This paper examines counterterrorist policies used against ...



Counterterrorism Against the al-Shabaab in Somalia

Newmann

2009

Counterterrorist policies used against al-Itahaad al-Islaami (AIAI), the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), and have been based in military intervention by alliances of Somali groups and outside powers. From 1996-1999, Ethiopia launched attacks inside Somalia and nearly destroyed al-Shabaab’s radical predecessor al-Itahaad al-Islaami (AIAI). In June 2006, the US supported Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism (ARPCT) fought the UIC and lost as the UIC seized Mogadishu. Ethiopia, backed by the US was successful in recapturing the capital by December 2006, and sponsored a new interim Somalia government. Since 2007, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has fought al-Shabaab, which merged from the collapse of the UIC. It has been backed by Ethiopia, Kenya, the US, and the African Union (AU). AU-sponsored troops have supported the government since 2007. The Somali government, in tandem with regional and international assistance, has prevented al-Shabaab from taking over the nation. However, these policies have failed to extinguish al-Shabaab. It remains a powerful insurgent force challenging for control of Somalia on a day-by-day basis. Two factors account for this: 1) the inability of the government to establish order and stability within the nation and 2) the inadequacy of regional and international responses.

The 1990s: As the Somali civil war raged in the 1990s, AIAI activities included terrorist attacks against Ethiopia (assisted by Eritrea, Sudan, and al-Qaeda). Ethiopia finally invaded AIAI-controlled regions several times from 1996-1999, nearly destroying it.[i] Successive regional and internationally-backed coalition governments failed to provide basic governmental services or law and order at the local level. Counterterrorism was negligible and the UIC emerged as a radical Islamist challenge to the government.[ii]

ARPCT vs. UIC: In 2006, the US sponsored a coalition of secular militias backed by local businesses, the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism (ARPCT) to fight the UIC. ARPCT lost the battle and the UIC seized power in June of 2006.[iii] Once again, outside intervention was necessary: Ethiopia, backed by the US, overthrew the UIC in December 2006.

Al-Shabaab: Today, the youth wing of the UIC, al Shabaab, has allied itself with al-Qaeda and moved to terrorism tactics.[iv] Other remnants of the UIC, including the Aweys-led Hizbul Islam, have also reconstituted their militias. Al-Qaeda-sponsored foreign fighters have joined al-Shabaab’s efforts, bringing new training and funding.[v] The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by former UIC member, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed remains barely in control of the capital. The African Union’s peacekeeping force of 8,000 soldiers, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), created in 2007, has been unable to provide stability to the government.[vi] Ethiopia’s withdrawal in January 2009 has led to increased al-Shabaab attacks and al-Shabaab control of much of southern Somalia.[vii] By May of 2009, under intense pressure from al-Shabaab and its allies, President Ahmed called for direct foreign intervention to save Somalia.[viii] Though none was forthcoming, Ethiopia moved troops to the Somali border. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton following a meeting with President Ahmed warned Eritrea to end any assistance it may be giving to Somali rebel groups.[ix]

Only strong regional and international assistance to the government of Somalia can move it out of the failed state category, and it is that failed nature of Somalia after nearly 20 years of civil war that allows Islamic radicals to gain their foothold in the nation. Without a strong central government capable of establishing order, Somalia’s counterterrorism efforts will fail. The African Union’s stance against non-intervention and Ethiopia’s reluctance to move back into Somalia means that regional assistance will be inconsistent. Since 2007 the US has launched air strikes against militants in the region,[x] but it is unclear if the Obama administration will make a larger commitment to Somalia’s counterterrorist efforts. These efforts have become synonymous with nation-building efforts. The success of the former depends on the success of the latter.

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[i] International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Islamists, pp. 7-9; and Gregory A. Pinio, The African Jihad (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2007), p. 61-70. AIAI’s relationship with AQ is examined in International Crisis Group, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa Report No. 45, May 23, 2002. Available at . Accessed August 21, 2006. Ethiopia’s policies toward Islamic fundamentalism and its counterterrorism strategy are examined in David Shinn, Ethiopia: Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism before and after September 11, Africa Notes No. 7 (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2002). Available at media/csis/pubs/anotes_0202.pdf. Accessed June 9, 2008.

[ii] Two coalition governments were established: Transitional National Government (TNG, 2000-2003) and the Transitional Federal Government October (TFG, 2004-2006). Pinio, The African Jihad, pp. 87-89; The TFG uses a parliamentary formula that divides seats equally among four major clans with half that number reserved for minor clans. International Crisis Group, Can the Somali Crisis be Contained, p. 3, and 8-9.

[iii] The struggle was also a clan-based fight: ARPCT leaders hailed from the Abgaal and Murosade subclan of the Hawiye clan, while the UIC had roots in Habir Gedir subclan of the Hawiye clan. International Crisis Group, Can the Somali Crisis be Contained, pp. 11-13.

[iv] International Crisis Group, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia, pp. 4-9.

[v] Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Comments by Secretary Clinton About Zimbabwe and Somalia,” United States Department of State, August 7, 2009. Available at: . Accessed August 17, 2009; and Associated Press, “40 Dead in Somalia Fighting, Witnesses Say,” New York Times, August 20, 2009. Available at: . Accessed August 23, 2009.

[vi] International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, Africa Report No. 146, December 23, 2008, pp. 20-21. Available at: . Accessed June 22, 2009.

[vii] Andrew Harding, Meeting Somalia's al-Shabaab, BBC News, July 3, 2009. Available at: . Accessed August 17, 2009.

[viii] BBC News, “Somali president calls emergency,” June 22, 2009. Available at: . Accessed June 22, 2009.

[ix] Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks After Meeting with President of Somalia Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed” US Department of State, August 6, 2009. Available at: . Accessed August 20, 2009.

[x] BBC News, 'Foreign fighters' die in Somalia, June 3, 2007. Available at: . Accessed June 20, 2007.

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