the University of Surrey, he was recently featured in the UK’s “Top Ten Great Briton” and has received the Times higher Education Supplement Award for Innovation for Disaster Monitoring Constellation (Martin, 2009, “Small Satellites: Their Emerging Role in International Space Security” Space Security and Global Cooperation pg 161-166)JCP
Small satellites provide a low entry cost into space and offer a quick response from concept to operation. This addresses one of the issues in security, military space or responsive space. Small satellites make it possible to do more missions within the same budget particularly by reducing the individual cost of spacecraft in constellations and making swarms of satellites financially viable. The lower cost allows independent access to the high ground of space and this provides opportunities again to defuse tension.
***SOLVENCY
Funding key to ORS
Fully funding ORS is vital to effective use of military space and reducing dependence on the commercial sector
Peel 8- Lt Col, USAF (Scott D., October 30, “Fixing the Nation’s Space Launch Woes: Operationally Responsive Space for Tomorrow’s Joint Force Commander—Panacea or Pipedream”, Naval War College, , Mintz)
The force enhancement and force multiplying effects provided by space products and space systems are critical enablers to today’s military operations, and are essential for achieving success on the modern battle ground. The Global Positioning System (GPS) has enabled precision engagement through accurate weapons delivery and assured navigation, Blue Force Tracking has aided commanders in establishing a real-time picture of friendly force distribution throughout the battle space, Defense Support Program payloads have enabled timely and definitive over-the-horizon missile warning and attack characterization, as well as systems aiding intelligence, weather, and reconnaissance. All of which have been supported by a variety of communication capabilities. They offer unprecedented levels of access and persistence, and enable U.S. forces to conduct global operations with significantly reduced logistics.
Despite advances in technology the means for our nation to rapidly respond to emergent needs was limited and primarily focused on utilizing non-military sources. For example, 80% of satellite communications used by U.S. military forces during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM were provided by commercial systems because existing military capabilities couldn’t provide the necessary capacity and the nation lacked the ability to launch new satellites within the JFC’s operational timelines.31 The unique nature of military space systems and the capabilities they provide, coupled with increased recognition by potential adversaries of U.S. reliance on them, demand we finally address the root issue— responsiveness. In 2002, prior to the use of GPS jammers by Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and before the first successful Chinese anti-satellite missile intercept, Joint Publication 3-14 identified that “commanders must anticipate hostile actions that attempt to deny friendly forces access to or use of space capabilities.”32 However, joint spacelift capabilities provided the JFCs with limited solutions to augment insufficient capabilities or replace damaged, degraded, or destroyed on-orbit systems.
The ORS concept codified in the NSSO’s plan and USSTRATCOM’s Concept of Operations appears to vector the DOD on the right course to overcome past challenges. However, the envisioned capabilities won’t be readily available tomorrow—as specified by USSTRATCOM, initial Tier-3 activities could take up to 36 months before normalizing to meet the desired level of responsiveness.33 The lead organizations require time to establish themselves and mature their processes. Additionally, the foundational satellites and launch vehicles will have to be tested, procured, and prepositioned and aren’t estimated to be in sufficient quantities until FY2015 to address scenarios requiring sustained launches, despite having an initial operational capability established in FY2013. 34 This also requires dedicated commitment of funding, and identification and refinement of theater requirements. Most important, the ability to integrate ORS capabilities into theater plans requires significant effort by planning staffs at the unified combatant commands and service components.
Current ORS is inadequately funded---the plan is key to its success.
Peel 8- Lt Col, USAF (Scott D., October 30, “Fixing the Nation’s Space Launch Woes: Operationally Responsive Space for Tomorrow’s Joint Force Commander—Panacea or Pipedream”, Naval War College, , Mintz)
Finally, to be successful, ORS requires dedicated and adequate funding and manpower. Initial investments will be required to establish the various organizations associated with ORS. Additionally the foundational Tier-2 capabilities (e.g., rapidly configurable satellites, quick-turn launch vehicles and associated mobile launch platforms, dedicated satellite command and control ground stations, etc.) will need to be developed, tested, bought in sufficient quantities and prepositioned at key launch areas. In the ORS CONOPS, USSTRATCOM identifies this as a critical action and correctly assumes responsibility for working with the services to attain funding to enable an adequate response to “emergent and unforeseen needs.” 37 But building Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) must occur several years in advance, and is dependent upon the military services to incorporate JFC requirements.
ORS is key both to recovering from attacks on US space assets and also to sustain military effectiveness in the status quo
Geib 9 – Captain, United States Air Force B.S., Naval Postgraduate School, this was submitted for his Master of Science in Systems Engineering (Jeremy S., March 2009 “A Satellite Architecture for Operationally Responsive Space”, )
Recommendations from this thesis fall into two categories. The first category is broad recommendations about ORS. The second one consists of the areas in which technology should and can be developed to reduce the cost associated with manufacturing ORS satellites.
The U.S. must accelerate its development of Operationally Responsive Space. The ability to quickly place satellites on orbit will be necessary in order to recover from a likely attack against the space-based assets. The additional benefit of being able to increase capacity on short notice can not be overlooked either, because the U.S. military has come to depend on the capabilities that space provides and because it is never guaranteed that such capacity will be where it is needed on short notice.
Funding is the only way to prevent ORS from becoming a useless tech demonstration
Larrimore, 07 – Lt Col, USAF (April, Scott C., Air Force Fellows Air University, “Operationally Responsive Space: A New Paradigm or Another False Start?”
)RK
Summary
The Operationally Responsive Space program offers exciting promise for the United States national security, but only if the effort is appropriately focused on the most appropriate and meaningful missions. Due to orbital constraints, ORS planned support to tactical forces should yield to supporting theater and operational level joint forces; augmenting larger on-orbit satellites; and reconstituting damaged intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance satellites in low Earth orbit.
The proliferation of ASAT technology to regional powers around the world and these powers’ increasing military capability causes the United States to consider seriously ORS’s launch on demand opportunity, although fiscal challenges the rest of the decade makes fielding an operational ORS system questionable. Establishing an operational system including spare launch vehicles, spacecraft, and appropriate program office, operations and operations support organizations, may be cost prohibitive. In that case, the initiative will remain a relatively cheap technology demonstration program, and eventually suffer the same fate as tactical satellite efforts of the past.
ORS key to rapid reconstitution
ORS allows for rapid launch, adjustment, development and response to any security imperative, the response can occur within days
Geib 9 – Captain, United States Air Force B.S., Naval Postgraduate School, this was submitted for his Master of Science in Systems Engineering (Jeremy S., March 2009 “A Satellite Architecture for Operationally Responsive Space”, )
The responsive portion of ORS is a need shared by the JFC and national security. The reasons for sharing are that the DoD relies on space capabilities and that, in future wars, an adversary would likely attempt to attack U.S. space assets or to use existing commercial assets in an attack against the U.S. In light of this shared need, the commander of USSTRATCOM has three desires for ORS (Sega and Cartwright, 2007).
• Rapidly exploit and infuse space technological or operational innovations.
• Rapidly adapt or augment existing space capabilities when needed to expand operational capability.
• Rapidly reconstitute or replenish space capabilities to preserve operational capability.
The first desire ensures that adversaries using existing commercial systems will have less capability than the U.S. does. The use of ORS as a space test bed will help improve the strategic side of the national space acquisition process by allowing experimental technologies to be fielded and tested on cheaper ORS systems before being incorporated into expensive national strategic assets. The second desire is directly related to meeting the JFCs needs of placing additional capability in needed locations either by on-orbit repositioning or by launching additional satellites. The third desire is focused on recovery in the event an adversary’s attempts to deny U.S. forces the space capabilities to which they have become accustomed. In this regard, ORS serves the needs of both the JFCs and the strategic users.
To meet these desires, the DoD and the intelligence community will take a three-tiered approach to enhancing the responsiveness of space capabilities. The first tier involves using the existing on-orbit capabilities by simply reprioritizing a satellite’s use or by carrying out the complicated task of changing a satellite’s orbit. Tier 1 solutions would be expected to take effect within a few days after the need is established. Tier 2 solutions involve augmenting the existing capabilities, generally by launching low-cost satellites that have already passed the majority of their integration and testing. The second-tier solutions would be expected to be available within weeks of a verifiable need. Tier 3 solutions involve the development of new capabilities. The responsiveness aspect of ORS requires such a development to be quicker than the current timelines for placing capabilities on orbit. Tier 3 solutions could take up to a year to meet the need.
The US is increasing dependent on space-based capacity, ORS allows to make this capacity modular and immediately responsive to any situation including space debris, attacks, espionage, and nuclear space weapons
Geib 9 – Captain, United States Air Force B.S., Naval Postgraduate School, this was submitted for his Master of Science in Systems Engineering (Jeremy S., March 2009 “A Satellite Architecture for Operationally Responsive Space”, )
The need for ORS is precipitated by an increasing use of and dependence on space-based assets by the U.S. military. In Desert Storm, 542,000 military members had 99 megabits per second available for use; by the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) ten years later, 350,000 personnel generated a throughput of 3,200 megabits per second (Cebrowski and Raymond, 2005). In Desert Storm, GPS was used to navigate in the desert; 10 years later in OIF, GPS was used to place 5,500 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMS) within 10 feet of their target (GPS Fact Sheet, 2007). In addition, the use of imagery and missile warning data has dramatically increased (Cebrowski and Raymond, 2005). This increased use has led to an increased need for imagery and missile warning capability as well as an increased usage of the communication satellites that transmit this data.
The need for ORS can be realized in one of two forms ─ augmentation and reconstitution (Sega and Cartwright, 2007). Augmentation means adding additional capability to what is already on orbit, generally based on the needs of a JFC. Reconstitution means quickly replacing a lost capability caused by an unexpected satellite failure or an adversary’s hostile actions.
Augmentation is driven by the needs of a JFC. Planning for Desert Storm, in September 1990, indicated that a communication satellite was needed to provide additional satellite communication capability. Yet, not until February 11, 1992, over a year and a half later, was a DSCS III satellite then placed in orbit (Brown, 2004). In the future with ORS, additional capacity could be realized without having to depend on commercial systems as it was in the case of Desert Storm.
Reconstitution may not be replenishment in kind, but it could provide reduced capabilities for national and military leaders in the event an on-orbit asset is no longer available (Cebrowski and Raymond, 2005). In the absence of adversary actions, a satellite may stop operating for many reasons. A design error or hardware flaw, undetected through ground testing, could adversely affect the satellite on orbit. The satellite could be damaged by space debris or space weather.
Recognizing the U.S. military’s dependence on space systems, an adversary, at some point, will likely attempt to deprive the U.S. military of its space systems. Threats from adversaries to the U.S. satellites can come in many of the following forms (ORS Mission Needs Statement AFSPC 001-01):
• Counterspace forces: Physical threats to space systems and operations, such as directed energy, kinetic energy, jamming, and sabotage against ground assets.
• Espionage: Information collection efforts targeting national security assets and space systems operations, technologies, manufacturing processes, and logistical networks.
• Sabotage: Physical threats to space systems payloads, fuels, spacecraft production facilities, transportation, ground operations, software, and command and control facilities.
• Information Warfare: Information attacks against military space systems communications links and relays.
• Nuclear Forces: Immediate effects from a nuclear weapon detonated in orbit as well as the resulting increase in background radiation.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The increasing dependence of the United States on its space assets at both operational and strategic levels dictates that the U.S. must develop means to maintain the space capability in times of conflict. To this end, the U.S. must have the ability to rapidly place capability on orbit to either augment or reconstitute existing capability. This ability will require pre-designed satellites and pre-built components that can be quickly integrated and then integrated onto a launch vehicle. The next chapter discusses the design of those satellites.
ORS is vital to quick satellite reconstitution
Geib 9 – Captain, United States Air Force B.S., Naval Postgraduate School, this was submitted for his Master of Science in Systems Engineering (Jeremy S., March 2009 “A Satellite Architecture for Operationally Responsive Space”, )
Operational requirements likely result from a need either to augment an existing system or to replace a portion of an existing system. A need for more capacity in a certain area by, for example, the Joint Forces Commander would require the augmentation. A replacement of a satellite would be needed if the satellite failed as a result of either an unexpected cause or a direct act by an adversary. Whether a satellite is required as an augmentation or a replacement, it would need to be placed on orbit on the order of weeks ─ not years as it would take to deploy a satellite from scratch.
ORS systems will be neither the required full-scale national systems nor the cutting edge systems used to gain an advantage against the U.S.’s adversaries. Rather, ORS systems will be a gap filler aimed at maintaining an existing advantage in unforeseen circumstances.
Space assets are key to US military capabilities – their loss would be debilitating
Steele, 9 – USAF Lieutenant Colonel, Command Lead for the EELV program and at United States Strategic Command (2/12/09, Thomas M., Air War College, Air University “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Eelv) For Operationally Responsive Space,” )RK
Since Desert Storm, integrating existing space capabilities and delivering emerging space technologies directly to the warfighter has become an important focus of the military space community. Today, our operational forces rely on space capabilities for situational awareness; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); wideband and secure communications; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); missile warning; weather; and, more. Many of these space-provided capabilities were not available, extremely limited, or could not be delivered in a timely manner to the warfighter during Desert Storm. “One need only compare Desert Storm with Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom to see how successful we have been at operationalizing our global space forces. One of the key differences between Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom is the distribution of satellite-based wideband communications down to the tactical level.”13
Today, the U.S. armed forces are by far the strongest and most capable military force on earth, and our space forces are without peer. Considering the current advantages in-place space assets provide our forces, and the use of Unmanned Ariel Vehicles on the battlefield to augment some space capabilities, one may legitimately ask if we need ORS. This is an emotionally charged question that surrounds the ORS program; the answer is a complex web of issues driven by the National Security Strategy (NSS). Additionally, in light of the nation’s current economic problems and DoD budget shortfalls, even if the answer is “Yes, we need ORS,” a follow-on question emerges, “Do we need it now?”
The short answer appears to be ‘yes.’ The issues ORS purports to solve should be addressed sooner rather than later, largely because of the transformation effects that space has provided to air, ground, and maritime forces. The value of these effects will not diminish, so recognizing that “the nation’s space capabilities directly impact speed of maneuver, the tempo of the fight, and the boldness and lethality of our forces,”14 it’s appropriate to conclude the warfighter requires worldwide, timely, and assured on-orbit capabilities. Therefore, “the ability to maintain, replenish, and augment space assets in a given theater is now more operationally and time critical than ever.”15
The “augment and reconstitute” argument appears to support the original Operationally Responsive Spacelift approach. As pointed out in Chapter 1, spacelift alone will not provide the responsive capability without satellites, infrastructure, and user equipment ready for rapid deployment. The ORS plan recognizes the importance of responsive launch vehicles and states “Initial ORS efforts will focus on providing rapid launch capabilities (launch vehicles, launch infrastructure, and associated launch support)…”16 Fortunately, the Air Force already operates spacelift systems that are capable of meeting most responsiveness requirements. By utilizing existing launch systems, the ORS program can concentrate fulfilling other aspects of responsive space that will meet the combatant commanders’ requirements.
ORS is vital to reconstitution
Brown 6 – liquid rocket engine system engineer for NASA and researcher at College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (Kendall K., Air and Space Power Journal Summer 2006, “Is Operationally Responsive Space the Future of Access to Space for the US Air Force,” ) NYan
HLV = Hybrid Launch Vehicle
An analysis of alternatives completed by AFSPC in 2004 concludes that "ORS can provide significant military utility at the campaign level" through the use of responsive space-asset delivery. The greatest impact occurs when the enemy has offensive counterspace (OCS) capabilities and the United States uses responsive launch vehicles and satellite systems to maintain on orbit capabilities. This ability to sustain and supplement on-orbit assets could become particularly critical if potential adversaries can destroy or disable our satellites-reportedly, China has this capability. Force application and OCS missions also provide significant military utility, with the former increasing as a function of theater access. 4 The United States has less access to some regions of the world as a result of the decreased forward presence of its forces and globalization of terrorism. Within that operational environment, the analysis of alternatives determined that a hybrid launch vehicle (HFLV), a reusable first stage with expendable upper stages, was the most affordable solution to meet mission requirements. A subsequent study, by this author, developed a potential concept of operations for an HLV system which showed that no insurmountable technology challenges existed.
ORS HIM wings located in the south central and southwestern United States will provide the combatant commander unprecedented strike capabilities without the burden of deployed assets or aerial-refueling resources required for long-range bombers. Inland CONUS basing offers an inherent degree of physical and operational security not available at deployed locations, as was the case with Atlas F intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) at sites in southern and southwestern areas, including rural Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico.
Reconstitution is vital to space access
Sheridan, 10 - Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center (John, “Operationally Responsive Space and the
National Security Space Architecture,” High Frontier, May, )
Our national security space architecture provides products and services for operational use in ongoing contingency operations, but greater responsiveness is required. Demand for imagery and bandwidth is growing. Technological advances on the battlefield are driving an insatiable demand for space capabilities that, in turn, drives a need for greater responsiveness. Joint force commanders also fear that space capabilities that are heavily relied upon by warfighters might not be available when needed most. We have seen foreign development and employment of an array of capabilities specifically designed to deny the US’ use of space. Of particular concern are a variety of physical threats to our space systems that we have not had to consider in the past. In short, space is now a contested environment. As the nation’s demands on its military instrument of power have shifted in the 21st century toward defeating a wide range of adversaries—state or non-state actors—with a charge to do so swiftly in overlapping campaigns, it is vital that we are able to augment, replenish or reconstitute space assets to provide responsive capabilities at the operational and tactical levels.
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines operationally responsive space (ORS) as assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of joint force commanders’ needs.2 The warfighting effects that are desired include reconstitution of lost capabilities, augmentation of existing capabilities, filling unanticipated gaps in capabilities, exploiting new technical or operational innovations, and enhancing survivability of space systems. In this context, two essential tasks must be accomplished to achieve ORS. First, we must develop and mature end-to-end ORS enablers that will be required to deliver highly responsive capabilities. The second essential task is to execute rapid end-to-end capability efforts to meet urgent operational needs.
We are off to a great start! The Space and Missile Systems Center is successfully applying our “small space” capabilities as enablers in meeting emerging responsive space needs. Consider for a moment our “small space” efforts in the context of the three tiers of ORS.3
For the first tier, we “employ” ORS capability to meet demand
with existing assets in a timeframe of minutes to hours.
Options range from re-utilizing current space assets on orbit to partnering with commercial entities to meet warfighter needs. We have seen several successful examples of Tier 1 “employment.” We are finding better ways to exploit data from existing sources. After we launched Space Based Infrared Systems Highly Elliptical Orbit, also known as SBIRS HEO, we realized the sensors on orbit were performing better than expected. We received funding from Congress for a series of independent projects to exploit the data for operational use, with each project not to exceed 24 months. These are small, one to three million dollar targeted efforts. Through better data exploitation, we find that we’re able to get key information to a greater number of operational users more quickly, resulting in earlier missile warning data and enhanced technical intelligence. Additionally, we are seeking partnerships with commercial entities on programs such as Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP) to take advantage of excess payload capacity to attach responsive military sensor packages.
If Tier 1 does not meet the need, we would seek a Tier 2 solution, with “launch or deployment” of on-call assets in a timeframe of days to weeks. Our “small space” efforts already include or have in work a number of enablers that support Tier 2 launch and deployment. Rockets such as Minotaur I and Minotaur IV, built with re-purposed intercontinental ballistic missile components, can be readied for launch relatively quickly and cheaply. A number of commercial entities are working toward faster, less expensive launch services that may provide a viable option for on-call responsive launches. For on-call launch to work, standardized services are becoming available, such as standard interface vehicle, evolved expendable launch vehicle secondary payload adapter, multi-payload adapters, and Hydrazine Auxiliary Propulsion System (HAPS) which can accommodate a variety of multiple payloads.
If an operational need cannot be met with employment of existing systems or launch and deployment of on-call assets, then we must move to Tier 3 “development” of a new or modified capability within a timeframe of months, not years. Operationally Responsive Space Satellite 1 (ORS-1) is a two year developmental effort to meet a central command urgent operational need for an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system capable of direct tasking by DoD. ORS-1 did not come out of a vacuum; again we benefit from previous “small space” efforts. The vehicle is based on our successful Tactical Satellite3 (TacSat-3) bus mated with an existing airborne ISR sensor, and will be launched on a Minotaur I rocket late this year.
As we work toward development of a robust ORS architecture, we are finding additional value along the way, and have gained a number of key insights in the design and build process. We need to focus on operational capabilities, not single experiments, and consider the transition to operations and sustainment up front. At present, we do not have an operations and maintenance pipeline for these capabilities. An ORS architecture must account for it.
End-to-end, responsive capability will require standardization; standard launchers, payload interfaces, satellite buses, and common ground system architecture. For example, the MultiMission Space Operations Center, built by our Space Development and Test Wing, is a common ground system architecture that is also open, flexible, and scalable to increased demand. Standardization will require dedicated help from industry partners. They must understand that ORS is simply not possible if we continue boxing ourselves into proprietary, stove-piped solutions. Open systems architecture is a must.
In applying “small space” capabilities to ORS requirements, we need to match the level of resources assigned to mission importance. “Small space” is not the answer for everything, and using “small space” for ORS will be inherently risky in the beginning. This needs to be weighed against mission requirements and public perceptions. Many are watching our progress very closely. Overall, we have a great start on developing a lasting ORS capability. Our “small space” infrastructure provides a great foundation, and we are learning a great deal as we go.
For ORS to work, we need to focus on operational capabilities, not single experiments. Going forward, an end-to-end series of ORS capabilities should be factored into the overall space architecture and assigned resources based on mission importance and user needs. Further, we will need to focus on effective mission assurance and proper resourcing during acquisition and operations to ensure we meet ORS needs with minimal risk … not zero risk! ORS has a unique niche to fill in an overall national security space strategy. It is dependent on the right solutions for warfighter requirements in the most efficient manner, whether leasing more commercial communications or fast development of dedicated space missions. Transition to a full ORS capability will require commitment to this revolutionary shift by both government and industry players. Our “small space” efforts helped us reach our dominant position in national security space. The path to ORS we choose today will figure prominently in the US space posture of the future.
Reconstitution key to defense
The ease of ASAT countermeasures make reconstitution the only possible defense
Walsh 7 – J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (Frank M., Fall, “ FORGING A DIPLOMATIC SHIELD FOR AMERICAN SATELLITES: THE CASE FOR REEVALUATING THE 2006 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY IN LIGHT OF A CHINESE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM”, 72 J. Air L. & Com. 759, Lexis Law)
The United States could research and develop technologies that would "harden" satellites to the point where they could evade or survive attacks. n98 This approach requires a variety of different mechanisms to be incorporated into new satellite designs. First, satellites could be equipped with sensors to detect incoming ballistic weapons and rockets so they can maneuver out of the way of a kinetic kill vehicle. n99 While this option would likely require too much fuel to be practical for bigger satellites, increased maneuverability could work against a rudimentary ballistic missile system like the current Chinese design. n100 Better ASAT guidance and tracking systems, however, could neutralize satellite maneuvering efforts by allowing an ASAT weapon to change course as it approaches the targeted satellite.
[*777] Alternatively, a backup system of replacement of satellites could help the United States reestablish its network in the case of a first strike. The capability to relaunch satellites is a unique goal because it is more of a logistical problem of rapidly launching satellites and less of a technological problem of hardening satellites against potentially awesome destructive power. n101 Because it is virtually "impossible to harden satellites against direct assaults by kinetic energy ASATs" n102 like the one China tested, a replacement program may be the only way to guarantee continued satellite operations. This system would also provide additional benefits since it would allow the United States to deploy replacements when the original satellites fail because of normal maintenance failure.
ORS is key to protect satellite systems from ASAT attacks
Larrimore, 7 – Lt Col, USAF (April, Scott C., Air Force Fellows Air University, “Operationally Responsive Space: A New Paradigm or Another False Start?”
)RK
The other argument for ORS, reconstitution, has largely been ignored. It is this capability that ORS could significantly contribute to the national defense. The country has no replacement capability for its critical ISR satellites. It takes years to produce these satellites, and months to launch them aboard large launch vehicles. However, technological advances have enabled several countries and a few commercial entities to produce small spacecraft with low-end reconnaissance abilities. The need for an ORS reconstitution system grows as ASAT technology proliferates around the world, enabling more state actors to diminish an important American military advantage. However, even a minimal reconstitution capability will be very expensive, at least a $100 million for a meager system. This insurance policy, though, is only about one-tenth the cost of a single United States’ imagery reconnaissance spacecraft and should be considered in light of the emerging multipolar political environment.63
ORS key to solve countermeasures
Space conflict is inevitable—ORS ensures US victory by improving adaptation to future countermeasures
Doggrell, 6 – senior project engineer with the Aerospace Corporation (6/1/06, Les, Air and Space Power Journal, “Operationally Responsive Space A Vision for the Future of Military Space,” )RK
In future conflicts, military space forces will likely face challenges ranging from defending against opposing systems to dealing with rapidly changing technology and support needs. The Air Force describes its vision for responding to these challenges as operationally responsive space (ORS). Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom clearly demonstrated the force-multiplication effect of space systems on US military capabilities. Precision-guided munitions; global, high‑speed communications; and enhanced situational awareness all contributed to the rapid destruction of the Iraqi military (fig. 1).1 Unfortunately, future opponents observed the United States’ dependence on space systems. To win the next war, this nation must prepare to respond to opposing space and counterspace systems. Gen Lance Lord, USAF, retired, former commander of Air Force Space Command, points to ORS as one way of shaping this response.2 According to a draft study of ORS, it “will provide an affordable capability to promptly, accurately, and decisively position and operate national and military assets in and through space and near space. ORS will be fully integrated and interoperable with current and future architectures and provide space services and effects to war fighters and other users. ORS is a vision for transforming future space and near space operations, integration, and acquisition, all at a lower cost.”3
During Iraqi Freedom, described as the first counterspace war, both sides executed counterspace missions. Iraq, for example, attempted to jam GPS signals using Russian-made equipment, and US forces destroyed an enemy ground-transmitting facility, disabling Iraq’s ability to communicate with its forces and the outside world by using commercial satellite television.4 A more capable future opponent will find additional techniques for using space to counter the space capability of the United States.
We can anticipate some responses to our space systems. Specifically, Russia, North Korea, Iran, India, and China may be capable of building a nuclear-armed antisatellite weapon system.5 Furthermore, “many countries are developing advanced satellites for remote sensing, communications, navigation, imagery, and missile warning,” and Russia, China, and the European Union have developed or are developing satellite-navigation systems.6 Improved antijam features can counter jamming defenses. However, the most effective countermeasures to our space capability will likely take the form of unanticipated actions by our adversaries. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld might call such actions the “unknown unknowns” or, in the worst case, a “space Pearl Harbor.”7 Fortunately, we have military techniques for responding to the unknown. Speed, maneuverability, and agility have allowed military forces throughout history to deal with unanticipated events. The ability to act and respond faster than the enemy is a well-known tenet of military operations.
Space systems do not adapt well to change. When it became obvious in September 1990, during the planning for Desert Storm, that existing satellite-communications capacity would not support the war effort, we made an urgent attempt to launch an additional Defense Satellite Communications System III spacecraft. That mission finally launched on 11 February 1992, missing the war by over a year. Luckily for the nation, we not only had access to a retired spacecraft but also were able to hire commercial communications capacity.8 The ability of the United States to support Iraqi Freedom with additional space capability has not significantly improved since Desert Storm.
President Bush has noted the need for responsive space capability. US Space Transportation Policy Directive 40, issued 6 January 2005, directs our government to “demonstrate an initial capability for operationally responsive access to and use of space—providing capacity to respond to unexpected loss or degradation of selected capabilities, and/or to provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities—to support national security requirements.” The same document describes the purpose behind this direction: “Access to space through U.S. space transportation capabilities is essential to: (1) place critical United States Government assets and capabilities into space; (2) augment space-based capabilities in a timely manner in the event of increased operational needs or minimize disruptions due to on-orbit satellite failures, launch failures, or deliberate actions against U.S. space assets.”9 The challenge for the Air Force lies in responding to this direction within the constraints of austere budgets.
Responsiveness in space systems has proven difficult to attain. Characteristics of existing systems include development times exceeding a decade, high cost, and an emphasis on reliability and long mission life. These traits are driven, in part, by the considerable expense of getting to space. Nevertheless, we can achieve the space capability we desire through multiple approaches. The United States maintains a highly responsive fleet of launch vehicles in the ICBM force and has previously maintained communication spacecraft and counterspace systems on alert—an effective approach but costly and encumbered by nuclear politics.10 Consequently, ORS is examining avenues other than brute force to secure responsiveness. To do so, we must change many aspects of the entire space architecture. The ground system, space vehicle, launch vehicle, and launch infrastructure all affect the responsiveness of space capabilities (fig. 2). Improving a launch vehicle’s reaction time has little effect if we have not similarly improved the infrastructure and spacecraft.
One approach entails not going to space at all since terrestrial systems or aircraft can meet many “space” needs. The Air Force identifies the domain above the typical operational altitudes for aircraft and below the orbital regime, roughly between 65,000 and 325,000 feet, as near space (fig. 3). This high altitude uniquely favors the deployment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; battlespace situational awareness; and communications assets. Although we have not made extensive use of near space for military operations due to the technical challenges of operating in this environment, advances in materials, solar collection, and power-storage technology can give the United States an opportunity to exploit this regime for persistent applications.11
Spacecraft already on orbit can provide high levels of responsiveness to some types of requirements. Beginning with the end user, the process of tasking, posting, processing, and using data must be timely, flexible, and tightly integrated with the war fighter’s processing infrastructure and communications.12 Centralized national processes task many existing high-demand, high-value space capabilities. The process of retasking a spacecraft must become responsive to a larger user community. Responsiveness applies as well to such actions as reorienting or maneuvering a spacecraft, modifying onboard software, or changing the pointing of the vehicle’s antenna.
We do not limit responsiveness to the space segment; launch can also improve the timeliness of meeting a new user need. Rapidly launching augmentation or replenishment spacecraft can prove essential to maintaining capability during a shooting counterspace war.13 Efficiently bringing a spacecraft online requires a reduction in initialization and checkout time, which in turn necessitates deliberate engineering to automate processes or eliminate intermediate steps. Currently we build spacecraft according to a launch-on-schedule concept, but responsive vehicles must prepare for launch on demand. We can more effectively shift to the latter approach by maintaining an inventory of war-reserve materiel, spacecraft, and associated launch vehicles at the launch sites (fig. 4). Reaching farther back into the process, acceleration of the research, development, test, and acquisition phase can improve reaction to a new need or an evolving threat.
ORS is key to overcoming countermeasures to satellite defenses
Doggrell, 06 – senior project engineer with the Aerospace Corporation (6/1/06, Les, Air and Space Power Journal, “Operationally Responsive Space A Vision for the Future of Military Space,” )RK
Development of responsive space may in turn enable new concepts. We could use a highly responsive and inexpensive space-launch capability to precisely deliver conventional ordnance anywhere in the world (a Prompt Global Strike system). Low‑cost spacecraft could enable space systems to provide direct support to the operational and tactical levels of warfare, as envisioned by the Air Force’s concept document on joint war-fighting space.16 Development of quick-response spacecraft capable of augmenting existing capabilities might allow transition to an expeditionary space forces concept whereby we deploy the full system capability only when needed. Counterspace missions will benefit from improvements to small spacecraft and responsive-launch technologies associated with ORS. Ultimately, technologies that improve the responsiveness of new missions and small spacecraft will transform the way we perform traditional space missions.
Changing the way space professionals think about space systems may prove the most formidable obstacle to creating a more responsive space system. Some people perceive current systems as high-value assets that we must protect—not consume. Deciding whether or not to shorten the projected mission life of an existing spacecraft by using onboard fuel to move the spacecraft in support of a contingency will have national implications. In the future, operators of responsive space systems will need to react to the changing needs of US forces and to the actions of opposing forces in a dynamic, timely fashion. Initiatives such as the National Security Space Institute, which shapes future space leaders, may be more important than technology development in the long run (fig. 6).
Future adversaries will inevitably take steps to counter US space capabilities. At the same time, technology will continue to shape the evolution of military space systems. Improvements in the responsiveness of space systems give us the means of proactively engaging these future changes.
ORS key to survivability
ORS makes space assets survivable – they can adapt to countermeasures and develop new systems
Peel 8- Lt Col, USAF (Scott D., October 30, “Fixing the Nation’s Space Launch Woes: Operationally Responsive Space for Tomorrow’s Joint Force Commander—Panacea or Pipedream”, Naval War College, , Mintz)
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Unveiled
The DOD officially defines ORS as “assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of Joint Force Commanders’ needs.” 11 It contains two key elements: an element of assurance of capabilities and timely delivery. Through robust, proven, and readily accessible means the nation will provide space effects and services within an operationally relevant timeframe prescribed by the joint commander during peace, crisis, and war. Since Operation DESERT STORM the nation has progressively improved the data products and services available to fielded forces, but its ability to tailor them to specific JFCs and be able to replenish and augment them rapidly has been questionable at best. In a significant departure from previous space efforts, ORS seeks to give priority to theater space needs, in essence shifting the paradigm founded in its strategic roots. But ORS isn’t just about increasing responsiveness to last-minute needs it also includes a level of daily anticipatory activities.
Seen in broad terms, ORS intends to provide the nation with the capability to reconstitute lost space systems, augment current existing systems, fill unanticipated capability gaps, increase capabilities through technical and operational innovations, and react to unanticipated or episodic events—all conducted rapidly on operationally-relevant timelines. 12 The cumulative effect of these capabilities will bolster survivability and adaptability of the nation’s space-based systems and therefore provide a level of deterrence. It is composed of three tiers: employ existing capabilities, launch/deploy new capabilities, and develop new approaches and systems (see Fig. 1). Response times increase from shortest during Tier-1 activities to longest occurring during Tier-3. Initially they might take 36 months to respond, but the envisioned end state is less than 1 year. 13
Tier-1 efforts seek to modify, improve, and adapt current capabilities available from existing on-orbit systems and associated ground-based infrastructure. Once the need is identified, the goal is to provide the requested capability as immediately as possible, and not to exceed several days. It doesn’t require the manufacture of new equipment, but addresses the problem from providing data, modifying current processing methods, looking for potential fusion benefits, etc. 14 In short, Tier-1 looks to leverage deployed systems in new ways to meet new needs of the JFC, something the space providers have become adept at although with priority historically focused on satisfying strategic-level users. While this issue could use more study it isn’t the focus of this paper and won’t be discussed further.
Tier-2 is the most progressive, and seeks to remedy the historical inability of the Air Force to deviate from a launch-to-schedule program. It proposes to utilize newly-developed yet proven launch vehicles and small satellites, stored on-hand as War Reserve Materiel at key locations and launch bases, to rapidly respond to emergent needs of theater commanders and strategic-focused agencies. Tier-2 operations would best be suited for augmenting or reconstituting existing on-orbit systems. 15 The need to launch new satellites and place new satellites into orbit would be determined by the coverage and capabilities of existing on-orbit satellite constellations, and the resultant coverage gaps and capability shortfalls as defined by the JFC’s operational requirements. The criteria used to determine if a launch, or multiple launches, is needed would be event-driven. Inherent in Tier-2 operations is the need for enhanced coordination and integrated planning, which will serve as the focal point of the remainder of this paper. The Tier-2 activities are expected to occur as earlier as within several days of the request, but not to exceed several weeks. 16
Maneuverability solves ASATs
Shifting the ORS program to develop assets for beyond geosynchronous orbit completely eliminates the risk of ASAT attacks against the US
Dinerman, 9 – DOD space consultant, and senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch (Taylor, The Space Review, “Space war: going deep”, 4/20, )
At a recent conference some suggested that if the US wanted to increase the security of its space systems it should not only rethink the way it builds and operates it space systems, but it should try to increase a potential enemy’s targeting problem by “going deep”. Putting military space systems as far away from the Earth as possible seems like a no-brainer, but so far few, if any, experts have examined what such a new approach would look like—at least publicly. Is it possible to put effective military observation satellites into orbits beyond geosynchronous (BGEO)? What about military communications ones or a new generation of navigation spacecraft?
One longstanding suggestion has been to hide a few on-orbit spares either in BGEO or in that region beyond the Moon that Professor Ed Belbruno of Princeton calls the “weak stability boundary” near the Moon (see “From chaos, a new order”, The Space Review, March 6, 2006). What if, instead of just putting a few spare early warning, navigation, and communications satellites up there, the US were to use that region as a vast hideout for operational spacecraft ? The eccentric orbits needed to keep station would in and of themselves make life difficult for anyone trying to destroy an object in that region. Maneuvering an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon inside the boundary or in BGEO would present an attacker with a truly difficult challenge. This would by itself go a long way towards negating the traditional advantage that an attacker has had in space over anyone trying to defend a space asset.
For early warning and other associated purposes, a new post-SBIRS generation of spacecraft could be designed, building on the work already done for the Advanced Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS). Based in eccentric BGEO orbits, these satellites would be far more difficult to target and attack than the current DSPs, which are, after all, vulnerable to a variety of ASAT systems, both kinetic and non-kinetic. This would require sensors that are far more sensitive than those we can build with today’s technology and having power and propulsion subsystems optimized for operations in such orbits. This should not be beyond the state of the art; certainly it should be possible to build these systems by the middle of the next decade. Civil spacecraft that are built to function at the Lagrange points have to deal with a similar environment and will provide valuable lessons for industry and government.
Moving as many US military satellites out of LEO as possible would have the added advantage of making this orbit less crowded. With few military targets available the incentive for potential US foes to build and test simple direct-ascent ASATs would be diminished almost to vanishing point. This does not mean that they would not do so, only that they would need to think up a new justification.
Commercial operators probably would welcome the absence of US military assets from LEO and GEO. The nightmare scenario of a chain of collisions knocking out one large, expensive commercial communications or remote sensing satellite after another might seem to be diminished if there were no or very few US military spacecraft in any of those orbital slots. They should however be careful what they wish for.
If the US were to successfully migrate most of its military and quasi-military spacecraft out of LEO, MEO, and GEO in the next 10 to 20 years, that area would constitute a sort of “free fire zone” in space. A new generation of US spacecraft—maneuverable, hardened, and stealthy, operating in eccentric, hard-to-predict orbits—would allow the US in wartime to shoot down enemy satellites moving about closer to Earth with no thought given to the effects on its own space assets. This might mean that the US and other space powers might find it profitable to station various types of killer ASATs this area, these would be harder to cope with than direct ascent ASATs or ones stationed in more conventional orbital positions.
In any case, if the US really wants to reduce its current vulnerability in space it will have to rethink the way it designs and operates its orbiting assets. This means that it must seek to protect its own systems by the use of distance and deception, as well as by the use of active defenses. The long-term strategy should be to make it very hard to destroy or degrade US satellites and very easy for the US to hold at risk not only enemy assets but also to make life extremely had for third parties who may believe that they can afford to ignore US interests while still enjoying the benefits of US space superiority.
Many US experts feel that if one or more major US assets, such as the big intelligence gathering satellites, were to be attacked, there would be essentially no effective US response. There is a belief, justified or not, that the US has more to lose from a battle in the LEO to GEO region than any other power. This has the effect of restraining how the US could react to a hostile action.
To begin with there would be the question of attribution: any attacker worth his or her salt would make an effort to disguise the origin of the action. If this were even minimally effective they know that there are literally dozens of political organizations that would seek to prevent or weaken any US response. For the US to threaten instant retaliation for an attack on a US satellite is, as things stand now, an empty one.
If, however, the US were able to effectively threaten the whole of the LEO-to-GEO region, this would push the so-called international community to try and put strong sanctions on bad actors such as North Korea and Iran who might, in the course of attacking the US, end up destroying the utility of near Earth space for everyone.
In the medium term, building LEO-based systems that are hard to detect and hit such as those that may emerge from the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program is one good way to make life hard for an attacker. However simply the fact that such satellite will be in LEO makes them vulnerable. However, future ORS-derived systems based in BGEO or even at the weak stability boundary should give future US space warriors options that would allow them to ride out an attack and to respond with carefully targeted violence, kinetic or non-kinetic, against the perpetrator and perhaps also against their allies and supporters.
ORS key to SSA
Expanding ORS improves Space Situational Awareness; this will even prevent ground based attacks by making a US surge capability credible
Sejba, 10 - USAF Congressional Budget Liaison Officer Budget and Appropriations Liaison Directorate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget Secretary of the Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC (Timothy, “ Deterrence for Space: Is Operationally Responsive Space Part of the Solution?”, High Frontier, May, )
One area of greatest concern to the US has been SSA. For years, service and joint commanders have stated that SSA is their highest priority need, serving as the foundation for superiority in space. New SSA capabilities such as the Space-Based Surveillance System have yet to be fielded. Concurrently, the global space surveillance network (SSN), made up of legacy systems designed to detect and track satellites and missiles launched from the former Soviet Union, continues to age, requires major refurbishment, and does not provide the capabilities needed in the present threat environment. Even with today’s SSA capabilities, significant coverage gaps exist within the US network. Regions of the world outside the western hemisphere, not covered by the SSN, provide significant opportunities to interfere with or attack our satellites, without fear of detection or attribution. For this reason alone, Tier 1 partnerships with allies to expand our coverage beyond current capabilities provide immediate benefit towards surveillance of space. Agreements to share SSA data, especially in regions with limited or no SSA coverage, would increase our ability to detect a possible attack, but more importantly, attribute it back to the aggressor.
Access to allied SSA capabilities and data from outside our surveillance visibility begins to close US coverage gaps. By increasing our detection capability, we reduce the likelihood of an unattributed attack. This likely would deter an adversary from taking actions on-orbit, or even attacks utilizing ground-based capabilities. Through proper agreements, there’s great value in adding these capabilities into routine, day-to-day operations. Yet, there may be legitimate reasons why we might only access some allied capabilities during increased tensions or time of conflict, viewing them as a “ready reserve” only. By doing so, and communicating our intent to tap into non-specified capabilities, we maintain a valid surge capability, while limiting our adversary’s ability to develop tactics, techniques or procedures to counter these non-standard modes of operation. Stating and exercising these reserve modes would demonstrate their credibility, aiding towards denying the benefit of military space actions outside the range of the US SSN. With the appropriate agreements, operational concepts and data feeds in place, routine modes would provide continuous 24/7 support, while ready reserve modes would allow our joint commanders flexibility in accessing additional SSA capability within minutes, resulting in a true on-orbit ORS Tier 1 capability.
SSA prevents surprise attacks
SSA vital to preventing surprise attacks
Smith, 11 – USAF Colonel, Director of the Air Force Space and Cyber Center at Air University. He served in the Pentagon’s National Security Space Office as the Chief of the Future Concepts shop (M.V., Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
In sum, aircraft have several distinct advantages over spacecraft in regard to theater ISR collection, but space-derived surveillance and reconnaissance information is critical to diplomatic and military operations because it provides a "first look" into denied areas and at the battlespace and assists planners in finding and coarsely geolocating many targets before terrestrial forces move into the region. As a rule of thumb, today's space-derived surveillance and reconnaissance is useful in finding 80 percent of the targets and is able to determine their location to roughly 80 percent of the accuracy required to conduct precision strikes. In some cases, space systems do better than 80 percent in finding and fixing targets, and in other cases, they do worse. What is important is the tremendous advantage space systems provide politicians and commanders by giving them a highquality first look into the situation they face. With this information, they are able to make decisions about how to employ their limited terrestrial surveillance and reconnaissance assets (aircraft, ships, submarines, reconnaissance ground forces, etc.) more efficiently to refine the surveillance and reconnaissance picture to the quality they desire for the operations they are considering. In some cases, the first look from space may suffice, but usually terrestrial surveillance and reconnaissance assets are required. During combat operations, space-based surveillance and reconnaissance sensors continue to provide data, filling gaps in coverage by theater assets. Space-based surveillance and reconnaissance sensors also frequently cue terrestrially based sensors, as was the case during the Gulf War with missile warning satellites cueing Patriot batteries to intercept Iraq's inbound Scud missiles.
Perhaps most important of all, day in and day out, during war and peace, spacepower provides the 80 percent first look on a global scale. It allows analysts to watch the world and report tip-offs, warnings, and indications that give political and military leaders the freedom to employ their terrestrial forces more expeditiously and with greater confidence that another threat is not more pressing. Spacepower literally watches the backs of terrestrial forces to make sure no threat is sneaking up behind them. This allows greater concentration of terrestrial forces in theaters of combat operations because space-based surveillance and reconnaissance assets are sufficient to act as a kind of global sentry. This sort of mission is ideally suited to space systems because they have unimpeded access around the globe and relatively few assets are required to sustain surveillance and reconnaissance missions on a global scale.
Much more is possible. By increasing the number of low Earth orbiting sensors, continuously improving the quality of the sensors, and developing the means to service and repair them (either on orbit or by recovery and relaunch), the 80 percent rule of thumb will creep closer toward the 100 percent solution, despite the warfighter's demand for ever-increasing precision. As space systems becomes more capable, is it likely that they will replace terrestrial forms of surveillance and reconnaissance collection? No. Aerial reconnaissance did not eliminate the need for land and sea forces to conduct reconnaissance of their own. There is no reason to believe that space-based reconnaissance will replace any other form of reconnaissance either.
Spacepower does not usurp missions from other forces. Spacepower assets give a state new core competencies for its military order of battle. The ability to do anything continuously on a global scale is a new contribution to warfare made possible by spacepower. The various C4ISR capabilities, including weather observation, missile warning, and navigation and timing broadcasts, give space-enabled forces a distinct asymmetric advantage over adversaries in the opening days of the 21st century. This advantage will evaporate over time as other actors on the world stage develop, lease, or borrow similar capabilities.
ORS key to TacSats
Committing to ORS makes the use of TacSats possible – vital to situational awareness and preventing surprise attacks
Pendleton, 10 - Lt Col Ryan R. Pendleton, USAF Chief, Operationally Responsive Space Integration Branch ORS Division, Requirements Directorate Air Force Space Command Peterson AFB, Colorado (“You Say You Want a Revolution: Will ORS Spark Innovation in DoD Overhead ISR?”, High Frontier, May, )
The US Department of Defense (DoD) is presently hesitating at a key decision point regarding the evolution of space technology and its associated command and control. A clear and purposeful decision, or lack thereof, will either lead to increasingly assured space-superiority and strengthened national security or a decrease in US relevancy in space and a greater likelihood of “strategic surprise” in the next conventional war.
The Current Situation
… we know from history that every medium—air, land, and sea—has seen conflict … space will be no different.… Thus far the US has not yet taken the steps necessary to develop the needed capabilities to maintain and ensure continuing superiority. 2 ~ Space Commission, 2001
Since the beginning of the space age, the US has largely enjoyed preeminence in space capabilities. Today the national security of the US depends heavily upon continued use of our national and civil space assets.3 Since our space systems were designed in the latter half of the 20th century using technology available at that time they were naturally built with inherent system “flaws” from that time—these include the fact that they are few in number, extremely expensive, and essentially defenseless. In general, a system designed with these characteristics is acceptable when no threat to it exists. However, the realities of the 21st century have changed the calculus.4 If space systems were designed from scratch today using modern technology and an acknowledgement of the current threats, the satellites and constellations would have very different characteristics. The same is true for the ground-based architectural elements that support them. This is the main thesis of the operationally responsive space (ORS) movement.
The reasons the US has not already started a deliberate reformation of our current space systems are at least threefold; (1) Many persons are not convinced of the need to change, (2) thorough change to most of the space technology base within the DoD (or any large enterprise) is a daunting task and it is difficult to know where to begin, and (3) bureaucratic stalling, indecision, and a failure to embrace change always hampers revolutionary ideas. The first of these factors is slowly improving because the need for change is becoming evident due to the rapidly developing anti-satellite capabilities of potentially hostile nations. The second reason, facts of life related to equipment replacement, is also being addressed as new systems are developed. Part of the ORS concept refers to the goal of faster infusion of technology, streamlined requirements, and expedited fielding processes. Perhaps this will serve as a catalyst for changing the direction of the US space acquisition juggernaut. That may occur, but a complementary revolution is required, not just incremental improvements. The final reason, though all too often a difficult reality, is the kind of challenge often overcome by forward-thinking airmen, and will be the focus of the following example.
An Opportunity for Revolution
The DoD has an opportunity to recognize and embrace a coming revolution in the delivery of space-based capabilities to warfighters, but tough decisions must be made quickly. The current controversial decisions center on the efficient implementation of TacSat-3 and ORS-1; both of which could become the first operational ORS satellites before the end of 2010. At present the detailed command and control architectures for implementation of these systems are a subject of great debate and thus remain undefined. The debate boils down to a choice between doing business as usual, failing to make any decision at all, or truly blazing a new trail.
Background
The possible transition of TacSat-3 to operations will illustrate this point.5 In November 2008, at the request of the commander of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), a joint team lead by Air Force Space Command began formal planning for the possible transition of TacSat-3 to become a space-based tactical surveillance and reconnaissance system in direct support of combatant commands (COCOM). The team has evaluated the satellite, created the appropriate follow-on architecture with associated cost estimates, and identified a source for funding beginning in May 2010. Feedback on the performance of this system has been favorable and the team is planning for a final transition decision. If this option is pursued the handover would occur at the end of the Air Force Research Laboratory testing phase scheduled through 19 May 2010. TacSat-3 could thus become the first USSTRATCOM- and US Air Force-owned satellite dedicated to delivering tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in direct support of the geographic COCOMs.6 As such, the systems and supporting architectures would be separate and distinct from the systems owned and operated by the National Reconnaissance Office and other national-level agencies.
Architectural Pathfinder
The planning for TacSat-3 follow-on operations has served as a pathfinder for setting-up the tasking and dissemination architectural elements for ORS-1 and similar ORS systems that may come. The challenging question is—will the mechanisms put into place be streamlined and support the tactical warfighter in a way consistent with the greatest potential of emerging technology; or will the architectures become mired in bureaucracy to the point that most of the advantages are lost? The most expedient and effective way to operationalize a USSTRATCOM-owned space-based ISR asset would be to extend the airborne model to include the necessary players. Since airborne ISR uses the most tactically-focused ISR architecture we currently own this would ensure the most tactical support possible at present. Figure 1 shows a simplified architecture for airborne ISR. In this case the systems are ‘organic’ assets for the COCOM (or at least the theater) and follow a tasking process that ensures the asset is used primarily for the tactical warfighter. A deconfliction step with national systems is accomplished at the theater Joint Intelligence Operations Center (or in some cases at the joint force combatant commander for ISR in DC). In this architecture all authorities are in place for efficient command and control and deconfliction and optimization between other airborne ISR assets and national systems. Even though tradeoffs often occur between taskings during this coordination step, the COCOM always retains primacy for use of the ISR assets.
Figure 2 illustrates how a USSTRATCOM-operated spacebased ISR system could function similarly to airborne ISR. If the intent is to use the satellite to the maximum extent as a tactical asset supporting the COCOMs one need only replace the combined air operations centers (CAOCs), joint intelligence operations center, and operational squadrons with more CAOCs (representing multiple COCOMs because a satellite overflies them all), Joint Functional Component Command (JFCC) ISR, and the JFCC Space/14th Air Force operational squadrons. In doing so the satellite appears to the COCOMs as an organic asset for the time it is over their area or responsibility, JFCC ISR still performs the deconfliction role with national systems, and JFCC Space operates the satellite via the assigned operational squadrons.
In the figure 2 architecture JFCC Space holds collection operations management authority and JFCC ISR holds collection requirements management authority (unless otherwise delegated by JFCC Space).7 It is important to note the relationship between these two authorities. The joint force commander collection manager prioritizes collection requirements and recommends the appropriate asset to be assigned to collect against a particular target. The collection manager, in coordination with the operations directorate, forwards collection requirements to the component commander exercising operational and tactical control over the theater reconnaissance and surveillance assets. A mission tasking order is then sent to the unit responsible for the accomplishment of the collection operations. This unit makes the final choice of specific platforms, equipment, and personnel based on such operational considerations such as maintenance schedules, training, and experience. The effective conduct of these two roles will become increasingly important as additional space-based ISR assets are assigned to JFCC Space.
A problem with the above architectural suggestion is that it is currently notional—all the affected agencies have yet to agree. The issue so far is not disagreement between the national agencies and the Air Force regarding who should “own” the satellite. The current problem is that for more than a year we have been reviewing all the possible incarnations of the command and control and system elements for this architecture and this is putting the successful employment of these systems at risk. Making bold decisions now and moving out with purpose is what is required. A clear choice here with a comprehensive DoD endorsement would be a first step toward the realization of the full potential of operationally responsive space ideas.
“Hyper-Tactical” Operations
The preceding paragraphs refer to architecture and command and control possibilities for the “routine mode” for satellites which can fully support strategic, operational, or tactical needs. However, TacSat-3 was designed with an additional capability which could be referred to as a “hyper-tactical” mode, that is the ability to re-task, process data on-board, and downlink a product to users all in one overhead pass. Figure 3 shows a high-level view of how that capability functions. This type of capability in a constellation, or multiple constellations, of satellites would constitute an even greater revolutionary leap in tactical support from space-based ISR than previously discussed. In this case, satellites would essentially be used as airborne ISR assets that simply “fly higher.” If one wanted to increase the focus on support to the tactical warfighter, fully implementing a “hyper-tactical” mode on small responsive space satellites could be an appealing approach for future systems. It remains to be seen, however, if warfighter needs, technical capabilities, and funding all point toward the maturation of this capability.
Conclusion
The DoD is in the beginning stages of a revolution in technology that could exceed the impact of the birth of airpower. Effectively applied responsive space concepts—in the form of numerous small spacecraft which rapidly incorporate emerging technology and are tied into responsive architectures—would deliver assured capabilities for combatant commanders and improved strategic deterrence for the nation. However, bold and decisive steps must be taken soon.
A first step in the right direction would be to seize the opportunity to revolutionize the way space-based ISR supports warfighters. Our activities with respect to space-based ISR should be pursued with the same vigor with which the Air Force has recently focused on increasing airborne ISR. We must act quickly, we must hold the line with respect to the simplicity of the systems, we must ensure rapid and direct support to tactical warfighters, and we must fully leverage the technology available. If we do so we may very well succeed in jumpstarting the ORS revolution in space.
Tier 2 good – reconstitution
Tier 2 ORS allows for the rapid development and launch of new satellites via a modular plug-and-play interface
Geib 9 – Captain, United States Air Force B.S., Naval Postgraduate School, this was submitted for his Master of Science in Systems Engineering (Jeremy S., March 2009 “A Satellite Architecture for Operationally Responsive Space”, )
Tier 2 solutions signify the revolutionary portion of ORS, which would require at least partially built satellites to be quickly integrated and placed on a launch vehicle to achieve orbit. Once on orbit, they would be quickly checked out and placed into operational use. One possible way to enable a quick launching of satellites would involve having a standardized bus to which various payloads could be attached in a plug-and-play concept. A standardized bus is desired to reduce both development cost as well as minimizing storage and extra production costs. The standardized bus would contain the core subsystems needed to sustain the payload, such as power generation, thermal control, electrical power, propulsion, communication, and structural and launch vehicle interface (Brown, 2004).
Tier 3 good - innovation
A strong technological innovation capacity deters attacks
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
A distributed architecture and force structure, enabling rapid technology insertion, coupled with persistent, ubiquitous SSA, will complicate an adversary’s decision calculus and potentially lessen their perceptions of both success and benefit. Technical Agility and Innovation Convergence of distributed architecture, rapid tech insertion, and advanced SSA provide a toolset for deterrence and warfighting. However, these tools do not necessarily answer the question of how the Air Force, DoD, and America will posture to responsively and successfully face scenarios spawned by advanced technology in the hands of adversaries. In an age of rapid technological change, advantages will go to those who innovate and who exploit new and established technologies to create new products, applications, and capabilities faster than an opponent or potential adversary. A strong capacity to rapidly innovate can, in effect, introduce uncertainty into an adversary’s decision calculus. Deterring and defeating adversary and criminal threats, confusing or complicating potential adversary strategies, defending against attacks and disruptions, and producing rapid responses to emerging threats will require a long-term concerted effort, prudent investments, and a commitment to innovation.61 Innovation will be the life blood of success in the 2035 timeframe, in terms of deterrent posture, economy of force, and, if deterrence fails, warfighting. Technological change and innovation will fundamentally alter how quickly military forces Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA). The ability to outpace an adversary’s ability to ―turn or ―field a new technology, application, or technique places an adversary at a disadvantage. Posturing a large organization or a pre-eminent nation for rapid, continuous innovation will require conscious effort. Large, industry-leading corporations are susceptible to the ―Innovate and Wait trap. Large companies and organizations can become complacent because of their market dominance in their field of endeavor. They may feel little or no incentive to innovate and implement new technologies, especially those which may be disruptive. Mid- and small-size companies tend to be the real innovators.62 Sherman N. Mullin, retired President of the famous Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, points out what he calls ―false premises regarding innovation, including assumptions that ―increased R&D funding increases innovation,‖ that ―innovators are influenced by philosophers of innovation, and that ―most aerospace executives are fond of finding and protecting innovators.63 Clearly, Mullin’s aerospace experience favors the individual and small team. They are deemed as important, if not the most important elements in innovation. While it may be self-evident that innovation is a creative and developmental activity fueled by individual talent and motivation, the environment in which these individuals operate does matter with regard to actual fielding of new innovations, products, and capabilities.64 Current government organizations for technology development and acquisitions are still structured based on Cold War and industrial age paradigms -- static, vertical, large, and command-driven. Information technology, by contrast, is characterized by small increments, multiplicative iterations, and demand-driven market forces and competition.65 Technology development will benefit from a change in paradigm to a more information-age-inspired 30 organizational and operational construct, in contrast to the current paradigm optimized for the Cold War’s static, industrial-age environment.
Substantial improvements in launch technology are possible with government investment
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
Trends in space transportation will spur global activity in space. The traditional means for space transportation, via chemical rockets, will experience incremental improvements in performance and cost reduction.11 Development of nano-energetic engineered propellants and the practical applications of combined cycle propulsion -- vehicles using one or more engine types and operating over a wide range of flight regimes and velocities -- and supersonic combustion ramjet or SCRAMJET technologies -- all combined with lighter, stronger, high-temperature materials -- promise to further improve chemical-based propulsion performance. In the near term, engineered propellants, SCRAMJETs, and hypersonic test programs, such as the Air Force X-51, could lead to more powerful, smaller expendable launchers, reusable first stage launchers, and increased performance in upper stages. These advancements could further lead to fully reusable launch vehicles (RLVs). By 2035, several innovative concepts for space transportation may emerge. These include magnetically-levitated and assisted (maglev) RLVs; a novel Space Pier concept, which comprises a series of towers 100km high and forming a track 200-300km long, from which RLVs or other payloads could be launched by way of a maglev;15 various types of projectile-firing guns, to include the Slingatron concept, all of which launch projectile-like payloads into orbit16; and a concept which generates considerable current excitement and has gained the official sanction of NASA, the Space Elevator, which would use a very advanced, lightweight, strong carbon ribbon strung from the surface of the Earth to a station at GEO altitude.17, 18 All of these future concepts require significant investment, but all appear technically feasible.19
Tier 3 good – small satellite development
ORS Tier 3 will develop nanosatellite constellations – key to rapid reconstitution and manufacturing economies of scale
London, 10 – John R. London III, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, with Brent Marley and David J Weeks, SETA Contractors (September 2010, “ARMY NANOSATELLITE TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THE TACTICAL LAND WARFIGHTER,” )RK
Concurrent with the changing nature of Army combat operations is the rapid advancement of many technologies, particularly in the field of electronics miniaturization, that have opened the door for small, highly affordable satellites designed to perform limited niche missions. These tremendous technical advances were first exploited in this country by universities seeking to rapidly develop satellites at very low cost for educational purposes. The CubeSat emerged as the standard for many academic institutions seeking to place student projects into space quickly and inexpensively. Although valued greatly by the academic community, CubeSat-class satellites were initially viewed by most traditional satellite developers and users as having little practical value.
One of the major shortcomings of LEO satellites is that individually they do not provide a persistent presence over a specific geographic area of the earth – Keplerian physics demands otherwise. From a systems standpoint, global persistence can only be achieved by the use of multiple satellites in a constellation. The best example of this kind of persistence is the Global Positioning System (GPS) that is always available to any user worldwide.
Taking all of these realities into account, the CubeSatclass satellite today offers a unique opportunity to address certain mission requirements for the Army. New trends in the miniaturization of electronic components driven to a large degree by advances in cell phone and Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) technologies are leading to smaller satellites with significant capabilities in the nanosatellite (1-10 kg) and microsatellite (10-100 kg) classes. From an individual satellite standpoint, these very small classes of space vehicles can be developed rapidly within the ORS Tier 3 timeline (one year) at very low unit cost. From a systems standpoint, nanosatellites/ microsatellites can be proliferated inexpensively into constellations that would achieve useful and affordable persistence over multiple regions of interest to the Army. It is important to recognize that a number of possible constellations may not be required by the Army to provide global coverage. Since the Army’s geographic focus may not stretch to the earth’s poles for many missions, constellations of nanosatellites/ microsatellites can be limited in number to provide coverage in latitudinal swaths that address specific regions of interest at greatly reduced cost.
Constellations of nanosatellites/ microsatellites could be sufficiently affordable to allow application against a specific mission need in a limited geographical area. Such constellations would have additional benefits such as being highly survivable, amenable to being frequently refreshed with technology advances due to shorter onorbit life expectancy, low detection probability, able to leverage manufacturing economies of scale, having good signal strength in LEO, and having the potential for being rapidly reconstituted on a per-unit basis.
Based on the promise that nanosatellites/microsatellites potentially hold for the Army, and because of urgent requirements gaps that this class of satellite could address, the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command decided in the Spring of 2008 to once again move the Army into the satellite development arena.
The US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) is investigating a number of nanosatellite/microsatellite technologies. These technology demonstrations include SMDC-ONE, Kestrel Eye, NanoEye, and SATS, together with a user-friendly ground segment and a dedicated launch capability provided by the Multipurpose NanoMissile System. Through these demonstrations the command hopes to validate the utility of the emerging trend in satellite miniaturization for the tactical land warfighter.
Demonstration projects key to small satellites
Demonstration projects spillover to deployment of small satellites – provides a tactical advantage
London, 10 – John R. London III, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, with Brent Marley and David J Weeks, SETA Contractors (September 2010, “ARMY NANOSATELLITE TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THE TACTICAL LAND WARFIGHTER,” )RK
CONCLUSIONS
Appropriate constellations of nanosatellites and microsatellites in low earth orbit can provide a high degree of persistence for the warfighter which he or she can depend upon, much like the GPS is today. The presence of a proliferated constellation of relatively short life nano- or microsatellites allow for technology refresh opportunities and are problematic to adversaries who might want to eliminate space-based support to the warfighter. Technology demonstrations such as SMDCONE, Kestrel Eye, NanoEye, and SATS, together with the dedicated launch capability provided by the Multipurpose NanoMissile System, can help establish the case for inexpensive space force enhancement for the tactical warfighter through low cost, rapidly developed nanosatellite constellations.
Small satellites key to responsive space
Shifting to smaller satellites allows for greater responsiveness and modernization of satellites
Doggrell, 6 – senior project engineer with the Aerospace Corporation (6/1/06, Les, Air and Space Power Journal, “Operationally Responsive Space A Vision for the Future of Military Space,” )RK
We do not limit responsiveness to the space segment; launch can also improve the timeliness of meeting a new user need. Rapidly launching augmentation or replenishment spacecraft can prove essential to maintaining capability during a shooting counterspace war.13 Efficiently bringing a spacecraft online requires a reduction in initialization and checkout time, which in turn necessitates deliberate engineering to automate processes or eliminate intermediate steps. Currently we build spacecraft according to a launch-on-schedule concept, but responsive vehicles must prepare for launch on demand. We can more effectively shift to the latter approach by maintaining an inventory of war-reserve materiel, spacecraft, and associated launch vehicles at the launch sites (fig. 4). Reaching farther back into the process, acceleration of the research, development, test, and acquisition phase can improve reaction to a new need or an evolving threat.
Because of the expense and risk of experimenting with major operational space systems, cost-reduction and risk-mitigation approaches need validation before commitment to a major acquisition program. The Air Force is exploring concepts for providing responsive capabilities using small spacecraft known as TacSats, relatively inexpensive vehicles weighing less than 1,000 pounds that hold promise as a proving ground for new concepts which enhance the responsiveness and survivability of future systems. Additionally, small spacecraft allow the possibility of designing distributed architectures featuring more spacecraft. By providing more but individually less critical targets, such architectures offer the potential to degrade gracefully in response to countermeasures such as antisatellite or ground-based jamming systems. TacSat spacecraft allow the Air Force to experiment with these concepts.
Spacecraft are notionally divided into two system segments: the payload and nonpayload support portions, known as the bus. Responsive spacecraft concepts include improving both of these. Advances in such technological areas as microelectronics could provide “big space” capability in a smaller package. TacSat 3, for example, will feature a hyperspectral—imaging payload and onboard target-recognition software. Existing space systems with long acquisition cycles and on-orbit lifetimes have difficulty incorporating the latest technology, whereas shorter cycles and lifetimes encourage faster technology refreshment in the space segment.
Small Sats good (Laundry list)
Small satellites allow for the creation of satellite constellations which enable military operations, space control, natural disaster detection, result in more effective treaties and disposable sensor networks for rapid-response, they also overcome the risk of signal-jamming
Barnhart et al. 09 – Major USAF, PhD, member of the IEEE and Senior member of the AIAA (“A low-cost femtosatellite to enable distributed space missions” Acta Astronautica Volume 64, Issues 11-12)JCP
Norris has proposed that clusters of small satellites operating in LEO will eventually be used to “virtually” replace larger monolithic telecommunication satellites [15]. There may be a demand for this someday as the GEO belt fills up, especially over the most populated areas of the Earth. Another variant of this idea, put forth by Edery-Guirardo, is to augment larger satellite missions with a constellation of smaller communication relay satellites [16]. For the near term, large satellites in GEO appear to be the mainstay of high-bandwidth global communications.
The GPS, GLONASS, and the upcoming Galileo mission have already been categorized as constellations using ground links. Nowhere in the literature has anyone proposed using crosslinks or a cluster for navigation DSSs. In addition, current navigation systems have known vulnerabilities to jamming [17] .For the GPS system in particular, next generation systems will mitigate this vulnerability with the combination of higher power RF signals with other anti-jam technologies, causing the mass to rise from the current 1000 kg to an estimated 1500 kg. The jamming environment will only get worse, requiring increased RF power from space. This trend does not facilitate the use of smaller systems.
There are numerous envisioned remote sensing DSSs; however, none of them has gone beyond the conceptual or experimentation phase. Examples of missions, which require real-time, distributed, multi-point sensing, are listed next. These mission ideas are based on the literature and suggestions formulated by the Surrey Space Centre (SSC) and SSTL.
• Volcano, fire, or earthquake pre-emptive warning and detection.
• Treaty monitoring (Kyoto Protocol, frequency, nuclear, other).
• Distress beacon monitoring.
• Space control, signal intelligence, and other military missions [18].
• In particular imaging with frequent temporal repeats and high spatial resolution.
• Constellation sharing where contributing members access the services of the entire group.
• Disposable, short-lived rapid-response sensor networks for use in LEO and the upper atmosphere [19].
Small satellites enable effective disaster monitoring and response, result in effective Earth Observation and can be used to keep track of potentially hostile nuclear developments as well as civil growth, traffic and pollution
Sweeting 09-PhD in Electronic Engineering, has participated in the construction of 29 nano, micro and mini-satellites with numerous organization including University of Surrey, Algeria, China, Nigeria, the UK and the Galileo program for the ESA, ge was knighted by Queen Elisabeth in 1995 and established as an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, he is a member of the ESA Advisory Committee on Human Spaceflight and a Distinguished Professor at the University of Surrey, he was recently featured in the UK’s “Top Ten Great Briton” and has received the Times higher Education Supplement Award for Innovation for Disaster Monitoring Constellation (Martin, 2009, “Small Satellites: Their Emerging Role in International Space Security” Space Security and Global Cooperation pg 161-166)JCP
For Earth observation, it is beneficial to use small satellites in constellations or swarms, which allows increase in the temporal resolution to provide contemporaneous data gathered from different sensors. This is very expensive to do with large satellites. A good example of small satellites in a constellation is a novel collaboration between five very widely dispersed countries-Algeria, Nigeria, Spain, Turkey, the UK and China-in disaster monitoring (DMC). The countries involved have individual ownership of their space assets but they operate them collectively in a constellation. This constellation of 100 kg micro-satellites was launched into orbit on three particular missions and these were then placed in a sort of string of pearls around the Earth. As the Earth rotates and these satellites go round, there is an overlapping image swap. This allows imaging anywhere on the Earth’s surface within a 24-hour period. In operating the spacecraft as a constellation the whole is greater than the sum of the parts--the five satellites-in providing a global imaging capability. The DMC small satellites provided excellent services during the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Traditional satellites found it very difficult to cover the area affected by this unusual disaster spread over a wide terrain. There was a need to image this area rapidly in order to identify areas most severely struck. Excellent support was provided by small satellites to all the aid agencies during this disaster. During the Katrina disaster, satellite help was available to assess the extent of the damage. Small satellites are also being used for monitoring the opium crop in Afghanistan. The US is using such assets for keeping track of nuclear and other events in Tehran. The Chinese authorities have used them successfully in preparation for the Beijing Olympics to monitor urban development, traffic flow and pollution.
Small sats key to reconstitution
Shifting to small satellites will substantially drive down costs – on the brink of a technological revolution now and could create viable CubeSats
Nagy, 10 - USAF Deputy Commander, Space Development Group Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (George, “SMALLER is Better: Technical Considerations for Operationally Responsive Space,” High Frontier, May, )
Despite the attractiveness of currently-planned ORS systems to meet urgent warfighter needs or provide reconstitution and augmentation of high-end DoD space systems, there are limits to what can be reasonably expected from this class of satellites. Any aerospace engineer can tell you that the cost of an aerospace platform is directly proportional to its mass. In this case, the cost of today’s 200-300 kg satellite is roughly $20-40 million for a basic design (and upwards of $80-100 million for satellites requiring more sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] payloads) with launcher costs ranging from $20-40 million depending on specific requirements. Including ground command and control, data exploitation, and other infrastructure, the cost of a single ORS mission in this weight class will run somewhere between $50-200 million dollars. While clearly attractive when compared to the billions of dollars required to field a high-end DoD space system, an adversary might checkmate the US in wartime if the cost to negate this space capability is significantly less than its replenishment costs.3
There is, however, substantial progress in the area of microsat/ nanosat/picosat development that suggests we are on the verge of a technological tipping point for exceedingly small satellites capable of meeting valid operational requirements— while serving as the “microorganisms” for space system survivability. 4 This trend is ultimately enabled by Moore’s Law and the increasing processing power that can be delivered in modern microelectronics. Combined with other benefits to related spacecraft subsystems resulting from decreased size, this trend allows for radically different space system architectures to evolve in ways that enhance their survivability, persistence, resiliency, and adaptability.
It’s All About Rocket Science
The first American space satellites of the late 1950s and early 1960s were small in size and capability—because both the launcher and space electronics technology of the day would not permit otherwise. As spacelift capability improved, the size of satellites increased along with their effectiveness and their complexity. These trends drove improvements in on-orbit lifetimes and reliability, which in turn drove the demand for improved capabilities resulting in ever-heavier satellites. As satellite mass (and cost) continued to increase, this again drove increased demands for launch vehicle performance and reliability. This “upward spiral” of launch vehicle and satellite cost/ complexity is realized today in typical satellite development timescales of over a decade—with costs in the billions of dollars to place small numbers of heavy, complex satellites into orbit for DoD and intelligence community users. But Moore’s Law and the power of miniaturization suggests there may yet be another way if we are willing to “think small.”
The act of launching a satellite into space is an inherently complex and dangerous process. The term “rocket science” is not casually applied, since the task of accelerating a vehicle to over seven kilometers per second and then operating remotely for weeks, months, or years in near-vacuum (with varying intensities of impinging electromagnetic energy and thermal cycling) requires enormous engineering, planning, and operations discipline. Few non-engineers appreciate the subtlety of the physics involved. The Tsiolkovsky Rocket Equation (which relates the initial and final mass of a rocket to its achievable velocity) is an exponential relationship.5 The reason for staging on all rockets that achieve orbital velocity is a direct consequence of this fact—the rocket engineer operates on the ragged edge of mass margins and structural materials strength to minimize a rocket’s mass to place a given payload into space. The heavier the payload, the more difficult the problem becomes, with a complexity that appears to take on exponential proportions of its own. Simply put, smaller rockets are simpler, require fewer moving parts, and obtain greater structural margins at a given throw-weight based on today’s materials technology.
The interaction between satellites and launch vehicles is also a complex one that dominates the technical challenges associated with placing payloads into space. Satellites must possess sufficient structural strength to survive the accelerations from typical g-forces during launch (routinely three to eight times the force of Earth’s gravity) while at the same time minimizing the structural mass required to ease performance requirements on the launch vehicle. G-force (or static load) requirements are not the only ones that satellites must endure—they must also deal with severe shocks imparted from staging/separation events and dynamic coupling between the satellite(s) and the launch vehicle itself. The latter concern (dynamic coupling) must be considered when examining interactions between the launch vehicle autopilot, propulsion subsystem, and induced structural vibrations experienced throughout the rocket. One phenomenon is famously known as “pogo oscillation” when experienced on liquid-fuelled launch vehicles, but similar concerns involving other resonant frequency interactions on both liquid-fuel and solid-fuel launch vehicles are also possible.6 A computational modeling process known as coupled loads analysis (CLA) is most often used to prevent such interactions from causing vehicle damage or breakup in flight; however, using today’s methods, a full CLA typically requires 12 to 24 months to complete. Generally speaking, the stiffer the spacecraft is, the easier the technical challenge becomes with integrating the satellite onto the rocket. An “infinitely stiff” spacecraft (for a given, fixed mass) remains the technological Holy Grail for satellite structural engineers.7
The Curve that Matters
Figure 1 is a scatter plot of spacecraft first fundamental (resonance) frequency versus mass for a number of small satellites designed and orbited over the past decade (data collected by the author). Two engineering observations immediately stand out. First, the general shape of the interpolated graph is hyperbolic [f(x) = 1/x]), which is not surprising given that specific strength (or strength to weight ratio) of typical aerospace structural materials like aluminum or titanium benefits from the significantly reduced spacecraft volumes achievable at lower spacecraft masses. Put another way, as a spacecraft grows in size (volume) its mass grows proportionally in such a way that the overall spacecraft stiffness that is achievable given the engineering strength of materials goes down—significantly so in the case of satellites weighing in excess of 1,000 kg at rest (1 g condition).8 The smaller the satellite, the easier the task at hand (almost absurdly so for spacecraft below 50 kg). In layman’s terms, just because a model bridge made from toothpicks can hold a mason’s brick doesn’t mean the results will scale into a full-size bridge given an equivalent load but the same building materials.9
The second observation is that the “knee” in this curve appears somewhere in the range of 200 kilograms for a first fundamental frequency above 25-30 hertz (Hz). In practical terms, a spacecraft with a first fundamental frequency above this value is much less likely to experience dynamic coupling with its launch vehicle (or just about any launch vehicle in the world’s inventory today). Put another way, spacecraft that achieve this minimum stiffness are more easily shifted from launcher to launcher with minimum changes to the systems engineering integration that is required. From the graph, the size (and associated mass) of the spacecraft that consistently attains this minimum are spacecraft weighing 200 kg or less.10
Small spacecraft yield other engineering benefits that scale positively with decreasing size and mass. While a small spacecraft ultimately has less electrical power available to it compared to traditional large spacecraft (due to reduced surface area or deployed area for solar arrays), the challenges associated with thermal load dissipation are also remarkably easier. Operating in vacuum, all satellites eventually rely on radiative cooling to maintain operating temperature. On large-volume satellites, complicated subsystems such as heat pipes and preferential placement of hot, energy-consuming components are required to maintain spacecraft thermal balance. The associated computer modeling required to analyze on-orbit behavior is an intensive engineering activity on most large spacecraft programs. By comparison, the distances involved in heat transfer on small satellites are short and relatively straightforward conductive paths. Other spacecraft subsystems benefit from similar decreases in complexity at smaller scales, although this result is not yet universally true (some subsystems have a minimum-size “form factor” given the current state of technology). As always, the cost and complexity of individual satellites scales with their mass and volume.
ESPA-class Satellite Standards and Implications
Over the past decade, a new class of satellites has emerged to take advantage of an emerging set of standards established for the evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) secondary payload adapter, or ESPA. ESPA began as a small business innovative research contract with CSA Engineering, Inc., as a jointly sponsored effort of the DoD Space Test Program (STP) and Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate to accommodate secondary payloads on EELV. The ESPA ring as designed can hold up to six 180 kg (maximum mass) satellites inserted underneath the primary payload (figure 2).11 ESPA was demonstrated successfully on its maiden flight in March 2007 during the STP-1 mission flown on an Atlas 401 (figure 2a) and has also been flown successfully as part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite mission in 2009. In February 2008 the secretary of the Air Force directed that ESPAhosted satellite operations be normalized to support responsive spacelift; currently, the EELV budget supports one ESPA flight per year beginning in fiscal year 2012.12
Designing satellites to fly on ESPA is not a “natural” activity as any aerospace engineer can attest. Because the original EELV specification left out any requirement for secondary satellites, the ESPA design is a deliberate attempt to minimize impacts to the primary payload by simply raising the satellite 24 inches inside the launch vehicle fairing.13 This requires the ESPA satellites to hang cantilevered off the ESPA ring, so the primary launch loads (up to 8.5 g’s) are transmitted through their transverse axes as compared to traditional satellites which experience their greatest loads in the axial direction. Additionally, the ESPA satellites experience a relatively severe shock environment (up to 400 g’s instantaneous at 1500 Hz) due to the stiffness of the ESPA ring and the transmission of the primary spacecraft separation loads. Despite these challenges, the ability to build ESPA-class satellites capable of surviving these launch environments yields substantial benefits. The Ball Aerospace-built STP standard interface vehicle (SIV) is designed to ESPA standards and is compatible not only with ESPA itself, but also readily transfers to launches from Orbital Sciences Corporation’s Pegasus, Minotaur I and Minotaur IV launch vehicles (and possibly SpaceX Corporation’s Falcon 1) with minimum impact and no structural design changes. In fact, the first launch of SIV is occurring in summer 2010 (along with three other microsatellites designed to ESPA standards) on the STP-S26 small launch vehicle mission using a Minotaur IV launch vehicle with a STP-sponsored multi-payload adapter. This adapter holds the satellites in a traditional (i.e., axially oriented) configuration.
CubeSats Gone Wild
At the extreme low-end of satellite weight classes, a revolution has occurred in the past decade for satellites in the 0.5-10 kg range. This revolution is enabled by technical standards for both the satellites themselves and their launch vehicle dispensers. These so-called CubeSats (named for their basic one-unit [U] design, a 10 centimeter [cm] x 10 cm x 10 cm cube weighing no more than an equivalent liter of water, or 1 kg) were first proposed at the turn of the century to foster educational outreach for high school and college students via hands-on satellite engineering (figure 3).14 Given the processing power of today’s commercial-off-the-shelf electronics, these tiny satellites are enormously more powerful than the early Explorer, Vanguard, and Pioneer satellites. The cost to build CubeSats is incredibly inexpensive— from $25,000 (a basic kit design and do-it-yourself labor) up to $1-5 million for complicated US government scientific projects (with labor and testing as the costdriver) (figure 4). The cost to launch a CubeSat as a secondary payload is also cheap, typically running from $50,000 to $70,000 for a 1U CubeSat. These satellites are today equipped with miniaturized global positioning system (GPS) receivers, cell-phone digital cameras, reaction wheels, radio transceivers and microprocessors running mobile-device operating systems. Larger 3U CubeSats taking advantage of the full volume of a standard California Polytechnic State University (CalPoly)Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD) can now be equipped with deployable solar arrays, antennas, and cold-gas propulsion subsystems.15 Available power is roughly one watt per 1U cube of surface area, with roughly 1.5 megabit per day of downlink capacity.16
A major advantage of CubeSats is their unobtrusiveness to the launch vehicle integration process. A full P-POD weighs just slightly over 5 kg and requires a simple electrical initiation signal to activate a resistive-actuator door release (the satellites themselves are deployed from the P-POD using a simple spring) (figure 5). The genius of the P-POD is the containerization of the CubeSats within a deployment device qualified to NASA Standard 7001 mechanical workmanship standards.17 In essence, the P-POD serves as a “shipping container” that prevents even a catastrophic CubeSat structural failure from escaping the P-POD and damaging the launch vehicle during flight.18 Even more importantly, the small size and mass of a P-POD greatly simplifies the launch vehicle CLA process as compared to larger satellite payloads. Whereas even microsatellites still require detailed computer finite element models (FEM) to numerically approximate a complex system, the PPOD is like a flea on the back of an elephant—CubeSats can be modeled with a simple mass-spring-dashpot approach that outputs a relatively straightforward (and deterministic) transfer function. This dramatically shortens the time required for CLA compared to normal FEM computer simulations.
Critics have argued that CubeSats are nothing more than toys. The rapid growth in small satellite technology over the past decade (approximately 30 CubeSats launched since 2003) challenges this view through the on-orbit demonstration of growing CubeSat utility in scientific and military endeavors. Today over 50 universities worldwide have active CubeSat programs.19 Various US scientific, defense technology and industry CubeSat efforts are also underway. Leading organizations include NASA, the DoD Space Test Program (STP) within SDTW, the National Science Foundation, the National Reconnaissance Office, CalPoly, AFRL, NRL, US Naval Postgraduate School, US Army Space and Missile Defense Center, the ORS Office, and Boeing Phantom Works. CubeSats’ small size, low-cost, and ease of construction have contributed to their proliferation across the aerospace industry. Current example missions include in-situ space weather monitoring, technology maturation, astrobiology, atmospheric density measurement, and beyond line-of-sight communications. Additional efforts are ongoing to expand CubeSat capabilities into medium-resolution earth sensing, unmanned ground sensor data exfiltration, tactical electronic support, and humanitarian relief missions. While it is true that physics may limit what small-sized spacecraft may achieve in some mission areas (such as large-optic telescopes for high resolution), the rapid progress achieved to date suggests these limits may be overstated by CubeSat detractors.
Many analysts have also expressed concern that CubeSat proliferation will greatly contribute to today’s orbital debris challenges (aka “debris-sat”). Orbital lifetime studies conducted for representative 1U CubeSats shows that uncoordinated reentry will normally occur within one year for orbital altitudes less than 275 km, two years at an altitude of 400 km, 10 years for an altitude of 550 km, and 25 years (the US government orbital debris mitigation standard) at an altitude of 625 km; however, the addition of an inexpensive 100-meter electrodynamic tether weighing less than 0.6 kg can decrease these lifetimes to less than a year for 525 km altitude, 10 years at 800 km altitude or 25 years at 1000 km height.20 The DoD STP, NASA and AFRL are currently sponsoring technology development efforts for other drag enhancing devices (including extensible “sails” for small satellites) that will be demonstrated as early as summer 2010.21 These improvements can substantially mitigate orbital debris concerns.
Conclusion
The DoD Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept published in 2004 made the following statements on future space control concepts:22
By 2015, space control will be most greatly enhanced by the joint force’s ability to use space systems in a highly-networked, peer-to-peer manner—to deny an adversary the easy means of holding critical US space system link, user, terrestrial, or space segments at risk.… This will be accomplished by proliferating, networking, protecting, and integrating each of these segments in a manner previously considered unachievable. The combination of low-cost production combined with miniaturization and shared understanding will enable both response and denial options for strategic deterrence.…
Satellite design will migrate toward small, single-purpose, distributed constellations providing continuous earth coverage. This will deny an adversary the ability to easily target a small number of critical nodes and create a much-needed measure of defensive redundancy. Command and control of these constellations will rely heavily on automated machine-to-machine interfaces. Terrestrial ground support infrastructure will not be stovepiped by specific mission area (i.e., ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; communications; etc.) but instead will service a variety of functions in a scalable, tailorable fashion.…
To populate, replenish, and rapidly reconstitute these constellations, low-cost responsive spacelift is essential. This capability will allow the US to respond to an adversary [weapon of mass effect] attack by rapidly reconstituting systems destroyed or degraded by enemy action. Responsive spacelift requires mobility and proliferation that reduces an adversary’s opportunity to target systems while in preparation for launch. Modular, production-line methods that allow for “mass customization” of satellites, launch systems, terrestrial C2 [command and control] and user segments are required.…
The emergence of small satellites and associated new concepts of operations are bringing these ideas to fruition—both with the space segments (small satellites), as well as the associated industrial base, workforce, and support infrastructure required to make this vision a reality. As just one example of this, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) effort on fractionated satellites (DARPA F6) recently awarded a contract to Orbital Sciences Corporation for satellites designed to ESPA standards.23 DARPA F6 will demonstrate by 2013 the distribution of multiple payloads onto smaller individual spacecraft as well as the decomposition of large spacecraft subsystems into modular systems hosted on multiple spacecraft.24 These new concepts, when proven, might replace (or, at a minimum, supplement) our current architectural approach of small numbers of large, expensive spacecraft—the space equivalent of less-complex life forms that achieve resiliency through their ubiquitousness.
Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz recently commented that “If a defensible [space] posture can be achieved not only by hardening and improving maneuverability of large, complex satellites, but also by smaller, simpler satellites, then we might emphasize further development of some less exquisite augmentation systems. With flattening budgets and likely declining purchasing power, these sorts of tradeoffs, while difficult, must be considered.”25 The advance of small satellite technology is rising to meet the challenge—and smaller is better— for reasons well-grounded in engineering, acquisition, and operational art.
Plug-and-play smallsats can be launched via jets as quickly as terrestrial forces are deployed on the ground
Hoey 6–Research Assoiciate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies this paper is based on a presentation at the “Symposium on non-proliferation and Disarmament” (Matthew, February 27, 2006, “Military space systems: the road ahead “)
Finally, another revolutionary technology under development involves the SMARTBus or “six-day satellite”. This is a “plug, sense, and play” system, meaning that each component, once assembled, recognizes the others without the need for special programming or software drivers. It is a customizable off-the-shelf satellite system that will significantly reduce the cost, complexity, and the development time required to assemble a small satellite bus to meet a satellite developer's mission requirements. The SMARTBus program is funded by the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program out of AFRL. Military applications might include asset replenishment in the event of an attack on our space assets and could require imaging, communications, and intelligence gathering abilities. Such a system might also be deployable in the theaters of military operations. Italian Air Force Lt. Col. Paolo Cesolari and Paolo Teofilatto released a study in April 2005 (reported by Defense News) stating that with the United States, NATO, and the European Union getting ready to dispatch military missions around on demand, setting up fast and temporary satellite intelligence and communications capabilities for those forces is becoming a headache. But as satellites get smaller, jets like a Eurofighter Typhoon could be used to launch microsatellites into orbit as quickly as forces deploy on the ground.
Small satellites allow for rapid communication systems, increased maneuverability which reduces the threat ASATs, the ultimate replacement of larger satellites and in orbit inspection and repair capacity
Ogundele and Solomon 6/7–Danil Ogundele works as an engineer at the ESS and NASRDA in Abuja, Iliya Solomon is the program coordinator at the space division of the Nigerian Society of Engineers (6/7/2011, Daniel and Iliya,“Small Satellite Technology: Current Status and Future Trends” )
Development of Small Launch Vehicles
Recognizing that the move toward smaller spacecraft places added emphasis on the costs and availability of appropriate launchers, the aerospace industry has moved to develop a number of "small" launch vehicles tailored specifically to meet this growing market segment.
Improvement on the Sensor Technology
Sensor technology is making great strides forward, putting more capable systems into smaller packages, and thus allowing small satellites to carry out missions that once required larger satellites.
Maneuverability of Small Satellites
The ability to move around in orbit, either to observe a target of interest on the ground or to evade threats, is a major future evolutionary technology of small satellite. The solution proposed for maneuverability of small satellites involves offloading some of the key functions of individual satellites into an on-orbit infrastructure that allows small-satellites to remain small while performing more ambitious missions.
Provision of High Speed Mission On-Orbit Communications Infrastructure
Effort is being made to create an on-orbit infrastructure that would provide high-speed mission communications as a service, as a utility: a wireless, high-speed broadband local area network. In this approach, a number of small “mission” satellites, equipped with sensors and short-range communications systems, would operate in the vicinity of a larger “communications concentrator” spacecraft. The concentrator spacecraft would serve as the hub of the local area network, accepting data from the mission spacecraft and transmitting it back to Earth using its own high-bandwidth communications system.
Replacement of Large Spacecraft by Clusters of Small Satellites
The general concept of taking the components of a large spacecraft and spreading them among several smaller spacecraft is called fractionation. In future systems, there is a proposition that groups of small satellites will be used to replace a larger satellite, providing additional mission flexibility. “Instead of building a single spacecraft,” three or four smaller spacecraft, simpler spacecraft, each hosting their own mission sensors” and flying in formation with the utility spacecraft can be built. “This would greatly simplify systems engineering on the spacecraft.”
In-Orbit Inspection of Larger Satellites
A very promising new application of small satellites is the inspection of larger satellites. A low-cost nano-satellite can observe the target spacecraft as it separates from its launch vehicle, deploys solar panels, and begins operations. Any problem during the initialization of operations, or later in the spacecraft's life, can be diagnosed by the escorting nano-satellite, which would have visible and infrared cameras as well as radio-based diagnostics.
Small sats key to deterrence
Small satellites are vital to deterrence – they have the ability to reconstitute capabilities more quickly
Butterworth, 8 - President, Aries Analytics, Inc. Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute (Robert, “Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs,”
Major Elements
Timeliness is the key to the projected deterrent effect of supplemental satellite systems, and for the next few years, at least, its possibilities are governed by a version of Einstein’s physics. Timeliness is a function of mass: The bigger the satellite, the larger the launcher, the fewer the launch site options, and the longer the time from call-up to orbit. Larger satellites are also more expensive, as are larger boosters and longer flight preparations; one can generally expect that the same budget will buy fewer large supplementals than smaller, cheaper ones.1 Fewer and larger, more and smaller—which package would better suit the needs of joint force commanders? A larger satellite would probably better approximate the capability of the legacy constellation of intelligence/ surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR, or “spy”) satellites. But with larger numbers come greater capacity, more frequent revisits, a diversity of collection geometries, and more targets to confound enemy planning.
On balance, more and smaller seems the preferred approach, if they can be launched quickly and if they can perform militarily useful functions. The first requirement, quickly responsive launch, can be met right away, using boosters from the Air Force’s longstanding Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP) and mobile range equipment developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory over the last few years. The boosters, decommissioned ICBMs, were designed for rapid launch under austere conditions, and the mobile range equipment frees them from dependency on the established launch sites in Florida and California, which could be targeted for sabotage or other hostile action.
Small sats key to surveillance
Small satellites increase military surveillance
Felt, 10 - USAF Commander, Space Test Operations Squadron Space Development and Test Wing Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (Eric, “Responsive Space Funding Challenges and Solutions: Avoiding a Tragedy of the Commons,” High Frontier, May, )
2. Evolving requirements: Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The military surveillance needs of today are much different from the military surveillance needs of the Cold War, but our space surveillance architecture has limited flexibility and insufficient capacity to meet the evolving needs. For example, in the current OCO it is extremely difficult to “find” the enemy. Demand for sensors such as ground moving target indication (GMTI) that can persistently monitor very large areas and detect “unusual” activity appears to be virtually insatiable because these capabilities enable wide area situational awareness and, more specifically, mitigate some Improvised Explosive Device threats. Presently our space architectures in general remain overly focused on delivering point targets at the highest possible resolution over wide area situational awareness. Small satellites are ideal for persistent wide area situational awareness because they are affordable enough to field the relatively large constellations needed for persistent wide-area surveillance. They provide access to denied areas and, because of the tremendous economies of scale inherent with space solutions, fielding the capabilities required by one combatant commander (CCDR) provides most of the capabilities needed by all CCDRs.
Small sats key to military communication
Small satellites key to improved military communications
London, 10 – John R. London III, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, with Brent Marley and David J Weeks, SETA Contractors (September 2010, “ARMY NANOSATELLITE TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THE TACTICAL LAND WARFIGHTER,” )RK
2. NANOSATELLITES FOR BEYOND-LINE-OFSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS
This section will describe the nanosatellites/ microsatellite efforts that took a government organization and its industry partner, neither of which had ever developed a satellite, from a standing start to the delivery within twelve months of eight flightqualified nanosatellites designed to address a specific warfighter mission need.
2.1. The Need for Beyond-Line-of-Sight Communications
On today’s battlefield, the tactical land warfighter does not always get the exact communications support he or she desires from the existing constellations of large, expensive military and commercial communications satellites in geosynchronous orbits. Constellations of satellites dedicated to tactical warfighters would greatly benefit command, control and communications as well as intelligence data dissemination to tactical land forces. There is an emerging niche for satellites focused on tactical missions such as data exfiltration from ground sensors, text message relay, voice communications and image and video transmission. Data exfiltration and text messaging are both fairly low data rate satellite communications applications and are relatively straightforward technologically.
To be practical in terms of utility to the tactical warfighter, satellites used for beyond-line-of-sight communications must have an intuitive user segment that is simple to employ. Ideally any new satellites should simply be interoperable with existing hand-held or mobile communications equipment. The satellites should also be available 24/7 to be truly usable everywhere within a given area. Because a large constellation would be needed, individual satellite unit cost would need to be very low, in the range of a few hundreds of thousands of dollars. Finally, the satellites should be responsively deployable and easily replenishable on orbit in accordance with the rapid deployment principles put forth by the Department of Defense’s Operationally Responsive Space Office.
2.2. SMDC-ONE Technical Approach
To investigate the feasibility of a BLOS communications nanosatellite constellation, the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) is executing the Space and Missile Defense Command – Operational Nanosatellite Effect, or SMDC-ONE, technology demonstration. The SMDC-ONE initiative succeeded in designing, developing, building and qualification testing two nanosatellite engineering qualification units as well as acceptance testing eight flight units within a one-year timeframe. Delivery was in April 2009. Three of the flight units are already manifested on launch vehicles bound for low earth orbit. A custom communications payload will provide a capability to support simulated ground sensors and text message relay. More complex communications applications are under consideration.
USASMDC/ARSTRAT’s initial focus for SMDC-ONE was on communications with emphasis on data exfiltration; that is, to uplink data of interest from unattended ground sensors and then downlink that data to a site beyond the line of sight from the originating sensor location. While there are military and commercial assets that can and do routinely provide communications from warfighters in one area to another location within or outside that theater, the challenge for the soldier in the field is to obtain the critical data that he or she needs in a timely manner. It would be strongly advantageous for land warfighters to have their own space assets to provide beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications. This is especially the case in areas of mountainous terrain where line-of-site access to satellites or airborne communications is limited or non-existent. A constellations of small satellites in low earth orbit could provide communications access that heretofore has not existed.
Small Sats solve miscalc
Small satellite swarms allow for rapid-response and surveillance activities for the military, they also enable cooperative constellations which reduce the risk of miscalc and aggression
Sweeting 09-PhD in Electronic Engineering, has participated in the construction of 29 nano, micro and mini-satellites with numerous organization including University of Surrey, Algeria, China, Nigeria, the UK and the Galileo program for the ESA, ge was knighted by Queen Elisabeth in 1995 and established as an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, he is a member of the ESA Advisory Committee on Human Spaceflight and a Distinguished Professor at the University of Surrey, he was recently featured in the UK’s “Top Ten Great Briton” and has received the Times higher Education Supplement Award for Innovation for Disaster Monitoring Constellation (Martin, 2009, “Small Satellites: Their Emerging Role in International Space Security” Space Security and Global Cooperation pg 161-166)JCP
To conclude, small satellites have a wide range of applications and have major military and security relevance. Their low cost and the rapid production timescales are consistent with military and security operations. However, these satellites could be put to best use in constellations or swarms. Such systems should also carry complementary sensors such as electro-optical SAR and intelligence-gathering gadgets. The information provided by such groups of satellites could be of great relevance in network-enabled environment.
Small satellites could be accessible at the entry level to every nation, using commercial off-the-shelf components. This would allow many nations to have independent surveillance from space and this could help reduce surprises and misunderstandings amongst nation-states. Surveillance in space is non-aggressive owing to the open skies policy. Small satellites also facilitate international cooperative constellations, both civil and military.
Small Sats key to tech development
Small satellites make can assist in almost every aspect of space development, they also provide ideal opportunities for technology testing and the understanding of space weather
Sweeting 09-PhD in Electronic Engineering, has participated in the construction of 29 nano, micro and mini-satellites with numerous organization including University of Surrey, Algeria, China, Nigeria, the UK and the Galileo program for the ESA, ge was knighted by Queen Elisabeth in 1995 and established as an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, he is a member of the ESA Advisory Committee on Human Spaceflight and a Distinguished Professor at the University of Surrey, he was recently featured in the UK’s “Top Ten Great Briton” and has received the Times higher Education Supplement Award for Innovation for Disaster Monitoring Constellation (Martin, 2009, “Small Satellites: Their Emerging Role in International Space Security” Space Security and Global Cooperation pg 161-166)JCP
Small satellites are capable of doing many things in communications, technology verification, Earth Observation, space science and even navigation. Also, they can do things which are not practical with large satellites. Small satellites have particular utility for electronic and signals intelligence gathering.
Small satellites are also important for technology verification. They provide an opportunity to get new technologies into orbit, check their viability and generate the prerequisite data before inducting these technologies on big and very expensive satellites. Thus, in a way, small satellites even have utility in supporting research. A case in point could be the use of such satellites for detecting broadband emissions from different types of lightening in the upper atmosphere in order to differentiate between different types of lightning and other energy-related events that might be occurring. There is also a need to monitor and understand the space radiation environment. Space weather is another import aspect. These environmental issues are of particular concern when space industry is using commercial off-the-shelf components.
Small Sats Better than large Sats
Small satellites have the potential to overcome the low margin for error on larger satellite systems and can be developed for specific missions
Grigsby 10 - Captain USAF, BSME (September 2010, David A. Grigsby, “SATELLITE CAPABILITIES MAPPING – UTILIZING SMALL SATELLITES”, )JCP
“Today’s national security satellites are a far cry from the relatively small and simple satellites that were flown in the early days of military space” [11]. The quantity of capabilities on current satellites out numbers those on legacy systems. In the pursuit of a large number of highly advanced capabilities, the spacecraft development becomes more complex, employs redundant systems to reduce risk, require longer schedules, and in the end is left with little margin for error. These are just a few of the many reasons the space industry must begin to study alternative paths by which standardized commercial off the shelf equipment can be utilized, evaluate and accept what capabilities are good enough, and apply new methods to delivering those capabilities. The space industry, academia, and the Department of Defense have engaged in many advanced research and development efforts aimed at improving various areas of spacecraft development, i.e. bus and payloads. Likewise, specific mission areas that are best suited for smaller satellites developed for specific missions have been researched and identified. A discussion of selected studies performed to understand these problems and the research attempting to provide solutions is provided in the sections that follow. The capabilities mapping process will make use of the many diverse efforts by employing the successes of academia and industry in the mapping of large-scale capabilities to small satellites and tracing back to an operational mission. By showing small satellite capabilities (sensors) have much of the same functionality in specific mission areas, the space community will continue to take more interest in smaller satellite solutions. Unfortunately, the successes with small sensors of industry and academia do not trace back to the mission area of a comparable large, legacy system. Many academic experiments address space weather but none of them trace back to the capability on a DMSP satellite. Without that, the experiments are tried, tested, and forgotten once they de-orbit. If successful, they should be considered for an operational mission, even if only for a short duration.
Small sats solve GEO
Small Satellites can be used as GEO fills up
Barnhart et al. 09 – Major USAF, PhD, member of the IEEE and Senior member of the AIAA (“A low-cost femtosatellite to enable distributed space missions” Acta Astronautica Volume 64, Issues 11-12)JCP
Norris has proposed that clusters of small satellites operating in LEO will eventually be used to “virtually” replace larger monolithic telecommunication satellites [15]. There may be a demand for this someday as the GEO belt fills up, especially over the most populated areas of the Earth. Another variant of this idea, put forth by Edery-Guirardo, is to augment larger satellite missions with a constellation of smaller communication relay satellites [16]. For the near term, large satellites in GEO appear to be the mainstay of high-bandwidth global communications.
China has small sats
China currently has a small satellite program that played a direct role in the 2007 ASAT test
Pollpeter 08 - China Project Manager for DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, specializes in China national security issues with a focus on China’s space program, he also served in research positions at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the RAND Corporation, B.A. degree in China Studies from Grinnell College and a M.A. degree in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies [NOTE: DGI=Defense Group Inc. a private consultation company for defense initiatives that works in conjunction with numerous US defense agencies including the DOD, DHS, DOE and DOJ] (Kevin, March 2008, “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOG DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE”, )JCP
In addition to developing a next generation launch vehicle, China completed the development of a smaller solid fuel rocket, called the Pioneer (kaituozhe), designed to launch micro and small satellites and to provide a capability to “rapidly enter space.” Though advertised as built for the commercial small satellite launch vehicle market, an article in Aerospace China lists the Pioneer’s benefits as “stressing low cost design and a variety of users, it is able to meet the special needs of the military for launching small payloads.”16 Indeed, it is the KT-1 that is believed to have been used to conduct China’s ASAT test on January 11, 2007.
China is developing a small-satellite program which allows them to surge satellites into orbit and provide ASAT capability even if launch bases are destroyed
Pollpeter 08 - China Project Manager for DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, specializes in China national security issues with a focus on China’s space program, he also served in research positions at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the RAND Corporation, B.A. degree in China Studies from Grinnell College and a M.A. degree in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies [NOTE: DGI=Defense Group Inc. a private consultation company for defense initiatives that works in conjunction with numerous US defense agencies including the DOD, DHS, DOE and DOJ] (Kevin, March 2008, “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOG DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE”, )JCP
The introduction of the Pioneer-1 solid fuel rocket, ostensibly to serve the micro and small satellite market, also enables China to surge a large number of satellites into orbit during a short period of time. Not only could this rocket supplement China’s communication and remote sensing needs, it could also be used to launch ASAT satellites into orbit or provide a direct ascent ASAT capability. Indeed, many observers have speculated that the January 2007 ASAT test was conducted using the Pioneer-1.
Because Pioneer rockets are presumably based on road-mobile military variants, China could potentially launch satellites or ASAT weapons into orbit even if its three launch bases were destroyed.69 Locating these launchers would be difficult, and they thus potentially provide China with a persistent ASAT and satellite launch capability.
AT: Small sats bad
Threats to US space assets are increasing exponentially – CubeSats will magnify the threat
Colón, 10 - Lt Col, USAF, former Director of Operations to the 45th Operations Support Squadron at Cape Canaveral AFS, served as the deputy commander 595th Space Group responsible for the operational testing of space and missile weapon systems until leaving for his present assignment at the Air War College (Miguel, “ DETERRENCE 2035 –THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY AND DIVERSITY IN A WORLD OF NANOSATS,” )
Deception, denial, disruption, degradation, and destruction are threats to space systems. Capabilities to attack the most vulnerable segment, command and control ground stations are increasingly available to a broad range of actors – nations, groups and even individuals. However, direct ascent destructive attacks on satellites require sophisticated capabilities demonstrated only by the Soviet Union (1973), the US (1985, 2008) and China (2007). Reports on space security list many potential threats from most to least probable.13
1. Jamming using directed energy
2. Physical attack on ground infrastructure
3. Dazzling or blinding of satellite optics using lasers
4. Pellets cloud aggression (debris-like shotgun pattern)
5. Space-based Anti-satellite weapon
6. Hit-to-kill – direct ascent
7. High Altitude Nuclear Detonation14
8. Directed energy beams15
There are many examples of individuals demonstrating their ability to disrupt or deny access to signals from spacecraft. On 27 April 1986, John R. MacDougall, an electronics engineer working as a satellite TV dealer in Florida, effectively jammed an HBO broadcast to protest a subscription hike of $12.95. For approximately 4 ½ minutes “Captain Midnight” convincingly demonstrated how a person with some technical knowledge and off-the-shelf equipment can effectively jam a satellite signal.16 In 2003, NBC reported the Voice of America’s Farsi television programming to Iran, carried on the Telstar-12 satellite, was jammed by individuals in Cuba.17 In 2005, Libya was accused by the UK18 of jamming a London-based radio station and disrupting CNN and BBC World broadcasts claiming the content was terrorist propaganda. The common denominator in these incidents was terrestrial jammers. In the future, CubeSat like spacecraft will enable the threat to operate from the medium of space where attribution is difficult.
Recent events provide cause for concern. In January 2007, China demonstrated its ability to destroy a satellite. The employment of a high-speed kinetic anti-satellite system was a surprise for many in the private, civil, and defense sectors. To complicate matters, another potentially hostile space-capable nation emerged in 2009, when Iran launched a satellite into orbit. Recently, a rocket carried a rodent, two turtles and worms into orbit in by an effort by Iran to legitimize its space program. 19 Interestingly, Iran presents a special challenge since it is a nation with motives and aspirations that are not entirely clear. It is especially concerning since the technology required to place a satellite in orbit also establishes the technical basis for a long-range ballistic missile system. By 2035, advanced space technology will enable even dangerous non-state actors to operate in the space domain as affordable dual-use spacecraft are built with the ability to threaten satellites.
The threat against space is not only limited to the space domain. The international community is aggressively challenging US’ leadership. US space technologies are subject to export controls which are regulated by the International Traffic Arms Regulations (ITAR) limiting the ability to compete internationally. Countries are taking advantage of congressionally mandated export restrictions on US space technology to market their own applications as “ITAR-Free”. Over a 10 year period (1998-2008), China purchased six satellites from European and Israeli suppliers at an estimated cost of $1.5 to $3.0 billion20. Although many argue that ITAR has negatively impacted US’ market share, more importantly is the fact that non-US companies are closing the gap and show better understanding of advanced technology. Therefore, maintaining the lead becomes paramount to US security amidst the technological advancements taking place and their projected impact.
What are the Technologies Enabling CubeSat’s Success?
Nanotechnology has the potential to increase the capabilities of electronic components while also reducing spacecraft weight and power requirements, making it an attractive proposition for future satellites.21 Currently, scientists are working on producing “memory chips with a density of one terabyte per square inch or greater”22. They are also developing integrated circuits with nano-sized features along with Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory (MRAM) with the potential to provide a memory density of 400GB per square inch.23 In essence, research in this area is moving closer to putting the computing power of a 2010 desktop in the palm of your hand. The miniaturization of integrated circuits can move industry closer to substantially decreasing the size of satellites which reduces the production, launch, and operating costs. It can also develop an affordable small satellite for a motivated nation state, group or individual.
In addition to advancements in electronic components, nanotechnology also enables the development of carbon nanotubes. A carbon nanotube’s molecular structure provides phenomenal strength. The best composite materials, like carbon fiber, are capable of three to four times the strength of steel while nanotubes manufactured today are 50 to 60 times stronger than steel.24 In general, nanomaterials promise to effectively scale down the weight of space systems while increasing material strength and enhancing the survivability of space-based systems. This allows for new capabilities, space transportation, and on-orbit support systems.
Both private and public institutions are actively promoting nanotechnology. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is researching ways to use nanotechnology to reduce mass, volume, and power consumption of sensors and spacecraft. In academia, the University of Michigan is developing electrostatic thruster technology using micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) to provide spacecraft propulsion.25 This nano-particle field extraction thruster is a promising technology that may provide higher propulsion efficiency while reducing the size and weight of satellites.
The convergence of nanotechnology, MEMS, and nanomaterials offers numerous ways for spacecraft to become smaller, lighter, and more affordable thus making it much more accessible to non-state actors. These are significant areas since launch costs are proportional to the size and weight of a spacecraft.26 No longer will access to space be limited to wealthy nations as nanotechnology changes the paradigm.
Microsatellite constellations are inevitable
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
By 2035, the Space Cloud will emerge; several technological advances and trends will make this possible. Accelerating technological change within the space industrial base will further reduce the size and weight of individual satellites as well as increase performance of their associated constellations. Structural materials, such as carbon-nanotubes (also known as buckytubes)21 and other molecularly manufactured materials will conservatively provide strength-to-weight improvements over steel of 100-1000 times, and, therefore, will significantly reduce structural mass of spacecraft, launch vehicles and other space system components. Future concepts include any number of various swarms of small satellites, coherently collaborating and processing in parallel to create a virtual large array or sensor aperture, perhaps 100-1000km across, for communications, power collection/generation, electric power beaming, remote sensing, environmental monitoring, or other applications.25 Other concepts leverage ultra-lightweight, incredibly strong materials and structures to construct enormous single or multiple apertures at geosynchronouos (GEO) altitude or at gravitationally-stable Lagrange 17 points26 between the Earth and Sun, or Earth and Moon, for space solar power and high-resolution, staring sensors. Structures and satellites stationed at these stable altitudes and orbits could be used for any number of support uses, such as reusable and re-taskable structures (akin to current-day cell phone and broadcast towers), transportation waypoints, and on-orbit storage facilities. The futurist Alvin Toffler noted in an interview in 2006 that one of the accomplishments for which he believes the current global generation (at least, since the mid-20th Century) will be most historically noted is the establishment and generation of value in orbit. His favorite example is the GPS constellation and the enormous global wealth and markets predicated on the GPS functions and signals.28 Additional value-generating space applications and capabilities are likely. Telecommunications and the nascent but rapidly-growing global commercial remote sensing industry are other current-day examples. The convergence of smaller, more capable spacecraft; lighter, stronger materials; collaborative processing and communications; and, 18 critically, space transportation methods with higher performance and reliability will enable the establishment and generation of even greater wealth and value in and from orbit.
A future space conflict is inevitable – small satellites are easily turned into weapons and constellations make debris inevitable
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
Space assets are both physically and electronically vulnerable to intentional attack, disruption, degradation, and destruction. Potential adversaries -- nations, groups, and individuals -- could take a range of actions in the future that may include subtle attacks or spacecraft disruptions masked by space environmental effects or disguised to appear as such. A single CubeSat, regardless of its stated intent -- perhaps a satellite declared derelict -- could be maneuvered to collide or interfere with another satellite. In a future era of the Space Cloud, cascading impacts could turn a constellation of small, collaborative, parallel sensing and processing satellites into an enormous cloud of useless debris, creating an enormous hazard for spacefaring nations. Given the inherent value of a construct such as the Space Cloud, disruption could prove costly not only to the US, but potentially disastrous to the global economy, which, by 2035, may become heavily reliant upon the Space Cloud for a wide range of information products and services. Adversary attacks could also include high power directed energy attacks which could disable or destroy the electronic systems of a select few or a wide swath of space assets. Furthermore, a future adversary could seek to exploit the Space Cloud in ways analogous to current-day hackers’ efforts to break into private, commercial, and government networks. 19 Consequences could range from eavesdropping, to signal spoofing, to reconfiguration or even repositioning of a spacecraft. Such results may not be catastrophic, but could still result in severe disruptions. As space capabilities become more affordable and attainable to a wider commercial and government market, adversarial threats may arise at the national, group, or individual level. As discussed with scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the lesson of 9/11 is that we must think about space in asymmetric terms -- a relatively small investment could yield very large impacts.30 An old adage from the space launch community warns, ―The only natural enemy of a satellite is its booster.‖31 Given the varying means of individuals, groups, and nations, the heretofore relatively benign nature of the space domain can no longer be assumed. America and her Airmen must be prepared to consider adversarial space threats in the future.
AT: ORS bad
ORS is inevitable – other space powers will do it if the US doesn’t
Wertz, 8 - president of Microcosm, a space technology small business in Los Angeles, and the general chairman for the first five Responsive Space Conferences (James, “It’s time to get our ORS in gear,” The Space Review, 1/7, )
Can the US overcome bureaucratic impediments in order to make it happen?
Here we would have to say that no one knows. It may or may not occur for all of the reasons that Dwayne Day has clearly pointed out. The need for ORS has been formalized for some years in the Operationally Responsive Spacelift Mission Need Statement (ORS MNS) of December 20, 2001. But that does not mean that it will actually come about. There are a variety of entrenched interests and organizational sandboxes arrayed against ORS, or trying to reshape it in their own image. This is, of course, the same process that has brought us $32 billion in cost overruns in the ten largest DoD space programs according to a 2007 Aviation Week article. We would have to conclude that the odds of success are slim, but not zero. In many past technology developments, it has been Congress that has made things happen. That may or may not occur here.
One thing seems clear: if ORS doesn’t happen in the US, it will certainly happen elsewhere. According to a DoD 2007 assessment, the Chinese have already announced a near-term goal of launching satellites within hours of demand. The Russians have been able to do so for years. The Europeans are well ahead of the US in a formalized process for creating low-cost space missions. The rest of the world will move ahead with the capability to respond rapidly to changing world events, irrespective of whether the US chooses to do so.
AT: Technological barriers
Technology exists for ORS, it’s a question of adopting it
Wertz, 8 - president of Microcosm, a space technology small business in Los Angeles, and the general chairman for the first five Responsive Space Conferences (James, “It’s time to get our ORS in gear,” The Space Review, 1/7, )
Does the technology exist to do ORS?
Clearly, it does and has for over 20 years. The Soviets launched over 50 satellites in direct support of the Falklands War from March to June 1982. The US got valuable imagery on the first or second orbit after launch from many of our systems launched during the 1970s, although at that time the data was returned to the ground by actually dropping a film canister from space. As to cost, Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) has been launching both communications and observations satellites for well over a decade that cost less than $10 million. (Initial images of New Orleans after Katrina, published in an Aviation Week article, were taken by NigeriaSat, one of the Disaster Monitoring Constellation satellites built by Surrey.)
Almost certainly, most of those satellites are not as capable as we would like for ORS. But if we can’t do much better for $20–25 million with today’s technology than what the British did a decade ago for $10 million, we certainly can’t claim to be a technology leader in space. If you want more details on proposed ORS systems and missions, many of them are in the papers presented at the first five Responsive Space Conferences and available on the website above. (RS6 will be April 28–May 1 in Los Angeles.)
Current private sector capabilities prove military ORS is possible
Brown 6 – liquid rocket engine system engineer for NASA and researcher at College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (Kendall K., Air and Space Power Journal Summer 2006, “Is Operationally Responsive Space the Future of Access to Space for the US Air Force,” ) NYan
HLV = Hybrid Launch Vehicle
The operational responsiveness of an ORS system is not science fiction. Burt Rutan made history in October 2004 when his privately funded SpaceShipOne aerospace plane completed its second suborbital trip into space. Rutan and other start up companies have demonstrated that it doesn't take a large, government-funded program to build a launch vehicle. Profit from commercial launch services, including space tourism, serves as their motivation; however the systems required to enable such a business may use the same systems and technologies needed by the ORS launch vehicle. If these programs can launch operations responsively, development of an Air Force operational capability can proceed with substantially decreased risk. Current trends in the air and space community show why this is possible. First, today's computer technology allows us to go from idea, to computer to machine-shop floor to final part in a fraction of the time it used to take. Second, the recent slump in the world space-launch market, coincident with a period in which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had no major hardware-development program, has permitted these new companies to hire technical experts who have experience in developing major space systems. This situation, coupled with the rapid increase in affordable computing capabilities and commercial engineering-analysis software, allows relatively few experienced engineers to produce designs that would have required much larger teams only a decade ago. Third, the economic potential of space tourism, combined with the wealth of a few dot com company entrepreneurs, has opened up innovation and risk taking. DARPA projects encourage this type of innovation with significantly less government oversight than occurs in a typical DOD research and technology project. Building upon this philosophy, an ORS launch-vehicle program will prove successful. A responsive HLV capability will serve as the foundation for ORS, which is critical to the future national security of the United States. A building block approach now under development will ensure that full-scale operational system development (toes not proceed until we have mitigated all significant risks; therefore, success of the FAICON and ARES programs is a critical first step. Such a capability will allow the United States to reduce its reliance on forward-deployed forces and will either maintain or decrease response time. Obviously, much work lies ahead, not the least of which is the writing of doctrine to guide the building of organizational structures; strategy; and operational tactics, techniques, and procedures. However ORS will become another paradigm-shaping event for the Air Force.
Technology development exists now, but programs have been slashed.
Brown 6 – liquid rocket engine system engineer for NASA and researcher at College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (Kendall K., Air and Space Power Journal Summer 2006, “Is Operationally Responsive Space the Future of Access to Space for the US Air Force,” ) NYan
Prior to a formal decision to pursue an ORS program, as provided in the US Space Transportation Policy, a number of activities within the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) have sustained the momentum and made progress in establishing the technology basis. DARPA's Responsive Access, Small Cargo, Affordable Launch (RASCAI) and Force Application and Launch from CONUS (FATCON) programs attempted to identify and develop low-cost, responsive launch concepts. The RASCAL program focused on concepts for launching small vehicles from high-speed, high-altitude aircraft, whereas FALCON concentrated on developing low-cost, expendable launch vehicles that could demonstrate ORS requirements. The DOD canceled RASCAL in February 2005 in order to focus on FAICON, which continues to investigate two distinctively different concepts: a conventional, multiple-stage, ground-launched rocket and a rocket deployed from the back of a C-17 cargo aircraft Under the FALCON program and with funding from the DOD's Office of Force Transformation, the Space Exploration Corporation (SpaceX) has demonstrated many low-cost and responsiveness attributes of ORS (luring preparation for the inaugural launch of its Falcon-1 small launch vehicle.' FALCON remains important to the future development of the HINV since the expendable rockets developed under the program could be used as upper stages on the reusable booster.
The Affordable Responsive Spacelift (ARES) program, the next step towards demonstrating the feasibility of an ORS system, set a goal of developing a subscale launch vehicle that demonstrates the characteristics of the HIV's reusable first stage. ARES has just begun system-concept studies, but its progress will shape the future of the ORS launch vehicle.
AT: Cyberdefense solvency argument
Military space expertise spills over into cyberspace
Lambeth, 11 – senior staff member at RAND, where he also directed the International Security and Defense Policy Program in 1989–1990 (Benjamin, Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
Similarly, those now tasked with developing and validating cyberspace concepts of operations might find great value in reflecting on the many parallels between space and cyberspace as domains of offensive and defensive activity. For example, both domains, at least today, are principally about collecting and transmitting information. Both play pivotal roles in enabling and facilitating lethal combat operations by other force elements. Both, again at least today, have more to do with the pursuit of functional effects than with the physical destruction of enemy equities, even though both can materially aid in the accomplishment of the latter. Moreover, in both domains, operations are conducted remotely by warfighters sitting before consoles and keyboards, not only outside the medium itself, but also in almost every case out of harm's way. Both domains are global rather than regional in their breadth of coverage and operational impact. And both domains overlap—for example, the jamming of a GPS signal to a satellite-aided munition guiding to a target is both a counterspace and a cyberwar operation insofar as the desired effect is sought simultaneously in both combat arenas.14 To that extent, it seems reasonable to suggest that at least some tactics, techniques, procedures, and rules of thumb that have been found useful by military space professionals might also offer promising points of departure from which to explore comparable ways of exploiting the cyberspace medium.
AT: Doctrinal barriers block
Funding ORS launch vehicles will cause an Air Force doctrine shift
Peel 08- Lt Col, USAF (Scott D., October 30, “Fixing the Nation’s Space Launch Woes: Operationally Responsive Space for Tomorrow’s Joint Force Commander—Panacea or Pipedream”, Naval War College, , Mintz)
Recommendations
Every unit that is not supported is a defeated unit. —Field Marshal Maurice, Comte de Saxe, 1732
While researching and writing this paper the author identified several items requiring additional study and action. These items include updating several doctrine and planning guidance documents, potentially implementing additional organizational changes, and the need to continue on-going efforts in several areas. There has been tremendous progress in the past two years on a problem that has existed since the beginning of U.S. space programs, and the following recommendations will increase ORS’s chances for success.
The first, and most significant, item requiring attention is the identification and assignment of forces. There are obvious benefits for acquisitions personnel within the ORS Office accomplishing long-term, acquisition-intensive Tier-3 activities. However, Tier-2 spacelift functions aren’t envisioned as being R&D or procurement focused, and could potentially benefit from an operation’s approach instead of the historical acquisitions mentality. This isn’t a new train of thought. For example, the 1994 Space Modernization Plan advocates a shift away from a ‘launch’ mentality to an ‘operations mentality. 35 But, never since the inception of the nation’s space launch activities has the Air Force been given the opportunity to reassess its current business practices and make sweeping changes. The deployment of ORS launch vehicles, with a supply of on-hand satellites, offers a solid opportunity to re-think (and potential shift) existing paradigms and truly operationalize spacelift.
The third potential area for improvement focuses on joint doctrine. The current version of joint space doctrine (JP 3-14 Joint Doctrine for Space Operations) was signed on 9 August 2002 after over 12 years of staffing, coordination, and compromise between the services and U.S. Space Command. More important than being over six years old, large portions of its contents are out of date. For example, it details the Deliberate Planning Process and specifies responsibilities for U.S. Space Command—a functional command that was deactivated within weeks of the publishing of JP 3-14. However, one of the glaring inadequacies is the lack reference to any aspect of ORS.
Next, various planning documents fail to reflect ORS capabilities. Both the GEF and Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP) should be reviewed for potential ORS-related additions or changes. These documents provide guidance for FY2008 – FY2010 timeframe, which is potentially two years after initial Tier-1 & -2 activities could potentially be incorporated into combatant commanders’ contingency plans. Additionally, the UJTL should be reviewed and amended to introduce new “ORS-related” spacelift activities with appropriately decreased time standards for assessing measures of performance. Consideration of including ORS tasks in either the “Strategic-Theater” or “Operational” levels should be considered. In accordance with the newest version of the UJTL—Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.04E, implemented on 25 August 2008— amendments should be submitted, staffed, and updated via the UJTL Task Development Tool (UTDT) process. 36
***Launch MECHANISMS
New launch technology inevitable
New propulsion technologies are inevitable
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
What will the space technology and operating environment look like in 2035? Technology trends in two fundamental areas -- spacecraft and space transportation -- indicate space technologies, capabilities, products, and services will become far more affordable, ubiquitous, globally available, and interconnected. Spacecraft and individual elements and nodes comprising a space-based constellation or network will become smaller, lighter, and more capable. Simultaneously, information and communication technologies will allow for truly distributed and collaborative satellite constellation designs. The space transportation industry will generate advances in both traditional chemical propulsion technologies and truly novel approaches to space access which may emerge by 2035. These trends suggest greater use of satellites and the electromagnetic spectrum in the space medium and more participation by a diverse set of spacefaring nations, groups, and stakeholders – including individual consumers.
Mechanism – Rolling Booster
Rolling booster concept solves – it increases the launch market and ensures launch capability is available
Steele, 09 – USAF Lieutenant Colonel, Command Lead for the EELV program and at United States Strategic Command (2/12/09, Thomas M., Air War College, Air University “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Eelv) For Operationally Responsive Space,”)RK
To address the assured access requirements in the ORD, AFSPC had at one time proposed a “rolling booster” CONOP. This CONOP called for an already manufactured booster to be present at the launch base for an instant call-up.
The rolling booster concept allows the USG to order a generic LV (launch vehicle) early and use it as an available inventory item in case of a rapid launch need. This generic hardware configuration will reflect the USG’s expectation of mission needs to ensure that all required hardware items (booster, upperstage, fairing, strap-ons) are available when needed. The rolling booster aspect means that hardware is used for the next manifested mission, therefore, not subject to component life and obsolescence issues. In a nutshell, this approach provides the USG the use of the next available booster.28
At the time of the rolling booster proposal, AFSPC envisioned a robust launch schedule that failed to materialize, resulting in the current launch on schedule CONOP. The rolling booster concept has a weakness in that the USAF, NASA, the NRO, and a variety of contractors might have to make internal mission assurance CONOP adjustments and address schedule changes to accommodate the “rolling booster” or crisis launch with little or no benefit to their programs. However, the influx of funding provided by an additional customer into the EELV program would result in reduced “overhead” (shared) costs and would create a responsive EELV capability that could eventually benefit all launch customers.
Mechanism – ESVA (EELV Secondary Payload Adapter)
ESVA allows for strategic space access and can lower launch cost
Steele, 09 – USAF Lieutenant Colonel, Command Lead for the EELV program and at United States Strategic Command (2/12/09, Thomas M., Air War College, Air University “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Eelv) For Operationally Responsive Space,”)RK
Another capability that should be of interest to the ORS program is the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA; see Figure 2). “The ESPA is designed to take advantage of unused payload margin to deploy up to six 181 kg (400 lb) secondary payloads. ESPA consists of an aluminum cylinder with six standardized secondary payload (SPL) mounting locations. The fore and aft flanges on the ESPA ring duplicate the 157.5 cm (62.01 in) EELV Standard Interface Plane, making ESPA transparent to the primary payload. By taking advantage of existing unused payload margin, ESPA will increase access to space for small satellites and space experiments.”29
The ESPA was successfully employed on the Space Test Program (STP)-1 mission in March 2007 on an Atlas V vehicle from Cape Canaveral Air Station and deployed six satellites in two separate low earth orbits. 30 The STP-1 launch demonstrated that a set of interrelated satellites could be successfully deployed to at least two orbits. Additionally, the set of satellites shared the cost of the launch, thereby significantly lowering the total cost to each individual satellite program. This was ESPA’s only launch to date. Unfortunately, many primary satellite programs consider using the ESPA with “their” launch as additional risk and discourage or refuse to offer the additional margin to others. This “launch margin ownership” issue needs to be changed with policy from the Secretary of Defense.
The ESPA, by itself, is another option to consider verses developing a small launch vehicle for small payloads. The ESPA provides the opportunity to package or bundle small satellites with a larger payload to provide a package of capabilities to the combatant commander. Coupled with the rolling booster CONOP, this capability can not only meet responsive launch needs but also provide a robust, tailorable, and scalable set of on-orbit missions for a specific theater or combat operation.
Space elevator key to military access
Developing a space elevator is vital to ensuring military access to space
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
The space elevator is a concept where a tether is used to lift cargo and personnel into space. This tether reaches from the surface of the Earth to a point some 62,000 miles into orbit. Vehicles traveling on this tether will be able to cheaply move heavy loads into orbit. From there, the cargo can be positioned in any desired position, with the major destination being geosynchronous orbit 22,240 miles up. The new technology which makes the space elevator possible is the carbon nano-tube (CNT), a material that is theoretically one hundred or more times stronger and ten times lighter than steel. The USAF, as the DoD Executive Agent for Space, can lead the U.S. in developing and deploying this alternate means of accessing space in support of DoD missions. In doing so, the USAF will be able to better meet its current needs for satellites on orbit along with rapid and extremely economical replenishment. The space elevator allows current missions to expand and new missions to be tackled thanks to its low cost and heavy lift capability and could be built in ten to fifteen years. A thread reaching down all the way from orbit to the surface of the Earth on which laser powered trucks carry huge loads into space for a very low price, this is the space elevator. A space elevator can serve as an alternate means to chemical-powered launch systems for the USAF to access space – a critical part in maintaining superiority of the ultimate high ground.
Quick access to space is vital to protecting US space assets
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
Should the U.S. Air Force pursue construction of a space elevator as an alternate means for accessing space? This question is critical considering the importance of space assets to the U.S. military and the nation. Today, the military relies on satellite communications, reconnaissance, surveillance, weather, and global positioning systems in orbit to perform even the most basic of missions.2 The systems U.S. forces uses are not limited to government assets. Commercial and allied communications and imaging systems are routinely used to bolster bandwidth and coverage areas.3 Unfortunately, these crown jewels of the military and commercial world are becoming increasingly vulnerable to enemy actions.
Jamming4, direct attack using high powered lasers5 or kinetic kill weapons6, as well as attacks on ground sites7 are but a few of the dangers faced by space assets used by the U.S. military. What happens when an adversary is able to deny U.S. forces of its eyes, ears, timing, and maps (no e-mail!?) provided by satellites? The current method of replacing an orbital asset requires months if not years of lead time and is extremely costly. In the mean-time, the loss of even a single satellite in orbit can greatly impact U.S. air, land, and sea operations. There are neither rockets standing on call to launch nor many replacement satellites in the barn ready for a ride to orbit. It is imperative that the U.S. be prepared to maintain the readiness of its space forces. Launch on demand merely provides a stop-gap means to maintain those capabilities already in place should they fail or be attacked. In order to maintain its superior position in space and to ensure the orbital assets it requires are available at all times, the U.S. must look beyond conventional capabilities to provide cheap, easy, quick, and assured access to space. This method is the space elevator.
Thesis
The construction of a space elevator by the U.S. would fundamentally alter how the USAF thinks about, plans for, and utilizes space. Space elevator technology could provide a viable alternate means for accessing space for scientific, commercial, and military purposes.9 Today, the cost of getting to orbit is the primary limitation on any system or mission wishing to make use of the space environment.10 The space elevator is the means for the USAF to lead a revolution in space-borne platforms and missions by providing the means to leap beyond current launch capabilities. Cheap access to space would facilitate the expansion of current missions and widen the launch window for entirely new mission arenas.
Space elevator lowers launch costs
A space elevator costs less than 10 billion and will lower launch costs to about 10 dollars a kilogram
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
A space elevator of the type described here is estimated to cost $6B in development and construction plus another $4B for regulatory, political, and legal costs. A second thread to space would be much cheaper, about $3B since the research and development and support infrastructure would already be established and the first elevator could be used to lift the necessary elevator material into orbit.15 For the initial $10B investment the cost for putting ‘stuff’ into space would drop from $20,000/kg to $250/kg16 with costs eventually dropping as low as $10/kg17. With a single shuttle mission costing $500M18 and the estimate for trip to Mars hovering around $1T (yes, ‘T’ for Trillion), even if a space elevator cost twice as much as estimated, it is still a good deal.19
Space elevator tech feasible
Carbon nanotubes make the space elevator possible
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
The key component of the type of space elevator proposed here is the tether linking the Earth’s surface to GEO. The only materials in development which theoretically possess the required yield strength for the tether called for in a space elevator are called carbon nano-tubes (CNTs). These CNTs would possess the needed yield strength of 47 GPa20 without allowing the tether to deform under the immense stresses it would encounter. 21 By comparison, steel has a yield tensile strength of a little less than 1 GPa. The next closest contenders are some titanium alloys and Kevlar with yield strengths a little greater than 1 GPa and 4 GPa respectively.
Obviously, none of these materials meets the needs of a space tether. Lab tests on small samples of CNTs have shown yield strengths as high as 65 GPa with conservative estimates for the strength of future CNT structures to be 100-150 GPa. Even going with the lower prediction, CNT material would have a tensile strength 100 times that of steel and be ten times lighter.22
Sea based ground station technology already exists – key to avoid space debris
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
The location of the ground station will be discussed further in a moment. It is sufficient to mention that large sea-going structures of the size needed to support lifter, power, and anchor functions have already been constructed. One needs look no further than the large mobile platforms in use today for oil exploration or rocket launches to see this technology is available. The reason you would want a mobile, ocean-going ground port is the need to move the tether around from time to time in order to avoid orbital debris.35 Movement of the base station would have to be based on predicting where the ribbon will be at any one time as it will take hours or even days for a small movement of the ground station to translate to movement of the ribbon along its considerable length.
The U.S. does a pretty good job tracking space debris now. An increase in the resolution of space debris tracks will need to be undertaken to ensure threats to the space elevator ribbon and lifters are well understood and thus avoidable. Again, this is not out of the realm of current technology. Combine the mobility of the water borne liftport with the accurate tracking of space debris and you have the components needed to develop avoidance protocols to be used in the daily operation of the space elevator. Whether the operators need to move the ribbon slightly or induce regular oscillations to ensure proper clearance for debris or other operational satellites, the means exist to allow safe operation of a space elevator.
The only technological uncertainty is about the tether
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
Recapping, the material needed to build the tether itself is the most critical technology needed to create a space elevator. The lifters, their power supply, and the space infrastructure needed to support orbital logistics can all be built using current technology. A floating ground port and orbital tracking systems supporting the space elevator can be based on systems in use today. There is also the consideration of ‘the more you use it the more you learn’. With each lifter traveling up the tether, each new satellite brought into mission, and each new challenge, the builders and operators of the space elevator will learn and adapt. New techniques, equipment, and materials will certainly be developed and brought into everyday use (as if CNTs were not enough). Theoretically, a USAF-led team can build and safely operate a space elevator, but what does it really need one for anyway?
Space elevator solves aerospace
A space elevator boosts the aerospace industry
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
Developing and deploying a space elevator is really only the first step to truly utilizing space to its utmost capacity. With a space elevator in place, ‘getting there is half the fun’ really no longer applies; it is what you can do once you have attained orbit which really becomes interesting. To enable full use of space and the lift capability of a space elevator, an entirely new industry based on orbital logistics must be developed. Transfer craft to deploy, retrieve, repair, and dispose of space assets will need to be developed. Stations capable of housing workers, visitors, scientists, and maintenance facilities will also be required. Full scale industrial complexes and tourist destinations could eventually be established to take advantage of raw materials and an eager population ready for the space experience as tourists. Finally, with the advent of extremely cheap access to space, there is every reason to believe exploration of the rest of the solar system (and beyond!) will explode. Dr. Brad Edwards asserts a space elevator will not be the end of today’s aerospace companies, but will instead be their greatest boon due to the technologies needed to provide and service the massive amount of equipment and machines needed to support the expansion of space missions following the first elevator’s construction.34
The NET effect on the aerospace industry would be overwhelmingly positive
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
Another potential issue is that a successful space elevator would likely put most other launch providers out of business overnight no matter what their nationality. This eventuality could be handled by governments maintaining at least a core capability to back up access to space should the space elevator experience damage or be unusable for any reason. Also, these industries could be focused on space infrastructure and logistics development instead of launch capabilities to keep eager aerospace firms employed. Actually, the construction of a space elevator would be wonderful for all of these industries due to expanded construction of space assets to be lifted by the space elevators and the orbital infrastructure needed to support them. 76 Tied into the politics of operating a space elevator is the use by military services of this valuable asset.
Space elevator key to space control
A space elevator is vital for space dominance
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
Why the USAF should be interested in a space elevator
The USAF will be able to use a space elevator to accomplish and enable current space missions and leverage this new capability for move into new mission areas. Eric Westling, a space elevator consultant says, “It [space elevator] will change the world economy. It’s worth what ever it costs to put it up.”37 The space elevator changes everything in space. For the Air Force, space elevators are all about the mission, and it will indeed be worth whatever the cost. Why should the USAF take the lead in developing a space elevator? Air Force Doctrine Document 1 provides an answer to this question quite well as it sums up the directives from DODD 5100.1. The USAF has the key organizational function to “organize, train, equip, and provide forces for…air and space support…”38 Furthermore, the USAF is “to provide launch and space support for the Department of Defense.”39 While AFDD 1 lays out the responsibilities of the USAF, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) tasks the DoD to:
“Improve responsive space access, satellite operations, and other space enabling capabilities such as the space industrial base, space science and technology efforts and the space professional cadre.”40
But why the need for the actions mentioned above? The QDR explains: 11
“Experience from recent operations, supported by the findings and recommendations in the 2001 QDR and a number of studies and commissions chartered by the Congress and the President – including those on national security, space management, remote sensing, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism – have underscored the increasingly critical role that intelligence capabilities, including those in space, play in supporting military operations, policy and planning and acquisition in the Department [DoD].”41
The QDR goes on to say:
“The Department [DoD] will continue to develop responsive space capabilities in order to keep access to space unfettered, reliable and secure. Survivability of space capabilities will be assured by improving space situational awareness and protection, and through other space control measures.”42
The tasks laid before the USAF are daunting: responsive, unfettered, reliable access to space while supporting the wide range of satellite missions the DoD relies upon for its operations and in support of decision making. The writers of the QDR are asking for a space elevator and didn’t even know it! Just how would a space elevator answer all these tasks?
Of the nine principles of war laid out in AFDD 1, three apply directly to the space elevator: mass, maneuver, and security. Mass means to “concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results.”43 This means all the tools at the commanders fingertips are applied effectively not simply in overwhelming numbers. A space elevator would enable a commander to easily build up communications, surveillance, and other space assets over his theater for use when and where he deems necessary. Current methods of redistributing space assets are time consuming and drain away the life of those assets as precious fuel is expended to change orbits. Adding to existing capabilities today is also challenging as surplus communications links or additional assets are simply in short supply or not available at all.
Maneuver is simply the “flexible application” of air and space power.44 Again, with the ability to quickly place satellites into orbit or to have the logistics support in orbit (enabled by an 12 elevator) to move assets around as needed, the space elevator satisfies this basic principle of war. The space elevator provides the flexibility to use space in the precise manner a commander wishes to configure his battlespace. Along with mass and maneuver, one can not forget the principle of security.
Security means “never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage” and “embraces physical and information medium”45 With a space elevator and the sheer access to space it would provide, no enemy would be able to acquire an unexpected advantage either on the ground, in the air, or especially in orbit. Physical patrol and protection of space-borne assets would be possible while a massive increase in information transfer capabilities could be constructed cheaply meaning he could have all the bandwidth and information he could desire. Assets placed in orbit by the elevator would help a commander no matter where he was located on the globe through increased communications, reconnaissance, surveillance capabilities.
“While the principles of war provide general guidance on the application of military forces, the tenets [of air and space power] provide more specific considerations for air and space forces.”46 A space elevator supports many of these tenets, especially persistence and balance. Persistence as used here can be summed by saying, as “space systems advance and proliferate; they offer the potential for permanent presence over any part of the globe”47. The persistence provided by today’s systems should be considered at risk, as mentioned earlier. The space elevator would provide greater numbers of more capable, more robust systems and a means to augment and easily replace systems lost to enemy actions. The tenet of balance is to “bring air and space power together to produce a synergistic effect”48 In other words, finite assets must be used to the best effect. The space elevator allows the placement and servicing of satellites allowing full battlespace awareness and support capabilities which serve as force multipliers.49
One of the key operation functions of the USAF is spacelift. “Spacelift delivers satellites, payloads, and material to space. Assured access to space is a key element to US national space policy and a foundation upon which US national security, civil, and commercial space activities depend. The Air Force is the DOD Service responsible to operate U.S. launch facilities.”50 When needed, “spacelift’s objective is to deploy new and replenishment assets as necessary to meet U.S. space goals and achieve national security objectives.”51 The great news is that by improving the means to access space, satellites placed in orbit using the space elevator are cheaper due to lower launch costs. Also, the reduction or even elimination of the strict weight limits placed on current systems would be realized using the space elevator. This reduction would simplify designs and allow cheaper but heavier materials to be used in satellite construction.
Spacelift dovetails right into the key USAF operation function of Combat Support which includes “essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to create and sustain air and space forces.”52 Similarly, Agile Combat Support “creates, sustains, and protects all air and space capabilities to accomplish mission objectives across the spectrum of military operations” all the while remaining “responsive and flexible.”53 All of these goals for space forces can be aided or meet using a space elevator.
Besides the spacelift and combat support tenets, the assets placed in orbit and maintained using a space elevator would contribute to other key USAF operation functions such as information operations, command and control, special operations, intelligence thru surveillance and reconnaissance (“essential to national and theater defense and to the security of air, space, subsurface, and surface forces”54), combat search and rescue, navigation and positioning used to “provide accurate location and time of reference in support of strategic, operational, and tactical operations”55, and weather service for both space and atmospheric operating environments56.
Air Force development of the space elevator is vital to maintaining space dominance
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
The future which can be made possible with a space elevator is stunning in its breadth, complexity, and sheer potential. With a concerted effort, the US could skip generations of launch vehicles while continuing to expand missions in space limited only by the imagination. With the rate of technological advancement towards creating materials which could be used for a tether and the availability of technology to support all other aspect of space elevator operations, the USAF really has three choices: continue with current incremental improvements in launch capabilities, allow someone else to build the space elevator, or take the lead in advocating and constructing a space elevator.
Continuing on with current operations and slowly implementing improvements in launch capabilities would be the safest bet for the USAF. After all, it is what has done for the last fifty years. But, growing needs for satellites and high costs dictate something else needs to be done. Doing things the old fashioned would leave the path to space elevator open to other nations, possible a competitor in more ways than one. As has been mentioned, the first to build an elevator will possess such an advantage over every other space-faring nation that those coming in second may never be able to fully recover. Maintaining space superiority demands the US not come in second when it comes to employing this new technology. Taking the lead and mandating a need for a new approach to space access is something the USAF must do. For a relatively small investment over a decade or more, the USAF can partner up with other agencies and nations to ensure the U.S. remains the leader in space access and space superiority. The need for cheap and easy access to space is very real. For decades, the idea of the space elevator has been overshadowed by the technological gap between the dream and reality. Today, the technology is real and easily within a dedicated nation’s grasp. Building a space elevator is a project the USAF should embrace and see through to the end.
AT: Space elevator causes weaponization
A space elevator doesn’t facilitate weaponization – political barriers prevent
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
Oddly enough, the one key Air Force operation function not likely to be supported by a space elevator is Counterspace, “those kinetic and nonkinetic operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of space superiority by the destruction, degradation, or disruption of enemy space capability.”57 Although the “main objectives of counterspace operations are to allow friendly forces to exploit space capabilities, while negating the enemy’s ability to do the same”58, using the space elevator for any sort of direct military action of to place overtly military weapons or hardware into orbit would be quite unpalatable to other users and would likely be curtailed with space elevator use policies. Using the space elevator for support missions also helps lower the risk to an elevator in the event of conflict. Pressure exerted by users not involved in the conflict could help keep this structure off target lists. The discussion of weaponizing space, whether with offensive or defensive weapons is an argument that has no good answers at this point.59 There are plenty of other non-weapon missions to discuss though. Of all the services within DoD, the Air Force finds itself uniquely positioned to take up the challenge of developing space elevator technologies for missions very much within its realm of responsibility.
Space elevator key to ISR
Space elevator is vital to ISR missions
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
Some new missions the USAF could embrace include massive communication arrays, true persistent surveillance from space, orbital solar power stations, and spotlights from space. The current missions are fairly well understood. Secure communications are key to any military operation. As mentioned earlier, the military has shown an insatiable appetite for bandwidth which is only going to increase as virtual warfighting capabilities, use of unmanned air vehicles, and simply more data is being exchanged between warfighters, coalition partners, rear areas, and support agencies.60 With weight restrictions basically eliminated thanks to the space elevator, the USAF could orbit massive communications arrays with basically unlimited bandwidth. These systems could include pin-point communication links that would be virtually uninterceptable.61 Along with communications, all military branches have become dependent on geo-location services provided by the USAF.62 These services could be easily (and cheaply) serviced thanks to the replenishment rates allowed by a space elevator. Besides the boons described here, a space elevator would aide several other revolutions in the use of space. With cheap, reliable access to space provided by a space elevator, the USAF stands on the threshold of a new age in space affairs. For instance, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) from orbit becomes a reality. Mirrors fifteen meters in diameter could be placed in GEO and “would have the same collecting power as a 2-meter system in a 400 mile orbit but could be positioned for 24/7 observation of any point on Earth.”63 ISR assets could be moved around as needed to meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders. Similarly, ISR assets could easily be stockpiled for contingency response. Other new missions would also become viable.
Space elevator key to military SSP
A space elevator makes military SSP possible
Kent, 7 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “Getting to Space on a Thread … Space Elevator as Alternative Access to Space,” April,
)
Building a space elevator suddenly makes many projects feasible which would have direct application to support the U.S. military. Power generation from orbit and on-call night16 time illumination are but two of these missions.64 Solar power is a free and inexhaustible energy supply. Using a space elevator, massive solar power collection and transmission stations could be constructed in GEO that could relieve and someday replace fossil fuel-based energy production. For the military, such stations could be developed to beam power down to fielded forces relieving these units from the need to bring fuel or generators into an undeveloped area of operations.65 Similarly, on-call illumination from either mirrors or spotlights in orbit could be built to support military operations or emergency response.66 These satellites would prove very useful in illuminating targeted areas or exposing enemy positions while leaving friendly forces shielded by darkness. In an emergency response situation, the same orbital illumination could be used to provide light while terrestrial power was restored or response personnel were in action. With a space elevator, legacy missions would grow while new missions are enabled. With these missions in mind, it is time to turn to the actual construction and operation of a space elevator.
A space elevator will incentize the DOD use of SSP
Kent, 10 - Major, USAF, Blue Horizons Paper for the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College (Jason, “National Security Space Access and the Space Elevator,” High Frontier, May, ) SE = Space Elevator
In the SE era, NSS services may expand to include remote power generation and transmission and spotlights from space. Building a SE suddenly makes many projects feasible. Power generation from orbit and on-call night-time illumination are but two of these missions.6 Solar power is a free and inexhaustible energy supply. Using a SE, massive solar power collection and transmission stations could be constructed in GEO that could relieve and someday replace fossil fuel-based energy production. For the military, such stations could be developed to beam power down to fielded forces relieving these units from the need to bring fuel or generators into an undeveloped area of operations. 7 Similarly, on-call illumination from either mirrors or spotlights in orbit could be built to support military operations or emergency response.8 These satellites would prove very useful in illuminating targeted areas or exposing enemy positions while leaving friendly forces shielded by darkness. In an emergency response situation, the same orbital illumination could be used to provide light while terrestrial power was restored or response personnel were in action. These are not the only missions which become feasible with the SE. Other future missions, led by the Department of Defense (DoD), may include asset protection and force projection. The need for such missions would depend on the threats faced by US assets, interests, and personnel in space.
RLV key to economy
Creating an RLV is the linchpin of US economic growth – it will prevent a global depression and the collapse of US leadership
Hsu and Cox, 9 - *Senior fellow, Aerospace Technology Working Group, AND **Founder & Director of the Aerospace Technology Working Group (Feng and Ken, “Sustainable Space Exploration and Space Development - A Unified Strategic Vision,” 2/20, )
(4) The U.S. space exploration goal should focus primarily on exploring unknown and new destinations by use of robotic exploration as much as is practical. However, the new vision (or VSE) must be more of an interplanetary-exploring nature, with a manned mission to NEO or staging at, and returning from the sun-Earth L2 libration point, as preparation for a precursor mission to Mars' moon Phobos, followed by manned missions to land on Mars. To achieve these goals, the U.S. should develop a Deep Space Habitat (deep space experiment module or station beyond low Earth orbit), complete with artificially produced gravity, for use in flying to destinations or to reside at various libration points (such as the moon-Earth L1 or sun-Earth L2 staging points), or to orbit various NEO destinations. This experiment module or habitat could be used as part of the "fly-by" and orbit program mentioned above.
(5) With the success of a manned NEO or L2 staging mission, a manned mission to Phobos can be carried out prior to a manned mission to Mars. Also, a one-way manned mission to Mars can be considered, with sufficient Mars crew Hub capacity and in situ resource utilization (ISRU) capabilities delivered prior to the arrival of the first manned Mars mission. We also recommend an R&D effort and demonstration projects on space-based solar power (SBSP, which offers a great potential for electric propulsion and power resources that can be utilized for deep space exploration missions. But more importantly, its key technology components can be shared or used by many other space applications, including future supply of baseload power from space for terrestrial electrical energy demands.
(6) The above exploration goals (lead by NASA and the international community) can not be achieved unless a cost-effective HLV (heavy launch vehicle) or affordable LEO transportation infrastructure is developed first, or developed concurrently by DOS and its global collaborators. Such as low-cost crew LV (launch vehicle) and cargo HLV system development should be the task of highest U.S. short-term priority in space development, as they are not only crucial for supporting all strategic space exploration goals but also imperative for space-based economic and commercial development, such as development and demonstration of SBSP and space tourist infrastructure system capabilities.
6. Propel Humanity's Outward Expansion into Space-based Economic Frontiers
As discussed in the previous sections, a space agency without reforms, as it still exists today, born out of the cold war era half a century ago, worked well for the space race, but is unlikely to deliver space-development achievements that benefit our national economy. It is also more likely to resist international participation, or even likely to exacerbate external threats and provoke an unnecessary or detrimental space race. What the U.S. and the international community urgently need in the 21 century, under a globalized world economy, for confronting the global climate change, energy and economic challenges is, however, opening the new frontier of economic and commercial development in space, especially industrialization in the Earth-moon LEO system. The recent history of the profound leap-forward of human economic development, triggered by the opening of commercial air transportation capability, must shed light on how we should embark on the next giant leap of humanity's economic and commercial expansion into low earth orbit.
Technology innovations have always lifted human society out of the economic gridlocks, and have led mankind from many of the worst economic crises to vast industrialization and enduring prosperity and growth. The history of human civilization has shown that technology innovations and human ingenuity are our best hope to power humanity out of any crisis, and especially a U.S.-lead human economic development into low earth orbit that will not only lift us out of the current acute global depression, but will most certainly bring about the next economic and industrial revolution beyond the confinement of Earth gravity. Commercial aircraft transportation and operations in the past 100 years since the Wright Brothers' first successful test flight have advanced significantly in all areas, and have contributed tremendously to the world economy and modern civilization.
Nonetheless, space access capability and associated LEO infrastructure has generally not advanced in nearly half a century. Particularly, as elaborated in the previous sections, given the current plans under the Bush VSE for the next generation of human space transportation being pursued by NASA, there exists little hope of making any substantial improvements in safety, affordability, or commercial operations of any LEO transportation infrastructure for another generation.
With the impact of the upcoming termination of Space Shuttle operations, as guided by the Bush VSE, it is very clear that the U.S. needs substantially improved crew and cargo space access capabilities, and such improved space access capabilities are largely represented by a two-stage, fully reusable launch vehicle (RLV) system (in the short- to mid-term). An evolutionary infrastructure buildup of such a RLV system that is largely based on existing heritage or capabilities should be a key element of a reliable and low-cost cargo/crew space transportation development. Indeed, development and government investment in such an affordable space transportation infrastructure in the Earth-Moon system is of paramount importance; it's all about the crossroads the U.S. is at with the current economic crisis and how Space could be a key part of the answer.
A key component of a sound strategic space vision that was missed almost entirely by the Bush VSE is the vision for space development (VSD), or a space-based economic and commercial expansion into low earth orbit. Such a vision should be to place the highest priority on embarking on a national and international strategic space development goal that will ensure the technological, and with it, the economical leadership of America for the 21 century and the next few hundred years ahead. Otherwise, we risk continuing on the course of the Bush VSE, allowing it to drift into the back waters of history.
Investing in space infrastructure development--such as low-cost RLV systems or fully reusable, two-stage (or ultimately single-stage) space access system developed as an extension of safe and reliable airplane operations or investing in SBSP (space based solar power) and space tourism infrastructures as a significant part of the national space economy and energy programs--is the choice of a strategic space goal that certainly will re-ignite the American spirit and jump-start its high-tech manufacturing sector. It will send a profound message to the world: that America is still a nation where great bold endeavors are the order of the day. , Or else, it will be a message that we will allow the nation to continue its drift into obscurity and signal that America's greatest days are in the past.
RLVs decrease launch costs
USFG investment RLV spills over to private sector and lowers costs
Adams and Hickman 4-- *Senior Project Leader in the Developmental Planning Directorate at Aerospace, AND **Director of the Advanced Spacelift and Force Application Directorate
(Winter 2004, Cross Link, “Future Launch Systems”, , FS)
Clearly, no first step in an evolutionary process can satisfy all the objectives of defense, civil, and commercial sectors. But the evolutionary approach establishes a low-risk process for building upon successes, ultimately supporting most or all spacelift needs. Once a substantial portion of nonrecurring reusable launch vehicle development costs are absorbed, then the recurring costs of operating commercial reusable launch vehicles could be significantly lower than for modern expendable launch vehicle systems. Thus, development of a reusable launch vehicle system by NASA or DOD would offer opportunities to spin off commercial variants.
RLVs cut launch costs by 90%
Collins and Tanaguchi 97 (1997, Patrick Collins and H. Tanaguchi, Space Future,“The Promise of Reusable Launch Vehicles for SPS”, , FS)
However, with the end of the Cold War, taxpayers' willingness to pay for the activities of government space agencies has been declining, and their budgets are being cut. This has led space agencies to acknowledge that launch costs are too high: Mr Goldin, the administrator of NASA, even stated that the US space industry should "...hang their heads in shame" because they have not developed a new rocket engine for 25 years (1). This revival of interest in developing re-usable launch vehicles with much lower launch costs has created a growing body of opinion that, with appropriate technology development, reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) could be developed with operating costs of 10% of today's costs or less. Some of the more important projects under way are described briefly in the following section.
RLVs drive down launch costs and create economies of scale
Global Security 5
(4/27/05,Global Security, “Reusable Launch Vehicles”, , FS)
The development of RLVs is driven by the desire to reduce launch costs. Potential reduction in RLV long-term production costs is attributed to vehicle refurbishment and reuse after each flight, rather than replacement. RLVs are designed for quick-turnaround operations that will allow for a higher volume and launch rate, resulting in economies of scale. Many studies suggest that reductions in launch costs will enable the emergence and development of new space missions and businesses.
High volumes of RLVs lower launch costs
Collins and Tanaguchi 97 (1997, Patrick Collins and H. Tanaguchi, Space Future,“The Promise of Reusable Launch Vehicles for SPS”, , FS)
It is now believed that if reusable launch systems are operated in large volume - hundreds of flights/year each by tens or hundreds of vehicles - then they could achieve similar cost reductions to aircraft, of which the operating costs have fallen continuously for decades as the demand has grown by several orders of magnitude. However, this of course depends critically on the demand for launches being sufficiently large, as shown in Table 2.
RLVs key to SSP
RLVs lower launch costs, facilitates SPS development
Collins and Tanaguchi 97 (1997, Patrick Collins and H. Tanaguchi, Space Future,“The Promise of Reusable Launch Vehicles for SPS”, , FS)
For SPS studies this recent growth of interest in sharply reducing launch costs is very promising because it means that the central cost problem of SPS is beginning to be tackled. This is a major change from the past 20 years during which this problem was largely ignored by government space agencies, which used less than 1% of their budgets for research aimed at low-cost reusable launch vehicles.
The increased activity on reusable launch vehicles is promising for SPS for a second reason. Even in their early flight-test phase reusable launch vehicles could be useful for launching SPS pilot plants such as the "SPS 2000" system currently being designed in Japan, shown in Figure 5.
RLVs lower launch costs and spur commercial development
Collins and Tanaguchi 97 (1997, Patrick Collins and H. Tanaguchi, Space Future,“The Promise of Reusable Launch Vehicles for SPS”, , FS)
Recent activity aimed at developing and operating low-cost, reusable launch vehicles have improved the prospects for sharply reducing launch costs. Which vehicles will be successful is still uncertain, as several different concepts are still in competition. However, all successful work towards reusable launch vehicles improves the prospects for SPS, both by improving the prospects of low launch costs, and in convincing the electricity industry and energy policy makers of SPS's feasibility.
In addition, plans for SPS pilot plants such as SPS 2000 have a potentially important role to play in encouraging prospective manufacturers of reusable launch vehicles to continue their work. By creating and making visible potentially large demand for a new generation of vehicles, and by providing details of the launch services that they require, planners of SPS pilot plants can help launch vehicle designers to design vehicles for which there will be large-scale demand. Without this launch cannot become much cheaper, and will continue to depend on taxpayers rather than becoming a commercially profitable business.
USFG can spur commercial SSP growth but RLVs are key
Nansen 2k led the Boeing engineers in the Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program for the Department of Energy and NASA, and President Solar Space Industries (9/7/2k, Ralph Nansen, Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, United States House of Representatives Committee on Science, One Hundred Sixth Congress, , FS)
The concept of solar energy generated in space for our use on the earth was first proposed by Dr. Peter Glaser in 1968 and has been studied extensively since then. The technology required for its development is known and solar power satellites have the potential of delivering abundant, low cost, nonpolluting electricity to all the nations of the earth. Their development has not proceeded because of high initial development cost of a reusable heavy lift launch system and other supporting space infrastructure. The time is now right for the United States to lead the world in developing the system. Fossil fuel costs are rising as world demand is increasing while supplies are dwindling. In addition global warming highlights the need to reduce carbon emissions in the atmosphere. The development of solar power satellites can solve these problems and bring economic dominance to the nation that develops and owns the system. The government's role in this program should be to provide leadership, seed money, and incentives for commercial development. Specifically the funding of a small scale Ground Test Program over a three year period at a funding level of $30 million a year would demonstrate to the commercial community the viability of the system. This along with tax and other incentives will bring about commercial development and the resulting benefits to the United States and the other peoples of the world.
RLVs are more cost-effective than expendable launches
Collins and Tanaguchi 97 (1997, Patrick Collins and H. Tanaguchi, Space Future,“The Promise of Reusable Launch Vehicles for SPS”, , FS)
Even at a cost of several $billions, the SPS 2000 project would still cost less than other comparable energy projects, such as a fast-breeder nuclear-reactor test plant. That is, an impartial cost-benefit analysis comparing the potential benefits of SPS 2000 with those of other such future energy projects such as fast-breeder reactors and nuclear fusion reactors would justify using a budget of even several $billions for SPS 2000. However, if such funding was available, it would be more cost-effective to use it for the development of a reusable launch system, and to use that for launching SPS 2000, rather than to purchase 20 or more high-priced expendable launches.
RRV key to military SSP
High launch costs prevent military SSP development – the DOD needs to develop an RRV to solve
Dinerman, 7 – DOD space consultant, and senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch (Taylor, “The chicken and the egg: RLVs and space-based solar power,” The Space Review, 11/19, )
The Space-Based Solar Power (SBSP) study released by the National Security Space Office on October 10th continues to have repercussions. Discussions have begun potential international partners and inside the US government on a possible set of demonstration projects both on Earth and in space.
The report does point out, in one of its most important findings, that “The SBSP Study Group universally acknowledged that a necessary pre-requisite for the technical and economic viability of SBSP was inexpensive and reliable access to orbit. However, participants were strongly divided on whether to recommend immediate, all-out attack on this problem or not.” We are back to the old question: is the technology ready or nearly ready to allow for the development of a successful reusable launch vehicle (RLV)? For the last three or four years the answer from NASA and from the US military has been “No”.
They are waiting for a breakthrough similar to the one that shifted most aircraft propulsion from piston engines to jet turbine ones. For those experts who want to gain a good understand of where things stand, Appendix D of the SBSP study provides an interesting look at where the NSSO’s experts think the Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) now stand. In order to have routine access to low Earth orbit (LEO) to achieve this goal the study examines a three-phased approach.
Phase one proposes a strategy that will “Develop new, fully-reusable two-stage, rocket-powered space access systems (aerospaceplanes) for passengers and cargo transport.” The mission is to “Transport passengers and cargo with ‘aircraft-like’ safety and operability.” The report claims that for such systems the TRL is 6–9 for a vehicle with a gross weight of 1400 tonnes with the capability of delivering a bit more than 11 tonnes of payload to LEO.
A TRL of 6 to 9 leaves a lot of questions unanswered. Do the authors of the study think that we are closer to 6 or to 9? If we are close to 9 for the overall system then it would be worth it for the US government to go ahead and begin work on such a system. If the answer is closer to TRL 6, though, then a more prudent approach would be wise. The DoD (NASA is in no position to fund such work) should conduct wide-ranging science and technology development work on structural materials, new propulsion, and on ultra-efficient control systems.
Investments in RLV sub-components and technology will invariably pay off in other areas, but non-space technology research programs should be mined for useful applications in space. The Defense Department is making major funds available to develop new types of lightweight armor for vehicles that will be exposed to enemy fire and to IEDs. The Air Force should not hesitate to join with the Army in working on any of these new materials that would fit into a future RLV program. This will require leaders who not only can get beyond any “not invented here” problems, but that can push the Air Force or DARPA to spend money on projects that would otherwise just be funded out of the Army’s R&D budget.
The need for low-cost reliable access to space has not gone away. The slow pace of the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program is not going to change any time soon. Money is short and the Air Force is losing many of its best people due to the draw down. This is all the more reason to find ways to leverage as many interesting outside technology projects as possible.
SBSP is one of the most promising medium- and long-term concepts out there. The need for a large-scale, clean new source of electricity is evident. Therefore, the need for RLV should also be obvious. Air Force Space Command should appoint an RLV Czar and give him or her a modest budget and the support staff to help promising technology efforts both within the Air Force and in other parts of the department.
Private sector RLV programs are already underway and there is a strong possibility that they may reach orbit before any government-supported one does. The DoD should be intellectually ready for this and have a well thought-out procedure for integrating such a system into their operational thinking.
Any dramatic change in the cost of access to orbit will have huge effects on the world’s military and economic balance of power. The US cannot afford not to be the nation where that breakthrough is made.
Hybrid launch good
Hybrid launch vehicles are feasible and cost-effective
Adams and Hickman 4-- *Senior Project Leader in the Developmental Planning Directorate at Aerospace, AND **Director of the Advanced Spacelift and Force Application Directorate
(Winter 2004, Cross Link, “Future Launch Systems”, , FS)
In its technical leadership role in the Air Force's Operationally Responsive Spacelift effort, Aerospace has also conducted analyses of hybrid reusable-expendable vehicles. These combine reusable boosters with expendable upper stages. The analysis suggests that such vehicles inherit an interesting combination of benefits from both elements.
Assuming optimal staging, at about Mach 7, hybrids expend about 35 percent of the hardware a comparable expendable rocket would expend. Thus, their recurring production costs are much lower. Also, the mass of the reusable booster stage for a hybrid is about 45 percent that of a fully reusable launch vehicle. Thus, development and production costs are significantly less. For these reasons, even relatively low launch rates could economically justify their development.
The hybrid vehicle also carries less risk than a fully reusable launch vehicle—primarily because it does not employ a reusable orbiter. Reusable orbiters present a difficult technical challenge, as they must survive on-orbit operations and reentry through Earth's atmosphere without significant damage. The reusable booster experiences a much less severe environment, resulting in fewer technical challenges and less risk.
Air breathing rockets fail
Air-breathing rockets unfeasible
Adams and Hickman 4-- *Senior Project Leader in the Developmental Planning Directorate at Aerospace, AND **Director of the Advanced Spacelift and Force Application Directorate
(Winter 2004, Cross Link, “Future Launch Systems”, , FS)
For example, air-breathing rockets must sustain combustion at hypersonic speeds while producing positive thrust. This has not been demonstrated, although projections of potential hypersonic performance have been made using computational fluid dynamics models; however, these models must be calibrated with test or flight data to be credible, and wind tunnels cannot produce conditions to simulate hypersonic combustion beyond a fraction of a second.
The thermal environment presents another problem. The hypersonic combustion process generates extreme heat. Extended hypersonic flight within the atmosphere can generate thermal and aerodynamic loading many times greater than that of equivalent conventional rockets. Thus, successful development of hypersonic air-breathing rockets will require highly advanced high-temperature technologies for engines and reusable structural thermal protection.
A further limitation is that runways can support aircraft weighing no more than about 635,000 kilograms. This places a ceiling on the gross weight of air-breathing reusable launch vehicles, all of which must take off horizontally. Relatively small changes in hypersonic performance predictions could cause this runway limit to be exceeded.
Sometimes, the argument is advanced that because air-breathing rockets operate from runways rather than launchpads, their recurring operations costs and timelines will be closer to aircraft costs and timelines; however, good operability stems from several factors, including component accessibility, operating margins, and component design life. To enable robust turnaround, designers must allocate sufficient dry mass and vehicle volume to allow robust subsystems (which are heavier than less robust ones). Whether or not a combination of weight growth and runway limitations would force compromises in operability and affordability remains an open question.
Thus, when one considers the theoretical nature of performance predictions, the advanced technological requirements, and the challenges for operability, it is clear that air-breathing concepts should be considered high risk well into the future.
***Disad ANSWERS
AT: Space militarization disad
Offensive weaponization will create a space arms race and risks making space unusable via space debris – a defensive strategy solves better
Putman, 9 – USAF Major, operations officer, 328th Weapons Squadron, United States Air Force Weapons School, former chief,
DSCS III Operations duties at the 3rd Space Operations Squadron (Christopher, “Countering the Chinese Threat to Low Earth Orbit Satellites: Building a Defensive Space Strategy”,
In response to the credible and expanding Chinese anti-satellite threat, the United States must adopt a defensive space strategy that can deter Chinese actions and then also recover ,from an attack. Some within the United States government, notably Senator Jon Kyl, have advocated an offensive deterrence strategy to counter the Chinese anti-satellite threat, creating weapons that would not only attack Chinese satellites but also anti-satellite systems.25 This policy, however, would in effect start a space arms race, a costly proposition with many high dollar systems competing for the defense budget. Offensive kinetic anti-satellite weapons, whether direct ascent or co-orbital, can create a significant debris field that could indiscriminately damage friendly satellites and ultimately hurt the United States more than China. The United States abandoned its Cold War kinetic anti-satellite program after a test where an F-15-launched missile destroyed a satellite and created a LEO debris field that took over 20 years to decay.26 However, the United States demonstrated its ability to rapidly reconstitute its direct ascent anti-satellite capability when it launched a modified Standard Missile-3 from the USS Lake Erie and destroyed a malfunctioning satellite before it could reenter and possibly impact a populated area.27 Although the United States engaged the satellite at the lower portion of the LEO regime to minimize orbital debris and provided timely notification to the international community, China criticized the operation as threatening to space security.28 This reaction supports the idea that pursuing an offensive anti-satellite program could drive a space arms race. Finally, in an anti-satellite exchange, China currently has much less to lose. China would be much less reliant on space systems to operate in a conflict.
Investing in space surveillance tradesoff with space weapons procurement
Redifer, 11 - LtCol, USMC, Master of Science in Applied Physics and Master of Science in Space Systems Operations, Naval Postgraduate School (Stephen, “TAKING THE INITIATIVE – PROTECTING US INTERESTS IN SPACE,” )
Second, the United States should make developing and fielding a terrestrial and space-based surveillance architecture a national priority. Making such an architecture a reality would support any of the possible strategies proposed in the preceding section of this paper, as space surveillance will support space being protected as a sanctuary, will be required for verification of any space treaties, and would be used to provide intelligence and targeting information should the United States ultimately elect to pursue a policy of space dominance. Making a comprehensive surveillance architecture a national priority would also focus US spending precedence on only one aspect of space control (possibly postponing and/or halting development of space-based weapons as a cost offset), thereby ensuring unity of effort toward a common goal.
Satellite defenses avoid the perception of weaponization and preserve US influence
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
Space Weapons: Perception and Provocation The term space weaponization defies precise definition; it is a matter of observed actions and perceived intent. As an inherent survival instinct, humans tend to distrust or fear those things -- in this case technologies and deployed systems -- they do not control, do not understand, or, given the first two conditions, into which they do not have, or are not afforded, insight sufficient to assuage their discomfort.51 This is an especially important issue relative to policy decisions and system deployment in the space domain, for the simple reason that the space domain is not restricted by borders, oceans, terrain, or firewalls. A single spacecraft can overfly, if so designed or directed, every point on the surface of the Earth. It should come as no surprise that the perceived presence of a space-based weapon in orbit can potentially evoke a visceral, negative response from the international community.52 Any action taken by the United States can have positive and negative impacts; perceptions of other nations and actors within the international security environment will vary and could present significant challenges. Articulating the details of military space efforts as defensive in nature may allow the United States to peacefully pursue development of advanced space technologies and methods, while safeguarding its political clout and cultural influence on the international stage.
Transparency builds international confidence in US intentions
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
One need only consider the negative international reaction to the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, in which a Chinese ASAT destroyed a derelict Chinese satellite and created a large, hazardous, long-dwell swath of debris. The reaction to the Chinese operation stands in stark contrast to the more favorable global reaction to the United States’ Operation Burnt Frost in March 2008, in which a United States missile interceptor destroyed a derelict, uncontrolled, and potentially hazardous satellite. The primary differences in the two operations were the level of transparency and the resulting environmental impacts. The Chinese 26 surprised the world with their operation, were less than forthcoming about the operation, severely polluted an entire swath of the LEO environment with debris, and were perceived as reckless. The United States, by contrast, informed the world community weeks in advance, were very transparent with respect to operational data, conducted the operation so as to completely de-orbit the resulting debris, and, though some groups and political rivals objected, the United States was perceived as acting responsibly.54
Transparency and perceived intentions matter. The United States would be very well served by a track record of responsible stewardship in the space operating environment through careful actions that strengthen international confidence and trust. Safeguarding the high frontier from the vantage of the moral high ground will give the United States an advantage in the future international arena.55
US Weaponization Good
Space weaponization prevents terrorism, EMP attacks and accidental launches
Dolman and Cooper, 11 – *Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at the Air University AND **Chairman of the Board of High Frontier. Ambassador Cooper’s long and distinguished career includes service as the first civilian Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Chief Negotiator at the Geneva Defense and Space Talks, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Everett and Henry, Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
Weapons in space could provide the global security needed to disrupt and counter small groups of terrorists wherever they operate, at the very moment they are identified. Currently, UAVs, dependent on space support for operations, fly persistent missions above areas of suspected terrorist activity in Iraq, providing real-time intelligence and, in some cases, onboard weapons to support ground forces in a specific area. Tactical units are informed of approaching hostiles, and due to all-weather and multi-spectral imaging systems, both friendly (Blue Force) and enemy tracking can occur throughout engagement operations. When ground troops are unable to respond to threatening situations beyond their line of sight or are unable to catch fleeing hostiles, armed UAVs can engage those threats.
The other option in a large-scale counterterror operation is to bring in an overwhelming number of troops, enough to create a line across the entire country that can move forward, rousting and checking every shack and hovel, every tree and ditch, with enough Soldiers in reserve to prevent enemy combatants from re-infiltrating the previously checked zones. America could in this manner combat low-tech terrorism with low-tech mass military maneuvers, perhaps at a cost savings over an effective space-based surveillance and engagement capability (if one does not count the value of a Soldier's life), but we do not think dollar value is the overriding consideration in this situation. Terrorism in the form of limited, low-technology attacks is the most likely direct threat against America and its allies today, and space support is enabling the most sophisticated response ever seen. All-source intelligence has foiled dozens of attacks by al Qaeda and its associates. But what of the most dangerous threats today? Weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear but also chemical and biological ones, could be delivered in a variety of means vulnerable to interception if knowledge of their location is achieved in time for counteroperations to be effective. In situations where there is no defense available, or the need for one has not been anticipated, then time is the most precious commodity.
A limited strike capability from space would allow for the engagement of the highest threat and the most fleeting targets wherever they presented themselves on the globe, regardless of the intention of the perpetrator. The case of a ballistic missile carrying nuclear warheads is exemplary. Two decades ago, the most dangerous threat facing America (and the world) was a massive exchange of nuclear warheads that could destroy all life on the planet. Since a perfect defense was not achievable, negotiators agreed to no defense at all, on the assumption that reasonable leaders would restrain themselves from global catastrophe.
Today, a massive exchange is less likely than at any period of the Cold War, in part because of significant reductions in the primary nations' nuclear arsenals. The most likely and most dangerous threat comes from a single or limited missile launch, and from sources that are unlikely to be either rational or predictable. The first is an accidental launch, a threat we avoided making protections against due to the potentially destabilizing effect on the precarious Cold War balance. That an accidental launch, by definition undeterrable, would today hit its target is almost incomprehensible. More likely than an accidental launch is the intentional launch of one or a few missiles, either by a nonstate actor (a terrorist or "rogue boat captain" as the scenario was described in the early 1980s) or a rogue state attempting to maximize damage as a prelude to broader conflict. This is especially likely in the underdeveloped theories pertaining to deterring third-party states. The United States can do nothing today to prevent India from launching a nuclear attack against Pakistan (or vice versa) except threaten retaliation. If Iran should launch a nuclear missile at Israel, or in a preemptory strike Israel should attempt the reverse, America and the world could only sit back and watch, hoping that a potentially world-destroying conflict did not spin out of control. When President Reagan announced his desire for a missile shield in 1983, critics pointed out that even if a 99-percent-reliable defense from space could be achieved, a 10,000warhead salvo by the Soviet Union still allowed for the detonation of 100 nuclear bombs in American cities—and both we and the Soviets had enough missiles to make such an attack plausible.
But if a single missile were launched out of the blue from deep within the Asian landmass today, for whatever reason, a space-based missile defense system with 99-percent reliability would be a godsend. And if a U.S. space defense could intercept a single Scud missile launched by terrorists from a ship near America's coasts before it detonated a nuclear warhead 100 miles up—creating an electromagnetic pulse that shuts down America's powergrid, halts America's banking and commerce, and reduces the battlefield for America's military to third world status8—it might provide for the very survival of our way of life.
The strategic value of space means other states will inevitably try to control it first – the US has a small window of opportunity to get there first
Dolman and Cooper, 11 – *Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at the Air University AND **Chairman of the Board of High Frontier. Ambassador Cooper’s long and distinguished career includes service as the first civilian Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Chief Negotiator at the Geneva Defense and Space Talks, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Everett and Henry, Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
Space is too vast to be controlled. If one state weaponizes, then all other states will follow suit, and a crippling arms race in space will ensue. Space is indeed vast, but a quick analysis of the fundamentals of space terrain and geography shows that control of just LEO would be tantamount to a global gate or checkpoint for entrance into space, a position that could not be flanked and would require an incredible exertion of military power to dislodge. Thus, the real question quickly becomes not whether the United States should weaponize space first, but whether it can afford to be the second to weaponize space.
Space has been dubbed the ultimate high ground (see figure 19–2). As with the high ground throughout history, whosoever sits ensconced upon it accrues incredible benefit on the terrestrial battlefield. This comes from the dual advantages of enhanced span of command acuity (visibility and control) and kinetic power. It is simply easier and more powerful to shoot down the hill than up it.
The pace of technological development, particularly in microsatellites and networked operations, could allow a major spacefaring state to quickly establish enough independent kinetic kill vehicles in LEO (through multiple payload launches) to effectively deny entry or transit to any other state. Currently, the United States has the infrastructure and capacity to do so; China may in the very near future. Russia is also a potential candidate for a space coup. Should any one of these states put enough weapons in orbit, they could engage and shoot down attempts to place counterspace assets in orbit, effectively taking control of outer space. Indeed, the potential to be gained from ensuring spacepower projection while denying that capability in others is so great that some state, some day, will make the attempt.
US military domination in other fields proves the US will be perceived as a benign hegemon
Dolman and Cooper, 11 – *Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at the Air University AND **Chairman of the Board of High Frontier. Ambassador Cooper’s long and distinguished career includes service as the first civilian Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Chief Negotiator at the Geneva Defense and Space Talks, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Everett and Henry, Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
With great power comes great responsibility. If the United States deploys and uses its military space force in concert with allies and friends to maintain effective control of space in a way that is perceived as tough, nonarbitrary, and efficient, adversaries would be discouraged from fielding opposing systems. Should the United States and its allies and friends use their advantage to police the heavens and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, control of low Earth orbit over time would be viewed as a global asset and a collective good. In much the same way it has maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights, the United States could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion.
There is reasonable historic support for the notion that the most peaceful and prosperous periods in modern history coincide with the appearance of a strong, liberal hegemon. America has been essentially unchallenged in its naval dominance over the last 60 years and in global air supremacy for the last 15 or more. Today, there is more international commerce on the oceans and in the air than ever. Ships and aircraft of all nations worry more about running into bad weather than about being commandeered by a military vessel or set upon by pirates. Search and rescue is a far more common task than forced embargo, and the transfer of humanitarian aid is a regular mission. Lest one think this era of cooperation is predicated on intentions rather than military stability, recall that the policy of open skies advocated by every President since Eisenhower did not take effect until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the singular rise of American power to the fore of international politics. The legacy of American military domination of the sea and air has been positive, and the same should be expected for space.
As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position of having to make decisions for the good of all. No matter the choice, some parties will benefit and others will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing. Fortunately, the United States has a great advantage: its people's moral ambiguity about the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is dangerous, but perhaps only Americans are so concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has such potential for self-restraint. It is this introspection, this angst, that makes America the best choice to lead the world today and tomorrow. America is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible, and it is preferable to other alternatives that will lead if America falters at the current crossroad.
Space weapons, along with the parallel development of information, precision, and stealth capabilities, represent a true revolution in military affairs. These technologies and capabilities will propel the world into an uncertain new age. Only a spasm of nuclear nihilism could curtail this future. By moving forward against the fears of the many, and harnessing these new technologies to a forward-looking strategy of cooperative advantage for all, the United States has the potential to initiate mankind's first global golden age. The nature of international relations and the lessons of history dictate that such a course begin with the vision and will of a few acting in the benefit of all. America must lead, for the benefit of all.
AT: Prompt Global Strike link
The US relies on ICBM launchers now – ORS will shift reliance to new launch vehicles
Doggrell, 6 – senior project engineer with the Aerospace Corporation (6/1/06, Les, Air and Space Power Journal, “Operationally Responsive Space A Vision for the Future of Military Space,” )RK
Responsiveness in space systems has proven difficult to attain. Characteristics of existing systems include development times exceeding a decade, high cost, and an emphasis on reliability and long mission life. These traits are driven, in part, by the considerable expense of getting to space. Nevertheless, we can achieve the space capability we desire through multiple approaches. The United States maintains a highly responsive fleet of launch vehicles in the ICBM force and has previously maintained communication spacecraft and counterspace systems on alert—an effective approach but costly and encumbered by nuclear politics.10 Consequently, ORS is examining avenues other than brute force to secure responsiveness. To do so, we must change many aspects of the entire space architecture. The ground system, space vehicle, launch vehicle, and launch infrastructure all affect the responsiveness of space capabilities (fig. 2). Improving a launch vehicle’s reaction time has little effect if we have not similarly improved the infrastructure and spacecraft.
The military is developing new launch systems now that rely on ICBMs
Freeman, 9 – Lt. Col, Launch Test Squadron, SMC/SDTW (Thomas, “Operationally Responsive Space Launch for Space Situational Awareness Missions,” )
The SDTW charged the Launch Test Squadron (LTS) to develop the operationally responsive spacelift capability for Low-Earth-Orbit Space Situational Awareness assets. The LTS strives to meet shortened operational response periods and on-time suspense criteria for the warfighter, while reducing the life-cycle development, production and launch costs of space launch systems. The LTS created and executed a space enterprise strategy to place small payloads (1000 pounds), at low cost (less than $28M to $30M per launch), repeatable and rapidly. The squadron provides scalable launch support services including program management support, engineering support, payload integration and post-test evaluation for space systems.
Based on these criteria, Air Force Space Command determined that LTS would employ retired Minuteman and Peacekeeper ICBM rocket motors as the launch systems for operationally responsive missions, to include Space Situational Awareness missions, to meet the National Space Policy operationally responsive goal [2]. Additionally, LTS would support government research and development space launches and missile defense tests target vehicles. Averaging over eight flight tests per year, LTS has maintained a 98% success rate for LTS managed launches. The squadron’s success is founded upon partnerships with commercial spacelift expertise. LTS utilizes task order contract vehicles with commercial space contractors for spacelift missions. In 2006, LTS conducted launch requirements for the NASA TacSat2 mission, employing a Minotaur I space launch vehicle, for a successful launch and mission completion. LTS also successfully launched TacSat3 on 19 May 09.
CONCLUSION: The United States’ increased Space Situational Awareness in direct support of assuring access to space as a requirement for critical national security, homeland security and civil missions will call for reduced costs in spacecraft and launch vehicles operations. The Air Force, through the SDTW/LTS, will continue to evolve its spacelift execution arm for Space Situational Awareness by creating small, less-expensive, repeatable and operationally responsive space launch capability. In doing so, LTS’ shared processes and lessons learned with Air Force, DoD, civil and commercial space entity partnerships will contribute to cost and schedule reductions in launch vehicle and spacecraft development, production and operations.
AT: Space debris disad
The plan reduces vulnerability to space debris
Donahue, 10 – USAF Major (Jack, “CATASTROPHE ON THE HORIZON: A SCENARIO-BASED FUTURE EFFECT OF ORBITAL SPACE DEBRIS,” )
The warning signs and leading indicators for a catastrophic collision between orbital debris and satellites or manned spaceflight missions are all around us. If significant strides are not made within the next 5 years to clear and remove orbital debris it could result in the loss of satellites and the death of space crew. Furthermore, if something isn‘t done to better protect space assets now it could lead to adversaries exploiting vulnerabilities through various kinetic, nuclear, and cyber attacks causing satellites to become inoperative. This would lead to the generation of new debris which will further compound the orbital debris problem. The effects of this would be felt worldwide with the disruption of communications, internet access, navigation, military surveillance, environmental research, and the banking industry. The best way to avoid these consequences is to continue to harden satellites, improve space monitoring, and develop backups/alternatives to satellite capabilities. As mentioned, the US must also continue to partner with other countries to implement solutions of clearing and reducing the proliferation of orbital debris. The world can change the potential alarming future of a catastrophic collision from orbital debris, but the time to act is now.
AT: Debris kills the aff
A space war won’t generate huge debris fields
Dolman and Cooper, 11 – *Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at the Air University AND **Chairman of the Board of High Frontier. Ambassador Cooper’s long and distinguished career includes service as the first civilian Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Chief Negotiator at the Geneva Defense and Space Talks, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Everett and Henry, Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
Weaponization of space will create conditions that will make space travel risky if not impossible.Having extended the illogic of opposing space weapons to the limit, opponents then take on the mechanics of war and the evils of the military. As for the first argument, orbital debris is the challenge, which the recent Chinese antisatellite (ASAT) test confirms. The destruction of its own dying satellite in 2007 created thousands of bits of debris that are now floating at orbital velocity, an expanding cloud that poses a lasting navigational hazard to legitimate space flight. True, the Chinese test was criminal, especially since it could have engaged with almost no debris remnants if it had altered its engagement path. In over a dozen antisatellite tests that the Soviet Union held in the 1970s and 1980s, only the first left appreciable debris. After that, the massive co-orbital ASAT engaged in a kinetic direction toward the Earth, down the gravity well, causing all of the detritus of the ASAT and target to burn up in the atmosphere. Indeed, in a scenario where the United States is controlling space, most engagements would occur in launch phase, before the weapons even reach orbit. Any debris that is not burned up or destroyed will fall onto the launching state. Because tested weapons systems have maximized destruction to validate capabilities does not mean that future engagements must create long-lasting debris fields. Satellites are very fragile, and a bump or a push in the wrong direction is all that is necessary to send them spinning off into a useless or uncontrollable orbit—if you get to space first. Space war does not have to be dirty war, and in fact spacefaring nations will go out of their way to ensure that it is not (an argument that nonspacefaring powers may wish to fight dirty, and the only reliable defense against them would be in space, occurs below).
AT: Small sats create debris
Small satellites do not create debris due to atmospheric re-entry and low-altitude orbits
Hellstrom and Eriksson 11 – Analyst at FOI, a research institute under the Swedish Ministry of Defence (Jerker Hellstrom, Mikael Eriksson, “Strategic Outlook 2011”)JCP
The current situation in space could in some respects be compared to the Wild West. There is, in principle, no regulation or supervision of the “traffic situation” in space. A large number of new satellites are under the supervision of less experienced operators. This will provide major challenges for future space activities. International regulations on how satellite operators should act in space are weak and non-binding. In addition, there is no globally accepted control mechanism to detect and prosecute dangerous activities. United Nations regulations on how to limit space debris can only be regarded as good advice and guidance. Few operators follow these guidelines in full since they limit the owner’s room for manoeuvre and demand more complex and therefore more expensive satellites. For small satellites, which lack a manoeuvring capability, these guidelines in reality mean that only low-altitude orbits can be used. Low-altitude orbits lead automatically to an atmospheric re-entry after a short time and thus generate no new space debris.
Space debris now
Space debris will grow geometrically
Sterner, 11 - fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. He was a senior professional staff member on the House Armed Services and Science Committees and served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as NASA's associate deputy administrator of policy and planning (Eric, “Managing the Space Domain,” World Politics Review, 5/17,
In some ways, the situation in space is more challenging. Compared to the number of launching states, or even the number of states that own and operate satellites, the number of objects moving around the planet is immense. United States Strategic Command's Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) follows roughly 22,000 objects, from as small as 10 centimeters across, in space. There may be more than 300,000 individual pieces of smaller debris. Collisions are expected, if not always predicted. Each one produces yet more objects and potential sources of collision. In other words, debris grows geometrically, and while a 10-centimeter piece of debris may not seem very big, when traveling at 10,000 miles per hour it is lethal.
AT: Spending
ORS satellites are radically cheaper to build and launch
Geib 9 – Captain, United States Air Force B.S., Naval Postgraduate School, this was submitted for his Master of Science in Systems Engineering (Jeremy S., March 2009 “A Satellite Architecture for Operationally Responsive Space”, )
An ORS satellite would have some top-level requirements that are independent of the mission it will be performing. First, its weight must be less than 1000 kg (Cebrowski and Raymond, 2005), as a satellite’s size is a significant contributor to the cost (and complexity) of both the satellite as well as the eventual launch options. Second, mature technologies must be used to build it. For example, improved miniaturization capability, which does not yet exists, is needed in order to achieve the required weight. Finally, it must cost less than current satellites. An estimated cost of less than $15M per satellite for design and development is the defined cost constraint goal within this thesis. This nominal cost was selected as it is representative of current small satellite development programs.
Short term resource investments bring down overall costs
Wilson and Haymond, 10 - * Commander, 45th Space Wing and Director Eastern Range Patrick AFB AND ** Vice Commander, Space Development and Test Wing Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (Burke and Jeff, High Frontier, May, “ Operationalizing Small Space: Challenges of Moving from Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation to Operations,” )
The fundamental question is whether the “good enough to win for RDT&E” with its rapid, agile strategy can be leveraged to make the leap to “good enough to win” for the warfighter with enough operational rigor to ensure mission success. These messages are in tension, but not in conflict; the importance of the mission sets in small space requires the underpinning of operational rigor, but we must be able to rapidly deploy these capabilities in a cost effective manner. While this seemingly is the impossible task of “having your cake and eating it too,” this tension presents a unique opportunity to reexamine the way we acquire and operate space systems. ORS provides the impetus to evaluate every aspect of our acquisition and operational processes and develop a new “playbook” that exploits the strengths of operational and RDT&E communities. To overcome the weaknesses of the past and build operational robustness into the inherently flexible RDT&E processes, we must:
1. Recognize an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure. While the cost goals of ORS seem unobtainable when built upon an operational foundation, the opposite is closer to the truth. Wise early spending to build an operational foundation for ORS will significantly reduce downstream costs. While prescience of future ORS needs without firm traditional requirements is not a trait highly rewarded by AFSPC programming budget drills, it is nevertheless required; and therefore will likely have to be driven top down. We have clearly learned from “big space” that lack of resources at the initial stages of space system development and acquisition costs us in spades when we experience mission or acquisition failure. In a recent small space example, the ORS-1 satellite build decision was made in July 2008 with funding contingent on Congressional approval for the reprogramming of funds. Naturally, when delays were experienced with the reprogramming, the program lost momentum and incurred delays. When a program is intended to deliver a space capability in less than two years, it is vital that all aspects of the program are “ready to go” at program initiation.1
The ORS shift to smaller space architectures is vital to preserving military space budgets
Felt, 10 - USAF Commander, Space Test Operations Squadron Space Development and Test Wing Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (Eric, “Responsive Space Funding Challenges and Solutions: Avoiding a Tragedy of the Commons,” High Frontier, May, )
3. Quantity and quality of space capabilities needed (our “space appetites”) far exceed available financial resources. Due to the many competing budget priorities at all levels of government, this situation will likely continue for the foreseeable future and will encourage innovative thinking and new concepts that can help close critical space capability gaps. These new concepts include innovative business models such as open standards and the Rapid Response Space Works the ORS Office is building at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. As the Department scales requirements back to match available resources, whether explicitly through the formal requirement processes or implicitly through budget priorities, responsive space systems will play an increasing role. Clearly, in most mission areas, some space capability is better than none. Furthermore, the space industrial base and government workforce expertise are jeopardized by the path our nation is pursuing to acquire only a few exquisite systems; opportunities for “learning” and “practice” within both industry and the government are essential to successfully field systems of any size. The risks facing the industrial base and government workforce could be partially mitigated by shifting more resources to small responsive space. Responsive space is therefore part of the solution to budget shortfalls, not part of the cause.
Small satellites maximize cost returns – they will protect the entire space budget
Felt, 10 - USAF Commander, Space Test Operations Squadron Space Development and Test Wing Kirtland AFB, New Mexico (Eric, “Responsive Space Funding Challenges and Solutions: Avoiding a Tragedy of the Commons,” High Frontier, May, )
Misperception that space “takes too long and costs too much.” Fielding space capabilities is technically challenging and costly. Nevertheless, the US has fielded the world’s highest-performing space capabilities. Just as no space professional works in the “Non-Operationally Responsive Space Office,” no part of our space enterprise wants space capabilities to cost more and take longer. Nevertheless, the misperception that space takes too long and costs too much jeopardizes the enterprise’s ability to convince others to increase the space budget to field needed additional capability. Adding responsive space capabilities to the current mix of mostly exquisite space capabilities would provide additional capability and price data points and options. These would help space leaders better explain and justify the entire space portfolio. In the communications mission area, for example, small satellites are not cost competitive with large satellites on a “per channel” basis. The analysis behind that assertion is sound and drove us to the current constellation of large satellites. Small communication satellites can be fielded rapidly and flexibly, though, making them responsive and attractive for reconstitution, spot augmentation, and other unanticipated urgent communication needs. Adding responsive space capabilities to the current space architecture mix will improve the cost and schedule “bang for the buck,” help us better justify the cost and schedule attributes of the current space architecture, or quite possibly both.
***CP ANSWERS
AT: Code of Conduct / Arms control
The permutation is the best option – solves the net benefit and deters if norms break down
Morgan, 10 - defense policy researcher working in RAND Corporation's Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force (Forrest, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space,”
Some of these questions cannot be answered outside the context of an actual conflict. In some future scenario, U.S. leaders might well decide, after weighing the risks, benefits, and alternatives, to attack an enemy’s orbital infrastructure. But in the meantime, U.S. leaders should be open to diplomatic engagement, treaty negotiations, and other confidence-building measures, and they should actively pursue agreements when they can be crafted to serve U.S. interests. In addition to the benefits that such agreements might offer, demonstrating leadership in diplomatic venues is important for characterizing the United States as a responsible world actor with the moral authority to use its power to protect the common operating environment of all spacefaring nations. In these and other settings, all U.S. policies, statements, and actions should be carefully orchestrated to foster and strengthen an international norm that condemns all but retributive attacks on space systems. Advancing such a norm would raise the political costs of space aggression in ways that potential adversaries would have to factor into their decision calculations in any crisis in which they are tempted to attack orbital assets.9
Deterring Attacks in Space with Threats of Punishment
Important as they are, norms alone will not deter aggression in space. When confrontation turns to crisis and it begins to appear that war is inevitable, the international political costs of violating peacetime norms of behavior pale in comparison to the costs of not taking action to reduce a dangerous adversary’s warfighting capabilities. However, fortifying taboos against attacking space assets would strengthen deterrence in another important way: It would bolster the credibility of U.S. threats to punish any state that violated the norm. As the space warfare taboo strengthens, U.S. policymakers could capitalize on leverage from it to generate support for diplomatic and economic sanctions against states that openly develop and test weapons for attacking satellites. More importantly, a firm stance condemning aggression in space, coupled with a national space policy that explicitly threatens those who attack space assets with severe punishment in ways, times, and places of the United States’ choosing, would bolster the credibility of U.S. threats to strike targets in the terrestrial domain in retribution for attacks on U.S. space assets. The aim of U.S. declaratory policies and strategies should be to manage perceptions: The international community should be conditioned to accept the justice of punishing space aggressors in the terrestrial environment and support the United States in its use of lethal force to do so. Potential adversaries, in turn, should be conditioned to take seriously U.S. threats to strike terrestrial targets in exchange for attacks on its satellites. Granted, carrying out such threats could be highly escalatory in some scenarios, but that is exactly the point. If, by the consistent nature of U.S. policies and the explicit nature of U.S. statements, potential adversaries are convinced that the United States would inexorably carry out its threats regardless of the risks—indeed, were they led to believe that U.S. leaders had placed themselves in a position in which they could not do otherwise—the last clear chance to avoid catastrophic escalation is put squarely on the adversaries’ shoulders. It places on them the onus of triggering a chain of events that might lead to a wider war.10
As previously stated, the United States should also continue research on capabilities for attacking enemy satellites. Although a simple tit-for-tat exchange of satellites would not work to U.S. strategic advantage, potential enemies must not be allowed to believe that they could attack U.S. satellites without suffering costly losses to their own orbital assets in return. To make such deterrent threats credible, capabilities to carry them out would be needed, but until technological advances overcome the inherent vulnerability of satellites, all capabilities for attacking enemy space systems should be based in the terrestrial domain to better protect them and minimize first-strike instability in crises and war. To remain consistent with a national space policy as outlined here, the purpose of such systems would be to provide a credible deterrent threat of retribution and, failing that, viable capabilities for defending the nation’s security interests in space. Any accusations that such capabilities are intended for dominating space or denying other states’ access to that domain should rightly be dismissed as contrary to U.S. policy except when employed in response to an aggressor’s first strike.
Treaties are unenforceable
Rendleman, 10 - Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (James, Astropolitics, 8:220–255, 2010, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Ebsco Political Science)
Of course, while engagement has been helpful, there is still an element of risk in relying solely on it to assure access to space capabilities. Enforcement mechanisms for violating treaties and agreements relating to space are rather limited. For example, there are no specific ‘‘legal’’ enforcement mechanisms in place to address violations of the Outer Space Treaty, and this increases the risk of depending on such documents, handshakes, unstated understandings, and backroom brokered deals to protect or assure access to space. Similarly, the ITU has been described as a ‘‘gentlemen’s club’’ depending on the ‘‘goodwill of its members. There is no mechanism for forcing an administration into compliance with the rules.’’55
International agreements can’t be verified – it makes attacks impossible to attribute given the lack of space situational awareness
Sejba, 10 - USAF Congressional Budget Liaison Officer Budget and Appropriations Liaison Directorate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget Secretary of the Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC (Timothy, “ Deterrence for Space: Is Operationally Responsive Space Part of the Solution?”, High Frontier, May, )
Impose Costs and Encourage Restraint—Completing Deterrence
This approach to a deterrence strategy, while focused primarily on denying benefits, must also consider means to impose costs and encourage restraint across a broad spectrum of potential adversaries. This integrated approach to deny, impose, and encourage, provides a cumulative effect to achieve a full spectrum deterrence strategy. Deterrence will be adversary dependent. No single action or capability, including ORS, will have the same deterrent effect on each potential adversary.
The US will use credible cross-domain capabilities in air, sea, and possibly land or cyber, to impose costs on an adversary.29 Examples could include sea or bomber-launched cruise missiles positioned in or near the region, or a future prompt global strike capability.30 In the end, our most credible means to impose costs will consist of cross-domain capabilities that threaten the most important adversary assets.
While conventional weapon systems play a role in this deterrence framework, encouraging restraint is likely best accomplished through diplomatic measures. The Outer Space Treaty signed in 1967 continues to serve as the basis for international space law.31 Forty-three years later, an updated Outer Space Treaty is in order. Additionally, establishing other “codes of conduct” for the peaceful use of space may enhance security and maintain stability within the international space community. These steps would broaden the international community committed to the peaceful use of space, creating a more coordinated international diplomatic response to an attack. Yet given this, treaties and codes will be difficult to monitor, verify or enforce. In the event of an attack, especially a non-kinetic attack, attribution back to the perpetrating nation will be difficult to detect, and even harder to prove to the international community. For these reasons, encouraging restraint through pure diplomatic measures, is a legitimate component and will aid in deterrence,32 but is far less likely to protect or deter attacks on its own.
Summary
ORS provides clear benefits towards deterrence for space. Without effective Tier 1 and Tier 2 capabilities to deter attacks, and protect our space capabilities, our adversaries will view space capabilities as vulnerabilities worth exploiting. By doing so, they could gain early offensive and defensive advantages in a conflict, while greatly affecting our ability to operate. ORS capabilities coupled with a deterrence strategy to deny benefits, impose costs and encourage restraint will maintain our ability to rapidly access space and provide continuous space capabilities during the full spectrum of military operations.
Beyond ORS, deterrence will require a cross-domain approach, with non-space capabilities providing key deterrent value, both in denying benefits and imposing costs. In addition to deterrence through military elements of national power, diplomatic measures should also be explored and undertaken where appropriate. Agreements with other nations would allow access to additional space capabilities and critical data, increasing the time-critical information available to senior decision makers and military commanders. If deterrence does fail and space becomes a contested and denied environment, adequate mission assurance of our basic space capabilities must allow the US and allies to “fight through” the degradation until full space capabilities are restored. The US has invested nearly $1.5 trillion in space over the last 50 years. The US stands to lose the most military and economic power without it. We must take necessary steps to deter, defend, and protect space capabilities. It is an investment we must undertake.
Russia, China, India, and developing countries will resist the Code of Conduct – perceived as US unilateralism and unverifiable
Listner, 7/7/11 (Michael, , “TCBMs: A New Definition and New Role for Outer Space Security,”
TCBMs as envisioned by the United States provide the Obama Administration with a diplomatic and policy tool that it can utilize to unilaterally project its foreign policy agenda without interference from Congress and in particular the Senate. With the loss of the majority in the House of Representatives and a greatly diminished majority in the Senate, the Obama Administration is faced with a less than favorable political environment to propose a treaty such as the PPWT. TCBMs give the Administration an alternative to side-step political impediments to pursue its foreign policy objectives in place of an actual treaty in regards to outer space stability and security. The position set forth by the United States regarding the use of TCBMs does not coincide with the traditional view and use of TCBMs. Per the National Space Policy, the United States is seeking to enter into TCBMs to define space activity and conduct as an alternative to entering into legally binding treaties.
This approach to TCBMs was articulated by Paula Desutter when discussing the implications of the United States signing onto the CoC. Ms. Desutter remarked that the CoC was preferable to the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) proposed by the Russian Federation and the Peoples’ Republic of China. She noted that the CoC could provide an alternative approach and vehicle to ensuring space security and stability that could undermine or ultimately lead to the demise of the PPWT. If this is the tack that the United States intends to take at next year’s meeting of the Group of Government Experts, then it will meet opposition from several constituencies.
The PRC and the Russian Federation will certainly oppose as they have in the past any form of TCBMs that are not linked to some sort of arms control agreement such as the proposed PPWT. The Russian Federation in particular has noted that TCBMs have been used in the past to address issues relating to space activities, and that it has used unilateral TCBMs itself in regards to notifications of launches and the pledge not to be the first to deploy space weapons. The Russian Federation has stated it will likely continue to support the use of TCBMs to lay the ground work for adoption of the PPWT and that the adoption of the PPWT would be the most important confidence-building measure in outer space.
If reaction by Asia-Pacific nations to the proposed CoC is any indicator, the United States could also find opposition from other space-faring nations in that region. Open-source material criticizing the CoC suggests that India might object to the United States’ approach to space security and stability. Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan’s, a Senior Fellow in Security Studies at the Observer Research Foundation remarked on whether India should endorse the CoC. Dr. Rajagopalan notes in her critique of the CoC that the European Council did not consult Asian nations while drafting the instrument, and that while the Coc is voluntary, its mandate for states to establish national policies and procedures to mitigate the potential for accidents in space could be seen as intrusive. She further critiqued that the voluntary nature of the CoC would preclude any penalty on states violating the norms within. Similarly, some of the concerns voiced by Dr. Rajagopalan could be expressed by India and other nations within the Asia-Pacific region concerning the use of TCBMs with the most prominent being their lack of enforceability and verification.
The United States will also find opposition from the non-space faring nations. The United States is portrayed as the neighborhood bully when it comes to matters of international security, especially in the realm of outer space security, and the realities of soft politics will ensure that will not change anytime soon. Attempts to address the issue of space security and stability via TCBMs as proposed by the United States will be met with suspicion by non-space faring nations and the delegation from the PRC and Russian Federation will likely stoke that dissension.
Obama called China’s bluff- statements prove they don’t want cooperation and just want weaponization.
Chang 9 - author of The Coming Collapse of China (11/6, Gordon, “The Space Arms Race Begins”, ) NYan
Did the arms race in space begin this week?
"Competition between military forces is developing towards the sky and space, it is extending beyond the atmosphere and even into outer space," said the chief of the Chinese air force in the Nov. 2 edition of People's Liberation Army Daily, the official newspaper of China's military. "This development is a historical inevitability and cannot be undone."
What cannot be undone is the effect of General Xu Qiliang's words. Chinese state media, however, tried to do just that, contending that the foreign media misinterpreted him. Then Chinese diplomats got in on the act. "China has never and will not participate in an outer space arms race in any form," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu on Nov. 5. "The position of China on this point remains unchanged."
China's position--at least up until this week--was that no nation should use space for the purposes of war. In February of last year, Beijing and Moscow introduced a draft space treaty at a disarmament conference in Geneva. The Bush administration opposed it on the sensible ground that a deal would be unverifiable--any object in space can be used as a weapon if it can be maneuvered to arrange a collision, for instance. Moreover, a ground-launched missile can also be used to knock out satellites, space stations or shuttles.
The Russians and Chinese, in all probability, were just engaging in a public relations exercise last year because they obviously had no intention of ever allowing the intrusive inspections that would have to be built into any meaningful treaty. Yet, minutes after his inauguration, President Obama called Beijing's and Moscow's bluff by coming out in favor of a global agreement to keep weapons out of the heavens.
In response to Obama's countermove, Beijing--or at least the People's Liberation Army--has now changed tack and announced its intention to begin the space arms race in earnest. General Xu's bold words, interestingly enough, come at the same time that some in Washington are calling for civilian cooperation with the Chinese in space.
Code of Conduct links to politics
The Code of Conduct counterplan links to politics
The Washington Times 2/3/2011 (“Republicans wary of EU code for space activity,” The Washington Times, Accessed online at , Accessed on 7/10/11)
Republican opposition in the Senate could scuttle the Obama administration’s plans to sign on to the European Union’s Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, an agreement that critics say could limit U.S. development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons.
Key Senate Republicans are urging Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to consult with the relevant Senate panels before signing the agreement.
The Obama administration is expected to unveil Friday the U.S. National Security Space Strategy, a classified document outlining how the Defense Department and the intelligence community will implement the administration’s space policy.
An unclassified summary of that strategy obtained by The Washington Times says the United States will pursue more confidence-building mechanisms and transparency measures with regard to its activities in space.
“We will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies,” the summary states. “We believe setting pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space can help avoid collisions and other debris-producing events, reduce radio frequency interference, and promote security and stability in the space domain — all of which are in the interests of all nations.”
However, the strategy also reserves the right to respond to aggression in space.
“The United States will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail. We will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self defense,” it says.
In recent months, the United States has reached out to the Russian and Chinese governments to discuss rules of the road for satellites, said U.S. officials familiar with the diplomacy. The Chinese so far have spurned offers to discuss space issues with the United States; the Russians have started technical talks.
In 2007, the Chinese military successfully tested a ground-based missile that destroyed one of its own satellites. In 2009, a communications satellite owned by satellite-phone maker Iridium crashed into a Russian satellite over northern Siberia.
Last month, an interagency group of U.S. experts concluded that the United States should sign the EU code of conduct with minimal changes to the document. Their recommendation is awaiting approval at the National Security Council.
This has Republican senators worried.
“We are deeply concerned that the Administration may sign the United States on to a multilateral commitment with a multitude of potential highly damaging implications for sensitive military and intelligence programs (current, planned or otherwise), as well as a tremendous amount of commercial activity,” the senators said in a letter to Mrs. Clinton.
The letter was signed by 37 Republican senators, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl of Arizona.
Specifically, the lawmakers ask what impact the code of conduct would have on “the research and development, testing and deployment of a kinetic defensive system in outer space that is capable of defeating an anti-satellite weapon, such as the one tested by the People’s Republic of China in 2007.”
Proponents of the EU code of conduct praise the agreement as a way of minimizing space debris that can disable intelligence, military and commercial satellites. The code of conduct is also an alternative to a space arms control treaty supported by China and Russia that both the Obama and Bush administrations have opposed as being unverifiable and counter to the U.S. national interest.
The senators say in the letter that they are unaware of any efforts to brief members of Congress on the agreement. “If this draft code is truly in the national interest, there can be no legitimate reason for concealing its negotiation from the Senate,” they wrote.
AT: PPWT
The PPWT has too many loopholes – allows China to develop ASATs but bans the US from defending against them
Listner 4-25-2011 (Michael is a legal and policy analyst with a focus on issues relating to space law and policy. Michael has numerous writings on the topic published in legal and online journals and also writes a regular column on space law and policy at . Michael received his JD in 2001 from Regent University of School of Law in Virginia Beach, “An exercise in the Art of War: China’s National Defense white paper, outer space, and the PPWT” ) BW
The proffered purpose in the preamble of the PPWT6 by the Russian Federation and China is to address the deficiency of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.7 Article IV bans the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit of the earth, but it is silent concerning weapons that are non-nuclear or otherwise do not reach the destructive potential of a weapon of mass destruction.
The PPWT offers the following definition of a space weapon:
The term “weapon in outer space” means any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage on them;
The PPWT goes on to say that:
A weapon shall be considered to have been “placed” in outer space if it orbits the Earth at least once, or follows a section of such an orbit before leaving this orbit, or is permanently located somewhere in outer space;
The PPWT then defines the “use of force” or the threat of “use of force” as:
The “use of force” or the “threat of force” mean any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, actions aimed at destroying them, damaging them, temporarily or permanently disrupting their normal functioning or deliberately changing their orbit parameters, or the threat of such actions.
The PPWT prohibits space weapons as defined by stating that:
[t]he States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to place such weapons in outer space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; and not to assist or induce other States, groups of States or international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.
More important than what the PPWT prohibits is what it does not prohibit or address. An August 18, 2009, letter from the Russian Federation and PRC delegation to the Disarmament Conference addressed concerns with the PPWT raised by other members. In particular, the letter asserts that:
The PPWT prohibits the use or threat of force against “outer space objects”, but it does not prohibit the use or threat of force in outer space.
The PPWT does not alter the right to self-defense allowed under Article 51 of the UN Charter; so long as that weapon is not prohibited by international law and is not used against a signatory of the PPWT.
The PPWT does not prohibit, the development, testing, and deployment of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) so long as they do not meet the definition of “weapon in outer space” as defined by the PPWT.
The PPWT does not prohibit the development, testing and deployment of ground-based lasers and electronic suppression systems.
The PPWT does not address the issue of “dual-purpose” space technologies that could be employed both for peaceful or aggressive purposes.
The PPWT does not include any mechanism for verification.
The wording and interpretation of the PPWT works to the PRC’s advantage by allowing it to continue to develop and deploy direct-ascent ASAT technology and other ground-based ASAT techniques. On the other hand, countries such as the United States would be limited in the means it could use to develop and deploy defenses specifically if the means of defense might be defined as a space weapon under the PPWT.
Wikileaks proves the PPWT is a Chinese attempt to gain the upper hand in space
Listner 4-25-2011 (Michael is a legal and policy analyst with a focus on issues relating to space law and policy. Michael has numerous writings on the topic published in legal and online journals and also writes a regular column on space law and policy at . Michael received his JD in 2001 from Regent University of School of Law in Virginia Beach, “An exercise in the Art of War: China’s National Defense white paper, outer space, and the PPWT” ) BW
An article from the Washington Times reported on an missile-defense test performed by the PRC in 2010 using components of the ASAT system used in the January 2007 test.13 The information concerning the test was gleaned by from a diplomatic cable belonging to the United States and disclosed by Wikileaks.14 In addition to the information relating to the missile-defense test, the disclosed cable purportedly notes concerns from United States’ diplomats that Beijing has duplicitous motives in regards to the issue of weapons in spaces.
The international community should continue to be wary of the public perception that the PRC works so hard to manufacture and promote.
According to the article, the cable purportedly contains concerns from United States’ diplomats that, while Beijing is promoting international treaties to limit or ban weapons in outer space, it is secretly developing its own missile defense and space weapons programs. The article continues that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, during a recent visit to Beijing, offered to hold talks with China on missile defense, space weapons, nuclear weapons, and cyber weapons, but was apparently rebuffed, with the PRC relegating the offer to be studied.
If accurate, diplomatic channels seem to verify that while publically touting its intention to prevent a arms race in space, the PRC is willing to do so only on its terms and through mechanisms like the PPWT to the exclusion of other methods, all the while increasing its ability to neutralize United States space systems and gain an upper hand in outer space.
AT: Bilateral treaties
Bilateral treaties fail
O’Hanlon, 11 – senior fellow at Brookings (Michael, Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, )
The United States currently conducts few space weapons activities, but that could change quickly. From time to time, a Pentagon official speaks of the need to be forward-leaning on the space weaponization issue, and periodically, the open press reports consideration of at least small amounts of research and development funding for dedicated antisatellite weapons. As best as one can tell from the outside, such programs do not appear to have much momentum as of now. Yet it is hard to be sure and very hard to predict the future. In this light, should the United States agree to restraints on future military uses of outer space, in particular the weaponization of outer space? Any useful formal treaties would have to be multilateral in scope. It makes little sense to consider bilateral treaties because it is unclear what country should be the other party to a treaty. At this point, any space treaty worth the effort to negotiate would have to include as many other space-faring countries as possible, ranging from Russia and the European powers to China, India, and Japan. To be sure, that accords would be multilateral does not mean that they should be negotiated at the United Nations, where many space arms control discussions have occurred to date. There is a strong and perhaps ideological pro–arms control bias in the UN Conference on Disarmament, where these discussions have taken place. In addition, some countries may be using those fora to score political points against the United States rather than to genuinely pursue long-term accords for promoting international stability. The United Nations might ultimately be involved to bless any treaty, but it might be best to negotiate elsewhere.
AT: International CP for space debris
US leadership is vital to space debris removal – it provides transparency that decreases the perception of anti-debris technology being used for weaponization
Buck 10 - Integration Manager for the NSSO Communications Functional Integration Office (COMM-FIO), and augments COMM-FIO leadership of a 200-member enterprise team of elite DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), NASA, and space & cyber industry engineers, operators & stakeholders (February 17, 2010, Darren J., “SPACE 2035: TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPARENCY, AND TRUSTED IMMUNITY,” )
Active Debris Mitigation Space Debris Removal technologies can potentially serve United States interests in building a credible Space Control portfolio of capabilities while ameliorating public and international angst over potential weaponization. As a part of its charter to protect the space 25 operating environment, the Space Constabulary should take the lead in mitigating the dangers posed by debris in space. Mitigation capabilities could include rendezvous, proximity operations, and, in the case of debris or derelict removal, grappling and transportation. A particularly effective means of debris removal, especially relative to smaller objects in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), would be ground-based directed energy used to ablate the surfaces of small objects. In effect, this technique produces thrust and imparts momentum transfer to the object, eventually de-orbiting it.53 One could argue that other nations could develop these capabilities. However, in a globally interconnected and interdependent environment, as will exist in the Space Cloud era of 2035, the use of these space control capabilities for anything other than debris removal from the space environment will tend to be constrained, presuming that any nation-state or large group will most likely have a political and economic stake in the international arena. At the very least, if the United States successfully establishes transparency and stewardship precedents, the international community will come to expect transparency in the use or practical test of such capabilities.
AT: Privatization CP
Government control key to ORS responsiveness – private sector conflicts prevent fast response
Larrimore, 07 – Lt Col, USAF (April, Scott C., Air Force Fellows Air University, “Operationally Responsive Space: A New Paradigm or Another False Start?”
)RK
Recommendation 5: Purchase and store several small launch vehicles.
By purchasing several small boosters and putting them in storage, the United States begins forming its space tactical reserve. The boosters are ready if called upon in contingency support of joint forces or if needed to replace a damaged satellite. Furthermore, science and technology experimental satellites (e.g. TacSats) can draw upon this reserve, providing launch stability for the science program and offering an opportunity to exercise the operational launch team. Satellites developers could then optimize their spacecraft to the provided rocket. Replacement boosters would be acquired each year and placed into the reserve. This is a similar concept of operation used for Thor launchers supporting Program 437 ASAT mission and ballistic missile tests.4 It is doubtful that resources would allow more than one booster model to be stored and supported.
Recommendation 6: Organize ORS Program Office as standalone joint organization
The Congressionally mandated ORS Program Office should be established as a joint DOD/NRO organization. A joint program office will increase synergy and integration with established on-orbit national space systems while forming another path for emerging operational requirement to be passed to on-orbit systems. Furthermore, providing some ownership of the ORS solution potentially helps obtaining “buy-in” from the Intelligence Community. An organization falling completely under DOD auspices would hinder this needed integration.
A standalone system decoupled from SMC’s Space Development and Test Wing will prevent Congress’ perception of poor performance from the current Joint Warfighter Space (JWS)/ORS from bleeding over into the new ORS Program Office. DOD should disband the current JWS/ORS Program Office upon the new Program Office’s establishment.
Recommendation 7: Organize the Joint ORS Program Office with 2 Components
The ORS Program Office should be expanded to include a joint technology demonstration program office, the focus of current initiatives, as well as a joint reconstitution program office. A reconstitution program office under ORS auspices will allow synergy between technology development, experimentation, and a reconstitution system.
Recommendation 8: Form a Joint Reconstitution Program Office.
A reconstitution capability is an insurance policy to minimize loss of critical space assets. To date, the nation has not needed this insurance due to operational redundancy or geopolitical stability. As ASAT technology proliferates, the number of actors that can affect United States’ space systems grows. A modest reconstitution capability is becoming a wise and prudent investment in a growing multi-polar and fractured world.
A joint DOD/NRO program office should acquire this reconstitution capability. The NRO is the owner and operator of potential adversaries’ most likely targets while the DOD ORS Program Office and associated organizations are the purveyors of responsive space launch systems and technologies. Both organizations would bring to the new program offices their respective technical, operational, and institutional expertise ensuring the reconstitution space system can work with established tasking and dissemination systems.
Recommendation 9: Develop a government-controlled responsive launch operations team.
The nation may not have the time to wait for a launch contractor to provided launch services. That contractor may have conflicting priorities and insufficient staff to support time critical ORS launch requirements. The government should form a government or “blue suit” launch operations team to provide the needed responsiveness. If contracted out, support to contingency launches should be explicit in the contract. This team would be responsible for integrating a small launcher, processing, and checking out a satellite aboard the booster, and launch operations. Besides training for contingency launches, the team would gain valuable experience launching periodic technology demonstration satellites. Due to the inherently local nature of the launch support, the Air Force Reserves in the state in which the launch facility is located may be well suited for this mission.
Recommendation 10: Develop a government-controlled responsive satellite operations team.
Once the ORS satellite is launched, it will need to be commanded. The satellite will need to be expeditiously deployed, checked out, and readied for operational use and then placed into nominal operation. A government or “blue suit” team should provide this capability. The team would have to exercise with simulators to develop proficiency operating reconstitution and augmentation spacecraft. Depending upon similarity with stored contingency satellites, the space operations team could operate technology demonstration satellites as well. If the reconstitution capability includes reconnaissance spacecraft, the satellite operations organization should be Joint. Due to the potential for surge operations, this may be a mission well suited to the Air Force Reserves. Satellite operations location can be independent from launch site. Further discussion is required with operating organizations to determine the appropriate command relationship and authorities.
In the event of an emergency it would take current commercial and governmental agencies a minimum of three months to launch a single GPS satellite and that is the best case scenario
Stanley 2 - Major, U.S. Air Force (Robert W., February 2002, “SPACELIFT – THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF AMERICAN SPACE POWER” )JCP
But even if a commercial mission is preempted in favor of a DoD mission to support the unified CINC, will it be enough? Let us look at a possible scenario and the steps that must be taken if our National Command Authority (NCA) decided to support preemption of a commercial launch. Put yourself in the shoes of a warfighting CINC as this process unfolds.
For example, let us assume America and her allies are engaged in a major conflict with North Korea. With Chinese assistance, the North Koreans have disabled a number of our GPS satellites, creating a “hole” in navigational coverage over a large portion of the region. At least one new GPS satellite must be placed in a particular orbit as soon as possible to bring the constellation back to minimal operating capability. USCINCSPACE decides to order preemption of a commercial Delta II launch scheduled with a telecommunications satellite for Brazil. We will assume that a GPS spacecraft is in storage at Cape Canaveral and will begin processing for launch as soon as the “call-up” is received. We will also assume that the needed booster components for the GPS launch are readily available.
To support LTS-U, America’s two prime launch vehicle providers, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, are on contract to support an emergency launch call-up in 40 and 60 days, respectively. Since the Delta II is a Boeing booster, we will use 40 days as the total time necessary from call-up for the booster to be ready for launch. However, in schedule compression exercises conducted by both companies, their boosters can be launch-ready in as little as 19 days. 8 If we assume Boeing succeeds in readying the booster for launch in 19 days, we may just succeed in getting the GPS on orbit as much as three weeks sooner than the normal LTS-U flow would have allowed, right? There is a catch.
The component that usually requires the most time in the launch schedule is the spacecraft. For instance, our relatively simple GPS spacecraft requires a minimum of six weeks to be ready for launch no matter what contingency is ongoing. So, even if we "bump" the Brazilian telecommunications mission and execute the 19-day booster flow, we are still left waiting the full 42 days for the GPS satellite. Had we not bumped the Brazilian mission, we would have had to allow it approximately 30 days for processing and launch, then tacked on our GPS mission's 19-day accelerated booster flow. During that time, the satellite would have been processing as well, so the launch could have feasibly happened within 49 days from call-up. In the end, by bumping the Brazilians, we only gained one week. Bottom line, even with an LTS-U execution, the spacecraft drives the schedule, and may mean the U.S. Government pays to maintain a multi-million dollar LTS-U capability that in all likelihood will never be used. Further, having this unplanned launch strategy on the shelf may also serve to give our warfighting CINCs a false sense of security.
Once launched, the new GPS satellite would require on average, between four to five weeks of on-orbit checkout and preparation before being declared “operational.” This checkout process would obviously be accelerated as much as possible, but would still take as much as two to three weeks to get the spacecraft up and running. As you can see, if everything went perfectly, the total amount of time for a relatively simple GPS satellite to be declared ready would, at a minimum, take nearly three months from the time of the request.
For our scenario, we made several fairly broad assumptions. We presumed Brazil would not formally seek legal action or intervention by the U.S. Departments of State, Transportation or Commerce against Boeing or the DoD for preempting its mission. Further, we assumed that no higher priority launches were scheduled ahead of our GPS mission by any of the various members of the CLSRB. Add to the equation the common uncertainty of severe weather at the launch site and routine variables such as hardware damage during shipping, and three months begins to look very optimistic indeed.
Moreover, a sophisticated DoD communications or reconnaissance satellite, coupled with an infinitely more complex and troublesome booster, like the Titan IV, would require several more months than our relatively simple GPS/Delta II combination. In the end, CINCs would probably not consider a minimum three-month wait to receive a GPS signal as “responsive.”
During the three-month wait for navigational signals to resume, the North Koreans (and possibly the Chinese), would attempt to take advantage of the situation as best as they could. Unless our forces were trained, ready and able to fall back on old methods of navigation, they would be in dire straits. Non-secure communications might also be severely degraded during this time. It is naïve at best to think our potential adversaries have not already planned for such a strike at this critical vulnerability. A theatre CINC’s C2, meteorological and ISR assets are also at risk, putting in jeopardy his entire decision-making process.
Rapid response is key to maintaining military effectiveness
Stanley 2 - Major, U.S. Air Force (Robert W., February 2002, “SPACELIFT – THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF AMERICAN SPACE POWER” )JCP
Right now, we have an opportunity. America is the only country capable of using space assets to multiply the power of our conventional forces on so large a scale. This capability makes us both strong and vulnerable at the same time. Eventually, adversaries will gain the ability to strike directly at this new center of gravity whether we are ready for them or not. We must be able to replace space-based assets quickly and reliably for our warfighting CINCs. The critical vulnerability has been identified, the necessary technology and knowhow is at hand, and the time is now. All that is missing is the sense of urgency necessary to put armor plating over the Achilles’ Heel of American space power.
AT: Private sector saves money
The private sector doesn’t reduce costs
Brown 6 – liquid rocket engine system engineer for NASA and researcher at College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (Kendall K., Air and Space Power Journal Summer 2006, “Is Operationally Responsive Space the Future of Access to Space for the US Air Force,” ) NYan
From this history of the responsive launch vehicle-whether it's called a military space plane, an SOV, or an ORS launch vehicle-one sees that the concept has emerged from the expansion of space capabilities through a technology-push program and that it has had inadequate capability-pull from the war-fighter community. Much of the support for a responsive launch concept depends upon obtaining access to space at lower costs. Claims of the low-cost-access-to-space companies in the 1990s, continuing with the more recent and better funded entrepreneurial companies, are accepted almost religiously.
These businesses are deceiving themselves and their supporters. Building the first test vehicle might prove relatively straightforward, but seeing such a system through production and operation will not. Such companies can operate inexpensively in the early phases of development because they have no past liability; no large, aging infrastructure to maintain and operate; no large pension and retiree health insurance funds to maintain; and no large bureaucracies to do the little things that have to be done. As a program matures, as such a system must, one will find no substantial cost difference between a system from one of the United States' traditional launch-vehicle companies and a system from one of the new companies.
***ADDONS
Small satellites key to maritime security
Small satellites are key to sea lane monitoring and preventing WMD terrrorism
Mantzouris, 10 - PhD Candidate, US Naval Postgraduate School (June 2010, Georgios, 15th International Command & Control Research & Technology Symposium, “Micro and Pico Satellites in Maritime Interdiction Operations,” )RK
1. Introduction
Maritime security has been a hot subject in the field of maritime arena. People and organizations from all over the world are trying to find methods and apply strategies that will enforce passive or sometimes active measures, in order to ensure maritime safety in both territorial and international waters. Countries, specifically in the Western world, have created internationally recognized organizations and signed worldwide accepted contracts and agreements, to utilize allied strategies to promote maritime security in a global level. Vigilance is a priority, especially when the sea lines of communication (SLOC) are the ways where terrorists use in order to transfer any type of Weapons of Mass Destruction, such as biological or radioactive materials. Therefore, the Naval Postgraduate School’s CENETIX laboratory along with MIO Testbed, is attempting to explore solutions that are going to be pivotal for the global maritime security. In this paper we describe all the possible measures that we can apply through Pico satellite space based solutions in order to improve the reach-back capabilities of our collaborative systems and increase readiness when dealing with the transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The following analysis will be based on Pico satellite solutions that we can use in order to search, identify, track and tag hazardous materials that may cause a potential risk to maritime security. Maritime situational awareness is an issue that incurs a lot of dynamic discussions worldwide, but until recently there has been no specific resolutions that can be used in a real maritime warfare situation.
The experiments will start and end in the space domain due to the fact that space is by far the most efficient area to apply new technologies that need to be shared worldwide through operation centers. Micro, Nano and Pico satellite solutions will be reported as the primary means of applying reach-back technologies in the maritime domain (for example satellites with AIS systems), but at the end the Pico Tubesat satellite will be incorporated on scenarios that are applied in the maritime environment. Tubesat is a new and promising Pico-satellite solution through which we can transfer and share valuable information to ships or network centers. There are important restrictions and limitations, but all these will be assessed and there will be a final estimation on how easy, fast and cost-effective the use of the commercial and available Pico satellite is to the problem of tracking and tagging WMD materials through the sea lines worldwide. Through these series of space experiments with the Tubesat satellites, we would like to generate the capability of transferring information back and forth, from the scene of action to a central node, so as to provide a key solution to those who deal on a daily basis with maritime warfare and the need to search on board merchant vessels for the existence of illegal trafficking of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Tubesat will be a critical part in our MIO Testbed for conducting the experiments.
Small satellites are the only cost effective way to modernize sea WMD monitoring
Mantzouris, 10 - PhD Candidate, US Naval Postgraduate School (June 2010, Georgios, 15th International Command & Control Research & Technology Symposium, “Micro and Pico Satellites in Maritime Interdiction Operations,” )RK
Although space applications and systems that deal with the maritime environment are numerous, previous research shows that there are not so many academic institutions or organizations utilizing WMD Sensing through space. It is clear from the above table that in spite the ongoing research in all the fields related with maritime applications there is a technological gap in the WMD area. It is primarily due to the fact that illegal trafficking of WMD materials has started to occupy the international community in the last years, even though this phenomenon has existed on a global level over the last century. Up to now, there were not any cost effective space solutions in order to implement this technology. Nowadays and with the advent of Pico Satellites, such as Tubesat, we are trying to send data regarding WMD back in MIO network operational centers and by analyzing this data we can provide fast and correct solutions to the people (e.g. Officers or Public Security Experts) that execute the boarding operations on board merchant vessels in real time timeframes. The Naval Postgraduate School is the first institution to deal with this critical subject and by using the Pico Satellite TUBESAT as an active part on the already applied MIO Testbed (Figure 1), we will try to overcome the obstacles and generate innovative and pioneering solutions for those that are dealing with WMD sensing in the maritime arena.
We comprehend thoroughly that MIO is not an easy task, especially when the geographical differentiation has to do with multicultural environments as well as distances that are large enough to distort any kind of information. For that reason and in order to overcome these issues, we propose the use of space based MIO applications, through Pico satellites, which factors in the cost and also the accuracy of information that we may have at the end of the operation. Last but not least, we should keep in mind that MIO operations are difficult when we are dealing with the transportation of illegal Weapons of Mass Destruction, where a simple mistake can evolve to a huge crisis.
3. Small Satellites in MIO – Maritime Tasks
Regarding the Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), there are numerous reasons why we try to use these space based technologies instead of the traditional solutions. We are not going to analyze all the effects and parameters that a small satellite incorporates, but instead we are going to analyze and search what are the elements that are needed in order to integrate small satellites in MIO operations with respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction Trafficking specifically through the sea and land lines of communication.
For revision purposes and taking into account that are different categorizations of satellites we need to specify that when we refer to small satellites we imply a bus that is less than 500 kgr in net weight. Table 1 summarizes the existing categories of satellites in the commercial space environment and shows explicitly what the weight differences in these categories are. In our research and experiments we are going to use the notion of Pico satellites, such as the Tubesat satellite bus which is less than a kilogram of net weight. Up to now there are no commercial Pico satellite buses in orbit that are able to reroute information from a maritime warfare operational area back to a network operation center.
No space maritime tracking
No maritime tracking is occurring now
Mantzouris, 10 - PhD Candidate, US Naval Postgraduate School (June 2010, Georgios, 15th International Command & Control Research & Technology Symposium, “Micro and Pico Satellites in Maritime Interdiction Operations,” )RK
Satellites with Space Maritime Tracking Capability are a relatively new technology. The research was started by academic institutions and today is available commercially, primarily in the applications of space maritime tracking of merchant vessels around coastal waters and in the primary sea lines of communications (e.g. Gibraltar). In the next pages we present all the available commercial small satellite applications that are in orbit or under construction and in the near future they are going to be used for space maritime tracking. It turns out that there are not so many “people” around the world that are using or trying to apply this technology and even more we did not manage to find out any organizations or small satellite applications on orbit or under construction that are dealing with the tracking of merchant vessels that are maybe transferring or carrying illicit cargo, in our case WMD (radioactive or biological) materials. Then Naval Postgraduate School small satellite MIO Testbed/experiment is going to be a unique application on this subject area and we hope that at the end we will provide solutions that will be unrivalled throughout the world. Of course, all the above should happen with the use of Pico satellite technology which is in our case will be the Tubesat satellite.
Space Weather 1ac / 2ac
Small satellites are vital to space weather monitoring – the current lack of space weather forecasting puts all military satellites at risk
Grigsby 10 - Captain USAF, BSME (September 2010, David A. Grigsby, “SATELLITE CAPABILITIES MAPPING – UTILIZING SMALL SATELLITES”, )JCP
Space is a hostile environment. The phenomena resulting from solar emissions can negatively impact the operation of any space system. However, the space environment is better understood today than ever before, but the sun’s activity is continuous and always producing phenomena that will put the operational mission of any space system at risk. This makes space weather monitoring and forecasting a critical mission in regards to space assets. Without the ability to monitor and forecast space weather phenomena, our satellites would become vulnerable which ultimately puts our national security at risk. The discussion that follows provides a discussion of space weather phenomena and impacts, space weather monitoring and forecasting user needs, capability gaps resulting from the dismantled NPOESS program, and the potential solutions offered by small satellites.
“The primary force in our corner of the universe is our sun. The sun is constantly radiating enormous amounts of energy across the entire electromagnetic spectrum containing x-rays, ultraviolet, visible light, infrared, and radio waves. The sun also radiates a steady stream of charged particles – primarily protons, electrons, and neutrons – known as the solar wind. [18]” When the energy and charged particles impact the Earth’s atmosphere they interact with spacecraft. The effect of these interactions can negatively impede the operation of the spacecraft. “Space weather effects have the most impact on communications, Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). [4]” For example, solar energetic particles accelerated by a coronal mass ejection (CME) or solar flare can damage electronics onboard spacecraft through induced electric currents, as well as threaten the life of astronauts. Also, changing geomagnetic conditions can induce changes in atmospheric density causing rapid degradation of spacecraft altitude in Low Earth orbit. The space weather effects will always present a threat to the operational mission of those systems. The forces that protect our country’s national security and interests rely on those systems. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that information on the space environment is of paramount interest to the war fighter [18]. The impacts resulting from the three main categories of solar emissions are summarized in Table 5.
Since space weather can produce negative effects on spacecraft, there is clearly a need to understand, monitor, and forecast space weather. The military, commercial, and civil sectors have spacecraft performing missions ranging from data collection supporting the national security of the United States to providing GPS directions to millions of travelers across the country. In June 1999 the “Space Weather Architecture Study” was completed to evaluate the ability of the projected baseline support system to mitigate space weather impacts [4]. The study identified and assessed the operational impacts that would be caused by space weather effects. Today the report still serves as a starting point when developing a space architecture that directly studies space weather or uses the data collected to provide support to other space systems.
The significance of these impacts is best illustrated by our reliance on space systems. The role of satellite operations has expanded to include an active role in addition to a support role [4]. For example, “In the future, terrestrial weapons will be directly targeted using space” [4]. The Space Weather Architecture Study stated “future National Security operations will require improved capability to accurately locate targets, provide precision navigation, and provide reliable mobile communications in a more time-constrained environment” [4]. Today, over ten years later, our dependence on space systems remains at a critical level providing evidence that it is equally critical to not only monitor and forecast space weather but also to better design satellites to resist these impacts.
As space systems age or near the end of their tenure, gaps are created if a replacement system is not launched to take its place of the old system. The needs and gaps serve as guidance to the studies that determine what direction stakeholders should take when preparing to procure a replacement system that will span several years, possibly a decade. As discussed in the introduction, NPOESS (Figure 4) was intended to be the next generation space weather monitoring system but was dismantled due to significant budget and performance problems.
Space Weather systems failing
Due to recent cuts we have 5 years to get space weather monitoring systems operational before our current space systems begin to fail
Grigsby 10 - Captain USAF, BSME (September 2010, David A. Grigsby, “SATELLITE CAPABILITIES MAPPING – UTILIZING SMALL SATELLITES”, )JCP
The NPOESS program illustrates the problems plaguing space acquisitions. The dismantling of NPOESS will reduce space weather monitoring capabilities (i.e. producing capability gaps) which is a more significant impact than the lost financial investment. In April of 2010, The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report discussing the need for a strategy to sustain critical climate and space measurements. The report shows that federal agencies lack a strategy for the long-term provision of space weather (SWx) data [3]. “The expected gaps in coverage for the instruments removed range from 1 to 11 years, and begin as soon as 2015” [3]. The SWx monitoring capability gap that now looms on the horizon demands a strategy that employs a process to develop a solution that addresses these needs.
Small Sats key to space weather
Smallsats constellations are the only way we can monitor space weather in the short term
Grigsby 10 - Captain USAF, BSME (September 2010, David A. Grigsby, “SATELLITE CAPABILITIES MAPPING – UTILIZING SMALL SATELLITES”, )JCP
The board made several recommendations for Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) but the one that is most relevant to the research in this thesis is the establishment of a comprehensive capability that generates good enough requirements [11]. If the CubeSat is to perform an operational mission then it must start by identifying a specific mission, what capabilities (i.e. instruments and sensors) currently exist to provide support, and a definition of what is good enough. Establishing these parameters could also identify sensors that would benefit from additional testing or don’t exist at all but are needed. To utilize CubeSats, the sensor must be within certain dimensions or, if possible, separated and integrated on multiple CubeSats and flown in formation. The space weather monitoring mission is one that has several experiments introducing or maturing many sensors compatible with the CubeSat bus. “The smallsat approach is particularly timely and critical as there is a looming crisis in the U.S. space weather capabilities because the Space Environmental Sensor Suite is no longer manifested on NPOESS. To meet AF requirements beyond the DMSP era, a smallsat constellation could be efficiently carried out independent of other missions and systems” [11]. Space weather phenomena and its impact on space systems will be discussed later. The next step is to discuss the current research and experimentation by academia, industry, and the Department of Defense.
Smallsats are uniquely capable of monitoring and understanding space weather
Grigsby 10 - Captain USAF, BSME (September 2010, David A. Grigsby, “SATELLITE CAPABILITIES MAPPING – UTILIZING SMALL SATELLITES”, )JCP
Space weather has already been identified as the best application for smallsats and the popular among academic experiments. Therefore, since there is a significant space weather monitoring gap following the problems of the NPOESS program, the best application of the capabilities mapping process would be to selected sensors on the SESS no longer included. If successful, it will link the academic experimental space weather projects to an actual operational mission and provide developers with a process framework to evolve. The application that follows attempts to make the square peg fit into the round hole.
Smallsat constellations are ideal for monitoring space weather, especially with recent micro-electronics developments
Grigsby 10 - Captain USAF, BSME (September 2010, David A. Grigsby, “SATELLITE CAPABILITIES MAPPING – UTILIZING SMALL SATELLITES”, )JCP
Space weather has been identified as an excellent mission to exploit the potential of small satellites. Advances in commercial micro-electronics have produced sensors with reduced SWaP, making them viable test subjects. Therefore, mapping capabilities to a small satellite, or constellation of small satellites, could provide solutions and affordable options to the adverse challenges facing space operations. The methodology developed here selects sensor of the National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Space Environmental Sensor Suite (SESS) and maps it to a CubeSat illustrating a small satellite can perform an operational mission.
Space weather can shut down military satellites
Space weather affects every aspect of US military and commercial operations without effective monitoring technology our military effectiveness, communications and electrical grid will all fail
Grigsby 10 - Captain USAF, BSME (September 2010, David A. Grigsby, “SATELLITE CAPABILITIES MAPPING – UTILIZING SMALL SATELLITES”, )JCP
“Space weather can adversely affect satellite operations, gathering of intelligence, communications, space-based and ground-based radar, Position Navigation & Timing (PNT), high altitude manned flight, and electrical power distribution grids. Space Weather support is important to the DoD because military operations are increasingly reliant on space and ground systems that are susceptible to failure or degraded performance during extreme space weather conditions. These increased user demands will drive SWx support needs to provide specifications, alerts and forecasts that have improved accuracy, timeliness, coverage, and confidence. [4]”. The capability to monitor and forecast space weather needs to remain a high national priority. Without it, other capabilities utilized by both the commercial and government sectors could be impacted.
Small satellites key to disaster response
Small satellites are vital to disaster response and space situational awareness
Wertz, 8 - president of Microcosm, a space technology small business in Los Angeles, and the general chairman for the first five Responsive Space Conferences (James, “It’s time to get our ORS in gear,” The Space Review, 1/7, )
What is the utility of ORS?
A few items were mentioned above. ORS can rapidly replenish assets lost due to enemy action or “natural causes.” They can bring new technology to bear in weeks or months, rather than decades. (Surrey launches computer technology that is typically less than a year old.)
But what about some specific examples of the potential utility of ORS? They’re not hard to come by. For convenience, let’s take it by broad categories.
Surveillance. Here the example I like best is a non-military one: the tsunami in Southeast Asia on December 26, 2004. No one knew it was coming. There were no advance preparations and no warning. Yet, had we been able to launch a surveillance mission within hours to cover the area, we might have been able to find areas most in need of help or even locate debris fields washed out to sea where people might still be alive.
Knowledge is key to getting help rapidly to where it is needed. The same is true of Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast or wherever the next natural or man-made disaster might occur. We may have advance warning about where the next global disaster will occur, or we may not. Terrorists can strike without warning, anywhere, any time. We need to be able to respond to and track events in a matter of hours. And we could.
As another example, let’s suppose that bin Laden has just been seen in the mountains of western Pakistan. A single satellite could cover that area every 90 minutes during most daylight hours. Three satellites could provide visible and IR coverage every 90 minutes, 24 hours a day—all without putting a single American life in danger or risking a further breakdown in a country that is already more unstable than we would like.
Communications. Here the rules of the game are different than for surveillance, and the resulting satellites and orbits will be different as well. For a time, it seemed likely that the best approach for achieving the persistence needed for communications would be to use elliptical orbits that are effectively small versions of the Molniya orbit used for many years by Soviet and Russian communications systems that were covering areas too far north for good coverage from GEO. However, recent work suggests that circular medium Earth orbits are probably much better for most applications.
Irrespective of the particular technology or orbit, there are multiple applications for low-cost, possibly short-to-moderate duration communications systems. The Army has a strong need for secure, real-time blue force tracking (BFT) and supplemental communications, often called “comms-on-the-move”. More communications are always needed in any war zone, starting with simple command and control and advancing to sending imagery captured on a soldier’s cell phone camera, and on to color video of events on the battlefield or suspected locations of enemy troops from cameras on the ground or on UAVs.
Returning to the Katrina example, the continental United States is as well positioned as anywhere in the world to provide good aerial surveillance and continuous communications by multiple means. But somehow Katrina managed to eliminate most of them. Supplemental communications and surveillance could have dramatically improved our ability to respond.
Weather. In a study done by the Air Force Space and Missile Command, the top unfulfilled need with high utility to all of the services was better wind data. Clearly this would also be a dramatic help to predicting the path of hurricanes or tracking the dispersion of bioagents, pollutants, or radioactive debris after a major disaster. Here again ORS can help. A traditional spaceborne wind lidar (basically a laser radar) operates from high altitude and is estimated to cost over $400 million. Even more than surveillance, active sensors, such as lidar and SAR, benefit greatly from reduced distances. A one- or two-year low-altitude lidar mission can likely fit within our $20–25 million recurring cost objective and provide great benefit either to the warfighter or in many types of disasters or potential disasters, such as hurricanes.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA). Again, the military has identified a need for much greater SSA in order to defend our assets from both attack and orbital debris. Small, low-cost, responsive satellites are almost ideally suited to this type of task.
***OTHER
ORS definition
ORS is a program for launching satellites quickly and at low cost – it covers both launch system and satellite development
Wertz, 8 - president of Microcosm, a space technology small business in Los Angeles, and the general chairman for the first five Responsive Space Conferences (James, “It’s time to get our ORS in gear,” The Space Review, 1/7, )
First, a bit of background. ORS officially consists of three tiers:
• Tier 1: Rapidly exploit existing assets
• Tier 2: Rapidly launch low-cost satellites from inventory
• Tier 3: Rapidly and economically develop and build new satellites
For the official definition of what all this means, read the DoD ORS Report to Congress of April 17, 2007. (It can be downloaded from the Responsive Space website, . This site also has all of the technical papers from the first five Responsive Space conferences that provide the technical background for most of the ORS work to date.) However, for the purpose of looking at ORS in the broader, non-bureaucratic context, I’ll argue that ORS consists of launching satellites quickly (i.e., within a few hours of a previously unidentified demand) and at low cost (less than $20–$25 million for the launch, payload, spacecraft bus, and one year of operations, but not including the non-recurring development cost). This is Tier 2 in the government terminology, although the government hasn’t yet bought into the cost or time numbers.
ORS includes small spacecraft, rapid launch capabilities, and satellite replacement
Larrimore, 07 – Lt Col, USAF (April, Scott C., Air Force Fellows Air University, “Operationally Responsive Space: A New Paradigm or Another False Start?”
)RK
Despite some incongruent elements, the common thread throughout all these definitions is the use of small, spacecraft quickly launched when needed to support joint forces. A major justification, though not mentioned consistently in many ORS definitions, is the reconstitution of incapacitated spacecraft.
Aff Framework defense
Scenario building is the best way to test truth claims and building an epistemic community – we agree fiat doesn’t exist but it is a necessary construct to guide all decisionmaking and is the foundation for all education in debate
Huntley et al 10 – US Naval Postgraduate School (Wade L. Huntley, Joseph G. Bock (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame) & Miranda Weingartner (Weingartner Consulting), “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy, Volume 26, Issue 1, February 2010, Science Direct)
The rate and uncertainty of change in both the technological and political dimensions of expanding human space activities complicates this task. Herein lies the value of ‘‘realistic visions’’. Rigorous articulations of the interplay of the wide variety of constraints, tradeoffs, uncertainties, and values entailed in human expansion into space can facilitate evaluation of the applicability of alternative governance concepts to human space activities in the context of dynamic change.
Among other things, such visions can explore how alternative futures in space are intimately linked to terrestrial conditions. As the human presence in space develops into an integral aspect of global life, it will increasingly reflect the prevailing conditions of global life. Anticipation of space weaponization premises continued earthly insecurity and conflict, while ambitions for growing commercial and exploratory development of space presume increasing international integration and collaboration. A future in which space becomes a domain of conflict and arms race competition may be irreconcilable with visions for increasing peaceful human presence embodied in today’s growing commercial and exploratory activities. Choices among alternative futures for the human presence in space may depend upon choices among alternative futures for life on Earth as well.
The following section reviews the potential for scenario-building techniques to inform these choices by providing rigorous detailed visions of future worlds that account for a wide range of current realities and span the spectra of the most important uncertainties. The resulting plausible, integrated visions can yield feasible policy-relevant insights that demonstrably enable current policy making to be more farsighted. Beyond the fruits of the exercises themselves, the longer time-frames entailed in scenario building also facilitate dialogue among diverse parties divided on nearer-term questions. The collaboration enabled can inspire innovation and integrated analysis among diverse experts, leading to the development of a productive ‘‘epistemic community’’25 addressing the full scope of future human space activities.
Vision development is only one aspect of long-term planning. Comprehensive knowledge generation and strategies for policy making are also required. But vision development is currently the least well advanced. All global policy debate, including US national security policy making, can benefit from having a fuller range of rigorous and credible assessments of long-term prospects from which to draw.
3. The scenario-building method
On 16 March 1966 Neil Armstrong deftly piloted the Gemini VIII within 0.9 meters of the pre-launched Agena Target Vehicle, then slowly accomplished the world’s first orbital docking. Armstrong and co-pilot David Scott were still in a celebratory mood, when Scott noticed the Gemini beginning to roll. Armstrong used the Orbit Attitude and Maneuvering System thrusters, but the moment he throttled down, they started to roll again. Turning off the Agena seemed to stop the problem for a few minutes. But when it began again, the roll was accelerating. They undocked and with a long burst of translation thrusters moved away from the Agena. But the roll continued to accelerate. Tumbling now at one revolution per second, the astronauts were in danger of impaired vision and loss of consciousness. But Armstrong was able to bring the wild oscillations under control thanks in part to preparation by a flight simulation training exercise that many pilots disliked, believing the simulation was too unlikely to waste their scarce training time and energy on.26 Fortunately, NASA did not plan the astronauts’ training based on the most likely scenarios. Instead, they planned on the basis of plausible and important scenarios.
Developing plausible scenarios helps us take the long view in a world of great uncertainty.27 Scenarios are narratives of the future defined around a set of unpredictable drivers, intended to expand insight by identifying unexpected but important possible directions and outcomes. Scenarios have a timeline over which meaningful change is possible. They are a useful tool for examining a number of different possible futures. They provide a means to stimulate new thinking, challenge assumptions, and provide an effective framework for dialogue among a diverse group of stakeholders. They can inspire new ideas and innovations by helping identify common goals and interests that transcend current political divides. Scenarios thus help to develop the means to work towards preferred futures.28
Scenarios are stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow; they do not need to be likely, but they ought to be plausible, internally consistent, and relevant. It is precisely by considering possible, even if not necessarily likely, scenarios that we are best prepared for the unpredictability of the future. By encouraging creative thinking beyond the future we anticipate, scenarios help us become more resilient to unexpected events.
With respect to their utility in guiding policy development, three features distinguish good scenarios from simple speculations, linear predictions or fanciful musings of the future:
Scenarios are decision focused. Successful scenarios begin and end by clarifying the decisions and actions the participants must make if they are to deal successfully with an uncertain future. One common misconception of scenarios is that they are prescient, path dependent predictions of the future. On the contrary, scenarios are used to order our thoughts amid uncertainty, build common ground among differing perspectives, and think rationally about our options. The value of a set of scenarios accrues not from their accuracy or likelihood, but from their plausibility and the insights they generate.
Scenarios are imaginative. In examining a decision within the context of a number of different futures, scenarios require us to look behind fixed assumptions. They encourage participants to challenge conventional wisdom, create new contexts for existing decisions, and think creatively about options for surmounting obstacles. At their core, then, scenarios are about learning.29
Scenarios are logical. The scenario process is formal and disciplined in its use of information and analysis. The creativity and imagination inspired by scenarios can only be as effective as it is based in realistic assessments. In requiring participants to challenge each others’ thoughts, perceptions, and mind-sets, the process helps clarify that reality.
Scenario planning over space policy is vital to shaping global space policy debates even if the policymaking process is imperfect – this requires a realistic vision that incorporates political and resource constraints
Huntley et al 10 – US Naval Postgraduate School (Wade L. Huntley, Joseph G. Bock (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame) & Miranda Weingartner (Weingartner Consulting), “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy, Volume 26, Issue 1, February 2010, Science Direct)
These prospects raise many issues. Accordingly, policies shaping current space activities are much debated in many arenas around the globe. The agenda of issues is wide-ranging, including improving space surveillance data and traffic management, preventing and mitigating space debris, concerns over space security and possible weapons deployment, the use of space travel for scientific advancement, the implications of ‘‘space tourism,’’ and the possibility of eventual ‘‘space colonization’’ for scientific, exploratory and commercial purposes.
These debates benefit from considerable ongoing efforts to generate relevant information, both technical and political. The decision-making processes often reflect the input of the many constituencies with near-term stakes in their outcomes. But lacking from these debates is a comprehensive and informed set of visions for the overarching objectives of the advancing human presence in space.
This absence is ironic, given that human interests in space are intrinsically visionary. Perhaps no other element of contemporary human life so inspires the imagination. Science fiction wonderment has motivated careers. In many nations, space-related achievements epitomize national purpose and pride. At this level, we are rife with visions.
But dreams do not constitute a basis for serious public policy planning. Lacking are what might best be termed ‘‘realistic visions’’ - that is, a set of integrated ideas about possibilities cast against the background of varying constraints, tradeoffs, and uncertainties. Realistic visions would map out how interests and forces operating within the expanding human presence in space will interact to produce outcomes over longer-term time frames.
Visions must also account for variance on ultimate aspirations. Hence, no single vision can suffice; such visions are not themselves policy-setting directions. Rather, creative visions of this nature contribute to contemporary policy debates by providing a foundation, beyond simple speculation, for tracing the potential longer-term consequences of immediate policy questions. Even in the absence of global value convergence, such visions can enable policy makers to anticipate and preemptively solve many of the challenges that the advancing human presence in space will pose.
Without such reflection, policy making is driven by extant knowledge, current political forces and short-term objectives. As in many other areas of human life, the long-term consequences of a perpetually ad hoc and unintegrated decisionmaking process may please no-one. The incorporation of serious visions into policy-making processes will not insure the ‘‘best’’ outcomes - impossible in the absence of global values consensus - but they can help avoid the worst outcomes, which are easier to identify.
Switch side debate is vital to capturing the educational value of scenario building
Huntley et al 10 – US Naval Postgraduate School (Wade L. Huntley, Joseph G. Bock (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame) & Miranda Weingartner (Weingartner Consulting), “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy, Volume 26, Issue 1, February 2010, Science Direct)
Workshop participants did note that most were from North America, and that different sets of assumptions and conclusions may have emerged if the process was held with Chinese, Indian or European participants. This observation reinforced the conveners’ pre-existing judgment: because successful scenario building depends upon the ‘‘friction’’ of diverse knowledge and outlooks, international participation would be vital to the success of more extensive exercises. Moreover, scenario analysis can also be an ideal vehicle for broaching sensitive topics in an international dialogue. Because the process is designed to identify shared critical uncertainties and focus on longer-term challenges, it is ideally suited to provide a forum wherein participants divided by contentious near-term issues can find a common basis for engagement. Thus, scenario-building exercises can yield community-building benefits independent of their substantive results.
In this vein, the process can also help generate ‘‘buy-in’’ among divided parties with very different interests to the minimal objective of identifying a shared set of long-term future concerns (as the Mont Fleur experience shows). It is not necessary for participants to possess, at the outset, common core values. It is sufficient that there be agreement on common process values within the exercise, the most important being commitment to the goals of the exercise and a willingness to think about matters imaginatively. Participants do not need to leave their opinions at the door - indeed, the ‘‘friction’’ of that diverse input is vital to the success of the process. They need only be ready and able also to view things from others’ points of view.
Achieving that atmosphere also depends in part on the design and facilitation of the exercises. Particularly when incorporating international participation, it is essential to account for asymmetry of power among the participants. The success of the Mont Fleur process resulted, in part, because no authority had the power to enforce solutions.42 That is not the case in the space domain insofar as the USA and other key actors do have disproportionate power, at least in the short run. Another challenge in garnering greater international participation is the scope of the exercises themselves. Typically, scenario building and analysis involves a group of 20-30 people, a limit allowing for full participation. A single scenario-building exercise including representatives of all stakeholders both internationally and with respect to issue areas (security, commerce, etc.) would be ungainly in size. Useful results will require a design involving an iterated set of differentiated exercises.
Scenario analysis is a promising approach for developing visions of the future of space that can help build global consensus around values and contribute to more far-sighted government policy making. As noted earlier, the use of scenario analysis as a tool in international public policy making on issues of war and peace is nascent. But its utility with respect to the many issues enveloping the expanding human presence in space is particularly appropriate, both because of the high levels of uncertainty in two discrete dimensions (technological and sociological/political) and because the human emergence into space expresses the most visionary side of the human experience.
Soft power key to US space launch markets
Declining soft power undermines US influence in the space launch market
Burton, 7 - Lt Col. USAF [“GLOBALIZED SPACELIFT: A THREAT TO ASSURED ACCESS”, , liam]
Since most satellites contain American components or are manufactured by U.S. companies, U.S. export licenses are required. This gives the United States a great deal of influence in the international launch marketplace.45 However, their ability to exert this influence may be waning. Anti-Americanism and resentment of U.S. policies have been on the rise worldwide and with it the United States has witnessed a corresponding decline in its "soft power." Joseph Nye defines soft power as the "ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them."46 The causes of anti-Americanism and declining soft power can be traced to the ways the United States has exercised its power in both the past and present.47 Its status as the only remaining superpower puts it in a position likely to provoke resentment. Further resentment was generated when the U.S. chose not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or accede to the International Criminal Court. U.S. propensity to act unilaterally in the Global War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq further damaged its soft power, made even worse by the prisoner abuse scandals at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.48 Further, the unilateral and determined development of missile defense systems is giving other major powers reason to question U.S. intentions.49 As Robert Pape suggests, when coupled with preventive war doctrine, "these military policies are creating conditions that are likely to fundamentally change how other major powers react to future uses of U.S. power."50
The continued decline of American soft power could result in negative reactions to U.S. companies, including space-related corporations, and increasing appeal of other major regional actors such as China and the European Union. Indeed, as Joshua Kurlantzick points out, "many groups once drawn to the United States are now abandoning it." For example, traditionally pro-U.S. Eastern European countries now believe the European Union has a more favorable position on many foreign policy issues.51 In the end, soft power is a means of obtaining foreign policy outcomes favorable to the United States. As Joseph Nye warns: "when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs.
Space begins at 100 km
Space is at least 100 km above the Earth (mesosphere only goes to 80 km)
Baltazar, 11 – Major at the Portuguese Air Force and Proffesor at the Institute of High Military Studies (Spring 2011, Ana, e-journal of International Relations, “Europe’s Fight For Space – A New Challenge,” )RK
In terms of space definition, the present article adopts a definition which, albeit not formally accepted1, is the one that attracts largest consensus among the scientific community, and which was coined by Von Karman (Chun, 2006: 14) in 1957: space starts at the height of 100km (already in the Thermosphere) above the surface of the earth. Accordingly, it is above the Von Karman line that the several types of orbits started to be defined, which are called as follows (Dolman, 2006: 65): LEO (Low Earth Orbit), MEO (Medium Earth Orbit), HAO (High Altitude Orbit), and HEO (Highly Elliptical Orbit).
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