1NR Demo Debate

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1NR Demo DebateAssurance O/VUS withdrawal from NATO wrecks its nuclear assurance and its reliability to deter aggression -- would prompt France and the U.K. to expand their nuclear capabilities and Germany and other non-nuclear countries to build their own nuclear arsenals the impacts are immediate -- a splintered EU, aggressive Russia, collapse of NPT, and cascade global prolif. Allied Prolif---LinksRemoving the Article 5 commitment causes allied prolif that goes nuclear through intentional or accidental warDr. Heidi Hardt 18, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, PhD from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva and MSc in European Studies from the London School of Economics, “Leaving NATO Would Make The U.S. And The World Less Safe”, Huffington Post, 7/16/2018, put, withdrawing from NATO would make the world less safe. It would likely increase the risk of attacks on allies and reopen the possibility of conflict among them.As part of the original North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s critical Article 5 binds together the security of 29 member states; an attack on one state is considered an attack on all of them. The article was intended to act as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, and recent history suggests that it still serves this purpose against Vladimir Putin’s Russia. For example, Estonia, Lithuania and other former Soviet states that are now NATO allies have so far found themselves to be immune to a Russian incursion of ground troops. However, Russia did intervene in Georgia and in Ukraine ― two states seeking NATO membership. These actions suggest that Putin perceives Article 5 as a credible commitment by allies to defend its eastern border. In addition to providing collective defense for its member states, NATO has two other core tasks: crisis management and cooperative security. The organization intervenes in crises around the globe on a scale that no one state has preferred to handle alone. The alliance is engaged in military operations around the world, from Kosovo to Afghanistan, with a renewed commitment to extend the latter operation till 2024. In addition to training Afghan security forces, NATO has committed to a new training mission in Iraq. The alliance also provides a forum for states to work together and teach one another in domains of common interest, such as arms control, counterterrorism and cybersecurity. After Russia’s internationally disputed annexation of Crimea, NATO reprioritized collective defense. The declaration that came out of this year’s NATO summit labels Russia as an aggressor that has undermined the “rules-based world order.”The alliance also disincentivizes conflict among its member states. Wars begin for many reasons, from leaders’ misperceptions to miscommunications and information gaps about capabilities and intentions. By regularly engaging in dialogue, NATO diplomats and military leaders ensure that disagreements among allies do not become conflicts ― all while working together to address common security problems. Importantly, the organization provides infrastructure, in the form of political and military headquarters in Belgium, where representatives of the member states communicate every day about security issues. Past studies in international relations have shown that providing such institutionalized cooperation can be an effective means of preventing conflicts. For the U.S. to leave NATO, or for the organization to disband, would bring significant risks to the internal and external security of its member states ― including the U.S. Although the U.S. spends significantly more of its gross domestic product on defense than any other country, it is not exempt from threats to its national security. After the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time. The alliance has been key in supporting reductions in nuclear stockpiles. Without the security of NATO’s nuclear umbrella, European states without nuclear weapons might be more likely to consider acquiring them, increasing the risk of an intentional or accidental nuclear attack. Collapse of NATO causes German rearm and wildfire prolif---nuclear warZack Beauchamp 18, Senior Reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on covering foreign policy and international relations, “How Trump is Killing America’s Alliances”, Vox, 6/12/2018, , 2018How the weakening of American alliances could lead to a massive war. There has never, in human history, been an era as peaceful as our own. This is a hard truth to appreciate, given the horrible violence ongoing in places like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, yet the evidence is quite clear. Take a look at this chart from the University of Oxford’s Max Roser. It tracks the number of years in a given time period in which “great powers” — meaning the militarily and economically powerful countries at that time — were at war with each other over the course of the past 500 years. The decline is unmistakable: [[TABLE OMITTED]] This data should give you some appreciation for how unique, and potentially precarious, our historical moment is. For more than 200 years, from 1500 to about 1750, major European powers like Britain and France and Spain were warring constantly. The frequency of conflict declined in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the wars that did break out — the Napoleonic conflicts, both world wars — were particularly devastating. The past 70 years without great power war, a period scholars term “the Long Peace,” is one of history’s most wonderful anomalies. The question then becomes: Why did it happen? And could Trump mucking around with a pillar of the global order, American alliances, put it in jeopardy? The answer to the second question, ominously, appears to be yes. There is significant evidence that strong American alliances — most notably the NATO alliance and US agreements to defend Japan and South Korea — have been instrumental in putting an end to great power war. “As this alliance system spreads and expands, it correlates with this dramatic decline, this unprecedented drop, in warfare,” says Michael Beckley, a professor of international relations at Tufts University. “It’s a really, really strong correlation.” A 2010 study by Rice’s Leeds and the University of Kentucky’s Jesse C. Johnson surveyed a large data set on alliances between 1816 and 2000. They found that countries in defensive alliances were 20 percent less likely to be involved in a conflict, on average, than countries that weren’t. This holds true even after you control for other factors that would affect the likelihood of war, like whether a country is a democracy or whether it has an ongoing dispute with a powerful neighbor. In a follow-up paper, Leeds and Johnson looked at the same data set to see whether certain kinds of alliances were more effective at protecting its members than others. Their conclusion is that alliances deter war best when their members are militarily powerful and when enemies take seriously the allies’ promise to fight together in the event of an attack. The core US alliances — NATO, Japan, and South Korea — fit these descriptors neatly. A third study finds evidence that alliances allow allies to restrain each other from going to war. Let’s say Canada wants to get involved in a conflict somewhere. Typically, it would discuss its plans with the United States first — and if America thinks it’s a bad idea, Canada might well listen to them. There’s strong statistical evidence that countries don’t even try to start some conflicts out of fear that an ally would disapprove. These three findings all suggest that NATO and America’s East Asian alliances very likely are playing a major role in preserving the Long Peace — which is why Trump’s habit of messing around with alliances is so dangerous. According to many Russia experts, Vladimir Putin’s deepest geostrategic goal is “breaking” NATO. The member states where anyone would expect him to test NATO’s commitment would be the Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — small former Soviet republics that recently became NATO members. We can’t predict if and when a rival like Putin would conclude that America’s alliances seemed weak enough to try testing them. Hopefully, it never happens. But the more Trump attacks the foundations of America’s allies, the more likely things are to change. The absolute risk of a Russian invasion of a NATO state or a North Korean attack on the South is relatively low, but the consequences are so potentially catastrophic — nuclear war! — that it’s worth taking anything that increases the odds of such a conflict seriously. The crack-up of the West? The world order is a little like a game of Jenga. In the game, there are lots of small blocks that interlock to form a stable tower. Each player has to remove a block without toppling the tower. But each time you take out a block, the whole thing gets a bit less stable. Take out enough blocks and it will collapse. The international order works in kind of the same way. There are lots of different interlocking parts — the spread of democracy, American alliances, nuclear deterrence, and the like — that work together to keep the global peace. But take out one block and the other ones might not be strong enough to keep things together on their own. At the end of the Cold War, British and French leaders worried that the passing of the old order might prove destabilizing. In a January 1990 meeting, French President Fran?ois Mitterrand told British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he feared a united Germany could seize control of even more territory than Hitler. Some experts feared that in the absence of the external Soviet threat, Western European powers might go back to waging war with each other. Thankfully, those predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one big one — one that also helped keep relations between other historical enemies, like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a shared participation in US alliance networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket, preventing these countries from having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of World War I. But if American alliance commitments become and remain less credible, it’s possible this order could crack up. America’s partners aren’t stupid. They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and that his victory might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last “America First” president in modern history, depending on America the way that they have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. The worst-case scenarios for a collapse in the US alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German rearmament, alongside rapid-fire proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a crack-up of NATO, with European powers at loggerheads while Russia gobbles up the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s historical tensions with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries or any combination of them and China. Allied Prolif---Impact---Turns RussiaIt causes Russian threat perception AND countermeasuresWolfgang Ischinger 18, Professor of Security Policy and Diplomatic Practice at the Hertie School and Founding Director of the Centre for International Security, Chair of the Munich Security Conference, Studied at the Universities of Bonn and Geneva, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Harvard Law School, “Germany’s Dangerous Nuclear Flirtation”, 8/10/2018, , a German nuclear bomb would damage the strategic environment in Europe – to Germany’s disadvantage. Russia would interpret German steps toward a nuclear arsenal as a direct threat to its own national security and would likely adopt military countermeasures. That, in turn, would make it even harder to pursue the vision of a pan-European order of peace and security, a core foreign-policy goal of all German governments since that of Konrad Adenauer. Moreover, a German nuclear ambition might jeopardize the delicate balance of power in Europe – including between Germany and France, for example – with incalculable consequences for the long-term cohesion of the European Union.Allied Prolif---Impact---Proliferation BadProlif causes multiple scenarios for nuclear warMatthew Kroenig 16, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council, “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future,” National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #58, June 2016The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia, of course, is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used. To be sure, the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences could be catastrophic. The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse, could result in large-scale death and destruction, and might set a precedent that shapes how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers, each with a finger on the nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear order.14 First and foremost, the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may pit multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal planning if a state’s strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may choose such a strategy if it believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both. Alternatively, in a war between state A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have also resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant in the precipitating dispute. In addition, conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may inadvertently impinge on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing them into conflict. There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a red line for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis. Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena the “security trilemma.”15 For example, if the United States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China. There is also the issue of “catalytic” war. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists feared that multiple nuclear players could increase the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a third nuclear power, such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible and thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor. This outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the third state as a way of destroying the superpowers and promoting itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass during the Cold War. With modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major powers, it is more difficult to imagine such a scenario today, although this risk is still conceivable among less technologically developed states. In addition to acting directly against one another, nuclear powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between their allies and brought face to face in peak crises. International relations theorists discuss the concept of “chain ganging” within alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present.16 Although this was a potential problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present, the greater the likelihood of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used. Multipolar nuclear crises are not without historical precedent.17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United States and its European nuclear-armed allies, Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States, the Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear disputes, including the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and several crises in the past two decades on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, many of these crises stand out as among the most dangerous of the nuclear era.Line By Line2AC #1 – This card does not say that nuclear prolif is inevitable. It is about the hypothetical scenarios that could result in nuclear proliferation. The only guaranteed scenario for cascade nuclear prolf is US withdrawal from NATO There’s no German prolif now, but continued NATO commitment’s keyDr. Ulrich Kühn 17, PhD in Political Science from Hamburg University and Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Dr. Tristan Volpe, Assistant Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, Ph.D. in Political Science from the George Washington University, Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Keine Atombombe, Bitte: Why Germany Should Not Go Nuclear”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2017, now, those calling for a German bomb are a fringe minority. For decades, Germany has stood as one of the world’s staunchest supporters of nuclear nonproliferation and global disarmament. In February, a spokesperson for Merkel told the press, “There are no plans for nuclear armament in Europe involving the federal government.” She and others evidently recognize that such plans are a bad idea: a German arsenal would destabilize EU-Russian relations and heighten the risk that other countries would attempt to go nuclear.But even though Germany’s current nuclear flirtation may reflect nothing more than a passing reaction to Trump’s presidency, it reveals a deeper problem: insecurity in Berlin, caused by years of meandering U.S. policy toward Russia and Europe. To solve this problem, Germany and the United States must work together. Merkel’s government should encourage the EU to coordinate more effectively on defense. The Trump administration, meanwhile, should double down on the U.S. commitment to the success of the EU and NATO while also pushing for broader negotiations with Russia over the future of European security. 2AC #2 – This card concedes that German officials have toyed with the idea of a national nuclear program because of the insecurity about the future of the US security guarantee, this card is in the context that the US guarantee would be remain strong – not withdrawing from the alliance Withdrawing the U.S. security guarantee causes Germany to proliferateHans Kundnani 17, Senior Research Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House and Author of The Paradox of German Power, “President Trump and the New Parameters of German Foreign Policy”, Aspen Review, Issue 1, 2017, is uniquely vulnerable to such a shift in US foreign policy— even if Trump does not go as far as many fear. Over the last few years since the beginning of the euro crisis, there has been renewed discussion about German “hegemony” in Europe. The election of Trump dramatically weakens Germany and creates uncertainty about the conditions upon which German power (which I have characterized as “geo-economic”) is based. It is not just that Germany, like other EU member states, depends on liberal international order, but also that its power in recent years, especially in the context of the EU, has been based on two aspects of US hegemony from which it was able to benefit—or according to critics, on which it was able to “free ride.”In particular, Germany has depended on two public goods provided by the United States. First, the United States bore disproportionate costs for European security, while German defense spending remained low—even compared to that of many other EU member states. Thus Germany was accused of “free riding” in security terms—in other words of consuming rather than providing security. Second, the United States acted as a consumer of last resort while aggregate demand in Germany remained low—again, even compared to other EU member states. Thus Germany was accused of “free riding” in economic as well as security terms. During the last decade the United States has become gradually less willing to provide each of these two public goods and may now cease to do so altogether.If this were to happen, it would dramatically weaken Germany. The withdrawal of the US security guarantee would force Germany to rethink its security policy and perhaps even its attitude to nuclear weapons—with huge consequences. Meanwhile a shift towards a more mercantilist approach in US trade policy could undermine the basis of the success of German economy, which has boomed on the back of demand from the United States even as demand from the eurozone “periphery” has slowed. Even if President Trump does not go as far as some fear on alliances or trade, the consequences of his election could undermine the basis of German power. In particular, the new uncertainty about the US security guarantee could transform relations between the EU member states.2AC #3 – They say that Germany doesn’t believe in the concept of nuclear deterrence, but there are elected German officials who have publicly called for Germany developing nuclear capabilities. German leaders have acted against public opposition in the past. Merkel took in thousands of Syrian refuges despite strong public disapproval. That’s also Kandani, above, and Beauchamp, in the overview. 2AC #4 & #5– France has 300 nukes and the U.K. has 215. By contrast, the United States maintains an arsenal of no fewer than 3,800 atomic warheads (1NC – Axe). France and the UK cannot replace the security guarantee the US currently provides – Germany will develop its own capabilities to boost its deterrence posture. US withdrawal will prove that they cannot rely on other countries to guarantee its security 2AC 6—they say doesn’t trigger NPT collapse, maybe not by itself but the cascade effect puts the NPT in the graveWolfgang Ischinger 18, Professor of Security Policy and Diplomatic Practice at the Hertie School and Founding Director of the Centre for International Security, Chair of the Munich Security Conference, Studied at the Universities of Bonn and Geneva, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Harvard Law School, “Germany’s Dangerous Nuclear Flirtation”, 8/10/2018, doubt on these commitments would severely damage Germany’s reputation and reliability worldwide. Germany would call into question the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrence, and thus the alliance itself, along with the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime.It is worth noting that since its creation in 1949, NATO has been one of the world’s most successful instruments of proliferation prevention. Not a single NATO member state – apart from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France – has found it necessary to acquire nuclear weapons of its own.If Germany were now to break out of its non-nuclear power status, what would keep Turkey or Poland, for instance, from following suit? Germany as a gravedigger of the international non-proliferation regime – who could want that?NPT collapse causes nuclear warCooper 15 – Cooper, Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, 15 (Christian H. is a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Pride of the Diplomats: Why the NPT Works” Global Policy Journal 5-19-15, ) The review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) this month is a once every five years chance to reaffirm and strengthen one of the strongest international norms: that against the proliferation and use of nuclear technology for military means. Representatives of 190 countries are gathered to examine the treaty itself and discuss new ways to increase global buy-in against nuclear dangers. This time, they might do so in a critical new way. Israel will be at the table for the first time in 20 years as an observer only (having not signed the NPT), and according to a senior Obama administration official, has agreed to begin working with Arabs on an agenda for a conference to discuss a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. This is a dramatic change from 2010, when Israel refused to even consider the idea. Incremental diplomatic wins like this one lie at the core of the truly transnational strategic interest on the path to complete nuclear weapons disarmament. This is precisely why ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear technology must remain a key component of all nations’ foreign policy doctrines. Perhaps one reason the NPT, and its review every five years, is often overlooked by the general public is because at face value, everyone agrees more nukes are a bad thing. However, the NPT, and the corresponding diplomatic collaboration surrounding nuclear weapons, go much deeper than simply halting the proliferation of such dangerous technology. It is through this nearly universal treaty the next generation of world leaders will likely see nuclear disarmament, avoid an open war with Iran over its nuclear program, and stop a Middle East nuclear arms race in its tracks. However, it wasn't always clear the NPT would be the resounding success it is. In 1961 when Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion told U.S. President John F. Kennedy that Israel's nuclear program at Dimona was for peaceful purposes only, Kennedy’s National Security Council was simultaneously warning that by the 1970s there could be 40 nuclear weapon armed states (including Israel). If an America in the future faced rampant nuclear threats and could not believe a face-to-face conversation with a reliable ally, what could anyone trust? There had to be a better way, and the NPT was the answer: Never trust, always verify. In Israel's defense, the only NPT signatories who have violated the treaty since adoption— Iran, Iraq and Syria—have sworn to destroy the Jewish state. Remaining a non-signatory to the NPT and maintaining an opaque nuclear first strike nuclear capability was strategically the right choice for Israel (regional de-stabilization be damned), and one that could be revisited given their 2015 decision to consider an agenda for a nuclear weapons free Middle East. Israel's gambit to wait for the NPT to become as ironclad as it has paid dividends that we can all reap both in June with a comprehensive agreement between the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (including Germany, a group colloquially referred to as the P5+1) and Iran and well into the future. The defining trait of the NPT is reframing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state from an act of national pride circa 1960 to an act contrary to international law by 1970. Thankfully, today we operate in a world that accepts nuclear power as a scientific pursuit but abhors its use for violence. This is also why Iran's right to domestically enrich as a signatory to the NPT will be a cornerstone of the P5+1 agreement that will be announced soon and likely ratified by the first of July. This comprehensive agreement will also implicitly underscore one of the pillars of the NPT: The gradual demilitarization of nuclear technology. And lest critics make the argument that the NPT can only be used to coerce pariah states like Iran, consider the actions of the major powers. Since the NPT entered into force, the United States has drastically reduced the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile by 80 percent and completely removed multiple entry warheads from its nuclear strike capacity. In some respects just as importantly, Washington is currently targeting the open ocean; there is no longer a single ICBM aimed at the Russian Federation and nuclear-armed, long-range strategic bombers have been removed from daily nuclear alert. Russia has made similar progress, with both commitments and demonstrated progress in reducing deployed warheads as well as deployed and undeployed delivery vehicles. Moscow has also taken the lead in other areas where the United States has lagged behind, singing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. To be sure, complications—including Russia’s tendency to view their remaining weapons as a counterweight to all NATO stockpiles rather than simply that of the United States—still exist, but the fact remains that the norm created by NPT has reduced the potential for nuclear disaster across the globe. And where has all that potential destruction gone? Fully 10% of electric power in the United States over the last two decades came from down-blended, highly enriched uranium earmarked for Russian megaton nuclear bombs. Over 20,000 warheads (and their associated risk of accidental launches) were removed from service all thanks the spirit of the NPT. The spirit of bilateral cooperation remains strong; despite the tensions in Ukraine, both the United States and the Russian Federation are fully implementing the terms of the New START treaty, wherein each shares data on the movement of strategic forces and both engage in reciprocal inspections of military facilities. The NPT is not just about non-proliferation; it is a shift in mindset that nuclear technology will be shared with those who want it for peaceful purposes in return for de-arming those who have militarized it. It has been a resounding victory for the idea of internationalism and the fundamental idea that a community of nations can come together and, through mutually-reinforcing and verifying behavior, make strategic choices that defy the self-serving nature of states in an anarchic system. Moreover, it has been the bedrock of a norm that spawned a range of bi- and multilateral measures to protect the world against the terrible risk of nuclear conflict. Collective continued nuclear demilitarization is a win for the diplomats of the world. Progress on the biggest issues comes in small breaks, such as the Israeli decision to if not pull a seat up to the table, at least pay close attention on the sidelines. Through extraordinary burdens of verification and disclosure, the NPT will continue to make the world a safer place.2AC #7 – German rearmament would trigger threat perceptions and countermeasures – most likely scenario for war ................
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