The Grand Strategy of the United States

The Grand Strategy of the United States

by R.D. Hooker, Jr.

INSS Strategic Monograph Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University

The Grand Strategy of the United States

R.D. Hooker, Jr.

INSS Strategic Monograph

National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. October 2014

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.

Cover: President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden meet with members of the National Security Council in the Situation Room of the White House hours before his national address, September 10, 2014 (The White House/Pete Souza)

First printing, October 2014

Contents

The Roots of American Grand Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 A Century Like No Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Ends of Grand Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The Means of Grand Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 The Ways of Grand Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 The Way Ahead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

The Grand Strategy of the United States

From the earliest days of the Republic, the outlines of an evolving American grand strategy have been evident in our foreign and domestic policy.1 Much of that history continues to inform our strategic conduct, and therefore American grand strategy rests today on traditional foundations. Despite a welter of theory and debate, grand strategy as a practical matter is remarkably consistent from decade to decade, with its means altering as technology advances and institutions evolve but its ends and ways showing marked continuity.

Grand strategy can be understood simply as the use of power to secure the state.2 Thus, it exists at a level above particular strategies intended to secure particular ends and above the use of military power alone to achieve political objectives. One way to comprehend grand strategy is to look for long-term state behavior as defined by enduring, core security interests and how the state secures and advances them over time. In a way, this means that what the state does matters more than what the state says. Grand strategy is therefore related to, but not synonymous with, National Security Strategies, National Military Strategies, Quadrennial Defense Reviews, or Defense Strategic Guidance. Grand strategy transcends the security pronouncements of political parties or individual administrations. Viewed in this light, American grand strategy shows great persistence over time, orienting on those things deemed most important--those interests for which virtually any administration will spend, legislate, threaten, or fight to defend.

The Roots of American Grand Strategy

American grand strategy cannot be understood without a historical grounding. Prior to the Revolution, the defense of the colonies as a whole was left to the British crown, and the colonial militia handled local defense. Contention between the great powers (Spain, the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain) on the North American continent bred an enduring distaste among the colonists for international intervention in the Western hemisphere. Prerevolutionary warfare was endemic and nearly constant in North America, fostering on the one hand a familiarity with conflict, but on the other a distrust of standing forces that would condition American strategic thought for several centuries.3

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