The Pentagon Papers



“FERRETS” AND “RATS” TO THE RESCUE: A REEXAMINATION OF OPERATION CRIMP DURING THE VIETNAM WARWilliam Head 78 ABW Office of History Robins AFBDuring America’s Vietnam War, many combat events, such as the Tet Offensive, Rolling Thunder, and the Spring Offensive of 1972 became, and some remain to this day, iconic parts of the popular culture of the American people. However, many other aspects of that war have become obscured by the passage of time and are only remembered by a handful of veterans and analysts. One such operation was Operation Crimp or the Battle of the Ho Bo Woods. The designation referred to putting a crimp in Communist operations.Officially, Operation Crimp was recorded as a search and destroy action undertaken by U.S. and Australian forces in Binh Duong Province, in South Vietnam, between 8 and 14 January 1966. Major General Jonathan O. Seaman, commander 1st Infantry Division, acted as the overall commander of all Allied forces during the operation. The combat units included 8,000 soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division, comprised mainly of troops from the 173rd Airborne Brigade (173 AB) and the 3rd Infantry Brigade (3 IB). The 1st Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR), operating as part of the 173rd AB, also played a significant role in the operation.As irrelevant as it seems today, at the time, it was the largest search and destroy operation undertaken. According to the After Action Report penned by Col. William D. Brodbeck, Commander, 3 IB and his Administrative Assistant, Second Lieutenant Leo J. Mercier, “On 8 January 1966, the 173rd Airborne Brigade terminated a successful Operation ‘MARAUDER’ along the Oriental River in Hau Nghia Province and moved directly into the largest U.S. operation thus far conducted in Vietnam.” He further reported that the operation was named “Crimp” and was: A massive attack by air and land to strike at the very heart of the Viet Cong machine in Souther RVN. The notorious ‘HOBO WOODS’ Region in Binh Duong Province, just West of the fabled ‘IRON TRIANGLE’ was believed to hold the Politico-Military headquarters of the Viet Cong Military Region 4. The Objective of Operation ‘CRIMP’ was to find and destroy or capture all personnel, equipment, and intelligence material of this headquarters. The actual combat took place 12 miles north of what would become an infamous location for many Allied soldiers, Cu Chi. The primary reason for the raid was to locate and obliterate a vital Viet Cong (VC) headquarters (HQ) that intelligence operatives were certain was located in subterranean tunnels hidden by dense three-canopy jungle foliage. During this, the largest joint Allied military operation attempted in South Vietnam to that time, the American/Australian forces uncovered an extensive tunnel network which extended for more than 150?miles. It was the first American engagement fought at the division level and, in spite of significant casualties, most Allied leaders believed the campaign was a success. In retrospect, it proved to be only a partial victory, and the tunnels in the region continued to be a key Communist transit and supply base throughout the war. The enemy’s resolve to sustain the tunnels allowed them to use them as a staging area for the attack on Saigon during the 1968Tet Offensive. It was not until 169-1970, when B-52s heavily bombed the tunnels, that they were destroyed.Tunnel Rats in VietnamDuring the battle, a group of specialized sappers, better known as “tunnel rats,” began to be used to crawl through the treacherous caverns to find and kill the VC in their hiding places. It was a dangerous job, but it allowed the allies to eliminate enemy combatants and destroy the tunnels. While Australian teams were originally referred to as “ferrets,” eventually, anyone brave or crazy enough, to perform such duties became a “tunnel rat.” The Communists had been building and renovating these caves for two decades when the American and Australian forces first discovered them. At first, sappers determined that the only way to root the enemy out of these underground facilities was to crawl in and kill them. The VC guerrillas had constructed this complex system of tunnels in order to hide from infantry sweeps and artillery attacks. They were intricate and perilous, replete with booby traps, and VC waiting to ambush anyone who tried to enter the tunnels. Standard procedure called for the “tunnel rats” to sneak in through the tight openings, creep carefully into the cave areas, and kill the ubiquitous enemy soldiers. Equipped with only a .45 caliber pistol, a grenade, and a flashlight, the “tunnel rats” were, out of necessity, smaller men with nerves of steel. Once inside the main passageways they often planted explosive charges that destroyed the tunnels. The soldiers assigned to this duty, especially in the Cu Chi tunnels, described the caverns as “eerie and dark.” They used the term “black echo” to describe their experience of being in the tunnels. While this group would become famous as the war progressed, it was during Operation Crimp they first burst onto the scene.Cu Chi TunnelsFrom the very beginning of the Southern insurrection, led by the National Liberation Front (NLF) and their guerilla forces, better known as the VC, the rebels had to find low tech means to combat the better supplied Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. They hollowed out hundreds of miles of tunnels throughout South Vietnam. The ones in the Cu Chi district, northwest of Saigon, consisted of a widespread network which the VC had dug, little bits at a time, often by hand. The U.S. made several efforts to destroy these subterranean outposts including Operation Crimp. Allied engineers used a geological and soil survey approach to eventually detect the enemy network of underground defenses. This was followed, in January 1967, by an assault on Cu Chi and the Iron Triangle Areas, known as Operation Cedar Falls. Finally, in 1969-1970, B-52 bombing destroyed most of the tunnels. The tunnels were built into Old Alluvium terraces and were highly resilient to most explosives because the soil contained large levels of clay and iron. The iron percolated from the ground level and gathered in the lower layers creating a cement-like binding agent. When the soil layers dried, they were like concrete, seldom becoming moist again especially around the tunnel walls. Young “volunteers” dug the tunnels in the monsoon season when the upper layers of soil were soft. As it dried, the soil remained stable, without supports, and could withstand adjacent munist soldiers used these underground caves and transport routes to house troops, transport supplies, plant booby traps, and initiate surprise attacks on opposing forces. After each assault, they would disappear into their underground sanctuaries. It was because of these tunnels that Allied leaders directed that some troops be trained to be the aforementioned “tunnel rats.” They navigated the tunnels in order to detect booby traps and the presence of enemy guerillas.The southern supporters of the Viet Minh Communist had begun digging the tunnels under the jungle terrain of South Vietnam in the late 1940s. During this time, Socialist forces, led by Ho Chi Minh, were fighting for their independence from the French. They employed a myriad of tools and methods; in some cases, tunnels were dug with sticks and rifle butts on hands and knees, frequently only a few yards at a time. Once the Americans joined the conflict in the early 1960s, they gradually escalated their military presence in Vietnam to prop up various non-Communist governments in South Vietnam. In response, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and VC troops not only expanded the infiltration routes from the North through Cambodia, known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail but, also, expanded their tunnel complexes. Northern leaders in Hanoi dedicated dozens of non-combat units to keeping the logistics and transport routes open. At the high point of the war, tunnels in Cu Chi linked Communist support bases which covered more than 150 miles and went from the outskirts of Saigon all the way to the Cambodian border.A Map of the Ho Bo Woods, Iron Triangle, and Cu Chi Base CampIn areas which experienced heavy artillery shelling, enemy troops spent most of their time underground. In some cases, the Cu Chi tunnels grew to the point where they could house entire villages underground. These included “living quarters, kitchens, ordnance factories, hospitals and bomb shelters. In some areas there were even large theaters and music halls to provide diversion for the troops and their families.”The tunnel complex near Cu Chi not only played a critical role in providing the VC with a safe haven but also facilitated Communist attacks against nearby Saigon. To protect these vital caverns, they placed trip wires to detonate grenades or dumped boxes of scorpions or poisonous snakes onto Allied troops. As mentioned, in an effort to thwart these tactics, Australian, ARVN, and American soldiers were trained to avoid the booby traps. It proved to be a hazardous job since they had to traverse the cramped, dark tunnels to scout for enemy troops.Tunnel complex at Cu Chi and how they were usedWhile the first Allied attacks against the Cu Chi complex involved the 8,000 U.S. and Australian troops of Operation Crimp, it was not the last. Numbers of B-52 bombers assaulted this same area with good results and, a year later, around 30,000 American troops launched Operation Cedar Falls, sweeping across the Iron Triangle region of Binh Duong province north of Saigon near the Cambodian border. This was followed by more bombing raids and defoliation of rice fields and contiguous jungle areas with herbicides. Once exposed, U.S. tanks and bulldozers sealed some tunnels either suffocating the inhabitants or causing survivors to flee. This proved to be only a temporary setback since, within only a few months, Communist forces returned. In January 1968, they used the restored complex as a base from which to launch their attacks against Saigon during the Tet Offensive of 1968. Perhaps the cruelest irony is that today, the tunnels near Cu Chi have become a tourist attraction. In the years following the victory by the North in 1975, the new government in Hanoi preserved the tunnels and made them part of a network of national war memorial parks. Today, visitors to Saigon can explore the passages where 45,000 VC and NVA died defending the Cu Chi tunnels. The tunnels in recent timesThe Enclave StrategyIn retrospect, one of the more significant aspects of Operation Crimp was that it was, simultaneously, the last Allied military engagement to operate under the “Enclave Strategy” and one of the first search and destroy operations of the War. Soon after, General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) convinced President Lyndon B. Johnson to change from a defensive policy to one of attrition. In early 1965, before the President began dispatching large number of U.S. troops to Vietnam, he made it clear he intended to implement a plan originally conceived by the American Ambassador to Vietnam, General Maxwell Taylor, known as “The Enclave Strategy.” Taylor opposed involving large numbers of U.S. forces in Vietnam. His strategy advocated that the Americans establish control only in areas of Vietnam already controlled by the Saigon government. This meant that the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) had to win the war, and the U.S. military acted only as support for ARVN troops by controlling the densely populate coast.The best recount of the Enclave Strategy can be found in Section III – Strategies for Ground Force Employment, Part B – Enclave Strategy of the Pentagon Papers. It states that:The President decided during NSC meetings on 1 and 2 April 1965 to get U.S. ground combat units involved in the war against the insurgents. He did this in the sober awareness that Rolling Thunder was unlikely to produce immediate results, but also with the caveat that U.S. troops might not do too well in an Asian insurgency environment. The enclave strategy, which had been presented by Ambassador Taylor as a way to get U.S. troops engaged at relatively low risk, was implicitly endorsed by the President. The strategy proposed that U.S. troops occupy coastal enclaves, accept full responsibility for enclave security, and be prepared to go to the rescue of the RVNAF as far as 50 miles outside the enclave. Initially, the U.S. was to experiment with four Marine battalions in two coastal enclaves to see if the concept and the rules for operating with the RVNAF (which were to be worked out with the GVN) were feasible.Without the benefit of any experimentation the number of battalions was increased at Honolulu in mid-April to 17 and the number of enclaves to 5. The enclave strategy as formalized at Honolulu was designed to frustrate the Viet Cong in the South while Rolling Thunder continued to hammer the North. The intent was not to take the war to the enemy but rather to deny to him certain critical areas while simultaneously providing ready assistance to the RVNAF if they should run into difficulty. The RVNAF were expected to continue aggressively prosecuting the war against the enemy's main forces, thereby bearing the brunt of the casualties.The enclave strategy was controversial and expectations for it ran the gamut from extreme optimism to deep pessimism. The Ambassador expected it to buy some time for the Vietnamese to eventually save themselves. General Westmoreland and other military men expected it to guarantee defeat for the U.S. and the RVNAF, who were already demonstrating that they were incapable of defeating the enemy.A masterpiece of ambiguity, the enclave strategy implied a greater commitment to the war on the part of the U.S., but simultaneously demonstrated in the placing of the troops with their backs to the sea a desire for rapid and early exit. While purporting to provide the basis for experimentation with U.S. soldiers in an unfamiliar environment, it mitigated against the success of the experiments by placing those troops in close proximity to the Vietnamese people, where the greatest difficulty would be encountered. In order to prove the viability of its reserve reaction foundation, it required testing; but the rules for commitment were not worked out until the strategy was already overtaken by events. As a consequence of this delay, several opportunities were passed up when the RVNAF really needed help and U.S. troops were available. The whole enclave concept implied that the RVNAF would ultimately prevail, but in any case the Viet Cong could never win as long as certain areas were denied to them. The enclave strategy tacitly yielded the initiative to the enemy, but the initiative was not seen as the vital factor. The key was to be able to outlast the enemy at lowest cost to the United States.A Different Kind of Strategy – AttritionWhile the focus of this article is not the evolution of U.S. strategy from early 1965 to early 1966, it is important to understand how this evolution manifested itself in the nature and tactical realities of Operation Crimp. Once Gen. Westmorland took over the prosecution of the Vietnamese civil war, he made it clear he did not believe in the Enclave Strategy and pressed the Johnson to deploy larger numbers of U.S. troops to Vietnam in order to “take the battle to enemy.” The General argued the overall performance of the ARVN, in battles like Ap Bac in January 1963, and the increase in the number of VC attacks beginning in June 1965 made the Enclave Strategy useless and made the RVN’s position untenable. While Johnson inched closer to supporting Westmoreland, he remained hesitant for the moment. Finally, in the late summer of 1965, he concluded that the only way to make Ho Chi Minh seek a negotiated peace and force the NVA to depart South Vietnam was to adapt Westmoreland’s strategy. This led to the Gulf of Tokin Resolution and Americanization of the War in Vietnam.As the number of troops increased, Westmoreland implemented a strategy called “The War of Attrition.” This was not a normal tactic for U.S. ground forces. For generations, they had been trained to capture and hold ground not “search and destroy.” Operation Crimp became the transitional reality of this new strategy. The tactical manifestation of this policy involved sending ground forces into the field to search and kill as many VC and NVA troops as U.S. weapons’ superiority would allow. It also expected U.S. air forces, to cause as many casualties as possible and destroy North Vietnam’s limited economy and industrial base in order to assure it could not resupply its men in the field and prolong the war. The problem with these notions was that destroying the Northern infrastructure was not only difficult but unimportant since, eventually, most of the weapons and resupplies necessary to continue the conflict came from the Soviet Union and China which were off limits to U.S. air or ground attacks.The first purely search and destroy campaign was Operation Starlite. Due to a spelling error by a clerk in Saigon, what should have Operation Satellite took place under the designation Operation Starlite. It lasted from 18 to 24 August 1965. It was the first large-scale U.S. ground operation in Vietnam and was spearheaded by U.S. Marines. It was aimed at 1,500 VC located in and around the village of Van Tuong. The U.S. committed a regimental-size force from 3rd Marine Division, 3rd Marine Amphibious Force to engage the 1st VC Regiment south of the newly built Marine base at Chu Lai in the I Corps Area of Operation (AO). While some of the enemy soldiers were part-time farmers, overall, this was a professional unit of battle-hardened troops, led by Col. Le Huu Tru, who had commanded a battalion at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. According to the official record, Operation Starlite was important since it was the first opportunity for the Marines to test a long advocated combat doctrine calling for combined amphibious assault and simultaneous vertical envelopment. In other words, they simultaneously landed Marines on a beach on one side of the enemy and inserted Marines by helicopter on the other. It was also the first Marine search and destroy operation of the war where they left the defensive enclave they had held since landing in Da Nang in March 1965 and attacked enemy positions. It was the pure manifestation of Westmoreland’s Attrition Strategy!The Lead Up to Operation Crimp While Operation Crimp took place after Operations Starlite and Marauder, it was a transition from an effort to protect the allies’ enclave in Saigon to a search and destroy attack extemporaneously designed to destroy the tunnels once they had been found. When the U.S. had first sent troops to Vietnam, their primary role had been to advise ARVN forces and provide materiel support. By 1964, American advisors totaled only 21,000 personnel but, within only a year, Saigon was faltering both politically and militarily and leaders in Washington feared they might collapse. This led to the infusion of a significant number of American troops commanded by Gen. Westmoreland, who reluctantly first implemented the Enclave Strategy which saw 14,000 more troops sent to Vietnam bringing the U.S. total to roughly 40,000 soldiers and airmen. In turn, Allied nations, mainly Australia and New Zealand, of what became known as the Free World Military Forces soon sent about 6,000 additional troops. With this initial limited buildup, the Americans determined to build a group of defensive positions around Saigon prior to moving into the countryside to pacify rural areas near VC strongholds. One example of the Enclaves’ defensive policy, was a plan to base the 25th Infantry Division HQ near Cu Chi once the dry season arrived. However, the enemy did not wait for the dry season and stepped up pressure on the South Vietnamese leading Westmoreland to call for, and receive, nearly 100,000 more troops in order to stem the enemy tide. When Johnson opened the personnel flood gates, Westmoreland was no longer constrained by the Enclave Strategy. Trained in the tactics of World War II and Korea, he decided to go on the offensive. Thus, he employed a tactical policy that sought out the enemy and forced him into conventional battles that caused major attrition of his men and material. As early as 1963, Australia, being a loyal ally of the U.S., first sent advisors to Vietnam designated the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam or AATTV. By June 1965, with South Vietnam on the verge of collapse, the Australian government decided to deploy the 1st Battalion, RAR, under the command of Lt. Col. Ivan “Lou” Brumfield, comprised of 1,400 troopers. These forces and New Zealand units were placed under the command of U.S. Brig. Gen. Ellis W. Williamson of the 173 AB headquartered at Bien Hoa. Their AO was in the III Corps Tactical Zone originally within the Bien Hoa-Vung Tau enclave. While later, Australian and New Zealand units serving in Vietnam were mostly conscripts, these were career soldiers were invested in their past achievements. From the start, the men of 1 RAR, increasingly participated, as part of the 173 AB, in search and destroy operations employing the recently developed doctrine of airmobile tactics. Under this concept, troopers used helicopters, like horse cavalry, to ride into battle. In this way they could insert light infantry and artillery into their AO. The aerial component also provided fire support, casualty evacuation, and resupply. The Aussies and Kiwis were part of several operations in War Zone D aimed at the Communist base area that intersected Phuoc Long, Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, and Binh Duong provinces in the Iron Triangle which was at the confluence of the Saigon and Thi Tinh rivers and Route 7. They fought in the Battle of Gang Toi on 8 November 1965. From 21 November to 16 December the 1 RAR, by now led by Lt. Col. Alex Preece, played a major role in Operation New Life in the La Nga Valley, about 47?miles northeast of Bien Hoa. On 1 January 1966, they were part of the insertion operation into the Plain of Reeds, known as Marauder. In each campaign they had performed with distinction.Planning the AssaultNo sooner had Marauder ended than senior leadership decided to step up pressure on enemy forces in this tactical zone near Saigon. To take advantage of the element of surprise planners proposed to launch Operation Crimp on the heels of Operation Marauder. They proposed that some U.S. and most of the RAR troops be airlifted, by helicopters into the AO. Planners scheduled preparatory action to commence late in the evening of 7 January 1966, with the actual insertion of troops to begin at 0530 hours the following day. As alluded to earlier, plans called for 8,000 troops, commanded by Maj. Gen. Seaman, to be involved, consisting of the 3 IB and six battalions from the 173 AB to include the 1 RAR battalion. Providing artillery support was the 105 Field Battery, engineers from 3rd Field Troop, Royal Australian Engineers, and the M113s from the Prince of Wales Light Horse. When it commenced, it was the largest Allied military operation mounted in South Vietnam up to that date. Once artillery shelling and airstrike ended, plans called for units of the 173 AB to initiate an airmobile attack from both the north and west, while the 3 IB sealed off the area to the south, in preparation for a sweep designed to force entrapped enemy forces to flee east toward the Saigon River where they would be annihilated. The 1 RAR were to form a blocking position in a village beside the river on the Brigade’s northern flank.In the official report of the Concept of Operation 06180CH January 1966, the 173rd Airborne Brigade OPORD 1-66, Operation Crimp was to be “controlled by the 1st Infantry Division, which employed the 3rd Brigade to the South of the 173rd Brigade AO. Actions to be conducted within the 173rd AO were left to the discretion of Brig. Gen. Williamson.” The report went on to declare, “To best accomplish the mission of driving into the ‘HOBO’ Woods region to destroy the headquarters of Military Region 4, the operation be conducted in six phases.” Just before the operation began, the Americans asked for and received permission to use tear gas. Only hours before the attack, on 7 January, Major John Essex-Clarke, 1 RAR Operations Officer, effected an aerial reconnaissance sortie of the intended landing area code named Landing Zone (LZ) June. Observing a lack of ground foliage, the Major speculated there might be an extensive VC defense networks near the LZ. With information in hand, the allies opted to land at a less exposed location. Had they decided to go ahead with the original plan, troops of the 1 RAR would have landed on top of a widespread enemy position and suffered severe casualties. The commander of the 3rd Field Troop forces, Captain Sandy MacGregor, later declared the “decision almost certainly saved hundreds of Australian lives.” Landing Zone June was located about two and one-half miles to the west of the Iron Triangle, in the Ho Bo Woods. Intelligence officials theorized that hidden within this dense jungle area was the headquarters of the VC’s Fourth Military Region which directed activities in and around Saigon. While the exact location was not known, experts speculated that it might be hidden in a network subterranean bunkers. Throughout the planning stages of the operation, reports from Allied moles, interrogation of prisoners and aerial reconnaissance indicated that somewhere in this region was a vital Communist center of operations. Based on as much information and data they could collect, leadership conjectured that the center of this network was located in a twelve?square mile area of jungle and marshland. Analysts reasoned the area had four entrances, each protected by a VC Regional Force company. They further speculated that two Main Force battalions were also in the region. Surveillance sorties had spotted units of the C306 Local Force Company, 3rd Quyet Thang Battalion, and 7th Cu Chi Battalion. Further research confirmed that the commander of the Cu Chi Battalion was Captain Nguyen Thanh Linh. Analysts have since speculated that the allies were up against 1,000—5,000 Communist troops in the Ho Bo Woods. Most of this data proved correct and, in the end, it facilitated the general success of Operation Crimp.Inserting the Ground ForcesA B-52 bomb run over Vietnam. Ones similar to this were used prior to Operation Crimp.The battle officially began on 8 January 1966, just after 0530 hours, with intense and concentrated U.S. preparatory artillery fire. This was followed by tactical air assets dropping napalm designed to defoliate the attack zone. Lastly, the Air Force carried out B-52 ARC LIGHT airstrikes which contributed to further defoliation and caused considerable damage to enemy defenses. Around 0930 hours, as the conflagration from the air attacks waned, the airmobile operation began. The first units inserted were units from Col. Brodbeck’s 3rd Infantry Brigade. They landed, via helicopters, on the northern, western, and southern ends of the battle zone. They brought in the remainder of their Brigade over land. In the early hours of 8 January, members of Brigade’s command HQ joined a convoy in Di An arriving in Trung Lap by midday. This was on the western end of the 3rd’s AO. As this aspect of the assault unfolded, two more battalions landed to the southwest. One blocked the south end of the Ho Bo Woods while the other swept the area to their front. These forces ran into enemy fire from small units and snipers. In turn, the 3rd Brigade’s 3rd Battalion marched from Trung Lap to join the battle.The official report described the start of the engagement as follows:Operation ‘CRIMP’ commenced at 080530 January 1966 when Task Force E/17 began clearing the route for the Brigade motor convoy to the HOBO Woods Region. At 071730H E/17 had displaced to the vicinity XT 603107 in preparation for the early morning move of 8 January. Two companies of the ARVN 38th Ranger Battalion were used to secure the route of march from Bao Trai to the new E/17 position. At 080600 the main body of the Brigade convoy departed Bao Trai. The convoy moved to the new Brigade Base vicinity XT 611235, closing at 081015H with no contact. The entire move was covered closely by airborne FAC’s, TAC air cap, and armed helicopters. Additionally, the road movement was timed to permit units to move to the forward troop safety limit as B-52 Bombers conducted a massive prestrike in the area of operation.In the meantime, along the northern perimeter, troopers of the 1 RAR disembarked at LZ March about two miles south and west of the American troops. They immediately ran into considerable opposition. To reach their assigned position, the Australians and New Zealanders had to fight their way through a maze of bunkers, punji stakes, and booby traps. The VC had also seeded the entire expanse with trip wires attached to artillery shells and grenades which they rigged in the undergrowth or hung from tree branches. Ultimately, they forced the VC regional force company to pull back. If this were not hard enough, at one point, they were misidentified by an U.S. helicopter which fired on the 1 RAR and called in artillery fire. Fortunately, the 1 RAR quickly contacted the Americans, and total disaster was averted. As D Company, commanded by Maj. Ian Fisher, approached a clear area that was originally supposed to be their LZ VC, once again, fired on them from a nearby tree line. Six men of the 12th Platoon were wounded, including their commander Lt. James Bourke. Worse still, the two medics who came to attend the wounded were killed. At this point, Col. Preece ordered his remaining companies to move around the flanks of D Company to cut off the VC and take up their planned blocking position. As they did, these forces were also fired on by small VC units from the same tree line. As the Aussies moved out, the enemy popped up from behind trees, spider holes, and what proved to be tunnel entrances. Preece soon realized they had stumbled onto a massive enemy defensive position much of which was underground. Major Ian McFarlane’s B Company, 1 RAR, also found an unground hospital complete with medical supplies, rudimentary transfusion equipment, and important military documents. With the operation now well underway, units of the 173 AB landed and began moving toward their AO. In addition, members of the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (1/503), were inserted at LZ April around noon, and the 2/503 Battalion put down at LZ May at 1430 hours. With the deployment going almost exactly according to plan, the brigades began to march eastwards, soon converging at what Allied intelligence operatives believed was the location of the Fourth Region Military headquarters. However, in spite of an exhaustive search of the area, they failed to turn up much of value. Initial conjecture was that the VC had fled the area in the face of the initial Australian advance. To the south, the 3 IB made snail-like progress, with the enemy staging numerous hit-and-run ambush attacks, not only to inflict casualties but to distract the Americans from their underground sanctuary tunnels. As it turned out, the enemy had retreated, specifically the 7th Cu Chi Battalion had withdrawn north and the 3rd Quyet Thang Battalion to the east. With nightfall approaching, and Preece, concerned they might be ambushed, he drew his units into a tightly defended perimeter capable of withstanding a VC counter attack. Darkness descended quickly. Soon, the Australian defenders detected movement all along their trench line near C Company’s perimeter. It turned out to be a squad of VC trying to infiltrate the 1 RAR’s position. At first, sentries thought it was one of their own clearing patrols. As a result, it was not until the last second that the machine gunners opened fire, killing one VC and forcing the others to fall back. Similar events continued throughout the night with Communist forces able to spring up undetected and, later, disappear, seemingly, at will. Worse, the Aussie patrols could not seem to locate VC in large numbers. Soon, they deduced that the enemy was using tunnels for movement and concealment. Preece reasoned the entire area must be honeycombed with tunnels that hid the enemy headquarters they had been sent to destroy. Allied leaders concluded that, since the only 173 AB unit to meet heavy resistance on the first day was the 1 RAR, they had to be sitting in the midst of the network. Their casualties at the end of the first day’s combat was three killed and 15 wounded. In addition, the artillery Forward Observer from 105 Field Battery was killed. With all the VC activity on that first night, members of the battalion got little sleep. In the early morning, several minor small arms exchanges erupted. They decided not to use their machineguns so as to avoid revealing their positions in the dark and hitting friendly troops. They resorted to throwing grenades in areas forward of the perimeter. The 3 IB forces had seen little action reporting no casualties and only six Viet Cong killed. The Second Day – 9 JanuaryWith the allies having discovered the tunnels, 9 January became the first day of the difficult and dangerous task of infiltrating, investigating, and destroying them. The main aim became the destruction of the enemy stashes in the tunnels, killing of as many enemy soldiers as possible and, eventually, demolition of as many tunnels as possible. The U.S. and 1 RAR methods of accomplishing this task were significantly different. Based on World War II tactics derived from the Pacific War, the U.S. normally either sealed up, blew up, or poured smoke, tear gas, or napalm into the tunnel systems to render them unusable prior to moving on. Instead, the Australians decided to take the time to have their military engineers painstakingly search and map the complexes they found. Captain Sandy MacGregor led the Australian sappers of the 3rd Field Troops in systematically exploring and clearing the tunnels in their area. They employed telephone lines and compasses to traverse the subterranean passages. They soon discovered the tunnels were replete with an array of command, control, and communications (C3) nodes as well as medical and living facilities. They were protected by interlocking arcs of fire and connecting fire in the tunnels. They had been burrowed into hard clay which generally had protected them from artillery and bombing by tactical air assets. Some tunnels were 500 yards long. They also had several ancillary tunnels which jutted off from the main passageways. In some places, the shafts were one, two and, even, three levels deep. One report described the tunnel network as so extensive they could house 5,000 men, some of whom lived underground, on and off, for as many as six months at a time. On seeing the tunnels, one U.S. soldier described them as “the New York subway.” For his courage and daring, MacGregor later received the Military Cross.On 9 January, while the 1 RAR was working its way into their tunnels, U.S. forces found and destroyed a cache of medical supplies, a massive store of rice, and a small hospital. They also captured 30 VC in a series of small engagements. At this point, the operation seemed to be Australian soldier in Viet Cong tunnel uncovered during Operation Crimp Tunnel entrances in Cu Chi, then and nowBooby-trapped tunnel in Cu Chi. Today a tourist attraction.going very well, however, some friendly fire incidents hindered the 173 AB’s sweep of their AO. During the second day of the battle, units of the 1/503 and 2/503 battalions moved east to the Saigon River, continuing to uncover material stores and abandoned equipment following small unit skirmishes with Communist forces. Throughout, the well-hidden enemy troops, concealed in camouflaged ambush positions, consistently inflicted casualties on the advancing U.S. troops. Worse, only one VC was killed during the fighting raising the two day total to only 22. By this point, in spite of the large number of Allied troops committed, they had had only limited contact with the VC causing frustration among senior officers. The Fighting Deepens during 10–11 JanuaryOver the next two days, Australians searched enemy’s subterranean havens finding more documents and equipment. During 10 January alone, they seized 59 manned weapons, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 100 fragmentation grenades, one 57?mm recoilless rifle, explosives, clothing, and medical supplies. They also reported 11 VC killed in action (KIA). Night engagements continued and, on the 10th, they killed five more VC just outside their perimeter.As for the Americans, at 0900 on the 10th, cavalry units from Troop E, 17th Cavalry Regiment, supported by Australians from the Prince of Wales Light Horse launched a combined search operation engaging numerous small VC units. The most significant encounter came at 1400, when the Allied forces ran into a sizeable number of Communist forces in trenches at their front. Throughout this protracted fight, the Allies called in airstrikes and artillery barrages. Once the firing ended, the Australian M113s investigated the area finding 16 enemy bodies and, later, discovering evidence that between 40 and 60 others probably had been killed. With the Americans hunt for the enemy floundering, 173 AB commander, Brig. Gen. Ellis Williamson, directed the 1/503 Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. John Tyler, to alter the direction of their sweep. On the morning of 10 January, Battalion troops deployed several platoon-sized patrols to the south and west, finally confronting a well-built defensive location that included bunkers and trenches tied together by a tunnel system. The position was abandoned and so, at 1330 hours, the Americans moved north to a new AO. As they advanced they, and armored units of Troop D, 16th Cavalry Regiment, soon ran into an entrenched VC Main Force company only 2,000 yards west of the 1 RAR. The U.S. commander called in artillery and airstrikes which caused the enemy troops to withdraw leaving 29 KIA. Concurrently, the 2/503 Battalion also sent out patrols. They encountered mostly snipers. Still, like their Australian and New Zealand counterparts, the U.S. paratroopers did uncover an extensive tunnel complex and fortifications. The 3 IB continued to move slowly, even after they reached the Saigon River late on 10 January. They had had only brief contacts with the enemy, finding a small base camp and destroying it. They also seized more than 10 tons of rice and 15 bales of cotton. The next morning, members of the Brigade located and destroyed more bunkers, several buildings, numerous sampans, and large quantities of medical supplies and food. They also found another tunnel complex and several maps, charts, and documents. Throughout this part of the operation, they met with little resistance. In fact, they had more men killed or wounded by booby-traps than enemy fire. Still, the U.S. forces continued their sweep with units of the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert Haldane, along a front roughly 1,600?yards wide. As they crept along, men were confronted by a well-hidden sniper that was hard to pinpoint. Even Lt. Col. George Eyster, commander of the 2/28 Battalion, was shot and killed. It was obvious the VC were trying to avoid a set piece battle. They split into small groups to fight from their spider-holes and tunnels, only engaging the Allies with small arms, like Soviet-made K-44 rifles, at close range, leading the U.S. forces to call in artillery and airstrikes. As this part of the operation unfolded, word soon reached other units that the 173rd forces believed they had found the main tunnel area and another sweep was ordered. For their part the members of the 1 RAR continued to investigate the tunnels in their AO where they seized enormous amounts of supplies, documents, and equipment. Simultaneously, members of the 3rd Brigade were exploring the tunnel complex they had found. This soon led to a violent engagement marked by intense hand-to-hand combat above ground. During the fight, Lt. Col. Haldane “rushed a bunker while under heavy fire armed only with a pistol, in order to give first aid to a number of wounded soldiers.” His courage and daring inspired his men, not only to evacuate their casualties, but to take their objective. Haldane, later, received the Silver Star.On 11 January, one of the most ironic events of the entire campaign took place. Soon after the 3rd Brigade resumed their advance, they came across signs of enemy defenses. A US soldier enters a tunnel A trooper finds a tunnel entranceMembers of the 1 RAR find a tunnelRooting out the VCSergeant Stewart Green, 1/28 Battalion, inadvertently sat down on a nail and discovered it was the opening to a tunnel trap door. Smarting from his wound Green, nonetheless, volunteered to crawl down the tunnel and investigate. Green and a squad of Americans, equipped with flashlights, pistols, and a field telephone, crept down nearly a mile into the network of caverns. At length, they came upon an underground dispensary with 30 VC in it. A fire-fight ensued. Some of the startled VC scurried out of one of the escape hatches. Others fired on the intruders. Since the Americans were wearing gas-masks, they hurled teargas grenades at the enemy and, then, began to fight their way back to the tunnel entrance. At one point, Green realized one of his comrades was lost in the darkness, so he crawled back in to find him. Once he had him in tow, they quickly crawled out of the tunnel. Eventually, these VC also broke off and fled to the surface. When Green related his story to his superiors, they determined to use a smoke machine to push smoke into the tunnel system. The ploy worked since the rising smoke soon exposed several tunnel entrances, various underground levels, and a plethora of bunkers. The U.S. troops were stunned by the expanse of the network. These were the first Americans to enter the tunnels and, as they explored them, they devised new ways to root out the VC and destroy the tunnels.One of the most effective methods was the introduction of CS gas, an abbreviation for O-chlorobenzylidene malonontrite. Chemists in the United States first discovered the properties of this compound in 1928. Six years later, a Dutch writer published an article discussing its potential chemical warfare uses. In World War II, scientists on both sides examined the effects of the gas but never really turned it into a weapon. It was not until the 1950s that it evolved into the combat tool it became during the Vietnam War. In recent times, it continues to be used by military and police forces worldwide. The gas containers hold three ingredients: the active CS chemical, a liquid solvent that dissolves and carries it, and an inert gas that operates as a propellant spray. The CS gas is a compound known as a lachrymator that causes tears in the eyes of those sprayed with it. This is how it got its modern name of “Tear Gas.” Besides itch and pain in the eyes, it causes skin inflammation and upper respiratory irritation that leads to sneezing, coughing, and breathing problems. Generally, it is not lethal. When the VC began to combat the gas with masks of varying sophistication, the allies began to employ explosives.Going after Charlie with the basics. Note the gas mask.These tactics had a limited shelf life, since the enemy developed clever countermeasures. In fact, most of those flushed out of the tunnels during Operation Crimp proved to be women and children, not soldiers. While some VC were exposed where they could be killed or captured, and many of the tunnels were temporarily destroyed, they proved to be a stubborn enemy and, soon, after the Allies departed, they returned to rebuild the Cu Chi complex better than before. By the end of fight, the 3rd Infantry Brigade had killed 22 VC at a cost of six of their own killed and 45 wounded. Many of these men were withdrawn prior to the official conclusion of the operation. The Operation Drags On, 12–13 January Throughout the 12th, the Communists again initiated the tactics they previously used against the 1 RAR, which included probing the Aussie’s perimeter during the night. Near dawn, this led to a skirmish between an Australian standing patrol and a small VC unit. During the next two days, the U.S. and 1 RAR troops continued to search the tunnels which led to sporadic sniper and mortar fire. The allies continued to find important documents, significant numbers of weapons/equipment, and tons of rice. They also detained hundreds of civilians for questioning. A 1 RAR patrol seized 15 tons of rice after an intense 20 minute fire fight in which six VC died. In the midst of combat, a significant number of civilians were exposed to the dangers of the fight when they were found hiding in ditches and tunnels. The Aussies eventually convinced them to come out of hiding, and they were sent to a nearby refugee camp. Later that same day, another unit from 11 Platoon stumbled onto another tunnel network only 50 yards from their AO. When a small group of Aussies, using a search dog, began exploring the tunnel, they were confronted by dozens of enemy soldiers. In the subsequent skirmish, eight VC were killed and the complex was demolished by Australian engineers. Even with these successes, not all went well. On the afternoon of 12th, an Australian engineer became wedged in a trap door that traversed two of the underground rooms. While it was only seven feet below the surface, things soon became desperate. Try as they might, his comrades could not be pry him loose, and he eventually suffocated from a combination of tear gas and carbon monoxide he breathed in when he dislodged his respirator in his struggle to free himself. It was devastating tragedy which left a pall over the entire 1 RAR. The emotional stress was beginning to take its toll. The men of the 1 RAR had spent five tense days living almost on top of the enemy, under constant fire from well-hidden snipers, and facing the daily fears of having to clear out the tunnels they found. As the number of casualties mounted, leaders concluded that the best tactics were those that risked the fewest number of Australian lives. As a result, on the afternoon of 12th, when they stumbled upon a sizeable group of VC while clearing a tunnel that refused to surrender, the 1 RAR “ferrets” backed out of the tunnel, blew it up, and filled it in. The result was eight enemy KIA and, probably, dozens more buried alive. Drawing of the Tunnel NetworkBy the end of 12 January, the surviving Allied forces were exhausted, and their leaders were ready to end the operation. Even so, Col. Haldane directed his men to search tunnels in their AO. They encountered several new chambers and entrances replete with grenades and booby traps. After destroying these passageways and preparing to withdraw, one of their number was shot and killed by a VC who had sprung out of what looked like an ant or termite mound. They killed their assailant and took their dead comrade back to camp to be sent home. On 13 January, platoon-size patrols of the 1/503 continued their sweep of their AO, with members of Company C skirmishing with a Communist platoon. It eventually became one of the largest battles of the entire operation. The U.S. forces soon called in artillery and airstrikes devastating the enemy positions. Throughout Operation Crimp, airpower had been successfully employed to the point that one wonders why it was not used more and why it was not a focal point of the operation. In the end, the Americans found the bodies of ten dead VC. Blood trails and human remains also indicated that as many as 20 to 30 more were killed and dragged away. The Battle Comes to an End, 14 January On the 14th, it became clear that little more could be done with this exhausted group of soldiers, so they took up defensive positions. They also realized they lacked the resources and manpower to totally explore and destroy the entire tunnel complex. At this point, officials in Saigon decided to call a halt to all offensive operations. Finally, six days after it commenced, with the approval from MACV headquarters and supported by artillery fire, U.S. and Australian forces began their withdrawal. The units of the 1 RAR returned to Bien Hoa on 14 January, while the U.S. troops began their protracted exit from the Ho Bo Woods and Cu Chi area. With this action, Operation Crimp officially came to an end, having lasted from 8 to 14 January 1966. In the end, the Australians, alone, had unearthed in excess of ten miles of tunnels. All of these were painstakingly searched and destroyed. They captured documents that included more than 100,000 pages explaining the enemy’s operational structure and the identity of agents operating in Saigon and elsewhere in South Vietnam. They seized 90 heavy weapons and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition. Last, but not least, they took “enough equipment, food, and other supplies to fill eight 2?-ton trucks.” In turn, the larger American units captured similar quantities of materials. The members of the 1 RAR had engaged more enemy troops than had the U.S. soldiers, in great measure due to the fact that their AO proved to be where the VC headquarters was located. In fact, it turned out the Australians had been the ones who examined the tunnels leading to the headquarters chambers which were supposed to be their main objective. Unbeknownst to them, they had only partially explored the tunnel, a tragic fact they only learned about three decades after the war ended. One of the main reasons they had not completed the action was that they had suffered heavy casualties from Communist snipers just getting to and entering the tunnel complex.Operation Crimp would prove to be the 1 RAR’s third and last deployment into what was, in fact, the VC’s backyard. At the end of the operation, the weary Aussie troopers decompressed for more than two weeks in Bien Hoa. It proved to be their longest break from combat during the Battalion’s entire tour in Vietnam. Summarizing and Analyzing the OperationAltogether, the 1 RAR had lost eight KIA and 30 WIA, while counting 27 VC KIA and another 30-40 probable kills. The U.S. units suffered 14 KIA and 76 WIA. The final official enemy casualty count came to “128 confirmed killed, and another 190 probably killed, as well as 92 captured and another 509 suspects detained.” One sobering fact was that roughly half of those Allied troops killed were slain by booby traps and not enemy fire. Another important fact was that many more enemy personnel almost certainly died in the caverns when they collapsed from explosions detonated by Allied engineers or from airstrikes. In fact, U.S. officials later asserted that the enemy’s 4th Military Region HQ had been destroyed during the operation. All in all, the operation has to be judged a success--not only because of the damage inflicted on the enemy forces but due to the massive amount of intelligence data seized. One report later described it as “the first Allied strategic intelligence victory of the war.” The documents had been so important that both Generals Westmoreland and Joseph McChristian, Chief of MACV Intelligence, visited the 1 RAR to congratulate them. The official operational report recorded it as follows: “On D+6 the 173d Airborne Brigade terminated Operation ‘CRIMP’ in the HOBO region and redeployed all units to the Brigade Base at Bien Hoa by the combination of helicopter lift and motor convoy.” Col. Brodbeck, described the results as, “Excellent” and declared the “tactical elements of the Brigade did an outstanding job during this operation.” With, “ground and air mobility being used very effectively to keep the VC off balance.” Not everything worked as planned. Original plans had called for the Allies to find the enemy and engage them in a set piece battle. Instead, enemy hit-and-run tactics had been the center piece of the operation. Indeed, Allied leaders had never planned on the discovery of such a massive tunnel network and the soldiers deployed were not equipped to fully deal with the tunnels and, thus, their tactics and techniques for dealing with thems were an ad hoc process. During Operation Crimp, the American “tunnel rats” and Australian “ferrets,” became the first Allied units to develop the earliest practices for neutralizing these enemy havens. Ultimately, due in part to the success of the 1 RAR in clearing some of the shorter tunnels, U.S. units adopted similar methods and formed tunnel-clearance teams or “tunnel rats.” While the VC had suffered significant losses, the allies had only partially cleared the battle zone above and below ground. In fact, the Ho Bo Woods continued to act as a vital enemy transit and supply base all during the 1960s. Later evidence determined that the vast majority of the Communist troops evacuated the area intact. Most of the units the allies engaged proved to be rear guard elements. This is no doubt why enemy leaders declared they had won a great victory. They claimed that they killed or wounded 2,000 American, destroyed 100 vehicles, and downed 50 aircraft. These numbers were gross exaggerations designed to bolster VC morale. In truth, Operation Crimp staggered the VC and their Communist comrades in Hanoi, so much so that they ordered these forces in South Vietnam to avoid being surprised like this again and to not bunch up their troops in the future. While it had been a near thing for the VC, Operation Crimp also indicated the intrinsic flaws present in search and destroy style operations. Or, it should have! But, here, as at the Battle of Ia Drang Valley in November 1965, Gen. Westmoreland misinterpreted the results and soon opted to make search and destroy the standard operation for the U.S. Army in Vietnam. In many ways, this brand of limited war proved to be the worst decision made by Allied leadership in this early phase of the Vietnam War. The Follow-upNot long after Operation Crimp ended, planners began conceiving another assault. This time, they employed heavy bombers, tactical aircraft, artillery, and fast moving ground strikes to, once again, put pressure on Communist forces in the Iron Triangle AO. Among these several engagements was the Battle of Suoi Bong Trang, which took place during the night of 23–24 February 1966. Again, the results were only partially successful as they would be in other lesser attacks throughout the remainder of 1966. During the following year, it became clear that activity in the Iron Triangle and Ho Bo Woods had increased. As a result, MACV directed another larger, better equipped, assault in January 1967. The offensive action was designated Operation Cedar Falls. It lasted from 8 to 26 January and inserted 30,000 U.S. troops into the battle zone, this time with specialized “tunnel rat” units. Again, the Americans hammered the VC, destroying great expanses of the tunnels and causing substantial enemy casualties. When the operation ended and the U.S. withdrew, the VC waited for a while and rebuilt. Thus, the tunnels remained a thorn in the Allies’ side. As noted, during the 1968 VC attack on Saigon, the complex was used as a staging area. Air Power Strikes The Final Blow! This was not the end! Finally, in 1969-1970, as part of a general air offensive, U.S. leadership initiated a series of B-52 ARC LIGHT attacks, dropping thousands of delayed-fuse bombs that penetrated deep into the earth prior to exploding. This made the tunnels very vulnerable and, eventually, nullified their utility. The B-52D Big Bellies, carrying M 117 750 pound ordnance and, to a lesser extent, MK 82 500 pound iron bombs, flew round-the-clock sorties that chewed giant holes in the ground where the tunnel complex had been. The irony remains, to this day, that it took so long for leadership to think of such a solution. Part of the reason for turning to the BUFFs was that the new American President, Richard M. Nixon, was in the process of withdrawing ground troops following the disaster of Hamburger Hill in October 1969 and was increasing the use of U.S. aircraft in support of his Vietnamization Program designed to turn the ground war over to the ARVN. Originally, many leaders in both the Johnson White House and the 1960s Air Force, were nervous about using the big bombers that were also part of America’s strategic nuclear triad and originally built to carry out Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) nuclear raids over the Soviet Union or People’s Republic of China. Nixon, who became president in January 1969, was determined to find a way out of the quagmire of Vietnam and, specially, how to stop the returning body bags from highlighting his tenure in office. During this time, he initiated Commando Hunt II through VII, Menu, and Linebacker heavy bomber raids on key targets along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Cambodian sanctuaries and, finally, against Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam. The decision to employ the big bombers on a large scale came far too late and, ultimately, all they achieved was the ability for the U.S. to get the hell out of Vietnam.A Tunnel Area turned into a crater by a B-52 750 pound bombA Final WordWhile the tactical outcome of Operation Crimp remains clear, strategically it also had a subtle effect. The apparent success of these early search and destroy efforts breathed new life into the sagging morale of both the ARVN and RVN government. While the VC threat to Saigon waned but, in order to keep things safe, Westmoreland initiated an even more aggressive offensive strategy. This led to an increase in the number of U.S. forces to 210,000 in January 1966, and to 327,000 by December 1966. The Australians also upped their numbers in March 1966, with the deployment of the 4,500 man 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) complete with armor, aviation, engineers, and artillery support. This was soon augmented by unites of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy which brought the Aussie contingency to 6,300. In short, the primary result of Operation Crimp was a massive increase in Allied personnel to take over the struggle from the ARVN. As for the professionals in the 1 RAR, they were eventually replaced by 1 ATF which was assigned its own AO in Phuoc Tuy Province, where they were able to engage in operations more independently employing their own counter-insurgency tactics and methods. Arriving between April and June 1966, they rapidly built a fire base at Nui Dat, where they were supplied by units of the 1st Australian Logistics Support Group operating out of the port of Vung Tau. Most Americans of that generation remember that, eventually, the troop commitment reached 545,000 and cost more than 58,000 American lives. After the war, many revisionists contended the U.S. never lost a battle in Indochina arguing the media and politicians lost the war. Clear headed analysis indicates Allied leadership consistently forgot the words of the Baron von Clausewitz that, “Resistance is a form of action aimed at destroying enough of the enemy’s power to force him to renounce his intentions.” The Communist knew this admonition, if not formally, then in practice. Between 1775 and 1783, American rebels had understood this principle only to have it fade over time, because they saw the enemy in Vietnam as puppets of the Soviet Union and not nationalist guerillas. As Rogers and Almodovar concluded in their lecture on the “Tunnels of Cu Chi,” “The VC demonstrated resolve by outlasting the Americans. Although no American unit of even squad size or greater ever surrendered to the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese during the entire Vietnam War; they still managed to prevail.” They also disregarded Clausewitz’s reminder that, “war is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it both in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced.” The American people realized, too late, that the costs in treasure and lives was not worth an undefined victory. ................
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