The issue of self and identity is one of crucial ...



Running head: The self as determinant of ingroup favoritism

When “I” turns into “we”:

The self as a determinant of favoritism towards novel ingroups

Sabine Otten

Department of Social Psychology,

Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, FRG

Key words: ingroup favoritism; positive ingroup default; self-anchoring; social

discrimination; social identity

Abstract

Initially, Social Identity Theory (SIT) seemed to have provided a straightforward concept how the self relates to ingroup favoritism: Based upon the distinction between personal and social identity, it posits a striving for positive ingroup distinctiveness as a means to enhance the self-concept. This reasoning was crucially influenced by findings in the Minimal Group Paradigm, demonstrating that mere categorization into two social groups can suffice to elicit favoritism even towards anonymous ingroup members. Although this effect was replicated in numerous studies, its interpretation in the framework of SIT has been questioned. In this context, my own empirical program proposes a link between self-concept and positive ingroup distinctiveness that relies on cognitive rather than motivational processes. Evidence is presented demonstrating that ingroup favoritism does not necessitate an explicit social comparison between ingroup and outgroup, and that the self can function as a heuristic to give meaning to novel ingroups. Hence, these findings suggest that – under certain conditions of the intergroup context – ingroup favoritism can rely on an intra- rather than an intergroup process.

(172 words)

When “I” turns into “we”: The self as a determinant of favoritism towards novel ingroups

The issue of self and identity is of crucial importance within social psychology (for a recent survey see Baumeister, 1998). As Turner and Oakes (1997, p. 365) put it: “The nature of the self and its relationship to social cognition is the theoretical core of social psychology“.

Hence, it is not surprising that this theme plays a central role in influential theories on intergroup behaviour, especially in Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). In both theories, the notion of a social identity, defined by group memberships and the evaluations and emotions attached to these membership is pivotal (see e.g. Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1999). However, whereas SIT is basically concentrating on the prediction of intergroup relations and the phenomenon of ingroup favoritism (see Brown, 2000a), SCT’s core issue is the more general question of the conditions and the (cognitive) consequences that arise when people categorize themselves as group-members with shared characteristics rather than as unique individuals. While SIT focuses rather on the motivational factors affecting group members’ perception and behavior, SCT focuses on social identity as “the cognitive mechanism that makes group behaviour possible” (Turner, 1984, p. 527). The basic goal of the empirical program presented in this chapter was to investigate basic determinants of ingroup favoritism. Thus, SIT rather than SCT was the reference point from which the research question was derived.

Although much broader in its scope, SIT is closely associated with experiments conducted in the so-called minimal group paradigm (MGP; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament; see also Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969). This paradigm was originally planned to provide a baseline in order to test subsequently the necessary and sufficient conditions for ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Hence, intergroup behaviour was analyzed in a situation of ‘mere categorization‘: Participants were anonymously assigned to one of two distinct, novel social categories; there was neither intra- or intergroup interaction, nor an opportunity to directly fulfil self-interests by allocations or evaluations, nor was there a functional relation between the categorization dimension, on the one hand, and the evaluation or allocation dimension on the other hand. However, the meanwhile commonplace and often replicated finding (see e.g. Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Brown 2000) was that already under these restricted conditions ingroup favoritism occurred.

SIT offers an explanation for the so-called ‘mere categorization effect‘ by postulating a need for positive social identity (see Brown, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1999). It is assumed that the self-concept comprises two components, personal and social identity. By treating or evaluating ingroup members more favorably than outgroup members, social identity can be ensured or enhanced. Thus, establishing positive ingroup distinctiveness serves the general motive of self-enhancement (see Sedikides, 1993; Sedikides & Strube, 1995). Accordingly, it is “presumed to be a causal connection between intergroup differentiation ... and self-esteem” (Brown, 2000, p. 755; see also Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990). Turner (1999) summarizes this assumption as follows:

“The basic hypothesis, which is at the psychological heart of the theory, is the notion that social comparisons between groups relevant to an evaluation of social identity produce pressures for intergroup differentiation to achieve a positive self evaluation in terms of that identity” (p. 18).

In fact, there is some evidence indicating that exerting relative ingroup bias increases self-esteem (Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Oakes & Turner, 1980); however, the findings are not unequivocal, and especially for the complementary derivation, threatened self-esteem as predictor of ingroup favoritism, the findings are not at all convincing (see Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Hence, it is not surprising that notwithstanding the many successful replications of ingroup favoritism in the minimal group paradigm, its interpretation in terms of a striving for positive social identity is still – or rather increasingly -- controversial (e.g. Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Diehl, 1989; Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Mummendey, 1995). According to Brown (2000) this discussion raises “the possibility of recognising a wider range of cognitive motives associated with social identification than those specified by SIT”(p. 756).

My own research program can be understood as a contribution to such discussion; however, rather than focusing on alternative motivational accounts, the present approach concentrates on basic cognitive processes that might account for ingroup favoritism even towards anonymous fellow group members in a minimal intergroup situation. Starting from the observation that a favorable attitude towards novel ingroups does not necessitate explicit social comparisons with the outgroup, a model is proposed, in which the self is not seen as immediately motivating and profiting from ingroup favoritism, but rather as a source of information from the definition of novel own groups can be derived.

More specifically, a research program will be presented that provided evidence in basically four domains:

a) Positive ingroup default: A set of study demonstrates that there is evaluative favoritism towards novel ingroups immediately after social categorization, and without any explicit opportunities to compare with an outgroup.

b) Implicit associations between ingroup and self: Response-time evidence implies that there is an overlap between the mental representations of self and ingroup; in case of ambiguous group judgments, ingroup evaluations are facilitated when matching self ratings.

c) Self-anchoring in explicit measures: There is evidence that – at least under certain contextual conditions – group mebers tend to assimilate the ingroup definition to the self definition in explicit evaluations. There is evidence that this process has a stronger impact than the tendency to differentiate the ingroup positively from the outgroup.

d) Self as heuristic: In a further study it is demonstrated that the process of self-anchoring is determined by the judges’ motivation and ability to use heuristics as a means of impression formation on their novel ingroup.

Positive ingroup default

According to SIT, social comparison with the outgroup is a decisive element in the process by which social categorization can turn into the creation of positive ingroup distinctiveness. Thus, the question is whether individuals that have been assigned to a novel social category will express a biased ingroup evaluation already before having engaged in explicit social comparisons (as typically requested in experiments on intergroup allocations and evaluations). In fact, Maass and Schaller (1991) argue that there is an “initial categorization-based ingroup bias” such that "group members seem to approach their task with the rudimentary hypothesis that their own group is better than the opposing group" (p. 204).

In the present context, crucial issues were: Can such positive ingroup default be demonstrated even for minimal groups? And: How can such initial bias be disentangled from bias that is not the starting point but rather the result of a comparison with the corresponding outgroup? Here, paradigms that study judgmental processes on an implicit level seemed most appropriate. A series of experiments on implicit intergroup bias was conducted by Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman and Tyler (1990), who demonstrated in learning tasks and lexical decision tasks that (subliminal) global reference to either own groups or other groups tasks primed positive affect in the former, but rather neutral affect in the latter condition. In sum, their findings imply that words relating to ingroup enhance the accessibility of positive trait information.

Perdue and collaborators (1990) did not refer to specific groups in their experiments; as ingroup designators they used terms like "we", "us", as outgroup designators terms like “they” and “them”. The authors themselves acknowledge that their experiments “do not demonstrate whether it is the in-group and outgroup terms themselves or whether it is the cognitively represented social entities that they signify that are source of these attitudinal biases” (p. 483). Whereas their findings can be read as evidence for intergroup bias on the implicit level, they do not parallel the minimal group paradigm, where the ingroup-outgroup distinction was conceptually unrelated to existing social schemata. Hence, their data can not demonstrate whether there is such thing as a ‘positive ingroup default’. However, such demonstration was provided in a series of studies by Otten and collaborators (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999). Instead of using unspecific primes for ingroup and outgroup, Otten and Wentura (1999) used the labels of categories which they had introduced in a minimal categorization procedure immediately before the lexical decision task. Again, there was an affective priming effect for ingroup labels such that their preceding subliminal presentation facilitated the classification of positive as compared to negative traits, whereas no affective congruency effects emerged for outgroup primes. Moreover, there was a significant correlation between implicit positive ingroup attitudes (as indicated by responses in the lexical decision task) and explicit measures of ingroup preference.

Otten and Moskowitz (2000) provided evidence for an implicit bias towards minimal ingroups in a different paradigm. They combined a minimal categorization procedure with a probe task demonstrating spontaneous trait inferences (STIs; e.g. Uleman, Hon, Roman & Moskowitz, 1996). The idea was that reference to the minimal ingroup should facilitate spontaneous inferences with regards to positive but not negative traits, whereas valence of traits should not affect STIs about outgroup members. At the beginning of the experiments, participants were individually categorized into a novel social category, allegedly based on their perceptual style when structuring visual information. The second part of the study was introduced as dealing with the structuring of verbal information. The ingroup versus outgroup condition was realized by claiming that the sentences that were presented stemmed from either ingroup or outgroup members who had described activities from their daily life. Following each sentence (which were either trait-implying or not) a target word was presented and participants had to decide quickly, whether this word was in the sentence or not. It was hypothesized that trait inference would be facilitated (thus interfering with the correct rejection of the word as not in the sentence) by references to the ingroup, but only for traits that were positive and that had been implied by the preceding sentence (for more details, see Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). The 2x2x2 (trait implication of sentence x valence of trait x group) ANOVA showed the predicted three-way interaction. The longest response latencies for correctly rejecting trait words were measured when positive traits followed sentences describing ingroup members performing behaviors that implied the respective trait. No effects of valence and group was found for trait words following non-trait implying sentences (see figure 1 for the results on trait-implying sentences).

Taken together, these experiments provide convincing evidence that there is ingroup favoritism on an implicit level even towards novel laboratory groups. The experiments by Otten and collaborators (Otten & Moskowitz; Otten & Wentura, 1999) did not involve any explicit social comparison and avoided reference to unspecific ingroup and outgroup designators as used by Perdue and colleagues (1990); hence, the findings support the assumed positive ingroup default that is the starting point or baseline rather than the result of intergroup evaluations. However, these results do not provide evidence about a process that can account for the immediate, automatic emergence of a positive ingroup stereotype. At this point, reference to the self seems worthwhile. As will be argued in more detail below, it is assumed that the positive value of novel ingroups is based on their association with the typically positively evaluated self (see e.g. Baumeister, 1998; Diener & Diener, 1996; Taylor & Brown, 1988).

Implicit associations between ingroup and self

Ample evidence for the close link between self-definitions and the definitions of own groups on an implicit level was provided in a series of experiments by Smith and collaborators (Smith & Henry, 1996; Smith, Coats & Walling, 1999; Coats, Smith, Claypool & Banner, 2000). Their research was based upon a paradigm developed by Aron and collaborators in order to demonstrate what they call “self-expansion” in interpersonal relationships (e.g. Aron, Aron, Tudor & Nelson, 1991). The cognitive connection between self and ingroup is reflected in response time evidence: Dichotomous judgments of self and ingroup, respectively, were significantly facilitated on those dimensions on which self definition and ingroup definition (as measured in previously administered questionnaires) matched. Smith and collaborators (Smith et al., 1999) conclude that self and ingroup are linked in connectionist networks of memory. When mental representations of self and ingroup overlap, the two stimuli elicit similar patterns of activation. Thereby, activating one concept facilitates congruent responses with regards to the other.

Interestingly, on this implicit level, there is little evidence for any systematic links between outgroup and self or ingroup and outgroup. In terms of the need for positive ingroup distinctiveness as assumed by SIT (see above) or the optimal distinctiveness theory by Brewer (1993), one might have expected that responses were facilitated on those trait dimensions characterized by mismatches with the outgroup. However, typically no such evidence was found (Coats, Smith, Claypool & Banner, 2000; Smith & Henry, 1996; Smith et al., 1999; see Brewer & Pickett, 1999, for one exception).

Although the empirical evidence revealing links between self and ingroup on the implicit level is broadly unequivocal, these findings are not yet sufficient to account for ingroup favoritism towards completely novel, arbitrary groups. Smith and collaborators tried to use social categories that were not heavily stereotyped (e.g. students with different majors; members or non-members of sororities/fraternities), but these were not completely novel groups. In fact, the task of evaluating ingroup and outgroup on a large set of trait dimensions can hardly be realized for arbitrary social categories. Therefore, when replicating the study by Smith and collaborators (1999) Epstude and Otten (2000) also refrained from analyzing minimal groups. Instead, they focused on how realistic social categories were judged in a forced-choice response format in the case of judgmental ambiguity (as indicated by the previous paper-pencil-ratings). As Hogg and Mullin (1999; see also Grieve & Hogg, 1999) have demonstrated, uncertainty is a crucial feature in minimal intergroup settings. Typically, this uncertainty is assumed to stem from the novel, ill-defined social categorization; however, one might argue that uncertainty could also be elicited by focusing on trait dimensions that are not clearly defined for the (realistic) groups in question. In the original studies, traits that were not judged as either applicable or as not applicable to the respective targets (answer “4” on the 7-point bipolar scale) were excluded from further analysis. However, in our study (where we used gender as categorization criterion) exactly these dimensions were of central interest. Data indicated that judgments about ambiguous trait were facilitated when adapted to self ratings, thus replicating the pattern of the match-mismatch effect as already obtained for clearly defined traits; the interaction between type of dichotomous ingroup judgment (response: yes, no) and previous self rating (trait applies; trait not applies) was significant for both ambiguous ingroup-traits and well-defined ingroup-traits. Again, matches or mismatches with the outgroup had no effects on response latencies.

The original findings by Smith and collaborators reveal that there is a firm link between the concepts of self and ingroup. Within the connectionist model, it does not really matter whether the link between the two targets stems from a definition of self in terms of the ingroup (as discussed by SCT; Turner et al., 1987) or whether it stems from a definition of the group in terms of the self, that is, from self-anchoring (see Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; see also Krueger, 1998, for the more general model of egocentric social projection). In this context, the study by Epstude and Otten (2000) suggests a possibility to disentangle and analyze the direction of activation patterns as manifested in response latencies.

Self-anchoring in explicit measures of ingroup favoritism

The findings summarized in the previous section provide convincing evidence for a firm association between self evaluations, on the one hand, and ingroup evaluations, on the other hand. Implicitly, such link can already account for positive ingroup judgments, as there is much evidence (at least in western cultures) for the overall tendency to see the self as positive and ‘above average’ (e.g. Baumeister, 1998; Matlin & Stang, 1978, Taylor & Brown, 1988; Triandis, 1989). Thus, in the following more direct tests of whether assimilating self- and ingroup-definition can account for positive and positively distinct ingroup judgments will be presented.

"Overall, in-group favoritism in the minimal group paradigm is a well-established phenomenon, but the exact reasons for this favoritism remain unclear” (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996, p. 661) -- against this background Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) derived an alternative account for favoritism toward minimal ingroups. In their approach, the process of self-anchoring plays a central role. They argue that in order to give meaning to their novel social category, group members apply a similarity heuristic such that the ingroup is defined as a less extreme (that is, slightly less positive) copy of the self. In a next step, by application of an oppositeness heuristic, the outgroup is defined as different from the ingroup: “... because self and ingroup are regarded favorably, the outgroup will be regarded, by a principle of differentiation, as less favorable" (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996, p. 662).

A series of experiments supported their model; in these experiment (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; studies 1 to 3) they categorized participants according to a minimal categorization, and measured both self ratings and ratings about one of the two groups (ingroup or outgroup). Before rating the target group, judges were provided with information about scores from the respective other group (outgroup or ingroup). Accessibility of self evaluation was varied via the sequence of evaluations (self first, self last). Data indicated that a) the self-group similarity was much greater for the ingroup than for the outgroup or 'neutral' group; b) evidence for self-anchoring was stronger when self ratings preceded rather than followed the ingroup ratings and c) judgments of the outgroup as well as of 'neutral' groups, but not those of the ingroup, followed the differentiation principle.

Notwithstanding the convincing evidence, the paradigm used by Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) might not be optimal to test the assumed processes underlying ingroup favoritism in the minimal group paradigm. Whereas in the original MGP the definition of both ingroup and outgroup has to be construed, their experiment already provided information about one of the two groups. Besides, self ratings were obtained after social categorization; hence, there is the possibility that self ratings were already self ratings as a group member; in this case, there would be a confound between self ratings and self-ingroup similarity.

Following this reasoning, Otten (2000) realized a modified replication of the third experiment by Cadinu and Rothbart (1996). Participants rated both ingroup and outgroup; therefore, the sequence of group ratings (ingroup-outgroup; outgroup-ingroup) was an additional factor to the position of the self rating (before or after the group tasks). Consistent with Cadinu and Rothbart, the findings revealed strong self-ingroup similarity and a most positive ingroup evaluation when the self was rated immediately before the ingroup. Interestingly, data also showed that self-anchoring and intergroup differentiation might be independent routes towards positive ingroup distinctiveness: Whereas in the self first/ingroup-outgroup condition there was significant ingroup favoritism due to an exceptionally positive ingroup rating, in the self last/outgroup-ingroup condition significant favoritism stemmed from an rather negative outgroup judgment. In addition, partial correlation revealed that the correlation between self and ingroup was significant when controlling for outgroup evaluations, whereas the the correlation between self and outgroup decreased to virtually zero when controlling for ingroup evaluations (this result was further validated in a study by Otten and Bar-Tal, 2000).

A different demonstration of the role of self evaluations for favorable ingroup judgments was provided by Otten and Wentura (in press), who used individual multiple regression analyses. In their experiment, participants initially rated themselves on a set of 20 traits (10 positive, 10 negative; embedded in a set of filler items). Then, a minimal social categorization was established (allegedly referring to temporal changes in concentration), followed by an ‘impression formation task’. In this task the very same traits previously judged for the self were now judged with regards to the question whether they applied more to the one or the other group. Thus, somewhat similar to intergroup allocation matrices (e.g. Tajfel et al., 1971), ingroup and outgroup were judged simultaneously. Favoritism could be expressed by assigning positive traits more to the ingroup than to the outgroup and by assigning negative traits more to the outgroup than to the ingroup. Hence, valence of traits could be expected to predict whether judgments on the intergroup evaluation scale would be tending more to the ingroup or more to the outgroup pole.

In individual multiple regression analyses both self ratings and valence of traits were tested as predictors of intergroup judgments; both predictors were significant, but self ratings was the more powerful variable. In addition, there was a significant interaction between the two predictors, such that the determination of group ratings by self ratings was stronger within the domain of positively valenced as compared to negatively valenced traits. Nonetheless, self was in fact a significant predictor in both valence conditions. This finding was consistent with valence effects that were obtained with regards to overall ingroup favoritism in this study. In accordance with the typical positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination (for surveys, see Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000), favoritism – was significantly stronger on positive than on negative trait dimensions. However, in both conditions, the favorable treatment of the ingroup significant.

The study by Otten and Wentura (in press) indicates that a striving for positive ingroup distinctiveness per se does not suffice to account for ingroup favoritism towards minimal groups. As has been pointed out earlier (Reynolds, Turner & Haslam, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1999), ingroup favoritism is not indiscriminate, but relies on certain conditions (see also Brown, 2000). In this context, the results imply that the (personal) self image can be an important variable to predict those dimensions that are relevant for ingroup definition and intergroup comparison.

Krueger (1998) subsumes the self-anchoring process as described by Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) under the more general term of egocentric social projection; people tend to project own traits, attitudes and behavioral intentions onto others (e.g., Clement & Krueger, 2000; Krueger, 1998; Krueger & Clement, 1996). Krueger (1998) explicitly applied the principle of egocentric social projection to intergroup judgements: "... projection is one of the mechanisms by which a person infers characteristics of groups" (p. 221). Due to the very act of social categorization group members "have reasons to believe that ingroup members share their own response more than outgroup members do" (p. 221/222). Hence, when comparing ingroup and outgroup judgments, the process of egocentric social projection is asymmetrical (Krueger & Clement, 1996; Krueger & Zeiger, 1993; Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson & Copper, 1992). In the case of minimal groups, this process fosters intergroup differences "where none exist" (Krueger, 1998, p. 228), excluding the outgroup from the "benefits of projection" (Krueger, 1998, p. 228). In fact, the discontinuity characterizing the findings for ingroup and outgroup in nearly all experiments summarized in this chapter (Otten, 2000; Otten & Bar-Tal, 2000; Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999, 2000) is fully consistent with the assumed categorization-based asymmetry in egocentric social projection.

Self as heuristic for ingroup evaluation

In their account for ingroup favoritism in the MGP, Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) explicitly relate to heuristical information processing. The self serves as an anchor for ingroup evaluation by means of a similarity heuristic (while the outgroup is defined by means of an oppositeness heuristic; see above). In the same vein, Krueger (e.g. 1998) assumes that egocentric social projection requires few cognitive resources and is partly based on cognitive simplifications, like the neglect of base rates. In conclusion, the use of self as an anchor for ingroup judgments should vary as a function of the depth of information processing.

Some data in line with this reasoning were already as provided in a study by Forgas and Fiedler (1996; experiment 3), who manipulated mood in order to demonstrate that intergroup bias is affected by the degree of reflection underlying evaluative decisions. There is ample evidence that positive mood compared to negative mood increases the probability heuristical information processing (e.g. Clore, Schwarz & Conway, 1996). Thus, Forgas and Fiedler (1996) hypothesized that -- for minimal groups -- intergroup bias would be strongest when group members were in a positive mood state. Results confirmed this assumption; in the positive mood condition: response latencies for the intergroup evaluation task were shortest, and ingroup favoritism was strongest. In addition, data revealed that increases in favoritism coincided with increases in self-group similarity.

Otten and Bar-Tal (2000) provided a further test of the assumed link between self-anchoring, positive ingroup evaluation and heuristical information processing. Rather than manipulating information processing via mood induction, they varied two other variables, the need for cognitive structure (NCS) and the ability to achieve cognitive structure (AACS). NCS is defined as the motivation to end up with quick and firm judgments as opposed to judgmental ambiguity (e.g. Kruglanski, 1996). Shah, Kruglanski and Thomson (1998) already showed that a high need for cognitive structure supports ingroup biases. In addition, Otten and collaborators (Otten, 1997; Otten, Mummendey & Buhl, 1998) have demonstrated the mirror image of this relationship, namely decreased intergroup bias when there is a need to avoid cognitive closure (fear of invalidity). Finally, the research by Hogg and collaborators on uncertainty reduction motivation as determinant of ingroup favoritism (Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Hogg, in press; Hogg & Mullin, 1999) can be mentioned at this point. Though derived within somewhat different theoretical contexts, there is a substantial overlap between the concepts (judgmental) uncertainty and of need for cognitive closure as determinants of intergroup bias.

However, Bar-Tal and collaborators demonstrated that cognitive structuring varies not only as a function of NCS, but also as a function of the ability to achieve cognitive structure (AACS; Bar-Tal, 1994; Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin & Tabak, 1997). A series of experiments revealed a significant interaction of NCS and AACS: reliance on heuristics, like schemata or stereotypes, was strongest when both NCS and AACS were high (e.g. Bar-Tal & Guinote, 2000; Bar-Tal et al., 1997).

Based on these findings, Otten and Bar-Tal (2000) varied both NCS and AACS in order to test the assumption that the self functions as a heuristic for minimal ingroup judgments. Self evaluations were measured before (allegedly as part of an unrelated experiment), ingroup and outgroup ratings right after the minimal categorization procedure.

In line with the predictions, our analyses indicated strongest regression weights for self-ratings as predictor of ingroup ratings in the condition where the probability of heuristic processing was maximum: When participants were under time pressure (high NCS), and when they – due to a previous experience of success in a problem solving task -- were confident they had the ability to solve this evaluative task they were most willing to use the self as an anchor for ingroup evaluation. Parallel to the results of most of the studies cited above (e.g., Cadinu and Rothbart, 1996, Otten, 2000; Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999; Perdue et al., 1990; Smith & Henry, 1996; Smith et al., 1999), significant effects were found for ingroup ratings, but did not apply to outgroup judgments.

Summary and conclusions

The research program summarized above intended to identify factors which can provide a convincing alternative account for ingroup favoritism towards minimal groups. Rather than focusing on a motivation for positive social identity and positive ingroup distinctiveness, the present research mainly referred to cognitive factors. The results can roughly be summarized as follows:

1. There is evidence for a positive ingroup default from two different studies (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999). Immediately after a minimal categorization procedure, positive ingroup attitudes manifest on implicit measures. Moreover, there is preliminary evidence that this effect corresponds to explicit ingroup preference (Otten & Wentura, 1999).

2. At the same time, there are consistent findings about an overlap between the mental representations of self and ingroup (Coats et al., 2000; Smith & Henry, 1996; Smith et al., 1999). A study by Epstude and Otten (2000) extended these results and showed that when there is ambiguity about the ingroup’s standing on a certain trait dimension, judgments matching the response to self-ratings are facilitated.

3. Correspondingly, a series of studies on explicit evaluations of novel, minimal in- and ougroups indicated a strong relation between self ratings and ingroup ratings (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Otten, 2000; Otten & Wentura, in press). The very act of social categorization implies that only ingroup but not outgroup is linked to the self. Hence, only the former, but not the latter can profit from a generalization from the typically positive self image. Both explicit ingroup and outgroup judgments and correlations between self and group evaluations (Otten, 2000) are in accordance with such asymmetrical egocentric projection (Krueger, 1998; Clement & Krueger, 2000).

4. Finally, there is evidence showing that projection from self to minimal ingroup and the resulting positive (and positively distinct) ingroup image are supported by heuristic information processing (Forgas & Fiedler, 1996; Otten & Bar-Tal, 2000). When the probability of heuristic processing was highest, the link between self ratings and ingroup ratings was closest.

A great merit of the theory of social identity was to direct social psychological researchers’ attention to aspects of the relation between groups, when discussing intergroup phenomena like social discrimination. Hence, the aspect of social comparison and intergroup differentiation plays a central role in this theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; see also Brown, 2000 for a recent summary). The present research program does not intend to question the SIT approach in general. Quite modestly, it started off in order to suggest an alternative explanation for favoritism towards minimal groups. In fact, the findings raise doubts whether social comparison and intergroup differentiation are necessary elements for the emergence of ingroup favoritism in minimal intergroup settings. As Maass and Schaller (1991) already suggested, favorable ingroup judgments might be the starting point rather than the result of intergroup evaluations.

The minimal group paradigm establishes conditions that are quite unique with regards to the possible interplay between self definition and (in-)group definition. Typically, it is hard to disentangle whether similarity between self and ingroup arises from group members’ defining themselves in terms of their ingroup (self-stereotyping; see Turner et al., 1987) or from defining the ingroup in terms of their personal self (self-anchoring). However, with completely novel, arbitrary ingroups, only self-anchoring, but not self-stereotyping is available in order to give meaning to the new group membership. Hence, reference to personal identity seems necessary in order to end up with a satisfying social identity, and ingroup-favoritism – at least in novel and/or arbitrary intergroup contexts -- might be better understood as intra- (self in relation to other ingroup members) rather than as an intergroup process (ingroup in relation to the outgroup).

As figure 3 indicates, varying levels of ingroup favoritism can emerge simply as a function of how close the ingroup judgment is assimilate to the self judgment, while outgroup judgments and self ratings need not vary at all (note, that in fact none of the experiments in the present research project revealed any effects of the experimental manipulations on self ratings). This viewpoint is completely consistent with the finding that variations in ingroup favoritism towards minimal groups stem from variations in ingroup rather than in outgroup treatment (Brewer, 1979). Thus, there can be a positive ingroup without a derogated outgroup, or, as Brewer (1999) pointed out, ingroup love does not systematically relate to outgroup hate (see also Allport, 1954). In sum, the present findings might be read as further support for a primacy of the individual self in social judgment (e.g., Dunning & Hayes, 1996; L. Gaertner, Sedikides & Graetz, 1999; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1993; Simon, 1993; Simon et al., 1995). As Krueger (1998) phrased it: "... , ingroup favoritism is not only ethnocentric, but also egocentric in nature" (p. 228).

A serious limitation of the findings summarized in this chapter needs to be stated explicitly. The research program focused on implicit attitudes and on explicit evaluations, but not on intergroup allocations, which is the ‘classical’ dependent variable in experiments on minimal groups. Yamagishi, Jin and Kiyonari (1999), however, defined only biased intergroup allocations as ingroup favoritism, and subsumed biased, nonmaterialistic intergroup evaluations under the term “ingroup boasting”. Besides, Otten, Mummendey and Blanz (1995) presented evidence indicating that simple extrapolations from the domain of intergroup allocations to the domain of evaluations (or vice versa) are questionable. One might argue that the positive ingroup default as demonstrated by Otten and collaborators (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999) can also affect allocation decision. However, how can self-anchoring manifest in intergroup allocations? Possibly, self-anchoring can affect intergroup allocations by shaping group members expectations in how far their fellow group members will reciprocate ingroup-favoring behavior (see Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Hertel & Kerr, in press). Thus, the self-anchoring process would be a mediating between social categorization/ingroup identification and biased intergroup allocations.

It follows from the above reasoning that an important task for future research is a) the comparison between intergroup allocations and evaluations, and b) a test of the generalizability of certain effects from the domain of minimal groups to naturalistic intergroup settings. With regards to the latter, it is interesting to note that Forgas and Fiedler (1996) already demonstrated that for more realistic groups the effects of heuristic processing were opposite to the effects obtained for minimal groups. For the former, a higher level of reflection, for the latter, a lower level of reflection supported ingroup bias and self-ingroup similarity. At the same time, the findings by Epstude and Otten (2000) imply that self-anchoring effects are not restricted to minimal groups, but can also be demonstrated for well-established social categories.

Amongst others, an interesting challenge for further empirical work is to disentangle the processes of self-stereotyping and self-anchoring and to compare whether these two pathways to self-ingroup similarity manifest in different effects in intergroup evaluations and allocation (e.g., either in favorable ingroup or unfavorable outgroup treatment). Besides, it can be assumed that the process of ingroup definition in realistic settings is dynamic and changes over time. In order to test this assumption, longitudinal designs are necessary measuring self-anchoring (and related processes) at several time points after individuals have become member of a novel group.

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Figure Captions

Figure 1: Hypothetical variations of relative evaluative ingroup favoritism as a function of self-ingroup similarity.

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